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                      UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
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                     NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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                 ALL EMPLOYEES MEETING ON "THE GREEN"
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                    PLAZA AREA BETWEEN BUILDINGS AT
                             WHITE FLINT
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                            PUBLIC MEETING
                             Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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                              White Flint North
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                              Rockville, Maryland
                             Thursday, September 3, 1998
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                              Thursday, September 3, 1998
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              The Commission met in open session, pursuant to
      notice, at 1:37 p.m., Shirley A. Jackson, Chairman,
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     presiding.
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     COMMISSIONERS PRESENT:
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              SHIRLEY A. JACKSON, Chairman of the Commission
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              NILS J. DIAZ, Commissioner
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               EDWARD McGAFFIGAN, JR., Commissioner
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                         PROCEEDINGS
                                                    [1:37 p.m.]
               MRS. NORRY: I would like to welcome everyone to
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     the all-hands meeting afternoon edition. In addition to the
     headquarters staff, we have the regions and the Technical
     Training Center, who are seeing this on video for the first
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     time. We also have audio connections with all of the
     resident sites. All of those people in addition to the
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     people here can ask questions following the remarks of
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     Chairman Jackson, Commissioner Diaz and Commissioner
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     McGaffigan.
              I would like to say that the officials from the
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     National Treasury Employees Employees Union are sitting over
      there in the second row.
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               We have a lot of questions that were submitted in
     advance, as we asked you to do. We are going to see to it
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     one way or the other that all of those questions get
     answered. If they don't get answered in today's sessions,
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     we will have some mechanism to provide answers to them.
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              I'd like to also say that, similar to last year,
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     this meeting is intended to address the new directions of
     the agency. We will not be discussing specific personnel
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     policies or practices or working conditions. We will,
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     however, have a meeting in October, which will be a joint
     labor-management partnership meeting where we will be able
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     to answer those questions, including some of the ones that
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     you submitted in advance.
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              To read the questions that you are going to submit
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      today, we have Amy Siller and Keith Everly.
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               Chairman Jackson.
               CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Thank you, Mrs. Norry.
6
              Good afternoon. With me today are my colleagues
     NRC Commissioners Nils Diaz and Edward McGaffigan, Jr. On
     behalf of my colleagues and myself, I would like to welcome
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all of you to this special meeting of the Commission with 10 the NRC staff. I welcome both those of you here in the tent 11 as well as those who are connected by videoconference or 12 13 telephonic hookup from the regions. These all employees meetings, as they are called, 14 have become an annual tradition at the NRC since 1991. They 15 are intended to stimulate and to facilitate direct 16 17 communication between the Commission and individual members 18 of the staff on mission-related policies and initiatives; to 19 clarify the Commission's agenda; to engender a shared 20 vision; and to motivate the staff in pursuit of that vision. 21 This year, as you know, the Commission actually 22 moved the date of this meeting forward because we 2.3 specifically wanted to solicit staff input during this time 24 of transition. 25 I suppose that some of you, perhaps many of you, 1 have been thinking that the time of transition has been with us for several years, and that in fact would be an accurate 2 thought, but the pace certainly has accelerated in a number of areas in recent months. 4 So let me begin by thanking all of you on behalf 5 of the Commission for your professionalism, for your hard 6 work, and for the dedication that you have exhibited under what I'm sure for many of you have been trying times. 8 As you know, the NRC has been the subject of a 9 10 number of recent external reviews both from our congressional appropriations and authorization committees. 11 12 the General Accounting Office, and other stakeholders. 13 In fact, on July 17 the Commission invited a 14 number of its stakeholders, including some of our harshest 15 critics, to engage in a round table discussion that was open to the NRC staff, the press and the public. 16 17 On July 30 the Commission testified in a hearing before the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works 18 Subcommittee on Clean Air, Wetlands, Private Property, and 19 Nuclear Safety. That's our authorization subcommittee. I 2.0 can never remember the name. 21 These interactions have provided the Commission 22 23 with beneficial insights. Although the recent feedback has 24 provided a very valuable range of perspectives on the strengths and weaknesses of NRC regulatory programs and 25 policies, these general topics also have been the focus of various Commission and staff efforts and initiatives for 2 3 sometime Some of the particular areas of focus include providing a more rapid transition to a risk-informed and 5 6 performance-based regulatory framework. Reexamining our reactor oversight processes, 8 including inspection, enforcement and performance 9 assessment, to ensure a proper safety focus, to enhance the 10 objectivity and defensibility of our methods, and to eliminate unnecessary licensee burden. 11 Ensuring that some of our frequently used 12 13 processes such as generic communications and confirmatory 14 action letters are subject to proper controls. Streamlining our licensing and adjudicatory 15 16 processes. 17 Ensuring the overall effectiveness of our organization, management and self-assessment capabilities, 18 including a reevaluation of staffing and resource needs. 19 20 A consistent thread that has run through various critiques is the need for us to be clear with our 21

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definitions, our standards, and our requirements.
23
              Now I'm sure that many of you have read various
24
      trade press articles or have heard discussions that have led
      you to ask, what does all of this mean? Where are we headed
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 1
      as an agency? What does it mean for me?
 2
               I would like to make several points in this
 3
      regard.
 4
               First, we should remember that change can be good.
 5
      Many of you may remember that when I spoke to you at an all
      employees meeting in 1996 I shared my vision, which included
 6
 7
      the need for NRC to position for change.
              In fact, we were in the process of active change
 8
      when some of the external reviews began, including
 9
      Commission initiatives such as the revisions of 10 CFR
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      50.59, the integrated review of reactor assessment
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12
      processes, the revisions to 10 CFR Part 35 and Part 70, and
      the new registration program for generally licensed devices,
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14
      as well as the changes to agency-wide planning and
15
     budgeting.
16
               These and many other initiatives had been in
17
      various states of gestation before the recent focus on the
18
     NRC, but they have not yet come to fruition. The recent
      external interests and focus have proven then to be useful
19
20
      in highlighting areas in which we need to accelerate change,
21
      as well as in revealing new areas that need additional
22
      attention. These changes will have an effect on the entire
23
      agency and will not be limited just to the reactor oversight
2.4
      program areas.
25
               Although the short-term focus is predominantly in
 1
      the reactor arena, it is important that we all understand
      that we will be assessing and changing how we do business
      throughout the NRC.
 3
              Today I would like to focus your thoughts briefly
      on the importance of what I have called holding the center.
              Let me emphasize at the outset that holding the
 6
      center does not -- I repeat -- does not mean adopting a
      defensive posture or clinging to the past. What it does
 9
      mean is not losing sight of our primary health and safety
10
      mission while enhancing our effectiveness by changing. It
11
      means continuing to stay focused on that mission as we make
12
      the transition from a traditional deterministic approach to
13
      a more risk-informed and performance-based approach to
     regulation.
14
15
               So how do we go about achieving change in a
      responsible manner? I've discussed this topic with the
16
17
      agency senior managers, and today I offer some strategies
18
      for your consideration which are drawn in part from a
      presentation made to the Commission by the Office of
19
      Research last month. What was presented was striking,
20
21
      because it seemed to indicate that the presenters got it, at
22
      least as articulated in the meeting.
               So what are these strategies?
23
24
               First, we need to be sure that we have articulated
25
      clearly and correctly our vision, our goals, and our
1
      requirements.
               We must use risk-informed thinking and techniques
      throughout the agency as a means for ensuring a proper
 3
 4
      safety focus.
               We should encourage a team concept both within and
      among offices, which means avoiding a stovepipe mentality,
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     because, after all, we all are one NRC with one mission.
               We must encourage agency-wide thinking that is at
8
      once proactive and anticipatory, that is outcomes and
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10
      results oriented, that is timely and that is cost effective.
               We should use what some call process mapping,
11
      which, simply put, means thinking about how we do things and
12
13
     the best way to do them, as a tool to establish efficient
     functional relationships and to eliminate duplication of
14
               We should build on our current strengths, which
16
17
      rest primarily with our people, but also on our programs and
18
     processes even as we change them.
19
               We must have management and staff buy-in, which is
2.0
      the reason we are all here today and why the Commission is
21
      here today.
22
               In addition to these overall high level
23
      strategies, we also should be using a series of what I have
24
     called implementing strategies. They include, for example,
25
     developing reasonable thresholds for decision-making in
1
      areas of potential high risk or safety significance.
               Conducting continual self-assessment and
2
      soliciting feedback from those we regulate and from our
 3
      other stakeholders.
               Assessing -- and this is hard to do -- whether our
5
      requirements achieve their intended purpose.
               Equally hard, sunsetting activities when they are
     no longer relevant for regulatory purposes.
8
9
               These are examples of strategies for achieving
10
      change in a manner that ensures that we are holding the
11
     center, that is, identifying and preserving our core or
12
      baseline requirements as we change to be more effective in
13
      accomplishing our fundamental mission.
14
               Let us take reactor oversight processes as an
      example. That has been an area of a high degree of recent
15
     focus. As I have discussed with NRC senior management, we
16
17
      should ask and answer the following series of questions
      which apply actually not just in reactor oversight, but more
18
     broadly.
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20
               (1) Within a risk-informed framework, what is the
21
      minimum level of inspection or assessment or licensing
     oversight that will continue to give us confidence that
22
23
     licensed facilities are being operated and maintained in a
24
25
               (2) What processes and methods must we establish
      to achieve a risk-informed baseline as effectively and
      efficiently as possible?
2
               (3) What core competencies and resources must we
3
4
     have to implement those processes?
5
               (4) What measures are necessary that will tell us
6
      when we have succeeded?
              (5) How can all of this be achieved in the most
      timely and most cost-effective manner possible.
8
               It is important that we establish this framework
10
      expediently and reasonably. To repeat, our objective is to
11
      be more effective. That's not saying that anyone has done
     anything wrong, because no one has done anything wrong, but
12
13
     our objective is to be more effective in accomplishing our
      public health and safety mission by being risk informed, by
14
15
     being performance based or results oriented, and by being
     cost effective.
16
17
              If we truly move to a program with these
      characteristics, appropriate burden reduction in fact will
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occur, burden reduction for ourselves even, but certainly
20
     burden reduction for those we regulate, because being risk
21
     informed means that there will be burden reduction in areas
22
      of low risk just as it may entail increased focus in areas
23
      we previously may have underemphasized. In the end, we will
24
     impose no more but no less than what is required.
25
               Before I close, I would like to offer all of you a
1
      few watchwords of which to be mindful as we continue to
      improve, the three C's -- confidence, courage and
3
      conviction.
               We need to be confident that our new inspection,
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assessment and enforcement programs provide objective criteria and consistent methodologies for providing reasonable assurance of public health and safety, and that they accomplish what they are designed to accomplish. We can achieve these goals through being risk informed, by obtaining input from all of our stakeholders, and by

11 rigorously challenging the expected outcomes and potential

12 weaknesses of all of the options that we consider.

We need to have the courage and the discipline to implement fully and consistently our new programs as they are developed and formally adopted. We need to build an assessment function into each of the programs and processes to allow early self-identification of performance results that are not consistent with effective public health and safety regulation. We need to self-initiate course corrections to our programs based on our own self-assessments as well as external inputs before our various stakeholders feel compelled to attempt to force a change on us with the attendant potential for overreaction.

23 change on us with the attendant potential for overreaction.
24 We are the foremost nuclear regulatory body in the

world. We should be leading change in response to a

changing external environment, and because we have new tools
and new approaches to allow us to better define safety, to
better articulate it, and to implement our programs in new
ways.

We have to have the conviction and the objective evidence to argue the merits of our programs and policies when challenged. We will be much more effective at resisting the pendulum effect and therefore in maintaining regulatory stability if we are willing to change ourselves, and in changing, to defend the soundness and the effectiveness of our programs as they evolve.

I believe I can speak for my colleagues when I say that the Commission encourages the staff to communicate directly with us when you have concerns. The Commission's open door policy is always there. I would encourage you to use that avenue if you have a public health and safety issue to which you feel NRC management or the agency as a whole is not properly responding. And more broadly, as we are making these changes in our various programs and in our whole approach, the Commission is open to your suggestions for improvement.

In closing, I would like to disabuse you of the view that some may have that we are jumping off the bridge in reaction to criticism from the Congress or from other stakeholders. We are doing what we need to do. We are

finishing what we started.

The changes we make will be made because they are
the right things to do, all predicated on safety first and

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foremost, but we will be smarter and better at how we carry
      out our mission. We should be excited -- I fact I'm excited
5
      -- and energized in our belief that these changes will allow
      us to have an even better safety focus, to be clearer in our
     expectations for our licensees and for ourselves, to reduce
8
      burden where it is appropriate to do so, to be responsive to
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10
      all of our stakeholders in a responsible way.
11
               In its criticism the Congress has provided us with
12
      a platform to accelerate our movement in a direction we know
13
      we must go, a direction we ourselves had decided we needed
14
               We talk a lot and you'll hear more talk today
15
      about risk and risk assessment. But there is a different
16
     kind of risk we must assume. Drawing on the watchwords that
17
18
      I mentioned, I ask you to keep the following in mind about
     risk. This is a quote given to me by a member of my staff.
19
20
              You cannot discover new oceans unless you have
21
      courage to lose sight of the shore.
22
               So I ask you, please help us stay focused on
23
      safety, have confidence, work hard, remain committed,
24
      maintain your conviction, and above all, have the courage to
25
      change.
1
               That concludes my preliminary remarks, but before
      taking questions. I am going to call upon my colleagues
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      Commissioner Diaz, and following him Commissioner
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4
      McGaffigan, to share some of their insights and thoughts
      with you
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 6
               Commissioner Diaz.
               COMMISSIONER DIAZ: Thank you, Chairman Jackson,
      and good afternoon. First, I would like to preempt any
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      thoughts you might have and I'm going to come right out and
     say that I agree with the direction, the trends and the
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11
      policies that Chairman Jackson outlined this afternoon. I
      think it is very important to realize that the Commission
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13
     has actually been working in establishing this framework and
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      we are in it together.
              I think it's important as we start these processes
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     to realize the different kinds of fears and anxieties that
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17
     everybody has. I know that the staff has more anxieties
     that have been created by the oversight committees or by
18
     GAO. They in fact are probably a major source of your
19
20
      anxieties, and that's probably all right. We want to make
21
      sure you know that we know that, that we are working to try
      to work together to make the anxiety level risk informed.
22
23
               [Laughter.]
24
               COMMISSIONER DIAZ: And to have some
     proportionality to outcomes, and we are very conscious of
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1
      all the things that you do with it.
2
               It is kind of hard to repeat yourself, because I
     look to put thoughts and not read them. I think it's
3
      important to realize that there is one thing that we have to
      be concerned with, one thing we have to fear, and that is
 5
      the fear to change. That is something that becomes natural,
      but in this case it is not reasonable and not healthy.
8
               We know that we can change. It is not something
     that just came out in the last two months. We know that we
9
10
     have learned enormously in the last few years. We know we
     have been developing the tools. We know we have the
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12
      expertise. We know it can be done. Sometimes what is
      missing is a little bit of an incentive. I think that a lot
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14
     of the incentive you might think had been external to the
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Commission.

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I think that is true, but also there has been a
17
      lot of internal discussion and a lot of thought and a lot of
18
      work among the Commissioners to come up to what the Chairman
      has stated as what I will call a road map of policies and
19
      directions that actually fits where the agency should be
20
21
22
               I've used the words "risk informed." This morning
23
      I wasn't prepared to even mention why I use the words
24
      frequently. I use this with my staff. There are many times
25
      in an assembly or a factory where there are many big wheels
 1
      and they take the attention; they make the noise; they are
     big gears. But there are some little gears that you
      introduce in the assembly that regulate the speed and
 3
      transmit the force from one place to another.
               I firmly believe that risk information is such a
      gear. It is one that will actually help us do regulation
 6
      better, with less burden, and will eliminate the
 7
      inconsistencies that presently exist. You might look at it
      as an extra gear. It is not. It is a natural gear. It's a
 9
      component of what we do, and think of it in mathematical
10
      terms. Think of it as what you want to do when you want to
11
12
      regulate. You want to regulate safety and health, you want
      to have an independent variable that is directly
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14
      proportional to what you are regulating, and in our case
15
      that is risk. By assessing risk, using risk, implementing
      risk assessment, we are actually directly going to perform
17
      our function better.
18
               I believe that we can do this. Probably I'm an
19
      optimist. I have now spent two years with many of you,
20
      sometimes in the open, sometimes in brainstorming, in
      strange hours of the night. I am convinced that we know how
21
22
      to do what we have set up in front of us. I think the
      commitment to do it is what becomes the bottom line.
23
24
             I have a comment on the issue of openness. It
25
      just happens that this issue has been worrying me, and I
      thought I would just throw it out right here.
               Last week I was on an elevator. A member of the
      staff, I would say middle level, said hello. I said hello.
 3
 4
      And I said, I haven't seen you in a long time.
 5
               He said, it is verboten.
 6
               I said, what do you mean by that?
               He said, it is verboten for me to come and see
8
     you.
9
               And I said, I do not understand what that means.
      Not in this society, not in this agency.
10
11
               It is not verboten to come to see a Commissioner.
12
      I think the Chairman was very emphatic on that point. That
      is an issue that should be laid to rest. There is no way
13
      that anybody will be looked at in a bad light because you
14
15
      come to see a Commissioner.
16
              The other thing is not true. Sometimes a
17
      Commissioner has more difficulty in going to see the staff.
18
      I do understand there are management directives and things
      that come into play so that things will be done in a proper
19
20
      wav.
21
               I think sometimes the ability to come and sit down
22
      and talk is very opportune. I am not a very disciplined
      person. So occasionally I intend to tackle these structures
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24
      and show up someplace, and if somebody says you need to go
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and check a line, I won't do it.

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[Laughter.]
               COMMISSIONER DIAZ: I made a comment this morning
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      that we always are asking our licensees, do you have a
 4
      questioning attitude? I always get bothered by the term
      because I still don't know what means. But the bottom line
 5
      is that it is obvious to everybody that the staff has a good
      questioning attitude, and if they don't have it, they should
      be developing it, because it is right with the times. The
 8
      Commission has a good questioning attitude. I think there
      is no doubt that we question a lot.
10
11
               I think that parallel to the idea of questioning
      and addressing processes is the idea of solutions. This is
12
      where I think we need to put them together. We need to put
13
      a solution track parallel to our ability to analyze, to
14
15
      create technical arguments. It is how we arrive at
      solutions and how we implement it.
16
17
              I would like to conclude by saying that I am
18
      committed to work with my fellow Commissioners and with
19
      every one of you to make this agency better.
20
               Thank you.
21
               COMMISSIONER McGAFFIGAN: The Chairman asked me to
      talk a little bit about the congressional environment in
22
23
      which the agency finds itself and the future of
24
      congressional interactions between the agency and the
     Congress.
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               What I said this morning, and like Commissioner
     Diaz, I will not exactly repeat it, the congressional
 2
      attention is not going to go away. There is a 15-year
 3
      period where we have not had an authorization bill. I would
 5
      predict that next year we will get an authorization bill.
      Certainly in the next Congress we will get an authorization
      bill. I regard that as an opportunity.
 8
               As I said this morning, there are some
      long-festering issues that, because the Atomic Energy Act
 9
     never gets amended to fix them, we sort of try to live with
10
      within our regulatory framework. We have very good lawyers
11
      who try to square circles for us, but the best way to deal
12
      with some of these issues that have been long festering is
13
14
      to straightforwardly say how we would amend the law in
15
      various places.
16
               I won't get out ahead of the Commission, but in
17
      areas such as antitrust reviews it's absolutely clear that
      the Commission does not think there is a lot of value added
      compared to all the other folks who are already involved in
19
20
      antitrust and have a real specialty there. There are other
21
     places as well.
              The Congress, as I said this morning, is 535
22
23
      individuals, but a single individual can make a large
24
      difference. I think Senator Domenici has made a large
25
     difference in our life. He's a very tenacious Senator. I
     know him fairly well.
 1
               His staff is very, very capable, among the most
 2
      capable in the Congress, and they are going to continue to
      ask hard questions. They will have the questioning attitude
 4
      that Commissioner Diaz and the Chairman have talked about.
 5
               We are going to have to come up with answers to
      the questions. I think some of the questions are very fair
      of us. I'll make a transition to another part of my remarks
 8
      this morning. I think it is very fair to ask us about the
     timeliness of our processes.
10
11
              Two years ago when I first appeared before you,
      having been here all of two months and spoken to what I
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refer to as the 40 wise people who I had interviewed for my
      TA positions, it already had struck me that the time
14
15
      constants of this agency are not compatible with the time
      constants of an industry undergoing restructuring and
17
      getting into a competitive environment.
18
               The old model was ponderous utility dealing with
19
      ponderous state utility commission dealing with ponderous
      Nuclear Regulatory Commission. That model is not going to
2.0
21
      be adequate in the 21st century, and it's under obvious
22
      stress today.
2.3
               At the moment we do extraordinary things to try to
24
      keep some of our most important processes timely.
25
              I see some of the people in the audience in dry
      cask storage. Mr. Kane is trying to do extraordinary things
      to get some dual purpose canisters certified.
 2
 3
               Sam Collins did extraordinary things -- I
      mentioned the top, but it is all the staff under them -- in
      getting AP600 across the finish line.
               Yesterday at the Commission meeting we heard that
 6
      Gary Holahan and Ashok Thadani are going to be doing
 7
 8
      extraordinary things to try to keep risk-informed licensing
 9
      actions on track.
10
               In license renewal we have some extraordinary
11
      processes set up to try to meet the 585 day time line, which
12
      we darn well better meet, to get the safety evaluation
13
      report and the environmental impact statements for Oconee
      and Calvert Cliffs completed.
14
15
               Improved standard tech spec conversions. Last
16
     year, an issue having been brought to our attention that we
17
     were being untimely, we provided some additional resources
18
      to the staff early in the fiscal year so that we could get
19
      back on track on improved standard tech spec conversions.
               The task is trying to make the extraordinary the
20
21
      ordinary for this agency. We have to find a way to make
22
      decisions reasonably promptly. I think we can.
              I've been in government, like most of you,
23
24
      essentially all my life. Since May of 1976 I've served
25
      continuously in government.
 1
               When I worked in the Congress for Senator Bingaman
 2
      we had to make certain schedules. If you weren't ready, you
      missed your opportunity. At the start of the year we talked
 3
 4
      about what it was that we were going to try to accomplish in
 5
      that year's defense authorization bill. We had lists like
 6
      the lists that Mr. Callan has submitted to the Commission.
      We would go through the hearing process and come May we
      would make judgments as to which of those things we could
 9
      get done and which we couldn't in the markup. We might save
      some for the floor, and then we would try to get things
10
11
      through conference.
12
               Senator Bingaman's expectation of me was that for
13
      a lot of this New Mexico stuff I better be batting close to
      a thousand. And for some of the extraordinary stuff, trying
14
15
      to restructure the strategic defense initiative program and
16
      break it down into its component parts, getting a good
      debate going was regarded as a sufficient outcome. And on
17
18
      some we just wouldn't make it; we would not get it done.
19
              I think you get to a good first order judgment
      fairly quickly, and maybe at times it's worth getting to the
20
21
      second order term in the equation. I think that arguing
22
      endlessly doesn't serve the agency well. We do have that
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23

reputation.

24 Since this morning, one of my staff has called my 25 attention to a letter to the Chairman from Mr. Colvin. We

23

1 $\,$ are getting a lot of help these days. It is dated August

28. He is sort of is trying to add to our tasking several

items, one of which is his rulemaking petition submitted in

1995 on quality assurance flexibility, 50.54(a), I believe

5 it is. "Why haven't I gotten an answer on that?"

2

22

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I know from reading staff documents carefully that
the rulemaking activity plan had told us we were planning to
deny that a year ago, and now we are planning to grant it in
part, and we are going to get a paper fairly soon.

10 We really don't need to argue for three years
11 about what the position is. We've got to find a way to make
12 these decisions, at least to first order, fairly quickly,
13 and the have a dialogue and get on with it.

I think that is the big challenge. I think the
big challenge is finding a way to make good, sound
regulatory decisions on a more prompt basis. It is a
challenge that other regulatory agencies, health and safety
agencies also face. The Food and Drug Administration has to
make extraordinarily complex decisions. Yesterday it was

20 tamoxifen. Last time I had to address a public meeting it 21 was the use of thalidomide for leprosy.

These are not easy choices, and yet they make them

23 with the help of advisory committees and using their best 24 judgment, and they make them under pressure from Congress.

25 When I was in Congress I did not cover FDA issues, but there

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was a lot of pressure from Congress to make prompter
decisions in the food and drug area. FDA has met that
that

The good news for you all is if we meet the

challenge, I think we will get some budget stability. That

does not mean that we will in every instance agree with the

Nuclear Energy Institute or with UCS or with any

stakeholder, but if we can just make a good faith effort at

getting our processes to work more rapidly, making good

decisions, making them more risk informed, as both the

Chairman and Commissioner Diaz have talked about. I think

Chairman and Commissioner Diaz have talked about, I think you can then get some stability back into our budget.

I hope all of you are following the documents very
closely. Commissioner Diaz talked about openness. Mr.
Callan's memo of August 25, COMSECY-98-024, is out there.
It's there for you to read; it's there for other
stakeholders to read. This Commission is increasingly going
toward putting documents that we are voting on out there for
people to see, what it is that we are voting on: 50.59; the

people to see, what it is that we are voting on: 50.59; the
Part 70 rulemaking. It is an increasing trend, so that you
do know what decisions are before us. Not only the external
stakeholders, but they are available for you as well.

23 So why don't I leave it at that and look forward $\ensuremath{\mathtt{24}}$ to the questions.

CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Thank you.

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We did ask for and receive questions sent to the Commission ahead of time, but we especially want to hear from those of you who have taken the time to come to talk with us. So we are happy to take any questions and we will try to answer any and all of them as straightforwardly as we can. So why don't we begin.

7 Is there a question from the audience?
8 QUESTION: This is a question from Region IV. I
9 would like to know if any of the Commissioners have ideas

regarding what NRC employees can do to help the American 11 public understand the value of our agency. With the current 12 budget trends, I am concerned that we will be less able to 13 address moderately important safety issues or proactively implement long-term safety improvements for high 14 15 consequence, low probability issues. 16 Is there anything that the NRC employees can do to better communicate the impact of the budget cuts to the 17 18 American public so that they will encourage their 19 congressmen to more carefully consider this issue? CHAIRMAN JACKSON: I think the appropriate focus 2.0 21 in terms of our communication with the public is on what our 22 health and safety mission really is, not in the context of talking about the money, but within the context of what our 23 role really is. I think all of the things that all of us 24 have spoken to you about are part of in fact sending that 25 1 2 It has to do with being clear on what our 3 standards and requirements are, being clear on how we have assessed the risk and risk significance of various activities among those we regulate, making a judgment that 6 we can defend, being clear in our requirements related to those judgments relative to our licensees, and making people 8 understand how we go about reaching our decisions. 9 A second way is for us to be, as Commissioner 10 McGaffigan says, less ponderous about how we do our business, to get on with it. There are rulemakings that 11 12 I've come to find out began seven years ago, and somehow we 13 never reached a resolution on them. They kind of died on 14 the vine, and then the whole context changes as to why these 15 rulemakings may have been relevant in the first place. 16 We hear the phraseology "justice delayed is justice denied." Well, a decision delayed is a decision 17 18 denied. When we do that kind of thing -- it may not seem to 19 be answering this question -- we lose the thread of why we were doing something in the first place. 20 That is all part of communication. So if people 21 22 don't understand on a continuing basis why you are doing 23 what you do, what your standards are, understand that you 24 get things done, you can communicate all of these things 25 clearly, then it is very difficult to come around if one 1 feels under duress and look for saviors. We can't operate that way. We need to be clear on 3 what our own baselines are. Then we have a responsibility and I have a responsibility as the Chairman to communicate that clearly, not just to the public, but to our various stakeholders, including the Congress. That is what we in fact intend to do, but it has to be predicated on our being clear on what we need to do and being about the business of 9 doing it. 10 Commissioner Diaz. COMMISSIONER DIAZ: I kind of see two parts of the 11 12 question. I think the first part could be interpreted very 13 broad in the sense of how we do our public communications better. I think this is something that we all need to be 14 15 very conscious about. I think the Commission spent a year 16 looking at that issue. It can work at any level in the 17 Commission. 18 The issue of communicating externally to the 19 Congress, I think that we have good channels to do that. 20 However, there was another part of the question

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that implied that we might be in a certain way impacting on
     what I have been calling the health and safety envelope. I
22
      don't think that is correct.
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               I think the Commission stands ready to defend what
     our mission is in maintaining and protecting the health and
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      safety envelope. We are not talking of reducing or cutting
      or impacting on the health and safety envelope. We are just
      saying that we can do things more efficiently while
      maintaining that health and safety envelope.
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               CHAIRMAN JACKSON: We sharpen our focus in doing
      it. I agree with the Commissioner.
               Commissioner McGaffigan.
               COMMISSIONER McGAFFIGAN: I will try to answer the
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      question. An individual employee of the Commission in a
     region trying to affect congressional process that happens
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      over a very brief period is darn close to impossible.
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               The Commission and the National Treasury Employees
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     Union, putting in a plug, did a very good job when
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      confronted with the $70 million cut earlier this year in
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      communicating rapidly when we thought the safety envelope
     was indeed threatened and making clear what the implications
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     of a cut of that magnitude that rapidly was for the agency.
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              I think that you sort of have to rely on the
     Commission and others who are right here in Washington
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      watching the process as it involves in the Congress -- and
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     hopefully we will not face a surprise cut of that magnitude
     again -- to represent you.
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               I do agree with Commissioner Diaz and the Chairman
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     that we really aren't talking at the moment about this $16
25
     million cut that we have facing us; $17 million if you
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      include the pay raise.
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               As best we can tell we are not affecting the
      health and safety envelope. It is going to be stressing; it
      is going to require changes, as both the Chairman and
     Commissioner Diaz have talked about change, but we think it
      can be accommodated by improving our processes and by
      stopping doing some things. As I said this morning, we are
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      going to do less inspection and probably less assessment and
      a few other things that we are working through in the budget
10
     process at the current time.
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               CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Another question.
               MS. FRATTALI: I am Sandra Frattali. I am an NTEU
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      steward, but I am speaking now as a former member of
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      Research. Currently I'm a member of NRR, but most of what I
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     am going to say is based on my experience in the Office of
      Research. It has to do with the emphasis on risk based. As
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      far as I can tell, I thought we were sort of doing this all
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      along. I don't remember ever not considering any of this in
      any rulemaking I've ever done.
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              I would also like to ask a question of our
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     perception of what is risk and what we can document and what
      we study and what the public will see as risk and what the
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      Congress persons will see as risk. Many years ago we put
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     out rulemakings that were definitely important and lowered
      the risk on the public, and people said, well, we don't have
2.5
      to justify this to the public. We know we are right; we
     know we are doing this for the health and safety of the
2
      public; we don't have to justify it. Now we are talking
      risk, and we are saying, well, we're not going to do this
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How do we get this risk-based,

because the risk is low.

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performance-oriented concept over to the public so that they 8 understand that we are doing our jobs? To some extent it goes along with the previous 9 10 question and the answers to the previous question. I'd also like to make a quick remark about the 11 12 length of time that things take in this agency. My 13 experience has frequently been hurry up and get this done, and I've watched staff break their necks to get something in 14 15 only to have it sit around, not necessarily because it was 16 ignored, but because there was another fire that was a more 17 important fire that had to be put out, and somehow or other the balance was never maintained. These are things, I don't 18 19 know that they will ever be solved, but I would not like to see them lost in the shuffle. 20 How does the agency function, I guess is my 21 22 question, under these constraints? 23 CHAIRMAN JACKSON: I'm glad you asked those two. I take them as two questions, one direct and one implied. 24 25 First of all, I think it is fair to say that 1 obviously the agency has considered risk. That undergirds 2 whatever activity, rulemaking, et cetera, the agency 3 undertakes What we are really talking about is having a shift 4 5 in the mind-set in terms of systematically recognizing and making use of available risk assessment methodologies and tools to quantify risk in a more refined way than we have done heretofore, to evaluate relative risk in a more defined 8 9 and coherent way, to organize work within the agency that 10 way, to have that at the basis of rulemakings we do, to have 11 it at the basis of how we inspect, how we enforce, and how 12 we assess over a longer term, and to have all of these 13 things aligned the same way. Not to have this being done this way and this being done that way and that being done 14 15 that way and that being done that way. That is at once both 16 a method to be clear about what risk-informed -- not riskbased -- regulation means, to be systematic about it, and to 17 provide a built-in mechanism to prioritize what one does, 18 19 and to have a built-in mechanism to have coherence and 20 synchronization of agency programs. 21 But let me go on, if I may. You talked about the 22 length of time and people hurry up and wait because there is another fire to put out. The other part of what we are 23 24 talking about and where we have invested a lot of time where 25 there was some initial resistance is in developing a coherent and overall framework for planning that involves an 1 ability to prioritize, to organize the work. 2 Not everybody is going to be able to see this, but here we are. We can think of ourselves as NRC. We are this mass. We have a bunch of activities that we do. So at any 6 given time there are any number of tasks that people have to do. In comes some new, emergent issue, and everything jiggles around the shape and goes somewhere. 8 But lately, here comes something called planning. 9 10 So the initial response is, oh, oh, I had four tasks. Now I have a fifth. It's called planning. I have this fifth task 11 12 called planning. But in fact it better not be. It is how 13 you organize the work in the first place. It is how you go about prioritizing what you do, 14 15 folding in, even planning our own work, not just at the basis of a regulation; a risk-informed approach to learn how 16 to really organize and develop plans for getting the work 17

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done so that if in fact there is an emergent issue -- you
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      can call it a fire -- it is not destroying the whole
19
      framework and fabric of what you are doing.
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               That is how you address that, but it requires an
     investment and an understanding that there are tools for
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23
      doing it and that you have to commit to learning them and
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      making use of them, and I believe those two things in fact
25
      address being systematic about using risk assessment
      methodologies and really meaning and appreciating and
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      believing what it means to have a coherent planning and
      budgeting process.
               That is how you deal with this, and to have this
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      synchronization and alignment of what we do here, and you
      don't have the stovepiping and you don't have, "well, I'm
      doing my project on X" and "I'm doing my project on X" and
 8
      "I'm doing my project on {\tt X,"} and never the twain shall meet.
               But it also means doing things from the simple to
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      the profound. When we are talking about making a transition
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      in terms of the systematic use of risk assessment
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      methodologies, and even some of the planning, it is
      profound. But there are some simpler things, things that I
13
      think all of us know about and have discovered.
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               I will give you two examples. One of my favorites
      was the business process reengineering effort that had
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17
      started when I got here. There was a lot going on and it
18
      was very focused on acquiring technology software. For a
19
      while it scrambled around and spent some money.
20
               There was a focus on trying to do a pilot and
21
      getting certain fundamental answers, and in the end there
22
      was a particular class of materials licenses that were being
23
      looked at and how long it took to get the reviews done, and
      the reviews went as part of the BPR from being 18 days to
24
2.5
      less than a day. But I never forget being totally struck by
      the fact that the 18 days to one day essentially was due to
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      just consolidating the guidance that people used, and the
      one day to the half a day or less than a day had to do with
      the deployment of and use of the information technology.
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               That's not to say it wasn't a lot of effort to do
      it, but it is simple in the sense of it being the right
      thing to do.
               Another is where you have regulations here and
 9
      branch technical positions there and generic letters there
      and they all kind of cover some part of the waterfront, but
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11
      they may not even agree with each other. You all know where
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      that is more than I do; you know where that is more than my
      colleagues do.
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14
               There are any number of those things that are
15
     built in that can save us time and at the same time make
      sure we don't lose our safety focus. We need to be trying
16
17
      to be more solutions oriented and being about getting those
18
     kinds of things done.
               That's aside from any litany or list of specific
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      tasks that the Commission may ask or approve for the staff
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      to do. These are just the most straightforward things that
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      you are empowered to help us get done.
23
               Thank you for asking the question.
24
               Commissioner Diaz.
               COMMISSIONER DIAZ: I think the question has two
2.5
      parts. I'm going to hate what I am going to do right now,
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     but I'd like to tell you that I fully agree with what
      Chairman Jackson said.
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4	[Laughter.]
5	CHAIRMAN JACKSON: You love it. Thank you.
6	COMMISSIONER DIAZ: I think that was a very good,
7	clear description of what the role of risk information is.
8	So that it won't become a habit for me to agree
9	with Chairman Jackson, I will not make any comments on the
	-
10	second question.
11	[Laughter.]
12	CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Thank you very much,
13	Commissioner.
14	COMMISSIONER McGAFFIGAN: I'll agree with the
15	Chairman. I agree with everything she said about
16	timeliness. I think on the risk side, the one that has
17	bothered me, and I've said it before, is with the backfit
18	rule there and with an industry deregulating and trying to
19	save money. We get this message all the time in these staff
20	workshops: we are only going to make risk informed work and
21	have it be coherent if industry wants to do it on a
22	voluntary basis.
23	The backfit rule does provide very powerful
24	protections to the industry. We are not going to be able to
25	make them all get quality PRAs.
	36
1	If parts of the industry want to live within the
2	prescriptive, deterministic set of rules we have at the
3	moment and have had historically, I think they will have
4	sufficient protection by the backfit rule, unless we waive
5	it, to stay there.
6	So there is a little bit of incoherence that will
7	come in all likelihood from pursuing risk information.
8	Should that stop us from doing it? No. But we just have to
9	be realistic that we may well have parallel processes, and
10	we have to make the risk-informed process attractive.
11	I think the great success story we cite in all
12	letters to the Congress about risk-informed,
13	
	performance-pased regulation is uption B to Appendix J of
	performance-based regulation is Option B to Appendix J of
14	Part 50 on containment leak testing. It was voluntary.
14 15	Part 50 on containment leak testing. It was voluntary. They all can stay under Option A.
14 15 16	Part 50 on containment leak testing. It was voluntary. They all can stay under Option A. I actually once read Option A, and I couldn't
14 15 16 17	Part 50 on containment leak testing. It was voluntary. They all can stay under Option A. I actually once read Option A, and I couldn't understand why anybody would want to stay under it, but we
14 15 16 17	Part 50 on containment leak testing. It was voluntary. They all can stay under Option A. I actually once read Option A, and I couldn't understand why anybody would want to stay under it, but we left it on the books and it was a voluntary initiative
14 15 16 17	Part 50 on containment leak testing. It was voluntary. They all can stay under Option A. I actually once read Option A, and I couldn't understand why anybody would want to stay under it, but we left it on the books and it was a voluntary initiative because that's what backfit required. But that was so
14 15 16 17	Part 50 on containment leak testing. It was voluntary. They all can stay under Option A. I actually once read Option A, and I couldn't understand why anybody would want to stay under it, but we left it on the books and it was a voluntary initiative
14 15 16 17 18	Part 50 on containment leak testing. It was voluntary. They all can stay under Option A. I actually once read Option A, and I couldn't understand why anybody would want to stay under it, but we left it on the books and it was a voluntary initiative because that's what backfit required. But that was so
14 15 16 17 18 19	Part 50 on containment leak testing. It was voluntary. They all can stay under Option A. I actually once read Option A, and I couldn't understand why anybody would want to stay under it, but we left it on the books and it was a voluntary initiative because that's what backfit required. But that was so attractive, I imagine that the 103 plants still operating
14 15 16 17 18 19 20	Part 50 on containment leak testing. It was voluntary. They all can stay under Option A. I actually once read Option A, and I couldn't understand why anybody would want to stay under it, but we left it on the books and it was a voluntary initiative because that's what backfit required. But that was so attractive, I imagine that the 103 plants still operating I hope all 103, but certainly 100 are under Option B at
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	Part 50 on containment leak testing. It was voluntary. They all can stay under Option A. I actually once read Option A, and I couldn't understand why anybody would want to stay under it, but we left it on the books and it was a voluntary initiative because that's what backfit required. But that was so attractive, I imagine that the 103 plants still operating I hope all 103, but certainly 100 are under Option B at the current time.
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	Part 50 on containment leak testing. It was voluntary. They all can stay under Option A. I actually once read Option A, and I couldn't understand why anybody would want to stay under it, but we left it on the books and it was a voluntary initiative because that's what backfit required. But that was so attractive, I imagine that the 103 plants still operating I hope all 103, but certainly 100 are under Option B at the current time. The challenge as we go forward in a risk-informed
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	Part 50 on containment leak testing. It was voluntary. They all can stay under Option A. I actually once read Option A, and I couldn't understand why anybody would want to stay under it, but we left it on the books and it was a voluntary initiative because that's what backfit required. But that was so attractive, I imagine that the 103 plants still operating I hope all 103, but certainly 100 are under Option B at the current time. The challenge as we go forward in a risk-informed framework and making Part 50 risk informed is to make that
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	Part 50 on containment leak testing. It was voluntary. They all can stay under Option A. I actually once read Option A, and I couldn't understand why anybody would want to stay under it, but we left it on the books and it was a voluntary initiative because that's what backfit required. But that was so attractive, I imagine that the 103 plants still operating I hope all 103, but certainly 100 are under Option B at the current time. The challenge as we go forward in a risk-informed framework and making Part 50 risk informed is to make that an attractive option.
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25	Part 50 on containment leak testing. It was voluntary. They all can stay under Option A. I actually once read Option A, and I couldn't understand why anybody would want to stay under it, but we left it on the books and it was a voluntary initiative because that's what backfit required. But that was so attractive, I imagine that the 103 plants still operating I hope all 103, but certainly 100 are under Option B at the current time. The challenge as we go forward in a risk-informed framework and making Part 50 risk informed is to make that an attractive option. 37 We had a Commission briefing yesterday led by
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25	Part 50 on containment leak testing. It was voluntary. They all can stay under Option A. I actually once read Option A, and I couldn't understand why anybody would want to stay under it, but we left it on the books and it was a voluntary initiative because that's what backfit required. But that was so attractive, I imagine that the 103 plants still operating I hope all 103, but certainly 100 are under Option B at the current time. The challenge as we go forward in a risk-informed framework and making Part 50 risk informed is to make that an attractive option. 37 We had a Commission briefing yesterday led by Mr. Thadani where the staff straightforwardly and honestly
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25	Part 50 on containment leak testing. It was voluntary. They all can stay under Option A. I actually once read Option A, and I couldn't understand why anybody would want to stay under it, but we left it on the books and it was a voluntary initiative because that's what backfit required. But that was so attractive, I imagine that the 103 plants still operating I hope all 103, but certainly 100 are under Option B at the current time. The challenge as we go forward in a risk-informed framework and making Part 50 risk informed is to make that an attractive option. 37 We had a Commission briefing yesterday led by Mr. Thadani where the staff straightforwardly and honestly acknowledged the criticism that we have at the moment, that
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25	Part 50 on containment leak testing. It was voluntary. They all can stay under Option A. I actually once read Option A, and I couldn't understand why anybody would want to stay under it, but we left it on the books and it was a voluntary initiative because that's what backfit required. But that was so attractive, I imagine that the 103 plants still operating I hope all 103, but certainly 100 are under Option B at the current time. The challenge as we go forward in a risk-informed framework and making Part 50 risk informed is to make that an attractive option. 37 We had a Commission briefing yesterday led by Mr. Thadani where the staff straightforwardly and honestly acknowledged the criticism that we have at the moment, that the way we have gone about risk informing our reactor
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25	Part 50 on containment leak testing. It was voluntary. They all can stay under Option A. I actually once read Option A, and I couldn't understand why anybody would want to stay under it, but we left it on the books and it was a voluntary initiative because that's what backfit required. But that was so attractive, I imagine that the 103 plants still operating I hope all 103, but certainly 100 are under Option B at the current time. The challenge as we go forward in a risk-informed framework and making Part 50 risk informed is to make that an attractive option. 37 We had a Commission briefing yesterday led by Mr. Thadani where the staff straightforwardly and honestly acknowledged the criticism that we have at the moment, that the way we have gone about risk informing our reactor regulations has been uneven thus far and has met criticism,
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25	Part 50 on containment leak testing. It was voluntary. They all can stay under Option A. I actually once read Option A, and I couldn't understand why anybody would want to stay under it, but we left it on the books and it was a voluntary initiative because that's what backfit required. But that was so attractive, I imagine that the 103 plants still operating I hope all 103, but certainly 100 are under Option B at the current time. The challenge as we go forward in a risk-informed framework and making Part 50 risk informed is to make that an attractive option. 37 We had a Commission briefing yesterday led by Mr. Thadani where the staff straightforwardly and honestly acknowledged the criticism that we have at the moment, that the way we have gone about risk informing our reactor regulations has been uneven thus far and has met criticism, and the staff has some ideas as to how to resolve the
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25	Part 50 on containment leak testing. It was voluntary. They all can stay under Option A. I actually once read Option A, and I couldn't understand why anybody would want to stay under it, but we left it on the books and it was a voluntary initiative because that's what backfit required. But that was so attractive, I imagine that the 103 plants still operating I hope all 103, but certainly 100 are under Option B at the current time. The challenge as we go forward in a risk-informed framework and making Part 50 risk informed is to make that an attractive option. 37 We had a Commission briefing yesterday led by Mr. Thadani where the staff straightforwardly and honestly acknowledged the criticism that we have at the moment, that the way we have gone about risk informing our reactor regulations has been uneven thus far and has met criticism, and the staff has some ideas as to how to resolve the problems that have come forward. That is just a slight dose
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8	Part 50 on containment leak testing. It was voluntary. They all can stay under Option A. I actually once read Option A, and I couldn't understand why anybody would want to stay under it, but we left it on the books and it was a voluntary initiative because that's what backfit required. But that was so attractive, I imagine that the 103 plants still operating I hope all 103, but certainly 100 are under Option B at the current time. The challenge as we go forward in a risk-informed framework and making Part 50 risk informed is to make that an attractive option. 37 We had a Commission briefing yesterday led by Mr. Thadani where the staff straightforwardly and honestly acknowledged the criticism that we have at the moment, that the way we have gone about risk informing our reactor regulations has been uneven thus far and has met criticism, and the staff has some ideas as to how to resolve the problems that have come forward. That is just a slight dose of realism.
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 1 2 3 4 5 6 6 7 8 9	Part 50 on containment leak testing. It was voluntary. They all can stay under Option A. I actually once read Option A, and I couldn't understand why anybody would want to stay under it, but we left it on the books and it was a voluntary initiative because that's what backfit required. But that was so attractive, I imagine that the 103 plants still operating I hope all 103, but certainly 100 are under Option B at the current time. The challenge as we go forward in a risk-informed framework and making Part 50 risk informed is to make that an attractive option. 37 We had a Commission briefing yesterday led by Mr. Thadani where the staff straightforwardly and honestly acknowledged the criticism that we have at the moment, that the way we have gone about risk informing our reactor regulations has been uneven thus far and has met criticism, and the staff has some ideas as to how to resolve the problems that have come forward. That is just a slight dose of realism. CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Is there another question?
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8	Part 50 on containment leak testing. It was voluntary. They all can stay under Option A. I actually once read Option A, and I couldn't understand why anybody would want to stay under it, but we left it on the books and it was a voluntary initiative because that's what backfit required. But that was so attractive, I imagine that the 103 plants still operating I hope all 103, but certainly 100 are under Option B at the current time. The challenge as we go forward in a risk-informed framework and making Part 50 risk informed is to make that an attractive option. 37 We had a Commission briefing yesterday led by Mr. Thadani where the staff straightforwardly and honestly acknowledged the criticism that we have at the moment, that the way we have gone about risk informing our reactor regulations has been uneven thus far and has met criticism, and the staff has some ideas as to how to resolve the problems that have come forward. That is just a slight dose of realism.
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 1 2 3 4 5 6 6 7 8 9	Part 50 on containment leak testing. It was voluntary. They all can stay under Option A. I actually once read Option A, and I couldn't understand why anybody would want to stay under it, but we left it on the books and it was a voluntary initiative because that's what backfit required. But that was so attractive, I imagine that the 103 plants still operating I hope all 103, but certainly 100 are under Option B at the current time. The challenge as we go forward in a risk-informed framework and making Part 50 risk informed is to make that an attractive option. 37 We had a Commission briefing yesterday led by Mr. Thadani where the staff straightforwardly and honestly acknowledged the criticism that we have at the moment, that the way we have gone about risk informing our reactor regulations has been uneven thus far and has met criticism, and the staff has some ideas as to how to resolve the problems that have come forward. That is just a slight dose of realism. CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Is there another question?
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 9	Part 50 on containment leak testing. It was voluntary. They all can stay under Option A. I actually once read Option A, and I couldn't understand why anybody would want to stay under it, but we left it on the books and it was a voluntary initiative because that's what backfit required. But that was so attractive, I imagine that the 103 plants still operating I hope all 103, but certainly 100 are under Option B at the current time. The challenge as we go forward in a risk-informed framework and making Part 50 risk informed is to make that an attractive option. 37 We had a Commission briefing yesterday led by Mr. Thadani where the staff straightforwardly and honestly acknowledged the criticism that we have at the moment, that the way we have gone about risk informing our reactor regulations has been uneven thus far and has met criticism, and the staff has some ideas as to how to resolve the problems that have come forward. That is just a slight dose of realism. CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Is there another question? MR. RADDATZ: Madam Chairman, I'm Mike Raddatz. I
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 1 2 5 6 7 8 9	Part 50 on containment leak testing. It was voluntary. They all can stay under Option A. I actually once read Option A, and I couldn't understand why anybody would want to stay under it, but we left it on the books and it was a voluntary initiative because that's what backfit required. But that was so attractive, I imagine that the 103 plants still operating I hope all 103, but certainly 100 are under Option B at the current time. The challenge as we go forward in a risk-informed framework and making Part 50 risk informed is to make that an attractive option. 37 We had a Commission briefing yesterday led by Mr. Thadani where the staff straightforwardly and honestly acknowledged the criticism that we have at the moment, that the way we have gone about risk informing our reactor regulations has been uneven thus far and has met criticism, and the staff has some ideas as to how to resolve the problems that have come forward. That is just a slight dose of realism. CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Is there another question? MR. RADDATZ: Madam Chairman, I'm Mike Raddatz. I work with the Spent Fuel Project Office, to your left, way

transportation and storage. Risk informed, performance 15 based. I might as well be giving the average member of the 16 public a lecture in differential equations. They don't get 17 18

I have yet to find any program within the agency

that assists us in informing and educating what it is and 20 21 how we do it. If you try to explain to a member of the 22 public that your risk is less than ten to the minus eighth. 23 they glaze over. Yet we avoid comparisons with other 24 industries. Any other hazardous waste material is avoided 25 like the plague. We don't go there. We stick with ours.

Yet there is a difference between the risk that you speak of, and that's real risk versus perceived risk. I'm an engineer. I work in real risk, but the perceived risk is extremely high. Most of the people I work with are just now starting to figure out that the public's perception of how dangerous it is is driving us. If the perception is going to drive it, then no amount of regulatory oversight or no amount of leniency or risk-informed work with our applicants will do any good at all, because the public does not understand.

What can we do as an agency to at least give it our best shot at explaining what the basis for our arguments are and why we are here?

CHAIRMAN JACKSON: From my perspective, there are a couple of things. First of all, it is very difficult to educate others before one is educated and clear oneself. So what I've been arguing is that in fact we have some work to do in house in terms of becoming more internally consistent, not only in our requirements and how they play off against each other or hang together in and of themselves, but in how we implement our programs relative to those requirements. That's the first part.

A second is we have to become better communicators ourselves. There is a public communications initiative that we are undertaking to try to accomplish some of what you are

speaking to.

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Commissioner Diaz has had some significant involvement in giving some of his insights to that initiative. So I'm going to let him speak with you in a second.

The third involves in fact perhaps investing more in our own people to help in that regard.

Once we are clear, that allows us to talk about relative risk. We have to be careful as regulators that we are not seeming to imply a primacy of nuclear activities over others because it is less risky in some way, but we just have to be clear on what the risks really are.

I think sometimes we are our own worst enemies because of our own lack of clarity in terms of how we talk about what we do. So I think there in fact is a lot that can be done in that regard.

I am going to defer to Commissioner Diaz.

COMMISSIONER DIAZ: I agree, Madam Chairman, and Mr. Raddatz. I do believe that sometimes we get enamored with how technical we are and how good we do the work. I think that is very good, and it's critical.

But we also have to become good at expressing what we do. Not to become defenders of nuclear power or any such thing, but to actually clearly communicate with the public

what are the risks in the normal decision-making, sometimes

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when the inspectors make reports and how they are
      interpreted and when events happen and when the decisions
               I can see kind of a feedback loop, and part of the
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      feedback loop will actually impact on budgets, on realities,
      and how we are perceived is how we present our work and how
 6
      clearly we can communicate how we are trying to regulate
 8
      risk.
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               COMMISSIONER McGAFFIGAN: I might just add that I
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      think we have to learn from experience and we have to
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      propagate that experience within the staff. At times,
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      sitting at the top of an organization, there is so much
13
      information streaming to us that we see things that you
      probably don't. I'll cite some success stories in
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15
      communicating risk.
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               I was reading the press clips today or vesterday
      -- I can't remember which -- about the meeting the staff had
17
      about moving the Haddam Neck reactor vessel down to
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19
      Barnwell. There was some very clear communications of risk
      in that circumstance
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21
               I forget whether it was the staff or the licensee,
     but it was implied that we endorsed it, and that the cask as
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23
      it moves its way in this concrete encasement, that the
      highest dose that one would get is 5 millirems per year.
24
25
      Then a person talking to the public in this public meeting
      tried to put 5 millirems per year into the context of a
 2
      round trip flight across the United States from Washington
 3
      to Los Angeles by air.
               We do a little bit of that in the NRC video. I'm
 5
      not sure how many of you have seen it, but there is some
      attempt to convey some risk information. I showed it to a
 6
      bunch of sixth graders last year when I did my duty as a
      parent in Arlington County, at Williamsburg Middle School.
8
 9
               The State of Connecticut has done an
10
      extraordinarily good job on these offsite releases from
      Haddam Neck, the cinder blocks that may have gotten into
11
      people's homes, trying to convey what the risk to the public
12
13
      is there.
14
               I think there are success stories in trying to
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      talk about risk in terms that your mother might understand
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      or the average member of the public might understand. A lot
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      of that is putting it into the context of background. That
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      seems to be a very successful approach.
19
               One of the things I've come across as I've tried
2.0
      to communicate about this with people is it's surprising how
21
      few folks realize there is background radiation.
22
               We had a discussion with a bunch of Montgomery
2.3
      County school teachers sponsored by Mr. Beecher. One of the
      teachers was a nuclear navy wife. So she was very well
24
      informed about radiation and background radiation. Her
25
 1
      husband had assured her that she gets more radiation as she
      sits at home than he gets on the nuclear submarine.
 2
 3
               The notion that flight attendants -- I've heard
 4
      this from Mr. Paperiello -- and flight crews generally are
 5
      more exposed on average than nuclear power plant workers.
 6
      They are getting something on the order of 300 or 400
      millirems per year as an occupational dose because of the
      flights they take. That is not widely known.
 8
               I think trying to put some of this stuff into
10
      context is terribly important, and I think we do have to
      collect success stories. The Connecticut cases are among
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the best successes. They are not all our doing. It's the 12 State of Connecticut and the State of Connecticut's Public 13 Health Department that has done a very good job in some of the Haddam Neck cases. 15 16 But wherever we get a success story we need to put it together and disseminate it and let you all think about 17 it, because you get the chance to communicate with the 18 19 public just as much as we do if you volunteer in your 20 schools or do any other public speaking or just talk to your 21 neighbors. 22 CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Let me make two further comments, because this kind of question comes up a lot. 23 24 First, a key strategy, of course, is to 2.5 demythologize what we do as well as the risks associated with the activities that we regulate. So one could argue 1 2 that a strategy of generalized openness always helps because the more people know, the less they fear. But let's not make a mistake. If there were not 5 risks that needed to be bounded and controlled, we would not be here as a public health and safety agency. So we should not fall into that kind of a trap. Therefore, one could argue that a key part of allaying the fears of the public has to do with our own credibility. Our credibility then allows the public to believe 10 11 that by virtue of what we do, of our value added, that risks 12 are kept at a level that are acceptable from the point of view of protection of public health and safety based on the 13 14 best information and the best techniques that we can apply. 15 That in fact is what we are talking about in terms of some 16 of the changes that are under discussion and are subject to 17 a number of the initiatives today. Thank you very much for the question. 18 19 Is there another one? MR. MENDELSOHN: My name is Barry Mendelsohn. I'm 20 with FCSS. I have a comment and a question. Let me make my 21 2.2 comment first. 23 I recently was reading some material about the 24 origins of the Atomic Energy Act and discovered that 25 apparently the Congress did not discuss very much public health and safety aspects of the NRC when they debated that 1 I don't disagree that we are primarily a health 4 and safety agency, but there is another aspect of our work 5 too which is not public health and safety and deals with common defense and security. I don't believe that anybody, despite efforts in the past to do this, has come up with any meaningful way of treating safeguards issues from a risk-informed viewpoint. It always has to be somebody making a judgment call as to what those things are. 10 11 My question is not really related to that. Madam 12 Chairman, you mentioned investing in the staff. Prior to coming to the agency some 20 years ago I was doing 13 cost-effectiveness analysis for the aerospace industry, and 14 15 I'm quite aware of the fact that the more and better the 16 risk analysis you do, the more expensive it is to do that 17 analysis. It takes resources. 18 It's hard for me to understand how, in light of the fact that our budget is being limited, we are going to 19 20 have the resources to train the people and to apply the techniques of doing risk analysis in new areas where it 21 22 hasn't been applied before. CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Let me address your question

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               In point of fact, as part of the overall budget
      and planning process more emphasis is in fact being given in
      various areas, from research to training to specific
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      projects to the risk assessment area, not only in terms of
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      regulatory program or requirement development, but in terms
      of creating the tools and the infrastructure to get it done.
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 6
      This increased emphasis itself is being done in a
      risk-informed way relative to the balance of all of our
 8
      programs.
 9
               So I think there is, and you will see it,
10
      increased focus in a number of areas. There has been a
      comprehensive training plan in the PRA area already laid out
11
      with certain commitments in terms of what it is meant to
12
      cover as well as who would get that training.
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               Now the issue becomes, is it comprehensive enough
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      and to what extent do people avail themselves of it? But in
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16
     fact, I would say the Commission has deliberately increased
      focus to both of these areas, namely, providing the tools,
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      the knowledge base, as well as providing the specific
      skills.
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               Then you made a comment about risk assessment in
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      safeguards. This is not the forum to discuss safeguards
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      with any degree of specificity, but the NRC is involved
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      internationally as well as within our government on any
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      number of activities and committees where various safeguards
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      and implementation strategies related to that are developed,
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      where we are able to bring our unique perspective to bear
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      that allows us to in fact insert some insights along that
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               As for a systematic effort in that regard, I can't
 5
      speak to that here at this point.
 6
               Thank you.
               Is there another question?
               OUESTION: We talk about risk and about being risk
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      informed and health and safety. I have a risk to the health
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      and safety of NRC headquarters personnel question.
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               At Pat Norry's behest, I was able to speak with
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      Mr. Dopp, who is the head of NRC security, about the guard
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      situation here at headquarters. Mr. Dopp clearly explained
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      the circumstances behind NRC headquarters not having armed
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      guards at this time. What he did not explain was why from a
      security standpoint not having armed guards is acceptable
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      for us here as an agency.
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               Around the world we have increased terrorist
      activity against U.S. targets. In our children's center
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2.0
      here we have approximately 50 percent of the children coming
      from the Israeli Embassy. Israel is the greatest targeted
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      place in the world. Our guards have to call the GSA police
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23
      and then 911 to get armed response here in the event of a
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     bomb or armed intruder or some other problem. It's going to
     take another two to three months for the contractor to get
25
      their permits so that we will have armed guards again.
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               I guess my guestion is, why is this acceptable
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 3
     from a security risk standpoint?
               CHAIRMAN JACKSON: As far I know, it's not true
     that none of our guards are armed. If there is a hiatus in
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      that, I will let Mrs. Norry speak to that specifically in a
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               More generally, I have in fact asked the EDO to
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and then I'll make a comment on your comment.

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overall security situation is, not just at One and Two White
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      Flint, but at all of our facilities. Of course we have an
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     obligation relative to the facilities we license.
               I don't want you to be left with the impression or
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      have you inadvertently leave the impression with the
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     audience here or anyone who may be listening that there
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     isn't an ongoing but in fact now heightened focus in all of
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      these areas, because the safety of our employees is
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     paramount.
19
               I don't know, Mrs. Norry, if you have a specific
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      comment you want to make.
              MRS. NORRY: During this period when we have taken
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      a new contractor we are pursing aggressively getting
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      permits. We had an unfortunate situation with the previous
      contractor where the permits for the weapons that the guards
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      were carrying were not exactly done in the right way. This
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     time we are doing it right. We are trying to make it as
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      quick as we can.
               The other thing we are doing in this period of
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     heightened security interest. We have considerably stepped
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      up the activities of the guards in being aware of what is
     going on on the campus, of pursuing situations out front on
     the streets where people are lingering or appear to be
      lingering unnecessarily. In the garage area, at the loading
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     dock area we are looking at all the potentially vulnerable
1.0
     spots
11
               We do have the capability to summon armed
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     assistance if we need it. In fact, in any case where we
13
      really were going to have a threat, we would be summoning
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      professional, competent help very, very quickly. We've had
      the occasion to do that in the past, and it has always been
15
16
      forthcoming. The Montgomery County police are extremely
17
      cooperative.
               CHAIRMAN JACKSON: I think the important point to
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     take away from Mrs. Norry's remarks is that it's not that we
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      intend to go forward without having armed guards here at One
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21
     and Two White Flint, and that issue is being addressed as
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      expeditiously as we can.
23
             Is there another question?
               QUESTION: I have a question from Region III.
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      What are each of the Commissioner's views on a poorly
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      researched NRR proposal to reduce the core inspection
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      programs for the emergency preparedness, safeguards and
      radiation protection programs by 25 to 40 percent with a
      proposed effective date in October 1998?
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               COMMISSIONER DIAZ: Would you repeat the question,
6
      please.
7
               OUESTION: What are each of the Commissioner's
8
     views on a poorly researched NRR proposal to reduce the core
     inspection programs for the emergency preparedness,
      safeguards and radiation protection programs by 25 to 40
10
11
      percent with a proposed effective date in October 1998?
12
               COMMISSIONER McGAFFIGAN: We have not seen this
13
      poorly researched proposal at this time. We will deal with
      it when we get it. We appreciate the heads-up that it's
14
15
     coming.
16
               [Laughter.]
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               CHAIRMAN JACKSON: My generalized comment is that
     these issues have to be addressed and brought forward by the
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19
     line management relative to exactly what the risks involve.
     This is new information. It will be interesting to
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look on a constant basis, especially now, at what our

21	evaluate.
22	Is there another question?
23	QUESTION: This is also from Region III. Bear in
24	mind this is not me saying this.
25	[Laughter.]
25	[Baughter.]
1	
	QUESTION: It says, I've been a regional inspector
2	for the last 15 years. I'm concerned that the new
3	enforcement process will instill a chilling effective on
4	identification of level 4 violations by the inspectors. We
5	always thought that the purpose of identifying level 4
6	violations was to ensure resolution of problems where they
7	have a more significant impact on plant safety. What are
8	the Commissioner's views in this area?
9	CHAIRMAN JACKSON: I think there are a couple of
10	things that can be said. I had occasion to ask Mr. Callan
11	recently in terms of our policy for identifying severity
12	level 4 violations had there been a look-see to determine
13	whether and how many such violations had been
14	inappropriately determined. His response was in fact that
15	had been looked at, and at most something on the order of 10
16	percent of the severity level 4 violations had been
17	improperly identified.
18	The changes in the enforcement policy, and perhaps
19	it needs some further clarification, are not meant to
20	obviate what the intent of tracking those violations is
21	meant to be.
22	There are two aspects to the identification of any
23	violation at any severity level. One is, has the violation
24	been appropriately identified? A key one, which has to do
25	with ensuring that we do our health and safety job but where
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1	given the nature of the violation that there is undue burden
1 2	51
	given the nature of the violation that there is undue burden
2	given the nature of the violation that there is undue burden associated with it, has to do with it's dispositioning. At
2	given the nature of the violation that there is undue burden associated with it, has to do with it's dispositioning. At the heart of what this enforcement policy emphasis is meant
2 3 4	given the nature of the violation that there is undue burden associated with it, has to do with it's dispositioning. At the heart of what this enforcement policy emphasis is meant to accomplish is to deal with how the severity level 4
2 3 4 5	given the nature of the violation that there is undue burden associated with it, has to do with it's dispositioning. At the heart of what this enforcement policy emphasis is meant to accomplish is to deal with how the severity level 4 violations are dispositioned. Essentially whether there is
2 3 4 5 6	given the nature of the violation that there is undue burden associated with it, has to do with it's dispositioning. At the heart of what this enforcement policy emphasis is meant to accomplish is to deal with how the severity level 4 violations are dispositioned. Essentially whether there is a formal notice of violation that is issued for a given
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policy to some degree, and that's one of the difficulties in 6 talking about it. It's a case where change is coming. We have not been hiding the change. I see Mr. Lieberman in the audience. There was a meeting vesterday or the day before. He unveiled Option 1. 1.0 I think we call it in the Commission. It is a model. He 11 12 unveiled it at a public meeting. Most severity level 4 13 violations would be called infractions going forward. Most 14 would not be cited even if we found them, unless they were willful or a few other criteria. 15 16 My problem with the severity level 4 violation $\,$ issue, which was called to the Commission's attention 17 earlier this year, is it's very difficult to justify to the 18 19 Congress or to any external stakeholder why severe level 4's 20 have gone from 500 to 1,500 over the last few years when the 21 performance of the industry as a whole has gotten better. 22 It's impossible to answer a senator when 23 Mr. Colvin, the head of NEI, sets out the three worst severe 24 level 4 violations issued by the NRC in the last few years. 25 Having a notebook on the table that might fall on a piece of 1 equipment or something during an earthquake was one example 2 he cited. The other problem is that from the data that we see we have lots of severity level 4's at plants that are 4 very, very good, that we are giving high ratings to; INPO gives high ratings to; and we have low numbers of severity level 4's at plants that are not very good, according to our and INPO evaluations. So the purpose that they are supposed to serve in terms of being precursors and hints as to things 1.0 that are coming, that's a purpose that they are meeting only 11 intermittently. 12 There is a challenge that we are facing. It's 13 clear that we are making a change, that we have not made a policy decision to make the change. The enforcement 14 guidance memo that Mr. Lieberman put out last month clearly 15 16 articulates, as the Chairman said, some changes within the policy that didn't have to come to the Commission, but I 17 think the notion of mining licensee's corrective action 18 19 program for violations, that has gone off the board. 20 We actually haven't made the change. I think we 21 are actually unanimous in making it, but we haven't formally 22 made it yet, that we are not going to put severity level 4 23 violations at the front of the corrective action program of 24 licensees irrespective of all the other stuff that they may 25 be working on that is much more safety significant or may well be much more safety significant. 1 2 So we are in the process of change here. The 3 change will come this fall, and then there will be more change, because I think the Chairman would very much like --4 5 and she and I have talked about this -- this is an area where she would like to see more risk informing. 6 CHAIRMAN JACKSON: That's right. COMMISSIONER McGAFFIGAN: Not just severity level 9 4's, but 3's. 10 CHAIRMAN JACKSON: The whole program. COMMISSIONER DIAZ: I was going to agree with 11 12 Chairman Jackson and Commissioner McGaffigan, but that would be precedent-setting. So I decided not to. 13 14 [Laughter.] COMMISSIONER DIAZ: I think the issue is a broad 15 16 issue, and the issue is that severity level 4 violations or

violations are just one set of data points, and they are not

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the only data points that are significant or important to
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     how we assess the performance of licensees.
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               I think they need to be put in the proper
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      perspective. That's why the Commission has been pushing the
      staff and the staff pushing the Commission to try to get
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23
      some agreement on what is called integrated assessment.
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      That is, trying to put things in perspective and in
     priorities. Severity level 4's are data points. They need
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      to be considered as data points. They are not drivers of
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      the process; they are important parts, but just one part of
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      the pie.
               CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Let me just say the following.
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     At the risk of upsetting you, I agree with the Commissioner.
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               [Laughter.]
               CHAIRMAN JACKSON: But let me make a statement to
     those who may be listening from the regions, because I think
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     if we talk too much down a certain line, it begins to sound
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      as if we are implying that the staff has done the wrong
      thing or that the inspectors have done the wrong thing, and
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      they haven't. I want you to keep doing your job and to stay
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13
      focused on safety.
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               As far as the run-up in severity level 4
      violations, they probably resulted not because of some
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     deliberate attempt to have a run-up in severity level 4
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violations. They resulted because we put more emphasis on consistency, consistency in the discovery of them and how they were documented and how they were tracked. When that happens, there will be some who maybe weren't doing as much as others. So you are going to see certain increases.

22 Secondly, we have given more emphasis on design 23 basis issues over the last couple of years. So there are a 24 number of these that may fall within that category.

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12 13 I think a lot of the stress if there is a "run-up"

really relates more to the disposition issue, and that is what on the short term is being addressed by the enforcement 2

But more broadly, the Commission will be considering changes to the enforcement policy and to have it completely more risk informed and to have it appropriately fully integrated into all other aspects of our reactor oversight processes.

As Commissioner Diaz says, they are data points and they are valid data points. The issue is to ensure that they are used within the right context, but because they are valid data points, they still are being tracked. That's not disappearing.

14 So if you want to look at the most fundamental 15 change in what the enforcement guidance memorandum accomplishes for now, and it is at least built into the 16 17 proposals that are being considered, it is fundamentally how 18 they are dispositioned: do we issue a notice of violation or not? And under certain circumstances that will cover 19 20 many, many licensees, particularly those that are the better performing licensees; there will not be notices of 21 violations issued, but the violations themselves are not 22 23 going off the map.

24 Let me just say one other thing which has to do with even INPO. At the risk of sounding like I'm 25

disagreeing with my colleague, which I'm not, it turns out that INPO is concerned about where they may have missed

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precursors relative to plants that they may have been highly
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      evaluating that later turned out to have some problems.
               So there is something that we can learn from each
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      other. They have in fact asked to come and talk with our
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      staff about plants that have gotten into trouble, plants
      that they have agreed in the end were in trouble, but where
      we tumbled to it, as it were, before they did. So there is
1.0
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      learning that is going to go on across the spectrum.
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               Is there another question?
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               QUESTION: I apologize in advance. This fellow
      who asked the question about the unarmed guards stimulated
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      my paranoia. In my job we look at analyses of possible
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16
      scenarios having to do with the safety at our facilities.
17
      We try to quantify those wherever possible.
               In your response to the previous question, I
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19
     didn't come away with a feeling that the issue had been
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      sufficiently researched. For example, the people who will
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      eventually have permits in two or three months, does that
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      imply that when they get their permits that they will at
23
      that point have zero experience in how to use the firearms?
               CHAIRMAN JACKSON: No.
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               QUESTION: Secondly, it seems like these badges
      that work in the card readers, they work whether you are
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      dead or alive. If a person were to intrude, as one did at
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      the Capitol recently, with armed guards he was able to kill
      two policemen. If we had to wait for a response, has anyone
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 5
      researched what the difference in the number of people
      killed might be?
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               CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Let me just say the following
      to you, which is the point to be made. We have gone from
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      one contract to another with respect to our quard force. In
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      making that transition we have a temporary -- I repeat --
      temporary hiatus relative to the guards being armed.
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               Mrs. Norry spoke to you about contingencies
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      relative to response if there is an issue. We can
      reevaluate that in terms of whether we have the groundwork
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      sufficiently covered in this interim period.
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               But in the end, in a very short time the intention
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      is to have NRC have armed quards. We've had them before.
     We have no intention of not having them now. When that
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      happens, the intention and in fact the requirement is that
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      the people are fully qualified in the use of those firearms.
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               I hope that addresses your question.
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               QUESTION: It addresses my question but not my
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     paranoia.
               [Laughter.]
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               QUESTION: I was thinking I might preface my
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      question by saying this is not really my question either.
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               CHAIRMAN JACKSON: It's okay if it is.
               [Laughter.]
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               QUESTION: With the emphasis on cost-beneficial
      actions taken by the staff, I was wondering if at the
      Commission level you have made any decisions that might
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      consider that impact when you put an SRM out for the staff
      to respond to something. Have you restrained that tendency
     based on cost-beneficial type considerations or
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     risk-informed decisions?
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               CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Let me talk to you about that.
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     The Commission obviously issues policy direction in the form
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      of the SRMs, and that in fact is the Commission's
      responsibility to do, to give that direction to the staff,
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things where in fact we had data that were provided

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particularly in areas that the Commission feels need to have high priority.

17 When those SRMs are issued, in fact there is a
18 discussion with the staff relative to appropriate due dates,
19 as to when the deliverables associated with addressing the
20 policy direction would come forward.

2.5

It is the responsibility then of the staff through the planning framework to prioritize all the tasks that the staff have to carry out, those that are built-in statutory requirements as well as any that come about as a consequence of Commission direction through the SRMs.

Then all of those things are further prioritized through the budget process which the Commission reviews, and in the end it is the manager's responsibility in submitting and bringing forth the planning guidance and the budget to the Commission to ensure that that kind of prioritization and a clear statement of what is realistic over the time horizon that the budget addresses is built into what we

So by definition there is a self-correcting mechanism, but the Commission will continue to give guidance in those areas that it feels are high priority areas, but in the end everything is rationalized to everything else in terms of the specific activities and deliverables associated with that.

More specifically, in terms of recent developments with respect to the tasking memo that came out of Commission discussion that I sent to the EDO and for which a response was returned, I explicitly told the EDO that in giving focus to these high priority areas that, first of all, the planning framework and the operating plans were to be appropriately readjusted, that items that had to go off the plate should go off of the plate, and that it was better to do fewer things well than to try to continue to do everything, and that is in fact the EDO's responsibility and those in other offices who have related responsibilities to

see that in fact the work proceeds on that basis.

2 Is there another question?

QUESTION: Maybe I ought to quit while I'm ahead.

I've been with this agency for better than two decades,
going back to the time before we were an agency in the sense
that we are still the Atomic Energy Commission.

One of the things that I've observed over the years and I felt pretty good about was the fact that we seemed to be relatively resistant to political pressures.

I emphasize the term "relative," because I think that no federal agency can be absolutely resistant to that, and certainly a regulatory agency can't be. But comparatively speaking, relative to other agencies I can think of, I think we are in that condition.

So it troubles me somewhat when I see what is happening now. I have no problem with the concept of change, and also I think I speak for my colleagues that we all want to do things more efficiently and more expeditiously. But I would hope that you folks have the courage to resist pressures that would result in our making decisions that are, let's say, less based on sound technology and technical safety basis type foundations,

technology and technical safety basis type foundations,
which has been the case in the past, and do things that

which has been the case in the past, and do things that are a reaction to the fact that you are being threatened or we

 $\,$ 25 $\,$ are being threatened by someone who has the power of the

1 purse over us. 2 One other point I wanted to make going back to 3 efficiency, and so forth. I remember back a decade or so in the past when I worked in NRR and we actually did reactor 4 licensing that one of the complaints that sometimes was directed toward us was that it took too long to get a 6 license The fact of the matter of is, and I hope I am not 9 acting simply in a defensive way to this, much of that delay 1.0 was not due to the NRC per se but was due to the fact that the industry was slow in responding to staff requests for 11 additional information, and it was also due in part to 12 13 things having to do with requirements for hearings and such, 14 which were things that were established by law. Again. I think that we see perhaps some 15 16 similarities to attacks that are going against us at the 17 present time and which may be somewhat misplaced. 18 CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Let me say this. At any given 19 time when an agency or an individual is criticized, 20 obviously truth to some extent lies in the eyes of the beholder, but in the end there is going to always be some 21 22 valid basis for a lot of the criticism. 23 As for the willingness of the Commission to stand up for the agency. I think that all of us have demonstrated 24 25 that we are willing to do that. I think you have seen, and we asked to have it shown, the videotape of the Commission's 1 2 appearance before our authorization subcommittee. I think you understood how we responded at the time that we were 3 4 facing the large budget cut. Having said that, in terms of standing up to political pressures, the members of Congress are the 6 7 best job they can. We are creatures of that Congress, and we have a responsibility to be responsive. 9 10 I was having a discussion with someone about the danger that NRC faced at the time we were going through our 11 interactions with the Senate appropriations subcommittee and 12 13 then the full committee, but particularly at the 14

people's representatives. They come to Washington to do the

subcommittee level. I was talking about how people had a large concern about -- this was another person at a high level in the government -- preserving the agency. This individual said to me something that has since stuck in my mind. He said, you mean preserving the agency's ability to do its job for the American people, don't you?

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I said, oh yeah, that's what I mean.

And that's what we are talking about here. I think we should keep that in mind. We're not unmindful -and the question came up in the earlier session -- that we are dealing with people, we are dealing with people's careers, we are dealing with people's lives, but in the end,

the best way we can address all of that is to work together but to stay focused on what our jobs are for the American people, but to be responsive and understanding that the members of Congress are the people's representatives.

We have a responsibility to be responsive, but being responsive doesn't necessarily mean we agree with each and every single thing. In fact we have made that point even in our congressional hearings that we don't agree with every single criticism that has come our way.

But some of the questions and even your concerns tell me -- and that is what we are going to be working on

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and the senior managers are going to be working on -- that
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      we may have somewhat of a communication problem. That's why
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      we're here.
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               If you really look at the list of specific
      initiatives and activities that we are asking you to do, and
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      even some of the changes to our programs and processes, and
      look at that list, that response to the tasking memo I sent
      to the EDO, which, as I said, was worked with the
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      Commission, and the specific areas of focus and the specific
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      activities associated with those areas of focus, there is
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      nothing new on that list. These were things we had already
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     started to do. Some were just at the talking stage, but
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      many of them we were well into.
               The issue is really not the Congress through
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     pressure coming along really telling us things that we
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     hadn't already recognized needed to be addressed and things
      we needed to do. So what we are doing is accelerating some
     of them. Yes, we're being responsive, but in fact I view it
      as an opportunity because we were probably taking too long
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      on some of them.
               No one is asking any of you not to take due
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     diligence and care in doing what you are being asked to do.
      I for one happen to believe that moving things along apace
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     but doing a quality job are not inconsistent. Again, it's a
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     question of how you organize, how many things you try to
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     handle all at one time, which has to do with prioritization,
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     and then having a mentality to get it done.
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               Again, take a look at that list. There is nothing
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     new on that list.
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             If in fact you've come away with the idea that you
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      are being asked to do things that we heretofore were not
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      even contemplating, then we haven't communicated well
     enough, and starting today, starting here and now, we are
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      going to change that, because you need to understand exactly
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      where we are and where we have been and the continuity of
      where we are going to the base we have been building over
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      the last few years.
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               Maybe many of us, until we had these pressures,
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     didn't really focus on it, or maybe we didn't take the
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      opportunity to say how all of the specific activities fit
     into a coherent whole, but we hope today you've at least
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      gotten a beginning of some understanding of how all of these
      do fit together. But really, there is nothing new here. We
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      just need to get on with it and get it done.
               COMMISSIONER McGAFFIGAN: I just want to remind
      you of one thing I said at the outset, and that is that this
     congressional scrutiny is useful in solving long-festering
      problems. The person who stood and talked about the
      licensing process taking a long time and that not being in
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      the hands of the staff, we can deal with that.
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              There is no reason, I believe, and I've said it in
      votes that will soon be public, that we can't go to
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     legislative style hearings more broadly in our process.
               In the case of the AVLIS application from USEC, we
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     need to get an amendment to Section 193 of the Atomic Energy
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17
     Act. The law already gives us great flexibility to go to
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     different style hearings, and indeed I think one rulemaking
     is just about ready to go on license transfers, and others
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      may follow. So stay tuned.
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               But the Congress can help us. I agree entirely
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      with everything else the Chairman said. I come out of the
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23 Congress. It is not politics; it is not Republican versus Democratic politics as they look at us. They are looking at 24 25 us and challenging us to be more efficient. 1 They are not challenging us to be less safe, but 2 they have a lot of data points being provided by various stakeholders, and at times it's Union of Concerned Scientists and the Nuclear Energy Institute arm in arm 4 walking in there and saying the same thing that we have to think about and that we were already thinking about, but we 6 7 now need to accelerate the change. CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Are there other questions? 9 [No response.] 10 CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Let me thank those who 11 addressed the questions that came to us beforehand and from 12 the regions and thank the questioners from this morning. I 13 didn't take the time to properly thank them. If you would 14 pass that along, Mrs. Norry. 15 We have enjoyed it. It has been very stimulating. I hope it has been helpful to you. Thank you very much. 16 17 [Applause.] [Whereupon, at 3:30 p.m., the meeting was 18 19 concluded.] 20 21 22 23 24 25