June 30, 2006

MEMORANDUM TO:	Luis A. Reyes Executive Director for Operations	
	Karen D. Cyr General Counsel	
FROM:	Annette L. Vietti-Cook, Secretary	/RA/
SUBJECT:	STAFF REQUIREMENTS - SECY-06-0126 - PROPOSED RULEMAKING - POWER REACTOR SECURITY REQUIREMENTS (RIN 3150-AG63)	

The Commission has approved publication of the proposed amendments to 10 CFR Parts 50, 72, and 73 in the *Federal Register*, subject to the comments and changes noted in the Commission votes, as modified by the comments below.

1. It is not necessary to seek public comment on the need to establish security requirements for the Emergency Response Data System.

2. PBL comment on page 320 (t)(4)(ii) and the bottom of page 926 should remain for the purpose of public comment in the proposed rule and the staff should clarify the basis for the cost benefit analysis.

3. PBL comment on page 460 should be deleted.

4. NJD vote, pp 99 - the staff should retain the rule text "to this part".

5. NJD vote, pp 674 - the SOC text of the change description in Table 6 should be modified, rather than eliminated completely. The SOC text should be revised to indicate that this requirement would apply to both CAS and SAS operators (consistent with the Chairman's and Comm. McGaffigan's directed changes to the rule text).

6. EXM and GBJ votes - non-SGI versions of the guidance documents - to the extent practicable, the staff should make implementing guidance publically available, as appropriate, without causing undue delay in completion of this effort or other high priority security rulemakings.

7. The staff should take administrative action to withdraw all previously issued orders where appropriate.

8. JSM comments on pages 41 and 42 - retain original language.

9. EXM vote - (Add new Rule text to 73.55(b)(7) page) The language should read, " (i)In

addition to ...... each licensee shall develop, and implement, and maintain an insider mitigation program.

The staff should plan to conduct more than one public meeting during the public comment period. Recent experience with other voluminous rule packages indicates that perhaps a second, or even a third, public meeting may be necessary to fully vet the issues addressed in this proposed rule.

In light of the status of NSIR and OGC staffs' ongoing interactions with the Department of Justice (DOJ) regarding the development of guidelines that will make new section 161A of the Atomic Energy Act effective, NSIR and OGC staffs should revise the proposed rule language for §§ 73.18 and 73.19 to reflect the current DOJ conceptual approach to section 161A, which would require licensees and certificate holders that are designated by the Commission to apply to the NRC for section 161A authority, if they wish to obtain the benefits of section 161A. The staff should make any other necessary conforming changes to the FRN's statement of considerations and to the supporting analyses to ensure consistency with the revised rule text. The staff should brief the Commission's technical assistants on the revised rule text prior to publication of the proposed rule.

Attachment: Commission Votes for SECY-06-0126

cc: Chairman Diaz Commissioner McGaffigan Commissioner Merrifield Commissioner Jaczko Commissioner Lyons CFO OCA OPA Office Directors, Regions, ACRS, ACNW, ASLBP (via E-Mail) PDR

## NOTATION VOTE

## RESPONSE SHEET

TO:	Annette Vietti-Cook, Secretary	
FROM:	CHAIRMAN DIAZ	
SUBJECT:	SECY-06-0126 - PROPOSED RULEMAKING - POWER REACTOR SECURITY REQUIREMENTS (RIN 3150-AG63)	
w/cor Approved <u>xx</u>	ments Disapproved Abstain	

## COMMENTS:

Not Participating \_

I approve publishing in the *Federal Register* the proposed amendments to 10 CFR Parts 50, 72, and 73 with appendices, and agree with staff's proposal to certify that the rule will satisfy the requirements of the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 605 (b). Over the past several years the NRC has aggressively enhanced security at nuclear facilities through the issuance of security orders, security evaluations and lessons learned. This rulemaking is a culmination of those activities and will bring closure to these issues. In addition, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 has provided the agency with certain provisions to enhance the security programs at nuclear facilities. Edits are attached for incorporation into the rulemaking package. Further, the Order requirements addressed by the final rule should be rescinded.

DATE

Entered on "STARS" Yes No

# Table 2 - Part 73 Stochim 73.55

	(c)(1)(ii) Site-specific conditions that	This requirement would be added to
	affect implementation of Commission	reflect the Commission's view that
	requirements.	licensees must focus attention on site-
		specific conditions in the development and
		implementation of site plans, procedures,
: · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	) [ ] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] []	processes, response strategies, and
	n en en sin en stranger en en en stranger en	ultimately, the licensee capability to
		achieve the performance objective of the
		proposed (b)(1).
	(c)(2) Protection of security plans. The	This requirement would be added $(+_0)$
	licensee shall protect the approved	emphasize the requirements for the
	security plans and other related	protection of safeguards information in
	safeguards information against	accordance with the requirements of
	unauthorized disclosure in accordance	§ 73.21.
	with the requirements of § 73.21.	
	(c)(3) Physical Security Plan.	This header would be added for formatting
		purposes.

Table 2 - Part- 73 Stater 73.55

§ 73.55(h)(1) Safeguards contingency	(c)(5)(i) The licensee shall establish,	This requirement would retain the current
plans must be in accordance with the	maintain, and implement a Commission-	requirement of § 73.55(h)(1) to provide a
criteria in Appendix C to this part,	approved safeguards contingency plan	safeguards contingency plan with minor
"Licensee Safeguards Contingency	that describes how the criteria set forth	revisions. Most significantly, the reference
Plans."	in section II of Appendix C, "Licensee	to Appendix C would be revised to reflect
	Safeguards Contingency Plans, " to this	the reformatting of the proposed Appendix
	-part will be implemented.	C which would have a section II that
		applies only to power reactors.
	(c)(5)(ii) The safeguards contingency	This requirement would be added to
• • ·	plan must describe predetermined	generally describe the content of the
	actions, plans, and strategies designed	Safeguards Contingency Plan.
. : •	to intercept, challenge, delay, and	
	neutralize threats up to and including the	
	design basis threat of radiological	
	sabotage.	
	(c)(6) Implementing procedures.	This header would be added for formatting
		purposes.

Table 2-Pert-73 Section 73.55

	(e)(4) Owner controlled area. The	This requirement would be added to
	licensee shall establish and maintain	provide a performance based requirement
	physical barriers in the owner controlled	to provide enhanced protection outside
	area to deter, delay, or prevent	the protected area relative to detecting,
	unauthorized access, facilitate the early	assessing, and delaying, a threat before
	detection of unauthorized activities, and	reaching any area from which the threat
	control approach routes to the facility.	could disable the personnel, equipment, or
		systems required to meet the performance
		objective and requirements described in
		the proposed paragraph (b).
	(e)(5) Isolation zone.	This header would be added for formatting
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	purposes.
10 CFR 73.55(c)(3) Isolation zones shall	(e)(5)(i) An isolation zone must be	This requirement would retain the current
be maintained in outdoor areas adjacent	maintained in outdoor areas adjacent to	requirement for an isolation zone.
to the physical barrier at the perimeter of	the protected area perimeter barrier.	
the protected area	The isolation zone shall be:	

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Table 2-Part 73 Section 73.55

(g)(1)(vii) In response to specific threat This requirement would be added to information, implement a two-person require two specific actions to be taken by (line-of-sight) rule for all personnel in the licensee where credible threat vital areas so that no one individual is information is provided. This proposed permitted unescorted access to vital requirement, would first require that the areas. Under these conditions the two-person rule be implemented, and licensee shall implement measures to second, that measures be implemented to verify that the two person rule has been verify that the two-person rule is met when met when a vital area is accessed. access to a vital area is gained. This proposed requirement would include those areas identified in the proposed (e)(8)(iv) to be protected as vital areas.

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Table 2 - Part 73 Section 7355

§ 73.55(h)(3) The total number of guards, and armed, trained personnel immediately available at the facility to fulfill these response requirements shall nominally be ten (10), unless specifically required otherwise on a case by case basis by the Commission; however, this number may not be reduced to less than five (5) guards. (k)(3)(i)(A) The licensee shall determine
the minimum number of armed
responders necessary to protect against
the design basis threat described in
§ 73.1(a), subject to Commission
approval, and shall document this
number in the approved security plans.

This requirement would be retained and revised to remove the specific minimum numbers of 10 but no less than 5, to provide a performance based requirement that meets the proposed requirement of (k)(1)(i). This proposed requirement would enjure that the licensee would provide the requisite number of armed responders needed to carry-out the protective strategy the effectiveness of which would be evaluated through annual exercises and triennial exercises observed by the Commission.

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Table 3 - Proposed Part 73 Section 73.56

		licensees, applicants, and C/Vs to establish thresholds in interpreting the results of the psychological test, to aid in determining whether an individual would be required to $(2 - e)$ interviewed by a psychiatrist or licensed
		clinical psychologist under proposed
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	paragraph (e)(4)(ii) of this section.
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$\frac{1}{2} = \frac{1}{2} \left[ \frac{1}{2} \left[$		
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Table 3 - Proposed Part 73 Section 73. Su

٤			history evaluation is completed.
			The proposed rule would not would
			establish employment history requirements
			for individuals whose UAA has been
			interrupted for 30 or fewer days. Proposed
			§ 73.56(h)(3) would require the entities who
			are subject to this section to obtain and
	•		review a personal history disclosure from
			the applicant for UAA that would address
			the period since the individual's last period
			of UAA was terminated. However, the
			licensee, applicant, or C/V would be
		<ul> <li>In the second secon second second sec</li></ul>	permitted to forego conducting an
			employment history evaluation for
			individuals whose UAA has been
	· · ·		interrupted for such a short period,
			because there would be little to be learned.

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Table 5- Proposed Part 73 Section 7.3.71

	appendix A to this part. Footnote: 2.	especially if this event is the opening
	Notifications to the NRC for the	action on an ineffectively coordinated
	declaration of an emergency class shall	multiple-target attack. Such notice may
	be performed in accordance with § 50.72	permit other licensees to escalate to a
	of this chapter.	higher protective level in advance of an
		attack. The Commission would expect
		licensees to notify the NRC Operations
		Center as soon as possible after they
		notify local law enforcement agencies,
		but within 15 minutes. The Commission
		may consider the applicability of this
		requirement to other types of licensees in
i		future rulemaking.

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Table 5- Proposed Dat 73 Section 73.71

	Footnote 1 would provide a cross
	(A-) reference to Appendix to Part 73 which
	contains NRC contact information.
	Footnote 2 would remind licensees of
	their concurrent emergency declaration
	responsibilities under 10 CFR 50.72.
(a)(1) When making a report under	The proposed rule would include this
paragraph (a) of this section, the	introductory statement, which provides a
licensees shall:	structure for the following list of
	information to be provided in the 15-
	minute report.
 (a)(1)(i) Identify the facility name; and	This requirement would be added to
	ensure the licensee's facility is clearly
	identified when a report is made.
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Proposed Pat 73 Section 7.3.71 able 5-

appendix A to this part. Footnote: 2. especially if this event is the opening Notifications to the NRC for the action on an ineffectively coordinated declaration of an emergency class shall multiple-target attack. Such notice may permit other licensees to escalate to a be performed in accordance with § 50.72 higher protective level in advance of an of this chapter. attack. The Commission would expect licensees to notify the NRC Operations Center as soon as possible after they notify local law enforcement agencies, but within 15 minutes. The Commission may consider the applicability of this requirement to other types of licensees in future rulemaking.

Jable 6 - Proposed Part 73, Appendix B, Paragraph I.B.2.b. Armed B.3.b. A licensed clinical psychologist. The requirement regarding emotional individuals, and central alarm station psychiatrist, or physician trained in part to instability would be retained. The phrase operators, in addition to meeting the identify emotional instability shall determine "Armed individuals, and central alarmwhether armed members of the security requirement stated in Paragraph a. station-operators"-would-be-replaced-withabove, shall have no emotional organization.in addition to meeting the the phrase "armed-members-of-theinstability that would interfere with the requirement stated in Paragraph a. of this security organization" for consistency. effective performance of assigned section, have no emotional instability that with the terminology-used in the security job duties. The determination would interfere with the effective proposed-rule shall be made by a licensed performance of assigned duties and psychologist or psychiatrist, or responsibilities. physician, or other person professionally

trained to identify emotional instability.

- and alarm station operators

Appendix

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Table 8-Part 73 Appendix 9

			or intelligence gathering efforts. Events
			reported under paragraphs I or II would
			require a followup written report. Events روم reported paragraph III would not require a
			followup written report.
		I. Events to be reported as soon as possible,	Paragraph I would be added to establish
		but no later than 15 minutes after discovery,	the types events to be reported within 15
•		followed by a written report within sixty (60)	minutes. Because the identification of
		days.	information-relating to an actual or
			potential threat could quickly result in an
		(a) The initiation of a security response	event, which may necessitate expedited
		consistent with a licensee's physical security	Commission action (e.g., notification of
	$_{\rm pr} \sim 24$ . The second s	plan, safeguards contingency plan, or	other licensees or Federal authorities), a
•		defensive strategy based on actual or	shorten reporting time would be required.
		imminent threat against a nuclear power plant.	This proposed requirement would also
			ensure that threat-related information
		n an	would be made available to the
			Commission's threat assessment process

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Tell 8- Part 73 Appendix

(2) Significant physical damage to
a power reactor or any facility
possessing SSNM or its equipment
or carrier equipment transporting
nuclear fuel or spent nuclear fuel, or
to the nuclear fuel or spent nuclear
fuel a facility or carrier possesses;

or

II.(a)(2) Significant physical damage to any NRC-regulated power reactor or facility possessing strategic special nuclear material or to carrier equipment transporting nuclear fuel, or to the nuclear fuel or spent nuclear fuel facility which is possessed by a carrier; or

Theduding nuclear fuel

This requirement would be retained with minor editorial changes to improve clarity and readability and renumbered. The phrase "NRC-regulated" would be added to specify that all Commission licensed facilities and transport would be covered by this requirement. This change would simplify the language in this section while retaining the basic requirement.

## NOTATION VOTE

## **RESPONSE SHEET**

TO:	Annette Vietti-Cook, Secretary		
FROM:	COMMISSIONER MCGAFFIGAN		
SUBJECT:	SECY-06-0126 - PROPOSED RULEMAKING - POWER REACTOR SECURITY REQUIREMENTS (RIN 3150-AG63)		
w/c	omments & edits Disapproved Abstain		
Not Participating			
COMMENTS:			

See attached comments and edits.

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·	SIGNATURE 28, 2006
Entered on "STARS" Yes X_ No	DATE

## Commissioner McGaffigan's Comments on SECY-06-0126

I approve publication of this proposed rulemaking for public comment, and agree with the staff's proposal to certify that this rule satisfies the requirements of the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 605(b). I would like to laud the work of the staff in putting together a well reasoned, organized and thoroughly conceived rule. In particular, the staff has made a constructive proposal for facilities that will use MOX fuel, and that is consistent with the Commission's action in a recent adjudication. I look forward to comments on the requirements contained in the proposed rule.

Having said that, I believe the rule should explicitly address the need for mitigation of potential insider threats. While the proposed rule text incorporates many of the elements that would serve to identify potential insider threats, additional language is needed to explicitly require the development and implementation of an Insider Mitigation Program and tie together the necessary program elements to allow for meaningful comment. As such, I am attaching proposed additional rule text language to be included in 10 CFR 73.55(b)(7).

The staff's modification to the Appendix B requirements regarding evaluations designed to identify emotional instability in critical personnel, is too narrowly drawn and should be expanded to at least include alarm station operators. Just like armed members of the security organization, CAS and SAS operators serve a critical function, the impairment of which could constitute a significant risk.

Modifications to Appendix G requirements for "Reportable Safeguards Events" should be more narrowly drafted to properly limit the scope of information that falls within the 4-hour reporting requirement set forth in Section III. As currently written, the use of "or other information" in subsection (a) of Section III is too open-ended.

The staff, with assistance from Idaho National Laboratory, has an ambitious plan to revise and update relevant guidance documents. I agree with Commissioner Jaczko that the staff should strive to make as much of the implementing guidance as possible publicly available. I recognize that some elements of the guidance will be considered Safeguards Information or sensitive unclassified information, and therefore could not be included in a public document. In such cases, the public version of the document could indicate that additional guidance is provided in the Safeguards Information version of the document. The staff should provide the guidance documents to the Commission for information when they are issued for comment.

Finally, while this rule will go a long way towards creating the necessary stability for applicants and licensees, particularly as we prepare for new reactor licensing, the security orders addressed in large part through this rulemaking should remain in place. Rescission of these orders automatically upon completion of the final rule is neither necessary nor prudent. When this rule is final, existing licensees will be required to examine their security plans to ensure compliance with the new regulations. While most licensees may not need to make any modifications, there is a chance that some changes will be necessary or they will need to seek relief. Following this review, some licensees may, in accordance with the terms of the orders, seek relaxation of order provisions or amendment of their licenses if necessary.

## ADD new Rule text to 73.55(b)(7):

(i) In addition to the access authorization program required above, and the fitness-for-duty program required in part 26 of this chapter, each licensee shall develop and implement an insider mitigation program.

(ii) The insider mitigation program must be designed to oversee and monitor the initial and continuing trustworthiness and reliability of individuals granted or retaining unescorted access authorization to a protected or vital area and implement defense-in-depth methodologies to minimize the potential for an insider to adversely affect, either directly or indirectly, the licensee capability to prevent significant core damage or spent fuel sabotage.

ADD new Rule text and Considerations to Table 2:

Current Requirement	Proposed Requirement	Considerations
	<b>73.55(b)(7)(i)</b> In addition to the access authorization program required above, and the fitness-for-duty program required in part 26 of this chapter, each licensee shall develop and implement an insider mitigation program.	This proposed requirement would be added to establish the insider mitigation program (IMP). The licensee's IMP should integrate specific elements of the licensee AA and FFD programs to focus those elements on identifying potential insider threats and denying the opportunity for an insider to gain or retain access at an NRC licensed facility.

	73.55(b)(7)(ii) The insider mitigation program must be designed to oversee and monitor the initial and continuing trustworthiness and reliability of any individual granted or retaining unescorted access authorization to a protected or vital area and implement defense-in- depth methodologies to minimize the potential for an insider to adversely affect, either directly or indirectly, the licensee capability to prevent significant core damage or spent fuel sabotage.	This proposed requirement would be added to provide a performance based requirement for the design and content of the IMP. The Commission has concluded that, by itself, the initial determination of trustworthiness and reliability is not adequate to minimize the potential opportunity for an insider to gain or retain access, and that only through continual re-evaluation of the information obtained through these processes can the licensee provide the level of assurance necessary. The Commission has also determined that defense-in- depth would be provided through the integration of physical protection measures with access authorization and fitness-for-duty program elements, to ensure the licensee capability to identify and mitigate the potential activities of an insider, such as, but not limited to, tampering. The Commission does not intend that a licensee would limit the IMP to any one or more elements, but rather that the licensee would identify and add additional elements as necessary to ensure the site's IMP satisfies the performance requirements specified by the Commission.
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	The Commission has determined that no one element of the physical protection program, access authorization program, or fitness-for-duty program would, by itself, provide the level of protection against the insider necessary to meet the performance objective of the proposed paragraph (b) and therefore, the effective integration of these three programs is a necessary requirement to achieve defense-in-depth against the potential insider.
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NRC Form 754) to the list of sections and forms with Office of Management of Management Budget (OMB) information collection requirements. A corrective

revision to § 73.8 would also be made to reflect OMB approval of existing

information collection requirements for NRC Form 366 under existing § 73.71.

Section 73.70, "Records" would be revised to reference the appropriate revised paragraph numbers in proposed § 73.55 regarding the need to retain a record of the registry of visitors.

Additionally, § 73.81(b), "Criminal penalties" which sets forth the sections within Part 73 that are not subject to criminal sanctions under the AEA, would remain unchanged since willful violations of the newly proposed §§ 73.18, 73.19, and 73.58 may be subject to criminal sanctions.

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Appendix B and Appendix C to Part 73 require special treatment in this rulemaking to preserve, with a minimum of conforming changes, the current requirements for licensees and applicants to whom this proposed rule would not apply. Accordingly, section I through V of Appendix B would remain unchanged, and the proposed new language for power reactors would be added as section VI. Appendix C would be divided into two sections, with Section I maintaining all current requirements, and Section II containing all proposed requirements related to power reactors.

## II. Rulemaking Initiation

On July 19, 2004, NRC staff issued a memorandum entitled "Status of Security-Related Rulemaking" (accession number ML041180532) to inform the Commission of plans to close former security-related actions and replace them with a comprehensive rulemaking plan to modify physical protection requirements for power reactors. This memorandum described rulemaking efforts that were suspended by the terrorist activities of September 11, 2001, and summarized the security-related actions taken following the attack. In response to this memorandum, the Commission directed the staff in an August 23, 2004, Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM) (COMSECY-04-0047, accession number ML042360548) to forego the development of a rulemaking plan, and provide a schedule for the completion of security-related rulemakings. The staff provided this schedule to the Commission by memorandum dated November 16, 2004 (accession number ML043060572). Subsequently, the staff revised its plans to amend the Part 73 security requirements to include a requirement for licensees to assess and manage site activities that could compromise either safety or security (i.e., the safety/security interface requirements). This revision is discussed in a memorandum dated July 29, 2005 (accession number ML051800350). Finally, by memorandum dated September 29, 2005 (COMSECY-05-0046, accession number ML052710167), the staff discussed its plans to incorporate select provisions of the EPAct 2005 into the power reactor security requirements rulemaking. In COMSECY-05-0046, dated November 1, 2005 (accession number ML053050439), the Commission approved the staff's approach in incorporating the select provisions of EPAct 2005.

III. Proposed Regulationsnote: Side 52 of EMetThis section describes significant provisions of this rulemaking:Is AEA of registreeIs AEA of registreeIs AEA of registree

1. <u>EPAct 2005 weapons requirements</u>. The new §§ 73.18 and 73.19 would contain the transfer requirements to implement provisions of Sec. 161A. of the AEA. In § 73.18, the NRC would propose firearms background check requirements and would also propose a new NRC Form 754 for licensee security personnel's submission to transfer accomplish these firearms background checks under the FBI's NICS database. In § 73.19, the NRC would propose requirements to support a licensee obtaining enhanced weapons under an ATF firearms license. <u>Safety/Security interface requirements</u>. These requirements are located in proposed § 73.58. The safety/security requirements are intended to explicitly require licensee coordination of potential adverse interactions between security activities and other plant activities that could compromise either plant security or plant safety. The proposed requirements would direct licensees to assess and manage these interactions so that neither safety nor security is compromised. These proposed requirements address, in part, a Petition for Rulemaking (PRM 50-80) that requested the establishment of regulations governing proposed changes to the facilities which could adversely affect the protection against radiological sabotage.

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- 3. <u>EPAct 2005 additional requirements</u>. The EPAct 2005 requirements that would be implemented by this proposed rulemaking, in addition to the weapons-related additions described above, consist of new requirements to perform force-onforce exercises, and to mitigate potential conflicts of interest that could influence the results of NRC-observed force-on-force exercises. These proposed new requirements would be included in proposed § 73.55 and Appendix C to Part 73.
  - 4. <u>Accelerated notification and revised four-hour reporting requirements</u>. This proposed rule contains accelerated security notification requirements (i.e., within 15 minutes) in proposed § 73.71 and Appendix G to Part 73 for attacks and imminent threats to power reactors. The proposed accelerated notification requirements are similar to what was provided to the industry in NRC Bulletin 2005-02, "Emergency Preparedness and Response Actions for Security-Based Events," dated July 18, 2005. The proposed rule also contains two new four-

hour reporting requirements. The proposed rule would direct licensees to report to the NRC information pertaining to suspicious activities as described in the proposed requirement. The proposed rule would also include a new four-hour reporting requirement for tampering events that do not meet the current threshold for one-hour reporting.

<u>Mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel requirements</u>. These requirements would be incorporated into proposed § 73.55 for licensees who propose to use MOX fuel in their reactor(s). These proposed requirements are in lieu of unnecessarily rigorous Part 73 requirements (e.g., §§ 73.45 and 73.46), which would otherwise apply because of the mixed oxide (MOX) fuel's low plutonium content and the weight and size of the MOX fuel assemblies. The proposed MOX fuel security requirements are intended to be consistent with the approach implemented by  $\omega^{+}$ Catawba through the MOX lead test assembly effort.

Nuclear Station

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<u>Cyber-security requirements</u>. This proposed rule would contain more detailed programmatic requirements for addressing cyber security at power reactors, which build on the requirements imposed by the February 2002 ørder. The proposed cyber-security requirements are designed to be consistent with ongoing industry cyber-security efforts.

<u>Mitigating strategies</u>. The proposed rule would require licensees to develop specific guidance and strategies to maintain or restore core cooling, containment, and spent fuel pool cooling capabilities using existing or readily available resources (equipment and personnel) that can be effectively

rule would also add new requirements, including predefined provisions for the suspension of safeguards measures for severe weather conditions that could result in life-threatening situations for security personnel (e.g., tornadoes, floods, and hurricanes), and reduced overly-prescriptive requirements through the inclusion of performance-based language to allow flexibility in the methods used to accomplish requirements.

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IV. Section-by-Section Analysis

This proposed rulemaking would implement new weapons requirements that stem from the EPAct 2005. This is the only portion of this proposed rulemaking that involves facilities other than nuclear power reactors. The newly proposed weapons requirements would apply to power reactors and facilities authorized to possess a formula quantity or greater of strategic special nuclear material whose security plans are governed by §§ 73.20, 73.45, and 73.46. The new requirements would be in three different sections and an NRC Form:

Revised proposed § 73.2 "Definitions"

Proposed § 73.18, "Firearms background checks for armed security personnel"
 Proposed § 73.19, "Authorization for use of enhanced weapons"

 Proposed NRC Form 754, "Armed Security Personnel Background Check"
 Proposed § 73.18 would contain requirements that implement provisions of new Sec. 161A. of the AEA (under Sec. 653 of the EPAct 2005) concerning firearms background checks for armed security personnel. This new section would require background checks that include fingerprinting and checks against the FBI's NICS. Security personnel protecting power reactors and Category I SSNM facilities are currently subject to background checks, including fingerprints, because they have unescorted access at such facilities. However, these security

personnel have not previously been subject to a check against the NICS database because the access authorization background checks were not intended to perform the entire scope of checks required for firearms possession. Although licensee security personnel possessing weapons have always had to comply with the federal regulations for firearms possession, the NRC did not have the authority to perform these checks. This proposed requirement would provide a process for conducting the NICS checks.

Implementation of the proposed § 73.18 background checks would be via proposed NRC Form 754, which armed security personnel would be required to complete. The NRC would forward the NRC Form 754 information to the FBI for evaluation, and upon completion of the FBI evaluation, inform licensees of the result. The result would be either "proceed," (as defined in 28 CFR Paid 25)" "denied," or "delayed." Proposed § 73.18 would be structured to readily enable revisions in the future, should NRC decide to expand the proposed rulemaking provisions to apply to other types of facilities and licensees.

Proposed § 73.19 would contain requirements that implement provisions of new Sec. 161A. of the AEA concerning the use of enhanced weapons to protect facilities, radioactive material, or other property as determined by the Commission. The proposed § 73.19 would authorize (not require) power reactors and facilities authorized to possess formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material (i.e., Category I SSNM) to incorporate the use of enhanced weapons into their protective strategy. Affected Category I licensees would include production facilities, spent fuel reprocessing or recycling facilities, fuel fabrication facilities, and uranium enrichment facilities. However, this would not include hot cell facilities, independent spent fuel storage installations, monitored retrievable storage installations, and a geologic repository operations area. The NRC plans to address whether the deployment of enhanced weapons is appropriate for these and other types of facilities, radioactive material, or other property in separate rulemaking(s). Furthermore, Sec. 161A. of the AEA takes effect upon the issuance of guidelines by the Commission, with the approval of the Attorney General. As indicated previously, the Commission intends to provide public notice of the issuance of these guidelines in a separate *Federal Register* notice to be published no later than the final rule on this action.

To implement the new weapons provisions, three new terms would be added to § 73.2: covered weapon, enhanced weapon, and standard weapon.

>The proposed new weapons requirements and supporting discussion for the proposed language are set forth in more detail (including the proposed new definitions) in Table 1.

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IV.2. Section 73.55, "Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage."

Proposed § 73.55 contains security program requirements for power reactor licensees. The security program requirements in § 73.55 would apply to all nuclear power plant licensees that hold a 10 CFR Part 50 license and to applicants who are applying for either a Part 50 license or a Part 52 combined license. Paragraph (a) of § 73.55 would identify the licensees and applicants for which the requirements apply, and the need for submitting to NRC (for review and approval) a "Physical Security Plan," a "Training and Qualification Plan," and a "Safeguards Contingency Plan." Paragraph (b) of § 73.55 would set forth the performance objectives that govern power reactor security programs. The remaining paragraphs of § 73.55 would implement the detailed requirements for each of the security plans, as well as for the various features of physical security.

This section would be extensively revised in an effort to make generically applicable security requirements imposed by Commission orders issued after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, based upon experience and insights gained by the Commission during implementation, fulfill certain provisions of the Energy Policy Act-of-2005, and add several new

requirements that resulted from evaluation insights from implementation of the security orders, review of site security plans, and implementation of the enhanced baseline inspection program and force-on-force exercises. The proposed regulations would require an integrated security plan that begins at the owner controlled area boundary and would implement defense-in-depth concepts and protective strategies based on protecting target sets from the various attributes of the design basis threat. Notable additions to the proposed § 73.55 are summarized below:

#### Cyber Security Requirements

The current security regulations do not contain requirements related to cyber security. Subsequent to the events of September 11, 2001, the NRC issued orders to require power reactor licensees to implement measures to enhance cyber security. These security measures required an assessment of cyber systems and the implementation of corrective measures sufficient to provide protection against the cyber threats at the time the orders were issued.

The proposed requirements maintain the intent of the security order by establishing the requirement for a cyber security program to protect any system that, if compromised, can adversely impact safety, security or emergency preparedness.

Requirements for CAS and SAS to Have Functionally Equivalent Capabilities

#### Such That No Single Act Can Disable the Function of CAS and SAS

Current regulatory requirements ensure that both CAS and SAS have equivalent alarm annunciation and communication capabilities, but do not explicitly require equivalent assessment, monitoring, observation, and surveillance capabilities. Further, the current requirement of § 73.55(e)(1) states "All alarms required pursuant to this part must annunciate in a continuously manned central alarm station located within the protected area and in at least one other continuously manned station not necessarily onsite, so that a single act cannot remove the capability of calling for assistance or otherwise responding to an alarm." The Commission orders added enhanced detection and assessment capabilities, but did not require

equivalent capabilities for both CAS and SAS. The security plans approved by the Commission on October 29, 2004, varied, due to the performance-based nature of the requirements, with respect to how the individual licensees implemented these requirements, but all sites were required to provide a CAS and SAS with functionally equivalent capabilities to support the implementation of the site protective strategy.

The proposed rule extends the requirement for no single act to remove capabilities to the key functions required of the alarm stations and would require licensees to implement protective measures such that a single act would not disable the intrusion detection, assessment, and communications capabilities of both the CAS and SAS. This proposed requirement would ensure continuity of response operations during a security event by ensuring that the detection, assessment, and communications functions required to effectively implement the licensee's protective strategy are maintained despite the loss of one or the other alarm station. For the purposes of assessing the regulatory burden of this proposed rule, the NRC assumed that all licensees would require assessments and approximately one third of the licensees would choose to implement hardware modifications.

The NRC has concluded that protecting the alarm stations such that a single act does not disable the key functions would provide an enhanced level of assurance that a licensee can maintain detection, assessment and communications capabilities required to protect the facility against the design basis threat of radiological sabotage. For new reactor licensees, licensed after the publication of this rule, the Commission would require CAS and SAS to be designed, constructed, and equipped with equivalent standards.

### Uninterruptible Power for Intrusion Detection and Assessment Systems

Current regulatory requirements require back-up power for alarm annunciation and nonportable communication equipment, but do not require this back-up power to be uninterruptible. Although not specifically required, many licensees have installed uninterruptible power to their security systems for added reliability of these electronic systems. However, the Commission has not required uninterruptible power for assessment systems. For the purposes of assessing the regulatory burden of this proposed rule, the NRC assumed that only a small number of licensees would require hardware modifications to meet this proposed requirement.

Through implementation of the Commission-approved security plans, baseline inspections, and force-on-force testing, the NRC has concluded that uninterruptible back-up power would provide an enhanced level of assurance that a licensee can maintain detection, assessment and communication capabilities required to protect the facility against the design basis threat of radiological sabotage. This new requirement would reduce the risk of losing detection, assessment, and communication capabilities during a loss of the normal power supply.

#### "Video-Capture" Capability

Current regulatory requirements address the use of closed circuit television systems, but do not explicitly require them. Although not specifically required, all licensees have adopted the use of video surveillance in their site security plans. Many of the licensees have adopted advanced video surveillance technology to provide real-time and play-back/recorded video images to assist security personnel in determining the cause of an alarm annunciation. For the purposes of assessing the regulatory burden of this proposed rule, the NRC assumed that a small percentage of licensees would require hardware modifications to comply with this proposed requirement for advanced video surveillance technology.

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Through implementation of the Commission-approved security plans, baseline inspections, and force-on-force testing, the NRC has concluded that advanced video technology would provide an enhanced level of assurance that a licensee can assess the cause of an alarm annunciation and initiate a timely response capable of defending the facility against

2001. Licensees have always been required to ensure that any changes to safety functions, systems, programs, and activities do not have unintended consequences on other facility safety functions, systems, programs, and activities. Likewise, licensees have been required to ensure that any changes to security functions, systems, programs, and activities do not have unintended consequences on other facility security functions, systems, programs, and activities. However, the Commission has concluded that the pace, number, and complexity of these security changes warrant the establishment of a more formal program to ensure licensees  $\chi$  properly assess the safety/security interface in implementing these changes.

On April 28, 2003, the Union of Concerned Scientists and the San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace submitted a petition for rulemaking (PRM-50-80) requesting that, in part, the NRC's regulations establishing conditions of licenses and requirements for evaluating proposed changes, tests, and experiments for nuclear power plants be amended to require licensee evaluation of whether the proposed changes, tests, and experiments cause protection against radiological sabotage to be decreased and, if so, that the changes, tests, and experiments only be conducted with prior NRC approval. In SECY-05-0048, dated March 28, 2005, the NRC staff recommended that the Commission approve rulemaking for the requested action, but did not necessarily endorse the specific amendments suggested by the petition. In SECY-05-0048, dated June 28, 2005, the Commission directed the staff to develop the technical basis for such a rule and to incorporate its provisions within the ongoing power reactor security requirements rulemaking. This proposed rule addresses, in part, the petitioner's request by incorporating proposed § 73.58 within this rulemaking.

The Commission has determined that the proposed safety/security interface rule requirements are necessary because the current regulations do not specifically require evaluation of the effects of plant changes on security or the effects of security changes on plant safety. Further, current regulations do not require communication about the implementation and timing of changes, which would promote awareness of the effects of changing facility conditions and result in appropriate assessment and response.

The NRC is aware of a number of occurrences of adverse safety/security interactions at nuclear power plants over the years to justify consideration of a new rule. Examples of adverse interactions include: (1) Inadvertent security barrier breaches while performing maintenance activities (e.g., cutting of pipes that provided uncontrolled access to vital areas, removing ventilation fans or other equipment from vital area boundary walls without taking compensatory measures to prevent uncontrolled access into vital areas); (2) Blockage of bullet resisting enclosure's (or other defensive firing position's) fields of fire; (3) Erection of scaffolding and other equipment without due consideration of its impact on the site's applicable physical protection strategy; and (4) Staging of temporary equipment within security isolation zones.

Security could also adversely affect operations because of inadequate staffing of security force personnel on backshifts, weekends, and holidays, to support operations during emergencies (e.g., opening and securing vital area access doors to allow operations personnel timely access to safety-related equipment). Also, security structures, such as vehicle barriers, delay barriers, rerouted isolation zones, or defensive shields could adversely affect plant equipment such as valve pits, fire stations, other prepositioned emergency equipment, blowout panels, or otherwise interfere with operators responding to plant events.

The NRC considered many factors in developing this proposed new requirement. One of the factors considered is that existing change processes are focused on specific areas of plant activities, and that implementation of these processes is generally well understood by licensees. An example is found in § 50.54(p), which provides that a reactor licensee may make changes to its safeguards contingency plans without Commission approval provided that the changes do not decrease the safeguards effectiveness of the plan. Similarly, § 50.65(a)(4) provides that a reactor licensee shall assess and manage the increase in risk that may result

from proposed maintenance activities. However, neither §§ 50.54(p) (security) nor 50.65(a)(4) (safety) require that an assessment for potential adverse impacts on safety/security interface be made before the proposed changes are implemented. The proposed § 73.58 would address this gap by requiring that, before implementing allowed changes, licensees must assess the changes with respect to the safety/security interface and, if potential adverse interactions are identified, take appropriate compensatory and/or mitigative action before making the changes.

The proposed rule reflects a performance-based approach and language which is sufficiently broad that, in addition to operating power reactors, it could be applied to other classes of licensees in separate rulemaking(s), if conditions warrant. In addition to the requirements in proposed § 73.58, a new definition for safety/security interface would be added to § 73.2.

Table 4 sets forth the proposed § 73.58 language and provides the supporting discussion for the proposed language, including a new definition for *safety/security interface* that would be added to § 73.2.

#### IV.5. Section 73.71 "Reporting of safeguards events."

The events of September 11, 2001, emphasized the need for the capability to respond to coordinated attacks that could pose an imminent threat to national infrastructure such as nuclear power reactor sites. Prompt licensee notification to the NRC of a security event involving an actual or imminent threat would initiate the NRC's alerting mechanism for other nuclear facilities in recognition that an attack or threat against a single facility may be the prelude to attacks or threats against multiple facilities. In either case, timely communication of this event to the NRC, and the NRC's communication of the threat or attack to other licensees could reduce the adversaries ability to engage in coordinated attacks and would strengthen the licensees' response posture. NRC would also initiate notifications to the Homeland

Security/Federal response networks for an "Incident of National Significance," as defined by the National Response Plan (NRP).

Currently, § 73.71(b)(1) requires power reactor licensees to notify the NRC within one hour of discovery, as described in Paragraph I of Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 73, "Reportable safeguards events." In addition, § 50.72 establishes reporting requirements for events requiring an emergency declaration in accordance with a licensee's emergency plan. Licensee notification under § 50.72(a)(3) is required only after the threat is assessed, an "Emergency Class" is declared, and initial notification of appropriate State and local agencies are completed first (i.e., not upon discovery). The current timing of requirements of this notification would not allow the NRC to warn other licensees of a potential threat to their facilities in a prompt manner to allow other licensees to change their security posture in advance of a threat or potential attack. The Commission has previously advised licensees of the need to expedite their initial notification to the NRC. The proposed accelerated notification requirements are similar to the provided to licensees in NRC Bulletin 2005-02, "Emergency Preparedness and Response Actions for Security-Based Events," dated July 18, 2005.

The proposed amendments to § 73.71 would add a new expedited notification requirement for licensees subject to the provisions of § 73.55 to notify the NRC Operations Center as soon as possible after the discovery of an imminent or actual threat against the facility as described in Appendix G, but not later than 15 minutes of discovery. The proposed amendments to § 73.71 and Appendix G would also add two additional four-hour notification requirements for suspicious events and tampering events not otherwise covered under Appendix G. The proposed § 73.71 would retain the requirement for the licensee to maintain a continuous communications channel for one-hour notifications upon request of the NRC. The proposed rule would not require a continuous communications channel for four-hour notifications, because of the lesser degree of urgency of these events. For 15-minute

Table 11 (See Section VIII) is a cross-reference showing where individual requirements of the current regulation would be in the proposed regulation.

IV.8. Appendix G to Part 73, "Reportable Safeguards Events."

Proposed Appendix G to Part 73 provides requirements regarding the reporting of safeguards events. Proposed Appendix G would contain changes to support the revised and accelerated reporting requirements which would be incorporated into this rulemaking.

Proposed Appendix G would also contain revised four-hour reporting requirements that would require licensees to report to the NRC information of suspicious surveillance activities, attempts at access or other information. Following September 11, 2001, the NRC issued guidance requesting that licensees report suspicious activities near their facilities to allow assessment by the NRC and other appropriate agencies. The proposed new reporting requirement will clarify this expectation to assure consistent reporting of this important information. Additionally, the proposed rule contains an additional four-hour reporting requirement for tampering events that do not meet the threshold for reporting under the current one-hour requirements. The proposed reporting requirements for tampering events will allow NRC assessment of these events. Table 8 sets forth the proposed amendments to Appendix G and provides the supporting discussion for the proposed language.

IV.9 Conforming and Corrective Changes.

The following conforming changes would also be made: §§ 50.34 and 50.54 (references to the correct paragraphs of revised Appendix C of Part 73), § 50.72 (changes to § 73.71 reports), §§ 72.212 and 73.70 (references to the correct paragraphs due to renumbering of § 73.55), and § 73.8 (adding § 73.18, § 73.19, and revised to reflect new NRC form 754 to

reflect recordkeeping or reporting burden). A corrective change would also be made to § 73.8 to reflect an existing recordkeeping or reporting burden for NRC Form 366 under § 73.71. However, no changes would be made to § 73.81(b) (due to the new §§ 73.18, 73.19, and 73.58), because willful violations of §§ 73.18, 73.19, and 73.58 may be subject to criminal penalties.

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# Table 1 - Proposed Sections 73.18 and 73.19

Firearms background check for armed security personnel and authorization for use of enhanced weapons.

PROPOSED LANGUAGE	CONSIDERATIONS
§ 73.18 Firearms background check for armed security	This new section would implement the firearms background
personnel.	check requirements of the new § 161A.b. of the Atomic Energy
	Act of 1954, as amended
(a) Introduction. (1) Licensees and certificate holders listed	This section would require a firearms background check for all
under paragraph (b) of this section shall ensure that a firearms	security personnel with access to covered weapons (i.e.,
background check is completed in accordance with this section	armed duties) [see also new definition of covered weapon in
for all security personnel assigned duties requiring access to a	§ 73.2 at the end of this Table]. These background checks
covered weapon at the licensee's or certificate holder's facility.	would only be required for security personnel who are
	protecting certain Commission-regulated facilities [specified in
	paragraph (b)].
$\left[ \left[ \left$	The Commission considers duties "requiring access to any
	covered weapon" would include such duties as: security
	operations and training and weapons' maintenance, handling
	accountability, transport, and use.

§ 73.18(a)(2) Licensees and certificate holders are not	Licensees and certificate holders would not be required to	
required to reperform a firearms background check for security	repeat firearms background checks for personnel assigned	
personnel who have been employed by the licensee or	armed duties at their facility as of the effective date of a final	
certificate holder (or a contractor thereto) and previously	rule. This discretion would apply to security personnel	
completed a firearms background check under the provisions	employed at the licensee's or certificate holder's facility and who have previously completed a firearms background check as required by an order issued under the authority of § 161A.	
of Sec. 161A. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended,		
after [insert date of publication of the Sec. 161A. guidelines in		
the Federal Register].	of the AEA. The security personnel may be employed directly	
	by the licensee or certificate holder or by a contractor to the	
na segura da parte de la companya d La companya de la comp	licensee or certificate holder.	

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
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This paragraph would limit the firearms background checks to security personnel protecting two classes of Commissionregulated facilities. Therefore, this section would apply to all current power reactors and to two current fuel cycle facilities authorized to possess Category I SSNM. This section would also apply to future power reactor facilities and future Category I SSNM facilities, including: production facilities, spent fuel reprocessing or recycling facilities, fuel fabrication facilities (high-enriched uranium or MOX fuel), and uranium enrichment facilities. The Commission may consider applying this section to other types of reactor, byproduct material, or special nuclear material facilities (e.g., Category II or III SNM, hot cell, independent spent fuel storage, or geologic repository operations area

facilities) in separate rulemakings.

§ 73.18(c) Firearms background check. (1) Licensees and certificate holders described in paragraph (b) of this section shall ensure that each person who receives, possesses, transports, or uses a covered weapon in their official duties completes a firearms background check. The firearms background check must verify whether security personnel are prohibited from shipping, transporting, possessing, or receiving a covered weapon under applicable Federal or State law. The background check must include -(i) The submission of fingerprints; and (ii) A check under the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI's) National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS) database established pursuant to Sec. 103.(b) of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act. •• .

This paragraph would require licensees and certificate holders to ensure that security personnel with "armed duties" shall first complete a firearms background check. This check would verify that such security personnel are not prohibited from possessing or receiving firearms under applicable laws. The requirement to perform background checks of armed security personnel at NRC-regulated entities against the Brady Bill (i.e., NICS) database arises from § 161A. of the AEA. Handau The background check would consist of two parts as required by § 161A. of the AEA. . . . A start of the sta

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	(c)(1)(i) How the physical protection	This requirement would be added to
	program will prevent significant core	describe the performance based
	damage and spent fuel sabotage	requirement to be met by the physical
	through the establishment and	protection program and the basic
	maintenance of a security organization,	elements of the system that must be
	the use of security equipment and	described in the security plans.
	technology, the training and qualification	<pre></pre>
	of security personnel, and the	
· · · · · ·	implementation of predetermined	
 	response plans and strategies; and	
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	(c)(1)(ii) Site-specific conditions that	This requirement would be added to
	affect implementation of Commission	reflect the Commission's view that
	requirements.	licensees must focus attention on site-
· .		specific conditions in the development and
		implementation of site plans, procedures,
		processes, response strategies, and
		ultimately, the licensee capability to
		achieve the performance objective of the
	and the second	proposed (b)(1).
	(c)(2) Protection of security plans. The	This requirement would be added $+_{O}$
	licensee shall protect the approved	emphasize the requirements for the
	security plans and other related	protection of safeguards information in
	safeguards information against	accordance with the requirements of
	unauthorized disclosure in accordance	§ 73.21.
	with the requirements of § 73.21.	
	(c)(3) Physical Security Plan.	This header would be added for formatting
		purposes.

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		be authorized are governed by State laws
		and nothing in this proposed rule should
		be interpreted to mean or require anything
		that would contradict such state law. The
		term "it" is replaced with the phrase
		"deadly force" to more clearly described
		the action described.
· .	(k)(3) The licensee shall provide an	This requirement would be added to
	armed response team consisting of both	provide a performance based requirement
	armed responders and armed security	that would retain the current requirement
	officers to carry out response duties,	for armed responders and add a category
	within predetermined time lines.	of armed security officer to clarify the
		division of types of armed response
		personnel and their roles.
	(k)(3)(i) Armed Responders.	This header would be added for formatting
		purposes.
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This requirement would be retained and (k)(3)(i)(A) The licensee shall determine § 73.55(h)(3) The total number of guards, and armed, trained personnel the minimum number of armed immediately available at the facility to responders necessary to protect against fulfill these response requirements shall the design basis threat described in nominally be ten (10), unless specifically § 73.1(a), subject to Commission required otherwise on a case by case approval, and shall document this number in the approved security plans. basis by the Commission; however, this number may not be reduced to less than five (5) guards.

revised to remove the specific minimum numbers of 10 but no less than 5, to provide a performance based requirement that meets the proposed requirement of (k)(1)(i). This proposed requirement would enure that the licensee would provide the requisite number of armed responders needed to carry-out the protective strategy the effectiveness of which would be evaluated through annual exercises and triennial exercises observed by the Commission.

	standardized, objective test to facilitate
	psychological re-assessments that wou
	be required under proposed
	§ 73.56(i)(1)(v). Comparing scores on
	standardized, objective test to identify
	indications of any adverse changes in t
	individual's psychological status is
	simplified when the testing that is
	performed for a re-assessment is simila
	or the same as previous testing that wa
	conducted under this section, particular
	when the clinician who conducts the re-
	assessment did not conduct the previo
	testing.
	The proposed paragraph would also
 l	require

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		licensees, applicants, and C/Vs to establish thresholds in interpreting the results of the
		psychological test, to aid in determining
		whether an individual would be required to $+b$
		interviewed by a psychiatrist or licensed
	:	clinical psychologist under proposed
;		paragraph (e)(4)(ii) of this section.
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		history evaluation is completed.
		The proposed rule would not would
		establish employment history requirements
		for individuals whose UAA has been
		interrupted for 30 or fewer days. Proposed
		§ 73.56(h)(3) would require the entities who
		are subject to this section to obtain and
		review a personal history disclosure from
a da anti- 1990 - Anti-Anti-Anti-Anti-Anti-Anti-Anti-Anti-	provide the second s	the applicant for UAA that would address
	en e	the period since the individual's last period
		of UAA was terminated. However, the
	and the second	licensee, applicant, or C/V would be
		permitted to forego conducting an
	a kasi Mastri Jit	employment history evaluation for
		individuals whose UAA has been
		interrupted for such a short period,
		because there would be little to be learned

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(3) The licensee shall base its decision	(h)(8) Determination basis. The	Proposed § 73.56(h)(8) would amend but
to grant, deny, revoke, or continue an	licensee's, applicant's, or C/V's	retain the meaning of current § 73.56(b)(3)
unescorted access authorization on	reviewing official shall determine	which requires licensees to base a decision
review and evaluation of all pertinent	whether to grant, deny, unfavorably	to grant, deny, revoke, or continue UAA or
information developed.	terminate, or maintain or amend an	review and evaluation of all pertinent
	individual's unescorted access	information developed. The terms used in
	authorization status, based on an	the proposed paragraph, such as
•	evaluation of all pertinent information	"unfavorably terminate" to replace "revoke
	that has been gathered about the	and "maintain" to replace "continue," woul
	individual as a result of any application	be updated for consistency with the terms
	for unescorted access authorization or	currently used by the industry and in other
	developed during or following in any	portions of the proposed section. In
	period during which the individual	addition, the proposed paragraph would
	maintained unescorted access	include references to the reviewing officia
	authorization. The licensee's,	rather than the licensee, to convey more

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	appendix A to this part. Footnote: 2.		especially if this event is the opening
	Notifications to the NRC for the		action on an ineffectively coordinated
	declaration of an emergency class s	hail	multiple-target attack. Such notice may
	be performed in accordance with § 5	50.72	permit other licensees to escalate to a
	of this chapter.		higher protective level in advance of an
			attack: The Commission would expect
			licensees to notify the NRC Operations
1 		•	Center as soon as possible after they
			notify local law enforcement agencies,
	$\left\{ \phi_{1,1}^{(1)} \right\} \in \left\{ \phi_{1,1}^{(1)} \right\} $		but within 15 minutes, The Commission
1		' .	may consider the applicability of this
•• : •			requirement to other types of licensees i
- - -		•	future rulemaking.
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		Footnote 1 would provide a cross
		reference to Appendix to Part 73 which
		contains NRC contact information.
		Footnote 2 would remind licensees of
		their concurrent emergency declaration
		responsibilities under 10 CFR 50.72.
	(a)(1) When making a report under	The proposed rule would include this
	paragraph (a) of this section, the	introductory statement, which provides a
	licensees shall:	structure for the following list of
		information to be provided in the 15-
		minute report.
	(a)(1)(i) Identify the facility name; and	This requirement would be added to
		ensure the licensee's facility is clearly
		identified when a report is made.
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Appendix B, Paragraph I.B.2.a.	B.3.a. Armed and unarmed members of the	This requirement to demonstrate good
Individuals whose security tasks and job	security organization shall demonstrate the	judgement, ability to implement
duties are directly associated with the	ability to apply good judgment, mental	instructions/tasks, and to communicate
effective implementation of the licensee	alertness, the capability to implement	would be retained. The phrase
physical security and contingency plans	instructions and assigned tasks, and	"Individuals whose security tasks and job
shall demonstrate mental alertness and	possess the acuity of senses and ability of	duties are directly associated with the
the capability to exercise good	expression sufficient to permit accurate	effective implementation of the licensee
judgment, implement instructions,	communication by written, spoken, audible,	physical security and contingency plans"
assimilate assigned security tasks, and	visible, or other signals required by	would be replaced with the phrase
possess the acuity of senses and ability	assigned duties and responsibilities.	"Armed and unarmed members of the
of expression sufficient to permit		security organization" to describe the
accurate communication by written,	la de la construcción de la constru La construcción de la construcción d	requirement that these mental
spoken, audible, visible, or other signals		requirements are minimum standards
required by assigned job duties.		that must apply to both armed and
		unarmed security personnel because.
		they share similar duties and
		responsibilities for the physical protection
		of the site.

individuals, and central alarm station operators, in addition to meeting the requirement stated in Paragraph a. above, shall have no emotional instability that would interfere with the effective performance of assigned security job duties. The determination shall be made by a licensed psychologist or psychiatrist, or physician, or other person professionally

trained to identify emotional instability.

Appendix B, Paragraph I.B.2.b. Armed B.3.b. A licensed clinical psychologist. psychiatrist, or physician trained in part to identify emotional instability shall determine whether armed members of the security organization in addition to meeting the requirement stated in Paragraph a. of this section, have no emotional instability that would interfere with the effective performance of assigned duties and responsibilities.

The requirement regarding emotional instability would be retained. The phrase "Armed individuals, and central alarm station operators" would be replaced with the phrase "armed members of the security organization" for consistency with the terminology used in the

## proposed rule.

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			or intelligence gathering efforts. Events
			reported under paragraphs I or II would
			require a followup written report. Events
			reported paragraph III would not require a
	· •		followup written report.
		I. Events to be reported as soon as possible,	Paragraph I would be added to establish
		but no later than 15 minutes after discovery,	the types events to be reported within 15
	•	followed by a written report within sixty (60)	minutes. Because the identification of
		days.	information relating to an actual or
		adaran Ali Marina Ali Andrea Ali	potential threat could quickly result in an
		(a) The initiation of a security response	event, which may necessitate expedited
		consistent with a licensee's physical security	Commission action (e.g., notification of
		plan, safeguards contingency plan, or	other licensees or Federal authorities), a
ļ		defensive strategy based on actual or	shorten reporting time would be required.
		imminent threat against a nuclear power plant.	This proposed requirement would also
		•	ensure that threat-related information
			would be made available to the
			Commission's threat assessment process

	in a timely manner. Initiation of response
	consistent with plans and the defensive
	strategy that are not related to an
	imminent or actual threat against the
	facility would not need to be reported (e.g
	false, or nuisance responses). Additional
	information regarding identification of
	events to be reported would be provided
	in guidance.
I.(b) The licensee is not required to report	This provision would be added to reduce
security responses initiated as a result of	unnecessary regulatory burden on the
information communicated to the licensee by	licensees to notify the Commission of
the Commission, such as the threat warning	security responses initiated in response
system addressed in Appendix C to this part.	to communications from the Commission
;	(e.g., changes to the threat level).

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I. Events to be reported within one	II. Events to be reported within one (1) hour of	This requirement would be retained and
hour of discovery, followed by a	discovery, followed by a written report within	renumbered.
written report within 60 days.	sixty (60) days.	
(a) Any event in which there is	II.(a) Any event in which there is reason to	This requirement would be retained with
reason to believe that a person has	believe that a person has committed or	minor revision and renumbered. The
committed or caused, or attempted	caused, or attempted to commit or cause, or	term credible would be removed. The
to commit or cause, or has made a	has made a threat to commit or cause:	Commission's view is that a
credible threat to commit or cause:		determination of the "credibility" of a
	· · ·	threat is not a licensee responsibility, but
		rests with the Commission and the
		intelligence community.
(1) A theft or unlawful diversion of	II.(a)(1) A theft or unlawful diversion of special	This requirement would be retained and
special nuclear material; or	nuclear material; or	renumbered.
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(2) Significant physical damage to	II.(a)(2) Significant physical damage to any	This requirement would be retained with
a power reactor or any facility	NRC-regulated power reactor or facility	minor editorial changes to improve clarity
possessing SSNM or its equipment	possessing strategic special nuclear material	and readability and renumbered. The
or carrier equipment transporting	or to carrier equipment transporting nuclear	phrase "NRC-regulated" would be added
nuclear fuel or spent nuclear fuel, or	fuel, or to the nuclear fuel or spent nuclear fuel	to specify that all Commission licensed
to the nuclear fuel or spent nuclear	facility which is possessed by a carrier; or	facilities and transport would be covered
fuel a facility or carrier possesses;		by this requirement. This change would
or		simplify the language in this section while
	or open vulear fuel	retaining the basic requirement.
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(d) The actual or attempted	II.(d) The actual or attempted introduction of	This requirement would be renumbered
introduction of contraband into a	contraband into any area or transport for which	and revised to delete the previously
protected area, material access	the licensee is required by Commission	specifically mentioned areas requiring
area, vital area, or transport.	regulations to control access.	access controls and change the language
		to include the actual or attempted entry of
		an unauthorized individual into any area
		or transport required to be controlled by
•		Commission regulations (see
		considerations for paragraph II.(b)
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •		above). Additional information
		regarding identification of events to be
		reported will be provided in guidance.
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NRC Information Assessment Team	III. Events to be reported within four (4) hours	This paragraph would add a requirement
(IAT) Advisories dated October 16,	of discovery. No written followup report is	for power reactor licensees to report
and November 15, 2001; May 20,	required.	suspicious activities, attempts at access,
2003; March1, 2004; and October		etc., that may indicate pre-operational
5, 2005.	(a) Any other information received by the	surveillance, reconnaissance, or
	licensee of suspicious surveillance activities,	intelligence gathering targeted against
	attempts at access; or other information,	the facility. This change would more
	including: to open ended.	accurately reflect the current threat
FBI's "Terrorist Threats to the U.S.	including: too open ended. I too open anded in the provident	environment; would assist the
Homeland: Reporting Guide for	(1) Any security-related incident involving	Commission in evaluating threats to
Critical and Key Resource Owners	suspicious activity that may be indicative of	multiple licensees; and would assist the
and Operators" dated January 24,	potential pre-operational surveillance,	intelligence and homeland security
2005, (Official Use Only).	reconnaissance, or intelligence-gathering	communities in evaluating threats
	activities directed against the facility. Such	
	activity may include, but is not limited to,	

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V. Guidance

The NRC is preparing new regulatory guides that will contain detailed guidance on the implementation of the proposed rule requirements. These regulatory guides, currently under development, will consolidate and update or eliminate previous guidance that was used to develop, review, and approve the power reactor security plans that licensees revised in response to the post-September 11, 2001, security orders. Development of the regulatory guides is ongoing and the publication of the regulatory guides is planned after the publication of the final rule. Because this regulatory guidance may contain Safeguard Information (SGI) and/or classified information, these documents would only be available to those individuals with a need-to-know, and are qualified to have access to SGI and/or classified information, as  $h_{as}$  determined applicable. However, the NRC considers that access to these guidance documents is not necessary for the public or other stakeholders to provide informed comment on this proposed rule.

VI. Criminal Penalties

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For the purposes of Section 223 of the Atomic Energy Act, as amended, the Commission is proposing to amend 10 CFR Parts 50, 72, and 73 under Sections 161b, 161i, or 161o of the AEA. Criminal penalties, as they apply to regulations in Part 73, are discussed in § 73.81. The new §§ 73.18, 73.19, and 73.58 are issued under Sections 161b, 161i, or 161o of the AEA, and are not included in § 73.81(b).

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### VII. Compatibility of Agreement State Regulations

Under the "Policy Statement on Adequacy and Compatibility of Agreement States Programs," approved by the Commission on June 20, 1997, and published in the Federal Register (62 FR 46517; September 3, 1997), this rule is classified as compatibility "NRC." Compatibility is not required for Category "NRC" regulations. The NRC program elements in this category are those that relate directly to areas of regulation reserved to the NRC by the AEA or the provisions of Title 10 of the Code of *Federal Regulations* (10 CFR), and although an Agreement State may not adopt program elements reserved to NRC, it may wish to inform its licensees of certain requirements via a mechanism that is consistent with the particular State's administrative procedure laws, but does not confer regulatory authority on the State.

#### VIII. Availability of Documents.

The following table indicates which documents relating to this rulemaking are available to the public and how they may be obtained.

Public Document Room (PDR). The NRC's Public Document Room is located at the NRC's headquarters at 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD 20852.

Rulemaking Website (Web). The NRC's interactive rulemaking Website is located at http://ruleforum.llnl.gov. These documents may be viewed and downloaded electronically via this Website.

the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, based upon experience and insights gained by the Commission during implementation, (2) fulfill certain provisions of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, (3) add several new requirements that resulted from insights from implementation of the security orders, review of site security plans, and implementation of the enhanced baseline inspection program and force-on-force exercises, (4) update the regulatory framework in preparation for receiving license applications for new reactors, and (5) impose requirements to assess and manage site activities that can adversely affect safety and security. The proposed safety and security requirements would address, in part, a Petition for Rulemaking (PRM 50-80) that requested the establishment of regulations governing proposed changes to facilities which could adversely affect the protection against radiological sabotage.

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission is seeking public comment on the potential impact of the information collections contained in this proposed rule and on the following issues:

1. Is the proposed information collection necessary for the proper performance of the functions of the NRC, including whether the information will have practical

2. Is the estimate of burden accurate?

utility?

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3. Is there a way to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the information to be collected?

4. How can the burden of the information collection be minimized, including the use of automated collection techniques?

A copy of the OMB clearance package may be viewed free of charge at the NRC Public Document Room, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Room O-1 F21, Rockville, MD 20852. The OMB clearance package and rule are available at the NRC worldwide Web site: <u>http://www.nrc.gov/public-involve/doc-comment/omb/index.html</u> for 60 days after the signature date of this notice and are also available at the rule forum site, <u>http://ruleforum.llnl.gov</u>.

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Send comments on any aspect of these proposed information collections, including suggestions for reducing the burden and on the above issues, by (INSERT DATE 30 DAYS AFTER PUBLICATION IN THE *FEDERAL REGISTER*) to the Records and FOIA/Privacy Services Branch (T-5 F52), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by Internet electronic mail to INFOCOLLECTS@NRC.GOV and to the Desk Officer, John A. Asalone, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0002, 3150-0011, and 3150-new), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. Comments received after this date will be considered if it is practical to do so, but assurance of consideration cannot be given to comments received after this date. You may also e-mail comments to John\_A.\_Asalone@omb.eop.gov or comment by telephone at (202) 395-4650.

XIII. Public Protection Notification

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The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a request for information or an information collection requirement unless the requesting document displays a currently valid OMB control number.

(2) A hearing aid is acceptable provided suitable testing procedures demonstrate auditory acuity equivalent to the hearing requirement.

(3) The use of a hearing aid may not decrease the effective performance of the individual's assigned security job duties during normal or emergency operations.

d. Existing medical conditions.

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(1) Individuals may not have an established medical history or medical diagnosis of existing medical conditions which could interfere with or prevent the individual from effectively performing assigned duties and responsibilities.

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(2) If a medical condition exists, the individual shall provide medical evidence that the condition can be controlled with medical treatment in a manner which does not adversely affect the individual's fitness-for-duty, mental alertness, physical condition, or capability to otherwise effectively perform assigned duties and responsibilities.

e. Addiction. Individuals may not have any established medical history or medical diagnosis of habitual alcoholism or drug addiction, or, where this type of condition has existed, the individual shall provide certified documentation of having completed a rehabilitation program which would give a reasonable degree of confidence that the individual would be capable of effectively performing assigned duties and responsibilities.

f. Other physical requirements. An individual who has been incapacitated due to a serious illness, injury, disease, or operation, which could interfere with the effective

performance of assigned duties and responsibilities shall, before resumption of assigned duties and responsibilities, provide medical evidence of recovery and ability to perform these duties and responsibilities.

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3. Psychological qualifications.

a. Armed and unarmed members of the security organization shall demonstrate the ability to apply good judgment, mental alertness, the capability to implement instructions and assigned tasks, and possess the acuity of senses and ability of expression sufficient to permit accurate communication by written, spoken, audible, visible, or other signals required by assigned duties and responsibilities.

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b. A licensed clinical psychologist, psychiatrist, or physician trained in part to identify emotional instability shall determine whether armed members of the security organization in addition to meeting the requirement stated in paragraph a. of this section, have no emotional instability that would interfere with the effective performance of assigned duties and responsibilities.

c. A person professionally trained to identify emotional instability shall determine whether unarmed members of the security organization in addition to meeting the requirement stated in paragraph a. of this section, have no emotional instability that would interfere with the effective performance of assigned duties and responsibilities.

4. Medical examinations and physical fitness qualifications.

 $(x_1, x_2, x_3) = (x_1, x_2,$ 

paragraphs II and IV of this appendix. Licensees shall make such reports to the Commission under the provisions of § 73.71 of this part.

I. Events to be reported as soon as possible, but no later than 15 minutes after discovery, followed by a written report within sixty (60) days.

(a) The initiation of a security response consistent with a licensee's physical security plan, safeguards contingency plan, or defensive strategy based on actual or imminent threat against a nuclear power plant.

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(b) The licensee is not required to report security responses initiated as a result of information communicated to the licensee by the Commission, such as the threat warning system addressed in Appendix C to this part.

II. Events to be reported within one (1) hour of discovery, followed by a written report within sixty (60) days.

(a) Any event in which there is reason to believe that a person has committed or caused, or attempted to commit or cause, or has made a threat to commit or cause:

(1) A theft or unlawful diversion of special nuclear material; or

(2) Significant physical damage to any NRC-licensed power reactor or facility possessing strategic special nuclear material or to carrier equipment transporting nuclear fuel,  $\mathcal{T}_{ux}$ or to the nuclear fuel or spent nuclear fuel facility which is possessed by a carrier; or

(3) Interruption of normal operation of any NRC licensed nuclear power reactor through the unauthorized use of or tampering with its components, or controls including the security system.

(b) An actual or attempted entry of an unauthorized person into any area or transport for which the licensee is required by Commission regulations to control access.

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(c) Any failure, degradation, or the discovered vulnerability in a safeguard system that could allow unauthorized or undetected access to any area or transport for which the licensee is required by Commission regulations to control access and for which compensatory measures have not been employed.

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(d) The actual or attempted introduction of contraband into any area or transport for which the licensee is required by Commission regulations to control access.

III. Events to be reported within four (4) hours of discovery. No written followup report is required.

(a) Any other information received by the licensee of suspicious surveillance activities, attempts at access, or other information, including:

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(1) Any security-related incident involving suspicious activity that may be indicative of potential pre-operational surveillance, reconnaissance, or intelligence-gathering activities directed against the facility. Such activity may include, but is not limited to, attempted surveillance or reconnaissance activity, elicitation of information from security or other site

quantities or greater of strategic special nuclear material, i.e., Category I SSNM facilities. Such facilities would include: production facilities, spent fuel reprocessing facilities, fuel processing facilities, and uranium enrichment facilities. The NRC plans to address separately whether the deployment of enhanced weapons is appropriate for other types of facilities, radioactive materials, or other property. Additionally, Section 651 of the EPAct 2005 requires the NRC to conduct security evaluations at selected licensed facilities, including periodic force-on-force exercises. That provision also requires the NRC to mitigate any potential conflict of interest that could influence the results of force-on-force exercises. These provisions would be reflected in proposed § 73.55.

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# 1.3 Regulatory Objectives

The NRC has five objectives for the current rulemaking. The first objective is to make generically applicable security requirements imposed by Commission orders issued after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, based upon experience and insights gained by the Commission during implementation.<sup>1</sup> The second objective is to fulfill certain provisions of the Energy Policy Act of 2005. The third objective is to add several new requirements that resulted from insights from implementation of the security orders, review of site security plans, and implementation of the enhanced baseline inspection program and force-on-force exercises. The fourth objective is to update the regulatory framework in preparation for receiving license applications for new reactors. The fifth objective is to impose requirements to assess and manage site activities that can adversely affect safety and security. The proposed safety and security requirements would address, in part, a Petition for Rulemaking (PRM 50-80) that requested the establishment of regulations governing proposed changes to facilities which could adversely affect the protection against radiological sabotage.

# 2. Identification and Preliminary Analysis of Alternative Approaches

This section presents preliminary analysis of the alternatives that the staff considered to meet the regulatory goals identified in the previous section. (Section 4 presents a more detailed analysis of the proposed rule option.) The staff considered two alternatives for revising Part 73's power plant security provisions as discussed below.

#### 2.1 Option 1: No Action

Under Option 1, the no-action alternative, NRC would not amend the current regulations regarding power reactor security. Licensees would continue to comply with the Commission's security orders. This option would avoid certain costs that the proposed rule would impose. However, taking no action would not improve security measures as authorized by the EPAct 2005 or establish regulatory requirements for lessons learned. Additionally, taking no action would present a problem for establishing appropriate security measures for new reactors that did not receive orders.

<sup>1</sup> Specific details related to requirements that are safeguards information (SGI) will not be specified in regulations but will be available only to those with appropriate clearance and need to know.

## **2.2.** Option 2: Amend Regulations to Enhance Power Reactor Security Operations

Under Option 2, NRC would conduct a rulemaking to address changes in several sections of 10 CFR Part 73 to enhance security operations at power reactors. These changes entail: (1) amending 10 CFR 73.2 to add definitions; (2) revising 10 CFR 73.55, 73.56, 73.71, Appendix B, Appendix C, and Appendix G; (3) adding 10 CFR 73.58 to introduce "safety/security interface" requirements, and (4) adding § 73.18, § 73.19, and Form 754 to implement EPAct 2005 provisions for background checks and authorization for use of enhanced weapons.

A comprehensive rulemaking would provide a means of addressing the identified issues and concerns with respect to Part 73. Through a comprehensive revision, the NRC could (1) ensure that all licensees would consistently implement measures to enhance security and safety at nuclear power plants; (2) modify current requirements to provide licensees with some flexibility; (3) address adjustments and changes in security plans that licensees have adopted through the development of the revised licensee security plans; (4) clarify the language of the rule; and (5) incorporate changes to address the requirements in the EPAct 2005

The NRC has estimated the benefits and costs of this option, as described in Sections 3 and 4 of this regulatory analysis, and has pursued Option 2 for the reasons discussed in Section 5.

# 3. Evaluation of Benefits and Costs

This section examines the benefits (values) and costs (impacts or burdens) expected to result from this rulemaking, and is presented in two subsections. Section 3.1 identifies attributes that are expected to be affected by the rulemaking. Section 3.2 describes how benefits and costs have been analyzed.

### **3.1** Identification of Affected Attributes

This section identifies the factors within the public and private sectors that the regulatory alternatives (discussed in Section 2) are expected to affect. These factors are classified as "attributes" using the list of potential attributes provided by NRC in Chapter 5 of its *Regulatory Analysis Technical Evaluation Handbook.*<sup>2</sup> Affected attributes include the following:

Safeguards and Security Considerations – The proposed actions are intended to establish requirements that will provide high assurance that activities involving special nuclear material are not inimical to the common defense and security and do not constitute an unreasonable risk to the public heath and safety.

Industry Implementation – The proposed action would require licensees to make facility modifications and to revise their

<sup>2</sup> Regulatory Analysis Technical Evaluation Handbook, Final Report, NUREG/BR-0184, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, January 1997.

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defend against the DBT. There would also be a reduced risk that public health and occupational health will be affected by radiological releases resulting from radiological sabotage. The proposed rule would also reduce the risk that off-site and on-site property will be affected by radiological releases resulting from radiological sabotage.

The new requirements in the rule are expected to result in specific qualitative benefits listed below:

• The security plan updates and revisions that would be required by the proposed rule would lead to the consistent implementation of best security practices.

Current security regulations do not contain requirements related to cyber security. The NRC issued orders after September 11, 2001, that required power reactor licensees to implement interim compensatory measures to enhance cyber security licensees. These security measures required an assessment sufficient to provide protection against the cyber threats at the time of the orders. However, as licensees implement digital upgrades for many systems at their plants the potential for cyber threats will be increased. The proposed requirements would maintain the intent of the security orders by establishing the requirement for a cyber security program to protect any systems that can, if compromised, adversely impact safety, security or emergency preparedness.

 The proposed rule would ensure that escorts are trained and knowledgeable about their duties while accompanying visitors. This proposed requirement would reduce the risk of a security incident initiated by a visitor since escorts would be better informed regarding visitor's authorized activities.

Current regulatory requirements ensure that both CAS and SAS have equivalent alarm annunciation and communication capabilities, but do not explicitly require equivalent assessment, monitoring, observation, and surveillance capabilities. Further, the current requirement of 173.55(e)(1) states "All alarms required pursuant to this part must annunciate in a continuously manned central alarm station located within the protected area and in at least one other continuously manned station not necessarily onsite, so that a single act cannot remove the capability of calling for assistance or otherwise responding to an alarm." The Commission orders added enhanced detection and assessment capabilities, but did not require equivalent capabilities for both CAS and SAS. The security plans approved by the Commission on October 29, 2004, varied, due to the performance-based nature of the requirements, with respect to how the individual licensees implemented these requirements, but all sites were required to provide CAS and SAS with functionally equivalent capabilities to support the implementation of the site protective strategy.

The proposed rule extends the requirement for no single act to remove capabilities to the key functions required of the alarm stations and would require licensees to implement protective measures such that a single act would not disable the intrusion detection, assessment, and communications capabilities of both the CAS and SAS. This proposed requirement would ensure continuity of response operations during a security event by ensuring that the detection, assessment, and communications

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functions required to effectively implement the licensee's protective strategy are maintained despite the loss of one or the other alarm station. For the purposes of assessing the regulatory burden of this proposed rule, the NRC assumed that all licensees would require assessments and approximately one third of the licensees would choose to implement hardware modifications.

The NRC has concluded that protecting the alarm stations such that a single act does not disable the key functions would provide an enhanced level of assurance that a licensee can maintain detection, assessment and communications capabilities required to protect the facility against the design basis threat of radiological sabotage. For new reactor licensees, licensed after the publication of this rule, the Commission would require CAS and SAS to be designed, constructed, and equipped with equivalent standards.

Current regulatory requirements require back-up power for alarm annunciation and nonportable communication equipment, but do not require uninterruptible back-up power. Although not specifically required, many licensees have installed uninterruptible power to their security systems for added reliability of these electronic systems. However, the Commission has not required uninterruptible power for assessment systems. Uninterruptible back-up power would provide an enhanced level of assurance that a licensee can maintain detection, assessment and communication capabilities required to defend the facility against the design basis threat. This new requirement would reduce the risk of losing detection, assessment, and communication capabilities during a loss of the normal power supply.

Current regulatory requirements address the use of closed circuit television systems, but do not explicitly require them. Although not specifically required, all licensees have adopted the use of video surveillance in their site security plans, and many of the licensees have adopted advanced video surveillance technology to provide real-time and play-back/recorded video images to help security officials determine the cause of an alarm annunciation. Advanced video technology would provide an enhanced level of assurance that a licensee can assess the cause of an alarm annunciation and initiate a timely response capable of defending the facility against the threat up to and including the design basis threat.

The proposed safety-security interface requirements would reduce the risk of adverse safety-security interactions. These requirements would enhance the communication among nuclear power plant staff in order to avoid adverse safety or security effects.

The proposed rule contains several new reporting provisions. It would require licensees to notify the NRC Operations Center no later than 15 minutes after discovery of an actual or imminent threat against the facility including a requirement to follow this report with a written report within 60 days. Additionally, the proposed rule would require licensees to report within 4 hours to NRC incidents of suspicious activity or tampering. These proposed requirements enable NRC to quickly obtain information that could

exercises and to mitigate any potential conflict of interest that could influence the results of force-on-force exercises. These provisions of EPAct 2005 would be incorporated into the newly proposed §§ 73.18 and 73.19, and the revision to proposed 73.55 and the newly proposed NRC Form 754 (Enclosure 2). To implement the EPAct 2005 provisions efficiently, the NRC expanded the rulemaking's scope beyond power reactors (for the EPAct 2005 provisions related to the use of enhanced weapons and firearms background checks only) to cover facilities authorized to possess formula quantities or greater of strategic special nuclear material (i.e., Category I SSNM facilities). Such facilities, and uranium enrichment facilities.

Through implementing the security orders, reviewing the revised site security plans, and evaluating force-on-force exercises, the NRC has identified some additional security measures necessary to ensure that licensees provide high assurance that public health and safety and the common defense and security are adequately protected.

Finally, Petition for Rulemaking (PRM 50-80), requested the establishment of regulations governing proposed changes to facilities which could adversely affect their protection against radiological sabotage. This petition was partially granted and the proposed new § 73.58 contains requirements to address this area.

The proposed amendments to the physical security requirements for power reactors, and for the new weapons requirements, Category I SSNM facilities, would result in changes to the following existing sections and appendices in 10 CFR Part 73:

• 10 CFR 73.2, Definitions.

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• 10 CFR 73.55, Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage.

• 10 CFR 73.56, Personnel access authorization requirements for nuclear power plants.

• 10 CFR 73.71, Reporting of safeguards events.

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• 10 CFR 73, Appendix B, General criteria for security personnel.

• 10 CFR 73, Appendix C, Licensee safeguards contingency plans.

10 CFR 73, Appendix G, Reportable safeguards events.

The proposed amendments would also add three new sections to Part 73:

Proposed § 73.18, Firearms background checks for armed security personnel.

Proposed § 73.19, Authorization for use of enhanced weapons.

Proposed § 73.58, Safety/security interface requirements for nuclear power reactors.

The proposed rule would also add a new NRC Form 754 under the proposed new

§ 73.18.

Conforming changes to the requirements listed below are proposed in order to ensure that cross-referencing between the various security regulations in Part 73 are preserved, and to avoid revising requirements for licensees who are not within the scope of this proposed rule. The following requirements contain conforming changes:

Section 50.34, "Contents of applications; technical information" would be revised to align the application requirements with the proposed revisions to Appendix C to 10 CFR Part 73.

Section 50.54, "Conditions of licenses" would be revised to conform with the proposed revisions to sections in Appendix C to 10 CFR Part 73.

Section 50.72, "Immediate notification requirements for operating nuclear power reactors" would be revised to state (in footnote 1) that immediate notification to the NRC may be required (per the proposed § 73.71 requirements) prior to the notification requirements under the current § 50.72.

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concluded that there will be no significant radiological environmental impacts associated with implementation of the proposed rule requirements for the following reasons:

(1) The proposed revision to the Part 73 security requirements would not result in changes to the design basis requirements for the structures, systems, and components (SSCs) in the facility that function to limit the release of radiological effluents during and following postulated accidents. As a result, all the SSCs associated with limiting the releases of offsite radiological effluents would continue to be able to perform their functions, and as a result, there would be no significant radiological effluent impact. In this regard, the safety-security requirement (new section added as § 73.58) is intended to address the interface between security and safety, and the need to ensure that the potential for adverse effects on safety (due to security actions) or security (due to safety actions) are assessed and managed such that facility safety and security is maintained.

(2) The standards and requirements applicable to radiological releases and effluents would not be affected by this rulemaking and would continue to apply to the SSCs affected by this rulemaking.

The principal effect of this action would be to revise the governing regulations pertaining to security to make them more closely align with the previously imposed orders, to make changes required to implement the EPAct 2005, and to add several new requirements. The majority of these requirements stem from the security orders issued after September 11, 2001, and are already in place at power reactors. None of the proposed revisions have an impact on occupational exposures, consequently the NRC has concluded that this action would cause no impact on occupational exposure.

For the reasons discussed above, the action will not significantly increase the probability or consequences of accidents, nor result in changes being made in the types of any effluents that may be released off-site, and there would be no significant increase in occupational or public radiation exposure.

With regard to potential nonradiological impacts, implementation of the rule requirements would have no impact on the environment. The revised requirements would not affect any historic sites, would not affect nonradiological plant effluents, and would have no other environmental impact. Therefore, there would be no significant nonradiological environmental impacts associated with the action.

Accordingly, the NRC staff concludes that there would be no significant environmental impacts associated with the action.

#### Alternatives to the Proposed Action:

As an alternative to the rulemakings described above, the NRC staff considered not taking the action (i.e., the "no-action" alternative). Not revising the security regulations would result in no change in current environmental impacts since the proposed requirements have no environmental impact and taking no action therefore results in no net change to the environment. However, the no action alternative would leave the governing security regulations as they are, and the regulation would not reflect the actual requirements governing security. In addition, not taking action would cause the NRC to not be responsive to the EPAct 2005. The NRC staff concluded that leaving the governing security regulations unaligned with order requirements is not a desirable regulatory practice . The Commission has directed the staff to revise the regulations in a Staff Requirements Memorandum dated August 23, 2004. Finally, the no action alternative would not be implement the requirements in the EPAct 2005.

## NOTATION VOTE

### **RESPONSE SHEET**

TO: Annette Vietti-Cook, Secretary

FROM: COMMISSIONER MERRIFIELD

SUBJECT: SECY-06-0126 - PROPOSED RULEMAKING -POWER REACTOR SECURITY REQUIREMENTS (RIN 3150-AG63)

Approved X\_Disapproved Abstain \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS:

Approved, subject to the attached comments.

Entered on "STARS" Yes X No \_\_\_\_

#### Commissioner Merrifield's Comments on SECY-06-0126

#### **Proposed Rulemaking - Power Reactor Security Requirements**

I approve the staff recommendation to publish the proposed amendments to 10 CFR Parts 50, 72, and 73, and appendices, in the Federal Register for public comment, subject to the attached edits. This comprehensive rulemaking will codify the requirements imposed on nuclear power plant licensees through Commission Orders, and bring closure to the significant nuclear power plant security issues raised by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. In addition, the proposed rule incorporates provisions that Congress enacted through the 2005 Energy Policy Act legislation.

While I am not enamored of rule packages on the order of one thousand pages, I believe in this case the volume is justified. The associated tables included in this rule package provide section-by-section explanations of the proposed changes that offer stakeholders without security clearances a chance to understand how the staff arrived at the proposed changes in a way that does not compromise common defense and security. I commend the staff for discussing the proposed changes in an open manner that allows meaningful public comment on security requirements at nuclear power plants.

I note the staff plans to conduct a public meeting during the public comment period. This is a good first step, but based on the sheer volume of issues being addressed, more than one public meeting may be needed to ensure that the staff provides stakeholders a chance to understand the reasoning behind the proposed changes. Recent experience with other voluminous rule packages leads me to believe that perhaps a second, or even a third, public meeting may necessary to fully vet the issues addressed in this proposed rule.

PROPOSED LANGUAGE	CONSIDERATIONS
§ 73.19(d) Approval process.	This paragraph would describe the process for
(1) Commission approval. (i) Licensees and	Commission approval of a licensees or certificate
certificate holders specified in paragraph (b) of this	holders plans to use enhanced weapons. The use of
section who choose to utilize enhanced weapons as	such weapons would be incorporated into security
part of their physical protection program, shall submit	plans for prior Commission review and approval. This
to the Commission for prior review and written	paragraph would also require the submission of a new
approval, new or revised physical security plans,	safety assessment evaluation of the onsite and offsite
training and qualification plans, safeguards	impacts from the use of the enhanced weapons (in
contingency plans, and a safety assessment	protecting the facility or from training activities).
incorporating the use of the specific enhanced	Submission of such revised plans for prior review and
weapons the licensee or certificate holder intends to	approval would be required irrespective of whether the
use. Licensees or certificate holders shall submit	licenseet or certificate holder concludes the use of
such revised plans for prior Commission review and	these enhanced weapons would not cause "a
written approval notwithstanding the provisions of	decrease in security effectiveness."
§§ 50.54(p), 70.32(e), and 76.60 of this chapter.	

PROPOSED LANGUAGE	CONSIDERATIONS
§ 73.19(d)(1)(ii) These plans, in addition to other	This paragraph would require additional specific
requirements for these plans set forth in this part, these plans, include	information to be included in the new or updated
must address the following issues -	physical security plans, training and qualification plans,
(A) Specific types or models, calibers, and numbers	and safeguards contingency plans provided to the
of enhanced weapons to be used;	Commission for review and approval. Tactical
(B) Tactical approaches and personnel to be	approaches would include the personnel and methods
employed in using these enhanced weapons;	used to employ these weapons, including areas or
(C) Assessment of any potential safety impact on the	locations where enhanced weapons could be
facility or radioactive material from the use of these	employed or areas where their use may be limited
enhanced weapons;	(e.g., safety issues associated with a specific area of
(D) Assessment of any potential safety impact on	the facility).
public or private facilities, public or private property, or	This paragraph would require an assessment of the
on members of the public in areas outside of the site	onsite and offsite safety impacts from the use of the
boundary from the use of these enhanced weapons;	enhanced weapons to protect the facility.
and	(1) A set of the se
§ 73.19(d)(1)(ii)(E) Assessment of any potential	See considerations for § 73.19(d)(1) above x
safety impact on public or private facilities, public or	
private property, or on members of the public from	and the second
the use of these enhanced weapons at training	na anna an an anna an anna an an an an a
facilities intended for proficiency demonstration and	
qualification purposes.	
and the provide the second second second	
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	would be
PROPOSED LANGUAGE	CONSIDERATIONS
§ 73.2 Definitions.	Would acc three new definitions to this section as
	conforming changes to the new §§ 73.18 and 73.19 for
	covered weapon, enhanced weapon, and standard
the second se	weapon. Other new definitions that would added as
	conforming changes to this section in support of other
	regulations (e.g., safety/security interface and target
	set) are discussed in other Tables under this notice.
Covered weapon means any handgun, rifle, shotgun,	A definition for covered weapon would be used as an
short-barreled shotgun, short-barreled rifle, semi-	overall term to encompass the weapons and devices
automatic assault weapon, machine gun, ammunition	listed in Sec. 161A. of the AEA. The definitions of the
for any such gun or weapon, or a large capacity	specific firearms, ammunition, or devices within this
ammunition feeding device as specified under § 161A	term would be the same as those found in ATF's
of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.	regulations in 27 CFR Part 478, Subpart B as of
Covered weapons includes both enhanced weapons	September 11, 2005.
and standard weapons; however, enhanced weapons	Definitions for enhanced weapon and standard
do not include standard weapons.	weapon would also be added to support the differing
Enhanced weapon means any short-barreled	scope of these new sections (e.g., a licensee's current
shotgun, short-barreled rifle, semi-automatic assault	authority to possess handguns, shotguns, and rifles
weapon, machine gun, or a large capacity	under State law is not obviated by Sec. 161A). The
ammunition feeding device. Enhanced weapons do	relationship between covered weapon, enhanced
not include destructive devices, including explosives	weapon, and standard weapon would be explained.
or weapons greater than 50 caliber (i.e., greater than	Also, enhanced weapons would not include destructive
a 1.27 cm [0.5 in] diameter bore).	devices as defined under ATF's regulations. The
Standard weapon means any handgun, rifle, or	NRC's authority under Sec. 161A does not include
shotgun.	destructive devices.

Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage.

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CURRENT LANGUAGE	PROPOSED LANGUAGE	CONSIDERATIONS
Requirements for physical protection	Requirements for physical protection	This title would be retained.
of licensed activities in nuclear power	of licensed activities in nuclear power $\gamma$	
reactors against radiological	reactors against radiological	
sabotage.	sabotage.	
	(a) Introduction.	This header would be added for
and the second second		formatting purposes.
§ 73.55 By Dec. 2, 1986, each	(a)(1) By [insert date - 180 days -	This requirement would be added to
licensee, as appropriate, shall submit	after the effective date of the final	discuss the types of Commission
proposed amendments to its security	rule published in the Federal	licensees to whom the proposed
plan which define how the amended	Register], each nuclear power	requirements of this section would
quirements of Paragraphs (a),	reactor licensee, licensed under 10	apply and the schedule for submitting
(d)(7), (d)(9), and (e)(1) will be met.	CFR Part 50, shall incorporate the	the amended security plans. The
	revised requirements of this section	Commission intends to delete the
GENERUL CONNENT: hyphenate	through amondments to its	current language, because it applies
Lisherate	Commission approved Physical	only to a past rule change that is
	Security Plan, Training and	completed. The proposed
	Qualification Plan, and Safeguards	requirements of this section would be
	Contingency Plan, referred to	applicable to decommissioned/ing
	collectively as "approved security	reactors unless otherwise approved
	plans," and shall submit the amended	by the Commission.
	security plans to the	
	Commission for review and approval.	

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Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage.

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CURRENT LANGUAGE	PROPOSED LANGUAGE	CONSIDERATIONS
73.55(b)(1)(i) The licensee is	(a)(4) The licensee is responsible क	This requirement would retain the
responsible to the Commission for	the Sommission for maintaining the	current requirement that the licensee
maintaining safeguards in accordance	onsite physical protection program in	is responsible for meeting
with Commission regulations and the	accordance with Commission	Commission regulations and the
	a a construction and the second se	
licensee's security plan.	regulations and related Commission-	approved security plans. The phrase
and a second	directed orders through the	"through the implementation of the
	implementation of the approved	approved security plans and site
n star i star star i star i s	security plans and site implementing	implementing procedures" would be
	procedures.	added to describe the relationship
		between Commission regulations, the
		approved security plans, and
	and the second	implementing procedures. The word
	an a	"safeguards" would be replaced with
		the phrase "physical protection
		program" to

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Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage.

CURRENT LANGUAGE	PROPOSED LANGUAGE	CONSIDERATIONS
		elements would comprise the
		component actions of response and
		would be provided by personnel
and the second		trained and equipped in accordance
$(1-i)^{-1} = (1-i)^{-1} = (1-$		with a response strategy. The third
		element "Intercept" would be the act
		of placing a person at an intersecting
na an a		defensive position directly in the path
		of advancement taken by the threat,
		and between the threat and the
		protected target or target set element.
		The fourth element "Chailenge" would
		be to verbally or physically confront
	<b>1</b>	the threat to imped, palt, or otherwise
		interact with

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Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage.

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CURRENT LANGUAGE	PROPOSED LANGUAGE	CONSIDERATIONS
		I
		prevention of significant core damage
		and spent fuel sabotage is a AVE
		measurable performance criteria
		against which the Commission would
		evaluate the effectiveness of the
$e^{-i\omega t}$ $e^{-i\omega t}$		licensee physical protection program.
and the second second second second second		The phrase "as bounded by the
en e		design basis threat" would be used to
		clarify the Commission's view that the
		license must ensure that the physical
		protection program is designed to
		protect against the design basis
		threat and all other threats that do not
		rise to the level of the design basis
	· ·	threat. The

Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage.

CURRENT LANGUAGE	PROPOSED LANGUAGE	CONSIDERATIONS
§ 73.55(b)(4)(i) Upon the request of	(b)(5) Upon the request of an	This requirement would retain the
an authorized representative of the	authorized representative of the	current requirement for demonstration
Commission, the licensee shall	Commission, the licensee shall	and would contain minor revisions to
demonstrate the ability of the physical	demonstrate the ability to meet	apply this requirement to the
security personnel to carry out their	Commission requirements through	licensee's ability to implement the
assigned duties and responsibilities.	the implementation eterny-component	physical protection program and not
	of the physical protection program, &	be limited to only the ability of security
$(\mathbf{r}_{1}^{*}) \in \mathcal{O}_{1} \times \mathcal{O}_{2} \times \mathcalO_{2} \times \mathcalO_{2} \times \mathcalO_{2} \times \mathcalO_{2} \times $	include but mot include but mot include	personnel to carry out their duties.
	armed and unarmed personnel to	This proposed requirement would
Sector Contraction	perform assigned duties and	clarify the Commission's view that the
n de service de la composition de la co	responsibilities required by the	licensee must also demonstrate the
	approved security plans and licensee	effectiveness of plans, procedures,
$e = \left\{ \frac{1}{2} e^{-i\theta} e^{-i\theta} + \frac{1}{2} e^{-i\theta} e^{-i\theta} \right\}$	procedures.	and equipment to accomplish their
		intended function within the physical
and the second		protection program.

Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage.

CURRENT LANGUAGE	PROPOSED LANGUAGE	CONSIDERATIONS
	(b)(6) The licensee shall establish	This requirement would be added to
	and maintain a written performance	specify that this performance
	evaluation program in accordance	evaluation program would be the
	with appendix B and appendix C to	mechanism by which the licensee
	this part, to demonstrate and assess	would demonstrate the capabilities
	the effectiveness of armed	described by the performance based
	responders and armed security	requirements of the proposed
	officers to perform their assigned	paragraphs (b)(2) through (4). The
	duties and responsibilities required for	word "target sets" would be used
<b>I</b>	the protection of target sets described	consistent with the proposed (b)(3) to
	in paragraph (f) and appendix C to	describe the combination of
	this part, through implementation of $\cdot$	equipment and operator actions
	the licensee protective strategy.	which, if all are prevented from
. 1 4		performing their intended safety
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	<b></b>	function or prevented from being
	·	accomplished,

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Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage.

CURRENT LANGUAGE	PROPOSED LANGUAGE	CONSIDERATIONS
	(c)(1)(ii) Site-specific conditions that	This requirement would be added to
and a second	affect implementation of Commission	reflect the Commission's view that
	requirements.	licensees must focus attention on
en de la companya de		site-specific conditions in the
tere and the first first starts and	an gana ang ang ang ang ang ang ang ang	development and implementation of
	particular de la companya de la comp	site plans, procedures, processes,
		response strategies, and ultimately,
		the licensee capability to achieve the
		performance objective of the
		proposed (b)(1).
	(c)(2) Protection of security plans.	This requirement would be added to
and the second	The licensee shall protect the	emphasize the requirements for the
	approved security plans and other	protection of safeguards information
	related safeguards information	in accordance with the requirements
	against unauthorized disclosure in	of § 73.21.
	accordance with the requirements of	
<ul> <li>A state of the sta</li></ul>	§ 73.21.	
	(c)(3) Physical Security Plan.	This header would be added for
		formatting purposes.

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Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage.

CURRENT LANGUAGE	PROPOSED LANGUAGE	CONSIDERATIONS
§ 73.55(b)(4)(ii) Each licensee shall	(c)(4)(i) The licensee shall establish,	This requirement would retain and
establish, maintain, and follow an	maintain, and follow a Commission-	separate two current requirements of
NRC-approved training and	approved training and qualification	§ 73.55(b)(4)(ii). This proposed
qualifications plan	plan, that describes how the criteria	requirement would require the
	set forth in appendix B "General	licensee to provide a training and
	Criteria for Security Personnel," to this	qualification plan.
	part will be implemented.	
§ 73.55(b)(4)(ii)outlining the	(c)(4)(ii) The training and qualification	This requirement would retain the
processes by which guards,	plan must describe the process by	requirement for the licensee to outline
watchmen, armed response persons,	which armed and unarmed security	the processes in this plan with minor
and other members of the security	personnel, watchpersons, and other	revisions. The phrase "guards,
organization will be selected, trained,	members of the security organization	watchmen, armed response persons"
equipped, tested, and qualified to	will be selected, trained, equipped,	would be replaced by the phrase
ensure that these individuals meet the	tested, qualified, and re-qualified to	"armed and unarmed security
requirements of this paragraph.	ensure that these individuals possess	personnel, watchpersons" to
	and maintain the knowledge, skills, $\varepsilon^{-1}$	generically identify all members of the
:	and abilities required to carry out their	security organization. The
	assigned duties and responsibilities	Commission does not intend that
· · · ·	effectively.	administrative staff be included
		except as these personnel would be
		used to perform duties required to
		detect, assess,

Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage.

CURRENT LANGUAGE	PROPOSED LANGUAGE	CONSIDERATIONS
§ 73.55(b)(3) The licensee shall have	(c)(6)(iv) The licensee shall:	This requirement would be retain and
a management system to provide	plocu	separate the two current
for	an a	requirements of § 73.55(b)(3) with
		minor revisions. The phrase
	• • • • • • • •	"management system" would be
		replaced with the word "process."
		The current requirement to have a
	an a	management system would be
	an tana ara ara ara ara ara ara ara ara ara	addressed in the proposed
	the state of the	§ 73.55(d)(2).
3 73.55(b)(3)the development,	(c)(6)(iv)(A) Develop, maintain,	This requirement would retain the
revision, implementation, and	enforce, review, and revise security	requirement to develop, revise,
enforcement of security procedures.	implementing procedures.	implement, and enforce security
		procedures. The words "maintenance
		and review" would be added to clarify
		these tasks as necessary functions.
		The word "implementation" would be
		deleted because implementation is
		addressed in the proposed (c)(6)(i)
		through (iii).

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Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage.

CURRENT LANGUAGE	PROPOSED LANGUAGE	CONSIDERATIONS	
§ 73.55(b)(3)(ii) Provision for written	(c)(6)(iv)(B) Provide a process for the	This requirement would retain the	
approval of these procedures and any	written approval of implementing	current requirement for written	
revisions to the procedures by the	procedures and revisions by the	approval with minor revisions.	
individual with overall responsibility for	individual with overall responsibility for		
the security functions.	the security functions.		
	(c)(6)(iv)(C) Ensure that changes	This requirement would be added to	
	made to implementing procedures do	ensure that the licensee process for	
	not decrease the effectiveness of any	making changes to implementing	
	procedure to implement and satisfy	procedures includes a process to	
· · · ·	Commission requirements.	ensure that changes do not result in a	
		reduction of effectiveness or result in	
		a conflict with other site procedures.	

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Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage.

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CURRENT LANGUAGE	PROPOSED LANGUAGE	CONSIDERATIONS
	•	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
73.55(b)(2) At least one full time	(d)(2)(ii) At least one member, onsite	This requirement would be retained
member of the security organization	and available at all times, who has the	with minor revisions. The phrase
who has the authority to direct the	authority to direct the activities of the	"who is assigned no other duties
physical protection activities of the	security organization and who is	which would interfere with" would be
security organization shall be onsite at	assigned no other duties that would	added to ensure that the designated
all times.	interfere with this individual's ability to	individual would not be assigned any
	perform these duties in accordance	duties that would prevent or interfere
	with the approved security plans and	with the ability to direct these activities
	licensee protective strategy.	when needed.
§ 73.55(b)(4)(i) The licensee may not	(d)(3) The licensee may not permit	This requirement would be retained
permit an individual to act as a guard,	any individual to act as a member of	with minor revisions.
watchman, armed response person,	the security organization unless the	
or other member of the security	individual has been trained, equipped,	
organization unless the individual has	and qualified to perform assigned	
been trained, equipped, and qualified	duties and responsibilities in	
to perform each assigned security job	accordance with the requirements of	
duty in accordance with Appendix B,	appendix B and the Commission-	
"General Criteria for Security	approved training and qualification	
Personnel," to this part.	plan.	

Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage.

CURRENT LANGUAGE	PROPOSED LANGUAGE	CONSIDERATIONS	
§ 73.55(b)(1)(ii) The NRC may	(d)(5)(ii) The Commission may	This requirement would be retained	
inspect, copy, and take away copies	inspect, copy, retain, and remove all	with minor revisions.	
of all reports and documents required	reports and documents required to be		
to be kept by Commission	kept by Commission regulations,		
regulations, orders, or applicable	orders, or applicable license		
license conditions whether the reports	conditions whether the reports and		
and documents are kept by the	documents are kept by the licensee		
licensee or the contractor.	or the contractor. Contractor	security employee)	
	(d)(5)(iii) At individual may not be	This requirement would be added for	
	assigned to any position involving	consistency with the proposed	
	detection, assessment, or response	requirements of the proposed (d)(4).	
	to unauthorized activities unless that	This proposed requirement would be	
	individual has satisfied the	stipulated in a contract because it	
	requirements of § 73.56.	relates to a function of the contract.	

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Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage.

CURRENT LANGUAGE	PROPOSED LANGUAGE	CONSIDERATIONS	
contractor security employee			
§ 73.55(b)(1)(iv) The contractor will	(d)(5)(iv) A <sup>M</sup> individual may not be	This requirement would retain and	X
not assign any personnel to the site	assigned duties and responsibilities	combine two current requirements of	
who have not first been made aware	required to implement the approved	§ 73.55(b)(1)(iv) and § 73.55(b)(4)(i)	
of these responsibilities.	security plans or licensee protective	with minor revisions necessary for	
§ 73.55(b)(4)(i) The licensee may not	strategy unless that individual has	consistency with the proposed rule.	
permit an individual an individual to	been properly trained, equipped, and		
act as a guard, watchman, armed	qualified to perform their assigned		
response person, or other member of	duties and responsibilities in		
the security organization unless the	accordance with appendix B and the $\sim$		
individual has been trained, equipped,	Commission-approved training and		
and qualified to perform each	qualification plan.		
assigned security job duty in	an a		
accordance with Appendix B		•	

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Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage.

CURRENT LANGUAGE	PROPOSED LANGUAGE	CONSIDERATIONS	
§ 73.55(c) Physical barriers.	(e) Physical Barriers. Based upon	This requirement would be added to	
	the licensee's protective strategy,	provide a performance based	
	analyses, and site conditions that	requirement for determining the use	
(*************************************	affect the use and placement of associate	and placement of physical barriers	
a general and a second second	physical barriers, the licensee shall	required for protection of personnel,	
	install and maintain physical barriers	equipment, and systems the failure of	
	that are designed and constructed as	which could directly or indirectly	
	necessary to deter, delay, and	endanger public health and safety.	
	prevent the introduction of	The phrase "Based upon the license	
\$.	unauthorized personnel, vehicles, or	protective strategy, analyses, and sit	
Ĵ	materials into areas for which access	specific conditions", would be used t	
	must be controlled or restricted.	ensure that licensees consider	
		protective strategy requirements and	
		needs, as well as any analyses	
		conducted by the	

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Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage.

CURRENT LANGUAGE	PROPOSED LANGUAGE	CONSIDERATIONS
73.55(e)(3) All emergency exits in	(e)(6)(iii) All emergency exits in the	This requirement would retain and
each protected area and each vital	protected area must be secured by	separate the two current
area shall be alarmed.	locking devices that allow exit only,	requirements with minor revision.
	and alarmed.	The phrase "secured by locking
e gan been general		devices which allow exit only" would
		be added to provide a performance
		based requirement relative to the
		function of locking devices with
		emergency exit design to prevent
		entry. Vital areas would be
		addressed in the proposed
		§ 73.55(e)(8)(vii). be
· · ·	(e)(6)(iv) Where building walls, roofs,	This requirement would added to
r de la companya de la	or penetrations comprise a portion of	provide a performance based
	the protected area perimeter barrier,	requirement for instances where this
	an isolation zone is not necessary,	site condition would exist.
	provided that the detection,	
	assessment, observation, monitoring,	
	and surveillance requirements of this	
	section are met, appropriately	
	designed and constructed barriers are	
	installed, and the area is described in	
	the approved security plans.	<sup>ت</sup> عر

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Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage.

CURRENT LANGUAGE	PROPOSED LANGUAGE	CONSIDERATIONS
	1	(be/
	(m)(1)(i) The licensee shall describe	This requirement would added to
	the cyber-security program	ensure licensees have a
	requirements in the approved security	comprehensive security plan by
	plans.	integrating cyber-security into the
		overall onsite physical protection
at 1 to 1		program. As licensees take
		advantage of computer technology to
		maximize plant productivity, the role
		of computer systems at nuclear
and the second		power plants is increasing the
		Commission has determined that
		incorporation of a cyber-security
 		program into the Commission
	and the second	approved security plans would be a
e waarde een een een een een een een een een e	··· ···.	prudent and necessary security
		enhancement.

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Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage.

CURRENT LANGUAGE	PROPOSED LANGUAGE	CONSIDERATIONS	
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		
	(m)(3)(i) The licensee shall apply	This requirement would be added to	
$(S_{ij})_{ij} = (S_{ij})_{ij} = (S_{ij})_{ij$	cyber-security requirements and	create a computer security program	
and the second state of th	policies that identify management	that establishes specific goals and	
$\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{L}} = \{ f_{\mathcal{L}} : f_{\mathcal{L}} \in \mathcal{L} : f_{\mathcal{L}} \in \mathcal{L} \} $	expectations and requirements for the	assigns responsibilities to employées	
$\mathcal{L}_{\mathrm{reg}} = \left\{ \hat{\mathbf{Y}}_{\mathrm{reg}} : \mathcal{H}_{\mathrm{reg}}^{\mathrm{reg}} \in \mathcal{H}_{\mathrm{reg}}^{\mathrm{reg}} : \mathcal{H}_{\mathrm{reg}}^{\mathrm{reg}} \in \mathcal{H}_{\mathrm{reg}}^{\mathrm{reg}} : \mathcal{H}_{\mathrm{reg}}^{\mathrm{reg}} \in \mathcal{H}_{\mathrm{reg}}^{\mathrm{reg}} : \mathcal{H}_{\mathrm{reg}}^{\mathrm{reg}} \in \mathcal{H}_{\mathrm{reg}}^{\mathrm{reg}} : \mathcal{H}_{$	protection of computer systems.	to meet those goals.	
	(m)(3) (ii) The licensee shall develop	This requirement be added to ensure	
	and maintain implementing	the licensee develops, implements,	
u≉ Sevent terretaria de datativa d	procedures to ensure cyber-security	and enforces, detailed guidance	
and the second	requirements and policies are	documents that licencee employees	
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	implemented effectively.	would be required to follow to meet	
		the stated security goals.	
	(m)(4) Incident Response and	This header would be added for	
	Recovery.	formatting purposes.	

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Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage.

CURRENT LANGUAGE	PROPOSED LANGUAGE	CONSIDERATIONS
§ 73.55(g)(4) These reports must be	(r)(2) The licensee shall maintain all	This requirement would be retained
maintained in an auditable form,	records required to be kept by	and revised to consolidate multiple
available for inspection, for a period	Commission regulations, orders, or	current records retention
of 3 years.	license conditions, as a record until	requirements rather than state the
	the Commission terminates the	same requirement multiple times for
Maria and a start of the second start of the s	license for which the records were	each record throughout this rule. The
n and an and a second	developed and shall maintain	phrase "unless otherwise specified by
	superseded portions of these records	the Commission" would be used
	for at least three (3) years after the	address any conflict that may arise
	record is superseded, unless	between other records retention
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	otherwise specified by the	requirements such that the more
	Commission.	restrictive requirement would take
		precedence.
	(s) Safety/Security Interface. In	This requirement would be added to
	accordance with the requirements of	provide specific reference to the
	§ 73.58, the licensee shall develop	proposed § 73.58 for Safety and
	and implement a process to inform	Security Interface requirements
	and coordinate safety and security	
	activities to ensure that these	
	activities do not adversely affect the	
	capabilities of the security	<b>)</b>
-	organization to satisfy the $\int_{-\infty}^{0}$	ant so fety.
	requirements of this section, $\sigma r$ pl	ant safety.

# Table 4 - Proposed Part 73 Section 73.58

PROPOSED LANGUAGE	CONSIDERATIONS
PROPOSED LANGUAGE	CONSIDERATIONS The Commission has determined that the proposed safety/security rule requirements are necessary for public health and safety, and reasonable assurance that the common defense and security continue to be adequately protected because the current regulations do not specifically require evaluation of the effects of plant changes on security or the effects of security plan changes on plant safety. Further, the regulations do not require communication about the implementation and timing of changes, which would
	promote awareness of the effects of changing conditions, and result in appropriate assessment and response.

# Safety/security interface.

## NOTATION VOTE


## **RESPONSE SHEET**

- TO: Annette Vietti-Cook, Secretary
- FROM: COMMISSIONER JACZKO
- SUBJECT: SECY-06-0126 PROPOSED RULEMAKING -POWER REACTOR SECURITY REQUIREMENTS (RIN 3150-AG63)

Approved X\_Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_ Abstain \_\_\_\_\_

Not Participating \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS: See attached comments.



### Commissioner Jaczko's Comments on SECY-06-0126 Proposed Rulemaking - Power Reactor Security Requirements

I approve of the staff's proposal to publish the proposed rule for public comment and complete the rulemaking within a schedule of one year. This rulemaking, which in large part codifies and improves the many of the elements of security orders imposed on power reactor licensees since September 11, 2001 and implements certain provisions of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, is very important step toward addressing security concerns following September 11 and preparing for potential new reactor licensing. I commend Chairman Diaz, Commissioner McGaffigan, Commissioner Merrifield for their leadership on the post-September 11 security work and the staff for their commitment to preparing such a comprehensive and ever-changing proposal on such a tight schedule.

Despite the importance of this proposed rule, I do not view this rulemaking by itself as the most important security rulemaking in process. This rulemaking is one of three security rulemakings focused on the security of power reactors the Commission is working on. The others are the on-going rulemaking on the design basis threat and the planned rulemaking on security assessments for new reactor designs

Most of the requirements set forth in this rulemaking are already in place as a result of the various security orders issued since September 11, 2001, and this rule change will primarily add stability and finality to that process. What remains undone, however, is an important rulemaking to require applicants for combined operating licenses of new reactors to design security features into their future facilities.

Today's regulatory framework, embodied in this rulemaking and imposed by the post-September 11 security orders, relies heavily on maintaining a physical security program to protect vital areas of a plant and on mitigating strategies to ameliorate the effects of losses of large areas of the facility of due to fires and explosions. It is imperative that future designs become inherently safer and more secure through design features that reduce the need for physical security programs, potentially reducing the number of needed armed responders, and through design features that prevent the loss of safety systems and functions, eliminating the need for mitigating strategies. The security assessment rulemaking needs to address these important issues. Completing this rulemakings in a timely manner will be crucial to finalizing a robust regulatory framework for existing reactors and potential new reactors.

As the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards recently stated in an April 24, 2006 letter on the review of ongoing security-related activities,

"A variety of potential mitigation strategies have been identified for existing plants. The degree to which the risk due to security events can be reduced for existing plants is severely constrained by the cost of modifications in an existing plant. However, if incorporated into the design before construction and licensing, the cost of reducing the risk due to security events can be substantially reduced. The pilot studies performed for existing plants should be extended to examine the potential for increasing the robustness of new plants for security events and for including security considerations in the design certification process. Criteria for enhanced plant protection against security events at new reactors should be developed on a priority basis."

With regard to the current rulemaking, there are three important issues that I believe the staff should solicit comment on.

First, the staff should solicit comment on the need to establish a regulatory requirement to maintain communication protocols with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in order to verify the authenticity of communications in a security event. The current rule establishes new reporting requirements for security-based events. The staff should solicit comments on whether these new requirements should include requirements for uniform \_protocols to verify the authenticity of reports under this new provision.

Second, the staff should expand on and solicit comment on the appropriate framework for the insider mitigation program requirements. I support amending the proposed rule prior to publication with the proposed language and structure presented to Commissioner McGaffigan and other Commissioner assistants on June 27, 2006.

Third, the staff should solicit comment on the need to establish performance-based security requirements for the transmission of vital plant information using the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS). ERDS is a crucial element of the NRC's incident response system in traditional accidents. Ensuring this important source of information can be transmitted during a security incident or even during a natural disaster will improve the NRC's ability to provide effective oversight of any emergency situation. Specifically, the staff should seek comment on using new technology that will both improve the performance of ERDS and improve the security of the system.

Lastly the staff should strive, to the extent possible, to make as much of the implementing guidance for all of these requirements publically available in order that all stakeholders can understand the requirements to which we hold our licensees in security. Making these requirements and the implementing guidance available to our stakeholders will go a long way toward instilling confidence that the NRC has required a much greater degree of security in a post-September 11, 2001 environment and will allow greater participation by stakeholders in the licensing process.

Grégory B. Jaczko Date

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## NOTATION VOTE

### **RESPONSE SHEET**

TO: Annette Vietti-Cook, Secretary

FROM: COMMISSIONER LYONS

SUBJECT: SECY-06-0126 - PROPOSED RULEMAKING -POWER REACTOR SECURITY REQUIREMENTS (RIN 3150-AG63)

Approved <u>X</u> Disapproved Abstain Abstain \_\_\_\_\_ w/comments & edits

COMMENTS:

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Entered on "STARS" Yes X No

#### Commissioner Lyons' Comments on SECY-06-0126

I approve publishing in the *Federal Register* the proposed amendments to 10 CFR Parts 50, 72 and 73 with appendices. I approve certifying that this rule, if promulgated, will not have a negative economic impact on a substantial number of small entities in order to satisfy the requirements of the Regulatory Flexibility Act. The Order requirements addressed in the final rule should not be rescinded, but should be dispositioned as having been satisfied, if applicable, in individual cases.

I would like to highlight one matter that I wish to have clarified through this rulemaking regarding escorted access for members of the public visiting nuclear power reactors. In Europe, I have noticed that members of the public tour nuclear facilities and attend informational briefings at the facilities that enhance public education and awareness. I support these measures, and I would like to see more effort on the part of industry and the government to encourage the public to visit US nuclear power facilities and other US fuel cycle facilities. Therefore, this rulemaking should request public comment on the feasibility of a modified escorted access provision to selected areas of the facility for members of the public in order to facilitate this goal.

In addition, I have included edits to the rulemaking package, as attached hereto.

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NRC Form 754) to the list of sections and forms with Office of Management of Management Budget (OMB) information collection requirements. A corrective revision to § 73.8 would also be made to reflect OMB approval of existing information collection requirements for NRC Form 366 under existing § 73.71.
Section 73.70, "Records" would be revised to reference the appropriate revised paragraph numbers in proposed § 73.55 regarding the need to retain a record of the registry of visitors.

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Additionally, § 73.81(b), "Criminal penalties" which sets forth the sections within Part 73 that are not subject to criminal sanctions under the AEA, would remain unchanged since willful violations of the newly proposed §§ 73.18, 73.19, and 73.58 may be subject to criminal sanctions.

Appendix B and Appendix C to Part 73 require special treatment in this rulemaking to preserve, with a minimum of conforming changes, the current requirements for licensees and applicants to whom this proposed rule would not apply. Accordingly, section I through V of Appendix B would remain unchanged, and the proposed new language for power reactors would be added as section VI. Appendix C would be divided into two sections, with Section I maintaining all current requirements, and Section II containing all proposed requirements related to power reactors.

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On July 19, 2004, NRC staff issued a memorandum entitled "Status of Security-Related Rulemaking" (accession number ML041180532) to inform the Commission of plans to close former security-related actions and replace them with a comprehensive rulemaking plan to modify physical protection requirements for power reactors. This memorandum described rulemaking efforts that were suspended by the terrorist activities of September 11, 2001, and

Safety/Security interface requirements. These requirements are located in proposed § 73.58. The safety/security requirements are intended to explicitly require licensee coordination of potential adverse interactions between security activities and other plant activities that could compromise either plant security or plant safety. The proposed requirements would direct licensees to assess and manage these interactions so that neither safety nor security is compromised. 1 These proposed requirements address, in part, a Petition for Rulemaking (PRM 50-80) that requested the establishment of regulations governing proposed changes to the facilities which could adversely affect the protection against radiological sabotage.

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EPAct 2005 additional requirements. The EPAct 2005 requirements that would 3. be implemented by this proposed rulemaking, in addition to the weapons-related additions described above, consist of new requirements to perform force-onforce exercises, and to mitigate potential conflicts of interest that could influence conducted the results of NRC-observed force-on-force exercises. These proposed new requirements would be included in proposed § 73.55 and Appendix C to Part 73.

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Accelerated notification and revised four-hour reporting requirements. This 4. proposed rule contains accelerated security notification requirements (i.e., within 15 minutes) in proposed § 73.71 and Appendix G to Part 73 for attacks and imminent threats to power reactors. The proposed accelerated notification requirements are similar to what was provided to the industry in NRC Bulletin 2005-02, "Emergency Preparedness and Response Actions for Security-Based Events," dated July 18, 2005. The proposed rule also contains two new four18 years for unarmed responders, qualification scores for testing required by the training and qualification plan, qualification requirements for security trainers, qualification requirements of personnel assessing psychological qualifications, armorer certification requirements, and program requirements for on-the-job training.

10. <u>Security Program Implementation insights</u>. The proposed rule would impose new enhancements identified from implementation of the security orders, review of site security plans, and implementation of the enhanced baseline inspection program and force-on-force exercises. These new requirements would include changes to specifically require that the central alarm station (CAS) and secondary alarm station (SAS) have functionally equivalent capabilities such that

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no single act can disable the function of both CAS and SAS. The proposed additions would also include requirements for new reactor licensees to position the SAS within the protected area, add bullet resistance and limit the visibility into SAS. Proposed additions also require uninterruptible backup power supplies for detection and assessment equipment, "video-capture" capability, and qualification requirements for drill and exercise controllers.

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11. <u>Miscellaneous</u>. The proposed rule would eliminate some requirements that the staff found to be unnecessary to ensure high assurance that activities involving special nuclear material are not inimical to the common defense and security and do not constitute an unreasonable risk to the public health and safety such as to be eliminated provides.
The requirement for guards to escort operators of motor vehicles within the protected area if the operators are cleared for unescorted access. The proposed

equivalent capabilities for both CAS and SAS. The security plans approved by the Commission on October 29, 2004, varied, due to the performance-based nature of the requirements, with respect to how the individual licensees implemented these requirements, but all sites were required to provide a CAS and SAS with functionally equivalent capabilities to support the implementation of the site protective strategy.

The proposed rule extends the requirement for no single act to remove capabilities to the key functions required of the alarm stations and would require licensees to implement protective measures such that a single act would not disable the intrusion detection, assessment, and communications capabilities of both the CAS and SAS. This proposed requirement would ensure continuity of response operations during a security event by ensuring that the detection, assessment, and communications functions required to effectively implement the licensee's protective strategy are maintained despite the loss of one or the other alarm station. For the purposes of assessing the regulatory burden of this proposed rule, the NRC assumed that all licensees would require assessments and approximately one third of the licensees would choose to implement hardware modifications.

The NRC has concluded that protecting the alarm stations such that a single act does not disable the key functions would provide an enhanced level of assurance that a licensee can maintain detection, assessment and communications capabilities required to protect the facility against the design basis threat of radiological sabotage. For new reactor licensees, licensed after the publication of this rule, the Commission would require CAS and SAS to be designed, constructed, and equipped with equivalent standards.

#### Uninterruptible Power for Intrusion Detection and Assessment Systems

Current regulatory requirements require back-up power for alarm annunciation and nonportable communication equipment, but do not require this back-up power to be uninterruptible. Although not specifically required, many licensees have installed uninterruptible power to their

response capabilities. Historically digital computer systems have played a limited role in the operation of nuclear power plants. However, the role of computer systems at nuclear power plants is increasing, as licensees take advantage of computer technology to maximize plant productivity. In general, licensees currently exclude from their access authorization programs, individuals who may electronically access equipment in the protected areas of nuclear power plants to perform their job functions, if their duties and responsibilities do not require physical unescorted access to the equipment located within protected or vital areas. However, because these individuals manage and maintain the networks that connect to equipment located within protected or vital areas and are responsible for permitting authorized and/or trusted personnel to gain electronic access to equipment and systems, they are often granted greater electronic privileges than the trusted and authorized personnel. With advancements in electronic technology and telecommunications, differences in the potential adverse impacts of a saboteur's actions through physical access and electronic access are lessening. Thus, the proposed rule would require those individuals who have authority to electronically access equipment that, if compromised can adversely impact operational safety, security or emergency preparedness of the nuclear power plants, to be determined to be trustworthy and reliable.

The proposed revisions to § 73.56 would also address changes in the nuclear industry's structure and business practices since this rule was originally promulgated. At the time the current § 73.56 was developed, personnel transfers between licensees (i.é., leaving the employment of one licensee to work for another licensee) with interruptions in unescorted access authorization were less common. Most licensees operated plants at a single site and maintained an access authorization program that applied only to that site. When an individual left employment at one site and began working for another licensee, the individual was subject to a different access authorization program that often had different requirements. Because some licensees were reluctant to share information about previous employees with the new

would be specified in proposed § 73.56(m) [Protection of information]. As a result, individuals who are subject to this section would establish a detailed "track record" within the industry that would potentially cover their activities over long periods of time and would follow them if they change jobs and move to a new position that requires them to be granted unescorted access authorization by another licensee. The proposed requirement acknowledges the industry initiative to develop and utilize a database to ensure accurate information sharing between sites. This increased information sharing is necessary to provide high assurance that individuals who are granted and maintain unescorted access authorization are trustworthy and reliable when individuals move between access authorization programs. In addition, the increased information sharing would reduce regulatory burden on licensees when processing individuals who have had only short breaks between periods of unescorted access authorization.

Another change in the NRC's proposed approach to access authorization requirements is the result of a series of public meetings that were held with stakeholders during 2001–2004 to discuss potential revisions to 10 CFR Part, 26, "Fitness-for-Duty Programs." Part 26 establishes additional steps that the licensees who are subject to § 73.56 must take as part of the process of determining whether to grant unescorted access authorization to an individual or permit an individual to maintain unescorted access authorization. These additional requirements focus on aspects of an individual's behavior, character, and reputation related to substance abuse, and, among other steps) require the licensee and other entities who are subject to Part 26 to conduct drug and alcohol testing of individuals and an inquiry into the individual's past behavior with respect to illegal drug use or consumption of alcohol to excess, as part of determining whether the individual may be granted unescorted access authorization. However, historically there have been some inconsistencies and redundancies between the § 73.56 access authorization requirements and the related requirements in Part 26. These

notifications, the NRC may request the licensee establish a continuous communications channel after the licensee has made any emergency notifications to State officials or local law enforcement and if the licensee has taken action to stabilize the plant following any transient [associated with the 15-minute notification]. In NRC Bulletin 2005-02, "Emergency Preparedness and Response Actions for Security-Based Events," dated July 18, 2005, the NRC had indicated a continuous communications channel was not necessary for the new 15-minute notifications. However, in developing this proposed rule the Commission has evaluated the need to promptly obtain information of an unfolding event versus imposing an unreasonable burden on licensees in the midst of a rapidly unfolding event and possible plant transient. The Commission considers that the proposed regulation would provide a reasonable balance between these two objectives. Table 5 sets forth the proposed amendments to § 73.71 language as compared to the current language, and provides the supporting discussion for the proposed language. Table 8 sets forth the proposed amendments to the Appendix G language as compared to the current language, and provides the supporting discussion for the proposed language. الجار والمتحرون والوارد المراج

The Commission is interested in obtaining specific stakeholder input on the proposed changes to § 73.71 and Appendix G. Accordingly, the Commission is requesting persons commenting on this proposed rule to address the following question:

 For the types of events covered by the proposed four-hour notification requirements in § 73.71 and Appendix G, should the notification time interval of all or some of these notifications be different (e.g., a 1-hour, 2-hour, 8-hour,

24-hour notification)? If so, what notification time interval is appropriate?

IV.6. Appendix B to Part 73, "General Criteria For Security Personnel." + i me

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Table 11 (See Section VIII) is a cross-reference showing where individual requirements of the current regulation would be in the proposed regulation.

IV.8. Appendix G to Part 73, "Reportable Safeguards Events."

Proposed Appendix G to Part 73 provides requirements regarding the reporting of safeguards events. Proposed Appendix G would contain changes to support the revised and accelerated reporting requirements which would be incorporated into this rulemaking. Proposed Appendix G would also contain revised four-hour reporting requirements that would require licensees to report to the NRC information of suspicious surveillance activities, attempts at access, or other information. Following September 11, 2001, the NRC issued guidance requesting that licensees report suspicious activities near their facilities to allow assessment by the NRC and other appropriate agencies. The proposed new reporting requirement will clarify this expectation to assure consistent reporting of this important information. Additionally, the proposed rule contains an additional four-hour reporting requirements. The proposed reporting requirements for tampering events will allow NRC assessment of these events. Table 8 sets forth the proposed amendments to Appendix G and provides the supporting discussion for the proposed language.

IV.9 Conforming and Corrective Changes.

The following conforming changes would also be made: §§ 50.34 and 50.54 (references to the correct paragraphs of revised Appendix C of Part 73), § 50.72 (changes to § 73.71 reports), §§ 72.212 and 73.70 (references to the correct paragraphs due to renumbering of § 73.55), and § 73.8 (adding § 73.18, § 73.19, and revised to reflect new NRC form 754 to

## Table 1 - Proposed Sections 73.18 and 73.19

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Firearms background check for armed security personnel and authorization for use of enhanced weapons.

PROPOSED LANGUAGE	CONSIDERATIONS
§ 73.18 Firearms background check for armed security	This new section would implement the firearms background
personnel.	check requirements of the new § 161A.b. of the Atomic Energy
	Act of 1954
(a) Introduction. (1) Licensees and certificate holders listed	This section would require a firearms background check for all
under paragraph (b) of this section shall ensure that a firearms	security personnel with access to covered weapons (i.e.,
background check is completed in accordance with this section	armed duties) [see also new definition of covered weapon in
for all security personnel assigned duties requiring access to a	§ 73.2 at the end of this Table]. These background checks
covered weapon at the licensee's or certificate holder's facility.	would only be required for security personnel who are
n an	protecting certain Commission-regulated facilities [specified in
(a) A set of the se	paragraph (b)].
	The Commission considers duties "requiring access to any
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	covered weapon" would include such duties as: security
	operations and training and weapons' maintenance, handling,
	accountability, transport, and use.

§ 73.18(c)(2) *NRC Form 754.* (i) Licensees and certificate holders shall submit to the NRC, in accordance with § 73.4, an NRC Form 754 for all security personnel requiring a firearms background check under this section.

(ii) Licensees and certificate holders shall retain a copy of all
 NRC Forms 754 submitted to the NRC for a period of one (1)
 year subsequent to the termination of an individual's access to
 covered weapons or to the denial of an individual's access to
 covered weapons.

This paragraph would require licensees and certificate holders to submit to the Commission a completed NRC Form 754 for each individual assigned armed duties. Licensees and certificate holders would submit these forms via paper or electronic means under the applicable regulation (see § 73.4) Licensees and certificate holders would be required to retain submitted forms as a record for a period of 1 year after the indiviava \is security officer's access to covered weapons is terminated or denied. NRC Form 754 would require individuals to provide certain identifying information to the Commission. A proposed draft NRC Form 754 is located in the NRC's ADAMS system as described in Section VIII of this notice, and comments on this form and its estimated burden may be submitted to the Commission as set forth under ADDRESSES.

§ 73.18(c)(9) Violations of law. The NRC will report instances of prohibited persons possessing or receiving covered	The NRC is obligated to report (potential or possible) violations of Federal or State law it becomes aware of to the appropriate
weapons in violation of Federal law to the appropriate Federal	agency (e.g., persons prohibited from possessing or receiving
agency, or in violation of State law to the appropriate State	actually performing armed security duties).
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§ 73.19(d) Approval process.	This paragraph would describe the process for Commission
(1) Commission approval. (i) Licensees and certificate holders	approval of a licensees or certificate holders plans to use
specified in paragraph (b) of this section who choose to utilize	enhanced weapons. The use of such weapons would be
enhanced weapons as part of their physical protection	incorporated into security plans for prior Commission review
program, shall submit to the Commission for prior review and	and approval. This paragraph would also require the
written approval, new or revised physical security plans,	submission of a new safety assessment evaluation of the
training and qualification plans, safeguards contingency plans,	onsite and offsite impacts from the use of the enhanced
and a safety assessment incorporating the use of the specific	weapons (in protecting the facility or from training activities).
enhanced weapons the licensee or certificate holder intends to	Submission of such revised plans for prior review and approval
use. Licensees or certificate holders shall submit such revised	would be required irrespective of whether the licensees or
plans for prior Commission review and written approval	certificate holder concludes the use of these enhanced
notwithstanding the provisions of §§ 50.54(p), 70.32(e), and	weapons would not cause "a decrease in security
76.60 of this chapter.	effectiveness."

	§ 73.2 Definitions.	changes to t <i>enhanced w</i> definitions th	hree new definitions to this section as conforming the new §§ 73.18 and 73.19 for <i>covered weapon</i> , <i>veapon</i> , and <i>standard weapon</i> . Other new hat would added as conforming changes to this upport of other regulations (e.g., <i>safety/security</i>
			d target set) are discussed in other Tables under
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 (a)(6)(ii) Licensees shall comply with	This requirement would be added for
the requirements of paragraph (i)(4)	consistency with and clarification of the
such that both alarm stations are	proposed requirement of (i)(4) and to
provided with equivalent capabilities for	clarify that for new reactors, both the
detection, assessment, monitoring,	central and secondary alarm stations must
observation, surveillance, and	be provided "equivalent capabilities" and
communications.	not simply equivalent "functional"
	capabilities as is stated in the proposed
	(i)(4). The Commission has determined
	that these capabilities must be equivalent
	for new reactors to ensure that the
	secondary alarm station is truely
	redundant to the central alarm station.
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10 CFR 73.55(c)(2) The physical barriers	(e)(6)(ii) The protected area perimeter	This requirement would be retained with
at the perimeter of the protected area	physical barriers must be separated	minor revision. The phrase "unless
shall be separated from any other barrier	from any other barrier designated as a	otherwise identified in the approved
designated as a physical barrier for a vital	vital area physical barrier, unless	physical security plan" would be added to
area within the protected area.	otherwise identified in the approved	provide flexibility for an alternate
	physical security plan.	methodology to be described in the
_		Commission approved security plans.
73.55(e)(3) All emergency exits in each	(e)(6)(iii) All emergency exits in the	This requirement would retain and
protected area and each vital area shall	protected area must be secured by	separate the two current requirements
be alarmed.	locking devices that allow exit only, and	with minor revision. The phrase "secured
	alarmed.	by locking devices which allow exit only"
	and a second second second second	would be added to provide a performance
and the second sectors of sufficient		based requirement relative to the function
i de la companya de la		of locking devices with emergency exit
	n An an an an an an an the standard and an an	design to prevent entry. Vital areas would
		be addressed in the proposed
		§ 73.55(e)(8)(vii).
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§ 73.55(c)(1) The licensee shall locate	(e)(7)(i) Vital equipment must be	This requirement would be retained with	r
vital equipment only within a vital area,	located only within vital areas, which in	minor revision. The phrase "of sufficient	•
which in turn, shall be located within a	turn must be located within protected	strength to meet the performance	ί υ
protected area such that access to vital	areas so that access to vital equipment	requirements of Paragraph (a) of this	we'd .
equipment requires passage through at	requires passage through at least two	نې د section" would be replaced with the	Drist ros
least two physical barriers of sufficient	physical barriers designed and	phrase 'that meet the requirements of this	Sper 2
strength to meet the performance	constructed to perform the required	section" for consistency with the proposed	the vite
requirements of Paragraph (a) of this	function, except as otherwise approved	requirements for physical barriers	reor c
section.	by the Commission in accordance with	discussed throughout this proposed	
	paragraph (f)(2) below.	§ 73.55(e). The phrase "except as	m155500
		otherwise identified in accordance with	ACE N
		§=73.55(f)(2) below" would be added to	1094 F)(2)
		account for the condition addressed by	pelow
		that paragraph.	
§ 73.55(c)(1) More than one vital area	(e)(7)(ii) More than one vital area may	This requirement would be retained.	
may be located within a single protected	be located within a single protected		
area.	area.		

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§ 73.55(e)(1) The onsite central alarm	(e)(7)(iii) The reactor control room, the	This requirement would retain and
station must be considered a vital area	spent fuel pool, secondary power supply	combine two current requirements from 10
and	systems for intrusion detection and	CFR 73.55(e)(1), for protecting these
§ 73.55(e)(1) Onsite secondary power	assessment equipment, non-portable	areas equivalent to a vital area. The
supply systems for alarm annunciator	communications equipment, and the	Commission added the "spent fuel pool" to
equipment and non-portable	central alarm station, must be provided	emphasize the Commission view that
communications equipment as required	protection equivalent to vital equipment	because of changes to the threat
in Paragraph (f) of this section must be	and located within a vital area.	environment the spent fuel pool must also
located within vital areas.		be provided this protection. The phrase
		"alarm annunciator" would be replaced
:		with "intrusion detection and assessment"
		to clarify the application of this proposed
		requirement to intrusion detection sensors
:	<ul> <li>A second sec second second sec</li></ul>	and video assessment equipment as well
		as the alarm annunciation equipment.
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	(e)(9)(i) The licensee shall control	This requirement would be added to
	waterway approach routes or proximity	provide a requirement for controlling
	to any area from which a waterborne	waterway approach routes consistent with
	vehicle, its personnel, or its contents	the requirement of the proposed (e)(9)(ii).
	could disable the personnel, equipment,	Because of changes to the threat
	or systems necessary to meet the	environment, the Commission views
	performance objective and requirements	waterway approach routes and control
	described in paragraph (b).	measures to be a critical element of the
		onsite physical protection program and
		one that requires continual analysis and
		evaluation to maintain effectiveness.
	(e)(9)(ii) The licensee shall delineate	This requirement would be added to
	areas from which a waterborne vehicle	provide a requirement for notifying
	must be restricted and install waterborne	unauthorized personnel that access is not
	vehicle control measures, where	permitted and the installation of barriers
a la seconda de la construcción de	applicable.	where appropriate.

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		Based on changes to the threat
	$\mathcal{A}_{1}\mathcal{N}_{2}$	environment, the Commission has
		determined that the proposed requirement
		is necessary to facilitate licensee
		achievement of the performance objective of the proposed (b).
	(g)(2) In accordance with the approved	This requirement would be added to
	security plans and before granting	specify the basic functions that must be
	unescorted access through an access	satisfied to meet the current and proposed
	control point, the licensee shall:	requirements for controlling access into
a an		any area for which access controls are
		implemented.
§ 73.55(d)(1) Identificationof all	(g)(2)(i) Confirm the identity of	This requirement would retain the current
individuals unless otherwise provided	individuals.	requirement with minor revisions for
herein must be made and		formatting purposes.
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	(g)(2)(iv) Confirm, in accordance with	This requirement would be added to	
	industry shared lists and databases, that	describe an acceptable information	
	individuals are not denied access to	sharing mechanism used by licensees to	••
	another licensed facility.	share information about visitors and	V
		employees who have requested either	
and a second second Second second second Second second		escorted or unescorted access to at least	
• •		one site. Based on changes to the threat	
		environment, the Commission has	
		determined that this proposed requirement	
		would be a prudent enhancement to the	ł
	,	licensee capabilities.	
	(g)(3) Access control points must be:	This header would be added for formatting	
		purposes.	ļ

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
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	(g)(4)(iii) The licensee shall ensure that	This requirement would be added to
	restrictions for site access and egress	provide a performance based requiremen
	during emergency conditions are	for coordination of security access
	coordinated with responses by offsite	controls during emergencies with the
	emergency support agencies identified	access needs of emergency response
	in the site emergency plans.	personnel. This proposed requirement is
4		intended to provide the necessary level of
		flexibility to the licensee to ensure access
		by appropriate personnel while
	:	maintaining the necessary security
		posture for controlling access to areas
		where dangerous conditions exit such as
	ан алан алан алан алан алан алан алан а	violent conflict involving weapons.
	(g)(5) Vehicles.	This header would be added for formattir
		purposes.
		and the second parts
	165	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·

§ 73.55(d)(8) All keys, locks,	(g)(6)(ii) Keys, Locks, Combinations,	This requirement would be retained and
combinations, and related access control	and Passwords. All keys, locks,	revised with minor revisions. Most
devices used to control access to	combinations, passwords, and related	significantly, the word "passwords" would
protected areas and vital areas must be	access control devices used to control	be added to account for technological
controlled to reduce the probability of	access to protected areas, vital areas,	advancements associated with the use of
compromise.	security systems, and safeguards	computers. The phrase "security systems,
· .	information must be controlled and	and safeguards information" would be
	accounted for to reduce the probability	added to emphasize the need to control
	of compromise. The licensee shall:	access to these items. The phrase "and
		accounted for " would be added to confirm
		possession by the individual's the access
, ,		control device has been issued.
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	(g)(7)(i)(B) Confirm the identity of each	This requirement would be added to
	visitor through physical presentation of $\alpha$	require the verification of the true identity
(	an identification card issued by a	of non-employee individuals through the
	recognized local, state, or Federal	presentation of photographic government
	Government agency that includes a	issued identification (i.e., driver's license)
	photo or contains physical	which provides physical characteristics
• : :	characteristics of the individual	that can be compared to the holder. The
· •	requesting escorted access.	word "recognized" would be used to
		provide flexibility for other types of
		identification that may be issued by local,
:		state or federal governments.
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	(g)(8) Escorts. The licensee shall	This requirement would be added to
	ensure that all escorts are trained in	provided performance based requirements
	accordance with Appendix B to this part,	for satisfying the escort requirements of
	the approved training and qualification	this proposed rule and would provide
	plan, and licensee policies and	regulatory stability through the consistent
	procedures.	application of visitor controls at all sites.
		Based on changes to the threat
		environment, the Commission has
		determined that emphasis on the
		identification and control of visitors is a
		prudent and necessary enhancement to
		facilitate licensee achievement of the
		performance basis of the proposed (b)(1).
		parachap
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area.	undercarriage, and cargo area.	
compartment, undercarriage, and cargo	cab, engine compartment,	
searched shall include the cab, engine	must include, but are not limited to, the	minor revisions.
§ 73.55(d)(4) Vehicle areas to be	(h)(6) Vehicle areas to be searched	This requirement would be retained with
		of the proposed (b).
		performance objective and requirements
		would facilitate achievement of the
		has determined that this requirement
		the threat environment, the Commission
		armed response. Based on changes to
	activities if necessary.	at a vehicle search area, to include an
	a timely response to unauthorized	and a timely response would be initiated
	observe the search process and provide	unauthorized activities would be identified
	at least one of whom is positioned to	proposed requirement would ensure that
	trained and equipped security personnel,	for performing vehicle searches. This
	be performed by at least two (2) properly	provide a performance based requirement
	(h)(5) Vehicle search procedures must	This requirement would be added to

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§ 73.55(d)(1)except bona fide	(h)(8) Exceptions to the search	This requirement would retain, combine,
Federal, State, and local law enforcement	requirements of this section must be $\sim$	and revise two current requirements
personnel on official duty to these	identified in the approved security plans.	§ 73.55(d)(1) and (4) to generically
equipment searches upon entry into a	Submitted to the	account for those instances where search
protected area.	Commission for pri	requirements would not be met before
§ 73.55(d)(4)except under emergency	approval and	granting access beyond a physical barrier.
conditions, shall be searched for items	approval and must be	This proposed requirement would require
which could be used for sabotage		that the licensee specify in the approved
purposes prior to entry into the protected		plans the specific circumstances under
area.		which search requirements would not be
•		satisfied.
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(i)(3) The licensee's intrusion detection	This requirement would be added to
system must be designed to ensure that	provide performance based requirements
both alarm station operators:	consistent with the current § 73.55(e)(1),
(i)(3)(i) Are concurrently notified of the	and the proposed requirements of this
alarm annunciation.	proposed section. The proposed
(i)(3)(ii) Are capable of making a timely	requirement for dual knowledge and dual
assessment of the cause of each alarm	capability within both alarm stations
annunciation.	provides a defense-in-depth component
(i)(3)(iii) Possess the capability to	consistent with the proposed requirement
initiate a timely response in accordance	for protection against a single act. Based
with the approved security plans,	on changes to the threat environment the
licensee protective strategy, and	Commission has determined this
implementing procedures.	proposed requirement is a prudent (and

		necessary clarification of current requirements necessary to facilitate the licensee capability to achieve the performance objective of the proposed $\rho c = 2.9$ (b)(1).
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	(i)(7)(iv) Provide visual and audible	This requirement would be added for	
	alarm annunciation and concurrent video	consistency with the proposed	
	assessment capability to both alarm	requirement for equivalent capabilities in	
	stations in a manner that ensures timely	both alarm stations. The phrase "visual	
	recognition, acknowledgment and	and audible" would provide redundancy to	
	response by each alarm station operator	ensure that each alarm would be	
	in accordance with written response	recognized and acknowledged when	
	procedures.	received.	
§ 73.55(e)(2)e.g., an automatic	(i)(7)(v) Provide an automatic indication	This requirement would retained with	
indication is provided when failure of the	when the alarm system or a component	minor revision for formatting purposes.	
alarm system or a component occurs, or	of the alarm system fails, or when the		
when the system is on standby power.	system is operating on the backup		  .
	power supply.		

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73.70(f) A record at each onsite alarm	(i)(7)(vi) Maintain a record of all alarm	This requirement would be added for
annunciation location of each alarm, false	annunciations, the cause of each alarm,	consistency with § 73.70(f). The
alarm, alarm check, and tamper	and the disposition of each alarm.	Commission has determined that this
ndication that identifies the type of alarm,		record would be a commonly maintained
ocations, alarm circuit, date, and time.		record in electronic form as an automatic
In addition, details of response by facility	n A set de la fille de la companya de la fil	function of intrusion detection systems
guards and watchmen to each alarm,	na ann an Aonaichtean ann an Aonaic Ann an Aonaichtean ann ann an Aonaichtean ann an Aonaichtean ann an Aonaichtean ann an Aonaichtean ann an Aonaic Ann an Aonaichtean ann an Aonaichte	used by industry and would therefore be a
intrusion, or other incident shall be		prudent and necessary requirement.
recorded.		
	(i)(8) Alarm Stations.	This header would be added for formatting
		purposes.
§ 73.55(e)(1) All alarms required	(i)(8)(i) Both alarm stations must be	This requirement would retain the current
pursuant to this part must annunciate in a	continuously staffed by at least one	requirement § 73.55(e)(1) for continuously
continuously manned central alarm	trained and qualified member of the	staffed alarm stations and would be
station located within the protected area	security organization.	revised to describe the necessary
and in at least one other continuously		qualifications that would be required of the
manned station		assigned individuals.
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	(i)(8)(iv) The licensee shall assess and	This requirement would be added to for
	respond to all alarms and other	consistency with current requirements.
	indications of unauthorized activities in	The specific requirements of the current
	accordance with the approved security	§ 73.55(h)(4) are retained in detail in the
	plans and implementing procedures.	proposed Appendix C.
	(i)(8)(v) The licensee implementing	This requirement would be added for
	procedures must ensure that both alarm	consistency with related requirements o
	station operators are knowledgeable of	this proposed section and to ensure that
	all alarm annunciations, assessments,	the licensee provides a process by whic
	and final disposition of all alarms, to	both alarm station operators are
a a canada a	include but not limited to a prohibition	concurrently made aware of each alarm
	from changing the status of a detection	and are knowledgeable of how each ala
	point or deactivating a locking or access	is resolved and that no one alarm statio
	control device at a protected or vital	operator can manipulate alarm station
······	area portal, without the knowledge and	equipment, communications, or
	concurrence of the other alarm station	procedures without the knowledge and
	operator.	concurrence of the other.

	(i)(9)(ii)(A) Continual surveillance,	This requirement would be added to
	observation, and monitoring	provide necessary qualifying requirements
	responsibilities must be performed by	for performance of observation and
	security personnel during routine patrols	monitoring activities. The word "continual"
	or by other trained and equipped	would mean the same as used in the
	personnel designated as a component of	proposed (i)(9)(ii).
	the protective strategy.	
an 1955 An an Anna an A	(i)(9)(ii)(B) Surveillance, observation,	This requirement would be added to
	and monitoring requirements may be	provide a performance based requirement
an an the Carlo party of the family and the second second second second second second second second second seco	accomplished by direct observation or	for ensuring surveillance, observation, and
	video technology.	monitoring capabilities may be met
		through the use of video technology or $\mathscr{B}$
		human observation.
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$\$ 73.55(f)(1)who shall be capable of	(j)(2) Individuals assigned to each alarm	This requirement would be retained with
calling for assistance from other guards,	station shall be capable of calling for	minor revision. Most significantly, in order
watchmen, and armed response	assistance in accordance with the	to provide flexibility and to capture the
personnel and from local law	approved security plans, licensee	proposed requirements of Appendix C for
enforcement authorities.	integrated response plan, and licensee	an Integrated response Plan, this
	procedures.	proposed requirement replaces the
		specific list of support entities to be called
		with a performance based requirement to
		follow predetermined actions.
§ 73.55(f)(1) Each guard, watchman or	(j)(3) Each on-duty security officer,	This requirement would be retained with
armed response individual on duty shall	watchperson, vehicle escort, and armed	minor revisions. Most significantly, this
be capable of maintaining continuous	response force member shall be capable	proposed requirement update the titles
communication with an individual in each	of maintaining continuous	used to identify the listed positions and
continuously manned alarm station	communication with an individual in	would add "vehicle escorts" for
required by paragraph (e)(1) of this	each alarm station.	consistency with the proposed paragraph
section		(g)(8).

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(I)(2) Commercial nuclea	ar power This requirement would be added because
reactors using MOX fuel	assemblies are the Commission has determined that due
exempt from the requirer	ments of to the low plutonium concentration,
§§ 73.20, 73.45, and 73.	.46 for the onsite composition of the MOX fuel, and
physical protection of uni	irradiated MOX configuration (size and weight) of the
fuel assemblies.	assemblies, the physical security
	protection measures identified in the listed
	regulations are superceded by those
	requirements addressed in this proposed
	section for unirradiated MOX fuel
	assemblies at nuclear power reactor
	facilities.
(I)(3) Administrative Co	ontrols. This header would be added for formatting
	purposes.
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		(I)(4)(v) Removal of locks used to	This requirement would be added to
		secure equipment and power sources	ensure that the licensee both security and
		required for the movement of	operations management level personnel
		unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies or	would be responsible for the removal of
		openings to areas containing	locks securing MOX fuel assemblies.
		unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies must	
	· · ·	require approval by both the on-duty	
		security shift supervisor and the	
		operations shift manager.	
		(I)(4)(v)(A) At least one armed security	This requirement would be added to
	:	officer shall be present to observe	ensure that immediate armed response
	;	activities involving unirradiated MOX fuel	capability is provided before accessing
	:	assemblies before the removal of the	equipment used to move unirradiated
	r	locks and providing power to equipment	MOX fuel assemblies.
:	÷	required for the movement or handling	
:	:	of unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies.	

	(I)(4)(v)(B) At least one armed security	This requirement would be added to
	officer shall be present at all times until	ensure that immediate armed response
	power is removed from equipment and	capability is provided during any activity
	locks are secured.	involving the use of equipment used
		required to move unirradiated MOX fuel
		assemblies.
	(I)(4)(v)(C) Security officers shall be	This requirement would be added to
	trained and knowledgeable of authorized	ensure that assigned security officers
	and unauthorized activities involving	possess the capability to immediately
	unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies.	recognize, report, and respond to
		unauthorized activities involving
		unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies.
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(m)(1) The licensee shall implement a	This requirement would be to ensure that
cyber-security program that provides	nuclear power plants are protected from
high assurance that computer systems,	cyber attacks via minimizing the potential
which if compromised, would adversely	attack pathway and the consequences
impact safety, security, and emergency	arising from a successful cyber attack.
preparedness, are protected from cyber	
attacks.	

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(m)(1)(i) The licensee shall describe the	This requirement would added to ensure
cyber-security program requirements in	licensees to have a comprehensive
the approved security plans.	security plan by integrating cyber-security
	into the overall onsite physical protection
	program. As licensees take advantage of
	computer technology to maximize plant
	productivity, the role of computer systems
	at nuclear power plants is increasing the
	Commission has determined that
	incorporation of a cyber-security program
	into the Commission approved security
	plans would be a prudent and necessary
	security enhancement.
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(m)(4)(i) The licensee shall implement a	This requirement would be added to
cyber-security incident response and	ensure that each licensee would be
recovery plan to minimize the adverse	prepared to respond to computer security
impact of a cyber-security incident on	incidents in a manner that ensures that
safety, security, or emergency	plants are safe and secure. A computer
preparedness systems.	security incident could result from a
	computer virus, other malicious code, or a
	system intruder, either an insider or as a
	result of an external attack and could
	adversely impact the licensees ability $+6$
	effectively maintain safety, security, or
	emergency preparedness. Without an
	incident response and recovery plan,
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	licensees would respond to an computer
	security incident in an ad hoc manner.
	However with an incident response and
	recovery plan, licensees would respond to
	an incident in a quick and organized
	manner. This would minimize the adverse
	impact caused by a computer security
	incident.
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(n)(3) The licensee shall periodically	This requirement would be retained with
review the approved security plans, the	minor revision. The phrase "Integrated
integrated response plan, the licensee	Response Plan" would be added to
protective strategy, and licensee	emphasize the importance of this
implementing procedures to evaluate	proposed plan and to emphasize its
their effectiveness and potential impact	relationship to other site plans. The term
on plant and personnel safety.	"implementing" procedures would be
	added for consistency with this proposed
	section.
(n)(4) The licensee shall periodically	This requirement would be added to
evaluate the cyber-security program for	account for the use of computers and the
effectiveness and shall update the	need to ensure that required protective
cyber-security program as needed to	measures are being met and to evaluate
ensure protection against changes to	the effects changes or other technological
internal and external threats.	advancements would have on systems
	used at nuclear power plants.
	review the approved security plans, the integrated response plan, the licensee protective strategy, and licensee implementing procedures to evaluate their effectiveness and potential impact on plant and personnel safety. (n)(4) The licensee shall periodically evaluate the cyber-security program for effectiveness and shall update the cyber-security program as needed to ensure protection against changes to

access control technologies and to focus on the need to ensure that this equipment is functioning as intended in response to the predetermined stimuli the phrase "each intrusion alarm" would be replaced with the phrase "Intrusion detection and access control equipment" to more accurately describe the equipment to be performance tested.			
beginning and end of any period that it is used for security. beginning and end of any period that it is used for security.	§ 73.55(g)(2) Each intrusion alarm shall	(o)(3) Intrusion detection and access	This requirement would be retained and
used for security.       security plans.       § 73.55(g)(2) and to add "access control equipment" due to the widespread use of access control technologies and to focus on the need to ensure that this equipment is functioning as intended in response to the predetermined stimuli field/piometrics. The phrase "each intrusion alarm" would be replaced with the phrase "Intrusion detection and access control equipment" to more accurately describe the equipment to be performance tested.	be tested for performance at the	control equipment must be performance	revised to correct the periodicity of
equipment" due to the widespread use of access control technologies and to focus on the need to ensure that this equipment is functioning as intended in response to the predetermined stimuli ( <i>ife</i> biometrics) The phrase "each intrusion alarm" would be replaced with the phrase "Intrusion detection and access control equipment" to more accurately describe the equipment to be performance tested.	beginning and end of any period that it is	tested in accordance with the approved	performance testing stated in the current
access control technologies and to focus on the need to ensure that this equipment is functioning as intended in response to the predetermined stimuli (Technometrics) The phrase "each intrusion alarm" would be replaced with the phrase "Intrusion detection and access control equipment" to more accurately describe the equipment to be performance tested.	used for security.	security plans.	§ 73.55(g)(2) and to add "access control
on the need to ensure that this equipment is functioning as intended in response to the predetermined stimuli (is biometrics) The phrase "each intrusion alarm" would be replaced with the phrase "Intrusion detection and access control equipment" to more accurately describe the equipment to be performance tested.			equipment" due to the widespread use of
is functioning as intended in response to the predetermined stimuli (response true) The phrase "each intrusion alarm" would be replaced with the phrase "Intrusion detection and access control equipment" to more accurately describe the equipment to be performance tested.			access control technologies and to focus
the predetermined stimuli (Editionetrics) The phrase "each intrusion alarm" would be replaced with the phrase "Intrusion detection and access control equipment" to more accurately describe the equipment to be performance tested.			on the need to ensure that this equipment
The phrase "each intrusion alarm" would be replaced with the phrase "Intrusion detection and access control equipment" to more accurately describe the equipment to be performance tested.			is functioning as intended in response to
The phrase "each intrusion alarm" would be replaced with the phrase "Intrusion detection and access control equipment" to more accurately describe the equipment to be performance tested.			the predetermined stimuli (i.e. biometrics).
detection and access control equipment" to more accurately describe the equipment to be performance tested.			The phrase "each intrusion alarm" would
detection and access control equipment" to more accurately describe the equipment to be performance tested.			be replaced with the phrase "Intrusion
to more accurately describe the equipment to be performance tested.			detection and access control equipment"
300			to more accurately describe the
300			equipment to be performance tested.
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§ 73.55(c)(8)(ii) The Commission will (t)(4) Alternative Vehicle Barrier This requirement would be retained with Systems. In the case of alternative approve the proposed alternative minor revision. The phrase "The vehicle barrier systems required by measures if they provide substantial Commission will approve the proposed § 73.55(e)(8), the licensee shall alternative measures" would be deleted protection against a land vehicle bomb, demonstrate that: and it is determined by an analysis, using because it would be unnecessary. The (t)(4)(i) the alternative measure proposed language clearly stipulates that the essential elements of 10 CFR 50.109, alternative measures will be reviewed by that the costs of fully meeting the design provides substantial protection against a vehicle bomb, and the staff and approval would be contingent goals and criteria are not justified by the upon the justification provided by the (t)(4)(ii) based on comparison of the added protection that would be provided. licensee to include an analysis. costs of the alternative measures to the costs of meeting the Commission's requirements using the essential elements of 10 CFR 50.109, the costs of fully meeting the Commission's and the second requirements are not justified by the protection that would be provided.

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	(a)(4) The licensee is responsible to the	This requirement would added to clarify
	Commission for maintaining the	that the licensee is responsible for meeting
	authorization program in accordance	Commission regulations and the approved
	with Commission regulations and related	security plans. The phrase "through the
	Commission-directed orders through the	implementation of the approved program
	implementation of the approved program	and site implementing procedures" would
and the second	and site implementing procedures.	be added to describe the relationship
		between Commission regulations, the
		approved authorization program, and
		implementing procedures. The
		Commission views the approved security
		plans as the mechanism through which the
		licensee meets Commission requirements
a an		through implementation, therefore, the
		licensee is responsible to the Commission
		for this performance.
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authorization program as part of its site		license under §§ 50.21(b) or 50.22 of this
shall implement the required access		remaining applicants for an operating
upon receipt of operating authorization,		current § 73.56(a)(2) because there are no
upon receipt of an operating license or		The Commission intends to delete the
Physical Security Plan. The applicant,		with respect to proposed § 73.56(a)(1).
authorization program as part of its		proposed section for the reasons discussed
nclude the required access	:	incorporating the requirements of this
ubmitted after April 25, 1991, shall		applicants Physical Security Plan
his chapter, whose application is		Commission review and approval of an
operating license pursuant to part 52 of		would also add a requirement for
ombined construction permit and		received. This proposed requirement
hapter and each applicant for a		when approval to begin operating is
ursuant to §§ 50.21(b) or 50.22 of this		approved access authorization program

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				background investigation; psychological
				assessment; behavioral observation; a
				review procedure for adverse
				determinations regarding an individuals
			•	trustworthiness and reliability; audits; the
				protection of information; and retaining and
				sharing records. The phrase, "to the extent
	, :			that the licensees and applicants rely upon
				C/V authorization programs or program
	2 * • • •			elements," would be used in proposed
			• • •	§ 73.56(a)(6) to clarify that C/Vs need only
				meet the requirements of this section for
		l	•	those authorization program elements upon
				and a second sec
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			engineers or information technology
			technicians to take actions from remote
			locations that may affect the operability of
			safety-related components, or affect the
			functionality of operating systems.
			Because the potential impact of actions
			taken through electronic means may be as
;	;		serious as actions taken by an individual
			who is physically present within a protected
	1		or vital area, the NRC has determined that
			subjecting this additional category of
			individuals to the AA program is necessary,
			to ensure public health and safety and the
			common defense and security.
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	strategy, which may include individuals
	who are not armed. In practice, the NRC is
	not aware of any licensees, applicants, or
	C/Vs who do not subject this broader
•	category of individuals to an AA program.
	However, the proposed rule would specify
	that these individuals shall be subject to an
	AA program because of their critical
	responsibilities in assuring plant security
e de la companya de l La companya de la comp	and, therefore, the need for high assurance
n an ann an Arrainn an Arrainn an Arrainn. An Arrainn	that they are trustworthy and reliable.
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(b) General performance objective and	(c) General performance objective.	Proposed § 73.56(c) would retain the
requirements. (1) The licensee shall	Access authorization programs must	meaning of the current program
establish and maintain an access	provide high assurance that the	performance objective, which is embedded
authorization program granting	individuals who are specified in	in current § 73.56(b), but would separate it
individuals unescorted access to	paragraph (b)(1), and, if applicable,	from the requirement in the current
protected and vital areas with the	(b)(2) of this section are trustworthy and	paragraph for licensees to establish and
objective of providing high assurance	reliable, and do not constitute an	maintain an AA program. The requirement
that individuals granted unescorted	unreasonable risk to public health and	to establish and maintain AA programs
access are trustworthy and reliable, and	safety or the common defense and	would be moved to proposed § 73.56(a),
do not constitute an unreasonable risk to	security, including the potential to	where it would be imposed on each entity
the health and safety of the public	commit radiological sabotage.	who would be subject to the section, for
including a potential to commit		organizational clarity. The performance
radiological sabotage.		objective would be revised to add cross-
		references to the categories of individuals
	:	who must be subject to an authorization
	4 ,	and a second second Name
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	(d)(1) Informed consent. The licensees,	Proposed §73.56(d)(1) would require the
	applicants, and C/Vs specified in	entities who are subject to this section to
	paragraph (a) of this section may not	obtain written consent from any individual
	initiate any element of a background	who is applying for UAA before the
•	investigation without the knowledge and	licensee, applicant, or C/V initiates any
	written consent of the subject individual	element of the background investigation
	licensees, applicants, and C/Vs shall	that is required in this section. The
	inform the individual of his or her right to	practice of obtaining the individual's written
	review information collected to assure its	consent for the background investigation
	accuracy, and provide the individual with	has been endorsed by the NRC and
	an opportunity to correct any inaccurate	incorporated into licensees' Physical
	or incomplete information that is	Security Plans since § 73.56 was first
	developed by licensees, applicants, and	promulgated. It is necessary to protect the
	C/Vs about the individual.	privacy rights of individuals who are
		applying for UAA. The proposed
		paragraph would also require licensees,

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
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		In the past, licensees' AA program
		procedures limited the number of years of
		the individual's credit history that reviewing
		officials were required to consider in
		determining an individual's trustworthiness
		and reliability. As a result, some reviewing
		officials may not have considered credit
		history information for several years, even
		if the reporting agency provided it. As a
		result, individuals who were subject $+ \circ$
		different authorization programs were
		evaluated inconsistently. Furthermore,
		credit history reporting agencies also
		provide employment data that can be
		compared to the information disclosed by
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(f)(3) Individuals who are subject to an	Proposed § 73.56(f)(3) would require
authorization program under this section	individuals to report any concerns arising
shall report to the reviewing official any	from behavioral observation to the
concerns arising from behavioral	licensee's, applicant's, or C/V's reviewing
observation, including, but not limited to,	official. This specificity is necessary
concerns related to any questionable	because the NRC is aware of past
behavior patterns or activities of others.	instances in which individuals reported
Licensees, applican	concerns to supervisors or other licensee
and CVs shall be	Soncerns to supervisors or other licensee personnel who did not then inform the reviewing official of the concern. As a result, the concern was not addressed and any implications of the concern for the
reporting and	reviewing official of the concern. As a
otherabuses of	result, the concern was not addressed and
this requirement.	any implications of the concern for the
	individual's trustworthiness and reliability
	were not evaluated. Therefore, the
	proposed rule would require individuals to
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(c) Existing, reinstated, transferred, and	(c)(1) Deleted.	The proposed rule would eliminate current
temporary access authorization. (1)		§ 73.56(c)(1), which permitted individuals
Individuals who have had an		who had an uninterrupted unescorted
uninterrupted unescorted access	:	access authorization for at least 180 days
authorization for at least 180 days on		on April 25, 1991, to retain unescorted
April 25, 1991 need not be further		access authorization and required them to
evaluated. Such individuals shall be		be subject to behavioral observation. The
subject to the behavioral observation		current paragraph would be eliminated
requirements of this section.		because these requirements no longer
• 		apply.
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
(c) Existing, reinstated, transferred, and	(h) Granting unescorted access	Proposed § 73.56(h) would replace and
temporary access authorization.	authorization. The licensees, applicants,	amend current § 7 3.56(c), which permits
	and C/Vs specified in paragraph (a) of	AA programs to specify conditions for
	this section shall implement the	reinstating an interrupted UAA, for

if, upon review and evaluation, the areas as visitors. Licensees' current reviewing official determines that such Physical Security Plans require that any visitor to a protected area or vital area must access is warranted. Licensees and be escorted and under the supervision of applicants shall lop re-instale-streview •• • - 1 - E an individual who has UAA and, therefore, procedures for is trained in behavioral observation, in SCOSING accordance with the requirements of this in dividuals who have been than section and related requirements in Part access-denied 26. However, in the current threat environment, the NRC believes that status permitting any individual who has been determined not to be trustworthy and reliable to enter protected or vital areas does not adequately protect public health and safety or the common defense and security. Therefore, 

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(k)(2) Authorization program personnel.	A new § 73.56(k)(2) would require that
Licensees, applicants and C/Vs shall	individuals who evaluate and have acces
ensure that any individual who evaluates	to any personal information that is collec
personal information for the purpose of	for the purposes of this section must be
processing applications for unescorted	determined to be trustworthy and reliable
access authorization including, but not	and establishes two alternative methods
limited to a clinical psychologist of	making this determination. Proposed
psychiatrist who conducts psychological	§ 73.56(k)(2)(i) would permit licensees,
assessments under paragraph (e) of this	applicants, and C/Vs to subject such
section; has unfettered access to the	individuals to the process established in
files, records, and personal information	this proposed section for granting UAA.
associated with individuals who have	Proposed § 73.56(k)(2)(ii) would permit
applied for unescorted access	licensees, applicants, or C/Vs to subject
authorization; or is responsible for	such individuals to the requirements for
managing any databases that contain	granting UAA in proposed paragraphs
	Licensees, applicants and C/Vs shall ensure that any individual who evaluates personal information for the purpose of processing applications for unescorted access authorization including, but not limited to a clinical psychologist of psychiatrist who conducts psychological assessments under paragraph (e) of this section; has unfettered access to the files, records, and personal information associated with individuals who have applied for unescorted access authorization; or is responsible for

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have access that is collected on must be and reliable, ive methods for Proposed t licensees, ect such stablished in anting UAA. vould permit Vs to subject irements for aragraphs

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		requirements would be added for the
		reasons discussed with respect to
		proposed § 73.56(k).
(e) <i>Review procedures</i> . Each licensee	(I) Review procedures. Each licensee,	Proposed § 73.56(I) would retain the
implementing an unescorted access	applicant, and C/V who is implementing	meaning of current § 73.56(e) but update
authorization program under the	an authorization program under this	some of the terms used in the provision.
provisions of this section shall include a	section shall include a procedure for the	The proposed paragraph would replace the
procedure for the review, at the request	review, at the request of the affected	term, "revocation," with the term,
of the affected employee, of a denial or	individual, of a denial or unfavorable	"unfavorable termination," for the reasons
revocation by the licensee of unescorted	termination of unescorted access	discussed with respect to proposed
access authorization of an employee of	authorization which adversely affects	paragraph (d)(1)(iii) of this section. In
the licensee, contractor, or vendor,	employment. The procedure must	addition, the proposed paragraph would
which adversely affects employment.	require that the individual is informed of	add references to applicants to reflect the
The procedure must provide that the	the grounds for the denial or unfavorable	NRC's new licensing processes for nuclear
employee is informed of the grounds for	termination and allow the individual an	power plants, as discussed with respect to
denial or revocation and allow the	opportunity to provide additional relevant	proposed § 73.56(a). Reference to C/Vs
employee an opportunity to provide	information, and provide an opportunity	would also be added for completeness, as
additional relevant information, and	for an objective review of the information	discussed with respected to proposed

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(i) Other licensees, contractors, or
 vendors, or their authorized
 representatives, legitimately seeking the
 information as required by this section
 for unescorted access decisions and
 who have obtained a signed release
 from the individual.

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(m)(2) Personal information that isPcollected under this section must becidisclosed to other licensees, applicants,reand C/Vs, or their authorizedarepresentatives, who are legitimatelyreseeking the information for unescortedfdaccess authorization determinationsfdunder this section and who haveuobtained a signed release from thestsubject individual.fd

Proposed § 73.56(m)(2) would enhance the current requirement for the disclosure of relevant information to licensees, applicants, and C/Vs, and their authorized representatives who have a legitimate need

for the information and a signed release from an individual who is seeking UAA under this part. This proposed provision would be added to further clarify current § 73.56 requirements because some

licensees have misinterpreted the current

provision as prohibiting the release of information to C/Vs who have licenseeapproved authorization programs and require such information in determining

	and the second	
	(m)(4) A licensee's, applicant's, or C/V's	Proposed § 73.56(m)(4) would require that
	contracts with any individual or	a licensee's, applicant's, or C/V's contracts
	organization who collects and maintains	with any individual or organization who
	personal information that is relevant to	collects and maintains personal information
	an unescorted access authorization	that is relevant to a UAA determination
	determination must require that such	must require that such records be
(	records be maintained as proprietary	maintained in confidence, as required
held i Dence	information, as required under	(under 10 CFR 2.390). The paragraph
held in confidence	10 CFR 2.390, except as provided in	would make an exception for the disclosure
	paragraphs (m)(1) through (m)(3) of this	of information to the individuals identified in
	section.	§ 73.56(m)(1) through (m)(3). This
		paragraph would be added to ensure that
		entities who collect and maintain personal
	and the second	information use and maintain those records
		with the highest regard for individual
н. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1		privacy.
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	appendix A to this part. Footnote: 2.	especially if this event is the opening
	Notifications to the NRC for the	action on an ineffectively coordinated
•	declaration of an emergency class shall	multiple-target attack. Such notice may
	be performed in accordance with § 50.72	permit other licensees to escalate to a
·	of this chapter.	higher protective level in advance of an
		attack. The Commission would expect
		licensees to notify the NRC Operations
		Center as soon as possible after they
	and the second	notify local law enforcement agencies,
		but within 15 minutes The Commission
		may consider the applicability of this
		requirement to other types of licensees in
		future rulemaking.
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(a)(3) The licensee shall, upon request	(e)(3) For events reported under	This requirement would be retained and
to the NRC, maintain an open and	paragraph (a) of this section, the licensee	revised into three separate
continuous communication channel with	may be requested by the NRC to	requirements The first sentence would
the NRC Operations Center.	maintain an open, continuous	be reworded to reflect the renumbered
	communication channel with the NRC	event reports under this section. For the
	Operations Center, once the licensee has	15-minute reports, the paragraph would
	completed other required notifications	indicate that a licensee may be requested
	under this section, § 50.72 of this	to establish a "continuous
	chapter, or Appendix E of part 50 of this	communications channel" following the
	chapter and any immediate actions to	initial 15-minute notification. The
	stabilize the plant. When established, the	establishment of a continuous
	continuous communications channel shall	communications channel would not
·	be staffed by a knowledgeable individual	supercede current emergency
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(a)(5) The revised report must replace	(g)(10) The revised report must replace	This requirement would be renumbered
the previous report; the update must be a	the previous report; the update must be	and retained with minor grammatical
complete entity and not contain only	complete and not be limited to only	changes
supplementary or revised information.	supplementary or revised information.	
(a)(5) Each licensee shall maintain a	(g)(11) Each licensee shall maintain a	This requirement would be renumbered
copy of the written report of an event	copy of the written report of an event	and retained with minor revision by
submitted under this section as record for	submitted under this section as record for	adding "(3)" after "three" [years].
a period of three years from the date of	a period of three (3) years from the date	
the report.	of the report.	
(e) Duplicate reports are not required for	(h) Duplicate reports are not required for	This requirement would be retained and
events that are also reportable in	events that are also reportable in	be renumbered.
accordance with §§50.72 and 50.73 of	accordance with §§ 50.72 and 50.73 of	$\frac{1}{2} = \frac{1}{2} \left\{ \frac{1}{2} + 1$
this chapter.	this chapter.	
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Appendix B, Introduction, Paragraph 1:	A.1. The licensee shall ensure that all	This requirement would retain the
Security personnel who are responsible	individuals who are assigned duties and	requirement for security personnel to
for the protection of special nuclear	responsibilities required to prevent	meet minimum criteria to ensure that they
material on site or in transit and for the	significant core damage and spent fuel	will effectively perform their assigned
protection of the facility or shipment	sabotage, implement the Commission	security-related job duties. The phrase
vehicle against radiological sabotage	approved security plans, licensee response	"security personnel" would be replaced
should, like other elements of the	strategy, and implementing procedures,	with the phrase "all individuals" to
physical security system, be required to	meet minimum training and qualification	describe the Commission determination
meet minimum criteria to ensure that	requirements to ensure each individual	that any individual who is assigned to
they will effectively perform their	possess the knowledge, skills, and abilities	perform a security function must be
assigned security-related job duties.	required to effectively perform the assigned	trained and qualified to effectively
	duties and responsibilities.	perform that security function. The
		phrase "on site or in transit and for the
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		individual possess the knowledge, skills,
		and abilities required to effectively
		perform the assigned duties and
		responsibilities" to describe the
		Commission determination that minimum
		training and qualification requirements
		are met to provide assurance that
		assigned individuals possess the
		knowledge, skills, and abilities that are
		required to effectively perform the
		assigned function.
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and the second second and the second	terre and the second	$\frac{1}{2} \left[ \left( \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2} \right) + \left( \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2} \right) + \left( \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2} \right) + \left( \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2} \right) + \left( \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2} \right) + \left( \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2} \right) + \left( \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2} \right) + \left( \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2$
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Appendix B, Paragraph I.C. Subsequent	B.4.b. Before assignment, armed members	This medical examination and physical
to this medical examination, guards,	of the security organization shall	fitness requirement would be retained.
armed response personnel, armed	demonstrate physical fitness for assigned	The phrase "guards, armed response
escorts and other armed security force	duties and responsibilities by performing a	personnel, armed escorts and other
members shall demonstrate physical	practical physical fitness test.	armed security force members" would be
fitness for assigned security job duties		replaced with the phrase "armed
by performing a practical physical		members of the security organization" for
exercise program within a specific time		consistency with terminology used in the
period.		proposed rule. The phrase "security job
;		duties would be replaced with the phrase
		"assigned duties and responsibilities" for
		consistency with terminology used in the
	:	proposed rule.
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	Appendix B, Paragraph II. A. Training	C.3.a. Licensees shall demonstrate		This requirement would be based on the
	Requirements - Each individual who	response capabilities through a		current Appendix B, Paragraph II.A. Due
	requires training to perform assigned	performance evaluation program as		to changes in the threat environment, the
	security - related job tasks or job duties	described in Appendix C to this part.		requirement would specify that the
	as identified in the licensee physical			licensee develop and follow a
	security or contingency plans shall, prior			performance evaluation program
	to assignment, be trained to perform			designed to demonstrate the
	these tasks and duties in accordance		:	effectiveness of the onsite response
	with the licensee or licensee's agent's		·	capabilities.
· •	documented training and qualification		i	
	plan.			
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aining Requirements - Each individual no requires training to perform signed security - related job tasks or	exercises in accordance with Commission approved security plans, licensee protective strategy, and implementing procedures.	current Appendix B, Paragraph II.A. Due to changes in the threat environment, the
no requires training to perform		
	strategy, and implementing procedures.	and the second superior of the state of
signed security - related job tasks or		requirement would specify that the
		licensee conduct drills and exercises to
o duties as identified in the licensee		demonstrate the effectiveness of security
ysical security or contingency plans		plans, licensee protective strategy, and
all, prior to assignment, be trained to		implementing procedures.
erform these tasks and duties in		
cordance with the licensee or		
ensee's agent's documented training		
nd qualification plan.		<u></u>
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		topics.
		sections relate to non-weapons training
and the second		would be used to clarify that the following
		formatting purposes. The word "duty
	D. Duty qualification and requalification	This new header would be added for
and qualification plan.		
licensee's agent's documented training		
accordance with the licensee or		
perform these tasks and duties in		
shall, prior to assignment, be trained to		training goals and objectives.
physical security or contingency plans		and exercises as a means of achieving
job duties as identified in the licensee		tabletop exercises to supplement drills
assigned security - related job tasks or		Commission view that licensees may use
who requires training to perform	objectives.	requirement would convey the
Training Requirements - Each individual	accomplish desired training goals and	to changes in the threat environment, the
	to supplement drills and exercises to	current Appendix B, Paragraph II.A. Due
Appendix B, Paragraph II. A.	C.3.b.(2) Tabletop exercises may be used	This requirement would be based on the

Appendix B, Paragraph IV. Qualification	F.4.c. Annual tactical qualification course.	This requirement would combine the
firing for the handgun and the rifle must	Qualifying score must be an accumulated	current qualification requirements in
be for daylight firing, and each individual	total of 80 percent of the maximum	Appendix B, Paragraph IV.A., B., and C.
shall perform night firing for	obtainable score.	In the proposed rule, the annual tactical
familiarization with assigned weapon(s).		course of fire would be developed and
		implemented to simulate the licensee
		protective strategy in accordance with the
		Commission approved training and
		qualification plan. Licensees would not
		be not required to include every aspect of
		its site protective strategy into one
		tactical course of fire. Instead, licensees
	·	should consider periodically
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Appendix B, Paragraph I.C. The	H.2. The licensee shall retain each	This requirement would combine all
physical fitness qualification of each	individual's initial qualification record for	record retention requirements currently in
guard, armed response person, armed	three (3) years after termination of the	Appendix B.
escort, and other security force member	individual's employment and shall retain	
shall be documented	each re-qualification record for three (3)	· ·
	years after it is superceded.	
Appendix B, Paragraph I.C. The		
licensee shall retain this documentation		gramma and the second
as a record for three years from the date		
of each qualification.		
Appendix B, Paragraph I.E. The		
licensee shall document each individual's physical requalification and		
shall retain this documentation of		
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	I. Audits and reviews.	This heading would be added to ensure consistency with the structure of the
		appendix.
	The licensee shall review the Commission approved training and qualification plan in	This requirement would be added for consistency with audit and review
	accordance with the requirements of	requirements of the proposed 10 CFR
	§ 73.55(n).	73.55(n).
Definitions	J. Definitions	This heading would be brought forward from the current rule and would be renumbered accordingly
Terms defined in Parts 50, 70, and 73 of	Terms defined in Parts 50, 70, and 73 of	This requirement would be brought
this chapter have the same meaning	this chapter have the same meaning when	forward from the current rule and would
when used in this appendix.	used in this appendix.	be renumbered accordingly.
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2.a. Identification of those events that	(d)(3)(l) Identify the types of events that	This requirement would be retained with
vill be used for signaling the beginning	signal the beginning or initiation of a	editorial changes. The phrase
or aggravation of a safeguards	safeguards contingency event.	"according to how they are perceived
contingency according to how they are		initially by licensee's personnel" would be
perceived initially by licensee's		deleted because the concept of
personnel.		"perceived" is captured through
		"assessment."
ntroduction: The goals of licensee	(d)(3)(ii) Provide predetermined and	This requirement would be retained with
safeguards contingency plansare:	structured responses to each type of	editorial changes. The phrase
	postulated event.	"safeguards contingencies" has been
2) to provide predetermined,		replaced with "each type of postulated
structured responses by licensees to		event" to include a wider range of
safeguards contingencies,		potential events.
2.b. Definition of the specific objective	(d)(3)(iii) Define specific goals and	This requirement would be retained with
to be accomplished relative to each	objectives for response to each	editorial changes. The word "goals"
identified event.	postulated event.	would be added for consistency with the
		proposed Paragraph (a)(3).

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(ii) Storage of spent fuel must be within a protected area, in accordance with § 73.55(e) of this chapter, but need not be within a separate vital area. Existing protected areas may be expanded or new protected areas added for the purpose of storage of spent fuel in accordance with this general license.

(iii) For purposes of this general license, personnel searches required by § 73.55(h) of this chapter before admission to a new protected area may be performed by physical pat-down searches of persons in lieu of firearms and explosives detection equipment.

(iv) The observational capability required by § 73.55(i)(7) of this chapter as applied to a new protected area may be provided by a guard or watchman on patrol in lieu of closed circuit television.

(v) For the purpose of this general license, the licensee is exempt from §§ 73.55(k)(2) and 73.55(k)(7)(ii) of this chapter.

PART 73 - PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS

7. The authority citation for Part 73 is revised to read as follows:

capable of facilitating timely evaluation of the detected unauthorized activities before completed penetration of the protected area perimeter barrier.

(ii) Assessment equipment in the isolation zone must provide real-time and playback/recorded video images in a manner that allows timely evaluation of the detected unauthorized activities before and after each alarm annunciation.

(iii) Parking facilities, storage areas, or other obstructions that could provide concealment or otherwise interfere with the licensee's capability to meet the requirements of paragraphs (e)(5)(i)(A) and (B) of this section, must be located outside of the isolation zone.

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(6) Protected Area.

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(i) The protected area perimeter must be protected by physical barriers designed and constructed to meet Commission requirements and all penetrations through this barrier must be secured in a manner that prevents or delays, and detects the exploitation of any penetration.

(ii) The protected area perimeter physical barriers must be separated from any other barrier designated as a vital area physical barrier, unless otherwise identified in the approved physical security plan.

(iii) All emergency exits in the protected area must be secured by locking devices that allow exit only, and alarmed.

the central alarm station, must be provided protection equivalent to vital equipment and located within a vital area.

(iv) Vital equipment that is undergoing maintenance or is out of service, or any other change to site conditions that could adversely affect plant safety or security, must be identified in accordance with § 73.58, and adjustments must be made to the site protective strategy, site procedures, and approved security plans, as necessary.

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(v) The licensee shall protect all vital areas, vital area access portals, and vital area emergency exits with intrusion detection equipment and locking devices. Emergency exit locking devices shall be designed to permit exit only.

(vi) Unoccupied vital areas must be locked.

(8) Vehicle Barrier System. The licensee must:

(i) Prevent unauthorized vehicle access or proximity to any area from which any vehicle, its personnel, or its contents could disable the personnel, equipment, or systems necessary to meet the performance objective and requirements described in paragraph (b).

(ii) Limit and control all vehicle approach routes.

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(iii) Design and install a vehicle barrier system, to include passive and active barriers, at a stand-off distance adequate to protect personnel, equipment, and systems against the design basis threat.

(C) Implement compensatory measures upon discovery or suspicion that any access control device may have been compromised. Compensatory measures must remain in effect until the compromise is corrected.

(D) Retrieve, change, rotate, deactivate, or otherwise disable access control devices that have been, or may have been compromised.

(E) Retrieve, change, rotate, deactivate, or otherwise disable all access control devices issued to individuals who no longer require unescorted access to the areas for which the devices were designed.

(7) Visitors.

(i) The licensee may permit escorted access to the protected area to individuals who do not have unescorted access authorization in accordance with the requirements of § 73.56 and part 26 of this chapter. The licensee shall:

(A) Implement procedures for processing, escorting, and controlling visitors.

(B) Confirm the identity of each visitor through physical presentation of an identification card issued by a recognized local, state, or Federal Government agency that includes a photo or contains physical characteristics of the individual requesting escorted access.

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(7) Vehicle search checkpoints must be equipped with video surveillance equipment that must be monitored by an individual capable of initiating and directing a timely response to unauthorized activity.

(8) Exceptions to the search requirements of this section must be identified in the approved security plans.

(i) Vehicles and items that may be excepted from the search requirements of this  $\mathcal{M} \cup S + b$ section must be escorted by an armed individual who is trained and equipped to observe offloading and perform search activities at the final destination within the protected area.

(ii) To the extent practicable, items excepted from search must be off loaded only at specified receiving areas that are not adjacent to a vital area.

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(iii) The excepted items must be searched at the receiving area and opened at the final destination by an individual familiar with the items.

(i) Detection and Assessment Systems.

(1) The licensee shall establish and maintain an intrusion detection and assessment system that must provide, at all times, the capability for early detection and assessment of unauthorized persons and activities.

(2) Intrusion detection equipment must annunciate, and video assessment equipment images shall display, concurrently in at least two continuously staffed onsite alarm stations, at

(iii) The licensee shall conduct random patrols of areas containing unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies to ensure the integrity of barriers and locks, deter unauthorized activities, and to identify indications of tampering.

(iv) Locks, keys, and any other access control device used to secure equipment and power sources required for the movement of unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies or openings to areas containing unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies must be controlled by the security organization.

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(v) Removal of locks used to secure equipment and power sources required for the movement of unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies or openings to areas containing unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies must require approval by both the on-duty security shift supervisor and the operations shift manager.

(A) At least one armed security officer shall be present to observe activities involving the movement unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies before the removal of the locks and providing power to OF equipment required for the movement or handling of unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies.

(B) At least one armed security officer shall be present at all times until power is Hereit and locks are secured.

(C) Security officers shall be trained and knowledgeable of authorized and unauthorized activities involving unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies.

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(5) At least one armed security officer shall be present and shall maintain constant surveillance of unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies when the assemblies are not located in the spent fuel pool or reactor.

(6) The licensee shall maintain at all times the capability to detect, assess, intercept, challenge, delay, and neutralize threats to unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies in accordance with the requirements of this section.

(m) Digital Computer and Communication Networks.

(1) The licensee shall implement a cyber-security program that provides high assurance that computer systems, which if compromised, would adversely impact safety, security, and emergency preparedness, are protected from cyber attacks.

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(i) The licensee shall describe the cyber-security program requirements in the approved security plans.

(ii) The licensee shall incorporate the cyber-security program into the onsite physical protection program.

(iii) The cyber-security program must be designed to detect and prevent cyber attacks on protected computer systems.

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(2) Cyber-security Assessment. The licensee shall implement a cyber-security assessment program to systematically assess and manage cyber risks.

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(t) Alternative Measures

(1) The Commission may authorize an applicant or licensee to provide a measure for protection against radiological sabotage other than one required by this section if the applicant or licensee demonstrates that:

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(i) The measure meets the same performance objective and requirements as specified in paragraph (b) of this section and

(ii) The proposed alternative measure provides protection against radiological sabotage or theft of unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies, equivalent to that which would be provided by the specific requirement for which it would substitute.

(2) The licensee shall submit each proposed alternative measure to the Commission for review and approval in accordance with § 50.4 and § 50.90 before implementation.

(3) The licensee shall submit a technical basis for each proposed alternative measure, to include any analysis or assessment conducted in support of a determination that the proposed alternative measure provides a level of protection that is at least equal to that which would otherwise be provided by the specific requirement of this section.

(4) Alternative Vehicle Barrier Systems. In the case of alterative vehicle barrier systems required by § 73.55(e)(8), the licensee shall demonstrate that  $\stackrel{()}{\stackrel{()}{\rightarrow}}$ 

(i) the alternative measure provides substantial protection against a vehicle bomb, and

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(ii) Any individual whose assigned duties and responsibilities permit the individual to take actions by electronic means, either on site or remotely, that could adversely impact a licensees or applicants operational safety, security, or emergency response capabilities; and

(iii) Any individual who has responsibilities for implementing a licensee's or applicant's protective strategy, including, but not limited to, armed security force officers, alarm station operators, and tactical response team leaders; and

(iv) The licensee's, applicant's, or C/V's reviewing official.

(2) At the licensee's, applicant's, or C/V's discretion, other individuals who are designated in access authorization program procedures may be subject to an authorization program that meets the requirements of this section.

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(c) General performance objective. Access authorization programs must provide high assurance that the individuals who are specified in paragraph (b)(1), and, if applicable, (b)(2) of such fhat float this section are trustworthy and reliable, and do not constitute an unreasonable risk to public health and safety or the common defense and security, including the potential to commit radiological sabotage.

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(d) Background investigation. In order to grant unescorted access authorization to an individual, the licensees, applicants, and C/Vs specified in paragraph (a) of this section shall ensure that the individual has been subject to a background investigation. The background investigation must include, but is not limited to, the following elements:

(f) Behavioral observation. Access authorization programs must include a behavioral observation element that is designed to detect behaviors or activities that may constitute an unreasonable risk to the health and safety of the public and common defense and security, including a potential threat to commit radiological sabotage.

(1) The licensees, applicants, and C/Vs specified in paragraph (a) of this section shall ensure that the individuals specified in paragraph (b)(1) and, if applicable, (b)(2) are subject to behavioral observation.

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(2) Behavioral observation must be conducted by the individuals specified in paragraph (b)(1) and, if applicable, (b)(2). The licensees, applicants, and C/Vs specified in paragraph (a) of this section shall ensure that individuals who are subject to this section successfully complete behavioral observation training.  $must be \leq ubjected + observation$ 

(i) Behavioral observation training must be completed before the licensee, applicant, or C/V grants an initial unescorted access authorization, as defined in paragraph (h)(5) of this section, and must be current before the licensee, applicant, or C/V grants an unescorted access authorization update, as defined in paragraph (h)(6) of this section, or an unescorted access authorization reinstatement, as defined in paragraph (h)(7) of this section;

(ii) Individuals shall complete refresher training on a nominal 12-month frequency, or more frequently where the need is indicated. Individuals may take and pass a comprehensive examination that meets the requirements of paragraph (f)(2)(iii) of this section in lieu of completing annual refresher training;

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(iii) Individuals shall demonstrate the successful completion of behavioral observation training by passing a comprehensive examination that addresses the knowledge and abilities necessary to detect behavior or activities that have the potential to constitute an unreasonable risk to the health and safety of the public and common defense and security, including a potential threat to commit radiological sabotage. Remedial training and re-testing are required for individuals who fail to satisfactorily complete the examination.

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Licensees. WU shall wat to to rate (iv) Initial and refresher training may be delivered using a variety of media (including, but not limited to, classroom lectures, required reading, video, or computer-based training systems). The licensee, applicant, or C/V shall monitor the completion of training.

(3) Individuals who are subject to an authorization program under this section shall report to the reviewing official any concerns arising from behavioral observation, including, but not limited to, concerns related to any questionable behavior patterns or activities of others. False report the ond other abuses of this requirement,

(g) Arrest reporting. Any individual who has applied for or is maintaining unescorted access authorization under this section shall promptly report to the reviewing official any formal action(s) taken by a law enforcement authority or court of law to which the individual has been subject, including an arrest, an indictment, the filing of charges, or a conviction. On the day that the report is received, the reviewing official shall evaluate the circumstances related to the formal action(s) and determine whether to grant, maintain, administratively withdraw, deny, or unfavorably terminate the individual's unescorted access authorization.

(h) Granting unescorted access authorization. The licensees, applicants, and C/Vs specified in paragraph (a) of this section shall implement the requirements of this paragraph for

been provided to the reviewing official and he or she determines that the accumulated information supports a positive finding of trustworthiness and reliability.

(9) Unescorted access for NRC-certified personnel. The licensees and applicants specified in paragraph (a) of this section shall grant unescorted access to all individuals who have been certified by the Commission as suitable for such access including, but not limited to, contractors to the NRC and NRC employees.

(10) Access prohibited. Licensees and applicants may not permit an individual, who is identified as having an access-denied status in the information sharing mechanism required under paragraph (o)(6) of this section, or has an access authorization status other than favorably terminated, to enter any nuclear power plant protected area, vital area, under escort or otherwise, or take actions by electronic means that could impact the licensee's operational safety, security, or emergency response capabilities, under supervision or otherwise, except if, upon evaluation, the reviewing official determines that such access is warranted. Licensees and applicants shall develop reinstatement review procedures for assessing individuals who have been (i) Maintaining access authorization.

(1) Individuals may maintain unescorted access authorization under the following conditions:

(i) The individual remains subject to a behavioral observation program that complies

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with the requirements of paragraph (f) of this section;

(v) An evaluation of character and reputation.

(2) Authorization program personnel. Licensees, applicants, and C/Vs shall ensure that any individual who evaluates personal information for the purpose of processing applications for unescorted access authorization including, but not limited to a clinical psychologist of psychiatrist who conducts psychological assessments under paragraph (e) of this section; has unfettered access to the files, records, and personal information associated with individuals who have applied for unescorted access authorization; or is responsible for managing any

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databases that contain such files, records, and personal information has been determined to be trustworthy and reliable, as follows:

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(i) The individual is subject to an authorization program that meets requirements of this section; or

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(ii) The licensee, applicant, or C/V determines that the individual is trustworthy and reliable based upon an evaluation that meets the requirements of paragraphs (d)(1) through (d)(5) and (e) of this section and a local criminal history review and evaluation from the State of the individual's permanent residence.

(I) Review procedures. Each licensee, applicant, and C/V who is implementing an authorization program under this section shall include a procedure for the review, at the request of the affected individual, of a denial or unfavorable termination of unescorted access authorization which adversely affects employment. The procedure must require that the individual is informed of the grounds for the denial or unfavorable termination and allow the individual an opportunity to provide additional relevant information, and provide an opportunity

(v) The presiding officer in a judicial or administrative proceeding that is initiated by the subject individual;

(vi) Persons deciding matters under the review procedures in paragraph (k) of this section; and

(vii) Other persons pursuant to court order.

(2) Personal information that is collected under this section must be disclosed to other licensees, applicants, and C/Vs, or their authorized representatives, who are legitimately seeking the information for unescorted access authorization determinations under this section and who have obtained a signed release from the subject individual.

(3) Upon receipt of a written request by the subject individual or his or her designated representative, the licensee, applicant, or C/V possessing such records shall promptly provide copies of all records pertaining to a denial or unfavorable termination of the individual's unescorted access authorization.

(4) A licensee's, applicant's, or C/V's contracts with any individual or organization who collects and maintains personal information that is relevant to an unescorted access authorization determination must require that such records be maintained as proprietary information, as required under 10 CFR 2.390, except as provided in paragraphs (m)(1) through

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(m)(3) of this section.

VI. Nuclear Power Reactor Training and Qualification Plan.

A. General requirements and introduction.

1. The licensee shall ensure that all individuals who are assigned duties and responsibilities required to prevent significant core damage and spent fuel sabotage, implement the Commission approved security plans, licensee response strategy, and implementing procedures, meet minimum training and qualification requirements to ensure each individual possess the knowledge, skills, and abilities required to effectively perform the assigned duties and responsibilities.

2. To ensure that those individuals who are assigned to perform duties and responsibilities required for the implementation of the Commission approved security plans, licensee response strategy, and implementing procedures are properly suited, trained, equipped, and qualified to perform their assigned duties and responsibilities, the Commission has developed minimum training and qualification requirements that must be implemented through a Commission approved training and qualification plan.

3. The licensee shall establish, maintain, and follow a Commission approved training and qualification plan, describing how the minimum training and qualification requirements set forth in this appendix will be met, to include the processes by which all members of the security organization, will be selected, trained, equipped, tested, and qualified.

4. Each individual assigned to perform security program duties and responsibilities required to effectively implement the Commission approved security plans, licensee protective

(1) Possess a high school diploma or pass an equivalent performance examination designed to measure basic mathematical, language, and reasoning skills, abilities, and knowledge, required to perform security duties and responsibilities.

(2) Have attained the age of 21 for an armed capacity or the age of 18 for an unarmed capacity; and

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(3) An unarmed individual assigned to the security organization may not have any felony convictions that reflect on the individual's reliability.

b. The qualification of each individual to perform assigned duties and responsibilities must be documented by a qualified training instructor and attested to by a security supervisor.

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2. Physical qualifications.

a. General physical qualifications.

(1) Individuals whose duties and responsibilities are directly associated with the effective implementation of the Commission approved security plans, licensee protective strategy, and implementing procedures, may not have any physical conditions that would adversely affect their performance.

(2) Armed and unarmed members of the security organization shall be subject to a physical examination designed to measure the individual's physical ability to perform assigned

(2) Firearms maintenance procedures that include cleaning schedules and cleaning requirements.

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(3) Program activity documentation.

(4) Control and Accountability (Weapons and ammunition).

(5) Firearm storage requirements.

(6) Armorer certification.

H. Records.

1. The licensee shall retain all reports, records, or other documentation required by this appendix in accordance with the requirements of § 73.55(r).

2. The licensee shall retain each individual's initial qualification record for three (3) years after termination of the individual's employment and shall retain each re-qualification record for three (3) years after it is superceded.

3. The licensee shall document data and test results from each individual's suitability, physical, and psychological qualification and shall retain this documentation as a record for three years from the date of obtaining and recording these results.

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I. Audits and reviews.