



**UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION**
REGION II
245 PEACHTREE CENTER AVENUE N.E., SUITE 1200
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-1200

May 4, 2021

Ms. Cheryl Gayheart
Regulatory Affairs Director
Southern Nuclear Company
3535 Colonade Parkway
Birmingham, AL 35243

**SUBJECT: JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT – INTEGRATED INSPECTION
REPORT 05000348/2021001 AND 05000364/2021001**

Dear Ms. Gayheart:

On March 31, 2021, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant. On April 20, 2021, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Charles Kharrl and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

No NRC-identified or self-revealing findings were identified during this inspection.

A licensee-identified violation which was determined to be of very low safety significance is documented in this report. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant.

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html> and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding."

Sincerely,

/RA/

Alan J. Blamey, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 2
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos. 05000348 and 05000364
License Nos. NPF-2 and NPF-8

Enclosure:
As stated,

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SUBJECT: JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT – INTEGRATED INSPECTION
REPORT 05000348/2021001 AND 05000364/2021001 Dated May 4, 2021

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NAME	P. Meier	S. Temple	A. Butcavage	D. Mas Peñaranda	A. Blamey
DATE	4/30/2021	4/30/2021	4/29/2021	5/4/2021	5/4/2021

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**U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Inspection Report**

Docket Numbers: 05000348 and 05000364

License Numbers: NPF-2 and NPF-8

Report Numbers: 05000348/2021001 and 05000364/2021001

Enterprise Identifier: I-2021-001-0066

Licensee: Southern Nuclear Company

Facility: Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant

Location: Columbia, AL

Inspection Dates: January 01, 2021 to March 31, 2021

Inspectors: A. Butcavage, Reactor Inspector
P. Meier, Senior Resident Inspector
S. Temple, Resident Inspector

Approved By: Alan J. Blamey, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 2
Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensee's performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to <https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html> for more information. A licensee-identified non-cited violation is documented in report section: 71152.

List of Findings and Violations

No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified.

Additional Tracking Items

None.

PLANT STATUS

Unit 1 began the report period at approximately 100 percent rated thermal power (RTP). On March 9, 2021, unit 1 began coasting down until March 21, 2021, to approximately 85 percent RTP. On March 21, 2021, unit 1 was shut down and entered Mode 5 for a planned refueling outage. Unit 1 remained in a shutdown condition and the refueling outage for the remainder of the report period.

Unit 2 began the report period at approximately 100 percent RTP. On March 19, 2021, RTP was reduced to approximately 90 percent for planned maintenance activities and returned to approximately 100 percent RTP on March 20, 2021. Unit 2 remained at or near 100 percent RTP through the end of the report period.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html>. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, "Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase." The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

Starting on March 20, 2020, in response to the National Emergency declared by the President of the United States on the public health risks of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19), resident inspectors were directed to begin telework and to remotely access licensee information using available technology. During this time, the resident inspectors performed periodic site visits each week; conducted plant status activities as described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, "Plant Status"; observed risk-significant activities; and completed on-site portions of IPs. In addition, resident and regional baseline inspections were evaluated to determine if all or portions of the objectives and requirements stated in the IP could be performed remotely. If the inspections could be performed remotely, they were conducted per the applicable IP. In some cases, portions of an IP were completed remotely and on-site. The inspections documented below met the objectives and requirements for completion of the IP.

REACTOR SAFETY

71111.04 - Equipment Alignment

Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:

- (1) Unit 1 'B' low head safety injection system during planned maintenance of the 'A' low head safety injection system pump room cooler on January 12, 2021 (FNP-1-SOP-7.0; D175038; D175041)
- (2) Unit 2 'B' containment spray system during a unit 2 'A' containment spray system planned maintenance outage on February 16, 2021 (FNP-2-SOP-9.0; D205038)

- (3) Unit 1 'B' train residual heat removal system during the unit 1 'A' train maintenance outage while refueling the unit 1 reactor on March 26, 2021 (FNP-1-SOP-7.0; D175038; D175041)
- (4) Unit 1 spent fuel cooling system following defueling of the unit 1 reactor on March 28, 2021 (FNP-1-SOP-54.0)

Complete Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors evaluated system configurations during a complete walkdown of the unit 1 "B" emergency diesel generator and support systems before moving fuel during the unit 1 refueling outage in March 2021 (FNP-0-SOP-38.0, A181005, D170119, D200013).

71111.05 - Fire Protection

Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:

- (1) Fire zone 2343, unit 2 'B' train switchgear room on February 8, 2020 (FNP-2-FPP-1.0)
- (2) Fire zone 2334, unit 2 'V' motor control center room on February 8, 2020 (FNP-2-FPP-1.0)
- (3) Fire zone 2405, unit 2 'DD' motor control center area on February 8, 2020 (FNP-2-FPP-1.0)
- (4) Fire zone 2226, unit 2 'B' vital DC bus on February 8, 2020 (FNP-2-FPP-1.0)
- (5) Fire zone 2347, unit 2 'U' motor control center room on February 8, 2020 (FNP-2-FPP-1.0)

Fire Brigade Drill Performance Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors observed the onsite fire brigade training and performance during an announced fire drill on January 19, 2021 involving a unit 1 main transformer simulated fire and an unannounced fire drill on February 25, 2021 involving a simulated fire inside the radiation controlled area (FNP-TR-425).

71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures

Inspection Activities - Internal Flooding (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated internal flooding mitigation protections in the:

- (1) Common control room located on the 155' elevation of the auxiliary building on January 14, 2021 (BM-99-1932-001)

Cable Degradation (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated cable submergence protection in:

- (1) The unit 1 'A' train emergency diesel generator cable tunnel on March 9, 2021 (BM-99-1932-001; CR10780525)

71111.07A - Heat Sink Performance

Annual Review (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated readiness and performance of:

- (1) Unit 1 'C' component cooling water heat exchanger during week of January 18, 2021 (WO SNC1121067)

71111.08P - Inservice Inspection Activities (PWR)

PWR Inservice Inspection Activities Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

The inspectors verified that the reactor coolant system boundary, steam generator tubes, reactor vessel internals, risk-significant piping system boundaries, and containment boundary are appropriately monitored for degradation and that repairs and replacements were appropriately fabricated, examined and accepted by reviewing the following activities from March 22, 2021 to April 7, 2021:

- (1) 03.01.a - Nondestructive Examination and Welding Activities.
 - Ultrasonic Examination (UT), Comp. ID, ALA1-4202-17-RB, Elbow to Pipe, ASME Class 1, (Reviewed)
 - UT, Comp. ID, ALA1-4203-8-RB, Elbow to Pipe, ASME Class 1, (Reviewed)
 - UT, MSIP Welds No's. ALAI-4100-IDM, ALAI-4100-2, ALAI-4300-2, ALAI-4300-IDM, ASME Cl.1 (Reviewed)
 - VT-2 BMI 2018 Inspection Penetration 14,16,17 and sample photos, ASME Cl. 1 (Reviewed)
 - VT-2 BMI 2021 Inspection Summary, ASME Cl 1 (Reviewed)
 - Weld Package Work Order No. SNC1128018, Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Check Valve, Q1G31V031A, ASME Cl. 3, (Reviewed)

- 03.01.b - Pressurized-Water Reactor Vessel Upper Head Penetration Examination Activities.
 - VT-2, Penetration No 51, 53, 54 (2018 Inspection) Reviewed

- 03.01.c – Pressurized-Water Reactor Boric Acid Corrosion Control Activities. Reviews
 - CR 10651526, Boric Acid on Q1E11V037B, and Evaluation TE 1013236
 - CR 10700892, CR 10700892, Borated Water Leak 1B RHR-HX, MOV8888B Valve Stem, and TE1053204
 - CR 10784122 - Heavy boric acid residue found on Q1B13V096B

- 03.01.d – Pressurized-Water Reactor Steam Generator Tube Examination Activities.
 - Reviewed NMP-ES-050-F01, Farley Review of 1R29 Degradation Assessment, 1R29 Operational Assessment, and information used in evaluating Steam Generator (SG) tube integrity prior to Farley 1R30 (Skip Year Basis)

Operating Experience Review:

1. Review and Discussion of Potential Long term Impacts of Boric Acid Leakage at Refuel Cavity Seal Area and on Sand Box Access Cover Seals.
2. Discussed Farley Application of NEI-18-03 with plant licensing personnel.

71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Regualification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the Control Room for the following dates and activities (NMP-OS-007):
 - February 24, 2021 - the unit 2 'B' emergency diesel generator surveillance, unit 1 dilution, and operator response to various control room alarms
 - March 18, 2021 into March 19, 2021 - the unit 1 turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump testing on backshift
 - March 21, 2021 - portions of the unit 1 down power before a refueling outage

Licensed Operator Regualification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated a licensed operator graded simulator scenario involving a loss of offsite power on February 9, 2020 (Segment LOCT 21-1).

71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness

Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:

- (1) Unit 2 letdown due to a malfunction and isolation on November 8, 2020 and December 31, 2020 (Condition Report (CR) 10752412 and CR 10763550)

71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (7 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:

- (1) Unit 1 'C' component cooling water heat exchanger unavailable during tube leak repair for the week of January 18, 2021 (NMP-DP-001)
- (2) Unit 1 'A' residual heat removal pump room cooler out of service for inspection and the number 4 service water battery out of service for cell replacement on January 13 through January 15, 2021 (NMP-DP-001)
- (3) Unit 1 risk with the unit 1 'B' motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump out of service for planned maintenance on February 4, 2021 (NMP-DP-001)

- (4) Fire water suppression header rupture that occurred on February 11, 2020 (CR 10773474; Work Order (WO) SNC1142296)
- (5) Unit 2 'B' emergency diesel generator surveillance and work in the high voltage switchyard on February 24, 2021 (NMP-DP-001)
- (6) 2C emergency (station blackout) diesel generator out of service for maintenance and work inside the high voltage switchyard on March 3, 2021 (NMP-DP-001)
- (7) Unit 2 risk while performing the unit 1 loss of offsite power surveillance rendering the 1-2 A emergency diesel generator unavailable to unit 2 on March 22, 2021 (FNP-1-STP-80.14)

71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:

- (1) The integrated plant computer alarm did not function as expected during unit 1 power range NI-43 detector testing on January 26, 2021 (CR10769325)
- (2) Unit 1 'B' emergency diesel generator lube oil leak identified on February 3, 2021 (CR10771471)
- (3) Unit 1 'B' component cooling water system pipe leak on the service water supply vent line located on the unit 1 'B' component cooling water heater exchanger identified on February 22, 2021 (CR10777229)
- (4) Number 3 service water battery failed performance test identified on March 10, 2021 (CR10781645)
- (5) Unit 1 '1C' emergency diesel generator output breaker closure time exceeded the acceptance criteria during planned surveillance testing identified on March 22, 2021 (CR10784390; FNP-1-STP-80.14)

71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing

Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the following post-maintenance test activities to verify system operability and functionality:

- (1) Number 4 service water battery cell replacement during the week of January 11, 2021 (WO SNC1136470)
- (2) Unit 2 'C' atmospheric steam dump valve controller card replacement on January 12, 2021 (WO SNC72648)
- (3) Unit 2 'A' containment spray pump room cooler inspection and cleaning on January 19 and 20, 2021 (WO SNC1028104)
- (4) Unit 1 'A' spent fuel pool cooling water pump check valve replacement during the week of January 24, 2021 (WO SNC1131322)
- (5) Number one diesel driven fire pump fuel leak repair and fuel pump replacement in February 2020 (WO SNC1140263)

71111.22 - Surveillance Testing

The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:

Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)

- (1) Unit 2 'C' charging pump surveillance on January 26, 2021 (FNP-2-STP-4.3)
- (2) Unit 2 'B' emergency diesel generator surveillance on January 28, 2021 (FNP-2-STP-80.1)
- (3) Unit 1 'B' motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump surveillance on February 4, 2021 (FNP-1-STP-22.2)
- (4) Unit 2 'A' component cooling water pump surveillance performed on February 23, 2021 (FNP-2-STP-23.1)

Inservice Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

- (1) Unit 1 'B' residual heat removal pump quarterly surveillance on December 31, 2021 (FNP-1-STP-11.2)

71114.06 - Drill Evaluation

Drill/Training Evolution Observation (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated:

- (1) A licensed operator simulator training scenario involving a loss of offsite power which contributed to the emergency response organization drill and exercise performance indicators on February 9, 2020 (Segment LOCT 21-1)

OTHER ACTIVITIES – BASELINE

71151 - Performance Indicator Verification

The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:

IE01: Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours Sample (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)

- (1) Unit 1 (January 1, 2020 - December 31, 2020)
- (2) Unit 2 (January 1, 2020 - December 31, 2020)

IE03: Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours Sample (IP Section 03.02) (2 Samples)

- (1) Unit 1 (January 1, 2020 - December 31, 2020)
- (2) Unit 2 (January 1, 2020 - December 31, 2020)

IE04: Unplanned Scrams with Complications (USwC) Sample (IP Section 03.03) (2 Samples)

- (1) Unit 1 (January 1, 2020 - December 31, 2020)
- (2) Unit 2 (January 1, 2020 - December 31, 2020)

71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution

Semiannual Trend Review (IP Section 02.02) (1 Sample)

- (1) The inspectors reviewed the licensee evaluation and corrective actions associated with a calorimetric constant input error identified in August 2019 for unit 2 against the error that was discovered during the measurement uncertainty uprate modification in November 2020 (CR10636696; CR10761082).

Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (IP Section 02.03) (2 Samples)

The inspectors reviewed the licensee’s implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:

- (1) Concern with the calorimetric input from the venturi-based corrected feedwater flow and potential impact on unit 1 and unit 2 maximum power license condition identified on December 15, 2020 and documented in the corrective action program on December 16, 2020 (CR10761082)
- (2) Resolution of equipment issues tracked on the aggregate operator review list (i.e. operator workarounds; burdens; control room deficiencies) last updated in June 2020 to ensure that potential safety concerns are addressed in a timely manner commensurate with their safety significance (NMP-OS-006-002)

INSPECTION RESULTS

Licensee-Identified Non-Cited Violation	71152
This violation of very low safety significance was identified by the licensee and has been entered the licensee corrective action program and is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.	
<p>Violation: Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant Unit 1 and Unit 2 operating license condition 2.C(1) authorized Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) to operate the facilities at reactor core power levels not in excess of the maximum power level in accordance with the Facility Operating License NPF-2 and NPF-8. Contrary to the above, SNC identified and confirmed that reactor core power exceeded the authorized maximum power level for extended periods of time from as far back as November 2015 to December 16, 2021 for Unit 1 and to September 30, 2020 for Unit 2. Specifically, during a unit 2 measurement uncertainty recapture power uprate in the fall of 2021, the licensee identified that the venturi feedwater flow detectors were not properly scaled with an accurate correction factor since initial startup of the units. This resulted in an approximate 0.45 percent non-conservative error as read on the calorimetric indication.</p> <p>Significance/Severity: Green. The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix M, “Significance Determination Process Using Qualitative Criteria.” The inspectors initially evaluated IMC 0609 Appendix A, “The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power,” which leads to IMC 0609 Appendix M. Because SNC did not exceed their safety analysis design basis limit of 102% rated thermal power, the inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green).</p> <p>Corrective Action References: CR 10761082</p>	

Observation: Calorimetric program input error	71152
The inspectors reviewed a concern that the licensee identified in August 2019 related to the calorimetric program used to measure reactor thermal power. The concern was related to a	

non-conservative calorimetric program input error that affected the as read power indication on unit 2 for a period of approximately four months. The inspector reviewed the evaluation and corrective actions associated with the issue to determine if they were reasonable and commensurate with the safety significance. In addition, the inspectors reviewed the concern to determine if there was a potential trend or relationship to the calorimetric issue identified in December 2020 and documented in this report that could have reasonably been identified in August 2019.

The inspectors did not identify any findings or violations associated with the August 2019 calorimetric concern. In addition, the inspectors did not find any trends or common cause that could have reasonably alerted the licensee of the calorimetric issue identified in December 2020. The August 2019 issue impacted unit 2 for a period of approximately four months following a spring refueling outage in 2019 that did not result in exceeding the licensed thermal power based on the available indication and information at that time. The December 2020 issue involved a distinctly different inaccurate input performed by a vendor that affected both units since initial startup.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

- On April 20, 2021, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Charles Kharrl and other members of the licensee staff.
- On March 26, 2021, the inspectors presented the Results of the Farley Unit 1 PWR Inservice Inspection Baseline Inspection results to Mr. Delson Erb, Plant Manager and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
71111.08P	Corrective Action Documents	CR 10095898	Clarification of "Boric Acid Deficiency" Definition	07/14/2015
		CR 10653820	NEI 18-03, "Operability Determination" Issuance	10/9/19
		CR 10700892	Borated Water Leak Around 1B RHR HX to RCS Cold Legs QIE11MOV8888B Valve Stem	4/5/20
		CR 10784122	Heavy boric acid residue found on Q1B13V096B	3/22/21
		CR-10707214	1R28 CTMT liner plate deficiencies were not repaired in 1R29	5/6/20
	Corrective Action Documents Resulting from Inspection	CR 10786916	1R30 Lessons Learned, Moisture Barrier, (Leak Chase)	3/31/21
	Engineering Evaluations	SNC584843	1R28 IWE Engineering Evaluation, Containment Surfaces	12/14/18
		Technical Evaluation-1053204	As Found Condition of Boric Acid Leak, Q1E11V023A (Q1E11MOV8888B)	9/3/20
		1E11-2019-001	Corrosion Assessment, CR/TE: TE 1013236, RHR and LHSI System	12/16/19
		NMP-ES-004-GL01	Steam Generator Program Strategic Plan	VERSION 18.0
		NMP-ES-019	Sample of System Engineer Unidentified Leakage Trending	1/1/21 thru 3/20/21
		NMP-ES-050-F01	SG Inspection Skip Year Basis Review	3/8/21
		TE-1013236	Corrosion assessment on Q IEI I V037B based on documented findings in CAR 273620	5/23/18

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
		Technical Evaluation 929196	Clarification of "Boric Acid Deficiency" Definition	12/18/2015
		Technical Evaluation: 1070335	CISA (Self Assessment) ACTION- complete all Farley Boric Acid Program corrosion assessments prior to 2R27	10/9/2020
		Technical Evaluation: 1084954	Perform corrosion assessment: Heavy boric acid residue found on Q1B13V096B.	3/22/21
	Miscellaneous	Westinghouse Badge No's. 29805, Badge: 37857, Badge: 35164	SNC Ultrasonic NDE Certification Reviews	2/9/21
		Badge No. 18910	Southern Nuclear Operating Company, NDE Examiner Certification Review, UT and Visual Certification Review	3/3/21
		Badge No. 2825	Southern Nuclear Operating Company, NDE Examiner Certification Review, UT and Visual Certification Review	3/10/21
		NMP-ES-024-207	GENERAL VISUAL EXAMINATION OF IWE SURFACES	5/2/18
	NDE Reports	FRAMATOME INC. Document Number: 180-9284798-000	NDE Services Final Report, Farley 1R28 Bare Metal Visual Examination	5/23/18
		NMP-ES-024-207, Version 5.0 Page	General Visual Examination, Moisture Barrier between Floor and Containment Liner, at 105 and Leak Chase Test Connections	5/2/18
		Report No. S21F1U028	Summary No. F1 ALA1-4202-17-RB, UT, Elbow to Pipe Weld	3/27/21

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
		Rpt. No, S21F1V013	NDE Summary No. F1 ALA1-1100C-BMI-BMV, RPV BOTTOM HEAD MOUNTED INSTRUMENTATION BMV	3/25/21
		SNC1128018	Q1G31V031A-1A SFP Pump Check Valve Welds 1F, 2F, NDE PT Report	2/25/21
		SNC584186	Pressure Testing or Piping and Components, Reactor Pressure Vessel BMI, Code ASME XI Cat/item N-722/B15.80	4/12/18
		UT Report S21F1U016	Summary No. F1 ALA1-4203-8-RB, Elbow to Pipe Weld,	3/27/21
		WDI-PJF-1313702-FRS-001 Rev 0	UT and EC Reactor Vessel Head Inspection Final Examination Report	Rev 0, 4/9/15
		Weld No. ALA1-4100-1DM	Westinghouse Services Reactor Vessel Weld Results Summary, Outlet Nozzle at 25 Deg. Nozzle to Safe End Dissimilar Metal Weld	4/5/21
		Weld No. ALA1-4100-2	Westinghouse Services, Reactor Vessel Weld Results Summary, Outlet Nozzle at 25 Deg. Safe End to Pipe SS Weld	4/5/21
		WELD NO. ALAI-4300-1 DM	Westinghouse Services Reactor Vessel Weld Results Summary, Outlet Nozzle at 145° Nozzle to Safe End Dissimilar Metal Weld	4/5/21
		WELD NO. ALAI-4300-2	Westinghouse Services Reactor Vessel Weld Results Summary, Outlet Nozzle at 145°	4/5/21

Inspection Procedure	Type	Designation	Description or Title	Revision or Date
			Safe End to Pipe SS Weld	
	Procedures	FNP-1-UOP-2.4	Planned Reactor Shutdown, Section 3.3.1, Walkdowns, Reactor Head Inspection	Version 31
		NMP-ES-019	Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program	VERSION 11.2
		NMP-ES-019-001	Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program Implementation	VERSION 12.0
		NMP-ES-019-003	Boric Acid Deposit Sampling, Analysis and Data Evaluation	VERSION 2.1
		NMP-ES-019-004	Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program - Corrosion Assessment	VERSION 5.1
		NMP-ES-024-501	PDI Generic Procedure for the Ultrasonic Examination of Austenitic Pipe Welds (Appendix VIII)	Version 8.0
	Work Orders	SNC1005692	Boric Acid found on Q1B13V096B	4/1/21
		SNC1128018	SFP Check Valve Addition Q1G31V031A, ASME Class 3	1/11/21
		WO SNC544330	Clean boron and verify packing gland torque on Valve Qt EI I V037B	10/3/18
		WO SNC991116	Boron located on Q1E11V037B 1B RHR Miniflow	2/11/20
		Work Order SNC1054636	IB RHR HX TO RCS COLD LEGS ISO Q1E11MOV8888D, Boric acid Found on Q1E11V023A	4/8/20