UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
611 RYAN PLAZA DRIVE, SUITE 400
ARLINGTON, TEXAS 76011-8064

September 16, 1999

Otto L. Maynard, President and
Chief Executive Officer
Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation
P.O. Box 411
Burlington, Kansas 66839

Dear Mr. Maynard:

SUBJECT: MIDCYCLE PLANT PERFORMANCE REVIEW (PPR) - WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION

On August 18, 1999, the NRC staff completed the midcycle Plant Performance Review (PPR) of the Wolf Creek Station. The staff conducts these reviews for all operating nuclear power plants to integrate performance information and to plan for inspection activities. The focus of this performance review was to identify changes in performance over the past 6 months at your facility and to allocate inspection resources over the next 7 months.

Our 6-month review of Wolf Creek identified that your performance in certain areas warranted increased NRC attention:

> In the area of Emergency Preparedness, changes to the emergency plan have raised questions regarding the potential for a decrease in the plan's effectiveness.
>
> In the area of Engineering, the modification effort installing diodes to suppress surges in the Emergency Diesel Generator A exciter circuit, and the subsequent results of the modification, have raised a number of questions requiring further review.

Therefore, we plan to conduct two additional inspections beyond the core inspection program over the next 7 months to address the questions raised by these issues.

Enclosure 1 contains a historical listing of plant issues, referred to as the Plant Issues Matrix (PIM), that were considered during this PPR process to arrive at our integrated review of licensee performance trends. The PIM includes items summarized from inspection reports or other docketed correspondence between the NRC and the Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation from October 1, 1998, through July 16, 1999. As noted above, greater emphasis was placed on those issues identified in the past 6 months during this performance review. The NRC does not attempt to document all aspects of licensee programs and performance that may be functioning appropriately. Rather, the NRC only documents issues that it believes warrant management attention or represent noteworthy aspects of performance.

This letter advises you of our plans for future inspection activities at your facility so that you will have an opportunity to prepare for these inspections and to provide us with feedback on any planned inspections that may conflict with your plant activities. Enclosure 2 details our inspection plan through March 2000. This date was chosen to coincide with the scheduled implementation of the revised reactor oversight process in April 2000. The rationale or basis for

each inspection outside the core inspection program is discussed above so that you are aware of the reason for emphasis in these program areas. Routine resident inspections are not listed due to their ongoing and continuous nature.

If circumstances arise which cause us to change this inspection plan, we will contact you to discuss the change as soon as possible. Please contact me at (817) 860-8148 with any questions you may have.

Sincerely,

William D. Johnson, Chief
Project Branch B
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos. 50-482
License Nos. NPF-42

Enclosures:
1. Plant Issues Matrix
2. Inspection Plan

cc w/enclosures:
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Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corp.
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bcc to DCD (IE40)

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Chief, Regional Operations and Program Management Section, OEDO
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Chief, NRR/DIPM/IIPB

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United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

PLANT ISSUE MATRIX

By Primary Functional Area

Region IV

WOLF CREEK STATION

Date	Source	Functional Area	ID	Type	Template Codes	Item Title / Item Description
06/12/1999	1999006	Pri: OPS Sec:	Licensee	NEG	Pri: 2B Sec: Ter:	**Failure to include 49 CCW system valves in locked valve program** During performance of the corrective actions for the failure to include Valve EGV-0105 in the locked valve program, the licensee discovered an additional 49 component cooling water system valves that were not included in the program. The licensee revised the appropriate procedure to include the additional valves. The licensee determined that the safety significance was low. The failure to include the valves in the locked valve program was an additional example of Noncited Violation 50-482/9902-04 and is not being cited separately. **Dockets Discussed:** 05000482 WOLF CREEK 1
06/12/1999	1999006-01	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	NCV	Pri: 1A Sec: Ter:	**Failure to correctly perform a surveillance procedure during turbine generator startup** A control room operator and a maintenance technician did not correctly perform a Technical Specification required surveillance procedure during the main turbine generator startup. The causes of the error were an inadequate prejob briefing and poor communications during the test. The licensee successfully reperformed the surveillance procedure. The failure to properly perform the surveillance test is a violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1.a. This is a noncited violation and is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 99-1847. **Dockets Discussed:** 05000482 WOLF CREEK 1
04/12/1999	1999003	Pri: OPS Sec:	Licensee	NEG	Pri: 1A Sec: Ter:	**Poor performance by operations personnel resulted in a fuel movement error during refueling efforts** Poor communications, ineffective supervisory oversight, and inattention to detail by refueling personnel resulted in the licensee placing one fuel assembly on top of another in the fuel transfer cart. The refueling bridge crane protective devices prevented the full weight of the assembly from resting on the assembly in the transfer cart. The fuel assemblies were not damaged. The licensee halted fuel movement until corrective actions for the event were implemented. **Dockets Discussed:** 05000482 WOLF CREEK 1
04/12/1999	1999003-02	Pri: OPS Sec:	Licensee	NCV	Pri: 1C Sec: Ter:	**Containment penetration bypassed during core alterstions** A violation of Technical Specification 3.9.4.c occurred when the licensee conducted core alterations with a direct access path open from the containment atmosphere to the auxiliary building atmosphere. A vent valve on the inside of containment and a test connection valve on the outside of containment in the reactor coolant system Hot Leg 1 to the residual heat removal Pump A line were open. This is a noncited violation and is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 99-1285. **Dockets Discussed:** 05000482 WOLF CREEK 1
04/01/1999	1999003	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 1A Sec: Ter:	**Good operations performance during plant shutdown** The power reduction and transitions associated with the shutdown of the reactor for Refueling Outage 10 were conducted smoothly and error free. **Dockets Discussed:** 05000482 WOLF CREEK 1
03/20/1999	1999002	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 1A Sec: Ter:	**Good operator response to emergency diesel generator failure** The operators' response to the failure of Emergency Diesel Generator A was prompt and thorough. The shift supervisor exhibited very good supervisory oversight. The control room staff was attentive to plant parameters during troubleshooting and maintenance activities. **Dockets Discussed:** 05000482 WOLF CREEK 1

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WOLF CREEK STATION

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03/19/1999	1999003	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 1A Sec: Ter:	**Good performance by operations during midloop activities** Operators drained the reactor coolant system to reduced inventory and midloop in a safe and deliberate manner, stopping on several occasions to ensure that all reactor coolant system level indications were tracking as required. Operations department management effectively established an environment in the control room which allowed the operators to focus on safe conduct of the evolution with few distractions. **Dockets Discussed:** 05000482 WOLF CREEK 1
03/19/1999	1999003-01	Pri: OPS Sec:	Licensee	NCV	Pri: 1A Sec: Ter:	**Reactivity mismanagement event** A control room operator deborated the reactor coolant system for 31 minutes instead of the required 5 minutes. As a result, core thermal power exceeded the licensed power level of 3565 MwTh by 5 MwTh for a short period of time. The failure to monitor and control reactor reactivity at all times is a violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1.This is a noncited violation and is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 99-0946. **Dockets Discussed:** 05000482 WOLF CREEK 1
02/06/1999	1998021	Pri: OPS Sec:	Licensee	POS	Pri: 1A Sec: Ter:	**Alert operator discovered maintenance failure to replace manway cover on waterbox** A nuclear station operator discovered that maintenance technicians had failed to replace a manway cover on a main condenser water box. The operator made this discovery while restoring the associated main condenser circulating water path to service following maintenance, but before flow had been restored. **Dockets Discussed:** 05000482 WOLF CREEK 1
02/06/1999	1998021	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 1A Sec: Ter:	**Good performance by operations personnel during fire protection system testing** The inspectors concluded that the operations department prejob briefing of fire protection system testing was thorough, professional, and met all of the standards and expectations established by licensee management. The operations department performance of fire protection system testing demonstrated a high level of operator system knowledge and equipment familiarity. Overall, licensee performance of the fire protection system testing was very good. **Dockets Discussed:** 05000482 WOLF CREEK 1
02/03/1999	1998021	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 1A Sec: Ter:	**End-of-life core MTC measurements were accomplished in a safe, deliberate, and conservative manner** The end-of-life core moderator temperature coefficient measurements were accomplished in a safe, deliberate, and conservative manner. All reactivity changes were made in accordance with established operations department guidance and expectations. The operations, engineering, and chemistry departments coordinated activities exceptionally well throughout the planning and performance of the procedure. Licensee management involvement was evident during briefings, and appropriate topics were discussed with an emphasis on safety over schedule adherence. **Dockets Discussed:** 05000482 WOLF CREEK 1
12/17/1998	1998020	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 1A Sec: Ter:	**Licensee management was aggressive in responding to several work performance problems** Licensee management was aggressive in responding to several work performance problems. The problems, although not safety significant, indicated a lack of attention to detail by plant personnel. A site-wide work standdown and management briefing reinforced the importance of public, plant, and personnel safety to licensee personnel. **Dockets Discussed:** 05000482 WOLF CREEK 1

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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Region IV
WOLF CREEK STATION

Date	Source	Functional Area	ID	Type	Template Codes	Item Title / Item Description
12/10/1998	1998020	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 1A Sec: Ter:	**Licensee responded properly to rod control system failure** The licensee responded properly to a failure of the rod control system. The control room staff entered and performed the appropriate off-normal procedure. The supervising operator exhibited good oversight during the response to the event. The operators minimized distractions in the control room during the rod control system maintenance and testing and maintained a good awareness of plant conditions.
Dockets Discussed: 05000482 WOLF CREEK 1						
10/15/1998	1998019-01	Pri: OPS Sec:	Self	NCV	Pri: 3A Sec: Ter:	**Inadequate clearance order** The clearance order established for the inspection and lubrication of the fuel building emergency exhaust absorber unit tornado damper was inadequate, and was a violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1. The clearance order did not provide isolation from all sources of high volumetric air flow and did not include special conditions or precautions on the clearance order summary sheet, as was required if positive boundaries were not established. This nonrepetitive, licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section VII.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
Dockets Discussed: 05000482 WOLF CREEK 1						
10/03/1998	1998017	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 3B Sec: Ter:	**Licensee developed techniques to prevent mispositioning events, raising management/personnel awarenes:** The licensee identified and responded to an increase in component misposition events. The licensee's response provided techniques for use by site personnel to prevent component misposition events and raised the level of awareness and attention for this issue to site management and personnel.
Dockets Discussed: 05000482 WOLF CREEK 1						
10/03/1998	1998017-01	Pri: OPS Sec:	Licensee	NCV	Pri: 3A Sec: Ter:	**Turbine trip instrumentation surveillance testing not performed prior to startup** The licensee failed to ensure that turbine trip instrumentation surveillance tests were performed during the required modes of operation as required by Technical specifications. This nonrepetitive licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section VII.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This item was identified by the licensee in LER 9722-00.
Dockets Discussed: 05000482 WOLF CREEK 1						
07/16/1999	1999011	Pri: MAINT Sec:	NRC	NEG	Pri: 5A Sec: Ter:	**Poorly implemented performance improvement request pertaining to meteorological instrumentation proble** The performance improvement request process was implemented poorly with respect to a meteorological instrumentation problem.
Dockets Discussed: 05000482 WOLF CREEK 1						
07/16/1999	1999011	Pri: MAINT Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 3A Sec: Ter:	**Meteorological instrumentation calibrated and maintained correctly** With the exception of the temperature channels, the meteorological instrumentation was correctly calibrated and maintained.
Dockets Discussed: 05000482 WOLF CREEK 1						

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

PLANT ISSUE MATRIX

By Primary Functional Area

Region IV

WOLF CREEK STATION

Date	Source	Functional Area	ID	Type	Template Codes	Item Title / Item Description
07/16/1999	1999011-01	Pri: MAINT Sec:	NRC	NCV	Pri: 3A Sec: Ter:	**Technical violation for failing to restore temerpature measuring instrumentation within 7 days** With the exception of the temperature channels, the meteorological instrumentation was correctly calibrated and maintained.
Dockets Discussed: 05000482 WOLF CREEK 1						
06/12/1999	1999006	Pri: MAINT Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 2A Sec: Ter:	**New central work control process was found to be good** The licensee's new central work control process incorporated just-in-time work package preparation, up-to-date work package review, work package approval by a senior reactor operator for current plant conditions, and inclusion of the work package in the approved daily schedule. The licensee realized an overall increase in personnel safety and reactor safety by reducing the opportunity for work to be accomplished outside of the comprehensive work planning, scheduling, and approval process.
Dockets Discussed: 05000482 WOLF CREEK 1						
06/12/1999	1999006-02	Pri: MAINT Sec:	Licensee	NCV	Pri: 2B Sec: Ter:	**Missed surveillance on the auxiliary shutdown panel** From November 1997 to May 6, 1999, the licensee failed to demonstrate the operability of all the auxiliary shutdown panel controls. This was a violation of Technical Specification Soction 4.3.3.5.2. The contacts were subsequently tested and found to be satisfactory. This is a noncited violation and is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 99-1777.
Dockets Discussed: 05000482 WOLF CREEK 1						
06/12/1999	1999006-03	Pri: MAINT Sec:	Licensee	NCV	Pri: 1A Sec: Ter:	**Source range nuclear instruments not tested before entering Mode 6** On April 9, 1999, the licensee entered Mode 6 without first performing an analog channel operational test for the source range neutron flux monitors. The failure to perform these tests, before entering Mode 6, violated the surveillance requirement of Technical Specification Section 4.9.2.c. This is a noncited violation and is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 99-1244.
Dockets Discussed: 05000482 WOLF CREEK 1						
04/18/1999	1999003	Pri: MAINT Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 3A Sec: Ter:	**Good performance during Reactor Coolant Pump B maintenance activity** The movement of Reactor Coolant Pump B from the reactor coolant system to a shipping container was well planned and executed. The prejob briefing was thorough and interactive. Personnel did not receive any unplanned radiological exposure.
Dockets Discussed: 05000482 WOLF CREEK 1						
04/09/1999	1999004	Pri: MAINT Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 3A Sec: 3B Ter:	**Satisfactory performance by contract examiners** The licensee's contractor examiners demonstrated skill in obtaining satisfactory examination coverage of a weld in spite of mechanical interference.
Dockets Discussed: 05000482 WOLF CREEK 1						

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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WOLF CREEK STATION

Date	Source	Functional Area	ID	Type	Template Codes	Item Title / Item Description
04/09/1999	1999004	Pri: MAINT Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 3A Sec: 4B Ter: 4C	**Good performance regarding ASME code-governed repair and replacement activities** ASME code-governed repair and replacement activities reviewed by the inspector were procured, performed, and tested in accordance with appropriate codes and procedures. The licensee's process for validating the use of proper material for code-governed repair and replacement was excellent. **Dockets Discussed:** 05000482 WOLF CREEK 1
04/09/1999	1999004	Pri: MAINT Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 4C Sec: Ter:	**Successfull ISI program implementation** The licensee's examination reports reviewed provided good documentation of successful program implementation. **Dockets Discussed:** 05000482 WOLF CREEK 1
03/20/1999	1999002-02	Pri: MAINT Sec:	Licensee	NCV	Pri: 1C Sec: Ter:	**Failure to correctly test a portion of the automatic level control circuitry of the EDG fuel oil transfer system** On October 29, 1998, the licensee identified that since January 16, 1996, operators had failed to correctly test a portion of the automatic level control circuitry of the emergency diesel generator fuel oil transfer system. The licensee determined the root cause of the event to miscommunications between engineering and operations personnel. The failure to correctly test the fuel oil transfer circuitry was a violation of Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2.a.1. This Severity Level IV violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 98-3230 (closure of LER 98-06). **Dockets Discussed:** 05000482 WOLF CREEK 1
03/20/1999	1999002-03	Pri: MAINT Sec:	Licensee	NCV	Pri: 2B Sec: Ter:	**Refueling water storage tank level channel analog channel operational test did not meet TS requirements** On May 5, 1998, the licensee failed to place the refueling water storage tank channel in bypass during the analog channel operational test. This was a violation of Technical Specification 3.3-3, Action 16. This Severity Level IV violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 98-0486 (closure of LER 98-03) . **Dockets Discussed:** 05000482 WOLF CREEK 1
03/20/1999	1999002-04	Pri: MAINT Sec:	Licensee	NCV	Pri: 2B Sec: Ter:	**CCW valve was not included in the locked valve program or monthly valve position surveillance procedure** On January 28, 1999, the licensee failed to include Valve EGV-0105, component cooling water to the excess letdown heat exchanger, in the locked valve program or monthly valve position verification surveillance procedure. This was a violation of Technical Specification 4.7.3.a. This Severity Level IV violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 99-0258 (closure of LER 99-01). FROM INSPECTION REPORT 99-06 - During performance of the corrective actions for the failure to include Valve EGV-0105 in the locked valve program, the licensee discovered an additional 49 component cooling water system valves that were not included in the program. The licensee revised the appropriate procedure to include the additional valves. The licensee determined that the safety significance was low. The failure to include the valves in the locked valve program was an additional example of Noncited Violation 50-482/9902-04 and is not being cited separately **Dockets Discussed:** 05000482 WOLF CREEK 1

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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WOLF CREEK STATION

Date	Source	Functional Area	ID	Type	Template Codes	Item Title / Item Description
03/12/1999	1999003-03	Pri: MAINT Sec: Ter:	Licensee	NCV	Pri: 4C Sec: Ter:	**Failure to perform surveillance tests on containment isolation valves in the appropriate power mode** On March 12, 1999, the licensee identified that prior to 1999 they had failed to complete testing of all containment isolation valves during Modes 5 or 6, as required by Technical Specification 4.6.3.2. However, all containment isolation valves had been successfully tested during this time. The majority of these valves were tested in modes other than that specified in the Technical Specification. This is a noncited violation and is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 99-0860 (Licensee Event Report 50-482/99-02).
Dockets Discussed: 05000482 WOLF CREEK 1						
02/06/1999	1998021	Pri: MAINT Sec: Ter:	Licensee	NEG	Pri: 3A Sec: Ter:	**Failure by maintenance personnel to replace manway cover on a waterbox** Licensee maintenance personnel did not replace a manway cover on a waterbox as specified in the work instruction. This would have allowed a significant volume of water to flow into the turbine building near the main condensate pumps, creating a significant personnel and equipment hazard, if circulating water flow had been restored.
Dockets Discussed: 05000482 WOLF CREEK 1						
02/06/1999	1998021	Pri: MAINT Sec: Ter:	NRC	POS	Pri: 2A Sec: Ter:	**Good material condition noted in essential service water pump rooms** The material condition of those plant systems and components evaluated during this inspection period was good, with few equipment deficiencies. Major material condition improvements were made to the essential service water pump rooms, including cleaning and painting of piping, valves, floors, and walls.
Dockets Discussed: 05000482 WOLF CREEK 1						
02/06/1999	1998021-02	Pri: MAINT Sec: Ter:	Licensee	NCV	Pri: 1A Sec: Ter:	**Component cooling water pump auto-start circuits not tested** In November 1997, a portion of component cooling water pumps automatic start circuits was not tested in accordance with Technical Specification 4.7.3.b.2. From April 27 to May 9, 1998, component cooling water Pump B was inoperable for maintenance. In violation of Technical Specification 3.7.3, both Train B component cooling water pumps were inoperable from April 27 to May 9, 1998, which exceeded the Technical Specification allowed outage time of 72 hours (LER 98-008). This nonrepetitive, licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VII.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
Dockets Discussed: 05000482 WOLF CREEK 1						
01/12/1999	1998021-01	Pri: MAINT Sec: Ter:	Licensee	NCV	Pri: 3A Sec: Ter:	**Work on electrical equipment w/o procedural controls or a clearance order** Licensee personnel performed work inside an electrical cabinet without the required protection of a clearance order and without the required work process controls. Maintenance technicians moved a wire termination in an inverter cabinet following a failed postmaintenance test without specific authorization in an approved work order and without a tagout. This is a violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1.a. This nonrepetitive, licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VII.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
Dockets Discussed: 05000482 WOLF CREEK 1						
12/24/1998	1998020-01	Pri: MAINT Sec: Ter:	NRC	NCV	Pri: 2B Sec: 3A Ter:	**Inadequate maintenance procedure** In violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1.a, licensee personnel performed maintenance on a steam generator atmospheric relief valve using an inadequate maintenance procedure. Licensee maintenance personnel failed to reinstall a control air isolation valve for a steam generator atmospheric relief valve. The maintenance department relied on skill of the craft to control the work on safety-related equipment, instead of providing adequate procedural controls. This was a noncited violation ADDITIONAL EXAMPLE FROM IR 98-21: Steam generator atmospheric relief Valve AB-PV-2 was inoperable from the local control station from June 4 through December 31, 1998, because of an inadequate work package. The inadequate work package for Valve AB-PV-2 was another example of a noncited violation identified in NRC Inspection Report 50-482/9820.
Dockets Discussed: 05000482 WOLF CREEK 1						

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Date	Source	Functional Area	ID	Type	Template Codes	Item Title / Item Description
12/10/1998	1998020	Pri: MAINT Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 2B Sec: Ter:	**Excellent performance by maintenance personnel in addressing rod control system malfunction** The licensee's execution of the procedure to identify and correct the cause of a rod control system malfunction was excellent. The prejob brief clearly identified potential causes, procedural steps, communication expectations and contingency plans. Maintenance technicians used excellent step-by-step control, peer checks, communication techniques, and system response verification throughout the process. **Dockets Discussed:** 05000482 WOLF CREEK 1
11/14/1998	1998019-02	Pri: MAINT Sec:	Licensee	NCV	Pri: 1C Sec: Ter:	**Spent fuel storage facility crane surveillance** In violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, the procedure for testing the spent fuel bridge crane was inadequate from September 1986 until October 1997 in that it failed to account for the weight of the scale during checks of the overload cutout setpoint, as required. As a result, the licensee failed to demonstrate operability of the spent fuel bridge crane. The licensee revised and successfully performed the procedure. This nonrepetitive, licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section VII.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. **Dockets Discussed:** 05000482 WOLF CREEK 1
10/03/1998	1998017-02	Pri: MAINT Sec:	Licensee	NCV	Pri: 3A Sec: Ter:	**Inadequte surveillance of pressurizer pressure interlock** The licensee failed to properly test Pressurizer Pressure Permissive P-11, because of an inadequate design. This nonrepetitive licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section VII.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This item was identified by the licensee in LER 9710-00. **Dockets Discussed:** 05000482 WOLF CREEK 1
05/01/1999	1999003-04	Pri: ENG Sec:	Licensee	NCV	Pri: 4C Sec: Ter:	**Failure to place snubbers in operable status within 72 hours** On November 9, 1997, a snubber failure resulted in the licensee's discovery that prior to October 2, 1995, several snubbers were inoperable. The licensee determined that these snubbers were not returned to operable status within 72 hours as required by then applicable Technical Specification 3.7.8. This was a violation of the Technical Specification. However, the licensee determined that the systems and subsystems remained operable with the degraded snubbers installed. This is a noncited violation and is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 99-0389 (Licensee Event Report 50-482/97-20). **Dockets Discussed:** 05000482 WOLF CREEK 1
03/20/1999	1999002-05	Pri: ENG Sec:	Licensee	NCV	Pri: 3A Sec: Ter:	**Installation of a snubber with a defective part resulted in a historical violation of TS 3.7.8** On December 7, 1998, the licensee discovered the installation of an inoperable snubber on a main steam isolation valve which was a violation of Technical Specification 4.7.8. The licensee determined that the valve was operable with the defective snubber installed. This Severity Level IV violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 99-0037 (closure of LER 98-10). **Dockets Discussed:** 05000482 WOLF CREEK 1
02/06/1999	1998021-03	Pri: ENG Sec:	NRC	NCV	Pri: 1A Sec: Ter:	**Leak rate testing of the containment hydrogen purge system** The failure to include the containment hydrogen purge system's containment isolation valves in the appropriate leak rate testing program was a violation of Technical Specification 3.6.7.1. This nonrepetitive, licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section VII.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. **Dockets Discussed:** 05000482 WOLF CREEK 1

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PLANT ISSUE MATRIX
By Primary Functional Area

Region IV
WOLF CREEK STATION

Date	Source	Functional Area	ID	Type	Template Codes	Item Title / Item Description
11/14/1998	1998019	Pri: ENG Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 4B Sec: Ter:	**Good engineering performance resulted in improved performance of turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump** Substantial effort by the engineering organization resulted in sustained improved performance of the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump. At the end of September 1998, the accumulated rolling 18-month unavailability for the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump was approximately 100 hours, substantially less than the goal of 200 hours. **Dockets Discussed:** 05000482 WOLF CREEK 1
10/03/1998	1998017	Pri: ENG Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 4C Sec: Ter:	**Licensee management demonstrated questioning attitude** Licensee management demonstrated a questioning attitude during an engineering presentation on the health of the residual heat removal system by asking challenging questions regarding long-term operability and bearing lube oil volume and demanding adequate responses. **Dockets Discussed:** 05000482 WOLF CREEK 1
07/16/1999	1999011	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	STR	Pri: 3A Sec: Ter:	**Properly documented and implementation of radiological environmental monitoring program** The licensee's radiological environmental monitoring program was correctly implemented. The radiological environmental monitoring program results were properly documented in an annual report. **Dockets Discussed:** 05000482 WOLF CREEK 1
07/16/1999	1999011	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	Licensee	WK	Pri: 3A Sec: Ter:	**Suspected overexposure based on miscalculation** Based on incorrect internal dose calculations, the licensee reported a suspected overexposure to the NRC. During the subsequent review of the event, the licensee determined no regulatory dose limit had been exceeded. However, the licensee identified weaknesses in radiological surveys, radiation worker practices, work planning, communications, radiation work permits, and procedural guidance for dose calculations. **Dockets Discussed:** 05000482 WOLF CREEK 1
07/16/1999	1999011-02	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	Licensee	NCV	Pri: 3A Sec: Ter:	**Failure to make surveys of airborne radioacitvity** The licensee identified a violation involving a failure to make surveys in accordance with 10 cfr 20.1501(a). Radiation protection personnel failed to evaluate airborne radioactivity concentrations in a work area. This Severity Level IV Violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforement Policy. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as performance improvement request 99-2319. **Dockets Discussed:** 05000482 WOLF CREEK 1
07/16/1999	1999011-03	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	Licensee	NCV	Pri: 3A Sec: Ter:	**Failure to follow radiation protection procedures** The licensee identified two examples of a violation involving a worker that failed to follow radiation protection procedural guidance in accordance with technical specification 6.8.1. A radiation worker failed to follow radiation work permit protective clothing requirements and failed to frish properly for radioactive contamination. This Severity Level IV Violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as performance improvement requests 99-2319 and 99-2437. **Dockets Discussed:** 05000482 WOLF CREEK 1

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Date	Source	Functional Area	ID	Type	Template Codes	Item Title / Item Description
06/18/1999	1999007	Pri: PLTSUP Sec: Dockets Discussed: 05000482 WOLF CREEK 1	NRC	POS	Pri: 3A Sec: Ter:	**External exposure control program was effectively implemented** The external exposure control program was effectively implemented. Appropriate radiological controlled area access controls were maintained. Radiation workers wore the proper dosimetry. Radiation, contamination, high, and locked high radiation areas were properly controlled and posted. Housekeeping within the radiological controlled area was generally very good. ALARA low dose waiting areas were appropriately located and clearly identified. Keys for locked high radiation areas were issued and controlled in accordance with station procedures. Radiation work permits contained clear, consistent radiological control information. A radiological pre-job briefing for movement of fuel in the spent fuel pool was professionally conducted. Radiation protection job coverage of the fuel movement in the spent fuel pool was appropriate. An effective dosimetry program was maintained. Personnel contamination events during Refueling Outage X showed a 67 percent reduction from the number experienced during the previous refueling outage .
06/18/1999	1999007	Pri: PLTSUP Sec: Dockets Discussed: 05000482 WOLF CREEK 1	NRC	POS	Pri: 3A Sec: Ter:	**Effective internal exposure control program was implemented** An effective internal exposure control program was implemented. The use and positioning of air sampling equipment within the radiological controlled area were appropriate for monitoring radiological airborne conditions. The respirator inventory, maintenance, and issuance program was properly implemented. Proper total effective dose equivalent/as low as is reasonably achievable evaluations for respirator use were performed. Whole-body counting systems were calibrated and performance checked in accordance with station procedures. Internal dose assessment methodologies provided appropriate evaluations of internal dose.
06/18/1999	1999007	Pri: PLTSUP Sec: Dockets Discussed: 05000482 WOLF CREEK 1	NRC	POS	Pri: 3B Sec: Ter:	**Station workers used the personnel contamination monitors properly** Station workers used the personnel contamination monitors properly. Radioactive material, laundry, and trash containers were properly labeled and controlled. The portable radiation protection instrumentation program was properly maintained. The calibration and source response check programs for portable neutron and beta/gamma radiation survey instruments were implemented properly. Effective radioactive source inventory and leak testing programs were in place.
06/12/1999	1999006	Pri: PLTSUP Sec: Dockets Discussed: 05000482 WOLF CREEK 1	NRC	POS	Pri: 3A Sec: Ter:	**Good use of 'RADS' monitoring system was noted during outage** The licensee's use of the RADS monitoring system to monitor radiological work in the containment building during the refueling outage greatly improved the licensee's efforts to maintain dose as low as reasonably achievable. RADS was comprised of a combination of radio communications, teledosimetry, and video monitoring in a single system. This enabled health physics technicians to monitor work in containment from a remote location. The licensee reported that the overall dose received during the outage was approximately 141 REM, which was the lowest dose received since Refueling Outage 2.
04/16/1999	1999003-05	Pri: PLTSUP Sec: Dockets Discussed: 05000482 WOLF CREEK 1	Licensee	URI	Pri: 3A Sec: Ter:	**Radiation worker entered a hot particle zone without wearing appropriate protective clothing** A radiation worker to entered a hot particle zone without wearing the protective clothing required by the radiation work permit. The licensee provided the inspectors with the results of their investigation, and the inspectors are continuing their review of this event. This item will be tracked as an unresolved item.

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Region IV
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Date	Source	Functional Area	ID	Type	Template Codes	Item Title / Item Description
03/31/1999	1999003	Pri: PLTSUP Sec: Dockets Discussed: 05000482 WOLF CREEK 1	NRC	POS	Pri: 3B Sec: Ter:	**Pre-outage radiation worker training was thorough and effective** Just-in-time radiation worker training provided to all radiation workers before the start of Refueling Outage 10 was thorough and effective. This resulted in raising the awareness and knowledge of radiation workers in the area of radiation protection.
03/20/1999	1999002-06	Pri: PLTSUP Sec: Dockets Discussed: 05000482 WOLF CREEK 1	Licensee	NCV	Pri: 3A Sec: Ter:	**Contract radiation worker entered the RCA without current training** A contract worker entered the radiological controlled area without current radiation worker training. The licensee determined that the root cause of the event was personnel error by a health physics technician. The technician issued dosimetry to the worker even though the computer based training record flagged the training as not current. This Severity Level IV violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 99-0327.
01/14/1999	1999001	Pri: PLTSUP Sec: Dockets Discussed: 05000482 WOLF CREEK 1	NRC	STR	Pri: 1C Sec: Ter:	**Performance in the physical security area was very good** Performance in the physical security area was very good. A proper security system testing and maintenance program was conducted and documented. Security equipment was repaired in a timely manner. The protected and vital area barriers and detection systems were well designed and maintained. All attempts by the licensee to intrude through the barriers were detected. Compensatory security measures were effectively deployed and were consistent with requirements of the security plan. The testing of the security backup power supply system was effective in demonstrating the capability of the system to perform its intended function. The security diesel generator was reliable and well maintained. Implementing procedures met the performance requirements in the physical security plan. The event logs and supporting incident reports were accurate and neat, and the security staff was correctly reporting security events. Security personnel were well trained on the program requirements.
12/26/1998	1998020	Pri: PLTSUP Sec: Dockets Discussed: 05000482 WOLF CREEK 1	NRC	NEG	Pri: 1C Sec: Ter:	**Licensee did not ensure habitability of technical support center** The licensee did not ensure that the technical support center would be habitable if the technical support center diesel combustion air inlet damper became inoperable. The licensee's planned corrective actions wer appropriate.
12/26/1998	1998020	Pri: PLTSUP Sec: Dockets Discussed: 05000482 WOLF CREEK 1	NRC	POS	Pri: 1C Sec: Ter:	**Good work by ALARA review committee regarding refueling outage work packages** The ALARA review committee provided a rigorous, probing, and in-depth review of a number of refueling outage work packages. The committee closely examined the work processes to ensure that all available means of reducing radiation exposure were considered and appropriately utilized.
11/14/1998	1998019	Pri: PLTSUP Sec: Dockets Discussed: 05000482 WOLF CREEK 1	NRC	POS	Pri: 1C Sec: Ter:	**Excellent licensee response to road closures due to flooding** Overall, the licensee's response to road closures due to flooding was excellent. The licensee maintained contact with offsite agencies and provided timely updates to necessary personnel. The licensee ensured that all emergency response organization requirements would be met if needed and provided updated road closure information to emergency response managers. The road closure information was also posted in the technical information center and the emergency offsite facility.

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Region IV
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Date	Source	Functional Area	ID	Type	Template Codes	Item Title / Item Description
10/03/1998	1998017	Pri: PLTSUP	NRC	NEG	Pri: 3A	**Poor radiation work practices regarding radiological boundary controls**
		Sec:			Sec: 3B	Observations by the inspector of poor radiological work practices indicated a deficiency in the knowledge of some radiation workers regarding contaminated area boundary controls and methods of preventing the spread of contamination. The inspector identified maintenance technicians working greater than 8 feet above the floor inside the radiologically controlled area without first contacting health physics. This supported the conclusion in NRC Inspection Report 98-15 that there was a deficiency in radiation worker knowledge regarding the requirement to contact health physics before working in the overhead in the radiologically controlled area.
					Ter:	
Dockets Discussed: 05000482 WOLF CREEK 1						
10/03/1998	1998017	Pri: PLTSUP	NRC	POS	Pri: 2A	**Improved appearance in the radiological controlled area**
		Sec:			Sec:	The inspector noted a reduction in the number of storage containers and installed drip bags, and a generally improved appearance inside the radiological controlled area because of a licensee housekeeping improvement effort directed at reducing the resources required to maintain tools and equipment, and improve surveying capabilities inside the radiological controlled area.
					Ter:	
Dockets Discussed: 05000482 WOLF CREEK 1						
03/31/1999	01	Pri: OTHER	NRC	LIC	Pri: 1C	**Technical Specification Amendment 123 (ISTS conversion)**
		Sec:			Sec:	WCNOC's effort in the development of the Improved Standard Technical Specification amendment request and supplements was very good, and the support received from the WCNOC organization throughout the staff's review of the submittals was outstanding.
					Ter:	
Dockets Discussed: 05000482 WOLF CREEK 1						
03/30/1999	50-482	Pri: OTHER	NRC	LIC	Pri: 4C	**Audit of Y2K readiness program.**
		Sec:			Sec: 4B	Wolf Creek is making use of its existing QA and modification programs and procedures to achieve Y2K readiness. Furthermore, Wolf Creek is engaged in extensive information sharing and interfaces with other entities on the Y2K problem. The need for Y2K contingency planning is understood by the Wolf Creek licensee and in keeping with the NEI/NUSMG 98-07 recommendation, one individual has been designated as the single point of contact for contingency planning. Executive management support was found to be aggressive at Wolf Creek. Management at Wolf Creek has dedicated the fiscal resources needed for successful completion of the Y2K readiness program.
					Ter:	
Dockets Discussed: 05000482 WOLF CREEK 1						

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Legend

Type Codes:

BU	Bulletin
CDR	Construction
DEV	Deviation
EEI	Escalated Enforcement Item
IFI	Inspector follow-up item
LER	Licensee Event Report
LIC	Licensing Issue
MISC	Miscellaneous
MV	Minor Violation
NCV	NonCited Violation
NEG	Negative
NOED	Notice of Enforcement Discretion
NON	Notice of Non-Conformance
OTHR	Other
P21	Part 21
POS	Positive
SGI	Safeguard Event Report
STR	Strength
URI	Unresolved item
VIO	Violation
WK	Weakness

Template Codes:

1A	Normal Operations
1B	Operations During Transients
1C	Programs and Processes
2A	Equipment Condition
2B	Programs and Processes
3A	Work Performance
3B	[illegible]SA
3C	Work Environment
4A	Design
4B	Engineering Support
4C	Programs and Processes
5A	Identification
5B	Analysis
5C	Resolution

ID Codes:

NRC	NRC
Self	Self-Revealed
Licensee	Licensee

Functional Areas:

OPS	Operations
MAINT	Maintenance
ENG	Engineering
PLTSUP	Plant Support
OTHER	Other

EEIs are apparent violations of NRC Requirements that are being considered for escalated enforcement action in accordance with the "General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Action" (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600. However, the NRC has not reached its final enforcement decision on the issues identified by the EEIs and the PIM entries may be modified when the final decisions are made.

URIs are unresolved items about which more information is required to determine whether the issue in question is an acceptable item, a deviation, a nonconformance, or a violation. A URI may also be a potential violation that is not likely to be considered for escalated enforcement action. However, the NRC has not reached its final conclusions on the issues, and the PIM entries may be modified when the final conclusions are made.

Item Type (Compliance,Followup,Other), From 10/01/1998 To 07/16/1999

09/16/1999 14:07:06

ENCLOSURE 2

WOLF CREEK STATION

Inspection / Activity Plan

09/01/1999 - 03/31/2000

Units	Inspection Activity	Title	Number of NRC Inspectors / Individuals	Planned Dates Start	Planned Dates End	Inspection Type
1	IP 82701	Operational Status Of The Emergency Preparedness Program	2	08/30/1999	09/03/1999	Core
1	IP 82701	Operational Status Of The Emergency Preparedness Program	2	08/30/1999	09/03/1999	Regional Initiative
1	IP 92903	Followup - Engineering	2	09/20/1999	09/24/1999	Regional Reactive
1	IP 71001	Licensed Operator Requalification Program Evaluation	2	10/04/1999	10/08/1999	Core
1	IP 82301	Evaluation Of Exercises For Power Reactors	1	11/15/1999	11/19/1999	Core
1	IP 84750	Radioactive Waste Treatment, And Effluent And Environmental Monitoring	1	12/13/1999	12/17/1999	Core
1	IP 37001	10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluation Program	1	01/10/2000	01/28/2000	Core
1	IP 93809	Safety System Engineering Inspection (SSEI)	5	01/10/2000	01/28/2000	Core
1	IP 93809	Safety System Engineering Inspection (SSEI)	5	01/31/2000	02/04/2000	Core
1	IP 40500	Effectiveness Of Licensee Process to Identify, Resolve, And Prevent Problems	2	03/06/2000	03/10/2000	Core

This report does not include INPO and OUTAGE activities.
This report shows only on-site and announced inspection procedures.