



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II
ATLANTA FEDERAL CENTER
61 FORSYTH STREET, SW, SUITE 23T85
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

May 19 1997

MEMORANDUM TO:

File

FROM:

Johns P. Jaudon
Johns P. Jaudon, Director
Division of Reactor Safety

SUBJECT:

MINUTES OF THE CRYSTAL RIVER RESTART PANEL EIGHTH MEETING
HELD MAY 9, 1997

The Crystal River Restart Panel met in the Region II offices May 9, 1997. The following panel members were at the meeting:

Johns P. Jaudon, Chairman
Frederick J. Hebdon, Vice-Chairman
Kerry D. Landis
Stephen J. Cahill

The status of current inspections and the management meeting completed May 9, 1997, between the NRC and Florida Power Corporation were discussed. The matrix of outstanding issues was reviewed and updated. It is attached for information. The panel noted that, based on information from inspectors, the quality and completeness of licensee packages reviewed recently for individual items on the matrix had improved significantly.

The panel determined that the next meeting should occur onsite June 18 and 19, 1997, and that F. Hebdon would ascertain suitable dates for a July management meeting in headquarters.

Docket: 50-30

Attachment: As stated

cc w/att:

L. Reyes, ORA/RII
S. Collins, NRR
J. Johnson, DRP/RII
S. Varga, NRR
F. Hebdon, NRR
H. Christensen, DRS/RII
K. Landis, DRP/RII
S. Cahill, SRI/RII
L. Raghaven, NRR
R. Schin, DRS/RII
G. Tracy, OEDO
Public



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Attachment A

CRYSTAL RIVER 3 ISSUES CHECKLIST

R ITEMS (TO BE INSPECTED BY THE NRC BEFORE RESTART)

Status as of May 9, 1997

The Crystal River Restart Panel met on November 13, 1996, and developed seven general areas under which the restart issues will be grouped. Those seven areas are:

1. Knowledge of design and licensing bases and adequacy of design margin
2. Regulatory knowledge and perspective
3. Operator performance and knowledge
4. Marginally effective engineering organization
5. Management oversight; including quality assurance, self assessment, and corrective action
6. Corrective actions for NRC violations
7. Other

Total Restart (R) Items: 136

Open 100
Closed 36

| ISSUE | DESCRIPTION | AREA | NRC LEAD | IR/SER | LICENSEE STATUS | COMMENTS | NRC STATUS |
|--|--|------|------------|--------|-----------------|---|------------|
| LICENSEE'S RESTART LIST OF DESIGN-RELATED ISSUES (D.I.s) (per 10/28/96 ltr from PPC) | | | | | | | |
| CR3 D.I. 1 | HPI pump recirculation to the makeup tank | 1 | RI Cahill | | D-1 | LER 97-08, See URI 96-01-02, IFI 96-17-02, IR 96-17 | R * |
| CR3 D.I. 2 | HPI system modifications to improve SBLOCA margins | 1 | Schin | | D-2 | See URI 96-01-02, LER 96-06, IR 96-17 | R * |
| CR3 D.I. 3 | LPI pump mission time (NRR for boron precip. review) | 1 | RI/NRR | | D-3 | See URI 96-201-01, IR 96-17 | R * |
| CR3 D.I. 4 | Reactor building spray pump 1B NPSH | 1 | RI Sanchez | | D-4 | See URI 96-201-02, IR 96-17 | R * |
| CR3 D.I. 5 | Emergency feedwater system upgrades and diesel generator load impact | 1 | Schin | | D-5 | See URI 96-12-01; EEI 96-12-02, IR 96-17 | R |

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|--|---|---------|-----------------------|--------|------------------------------------|--|------------|
| CR3 D.I. 6 | Emergency diesel generator loading | 1 | Pillion/ Schin | | D-6 | See EEI 96-12-02, IR 96-17 | R * |
| CR3 D.I. 7 | Failure modes and effects of loss of DC power | 1 | Miller | | D-7 | See URI 96-12-01, LER 96-07, IR 96-17 | R * |
| CR3 D.I. 8 | Generic Letter 96-06 (Thermal overpressure protection for Containment piping, penetrations, and coolers) | 1 | RI Cahill/ Crowley | | D-8 | See IR 96-12 | R * |
| LICENSEE'S OTHER RESTART ITEMS | | | | | | | |
| RMG 29/30 | Seismic mounting of HR Rad Monitor | 1 | Lenahan/RI | | D-19 | | R * |
| BWST NPSH | NPSH concern with ECCS pumps when SFP pumps are running in BWS and Recirc | 3 | Thomas | | D-18 | Review SP-630 test results following MUT event | R * |
| MUV-27 | Section XI leakage testing | 1 | | | R-21 | | R * |
| FIVE AREAS OF CONTINUING CONCERN, WITH IPAP RECOMMENDED INSPECTION AND RII RECOMMENDED ADDITIONS | | | | | | | |
| Management Oversight - IPAP Recommended Inspection | - NRC inspect Problem Identification; focusing on <u>QA audits</u> and the <u>problem reporting system</u> . - Increased inspection of Problem Analysis and Evaluation; focusing on <u>root cause evaluations</u> . | 5 QA | RI Cahill/ Thomas | | OP-2, OP-3 | Inspect New PC system FPC closing OP-2 | R * |
| Marginally Effective Engineering Organization - IPAP Recommended Inspection | - NRC inspect Engineering Problem Identification and Resolution; with emphasis on <u>licensee evaluations for significant issues and work backlogs</u> . - Also inspect Quality of Engineering; with emphasis on 10 CFR 50.59 screening and safety evaluations, accuracy of the FSAR, and management oversight. Inspect the licensee's FSAR Review Project and assess the identified FSAR errors. | 4 | Schin | | OP-4 OP-6 | 50.59 | R |
| Lack of Adequate Knowledge of the Design Basis - IPAP Recommended Inspection | - NRC inspect Engineering Safety Focus; focusing on <u>proper identification of discrepancies with the plant's design basis in the corrective action system</u> . - Also inspect Engineering Problem Identification and Resolution; focusing on <u>programs for identifying design basis issues and capturing them in the corrective action program</u> . - Also inspect Quality of Engineering; focusing on <u>sensitivity/understanding by the engineering/licensing staff of the plant's design basis</u> . - Also assess the <u>design margin</u> , including the licensee's "extent of condition" reviews | 1 | Schin | | OP-7, OP-8, D-13, D-15, D-16 | | R |
| Lack of Regulatory Knowledge and Compliance With Regulations - IPAP Recommended Inspection | - NRC inspect <u>50.59s, operability, reportability</u> | 2 | Schin | | OP-5, OP-4 | | R |

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|--|---|------|----------|--------|-----------------|----------|------------|
| Operator Performance - IPAP Recommended Inspection | - NRC inspect Safety Focus; focusing on communication within operations, communication with other site groups, and overtime | 3 | RI | | 0-6 | | R |
| | | | | | | | |

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|---------------------------|--|------|---------------|----------|-----------------|--|------------|
| INSPECTOR FOLLOWUP SYSTEM | | | | | | | |
| URI 95-02-02 | Control room habitability envelope leakage. Excessive leakage paths through doors, dampers, and drains due to design errors and lack of surveillances/preventive maintenance | 1 | Schin | | R-12 | See TIA 95003; FPC TS Change Request No. 208 of 8/28/96; LERs 96-04, 94-10, 95-01, 95-04-01, 95-09; IRs 95-02, 95-09, 95-11, 95-16, 95-21; FPC ltrs. of 5/26/95 and 10/23/95 | R |
| URI 96-01-02 | Discrepancies in the high pressure injection design basis analysis | 1 | Schin | | D-9, D-1 | See CR3 D.I. 1; CR3 D.I. 2 | R * |
| URI 96-04-01 | Discrepancies in the EDBD and the FSAR regarding the prevention of post-LOCA boron precipitation | 1 | Crowley | IR 96-19 | | See EEI 96-19-07. | R, C |
| URI 96-05-02 | Design concerns with main steam line hangars used in seismic and other dynamic load applications | 1 | RI, Raghavan | IR 97-01 | D-51 | See VIO 96-05-01; Coordinate with L. Raghavan | R, C |
| URI 96-06-03 | Non-safety related transfer switch used in ES status indicating light circuitry | 1 | Fillion | IR 97-04 | D-21 | | R, C |
| URI 96-12-01 | Emergency Feedwater low NPSH to both pumps due to postulated single failure | 1 | Schin | IR 96-19 | D-17 | See CR3 D.I. 5; CR3 D.I. 7; EEI 96-19-03, -04, -05, -06 | R, C |
| URI 96-17-03 | Failure to conduct required Technical Specification surveillance testing on safety related circuitry (GL 96-01) | 4 | M. Miller | IR 97-02 | OP-18 | See MPA #L601 (GL 96-01); See IR 97-01 | R, C |
| URI 96-201-01 | Long term plant cooldown following a small break LOCA assuming a single failure in the decay heat drop line | 1 | RI Cooper/NRR | | D-3 | See CR3 D.I. 3; See IR 96-11. NRR taking responsibility for this item. | R * |
| URI 96-201-02 | NPSH for building spray pump has very little margin, and some calculation factors were nonconservative | 1 | RI Sanchez | | D-4 | See CR3 D.I. 4 | R * |
| URI 96-201-03 | Operating curves 16, 17, and 18 in OP-103B are not validated by licensee | 4 | Hopper | | O-1 | | R |
| URI 96-201-04 | Nonsafety-related positioners on safety-related valves | 1 | Thomas | | R-7, D-10 | See IR 96-08, IR 97-01 | R |
| URI 96-201-05 | Service water system heat loads did not consider maximum input heat (OP-103B, Curve 15) | 1 | Crowley | IR 96-19 | O-1 | See EEI 96-19-08 | R, C |
| URI 96-201-07 | EDG not protected against water spray from failure of fire protection deluge system in EDG room | 1 | Fillion | | D-52 | | R |
| URI 97-01-06 | HPI system design, licensing basis, and TS concerns | 1 | Schin | | | See IR 97-06 | R, C * |
| URI 97-01-08 | Adequacy of procedures to take the plant from hot standby to cold shutdown from outside the control room (Appendix B) | 2 | Thomas | IR 97-02 | | | R, C |
| URI 97-02-02 | Deletion of water quality requirements from the FSAR | 2 | Thomas/NRR | | | | R * |
| LER 95-13-01 | Design deficiency may cause makeup tank vortexing resulting in failure to meet Appendix B requirements | 1 | Mellen | | D-48 | LER 95-13-00 closed in IR 96-06 | R |

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|---|---|------|-------------------|--------|-------------------------------|--|------------|
| LER 96-18-00, LER 96-18-01 | Failure to verify RB penetrations closed per TS | 1 | RI Cooper | | O-2 | See EA 96-365 VIC B (02013) | R * |
| EEL 96-10-01 | Four examples of failure to follow refueling procedure FP-203 | 3 | Hopper | | O-4 | See EA 96-316 (01014) | R, C |
| EEL 96-10-02 | Failure to assure root cause analysis and corrective actions taken to preclude repetition were adequate after refuel incident (no PR issued) | 5 | Hopper | | O-5 | See EA 96-316 (02014) | R, C |
| EEL 96-12-02 | EDG loading USQs due to inadequate 10 CFR 50.59 evaluations; three examples (one modification & two procedure changes) | 4 | Schin/ Fillion | | R-2, D-6, D-14, D-15, OP-5 | See EA 96-365, 96-465, 96-527, VIO A (01012, 01022, 01032). See CR3 D.I. 5; CR3 D.I. 6 | R, C |
| EEL 96-12-03 | Inadequate corrective actions for 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation errors; two examples | 5 | Schin | | OP-14 | See EA 96-365 et al, VIO C (03013) | R, C |
| EEL 96-12-04 | Use of unverified calculations to support modifications. NRC inspect licensee's extent of condition reviews | 4 | Schin | | OP-6, D-14 | See EA 96-365 et al, VIO B (02013) | R, C |
| EEL 96-19-01 | Three inadequate procedures for containment penetration surveillances | 1 | RI | | OP-15 | See EA 96-365 et al, VIO B (02013) | R, C |
| EEL 96-19-02 | Inadequate corrective actions for inadequate containment penetration surveillances | 1 | RI | | OP-16 | See EA 96-365 et al, VIO C (03013) | R, C |
| EEL 96-19-03 | EPW NPSH USQ due to inadequate 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation for a modification | 1 | Schin | | D-38 | See EA 96-365 et al, VIO A (01042), See IR 97-04 | R, C |
| EEL 96-19-04 | Failure to update applicable design documents to incorporate EFW design information (EFP-2 assumed operating when EFP-1 trips at 500# RCS pressure) | 1 | Thomas | | D-39 | See EA 96-365 et al, VIO B (02013) | R, C |
| EEL 96-19-05 | Failure to include applicable design information in the design input requirements for an EFW modification (EFP-2 continuing to operate after EFP-1 trips at 500# RCS pressure and hydraulic requirements) | 1 | Thomas | | D-40 | See EA 96-365 et al, VIO B (02013) | R, C |
| EEL 96-19-06 | EPW USQ due to removing the automatic open signal from ASV-204, reducing the reliability of EFP-2 | 1 | Thomas | | R-4 | See EA 96-365 et al, VIO A (01052) | R, C |
| EEL 96-19-07 | Inadequate 50.59 evaluation for post-LOCA boron precipitation control | 1 | Crowley | | OP-17 | See EA 96-365 et al, VIO A (01062), Verify procedures and documentation adequate prior to restart. | R, C |
| EEL 96-19-08 | Error in design calculations for SW system heat loads | 1 | Crowley | | D-28 | See EA 96-365 et al, VIO B (02013) | R, C |
| EEL 97-06-01 | Inadequate safety evaluations for added operator actions for design basis SBLOCA mitigation | 1 | Schin | | | | R * |
| EA 95-16 (was EEL 95-02-04) | Use of non-conservative trip setpoints for safety-related equipment (SLIII). Additional examples identified in IR 95-16. | 6, 1 | Mellen | | OP-13 | See IR 95-16, IR 95-21, IR 97-01, IR 97-02 | R |
| EA 95-126, VIO I.A (was EEL 95-22-01) | Nine instances where operators violated procedures for MUT pressure/level (SLIII). | 6, 3 | Schin | 97-07 | R-13 | See IR 96-04 | R, C * |

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|--|---|------|-----------------|--------|----------------------------|----------------------------|------------|
| EA 95-126, VIO I.B (was EEI 95-22-02) | Conduct of unauthorized tests of MUT without 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation (SLIII). Additional examples (four tests) identified in 1/18/96 letter titled EA 95-126 and EA 96-185). (See URI 96-04-08) | 6, 3 | Schin | 97-07 | OP-10 | See IR 96-04 | R, C * |
| EA 95-126, VIO I.C.1 (was EEI 95-22-03) | Failure to take adequate corrective actions for operator concerns regarding OP-103B, Curve 8, for MUT pressure/level limits (SLIII) | 6, 5 | Schin | | D-37 | | R |
| EA 95-126, VIO I.C.2 (was EEI 95-22-03) | Corrective actions for an inadequate Curve 8 (two STI's and a revised Curve 8A & 8B) were also incorrect (SLIII) | 6, 5 | RI Cooper/Schin | | O-1, D-37 | | R * |
| EA 95-126, VIO I.D.1 (was EEI 95-22-04) | Design controls failed to ensure adequate safety margin for HPI pumps for certain LOCA scenarios (SLIII) | 6, 1 | RI Cooper/Schin | | OP-6, OP-13 | | R * |
| EA 95-126, VIO I.D.2 (was EEI 95-22-04) | Swapover of ECCS pumps' suction from BWST (at five feet) to reactor building sump was inadequate (SLIII) | 6, 1 | RI Cooper/Schin | | OP-13 | | R * |
| EA 95-126, VIO II.A (was EEI 95-22-04) | EOPs allowed single LPI pump to supply two HPI pumps, with insufficient NPSH for LPI pump (SLIII) | 6, 1 | RI Cooper/Schin | | OP-13 | | R * |
| EA 95-126, VIO II.B (was EEI 95-22-03) | Failure to take adequate corrective actions for tank volumes/level/suction point (SLIV) | 6, 5 | RI Cooper | | D-37 | | R * |
| EA 95-126, VIO II.C (was EEI 95-22-03) | Failure to ensure fire water storage tank contained adequate volume of water (SLIV) | 6, 1 | RI Cooper | | D-37 | | R * |
| EA 96-316 (01014). (was EEI 96-10-01) | Four examples of failure to follow refueling procedure FP-203 | 3 | Hopper | | | | R |
| EA 96-316 (02014). (was EEI 96-10-02) | Failure to assure root cause analysis and corrective actions taken to preclude repetition were adequate after refuel incident (no PR issued) | 5 | Hopper | | | | R |
| EA 96-365, 96-465, 96-527, VIO A (01012, 01022, and 01032). (was EEI 96-12-02) | EDG loading USQs due to inadequate 10 CFR 50.59 evaluations; three examples (one modification & two procedure changes) | 4 | Schin/Fillion | | R-2, D-6, D-14, D-15, OP-5 | See CR3 D.I. 5; CR3 D.I. 6 | R |
| EA 96-365 et al, VIO A (01042). (was EEI 96-19-03) | EFW NPSH USQ due to inadequate 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation for a modification | 1 | Schin | | | | R |

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|--|---|------|----------------|--------|-----------------|--|------------|
| EA 96-365 et al, VIO A (01052). (was EEI 96-19-06) | EPW USQ due to removing the automatic open signal from ASV-204, reducing the reliability of EFP-2 | 1 | Thomas | | | | R |
| EA 96-365 et al, VIO A (01062). (was EEI 96-19-07) | Inadequate 50.59 evaluation for post-LOCA boron precipitation control | 1 | RI | | | Verify procedures and documentation adequate prior to restart. | R * |
| EA 96-365 et al, VIO B (02013). (was EEI 96-12-04) | Use of unverified calculations to support modifications. NRC inspect licensee's extent of condition reviews. | 4 | Schin | | OP-6 | | R |
| EA 96-365 et al, VIO B (02013). (was EEI 96-19-01) | Three inadequate procedures for containment penetration surveillances | 4 | RI Cooper | | | | R * |
| EA 96-365 et al, VIO B (02013). (was EEI 96-19-04) | Failure to update applicable design documents to incorporate EPW design information (EFP-2 assumed operating when EFP-1 trips at 500# RCS pressure) | 1 | Thomas | | | | R |
| EA 96-365 et al, VIO B (02013). (was EEI 96-19-05) | Failure to include applicable design information in the design input requirements for an EPW modification (EFP-2 continuing to operate after EFP-1 trips at 500# RCS pressure and hydraulic requirements) | 1 | Thomas | | | | R |
| EA 96-365 et al, VIO B (02013). (was EEI 96-19-08) | Error in Design calculations for SW system heat loads | 1 | Crowley/Mellen | | | | R * |
| EA 96-365 et al, VIO C (03013). (was EEI 96-12-03) | Inadequate corrective actions for 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation errors; two examples | 5 | Schin | | | | R |
| EA 96-365 et al, VIO C (03013). (was EEI 96-19-02) | Inadequate corrective actions for inadequate containment penetration surveillances | 1 | RI Cooper | | | | R * |
| VIO 93-16-07 | Inadequate EOP and AP procedures | 6, 3 | Hopper | | 0-3, OP-19 | See IR 96-04, IFI 96-04-03, IR 96-08 | R |
| VIO 95-16-03 | Inadequate procedure for operation of the makeup pump 1A cooling water | 6, 1 | RI Cahill | | 0-8 | See LER 96-10 | R * |
| VIO 95-21-03 | Failure to isolate the class 1E from the non-class 1E electrical circuitry for the RB purge and mini-purge valves | 6, 1 | Thomas/RI | | D-30 | See LER 95-25, LER 96-02, IR 97-01, IR 97-02 | R |

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|--------------|---|------|---------------------|----------------------|-----------------|--------------------------------|------------|
| VIO 96-01-01 | Inadequate corrective action for HPI flow indication problem | 6, 5 | RI Cooper | | D-53 | See LER 96-05 | R * |
| VIO 96-01-06 | Failure to correctly translate design basis of SW system into procedures, drawings, and instructions | 6, 1 | RI | | D-54 | | R |
| VIO 96-04-02 | Failure to take prompt corrective action in revising procedure VP-580, Plant Safety Verification (for STAs). VP-580 contained outdated and incorrect information. | 6, 5 | Hopper | | O-9 | | R |
| VIO 96-05-01 | Failure to create a PR and OCR for damaged main steam line hangers | 6, 5 | RI, Raghavan | IR 97-01 IR 97-02 | O-10 | See URI 96-05-02; See IR 97-02 | R, C * |
| VIO 96-05-05 | Failure to follow procedures for updating design basis documents | 6, 4 | Crowley | IR 97-01 | OP-8, D-55 | | R, C |
| VIO 96-05-07 | Inadequate receiving inspections for battery chargers (vendor tests) | 6, 4 | Schin | IR 97-01 | OP-20 | | R, C |
| VIO 96-05-08 | Failure to follow purchasing procedures for inverters | 6, 4 | Schin | IR 97-01 | OP-21 | | R, C |
| VIO 96-06-02 | No procedure for demineralized water flush performed by operators on boric acid addition lines | 6, 3 | RI | IR 97-02 | OP-22 | | R, C |
| VIO 96-06-04 | No evaluation on non-FSAR vital battery charger configuration | 6, 4 | RI Cooper | | R-18 | | R * |
| VIO 96-06-07 | PR not initiated to resolve CREVS test failure | 6, 5 | Lenahan/ Crowley | IR 97-02 | OP-23 | | R, C |
| VIO 96-08-01 | Corrective action not taken on make-up system audit findings & excessive vibration on spent fuel pool pump cooling fan motor | 6, 5 | RI Cahill | | OP-24 | | R * |
| VIO 96-09-03 | Failure to perform a 10 CFR 59.59 safety evaluation for changes to procedures described in the FSAR for controlling dissolved hydrogen concentration in the RCS | 6, 3 | Thomas | IR 97-02 | OP-25 | | R, C |
| VIO 96-09-04 | Failure to update operating curves to reflect 1981 power uprate | 6, 4 | Thomas | IR 97-02 | OP-26 | | R, C |
| VIO 96-09-05 | Failure to incorporate design change of MUV-64 into operations procedures | 6, 4 | Thomas/ Crowley | | OP-27 | | R |
| VIO 96-09-06 | Three examples of design control errors (erroneous calculation inputs and ISI boundary) | 6, 4 | M. Miller | | OP-8 | | R |
| VIO 96-09-07 | Untimely corrective actions for the EPIC system concerns and problems | 6, 5 | Thomas | | OP-28 | See IR 97-01 | R |
| VIO 96-11-04 | Reactor building sump not constructed in accordance with approved construction drawings | 6, 1 | RI | | D-56 | See IR 97-02 | R |
| VIO 96-15-02 | Failure of reactor coolant pump oil collection system to retain oil leaking from reactor coolant pump | 6, 7 | W. Miller | | D-57 | See IR 97-02 | R |
| VIO 96-20-01 | Failure to adhere to reactor coolant system cooldown limits | 3 | RI Cooper | | OP-29 | | R * |
| VIO 96-20-02 | Failure to follow procedure AI-400C for review and development of Maintenance Procedure PM-191, Main Turbine/Generator, Feedwater Turbine Layup | 7 | RI Cooper | | OP-30 | | R * |
| VIO 97-01-01 | Inadequate clearance tagging requirements | 3 | RI Cahill | | | | R * |

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|---------------|---|------|------------|----------|-----------------|--|------------|
| VIO 97-01-02 | Failure to follow procedures, resulting in inadvertent EDG start | 3 | RI Cooper | | | | R * |
| VIO 97-01-04 | Failure to perform TS surveillance for spent fuel pool level | 3 | RI Cooper | | | | R * |
| VIO 97-01-07 | Instrument loop uncertainty setpoint calculation assumptions not translated into procedures | 4 | Mellen | | | See IR 97-02 | R * |
| VIO 97-01-09 | Inadequate corrective actions for cable ampacity | 4 | Fillion | | | | R * |
| VIO 97-02-01 | Failure to follow equipment status control procedural requirements | 3 | RI | | | | R * |
| VIO 97-02-03 | Adequate procedures not in effect to take the plant from hot standby to cold shutdown from outside the control room | 1 | Thomas | | | | R * |
| VIO 97-02-04 | Failure to conduct TS logic testing | 1 | M. Miller | | | See GL 96-01 | R * |
| IFI 95-15-01 | Design requirements for nitrogen overpressure (service water) | 1 | L. Mellen | IR 97-01 | D-41 | Need to review licensee's calculation & conclusion. See IR 95-21 | R, C |
| IFI 95-15-02 | Design requirements for dynamic LOCA effects per surge line effects | 1 | RI | | D-58 | See IR 95-21 and TIA 96-013 | R * |
| IFI 95-15-03 | Design requirements for reactor coolant pump cooler failure | 1 | Thomas | IR 97-05 | D-59 | See IR 95-21 and TIA 9-014 | R, C * |
| IFI 95-15-04 | Code requirement for thermal relief valves on decay heat removal heat exchangers | 1 | RI Sanchez | | D-60 | See IR 95-21 and TIA 96-014 - issued | R * |
| IFI 95-15-05 | Relief valves removed from heat exchangers | 1 | RI Sanchez | | D-61 | See IR 95-21 and TIA 96-014 | R * |
| IFI 96-03-15 | Evaluate the licensee's revised TS Bases and related 10 CFR 50.59 analysis for HPI flow indicators | 2 | RI Cahill | | R-14 | | R * |
| IFI 96-17-02 | Potential for HPI/LPI recirculation resulting in make-up tank overflow | 1 | RI Cahill | | D-42 - D-1 | See CR3 D.I. 1 | R * |
| IFI 96-17-04 | Adequacy of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R fire study and documentation | 1 | W. Miller | | D-43 | | R |
| IFI 96-201-11 | Design basis for decay heat/core flood/reactor coolant piping temperature | 1 | Crowley | IR 97-02 | D-44 | Identified in IPAP report as IF-96-201-01 | R, C |
| IFI 96-201-12 | Conduit sizing criteria - jamming ratio not considered | 1 | Fillion | | D-45 | Identified in IPAP report as IF-96-201-02 | R |
| IFI 96-201-13 | Cable ampacities - several cables exceed rating, including DHP-1 | 1 | Fillion | IR 97-01 | D-22 | Identified in IPAP report as IF-96-201-03 | R, C |
| IFI 96-201-14 | EDG protective trips not bypassed during emergency mode of operation | 1 | Fillion | | D-12 | Identified in IPAP report as IF-96-201-04 | R |
| IFI 96-201-15 | Verification of motor starting data | 1 | Fillion | | D-46 | Identified in IPAP report as IF-96-201-05 | R |
| IFI 96-201-16 | Coordination of Second level undervoltage relay (SLUR) setting vs. inverter operation | 1 | Fillion | | D-47 | Identified in IPAP report as IF-96-201-06 | R |

| ISSUE | DESCRIPTION | AREA | NRC LEAD | IR/SER | LICENSEE STATUS | COMMENTS | NRC STATUS |
|--|--|------|----------------------|--------|-----------------|---|------------|
| IFI 96-201-17 | Coordination of SLUR and fuse protection | 1 | Fillion | | D-31 | Identified in IPAP report as IF-96-201-07 | R |
| IFI 97-02-05 | Outstanding issues associated with the emergency diesel generator power uprate modification | 1 | RI Cooper | | | | R * |
| IN 97-06 | Weaknesses in plant-specific emergency operating procedures for refilling the secondary side of dry once-through steam generators | 3 | Hopper/ RI Cooper | | | Inspect licensee's EOPs - in FPC planned upgrade | R * |
| MULTI-PLANT ACTIONS | | | | | | | |
| MPA #L507; GL 95-07 | Pressure locking and thermal binding of safety-related gate valves. Currently in staff review. An RAI is outstanding. Expected completion? | 2 | NRR | | D-49 | | R |
| MPA #L601; GL 96-01 | Testing of safety-related logic circuits - Licensee response in staff review. More details are required. This issue requires attention. | 2 | Miller | | R-1 | 11/96 - the licensee has identified testing deficiencies that must be fixed prior to restart (VIO 97-02-04) | R * |
| MPA #L503; GL95-03 | Circumferential cracking of SG tube flaws. Licensee response in staff review. | 2 | Blake/NRR | | R-17 | | R |
| LICENSE AMENDMENT/RELIEF REQUESTS | | | | | | | |
| CCHE | Control complex habitability envelope - Including TS-208 and TIA 95-03 need to be addressed. Licensee submittal does not provide adequate TS action. | 2 | Schin/NRR | | R-12 | | R |
| USQs | Licensee request and NRC review and issue license amendments for all Unreviewed Safety Questions (USQs) | | NRR | | R-2, R-4 | | R |
| USQ | EDG Load Uprate | | Fillion/ NRR | | R-2 | See EEI 96-12-02, CR3 D.I. 6 | R |
| USQ | ASV 204 | | Thomas/ NRR | | R-4 | See EEI 96-19-04, CR3 D.I. 5 | R |
| USQ | DH-45-FI (post-LOCA boron precipitation issue) | | Crowley/ NRR | | R-5 | See URI 96-201-01, URI 96-04-01 | R * |
| USQ | EDG Load List Update | | Fillion/ NRR | | R-6 | See EEI 96-12-02, CR3 D.I. 6 | R |
| USQ | ITS 3.0.3 relief for LPI/DH to allow modification of air operators for DCV 17, 18, 177, 178 | | Thomas/ NRR | | R-7 | See URI 96-201-04 | R |
| ILR: | Conduct an ILRT or seek an Amendment to utilize Method B of Appendix J to 10 CFR 50 | | NRR | | R-10 | | R * |
| OTHER ISSUES | | | | | | | |

| ISSUE | DESCRIPTION | AREA | NRC LEAD | IR/SRR | LICENSEE STATUS | COMMENTS | NRC STATUS |
|-------------------------|--|------|-------------------------------|--------|-----------------|--|------------|
| LTOP | Current TS does not address LTOP prevention or mitigation. On the basis of GL 88-11, the licensee submitted information to demonstrate that LTOP in B&W plants have less than 1 in 100 reactor years probability of occurrence and as a result per GL 88-11 non-appendix G methodology can be used for PT curves. Such a PT curve would provide for higher LTOP enable pressure and temperature and would provide operational flexibility. Staff denied the request in 1995 and requested a revised response. The licensee expects to respond late 1997. | 2 | NRR/RI | | R-16 | R ₁ system branch will send letter to licensee that they have to submit TS. Short term action to change PORV setpoint/limit RCS P to 100# | R * |
| Appendix R | Appendix R design basis issues review by FPC consultant. NRC review open Appendix R issues to assure that there are no restart or operability issues imbedded in them. | 1 | W. Miller/ Fillion/ NRR | | D-11 | | R |
| Operator Workarounds | NRC review operator workarounds list to assure that there are no restart or operability issues contained in them | 3 | RI Cahill | | M-2, O-7 | See VIO 96-09-07 | R * |
| 50.54f Letter | NRC review licensee's 50.54f letter response (due 2/9/97) on design bases | | NRR | | R-8 | Phase 2 review complete | R, C |
| License Conditions | Verify license conditions are met | 2 | RI | | R-15 | | R |
| RC Loop Piping Analyses | In a survey inspection, the staff noted that certain branch pipes off the primary coolant loop were not analyzed as Code Class 1 pipe (i.e., no fatigue analysis) as required by the Code. Need NRR technical branch's opinion on this | 2 | NRR | | D-62 | | R |
| | | | | | | | |

Sources for issues include: IFS, SIMS, NUREG 1435 (Status of Safety Issues at Licensed Power Plants), Resident's OIL, PM's OIL

NOTE: Open allegations, OI investigations, and emerging/draft issues are listed separately.

CRYSTAL RIVER 3 ISSUES CHECKLIST

N ITEMS (INSPECTION PRIOR TO RESTART IS NOT NEEDED)

Status as of May 9, 1997

Total Non-Restart (N) Items: 84

Open 76
Closed 8

| ISSUE | DESCRIPTION | AREA | NRC LEAD | IR/SER | LICENSEE STATUS | COMMENTS | NRC STATUS |
|--|--|------|----------|----------|-----------------|--|------------|
| LICENSEE'S RESTART LIST OF DESIGN-RELATED ISSUES (D.I.s)(per 10/28/96 ltr from FPC) | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | |
| LICENSEE'S OTHER RESTART ITEMS | | | | | | | |
| OTSG Tubes | Adequacy of OTSG tube stress-relieved rolled joints is questioned. BWOOG analysis of a Davis-Besse pulled OTSG tube, current test data, and limited field experience conflict with test data from 1972 which "qualified" a stress-relieved rolled joint. | 7 | | | | See licensee Precursor Card PC 96-5077 of 11/6/96. (No TIA) | N (G) |
| FIVE AREAS OF CONTINUING CONCERN, WITH TPAP RECOMMENDED INSPECTION AND RII RECOMMENDED ADDITIONS | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | |
| INSPECTOR FOLLOWUP SYSTEM | | | | | | | |
| URI 95-21-04 | Excessive cooldown rate | 3 | | IR 96-20 | | See CR3 D.I. 1 | N (S), C |
| URI 96-03-04 | Measuring of percent through-wall indications with an unqualified procedure | 7 | | | | See IR 96-06. Generic issue being addressed by NRR. (no TIA) | N (G) |
| URI 96-03-05 | Eddy current sample expansion based on degraded tube percentages | 7 | | | | See IR 96-06. | N (S) |
| URI 96-06-10 | Justification for removal of Thermo-Lag protection from the source range instrumentation | 1 | | | | | N (S) |
| URI 96-07-03 | Incorrect information provided by contractors | 7 | | | | ** | N (S) |
| URI 96-201-06 | Preferred offsite electrical power source with plant shut down (500 kv switchyard) is not qualified. Note: Until this issue is resolved, licensee is not using 500 KV switchyard as an electrical power source. | 1 | | | | | N (S) |
| URI 96-201-09 | Testing to qualify relays beyond manufacturers' ratings was inadequate | 1 | | | | | N (S) |

| ISSUE | DESCRIPTION | AREA | NRC LEAD | IR/SER | LICENSE STATUS | COMMENTS | NRC STATUS |
|--|--|------|----------|----------|----------------|---|------------|
| EA 97-012 | Failure to maintain protected area barriers | 7 | | | | See IR 97-01 | N (S) * |
| LER 93-02-02 LER 93-02-03 | Switchyard cable failure caused degraded voltage of Class 1E electrical buses and actuation of EDG | 7 | | | | LER 93-02-01 closed in IR 95-09 | N (I) |
| LER 94-06-01 LER 94-06-03 LER 94-06-04 LER 94-06-05 | Deficiency in understanding of technical requirements leads to nonconservative RPS setpoint and potential violation of TS | 2 | | | | LER 94-06-00 closed in IR 95-16. See EA 95-16. | N (D) |
| LER 95-09-00 | Minimal release during sulfur dioxide delivery causes actuation of toxic gas monitor resulting in control room emergency ventilation actuation | 7 | | | | See IR 95-11. | N (I) |
| LER 95-10-01 | Inadequate procedure causes low cooling water flow to makeup pump resulting in operation outside the design basis | 1 | | | | LER 95-10-00 closed in IR 95-16. See also URI 95-11-02, VIO 95-16-03. | N (I) |
| LER 95-17-00 | SW flow to control room coolers controlled by air operated valves which could fail open | 1 | | | | See IR 95-16, VIO 96-01-06. | N (D) |
| LER 95-18-00 LER 95-18-01 LER 95-18-02 | Inadequate TS note allowed delayed entry into TS LCD | 2 | | | | See NCV 95-18-05. | N (I) |
| LER 95-19-00 | Leak instrumentation for SW flow to RBCUs incapable of measuring 90 gpm | 1 | | | | See IR 95-18. | N (I) |
| LER 95-23-01 LER 95-23-02 | Inconsistent design assumptions cause building spray flow rates to be outside design basis | 1 | | | | LER 95-23-00 closed in IR 96-04. | N (I) |
| LER 95-25-00 LER 95-25-01 | Inadequate isolation of safety/non-safety related circuits | 1 | | | | See VIO 95-21-03. See IR 97-02. | N (D) |
| LER 95-28-00 LER 95-28-01 | BWST vacuum breaker has inadequate relief capacity | 1 | | | | See IR 95-21. | N (I) |
| LER 96-01-01 | EFIC control circuits misrouted: Appendix R concern | 1 | | | | LER 96-01-00 closed in IR 96-04. See also NCV 96-01-03. | N (I) |
| LER 96-02-00 | Minipurge valve has safety/non-safety related circuits without isolation | 1 | | | | See VIO 95-21-03. | N (I) |
| LER 96-03-00 LER 96-03-01 | RCS cooldown rate exceeded during cooldown | 3 | | | | See URI 95-21-04. | N (I) |
| LER 96-04-00 | CCME control dampers found damaged & leaking | 1 | | | | See URI 95-02-02, IR 95-21. | N (D) |
| LER 96-05-01 | SW flow to RBCUs could exceed design | 1 | | | | LER 96-05-00 closed in IR 96-04. See also VIO 96-01-01. | N (D) |
| LER 96-06-00 LER 96-06-01 | HPI instrument error could result in HPI pump runoff | 1 | Mellen | IR 97-06 | | See IR 95-20, IR 96-04, CR3 D.1.2. | N (D), C |
| LER 96-07-00 LER 96-07-01 | HPI line SBLOCA/LOOP/loss of dc bus could have inadequate HPI flow instrumentation | 1 | | | | See IR 96-01, CR3 D.1.2. | N (D) |
| LER 96-08-00 | Ambiguous TS note results in not performing RCS leak surveillance prior to Mode 2 | 2 | | | | | N (S) |
| LER 96-09-00 | Failure to reattach instrument tubing to seismic supports after modification leads to operation outside design basis | 1 | | | | See URI 96-03-06, IR 96-05. | N (I) |

| ISSUE | DESCRIPTION | AREA | NRC LEAD | IR/SER | LICENSEE STATUS | COMMENTS | NRC STATUS |
|--|--|------|----------|----------|-------------------------------|--------------------------------|------------|
| LER 96-10-00 | Low flow in SW system cooled components causes operation outside design basis | 1 | | | | See VIO 95-16-03. | N (D) |
| LER 96-11-00 | Personnel error causes testing deficiency resulting in condition prohibited by improved TS (GL 96-01 issues) | 1 | | | | See MPA #L601 (GL 96-01). | N (D) |
| LER 96-12-00, LER 96-12-01, LER 96-12-02 | Operation outside design basis caused by battery chargers having inadequate test results accepted in error | 4 | | IR 97-01 | | See VIO 96-05-07. | N (D), C |
| LER 96-13-00 | Operator error resulted in the inadvertent actuation of DCP-1A | 3 | | | | See NCV 96-03-02. | N (I) |
| LER 96-15-00 | Personnel errors cause cable separation/isolation concerns resulting in operation outside the design basis (toxic gas monitors) | 1 | | | | See IR 96-04. | N (I) |
| LER 96-16-00 | CREVS filter testing did not meet TS specs | 2 | RI | | | | N (S) |
| LER 96-19-00 | Non-safety related switch used in safety related wiring for ES status lights | 1 | | | | See URI 96-06-03. See IR 97-04 | N (D) |
| LER 96-20-00 | Unreviewed safety questions concerning EDG overloading caused by interpretation of regulatory requirements | 4 | | | R-2, D-6, D-14, D-15, OP-5 | See EEI 96-12-02. | N (D) |
| LER 96-23-00 | Personnel error leads to missed surveillances resulting in violation of Technical Specifications (missed remote shutdown panel EFW pump pressure instrument channel check) | 2 | | | | See VIO 96-15-01. | N (D) |
| LER 96-24-00 | Plant modification causes unanalyzed condition regarding emergency feedwater | 1 | | | | See URI 96-12-01. | N (D) |
| LER 96-25-00 | Personnel error causes testing deficiency resulting in condition prohibited by Technical Specifications (12 contacts in ES logic were not being tested) | 1 | | | | See MPA #L601 (GL 96-01). | N (D) |
| VIO 94-25-01 | Failure to properly control the Control Complex Habitability Envelope (door blocked open for maintenance work) | 6, 7 | | | | See URI 95-02-02. | N (D) |
| VIO 94-27-02 | Failure to make two 10 CFR 50.73 reports to the NRC within the required time | 6, 2 | | IR 97-04 | OP-4 | See IR 95-02, IR 95-08. | N (I), C |
| VIO 94-27-03 | Failure to make one required 10 CFR 50.72 report to the NRC within the required time | 6, 2 | | IR 97-04 | OP-4 | See IR 95-08. | N (I), C |
| VIO 96-01-05 | Two examples of failure to update FSAR as required by 10 CFR 50.71(e) | 6, 4 | | | | | N (S) |
| VIO 96-02-01 | Failure to maintain 0.2 footcandles in the protected area | 6, 7 | | | | See IR 96-07. | N (S) |
| VIO 96-02-04 | Failure to maintain secondary alarm station operable and inadequate compensatory measures | 6, 2 | | | | | N (S) |
| VIO 96-03-11 | Failure to follow radiation work permit requirements | 6, 7 | | | | | N (S) |
| VIO 96-03-12 | Failure to report the transport of a radioactively contaminated individual offsite | 6, 2 | | | | | N (S) |
| VIO 96-03-13 | Unescorted visitor personnel within the protected area | 6, 7 | | | | | N (S) |
| VIO 96-05-04 | Licensee approved eddy current acceptance criteria different from TS requirements | 6, 2 | | | | | N (S) |

| ISSUE | DESCRIPTION | AREA | NRC LEAD | IR/SER | LICENSEE STATUS | COMMENTS | NRC STATUS |
|--------------|--|------|-----------|----------|-----------------|---|------------|
| VIO 96-06-06 | Failure to timely notify the NRC of a condition outside the Appendix R Licensing design basis | 6. 2 | | IR 97-04 | | | N (S), C |
| VIO 96-07-01 | Failure to protect safeguards information | 6. 7 | | | | | N (S) |
| VIO 96-07-02 | Failure to complete screening elements for Fitness for Duty Personnel | 6. 7 | | | | | N (S) |
| VIO 96-09-01 | Failure to follow a maintenance procedure resulting in the inadvertent initiation of the control room emergency ventilation system | 6. 7 | | | | | N (S) |
| VIO 96-09-02 | Unescorted visitor personnel within the protected area | 6. 7 | | | | | N (S) |
| VIO 96-11-01 | Inadequate work instructions to prevent the inadvertent start of the A EDG | 6. 7 | | | | | N (S) |
| VIO 96-11-03 | Personnel performing work on the reactor building sump without logging onto a clearance, as required by approved WR | 6. 7 | | | | | N (S) |
| VIO 96-15-01 | Failure to perform a required TS surveillance for the remote shutdown panel | 6. 2 | | | | See LER 96-23 | N (S) |
| IFI 94-18-09 | Review periodic verification plans - MOV (GL 89-10 item) | 2 | | | | See IR 95-11; IR 95-21; See GL 89-10 | N (I) |
| IFI 95-02-05 | Resonance noise in vicinity of MUV-25 | 7 | | | | | N (S) |
| IFI 95-08-03 | Emergency Operating Procedure update program | 3 | | | | See IR 95-16, VIO 93-16-07 | N (S) |
| IFI 95-11-01 | SCBA requirements for personnel during a toxic gas release | 2 | | | | | N (S) |
| IFI 95-21-02 | Modification to the standby feedwater pump recirculation line | 1 | | | | | N (S) |
| IFI 96-03-16 | Review of MAR 96-02-09-01, HPI flow indicators, installation package and functional testing results | 1 | | | | | N (S) |
| IFI 96-04-03 | Effect of setpoint calculations on EOP revisions | 1 | | | | See VIO 93-16-07 | N (D) |
| IFI 96-05-06 | Large break loss of coolant analysis generic concerns | 1 | | | | | N (S) |
| IFI 96-06-09 | Deficiencies in Mecatiss fire barrier program procedures and documentation | 4 | | IR 96-15 | | | N (S), C |
| IFI 96-08-02 | Reactor building cavity cooling piping thermal relief protection | 1 | | | | See D.I. 8, GL 96-06 | N (D) |
| IFI 96-15-03 | Actions taken to resolve post-accident recriticality concerns due to localized boron dilution | 1 | | | | NRR reviewing, generic B&W issue | N (G) |
| EEL 97-04-01 | Failure to make an emergency phone report within the time requirements of 10 CFR 73.71 | 7 | RI Cahill | | | | N (S) * |
| EEL 97-04-02 | Failure to hand carry a suspected reportable issue to the shift manager for reportability review | 2 | RI Cahill | | | | N (S) * |
| EEL 97-04-03 | Repeat failure to report outside design basis conditions | 1, 2 | Schin | | | | N (S) * |
| | | | | | | | |

| ISSUE | DESCRIPTION | AREA | NRC LEAD | IR/SER | LICENSEE STATUS | COMMENTS | NRC STATUS |
|---|--|------|----------|----------------------|-----------------|--|------------|
| MULTI-PLANT ACTIONS | | | | | | | |
| MPA #B105: GL 87-02 | Seismic qualification of equipment. Licensee's criteria and procedures approved. Some issues are pending and would be resolved thru audit (scheduled for Mar 97). Licensee's field walkdown results are currently in staff review. | 2 | | | | Expected completion December. | N (S) |
| MPA #B111 (IPE): MPA#B118 (IPEEE) | IPE and IPEEE - These are in staff review. Not a restart item. | 2 | | | | | N (S) |
| MPA #X602: NRCB 96-02 | Movement of heavy loads over spent fuel pool - Licensee response in staff review. This would not be a restart issue. | 2 | | | | | N (S) |
| MPA #L20B: GL 92-08; BU 92-01 | Thermolag - Licensee plans to use Mecatiss (an alternate material), some reanalysis of APPENDIX R, and some exemption. Fire barrier tests of Mecatiss including Ampacity tests are in staff review. This also may not be restart issue. | 2 | | | | See IR 96-01; IR 96-06 | N (S) |
| MPA# L201: GL 92-01 Rev 1, Supp 1 | Reactor vessel structural integrity. RAI to licensee on 7/22/96. Only a data base issue, not a restart item. | 2 | | | | | N (S) |
| MPA #L604: GL 96-04 | Boraflex degradation. Licensee response is just in. Staff review to commence. This may have to be addressed prior to restart because of sensitivity to spent fuel pool issues. | 2 | | NRC ltr of 5/1/97 | | Closed by NRC to FPC letter dated 5/1/97 | N (S), C |
| MPA GL 89-10 | MOV testing & surveillance. This item is closed with the exception of IFI 94-18-09 on periodic verification, which is to be followed up after a new generic communication is issued. | 2 | | | | See IFI 94-18-09 | N (I) |
| LICENSE AMENDMENT/RELIEF REQUESTS | | | | | | | |
| R.G. 1.97 Instruments | RG 1.97 instrumentation - Subcool monitors etc - category change. License amendment may be approved by December. | 2 | | | | | N (S) |
| Biometrics & Security | Biometric exemption to allow taking security badges offsite - Staff review is expected to be complete soon. | 2 | | | | | N (S) |
| Core Flood Nozzle | Relief request RE: Core flood nozzle - Staff needs more info. PM will keep RII informed. | 2 | | | | | N (S) |
| OTSG Tubes | OTSG tube testing - Licensee proposed a revised OTSG tube acceptance criteria. | 2 | | | | See VIO 96-05-04 | N (S) |
| OTHER ISSUES | | | | | | | |
| Pressurizer Nozzle Flaw | During Refuel 9 a sub-surface flaw was discovered. The licensee performed better inspection during R10 and found the flaw to be acceptable. The new inspection results in reduced flaw size and consequently acceptance criteria (which is based on ratio of flaw to thickness) changes. Staff review in progress. | 2 | | | | | N (S) |
| Criticality Monitor | The licensee did not carry a previously approved exemption from part 70 (70.247) requirements to Part 50 license. Need legal interpretation of the status of the exemption. | 2 | | | | | N (S) |

Sources for issues include: IFS, SIMS, NUREG 1435 (Status of Safety Issues at Licensed Power Plants), Resident's OIL, PM's OIL

NOTE. Open allegations, OI investigations, and emergency/draft issues are listed separately.

LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

| | |
|----------|---|
| AP | Abnormal Operating Procedure |
| BWST | Braced Water Storage Tank |
| C | Closed |
| CCHE | Control Complex Habitability Envelope |
| CFR | Code of Federal Regulations |
| CR3 D.1. | Crystal River 3 Design Item |
| CREVS | Control Room Emergency Ventilation System |
| EA | NRC Escalated Enforcement Action |
| EDBD | Engineering Design Basis Document |
| ECCS | Emergency Core Cooling System |
| EDG | Emergency Diesel Generator |
| EEI | NRC Escalated Enforcement Item |
| EOP | Emergency Operating Procedure |
| FSAR | Final Safety Analysis Report |
| GL | NRC Generic Letter |
| ILRT | Integrated Leak Rate Test (of the Reactor Building) |
| IFI | NRC Inspector Followup Item |
| LER | Licensee Event Report |
| LOCA | Loss of Coolant Accident |
| LPI | Low Pressure Injection |
| LTOP | Low Temperature Overpressure Protection |
| MPA | NRC Multi-Plant Action |
| MUV | Makeup Valve |
| N (D) | Not an NRC Restart Item (because the issue is duplicated by a restart item) |
| N (G) | Not an NRC Restart Item (because it is a generic issue affecting multiple operating plants and is being addressed by NRR) |
| N (I) | Not an NRC Restart Item (because previous inspection of the issue is adequate for restart) |
| N (S) | Not an NRC Restart Item (because resolution of the issue is not needed for safe restart) |
| NOV | NRC Notice of Violation |
| NPSH | Net Positive Suction Head |
| OCR | Operability Condition Report |
| OP | Operating Procedure |
| PORV | Power Operated Relief Valve |
| PR | Problem Report |
| R | NRC Restart Item |
| RB | Reactor Building |
| RCS | Reactor Coolant System |
| RMG | Radiation Monitor |

SFP Spent Fuel Pool
TIA NRC Task Interface Agreement (between NRC offices)
TS Technical Specifications
URI NRC Unresolved Item
USQ Unreviewed Safety Question
VIO NRC Violation

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY DOCUMENT NAME: S:\DRS\RESTART.CR3\RESTART.597