

May 6, 1997

PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION OF EVENT OR UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE PNO-IV-97-026

This preliminary notification constitutes EARLY notice of events of POSSIBLE safety or public interest significance. The information is as initially received without verification or evaluation, and is basically all that is known by Region IV staff in Arlington, Texas on this date.

<u>Facility</u>	<u>Licensee Emergency Classification</u>
Entergy Operations, Inc.	Notification of Unusual Event
River Bend 1	Alert
St Francisville, Louisiana	Site Area Emergency
Dockets: 50-458	General Emergency
	X Not Applicable

Subject: SHUTDOWN GREATER THAN 72 HOURS AFTER MANUAL SCRAM

On May 6, 1997, at 9:02 a.m. (CDT), while operating at 99 percent power, the 13.8-kV nonsafety-related Bus B and the 4.16-kV safety-related Bus B lost power. The power loss resulted in the loss of two of the three motor-driven reactor feedwater pumps and reactor recirculating Pump B. An operator immediately manually scrammed the reactor. The reactor shut down and the main turbine trip occurred in accordance with plant design. Reactor Protection System B power was also lost, since it is supplied by nonsafety-related Bus B, and, as a result, various plant systems isolated, as designed, including cooling water to the reactor recirculating pumps. The operators secured Reactor Recirculating Pump A, which initiated natural circulation. The alternate power supply to power Reactor Protection System B was provided and the isolated valves and other components were returned to their normal status.

The Division II and III emergency diesel generators started automatically and provided power to their safety-related loads. The operators maintained reactor level and pressure with one operating reactor feedwater pump and the turbine bypass system until the outboard main steam isolation valves were closed to conserve heat and reduce cooldown rate. Pressure control was then maintained using the safety relief valves and steam drains. At 11:41 a.m., the inboard main steam isolation valves closed on high steam tunnel temperature due to loss of chilled water flow to the coolers.

All ESF systems responded in accordance with their intended design functions. Offsite power was not lost or degraded during this event. The plant was in a normal hot shutdown status at approximately 11 a.m. (CDT). The cause of the loss of power to the 13.8-kV nonsafety-related Bus B is not known at this time.

The licensee plans to commence an outage to repair: (1) a 2 gpm unidentified leak in the drywell; (2) Reactor Recirculation Flow Control Valve B, which has been stuck at 85 percent open position; and (3) several other minor items. The duration of the outage is unknown at this time because the scope of the flow control valve work will not be known until an inspection of the valve can be performed. The licensee currently estimates that the outage could be as long as 13 days.

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The state of Louisiana will be informed. Region IV received notification of this occurrence by telephone from the Senior Resident Inspector at 9:20 a.m. (CDT) on May 6, 1997. Region IV has informed OEDO, NRR, and PA.

This information has been discussed with the licensee and is current as of 3:32 p.m. on May 6, 1997.

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