ORIGINAL

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

IN THE MATTER OF:

DOCKET NO: STN 50-498 OL STN 50-499 OL

HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER COMPANY, et al.

(South Texas Projects, Units 1 & 2)

LOCATION: BETHESDA, MARYLAND

PAGES:

15711 - 15911

DATE:

FRIDAY, MARCH 21, 1986

8503250181 860321 PDR ADOCK 05000498

ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

Official Reporters 444 North Capitol Street Washington, D.C. 20001 (202) 347-3700

NATIONWIDE COVERAGE

1

2

3

4

8

10

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD

In the Matter of:

HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER COMPANY, et al.

(South Texas Project, Units 1 & 2):

Docket Numbers

STN 50-498 O1 STN 50-499 OL

Nuclear Regulatory Commission Fifth Floor Hearing Room 4350 East-West Highway Bethesda, Maryland

Friday, March 21, 1986

The conference in the above-entitled matter convened at 9:30 a.m.

BEFORE:

JUDGE CHARLES BECHHOEFER, Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555

JUDGE JAMES C. LAMB III, Member Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555

JUDGE JUDGE FREDERICK J. SHON, Member Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555

APPEARANCES:

2

1

On behalf of the Applicant:

3

MAURICE AXELRAD, ESQ. JACK R. NEWMAN, ESQ.

4

DONALD J. SILVERMAN, ESQ. ALVIN H. GUTTERMAN, ESQ.

5

Newman & Holtzinger, P.C.

1615 L Street, N.W. Suite 1000

ð

Washington, D. C. 20036

7

On behalf of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Staff:

8

EDWIN J. REIS, ESO.

9

Office of the Executive Legal Director U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

10

Washington, D. C. 20555

11

On behalf of the Intervenor, Citizens Concerned About Nuclear Power, Inc.:

LANNY A. SINKIN, ESQ.

The Christic Institute 1324 North Capitol Street Washington, D. C. 20002

15

13

16

р,

л

20

21

23

20

24

Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc.

25

PROCEEDINGS

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. This is the seventh prehearing conference in this operating license proceeding. The Board here is the same as the one that presided over hearings last summer, but for those of you who may not be familiar with this Board, on my left is Mr. Fred Shon and on my right is Dr. James Lamb. My name is Charles Bechhoefer.

For the benefit of the reporter, would the parties' representatives identify themselves?

MR. AXELRAD: Yes, Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the Applicants I am here today. My name is Maurice Axelrad, with the law firm of Newman & Holtzinger. Sitting on my right is Mr. Jack R. Newman and on my left, Alvin Gutterman. Seated in back of me is Mr. Donald J. Silverman.

MR. REIS: I'm Edwin J. Reis, appearing on behalf of the NRC Staff.

MR. SINKIN: Lanny Alan Sinkin, appearing on behalf of Intervenors, Citizens Concerned About Nuclear Power.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: The purpose of this prehearing conference is really twofold. First, to determine what matters there are remaining for phase 3 hearings. But also to determine whether there are any left over matters from phase 2. In that context, we have two

additional	l motions to reopen t	he record that are b	efore us.
I thought	we would deal with t	he motions to reopen	first.
We have a	number of questions,	but does any party	want to
raise any	preliminary matters	first?	

MR. AXELRAD: Mr. Chairman, I don't have any preliminary matters, but I would appreciate it if the Board could identify for us, perhaps a little more specifically, exactly what matters the Board intends to take up today and in what sequence.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: We have just a few questions dealing with motions to reopen.

MR. AXELRAD: Fine. Then you will identify the matters that you want to discuss with respect to phase 3 before we begin that set of discussions?

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Well, there's really only one matter, I think, which is what we do with the so-called drug issue. There may not be a drug issue.

MR. AXELRAD: Fine.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Where it falls, how it should be considered, whether it should be considered. We have, essentially, only one issue before us for phase 3. But we thought we would start with the motions to reopen.

I think the Board will just start by asking its own questions, and then if parties have any further information they want to provide on these motions, they can

do so.

1

2

3

4

5

6

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

First, I would like to ask Mr. Sinkin, concerning both the fourth and fifth motions, why is the information in the Briskin/Saltarelli affidavits, conceptually any different than the side benefit testimony that we've already got extensively in the record? What would it add?

MR. SINKIN: Our essential argument is that if you take motion to reopen number 2 in context with motion to reopen number 4 and motion to reopen number 5, you have a very clear pattern that when individuals are recorded as giving their reasons why the Quadrex report was commissioned, the only reason they provide is that the Quadrex report was commissioned to prepare for the phase 1 licensing hearings and that that independent, three-point proof of that as the reason for commissioning the Quadrex is quite different from the Applicant's position that there was, perhaps, a side benefit of commissioning the Quadrex report, that they might be able to answer in hearings in phase 1; but they did not consider the Quadrex report as being prepared for phase 1. We think that's a clear distinction between what is being said in the motions to reopen and what has been testified to by the witnesses for Applicants.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Do you think the deposition,

the two depositions in question establish that the Quadrex report was prepared to respond to phase 1 issues? Or did they merely state that, as Mr. Goldberg just stated on the record, and a number of other of witnesses have confirmed, that the company wanted the background information in case any questions were raised in the hearings which may or may not be phase 1? Particularly the Briskin deposition appears to me to support only the latter.

MR. SINKIN: Well, it depends, of course, in part on how you view Mr. Briskin's deposition, in terms of the intention to submit the Quadrex report as backup to Mr. Goldberg's testimony versus Mr. Briskin's affidavit, which says: That didn't mean backup was being submitted. It depends on which version you want to accept, as far as we are concerned on that point.

We think, overall --

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Why isn't backup -- why couldn't that be construed -- why shouldn't it be construed as having the information available in case the line of questioning got into that area? What I'm trying to figure out is what additional this new information would add to the record, if anything?

MR. SINKIN: Well, I think it depends in part on how the view of the Board is today on the state of the record. If the view of the Board is that the Ouadrex

report was prepared for the phase 1 licensing hearings and that that is indisputable and shown by the record, and that Applicant's testimony that the Quadrex report was not prepared for the phase 1 hearings is therefore false, then this adds nothing to the record.

We are not sure that the Board views the record as it now stands in that light. We think that the addition of these pieces of evidence and, we would expect, the cross-examination of these witnesses, would solidify that particular point in the mind of the Board as to why the Quadrex report was commissioned.

I think, too, that there may be an ambiguity around the word "issues," whether it is being used in a capitalized or noncapitalized sense.

If the Applicants want to take the position that the Quadrex report was not with respect to the Issues A through E, that the issues called into question the competence of the Applicants, therefore it was relevant to the Issues, capital "I." If they want to say it was not relevant to any of the issues -- small "i" -- in the proceeding, we think that is disputable. There have been varies arguments made in the Applicant's pleadings as to which way they are going in that respect.

The affidavit filed by Mr. Goldberg, if I'm correct, says issues with a small "i." And the testimony

similarly has said that, but there are some ambiguities this would help clear up. That's a minor point.

I think the more important point is that the Board has set out the contention, in ruling that the McGuire rule was violated, the Quadrex report should have been turned over to the Board. The only question remaining in the Board's mind, as set out in the February 25, 1985 order, was: Did that failure to turn over the report to the Board reflected adversely on the character and competence of the Applicants? Part of the decision on whether it reflects adversely will revolve around the motivations for not turning it over.

The Applicants would have you believe it was a perfectly innocent error, if error it was. They would even have you overturn your earlier ruling, but if you insist on your ruling that the McGuire rule was violated, they would insist it was an inadvertent, innocent error.

We think the evidence was to the contrary, the report was prepared for the phase 1 licensing hearing, Mr. Goldberg fully expected to testify about the quality of Brown & Root's engineering, and we think that's another reason to have it reopened, because the evidence is Mr. Goldberg fully expected he would be questioned about the quality of engineering, one, because he was vice-president for construction and engineering, two,

because he was the new man on the job, and three, because Brown & Root's construction work had been so poor that there were obviously going to be some serious questions about the rest of their work, that they fully expected the matter to come up.

It was not going to be an incidental matter, as they have since testified, and the Quadrex report was then central for preparing questions they expected to come from the Licensing Board, not some matter that was a side benefit while they were in fact preparing the Quadrex report for some other reason. I think that would be my final response to your question. They are claiming the Quadrex report was prepared for some other reason, whatever that reason is. The evidence submitted in the motion to reopen shows that every time they are talking about why the Quadrex report was commissioned, the only reason anybody seems to record or remember was to prepare for the phase 1 licensing hearings and that's where we say the issue of false testimony comes into clarity.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Again I ask, do you mean prepare for those hearings or just be prepared to answer questions if they arise, assuming at those hearings?

I tried to see if most of the evidence in the record wouldn't be consistent, including the depositions.

MR. SINKIN: I guess in part I would respond

Applicants on engineering that was limited, to a great extent, to HL&P's engineering oversight and not Brown & Root's quality of engineering. So it wasn't just a matter of whether the Board might ask a question out of the blue and therefore the issue would come up, totally unexpected to them. They fully expected engineering would be a matter of controversy and submitted prefiled testimony on engineering. So if you expect an issue to come up and you commission a report to prepare for it and the report comes in highly critical and you don't submit it to the Board, that's our case for a deliberate withholding of the Quadrex report from the Board.

Part of their defense is the report was not prepared for the hearing, was not -- that's what Mr. Goldberg's affidavit says. It was not prepared in preparation for that hearing.

Second, that they only expected it to come up as an incidental matter and might not come up at all. And third, therefore, that was not a reason for having Quadrex prepared. It was a side benefit, if it happened to come up, they'd have something to answer with.

We see that as two distinct stories. They are very different stories. And you can't have it both ways.

So, that's the difference in the record that we

ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

see, if this evidence is admitted. And we think "prepared for the hearings" has a very strict meaning. It's not -- you don't go out and spend \$500,000 on a study because you think maybe, maybe, maybe, way out in nowhereland the Board might ask a question you didn't expect. And you come in with the answer based on this massive study. Maybe it was a \$300,000 study. Maybe I overstated that.

There's a very real difference in our minds and a very real difference in the credibility of the testimony, depending on what you decide as to whether it was prepared for the phase 1 hearing or not.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: If we should decide it was maybe prepared in part for the hearings but also had the other purpose that the Applicants have uniformly testified to, would that make a difference?

MR. SINKIN: Well, it seems to me there's gradations here. Grade 1 is it was never prepared for the hearings, wasn't considered relevant to the hearings and issues and all that.

Grade 2, well, it might have had a side benefit that we could answer questions in the hearings, but it wasn't prepared for the hearings.

Grade 3, yes, it was prepared for the hearings but was also prepared for other reasons.

And grade 4 is it was primarily prepared for the

1

2

3

4

5

6

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

hearings and had some side benefits for the other reasons. The Board will have to decide which of those four stories they think is the truth.

We think it was prepared primarily so Mr. Goldberg could testify about the quality of Brown & Root's engineering before this Board in phase 1 of the licensing hearings. And all the other items, the status of the hearings, whether they complete the project on time, those were the side benefits of the Quadrex report to the Applicants. The Applicants would put it down at grade 1, that it wasn't really prepared for the licensing hearings at all and it was maybe in Mr. Goldberg's mind some side benefit, but that's all. And that that is -- goes to the heart of the motivation that would exist for turning that report over to the Licensing Board or not turning that report over to the Licensing Board and the motivation is a key element in deciding whether their failure to turn it over to the Licensing Board reflects adversely on their character and competence and so that's where our whole line of argument goes.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: On the question I just asked,
I would like Applicant's and Staff's response, if they wish
to. I'd ask that.

MR. AXELRAD: Yes, Mr. Chairman. I have just a couple of things.

Mr. Sinkin makes the point or tries to make the
point that when people spoke, apart from these hearings,
they described the purpose of the Quadrex review
differently than has been testified to at the hearings, and
he attempts to cite the depositions of Mr. Saltarelli and
Mr. Briskin to that effect. And, quite clearly, as we have
pointed out in our responses, those depositions dealt with
discussions which had taken place at which the overall
purpose of the Quadrex report had not been expected to come;
there was no reason for there to have been a complete
discussion; there was no reason for the individuals
involved, namely Mr. Saltarelli and Mr. Briskin, to have
explained in their depositions some of the other matters
involved if they knew the specific reasons Mr. Goldberg had
in mind. And clearly there was no reason to expect that
there would have been a complete explication in those
depositions of all the reasons that the Quadrex report had
been undertaken.

To the response to the second part of

Mr. Bechhoefer's questions, Mr. Sinkin has not really
responded to the question of whether "prepared for
hearings," in his language, means prepared for presentation
at the hearing at the ASLB hearings with respect to
engineering matters which are part of the issue before the
Board, or whether the Quadrex report was viewed as having

the incidental benefit of being available if questions should arise.

Board has heard that the Quadrex report was not prepared for submission at the hearings in phase 1 or at any hearings before this Board and the depositions of the two individuals involved are quite consistent in that regard. And specifically, as Mr. Bechhoefer has indicated, Mr. Briskin's deposition talks about the information being available if questions should arise at the hearing and therefore is clearly consistent with all of the testimony that has been given before.

Mr. Sinkin, in the course of his argument, stated that the company would not have spent \$300,000 or \$500,000 or whatever the amount was, simply in order to have information available if questions would arise at the hearing, and he is quite right. That is not the reason why that money was expended. And there was extensive testimony by Mr. Barker, Mr. Goldberg, and others as to the project-related purposes for which a report was prepared and the fact that the report might be available if questions would arise was just a side benefit. And to the extent that there might have been any ambiguity at all in the two depositions, the affidavits that we have provided, particularly the affidavit of Mr. Briskin, is quite clear

on that point.

With respect to Mr. Saltarelli, Mr. Goldberg had testimony even at the phase 2 reopened hearings with respect to his previous discussions with Mr. Saltarelli and the fact that he had attempted to -- they had those discussions in order to convince Mr. Saltarelli of the importance to the project of having those kinds of reviews done. Of course, that was then confirmed in Mr. Goldberg's subsequent affidavit.

As to Mr. Goldberg's expectations, he has testified many times on that subject and, as a matter of fact, even though Mr. Sinkin has claimed in one of his pleadings that Mr. Goldberg concocted the side benefit theory in order to respond to Mr. Sinkin's second motion to reopen, that side benefit explanation had been provided from the very first back at the phase 2 hearings in the summer of 1982. That has been Mr. Goldberg's consistent explanation of that -- I'm sorry, the summer of '85.

It had been Mr. Goldberg's consistent explanation, even at that time. It is fully consistent with all logic to expect that a new vice-president for engineering and construction would have wanted to be sure at the time that he took over responsibilities in the project that he knew the status of engineering.

Mr. Goldberg's background, in particular with Stone &

ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

Webster, would have led him to want to be sure that he knew what that status was. And the fact that hearings were forthcoming and that the information might be useful in case he was asked questions, as Mr. Sinkin aptly put it, as a new kid on the block — the individual just come on the project and as a vice-president who was in charge of both construction and engineering — I think that made it quite apparent that it would be considered as a side benefit of that information. But the need is clear on the record, clear on the undisputed testimony of a number of witnesses, and nothing in these two depositions, these exhibits that Mr. Sinkin is trying to get into the record, would cast any doubt on that consistent testimony.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Mr. Reis?

MR. REIS: Mr. Chairman, first I would like to mention that of course we have already had reopened hearings focusing on the question of why the Quadrex report was commissioned and the question is: Do these things show anything different?

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: That's really what I was trying to --

MR. REIS: Yes. And I don't believe they do. The first point is there is no showing the witnesses who had direct and actual knowledge of what went on, was testified already in this proceeding, and there is no

showing that Mr. Saltarelli or Mr. Briskin, even if they had given their full knowledge at that deposition, which was not focused on that question at all -- it was an aside in both depositions -- even if it was focused, there's no showing that they had complete knowledge, that they were privy to the thinking of HL&P management or of Mr. Goldberg. Secondly, and what the Staff believes is very important in this, is if we look at the commissioning of the Quadrex report and look at the Quadrex report and how it was formulated and what it addressed, it addressed problems. It obviously couldn't have been commissioned to show good engineering if it was focusing on problems.

The testimony is consistent in the record that when Quadrex was brought on board, they were told to search out problems. There were certain areas where HL&P thought there were problems which were given to Quadrex and they were told to explore those areas.

This whole thing indicates, and gives the whole background of indicating that the report was not generated and there is no basis to think that it was generated to show proper engineering, but instead, to look at problems. And in footnotes 5 and 7 of our last pleading, of March 19, in replying to motion 5 to reopen, we specifically cite the record on that.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Mr. Sinkin, any response to

those comments? Anything additional?

MR. SINKIN: Well, a couple of points,

3 Mr. Chairman.

First of all, we don't have an affidavit from Mr. Saltarelli. All we have is Mr. Goldberg's supposedly reading his affidavit to Mr. Saltarelli and Mr. Saltarelli agreeing with the essence of it.

Secondly, we don't think this is a matter that should be disposed of simply on pleadings that there are serious questions raised by the evidence submitted and it should be dealt with in a hearing with cross-examination. And as to Mr. Reis' point that the witnesses who had direct knowledge have testified, I would say, essentially what we are saying is we think that testimony was false and there's evidence it -- it has been contradicted. So we can't rely simply on the fact that the witnesses with the most direct knowledge have testified, when it is in fact their testimony that is called into question.

I think that's all we have in response to the remarks that have been made so far this morning. We did want to direct the Board's attention to one matter related to motion to reopen number 5, since that is what we are now discussing.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: I thought we would go through the few Board questions we have and --

MR. SINKIN: Oh, you have more? Fine.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: That's just the first. Then we'll let all the parties make any additional statements concerning the motions that they deem necessary.

I would like to start with the Applicants on this question. Why was not the side benefit mentioned in the direct testimony for phase 2, or the prepared testimony here?

MR. AXELRAD: Mr. Chairman, I don't have the direct testimony with me, but my recollection, unless it is faulty, is that the testimony did specifically state that the information would be available to respond to questions from regulatory authorities.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: That statement was made but that isn't -- the side benefit of answering the question should they be asked by the Board. That's a little stretching of that. It came up on cross-examination and Mr. Goldberg readily answered questions on cross-examination as I recall.

MR. AXELRAD: Mr. Chairman, we view the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board as part of regulatory authorities. I didn't think there was any distinction between the hearing arm of the NRC and the administrative arm of the NRC.

I'm sorry, is my answer clear or am I missing

something?

1 .

2

3

4

5

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: No. I just wondered why the so-called side benefit wasn't explicitly mentioned in the direct testimony as such, side benefit of answering questions should they arise.

MR. AXELRAD: Let me just make sure the Board understands. The purpose of the Quadrex review was to obtain information that was necessary in order to be able to conduct and complete the project in an acceptable and satisfactory fashion. The side benefit of the review was that if questions arose from any source, they'd be able to be answered. Those other sources could be co-owners; the other sources could be the NRC Staff in the course of its review; the other sources could be the inspection arm of the NRC; other sources could be the Licensing Board if, as Mr. Goldberg explained, because of the Board's wide latitude they might get into other issues. That was all swept into Mr. Goldberg's thinking about the side benefit of the review. The side benefit wasn't just the Board. The side benefit was being able to answer questions if anybody asked them; that the information was needed in order to be able to conduct the project properly.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Should the Board have been specifically named, particularly in view of the importance or the prominence which that point had in the minds of

people like Mr. Briskin and Mr. Saltarelli, or even -- I think we have some testimony by Dr. Sumpter to that effect, if I recall?

MR. AXELRAD: Prominence? To the extent it had prominence in the mind of Mr. Briskin, my recollection is that it happened to come up in the course of discussions that he and Mr. Goldberg were having with respect to the forthcoming hearings and that's why it had that -- it was coupled in that way in his mind. But as Mr. Briskin's affidavit indicates, he clearly was aware of the project-related purposes. I don't think that the forthcoming hearing or that possible side benefit had any particular prominence in his mind.

To the extent that any other individuals were involved, certainly Dr. Sumpter was fully, fully aware of the project-related purposes for which the review was being conducted.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: I'm not denying the project-related purpose. But the thought is, wasn't the side benefit of having it available to discuss with the Licensing Board at the hearings enough so that, in the phase 2 direct testimony, that should have been mentioned?

MR. AXELRAD: No, Mr. Chairman.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Specifically.

MR. AXELRAD: The only reason that particular

1.4

side benefit came up in the phase 2 hearings with which it is now developed is because those were the questions people were asked. If anyone asked Dr. Sumpter or the other witnesses: Is one of the side benefits of the review the ability to answer the questions that are going to come up in the course of the Staff's review of the FSAR? They'd say: Sure, that will be an important reason. We know they will have questions.

If someone asked: Isn't it important, an important side benefit of review that if we have future meetings of the committee -- they'd say: Sure, it's an important benefit. We have been talking about those at management meetings for the past two years. Those are all side benefits of the review.

The reason they didn't develop prominence at these hearings is because nobody asked about that. Everybody started to focus about the possible side benefit of having information if questions came up at the hearings. I really don't think there was the kind of prominence that your question is implying, Mr. Chairman. And that's why the direct testimony didn't focus on it. We didn't go into trying to identify all of the possible sources of questions that might have come up. It was covered in a general fashion and in our minds there was no doubt about what the prefiled testimony was saying.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: I take it you would not agree with what I read in Mr. Sinkin's motion, second motion I guess -- maybe first as well -- or fifth motion, and maybe fourth as well, whether failure to mention that directly would be a McGuire violation or akin to one?

MR. AXELRAD: Yes. I would certainly deny that anything that Mr. Sinkin says about a McGuire violation has any validity at all. I think the prefiled testimony was very, very accurate with respect to the reasons why the review was conducted, and I think provided information with respect to the potential side benefits of that review and that there was certainly an ability on the part of anyone to question Mr. Goldberg fully with respect to any details of that testimony that they wanted to inquire about. I know of nothing in the McGuire rule that spells out the details that have to be included in the testimony of an individual that's going to be subject to full cross-examination. I just don't know how you can try to devise a rule that specifies every potential connotation that people may have in mind and require that the individual visualize that in advance and try to cover it fully and completely to everyone's satisfaction in prefiled testimony.

As the Board is well aware, the individual could even just have appeared at the proceeding and been subject

to examination and cross-examination without prefiled testimony at all. I think the prefiled testimony in this instance was fully adequate and satisfied all NRC requirements, both of the regulations and of case law.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: If we were to determine -hypothetically now, if we were to determine that the direct
testimony should have specifically referred to the side
benefit, would the Applicants want to have the record
reopened for them to explain? Or would they take a chance
on what measures, if any, we might think were warranted
because of that?

MR. AXELRAD: I'm not sure I understand that hypothetical question, Mr. Chairman. I don't know what the potential decision would say, hypothetically, with respect to what obligation was violated, how it was violated, whether it was inadvertent or advertent, whether it has any significance to the issues before this Board, whether it impeaches the witness or not. I just cannot conceive, on the basis of this record and the information that was provided and everything, all the information in the record, that the Board could conceivably come out with the hypothetical judgment that you just described.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Just assume it for the moment.

MR. AXELRAD: What I'm trying to say,

Mr. Chairman, is I have difficulty visualizing that

judgment. I can't quite visualize the context in which it would come up, what the ramifications would be, because it would be so dependent upon what the Board says in conjunction with that judgment.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: The context would be that the side benefit was so well understood, perhaps from as early as December 1980 at least until throughout the period of Quadrex review and extending at least until at dinner that Mr. Briskin talked about, it was so well understood that it should have been -- and was so important that it should have been put in as an explicit statement in the direct testimony.

and I'm not saying what implications we would draw from it

-- would the Applicants want to have the record reopened to
permit them to provide an explanation why they didn't
mention it? Why the various witnesses -- mostly

Mr. Goldberg, I think -- why he didn't mention it in the
direct testimony?

MR. AXELRAD: Mr. Chairman, I hate to say that Applicants would not want an opportunity to explain anything that seems to be troubling the Board, but it seems to me that Mr. Goldberg has so clearly and consistently explained what was on his mind from December 1980 until 1985, which is the last time that he testified, and it

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

seems to me that his explanations are so clear and explicit, that it would seem to me that the Board is fully aware of his motivations, the reasons why he took actions, the reasons why he gave testimony and what he meant by his testimony, that at the present time, without having consulted either with my client or my cocounsel, I can't visualize what we would add to that.

I think we have presented a fully persuasive case to the Board and it would seem to me that even if that kind of hypothetical judgment were made by the Board, the Board would fully understand that it was an inadvertent violation of this obligation that the Board has conceptualized, and that it cannot possibly reflect upon the character and credibility of the witnesses here. And of course, that is a key issue before this Board. We are not really parsing testimony or anything else, the Board is trying to reach a judgment as to the character and competence of the Applicants and is trying to do so based upon its views on the integrity, the character and the credibility of witnesses it has had before it from senior management of the company, witnesses that in some instances have appeared before this Board for at least -- on at least three or four different occasions over days and days of testimony. And it appears to us if the Board, on the basis of all that testimony, does not have complete faith in the

credibility and integrity of those individuals, cannot on the basis of their answers to questions believe that those individuals gave truthful and candid testimony, I'm not sure what I could add to that, Mr. Chairman.

(Discussion off the record.)

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: I would like to get comments of the other side, not on whether we should open up the hearing, but whether the side benefit should have been specifically mentioned, whether that may constitute either a McGuire violation or something akin to it.

MR. REIS: Mr. Chairman, of course the Staff has said that failing to reveal the Quadrex report before phase 1 -- Staff felt was a violation of McGuire, although Staff's position has been it was not so serious as in the Three Mile Island case -- similar to the Three Mile Island case as to reflect adversely on character and competence. In this case we don't see a violation of McGuire.

When we look at the total context of what the testimony said, when it said "regulatory authority" -- and we know the time at which the Quadrex report was dealing, immediately preceding the hearings -- regulatory authority had to include this Board and the questions of this Board.

Just reading it on the face of the record, looking at the times talked about and when this issue was there, this wasn't sometime three years later or three

years before, where a regulatory authority was the Public Service Commission or Railroad Commission of the State of Texas. This was talk about the time immediately before the hearings. What other regulatory authority? The phrase itself indicated this Board.

That's all the Staff has.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Mr. Sinkin?

MR. SINKIN: I guess in a sense I would endorse Mr. Reis' analysis that a report prepared immediately before the hearings was intended for the hearings.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: I'm not sure that's what he said.

MR. SINKIN: I'm not sure Mr. Reis would agree with that interpretation of his analysis but that's how it sounded to me.

MR. REIS: Let me make the record very clear that I don't --

MR. SINKIN: The issue raised by the Board -- I think when you talk about total context, Mr. Reis talked about total context -- total context goes back to December 3, 1981, when the Applicants first informed the Board and parties about the existence -- no, actually it goes back a little earlier than that, December 3, 1981, Applicants sent a letter to the Board explaining the letter of the Quadrex report, and nowhere in there is there any mention of the

licensing hearings, although other reasons are given such as NRR might be interested. So they were told about it and reviews were being conducted for why Brown & Root wasn't staying apace of construction. There was nothing mentioned about any side benefit to the Licensing Board at all.

Then, I think in Mr. Goldberg's sworn statement to the NRC investigators is the first time that there seems to be a link between the licensing hearings and the Quadrex report, in his explanation of why it was commissioned.

Although there, it is not really very clear at all that he perceived it as a side benefit or anything of the sort.

And then, as has become clear through cross-examination and motions to reopen and new documents, that there is a distinct link between the Quadrex report and the phase I licensing hearings, I think we have seen Applicant's position move in a sense to embrace at least the side benefit theory, so that there would be an explanation for all this evidence that has come forward over the years as to why the Quadrex report was commissioned, and that there has been a lack of candor from the beginning as to the relationship between the Quadrex report and the phase I licensing hearings.

MR. AXELRAD: If I can have just one very brief reply, Mr. Chairman? Mr. Sinkin again talks about a shift in position based on his motions to reopen. That's totally

and utterly false. The side benefit theory -- side benefit explanation was provided before Mr. Sinkin's motion to reopen was filed.

The discussion about informing NRR and not mentioning the Board -- Mr. Goldberg has clearly explained why the company thought that NRR, which does review the engineering aspects of the project, should be informed fully and completely while the review itself was being undertaken.

Mr. Sinkin is raising matters which have nothing to do with the guestions that the Board raised.

MR. SINKIN: Mr. Chairman, if I might be indulged by the Board, there was an additional point I wanted to make that I overlooked.

prominence, in relation to your initial question about why it wasn't mentioned in direct testimony, is the contention that was being addressed. The contention that was being addressed was: Why didn't you tell us about the Quadrex report when you received it? That is the essence of contention 10, I guess it is whether it reflects adversely on the character and competence, would revolve around why they didn't turn it over to the Board. And any information that the purpose for which the report was commissioned related to, expected questions from the Board or even

questions they hypothetically thought might come from the Board, would be relevant to that contention and would be highlighted by that contention and given prominence by that contention; whereas the other matters Mr. Axelrad touched upon, such as the management committee or being able to answer questions to the management committee or other partners or whatever, were certainly not highlighted in any way by the existing contentions.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: I have one question now on some of the discovery questions that we have had a number of papers filed on. I'll ask the Applicants first. Did CCANP have any right to discovery after the May 5 date, after the Brown & Root material -- the protective order on the Brown & Root material was lifted?

MR. AXELRAD: I'm sorry, Mr. Chairman, could you repeat the question? I didn't hear the question.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Would CCANP have any right of discovery or to engage in discovery following the lifting of the -- I call it protective order, but I'm not sure what the Court in Texas called it -- on the materials filed in the Brown & Root HL&P litigation?

MR. AXELRAD: Mr. Chairman, there was no discovery period in effect at that time. The materials, of course, were from the Brown & Root litigation record, were available in the courthouse beginning in May, and Mr.

Sinkin was well aware of that. He even referred to it in a pleading or a letter that he filed with the Board sometime in June. The materials, including additional materials, were also available beginning in September in Austin. As the Board itself pointed out, in asking Applicants to provide some additional information when the hearings were reopened, Mr. Sinkin, as I recall, had not asked for discovery with respect to that particular reopening of the hearing at that time. I think that was later than 1985.

But the short answer is that there was not discovery available at that time, but the information, the documents, bulk of the documents were obviously readily available to Mr. Sinkin and CCANP if they had chosen to go to Matagorda County or Austin.

Mr. Sinkin. I am aware that the Staff has taken the position that CCANP ought to have -- since it was a publicly available document, they should have undertaken research earlier. I want to ask Mr. Sinkin what his response is to why, particularly prior to the second motion to reopen the record, the depositions in question could not have been uncovered, so it all could have been considered in the reopened record in December. I guess that would had to have been in the September-October period, you would have had to have discovered it.

MR. SINKIN: I presume the assumption in the question is that CCANP had some discovery rights.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: I'm talking about a publicly

available document now.

MR. SINKIN: I'm not sure what the term "publicly available document means." There was a document room in Austin that was created for litigation that was Public Utility Commission dockets that were being heard by the Public Utility Commission of Texas. CCANP was not a party to those dockets. I was not a representative of any party to those dockets. Those were dealing with the Brown & Root settlement.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Were they not publicly available? Anybody walked in off the street, couldn't anybody have gone through that material, or am I wrong? This is what I'm trying to find out.

MR. SINKIN: I believe you are wrong,
Mr. Chairman. I believe those rooms were available to the
parties in the proceeding and not to anyone walking in off
the street who cared to read what was on the shelf.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Do the Applicants have any further knowledge on that?

MR. GUTTERMAN: I think I have a little more,
Mr. Chairman. There are two different places in which
documents were available. There were documents available

at the courthouse in Matagorda County. Those are documents that were filed with the Court and that would include Mr. Saltarelli's deposition. There's also a document room which was created in connection with the Public Utility Commission proceeding in which HI&P has put into a public — into a document room, which was created to be available to the parties in the Public Utility Commission proceeding.

It is a document room where, to my knowledge, nobody has ever been denied access to it, whether they represented a member of one of the parties to the proceeding or not. My understanding is that the copies of the documents that were attached to CCANP's motions 4 and 5 to reopen the record were both copied out of the document room in Austin. They came out of that very same document room.

As Mr. Sinkin has pointed out, on a couple of occasions he has been associated with another organization other than CCANP, which is a party to the PUC proceeding, an organization called the Cancellation Committee, or Cancellation Compaign -- something like that.

My *inderstanding is that the documents that were attached to the motions to reopen 4 and 5 were obtained by a representative from that Cancellation Campaign shortly before they were filed with this Board.

In addition to that, the --

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Can we take that into account in ruling on timeliness of a party before us? The fact that it was available to a party in another proceeding with whom the representative here had some connection? Can we legitimately rule that CCANP, now, which is the party here, should have had access and undertaken its -- well, not discovery as such, but uncovering of information for this proceeding, just because its representative had a connection of some sort with another organization involved in that other case?

MR. GUTTERMAN: I want to make sure we understand, Mr. Chairman, that there are two different cases here.

In motion 4, that dealt with documents which were filed with the Court and are publicly available to everybody in the world at the courthouse in Matagorda County.

The issue that you raised arises with respect only to Mr. Briskin's deposition, which had not been filed with the Court and therefore was not available at the courthouse in Matagorda County. As far as whether the Board can consider that that's a document that's publicly available, I think as a practical matter, Mr. Chairman, it is publicly available.

As a formal matter, I suppose one could say

there is a formal distinction there, that at the time, the reason the public can get those documents is because HL&P is willing to make them available to the public and not because HL&P has opened the doors and put a sign, "Welcome public" on the front of the doors. There is a distinction there. I'll agree it's a distinction. But as a practical matter, these documents could have been obtained much earlier than we've seen them.

Of course, as we have pointed out to the Board on both occasions, discovery in this proceeding was unlimited for a long period of time and the very information that we are now seeing in motions to reopen could have been discovered back in 1984 or 1983.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: I'm aware of that. I was trying to focus on the other aspect.

Mr. Reis, do you have any further comments on that guestion?

MR. REIS: My only comment is I think the Board should look at the realities of the situation and know organizations or corporations act through individuals. It's what those individuals actually know and the ability to get material.

Here there is no showing that CCANP lacked the ability to get the material in Austin as well as in Matagorda County.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Apparently one of those documents was not at Matagorda County.

MR. REIS: That's true.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Mr. Sinkin, anything further?

MR. SINKIN: Yes. I would like to address the whole question. I don't want to repeat all the arguments that we have given in our various responses to this discovery question. Discovery did end for CCANP in 1984, long before the lifting of the protective order. Formal discovery rights were over.

As far as their being available in the Matagorda County courthouse, we are talking about something in the nature of 3 million pages. And to expect a pro bono representative with no resources to review 3 million pages is, I think, unreasonable.

Furthermore, the documents in the Matagorda

County courthouse are not kept in a well ordered manner.

According to the people I have discussed -- whether I

should bother going down to Matagorda County -- the

opinions I heard, it was clear that case was never going to

trial, because all the documents were stuck in boxes and

thrown in a warehouse for the Court, and they were not

easily accessible. That may or may not be relevant.

As far as documents in Austin, I think it would be incredible if CCANP were held to be responsible for

knowledge that an organization that CCANP's representative happens to belong to might have in another proceeding in which I am not involved, and which the organization I do not represent happens to be involved, but I happen to be a member of the South Texas Cancellation Campaign.

When matters came to my attention from Austin about documents in that room, I would ask the party to the proceeding, the South Texas Cancellation Campaign, to go to that room and copy the necessary documents and send them to me. And you will see that the Applicants are absclutely correct, they came from that room. There's a little notation that is required to be put on any document copied in that room as to who copied it and you will see in the documents submitted in the motions to reopen, it says "Dan Harrison, STCC." Mr. Harrison is the representative for the South Texas Cancellation Campaign in the PUC proceedings and I simply call him and say, here's what I heard, will you please go look up this document and will you please send it to me, copy it and send it to me.

That's how I happened to come to have this information.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: How did you find out about the information to start out with? Did Mr. Harrison call you? Or someone in that group?

MR. SINKIN: Someone other than Mr. Harrison called me who is participating in the proceeding.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: I don't care about the name of the person.

I assume that person knew something about the issues in this proceeding?

MR. SINKIN: They were aware of the issues being litigated by this Board.

MR. GUTTERMAN: Can I just add a couple of points, Mr. Chairman?

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Yes.

MR. GUTTERMAN: First of all, the point about the protective order being in effect, the Court's protective order during the time of the discovery that CCNP had available to it, certainly the Court's protective order was in effect at that time, but that protective order would not have in any way limited CCANF's ability to take the depositions of Mr. Saltarelli or Mr. Briskin or to obtain production of the exhibits to those depositions or the documents that eventually became exhibits to those depositions.

Secondly, while I don't know whether there really are 3 million pages of documents filed with the Court in Matagorda County, I will concede there are a lot of documents there, but the vast bulk of those documents are pleadings, interrogatories or responses to interrogatories, motions, responses to motions. To think

of that volume of documents and assume because it is a lot of paper one can't find anything in it, I think that's a little bit misleading.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Do you know whether they were indexed in any way or were they just sitting in boxes, in a warehouse?

MR. GUTTERMAN: Well, frankly, all I can say about that is the one time I went down there to get some documents from the courthouse, they were indexed, but it was very early in the lawsuit. I wouldn't -- I couldn't really represent that that was representative of the way they were maintained years after that.

Mr. Sinkin mentioned that he has called and asked a party to go to HL&P's room in Austin. I think that, then, is an admission that he's well aware of the existence of that room and has been aware of it for sometime.

I would also point out, I didn't mention before that in addition to members of -- representatives of parties in that proceeding going to that room, members of the press frequently go in that room. In fact, HL&P, from the day that the lawsuit settlement was first announced in May of 1985 has routinely made available to remembers of the press, on request, any part of the material discovered in the Court or discovered as part of that proceeding.

So there has been a very large public

availability of the materials generated in the Brown & Root litigation.

The only other point I wanted to add is that while Mr. Sinkin says that he's just a member of the Cancellation Committee, he, in fact appeared as its legal representative in proceedings before the PUC in the prior PUC docket involving the South Texas project. That's a little bit more than being just a member, although I don't know that he has appeared in the current PUC proceeding.

MR. SINKIN: Mr. Chairman, number one, there's no question of my admitting to the existence of that room. I put the existence of that room in my pleadings to explain to the Board where the documents are coming from. I never denied the existence of the room or knowing it was there. Two, the fact that I represented a party in the HL&P rate case some years ago has nothing to do with whether I am representing that party in an entirely different proceeding in front of the PUC in 1985. I am not representing that party. I am not consulting with the representative for that party. I have called upon them to perform favors for me in that proceeding, and it's up to them whether they would devote the resources to help me. I am a member of the organization, but I don't think that gives me any legal obligation to know what's going on in that proceeding.

wanted to ask about the motions to reopen. Do the parties have any further statements they want to make about the two outstanding motions? We'll take a break after that.

MR. SINKIN: I did want to direct the Board's attention to one matter. In motion to reopen number 5, we supplied a sworn deposition by Mr. Briskin, and the Applicants have responded with an affidavit from Mr. Briskin. I do want to direct the Board's attention to page 399 -- excuse me -- 397 of Mr. Briskin's deposition, which is attached as an exhibit to our motion to reopen 5, in which Mr. Briskin talks about a meeting.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: What page was that? MR. SINKIN: 397.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Go ahead.

MR. SINKIN: Page 397, Mr. Briskin is discussing a meeting in the summer of 1981, late spring or May of 1981. He's talking about sitting at a dinner and discussing with Mr. Goldberg -- just a moment. I'm going to withdraw that for the moment, Mr. Chairman. I see something else that may change my mind about what I was going to say.

That was all I had.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Do the other parties have anything further on the motions?

MR. AXELRAD: I would just like those remarks by Mr. Sinkin to be stricken from the record since they had no

1	basis in the remarks in the transcript that he was
2	purporting to cite. There is nothing about May in the
3	transcript.
4	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Nothing about what?
5	MR. SINKIN: Who said "May"?
6	MR. AXELRAD: You said "late spring or May."
7	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: I thought he said "summer."
8	I was reading it it said late spring of '81. Line 4.
9	He's withdrawing any comments on it.
0	MR. AXELRAD: I withdraw my request.
1	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: I think we'll leave it.
2	Let's take a 15-minute break and then we'll come
3	up with talk about
4	MR. AXELRAD: Mr. Chairman, before we do take
5	that break, I would like, in order for the parties to be
6	fully prepared, to make sure after the break exactly what
7	the Board plans to take up and in what sequence.
8	As I understand it, the only matter left is the
9	so-called drug use matter?
0	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: That's correct. I'm going to
1	ask that, but I assume that's correct. We are going to ask
2	Mr. Sinkin to identify whether he he still has an
3	opportunity to come forward with comments, at least on the

Staff's Issue C -- or on both of your Issue C affidavits.

He had two weeks after the Staff. We may be talking a

24

25

little bit about that. But the drug is the only issue identified so far.

MR. AXELRAD: On the opportunity -- there was a specific date specified in the Board's order when Mr. Sinkin was to specify any issues that he wanted to raise based upon the affidavits that were filed. That was this past Tuesday. The Applicants had filed their affidavits four weeks before that. The Staff was late in its response. Mr. Sinkin, to my knowledge, did not request any extension of his opportunity to file anything.

If he had asked for such an opportunity to file late, we would certainly have taken the position that there was no reason why he could not have filed anything based upon Mr. Dewease's affidavit this past Tuesday, which was four weeks after he had received Mr. Dewease's affidavit. That would then have permitted the Board to consider argument at this prehearing conference and dispose of any such matters. If he asked for more time to respond to the Staff affidavit, we would certainly have argued that the only time he would be entitled to would be to file any issues that he had based upon any new information in the Staff's affidavit, which differed from that that was contained in Mr. Dewease's affidavit, and there was none such, at least in the Applicant's view.

But the crux of the matter is that Mr. Sinkin

did not request any more time to file anything, simply let last Tuesday's filing deadline go past without saying anything and I think that certainly prejudices the Board's ability to hear any of these matters at this prehearing conference today and dispose of them.

Therefore, I think it's incumbent upon the Board to decide whether Mr. Sinkin is in fact entitled to any -- as a matter of fact, Mr. Sinkin has not asked for any more time to my knowledge until today.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: We will break until after the break, before we discuss it, but that was one of the matters we were going to discuss, and then we'll get into the drug issue.

MR. REIS: Again, the Staff, again, doesn't know whether Mr. Sinkin has anything. But let me make it clear that in my letter, although Mr. Sinkin didn't move, I said in my letter, since my time was extended, Mr. Sinkin's time ought to be extended. I think that is the posture we are in.

I don't know whether because I said that, Mr. Sinkin also had to move. I'm not sure at all. I really don't think so.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Well, let's talk about that after the break, but we are going to talk about that subject. When we get into drugs we are going to discuss

first were whether -- well, I don't know about first -- but we want to discuss whether the drug issue would be barred by the rulemaking, by the rulemaking, that position which the Applicants have taken. We would want to discuss whether the drug issue falls within either Issue C or Issue F. And then we would want to discuss -- if we decide that the drug issue should be heard -- how it should be handled. We have a number of documents dealing with what the permissible types of discovery should be. I would think we could discuss to some extent if we should decide that the drug issue is a proper issue or if we should decide that, based on some additional information, it might be a proper issue, we could decide then what kind of discovery would be allowable.

I recognize that the discovery was submitted in connection with Issue F, but it may well be that we decide the issue should go someplace else.

MR. AXELRAD: Mr. Chairman, that's exactly why I raised that question about what we are going to argue in what sequence. It seems to me that we should not be indulging, in this prehearing conference, in theoretical arguments on matters which do not have a direct bearing upon the matters before this Board, and it seems to me it is important to consider these issues in a proper, appropriate and orderly fashion.

The first question before this Board is not, you know, whether the drug issue is barred into rulemaking, although that may be a subissue, but the only thing pending before this Board now is whether or not the drug issue question is part of Issue F.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: We have asked for argument on C.

MR. AXELRAD: I understand. I would just like to go in an orderly sequence.

With respect to the question of Issue F, we have filed a motion for a protective order and that motion for protective order, among other things, does bring up the rulemaking question, and I think it's perfectly appropriate to have argument, if that's what the Board wants, on the motion for protective order and everything that is associated with that -- that that's an Issue F question.

There is also a motion to compel by Mr. Sinkin which deals with the discovery on Issue F. We don't believe that it is necessary to get to that motion for protective order, because -- to that motion to compel because we think the motion for protective order, when decided by the Board, if they can decide it today, for example, would in fact take care of that.

But if the Board still has that question opened, then we should have an argument on the motion for

protective order, but again within the context of Issue F.

If we rule on Issue F, the only question before this Board would then not be whether the drug use question falls within Issue C or something like that, but only whether that issue falls within the limited portion of Issue C which is still before this Board.

The Board has ruled on Issue A, it has ruled on Issue B, it has ruled on Issue C, except for a limited update. And we can have a perfectly appropriate argument -
JUDGE BECHHOEFER: I can argue with you on the limited, but --

MR. AXELRAD: Whatever the Board reserved in its partial initial decision with respect to Issue C, that's the only matter still reserved. The Board disposed of Issues A, B, and C.

If beyond that -- whether it is narrow or not -whether beyond that reserved portion of Issue C, whether
drug use is something which should be considered by this
Board, that could only be considered in the context of any
motions to reopen Issue A, B, or C by Mr. Sinkin.

Now, if the Board wants to consider Mr. Sinkin's allegations with respect to that matter, in essence, a motion to reopen Issues A, B, and C, then we can discuss that in the context of a motion to reopen. But I think it's extremely important that we discuss these various

matters in their proper context, so the Board can apply the proper standard. And I think it is also extremely important that we not confuse arguments and not get into a mix of arguments without either the Board or the parties being aware of what issue is being addressed in what context.

So I would strongly suggest that we have argument on our motion for protective order first. Then, if the Board feels it necessary, have argument on the motion for protective order. And then, if the Board wishes, we can have, as apparently invited by the Board's order, have an argument as to whether the drug question, even if it does not come within Issue F, falls within the reserved portion of Issue C. And I think those three arguments should be kept separately.

(Discussion off the record.)

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: I think however we want to term it, the rulemaking issue is sort of basic to any consideration, or may be basic to any consideration of the issue as framed in discovery, the discovery responses, and we will have to hear argument on that. I would just as soon start with that.

MR. AXELRAD: But, Mr. Chairman, we can't discuss rulemaking in a vacuum.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Well, you have said that

because it is -- in rulemaking it can't be considered.

Basically that's your position. I am not sure I agree with that. I have given you some other decisions which might counteract that, but I want to hear argument on that first, because, if we can't consider it at all, we don't have to get into anything else, and it's irrelevant whether you call it a motion for protective order or motion for summary disposition of F, or whatever context. Your argument would apply whether it goes into C or F, or whether we should consider whether it be considered a late-filed contention.

MR. AXELRAD: I understand, Mr. Chairman, but in all fairness to the Applicants, I hope the Board appreciates that our basic position is that the matters that Mr. Sinkin is trying to raise is not within the scope of Issue F and if it's not within the scope of Issue F you don't have to reach the issue of rulemaking.

We have reached that, because it's a help in consideration Issue F, but Issue F is clear on its face, and whether the rulemaking doctrine ever applied it is not at at all credible that the issue Mr. Sinkin is trying to raise falls within Issue F.

JUDGE BECHHOZFER: Assuming we agree with you, we have raised Issue C, and we are also going to ask the parties to consider whether we should consider it as a late-filed contention. Because there's plenty of

1.1

information in there which would support that.

MR. AXELRAD: I'm sorry, Mr. Chairman, the late-filed contention question is the first time the Board has just raised that. But in any event, it does seem to me that orderly procedure is to first of all determine, is it within Issue F; is it within the reserved portion of Issue C; and then, is it proper for a motion -- is it a proper motion to reopen, including as a late-filed contention? And we can argue those things.

All I'm trying to do is I want to make sure that we don't lose track of the issues that are before this Board. The issues that this Board has to decide is whether or not the matters Mr. Sinkin is trying to raise fall within Issue F, for example. And that involves much more than the simple question of whether it is barred by rulemaking.

As a matter of fact, the question I'm raising is I think more fundamental and would not require the Board to seriously consider the rulemaking question.

MR. REIS: Mr. Chairman, there are some very grave questions of the jurisdiction of the Board here, especially in the light of the recent opinion of the Commission in the Waterford case. To go out and reach for things on the basis -- I mean we'll have to address this after the hearing, but I just want to say something. To go

out and reach for this on the basis of what is admittedly an anonymous telephone conversation, and seek to expand and reopen the proceeding to reach for these sort of things and talk about contentions and new contentions without a motion that addresses the standards in the rules and regulations that the Commission has again and again reemphasized and the Appeal Board has again and again reemphasized, to just throw that out at this point is very improper.

If we are talking about a new contention, we better get a motion in for a new contention, that we can talk about good cause, that we can talk about a basis for the contention with specificity, with a showing -- a late-filed contention that there is evidence to support the contention. Because the rules for a late-filed contention are different than contentions at the beginning of the proceeding and you have to show a basis to go forward, and there are a lot of things we are going to have to talk about after this break.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: I'm aware of that. I'm aware of that.

MR. SINKIN: Mr. Chairman, just for our two cents in this little debate, it seems to me the Board has indicated if it's not under Issue F, we might want to look whether it's under Issue C, and if it's not under Issue C, we might want to look at whether it's a late-filed

contention. And the Board has raised the other side of the issue as, if it is barred by being in rulemaking, then none of those three can happen. It makes sense that both of those have to be argued. We don't care which order they are argued in, but both of them have to be argued. There is a threshold question, if it's barred by rulemaking all the rest of the debate becomes irrelevant, but I don't think the Board is going to make a ruling today whether it's barred by rulemaking. If you are prepared to rule today whether it may be barred, maybe we ought to take it up first and not waste time on the rest of it. If you are not going to make a ruling today, we are going to have to address both of them.

MR. AXELRAD: I would strongly object to that.

It's almost as if the Board were trying to decide a constitutional question while there are very simple factual questions that can be decided, the question whether this is an appropriate issue under Issue F. And it is not. And it seems to me --

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Or C. Or C.

MR. AXELRAD: But the first question -- the Board is the only party, the only participant in this proceeding so far that has raised Issue C. The only thing that the Intervenor has raised, is this under Issue F.

I'm perfectly willing to argue anything the

Board wants to hear, but it seems to me that the first thing the Board should hear is argument with respect to the matters that are properly before it. And then it can decide whether it wants to go into other matters which nobody else has raised before it.

MR. SINKIN: Mr. Chairman, I guess I'd make my argument the other way, too. If the Board is not prepared to rule today that it is or is not under Issue F, then we are going to hear debate on all those issues including the rulemaking issue, anyway, so it doesn't matter what order we take them up in. If the Board is prepared to rule today that the issue is not under Issue , then that may be a different situation. I didn't sense -- I thought the Board wanted to hear argument. I didn't sense the Board was prepared to make rulings today. Maybe that would determine it. If you are not prepared to make rulings, we are going to discuss all these issues and it doesn't matter what order we discuss them in.

(Discussion off the record.)

MR. AXELRAD: Mr. Chairman, I believe the parties will be prepared to address these issues in whatever sequence the Board wants to address them, having heard our arguments, so this might be an appropriate time to take the break and then after the break you can tell us what you want of us.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

There are a limited number of sequences that can arise.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: We'll take a 15-minute break. (Recess.)

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Back on the record. We have flipped a three-headed coin and we have decided that we will start with Issue F first. But then, next we'll certainly have to discuss the rulemaking point. I guess the Applicants can lead off on Issue F. In addressing Issue F, I would like the Applicants to comment on whether the issue as defined in the responses to interrogatories, as well as in the pleadings filed by CCANP, would fall within the introductory language to Appendix B, which states that: "The Applicants must set forth the managerial and administrative controls to be used to assure safe operation." And the definition of quality assurance which says that: "Quality assurance comprises all those planned, systematic actions necessary to provide adequate confidence that a structure, system or component will perform satisfactorily in service."

If you read those two together the question we raise is: Wouldn't drug use by plant personnel fit within the context of that, of that language?

MR. GUTTERMAN: Well, let me see if I can address this issue, Mr. Chairman. I'm not sure I have the

exact language you quoted, but I think I got the general thrust of it.

JUDGE RECHHOEFER: It's in the first and third paragraphs to the introduction. What I quoted first was the last sentence of the first paragraph of the introduction. Secondly I quoted the definition of quality assurance in the third paragraph.

MR. GUTTERMAN: As the Board clearly recognizes our contention, our position is that the issues CCANP seeks to raise do not fall within Issue F.

Implicit in the way the Board addressed the last question is the recognition that Issue F deals with only one question, that question is whether Applicant's quality assurance program for the operation of the South Texas project meets the requirements of Appendix B.

Appendix B, there is some language which is very general in nature. It, in essence, says quality assurance program comprises a certain set of actions necessary — related to the physical characteristics — well, I'm not reading it right. I realize there's very general language in the introduction to Appendix B. But the fact that there's general language in that introduction does not alter the fact that quality assurance programs are comprised of all of the specific requirements that are set forth in the 18

criteria of Appendix B.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Only those?

MR. GUTTERMAN: Yes, Mr. Chairman, I think that's right. I don't think you'll find any additional requirements in the introduction that aren't addressed in the 18 criteria. I think the 18 criteria explain how one meets the general objectives that are included in the introduction.

The quality assurance system set out by Appendix B is a system of planning and training, checking, inspecting, auditing. It does not purport to address matters such as control of drug use by project employees. The FSAR that the Applicant has filed -- I invite you to look at the SAR filed by any Applicant -- the standard review plan that the Commission uses to judge the adequacy of these safety analysis reports, the regulatory guides, the ANSI standards, all of the documents which interpret and implement Appendix B do not address drugs. That's shown by the affidavit of -- well, I'd be getting off talking about the motion for summary disposition which hasn't been addressed yet.

But I think it is clear, on the face of it,
there is no mention at all in Appendix B of control of drug
use. If the Board were to interpret a generalized
statement in the introduction as requiring some control of

drug use, the Board would have absolutely no standard to go by in determining what was an acceptable drug control program. There's nothing there, nothing in Appendix B that tells you how to judge that. In essence, the Board would be writing on a clean slate and reaching its own determination of what the Board considers is an acceptable program of controlling drugs. There's nothing in Appendix B that establishes that standard.

Standpoint, wouldn't reasonable assurance depend on that?

If -- particularly if an issue -- if indications of improper drug use were shown, which is one of the questions we are going to get into later, but assuming that there were an adequate basis for showing that there was improper -- either improper drug use or improper administrative controls applied to that drug use, wouldn't a reasonable assurance finding in a particular case -- maybe not generally, but in a case where such an issue was raised, wouldn't that be necessary and proper?

MR. GUTTERMAN: Mr. Chairman, I think the

Commission's regulations have a set of standards by which

Applicants are judged. Implicit in the question is the

assumption that if people were using drugs, their behavior

would be unacceptable and they would do something wrong.

Appendix B establishes a system for detecting that "something

wrong" that might be done, a work activity that's done wrong. That's what Appendix B is focused on. It's planning the work activities, checking to see that those plans are properly followed, auditing to verify the work is done in accordance with the applicable requirements. The entire focus of the Commission's regulations in this respect is on achieving the quality-related activities, not testing the capabilities of the individuals, in the sense of, are they strong enough or are they in good health, are they under the influence of strong rays of the sun or illegal drugs or alcohol or mesmerized by rock and roll music or whatever may affect somebody's behavior. Those kinds of things are not addressed in Appendix B.

That doesn't mean they are not real or they shouldn't be of concern. In fact, in this particular, case the Applicants have a very strong program for controlling drugs. But that's not an Appendix B program.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: That is what the question is being raised about, basically.

MR. GUTTERMAN: If the chairman understands what the question is, you are one step ahead of me. Because reading all the filings of CCANP, I'm not clear what it is about. But whatever it has to do with, it's got nothing to do with compliance with Appendix B.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: How about the general

language defining quality control, which is the last part of the introductory paragraph?

MR. GUTTERMAN: Could you read a couple of words just to get me oriented to the sentence you are looking at?

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: It says: Quality assurance includes quality control which comprises those quality assurance actions related to the physical characteristics of the physical structural component or system which provides a means to control the quality of the material, structure, component or system to predetermined requirements."

MR. GUTTERMAN: I see the sentence you are directing my attention to. I'm not sure I understand the question, though.

If the Board's question was, does the definition of quality control imply that control of drug use is an element of quality control, I think clearly that's not the case. And I point out to this Board, in phase 1 of this proceeding, the Board considered the adequacy of Applicant's quality assurance program for control -- applicable to construction of the plant, and found it was acceptable and there is no mention there of control of drug use. And there was no issue considered by the Board about that. It was clearly not an issue. It was not a matter that is addressed in any way in the quality assurance program

description that was filed with the Board. It's not mentioned in any way in the quality assurance section of the preliminary safety analyzis report that was the basis for the issuance of construction permits. There's no mention at all about drug control in any of the documents related to Appendix B, either in this docket or in any docket that I am aware of, or in any of the various documents that the Commission and the Staff have issued that interpret Appendix B and explain what is an acceptable program to meet the Commission's requirements.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: How about the implementation of Appendix B? You recognize, I assume, that implementation is part of the likelihood -- adequate implementation has long been recognized as part of an adequate QA program.

MR. GUTTERMAN: Certainly it requires that the requirements of Appendix B be implemented properly.

JUNGE BECHHOEFER: Could drug use have an effect on that? Likely? Could it? Would it?

MR. GUTTERMAN: I'd be speculating what people would do under the influence of drugs, but Appendix B doesn't establish any requirement for control of the use of drugs to assure that implementation. It requires the inspection and checking and auditing functions, and also training requirements.

Certainly there are other things that might influence people's behavior that are not addressed by Appendix B.

I don't think that in any way makes something that might affect peoples' behavior a part of Appendix B.

You can't have -- I don't see how you could read into Appendix B a requirement if people have a fight with their wife, they shouldn't go to work because they might not be concentrating on their work.

If one tries to apply one's imagination to it, you can imagine numerous things that might affect somebody's behavior on the job, but Appendix B doesn't try to get at assuring quality by controlling those things. It tries to get at it through a system of audits and inspections. And drug use, drug -- control of drug use is not a part of that directly. Although if somebody were on drugs and his performance on the job was adversely affected by it, certainly one would expect that the control programs that are in Appendix B would detect that, would detect the poor performance of work. That's what those control programs are designed for, is to detect poor performance on the job.

JUDGE SHON: Mr. Gutterman, what about the point I think Mr. Sinkin has made a couple of times in his filings, which is that he is not really addressing the goodness, the excellence of the drug control program, its

adequacy or lack of adequacy. What he is addressing is, in a sense, management dishonesty. He maintains, not that this is a bad program or that it may miss people who take drugs or that there may be drug use on the job, but that this program, since it is applied in a discriminating and unfair way, manifests a management attitude that is inconsistent with proper control of a nuclear power plant; that is, not managerial and administrative controls used to assure safe operation that are mentioned in Appendix B, just the unevenhandedness of its administration represents that sort of a flaw.

MR. GUTTERMAN: Thank you, Judge Shon. I'm happy to address that, because I think that gets to the heart of what we were discussing just before the break.

That kind of contention, to the extent I can understand it, clearly goes to whether there is reasonable assurance that this Applicant will meet -- will comply with its QA program, not to the question of whether the QA program meets Appendix B.

When the Board set out the six issues, A through

F, to be considered in this proceeding, it encompassed

within Issues A and B, the questions of the character of

the Applicant and whether its performance showed a

character which would be inclined to try to comply with the

Commission's regulations, could be reasonably expected to

comply with the Commission's regulations.

Issue F was never intended by the Board to invite a separate litigation of the same kinds of facts that the Board was considering under Issues A and B.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Mr. Gutterman, are you forgetting or ignoring the rulings that go way back to the early Midland decision, I think, which said that implementation of a QA program is as significant as the formal structure of it. I think ALAB-106 was the earliest decision that said that, that you have to look at the implementation as well as the paper program.

MR. GUTTERMAN: Mr. Chairman, I am not ignoring that and I'm certainly not arguing that the Board ignored it in phrasing the issues. I think the Board had that clearly and directly in mind when it wrote issues A through F. And I think the Board parsed those issues, among issues A through F, and issues A and B were issues the Board established to determine the character of HL&P, to determine whether the Applicants in general could be relied upon to carry out and follow the Commission's requirements.

Issue F was a much narrower issue. It assumed that Issues A and B had already been answered and the Board had reached a judgment about the character of the Applicants and looked solely at whether the quality assurance program that had been established for application

during the operation of the plants met the requirements of Appendix B. That's all Issue F is related to and nothing further.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Does A and B cover operation or construction?

MR. GUTTERMAN: I think clearly issues A and B were intended to judge the qualification; of the Applicants to be given operating licenses.

As you recall, Mr. Chairman, this was not an enforcement proceeding. The entire proceeding has been a proceeding on application for operating licenses. And in judging the character and competence of the Applicants, the issue was the eligibility to be granted operating licenses.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Wasn't Issue A linked to their record of past -- the evidence relevant to Issue A, I would gather, would be limited to the past performance?

MR. GUTTERMAN: Mr. Chairman, I agree with you entirely, exactly what Issue A was related to was past performance, i.e., the performance of the Applicants during the construction of the plant.

Now that I have Issue A in front of me, I see the explicit words are, "if viewed without regard to remedial steps including --" and then the four examples are included, it says, " -- sufficient to determine that HL&P does not have the necessary managerial competence or

character to be granted licenses to operate the STP."

Clearly Issue A was talking about qualifications for operating licenses.

As you recall, I'm sure, Mr. Chairman, during the course of the phase I proceeding, new questions were raised, new staff inspection reports were issued as the proceeding was going on and that came in to evidence, evidence of those inspections, the results of them,

Applicant's responses to them, all came into evidence under Issue A, even though they weren't past in the sense they occurred before the Board's December 2, 1980 order, but they were events that occurred during the construction of the project.

To the extent that there is some issue to be raised under the matters that are discussed in CCANP's pleadings, whatever events they are -- and really they are a little hard to recognize, because the facts don't seem to relate to what has actually happened -- but whatever they are, they are matters that occurred during the construction.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: That we can't decide now.

MR. GUTTERMAN: I understand that, Mr. Chairman.
But whatever they are, they are clearly intended to be
matters that occurred during the construction of the
project and, as such, to the extent the Board ever
contemplated hearing something about them in Issues A

through F, it was clearly under Issues A or B.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Well, I won't ask you about C, now, but when we get to talking about C -- that's perhaps a different question. Right now we are on F.

Do you have anything further on F? We'll go to the other parties if you don't.

MR. GUTTERMAN: I'm just reminded that we were going to talk about the relevance of the rulemakings and I suppose I ought to reserve that for the second element.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: We want to hear the original parties first.

MR. GUTTERMAN: I want to point out -JUDGE BECHHOEFER: I realize that.

MR. GUTTERMAN: -- that our pleading cited the pendency of two rulemakings was to just point out the implication that the Commission, in proposing rules that would require control of drug use, by implication is suggesting that Appendix B does not address such matters. I'm not sure that argument is necessary, because I think on the face of it, what we all know about the history of the application of Appendix B and nuclear power plants has been that drug control has not been an element of quality assurance programs. But that's an added indication that the Commission itself interprets its requirements as not currently addressing the control of drugs. That's all I

have, Mr. Chairman.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Let me ask -- well, I'll save it for the rulemaking part. I guess we haven't heard at all what the Staff's position is on this, because you haven't had a chance to file anything. I guess we ought to hear what the Staff's position on Issue F is.

MR. REIS: It is a dispute for discovery between Applicants and -- but there are broader implications here, so I will make some comments on it.

First of all, I want to put this into the context of what Mr. Sinkin is trying to get to in the sense of his answer to the eighth set of interrogatories, where Mr. Sinkin has said "CCANP does not contend that the quality assurance program for South Texas will not satisfy the requirements of Part 50, Appendix B, or revisions or additions to such QA programs are necessary in order to satisfy the parts."

Now, he goes on and says that he doesn't feel that HL&P's program for operation of South Texas will not -- he does say that he does not feel that HL&P's QA program for operation of South Texas will not meet the requirements of Appendix B, because HL&P lacks the character to properly implement such a program, which plainly shows it does not fall under Issue F. If any place, it might have been under Issue B, which did deal with: Has HL&P taken sufficient

1.3

remedial steps to provide assurance that it now has the
managerial competence and character to operate South Texas
safely. But mainly from what Mr. Sinkin says, it is not
under F. We have an interpretation that we are talking
about a program. And that is what we were all talking
about when these particular issues were adopted, when we
talked about what evidence would be put in on these issues,
how we were formulating the issues - we were looking at
the FSAR for operations; that's why it couldn't be heard
originally, why we didn't have the sufficient information
to go into Issue F originally at the original Phase 1
hearings, and that's what we are faced with today.

MR. GUTTERMAN: Was the issue limited to that or did it include likely implementation?

MR. REIS: I think at the time --

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: It falls under Appendix B, and I again refer to the ALAB-106 which is probably the first decision, that was way back.

MR. REIS: I agree we can look at implementation of a program and there's no question about that. And the implementation of Appendix B can be litigated in the light of whether Applicant has the character to implement it.

But that wasn't what Issue F dealt with. It dealt with the program. The program in the square terms of Appendix B.

And that's what we are dealing with. If you are talking

QA program, that was encompassed within Issue B.

What we talked about for Issue F, and what was raised at the time, was the foursquare written document for QA of operations. And we could not review that and did not put evidence in -- and we could not introduce evidence at phase 1, and that's why we required other phases, because that wasn't prepared at that time.

MR. GUTTERMAN: Well, would Issue B have even permitted any consideration of --

MR. REIS: To the extent --

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: -- because they are talking about corrective actions under A, and I'm not sure this drug use allegation, at least, would fall there either.

MR. REIS: It may be, as the Staff will take the position, if it's anything, it's a new contention or should be submitted as a new contention and must be judged under those standards. It could be that it is not in proceeding at all and that's really where the Staff is ultimately in this discussion going to come out, that it is not in this proceeding, that it must be judged under the standards of 2.714 as a new contention, and whether there is sufficient information to allow it to be raised as a new contention.

Perhaps I'm getting ahead of myself, but 1 quoted from paragraph 4 of the response, or answer 4 of the

anonymous telephone calls and information being put forth on that basis.

The Staff will ultimately take the position -JUDGE BECHHOEFER: We have a lot of questions
about that when we get to it. We recognize there may be
problems with that. But we are going to address that when
we get to it. But we started with this Issue F first.

MR. REIS: To reiterate, the Staff, again, emphasizes that Issue F was only looking at the foursquare program. I realize what the Midland case said. But that was not -- when Issue F was drafted, it did not encompass what was talked about in Midland. What was talked about in Midland we all talked about in connection with Issue A; we briefed it in connection with Issues A and B, and that was in that sense.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: When we talked about QA for operations, Issue F, did we have any discussions one way or the other? Was there any record that we limited it to the program, as such, rather than the likely implementation during operations?

MR. REIS: My recollection -- and I think -- is that we did limit it to the program at that time. I'm trying to think of whether there was any particular record of it. I can't think of it spelled out in any particular

prehearing conference order. But it was talked about in terms of the program.

Certainly I agree with the Applicants, that the Commission's talk about further rules and the need for further rules shows that the drug problem, and drug issue -- which is a problem and it is an issue -- generically -- is not of itself under Appendix B.

(Discussion off the record.)

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Mr. Sinkin, I guess it's your turn.

MR. SINKIN: Thank you.

First of all, Mr. Chairman, I think that the argument made by Applicants that the quality assurance program is designed to examine the work done and to catch any work done by people in a condition where they have not done the work properly, but is not designed to control the behavior of the people doing the work, is simply unreasonable.

We know in cases such as Midland, where 27 workers were found to be using drugs, the enforcement response by the NRC regional officer, Mr. Keppler, regional director, was to order 100 percent reinspection of all the work done by anyone who had sold or used drugs.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: That wasn't the Midland I was referring to in my question, by the way. I was referring

to a very early decision.

MR. SINKIN: But I think Region 4 has taken a different approach to drug use, and not required this kind of major reinspection, to our knowledge. But the idea that you don't control drug use under Appendix B, but if you find someone has been using drugs then you go back and reinspect everything you inspected under Appendix B, I think is a clear indication that the drug use itself is an Appendix B problem.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Was that taken under Appendix B or some other authority?

MR. SINKIN: I can't tell you. I don't know.

More specifically, however, I think that rather than in addition to the introductory sections you called to the attention of the Applicants, that a reading of criteria 2, as to what constitutes a quality assurance program -- clearly drug use by people doing safety-related work would fall under the type of activity that should be detected by such a program.

For example, last line on -- well, I don't know if we have the same version -- in that first paragraph it states: "The quality assurance program shall provide control over activities affecting the quality of the identified structures, systems and components to an extent consistent with their importance to safety."

Well, obviously one activity affecting the quality of the structures, systems and components is the condition of the people performing the work producing the structures, systems, and components. "Activities affecting quality shall be accomplished under suitably controlled conditions." We don't consider that people under the influence of controlled substances are what this phrase means by "suitably controlled conditions," that instead, it means they should not be under the influence of controlled substances.

Those are matters that a quality assurance program, in general, must address.

We do think the introductory section has meaning apart from the 18 criteria, and that it is designed to be flexible, that the fact that there were not previously specific instructions about control of drugs results from the fact that previously, up until three or four years ago, it was not recognized as a serious problem on nuclear power plant projects. It has become a serious problem. We would direct the Board's attention to Business Week magazine, October 1985, where they focus on the fact that drug abuse at nuclear power plants has become a major problem.

The NRC has declined to adopt a program to address that on more than one occasion, leaving it up to the industry to address it. But the problem has surfaced

and has become a problem at nuclear power plants, and we would argue falls under Appendix B and Appendix B should be read broad enough to include new problems for which regulations had not previously been written.

As far as Issue F, and what it contains or does not contain, at the time we were discussing Issue F in 1981, the Applicants didn't have a quality assurance program for operations. They were in the process of -- excuse me -- they had a quality assurance program for operations. They didn't have a fully staffed program for operations. So we were looking at the fact that there was a program that we would be able to evaluate, perhaps. Mr. Reis says we were looking at the foursquare program. We weren't just looking at the program, we were looking at personnel as something that would need to be examined. And in 1981, that wasn't developed well enough for us to look at, so we deferred consideration of that until a later time.

Now we have the personnel. What we are arguing in our -- regarding the drug use -- is that we not only have, now, the program and the personnel, we have evidence on the actual implementation of that program and how personnel in the operations group will be treated when found to be in conditions that are not -- that are not suitable for the safety-related work that they were required to perform.

The fact that it is happening in the construction phase doesn't mean that it's not relevant to an operations contention. The whole thrust of a licensing proceeding is that it is predictive and that has been stated on more than one occasion and in this proceeding it has been stated.

What we are saying is you now have a basis for predicting how well the quality assurance program for operations is going to work by how the operations personnel have been treated during this drug investigation and its resulting dismissals or nondismissals of personnel.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Mr. Sinkin --

MR. SINKIN: Yes?

propose to litigate, does it include solely the managerial treatment of people who are -- who have been found to use drugs? There was one statement in one of the papers you filed that indicated that you thought the Applicants had not been forthcoming with the NRC regional people. Is that still part of your claim? Or is it solely limited to the managerial problem?

MR. SINKIN: Let me restate it. There's two parts.

The essence of the allegation is that operations group personnel implicated in the use and/or sale of

illegal drugs were protected by management. They were protected in that people were fired who were found to be using or selling drugs, but other people in similar condition were not fired because they would implicate the operations people, and this effort was made to protect the operations group from exposure. There was use and sale of drugs within the operations group.

The exposure, that we understand would be -- the concern would be that the NRC would be very upset if they found out the operations group was involved in the sale or use of illegal drugs and that some enforcement action would undoubtedly follow.

The thing that captured our attention, obviously, when we got this allegation, was that there was a pending contention before the Licensing Board about whether the quality assurance program for operations of the Applicants would be adequately implemented and, in our view, this would -- this, as a pending matter before -- the one pending issue before the Licensing Board was the operations of the plant. And here was the operations group, right in the middle of what appeared to be a special treatment of a problem that had been discovered in their group, and that it would relate to the licensing hearings, too, and we expressed that directly to the NRC investigative office when we called with the allegation that this had numerous

not only because there was apparent drug use in the operations group, but also because there was apparently an effort by management to cover it up that would affect about both the NRC's licensing arm and this Board's inquiries. That's how we presented the allegation originally to the office of investigations.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Does your allegation, then, as to keeping the NRC informed, was that as to the preferential treatment or was that as to drug use itself?

MR. SINKIN: Well, the allegation is not that they didn't tell the NRC they gave preferential treatment to the operations group. They didn't tell the NRC that. And that could be part of it. The essence of the allegation was that they took steps to prevent the NRC from learning that the operations group was involved in the sale and/or use of illegal drugs.

What you are suggesting in your question was there was a second thing they didn't tell the NRC, and that is they were going to take those steps. I mean if they took the steps, that's the issue.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Are you claiming that NRC wasn't told anything, that there was anyone involved with drugs on the site?

MR. SINKIN: Oh, no. The firings were in the

1	newspaper of the security guard group; some of them, at
2	least.
3	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: I see. Okay.
4	MR. SINKIN: The fact of the investigation, the
5	fact that there were firings, were not hidden facts. What
6	we are talking about is the allegation that the actual
7	firing process was conducted in a discriminatory way.
8	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Okay. Go on.
9	MR. SINKIN: As far as Issue F, that's the
10	essence of our response.
11	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Let's hear some responses, if
12	you have any.
13	MR. GUTTERMAN: Can I have just a minute,
14	Mr. Chairman?
15	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Sure.
16	(Discussion off the record.)
17	MR. GUTTERMAN: I can go ahead now.
18	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Fine.
19	MR. GUTTERMAN: The first point I wanted to make
20	is while counsel for CCANP read to us from criterion 2,
21	CCANP's answers to Applicant's eighth set of
22	interrogatories clearly say that CCANP is not contending
23	that Applicant's QA program, in the sense of a written
24	program for plant operations, in any way fails to satisfy
25	NRC requirements. So I don't understand CCANP is

contending	in any	y way that	there's a	n alleged	deficiency	of
some sort	in the	Applicant	's quality	assurance	program.	

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: I read them as saying there's a deficiency in how it's going to be implemented.

MR. GUTTERMAN: Yes, Mr. Chairman. I just wanted to be sure that distinction was clear. The program that is on file, that CCANP has conceded meets Appendix B, does not mention anything about drug control.

Also I would just respond to the last comment about some allegation about concealing something from the NRC which --

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: I saw that in some of the documentation.

MR. GUTTERMAN: In CCANP's?

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Yes.

MR. GUTTERMAN: I agree it was there.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: I can't remember which one

but --

MR. GUTTERMAN: There's no basis for it at all.

I just wanted to point out that in CCANP's descriptions of how it came to be making these allegations, it refers to an anonymous phone call, but it does not represent in any of its written documents that whoever made this anonymous phone call to CCANP alleged anything about hiding information from the NRC. This is totally a speculation

that CCANP has come up with based on the allegations it received in this anonymous phone call.

If one goes back and looks at the issues as the Board adopted them at its December 2, 1980 order, the conclusion that the issue of judging an Applicant's character and competence to be granted operating licenses was intended to be encompassed within issues A and B is just simply inescapable.

Looking at the context of the six issues written together, one cannot possibly, I don't think, conceive that the Board had in mind that when we got down to considering Issue F, that every fact which would be considered under issues A and B would then be considered anew under Issue F.

Clearly what was contemplated was that the Board would be able to judge Applicant's character and competence to be granted operating licenses based on the evidence it would hear under Issues A and B. And in fact, the Board issued a partial initial decision in March of 1984 in which the Board concluded that the Applicants had the necessary character and competence to be granted operating licenses, reserving only on the question of how the handling of the Quadrex report reflected on the Applicant's character. And also asking for an update about Issue C. But we'll discuss that in a few minutes.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: There were some B questions

left open, but they were competence questions.

MR. GUTTERMAN: As to character, the only question that was left open was clearly the handling of the Quadrex report. The Board clearly did not have in mind at that point that, having reserved on Issue F, it had reserved some question about Applicant's character for implementing the quality assurance program for operations.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Would these allegations have been even entertainable under Issues A or B? I'm not sure they would have been.

MR. GUTTERMAN: If one puts aside the question of timing --

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Putting that aside. Assuming there was some event, some uncovering of drug use, the preferential treatment would have been difficult because you didn't have identified too many operations personnel.

But --

MR. GUTTERMAN: I realize CCANP has said that, but if you look back at the phase I testimony, you'll see there was a considerable operational staff even then. I can't really speculate too much, really, what the Board would have done had this been sought to have been raised back then. I would point out, on the eve of the start of the phase I hearing, there was an NRC inspection of an electrical termination shack on the site, and there were

issued raised at the hearing about the handling of that inspection, about what the inspectors found, whether the fact that the inspection had been disclosed to the -- the fact of the imminence of the inspection had been disclosed to people in the termination shack.

Also, it's a matter that occurred long after the adoption of the December 2, 1980 order, facts which cannot go directly to anything that was raised and anything explicitly set out in Issue A. In fact, the work that was involved that we heard testimony about wasn't even safety-related work. Clearly it was not something under the quality assurance program, something specifically contemplated when the Board wrote it's December 2, 1980 order.

Facts of this sort did come up under Issue A.

But Issue A has been decided and the record was closed on that.

The only other point I wanted to make was that in listening to all of the statements of CCANP's counsel, looking at all the pleadings that CCANP has filed, no place is there a single citation of any requirement, any specific requirement in Appendix B, on Applicant's quality assurance program for plant operations, that is alleged to have been violated. There's just nothing there.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: What do you think about the

argument	about	criterion	41	wnich	Mr.	Sinkin	just	mentioned	
	22.50	CT 5 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2				***	and the second second		

MR. GUTTERMAN: As I said, Mr. Chairman, CCANP
has itself conceded that Applicant's quality assurance
program for plant operations complies with Appendix B. And
there is nothing in there, nothing in the quality assurance
program of Applicants that is alleged to have been violated.
So there is no violation of criterion 2 that has been
explicitly alleged. All we have is some pointing out that
there is some general language in Appendix B that says that
we should take care to assure there's good quality in a
nuclear plant. Nobody is contesting that. The question is:
Is there a requirement for some specific characteristic of
a quality assurance program that we are alleged to not be
meeting? I haven't heard that at all.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: If we read "program" to include implementation, consider his comments. Because I'm not positive -- I haven't decided yet whether implementation was excluded. I'm not sure that it was.

Assume that it is included for the moment.

Would it then -- would theme allegations fall under criterion 2?

MR. GUTTERMAN: I don't think so, Mr. Chairman.

There's just no allegation that I have heard that alleges
any violation of the quality assurance program requirements
or any allegation that the quality assurance does indeed

violate Appendix B. If we violate 2, then the quality assurance program either fails to address something that should have been addressed or there was a violation of the quality assurance program. I haven't heard any allegation of either of those.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: The allegation, I guess, is that the program will not be implemented in accordance with criterion 2. That doesn't mean that the paper program doesn't meet the Appendix B, but the allegation, as I understand it, is the way it is going to be implemented will not comply with criterion 2. That is what I heard from Mr. Sinkin just now. And that's a little bit different.

MR. GUTTERMAN: I agree with the chairman, it is different. And what you just heard is what I heard, too.

It's the allegation about the Applicant's character, whether they will comply with the quality assurance program. It's not an allegation about the quality assurance program itself. And my thesis is that the Board judged the Applicant's character and whether it could be reasonably expected to comply with the applicable NRC requirements, including the requirements of Appendix B, in reaching the judgment on Issues A and B.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: If we should disagree with you and determine that implementation was or is included in

Issue F, is that, the allegation we have just heard or assertion we have just heard, a violation or potential violation of criterion 2?

MR. GUTTERMAN: There's a big "if" there,
Mr. Chairman. I don't believe that what I have heard
alleges a violation of criterion 2, no matter how you look
at it, how you parse it, how you turn it upside down or
whatever. There's just nothing there that says that
there's a violation of criterion 2. And the reason for
that is simple. Criterion 2 requires a written program.
And it describes some of the characteristics for the
written program. For there to be a violation of criterion
2, one of two things has to happen. Either you have a
written program that is inadequate because it doesn't meet
criterion 2 or you didn't satisfy your written program.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Isn't that what is being

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Isn't that what is being alleged?

MR. GUTTERMAN: No, Mr. Chairman. That's my point.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: That it won't be. The evidence now shows it won't be. That's what I am hearing.

MR. GUTTERMAN: To the only extent that is alleged, it's not pointing at any requirement of the quality assurance program and saying that in particular is not going to be followed. It's making a general allegation

1

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

that these Applicants lack the character to comply with the applicable requirements. And that, Mr. Chairman, is exactly what the Board considered in deciding on Issues A and B.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: I asked you to assume that we could include implementation in Issue F.

MR. GUTTERMAN: Mr. Chairman, what is being alleged here is not some specific intent to evade some quality assurance requirement. All I hear alleged is a general allegation that the Applicants lack the character and competence, or lack the character to carry out the requirements applicable to the operation of the plant. particular, he says, "the applicable requirements under Appendix B," but there is no attempt to separate out Appendix B, and say it is Appendix B in particular they won't comply with. In fact, there's no allegation there that in the actions he says are indicative of character propensity not to comply, that there was any violation of Appendix B there. There is no allegation that these events are related to hiring or firing of people for drug use, or drug abuse had anything to do with Appendix B or a violation of Appendix B. Appendix B just simply doesn't enter into it at all and the attempt to connect this anonymous phone call with Issue F is strained, extremely strained.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Does Appendix B contemplate that where particular circumstances are shown, the QA program of one Applicant might have to differ somewhat from the standardized QA program that is spelled out in various guidance documents?

MR. GUTTERMAN: Mr. Chairman, that question is so general that it's hard to say no to it.

quality assurance program that is adequate for the circumstances of that plant. So, certainly I would expect there would be differences from one to another. There are different organizations involved in one plant or another; there are different sites involved. There might be the possibility of flooding at one site that doesn't exist at another, so that the quality assurance program of one site might have specific requirements to address that wouldn't exist at another. Certainly there are differences.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: What about if drug use were shown to exist in one site but is not necessarily assumed to exist generically? What about that?

MR. GUT TERMAN: Well, Mr. Chairman, I guess I have two things to say to that. First of all, there's certainly no basis for saying there's some special problem in Texas that doesn't exist nationally. In fact, Mr. Sinkin just cited to us a national journal that talks about

drug use in the country. But aside from that, the kind of problem you are talking about here, drug use, is something that is not addressed by Appendix B.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: That's what we are trying to decide.

MR. GUTTERMAN: In trying to decide that, I don't think it's helpful to start off with the hypothesis that there is a requirement to address drug use. Appendix B doesn't talk about that. It is hard for me to start off with a hypothesis that you have a drug use problem that is found to be of quality concern and then say I don't have to address it.

My point is, Mr. Chairman, the way Appendix B is structured attempts to assure quality through a certain series of ways of looking at the question of quality. It does not attempt to get at it through control of drug use. There are requirements for training and for planning the work, for writing written procedures, for writing engineering specifications and drawings, and it has requirements for checking for imposition of engineering requirements on people you procure things from and for inspecting, for auditing. But it does not say anything about control of drug use or control of numerous other things that affect the performance of people in their work.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Mr. Reis or Sinkin, do you

have any further comments? I think after we get done with this Issue F, we'll probably want to break for lunch and then come back and talk about the rulemaking later, even though it affects Issue F as well as the other issues.

MR. REIS: Mr. Chairman, when I look at the gravamen of what is alleged with this drug problem, we are talking about character, plain and simple character, and character was what was litigated already in this proceeding. It was not to be included in Issue F.

Whether we talk about it in terms of implementation or reliability for implementation or how we parse or mix up the words, character is something that has passed by in this proceeding.

If we are moving to reopen, that's one thing.

If we are moving for new contentions, that's another thing.

But it is not -- it is what we have already passed. The whole focus of this matter is on character.

When we talk about implementation and we get bound up on whether there be implementation and whether the Midland decision talked about implementation, in the context of this proceeding, any of that stuff should have come in before when we were discussing character. And this is an attempt to enter by the back door and bring in by the back door what was shoved out the front door in going to character again. And it is character.

If you look at the matters, he talks about preferential treatment and so forth -- that is character.

And that is what was heard before, not what is to be heard now.

If we have some motions to reopen, if we have some motions for new contentions, that's something else again. We will face those at that time. But whether it is what is talked about in Issue F, no. The whole thought it the proceeding in the past was to deal with character and that is the gravamen of this complaint. It says "lacks the character to properly implement such program."

Well, the program is there and that's what the issue itself talks about, the program. And it is admitted the program is there. But the character part is what we litigated already. And it is quite clear.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: If we were to determine otherwise, do you believe that drug use is properly considered under criterion 2? Implementation -- under the implementation?

MR. REIS: The Commission in the past has not required that the drug -- that a drug program, to my knowledge, be under criterion 2.

As far as implementation of it, if it affects the work, I don't think so. I don't think the Commission has looked at it that way, though I am not positive. As

far as I know, criterion 2 has not involved implementation
of the drug program and we are not talking here of general
implementation of a drug program. We are talking about
character to implement a drug program and character is wha
we were talking about before, and is not involved in this
issue.

Let me say further, that I am upset that we are spending this much time and this depth of discussion on anonymous telephone calls that say -- and I think they say, and I don't know what the anonymous telephone calls really said and I don't know if the one who dialed the number and mailed the call had direct knowledge, or whether he heard it from somebody who heard it in a bar somewhere --

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: That comes later in the day.

MR. REIS: Okay, it comes -- no. I think that's the primary question and is the question that comes first.

What are we dealing with here? Are we dealing with scuttlebutt and gutter talk or are we dealing with real things?

As far as I can tell, there is nothing here to say that we are dealing with something real at all.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: We are going to get to this, but we think we have to discuss this under --

MR. REIS: The only thing, when I look at number 5 in the answer to the interrogatories, which is really the

heart of what perhaps we get to in Issue F, there's nothing wrong with personnel being terminated. There's nothing wrong that they turned up things. It's only that there may have been a discriminatory termination of people in some group rather than another group, and we haven't even gotten to hear whether one group could have been treated different than another group, because was one group doing real work? Was one group employed by a different employer who might have had regulations that prohibited use of drugs off the job and another group didn't yet, but will put them, in effect, beforehand? We don't know.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Isn't that the merits, though? MR. REIS: We don't know anything.

MR. REIS: It goes to the basis of the contention. And we are talking about dragging in something very late. And we have to have some basis. And when we talk about late-filed contentions, certainly the Commission and the Appeal Boards have emphasized again and again that you certainly have to spell out the basis of your evidence. You don't necessarily need basis to put a contention in earlier.

But when you are bringing in something at the end of a proceeding or mid-proceeding, you certainly have to show your basis of your evidence, and that isn't shown

here.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Well, that we are going to get to after lunch, actually; whether it is or isn't. But until we know where it falls, I'm not sure -- we don't know what sort of basis has to be shown. If it falls under an existing contention, you may need a little less than if you view it as a new contention.

MR. REIS: Well, I --

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: I guess that's the order we were discussing things in. Although they all sort of overlap.

MR. REIS: Certainly I think it has been made clear that contentions should not be strained to expand things and bring things into contentions that may already exist in a proceeding.

But let me go back to my original point and just conclude with that.

Certainly what we tried before was character.

What was talked about here is character. And certainly every -- at least for the Staff, we thought the character issues were completed in this proceeding.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Mr. Sinkin? I guess you can respond.

MR. SINKIN: It seems that what the Applicants are arguing -- it's, if you look at their quality assurance

program, that it would not be a violation of their quality assurance program to treat in a discriminatory manner the operations group, if the operations group were found to be engaged in the sale and/or use of illegal drugs that there's nothing in their quality assurance program that would prevent that. Perhaps, then, we have taken an incorrect position that their quality assurance program is adequate. We assumed that their quality assurance program commits them to the implementation of Appendix B, that it does fall under criteria 2. It also falls under criteria 16 -- "prompt correction of conditions adverse to quality" -- that anything that did not meet the requirements of quality at this project would be a violation of their quality assurance program and that they would treat it as such.

If it is their position that these kind of matters are not matters they will treat as falling within their quality assurance program, then perhaps their quality assurance program is deficient.

We think, in actual fact, that their quality assurance program commits them to implement Appendix B, that the violation we are pointing to in this incident is a violation of Appendix B, and that it is all an unnecessary debate around a point that should be moot.

Also, the Applicants want to characterize

Appendix B has somenow set in concrete, when it was written
as to what it would cover. Appendix B is very much a
policy document. It very much says to the Applicants: You
will control all conditions which might affect quality. We
are not giving you a list of every condition that might
affect quality and saying these are every ones that might
control. We are saying, as a matter of policy you are
committing to affect all conditions that might affect
quality and we contend that the use and sale, even, of
illegal drugs by personnel at this project involved in
quality-related activity is something that must be
controlled by their commitment to be a licensee of the NRC.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: You are saying, then, in a situation where there is some indication -- assume for a moment that there is some indication of drug use, that in those situations an Applicant or licensee must include in its QA program provisions for dealing with that, on an ad hoc basis, for when those situations are shown to exist.

MR. SINKIN: Well, I would think that that might be saying that the Applicants have to be too specific. In a sense you have to say, if it's recognized as a condition adverse to quality, the quality assurance program has to deal with it.

I don't think the Applicants would debate -- maybe they would, but I don't think they would debate that

having the operations group involved in the use of illegal drugs is not a condition adverse to quality, and that they would want our quality assurance program to address that condition and address it. It might be useful if they had specifically in their quality assurance program something about the use or sale of illegal drugs.

See, again, too, we are dealing with criminal activity. I don't think the quality assurance program has to go through and specify statute by statute which criminal activities will not be permitted by people engaged in quality work. I think they say people engaged in quality work will not engage in criminal activities. Period.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Is that part of the QA program, or perhaps another obligation of an Applicant, taken care of under some other rule or regulation?

MR. SINKIN: Well, our contention is, under criteria 2 and criteria 16, these are conditions adverse to quality that should be controlled. If there are other obligations that the Applicants are under as well as those, then those are violated, but we were aiming specifically at the quality assurance issue.

The only other point I wanted to make is that perhaps we would have been better if in answer to interrogatory 4 we would have simply said: Yes.

"Are there any other facts or reasons we contend

1	support a claim that HL&P QA program will not meet
2	requirements?" We could have answered that yes. Question
3	5 indicates if the answer to 4 is yes, then we specify wha
4	the allegation is as to why they will not meet the
5	requirements of Appendix B.
6	The argument made by Mr. Reis is essentially
7	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: So your answer 4 was purely
8	limited to the program as it appears on paper?
9	MR. SINKIN: Answer 4 is not limited to the
0	paper program. It talks about the implementation of the
1	program.
2	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Wait a minute. I may not
3	have the right numbers here.
4	MR. SINKIN: It says, "to properly implement
5	said program." Answer 4.
6	You are referring back to the earlier answer
7	where answer 1 is limited to the paper program.
8	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Yes. I'm sorry.
9	MR. SINKIN: Yes. Answer 1 is limited to the
0	paper program; the program itself as written, we did not
1	perceive as being in violation of Appendix B.
2	What we are talking about is how they are going
3	to implement the program and I think the chair has clearly

called that out as the crux of the issue. If you include

implementation and that the Board must have a reasonable

24

25

assurance that the QA program will be implemented, that's got to be part of Issue F, and it doesn't matter if they have a paper program if they don't implement it. That was a ruling a long time ago in the NRC case law.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: But if we go the other way, the way the original parties suggested, saying Issue F only includes paper programs, you don't find any problem with that, then?

MR. SINKIN: After hearing the argument today, we may have a problem with that. If the Applicant's argument is really, in fact, that their quality assurance program for operations would not affect in any way the event that we have described and would not apply to that event, then we may have a problem with their program. We assumed that their program would cover such an event and this was a violation that had been covered up.

We did want to make one final point in response to Mr. Reis' argument. If you take Mr. Reis' argument on its face, he's saying that you can only hear implementation problems if they don't rise to a character level under Issue F.

Well, I think that turns the world on its head a little bit, because obviously if they rise to a character level, they are even more serious than if they didn't.

Issue F does not set out specifically the issue

of character. It doesn't have the word "character" in it.

It's a statutory requirement, first of all. It's in the

Atomic Energy Act. It must always be there.

regarding the treatment of the operations group call into question the character of the Applicants, the Board cannot evade that issue and not look at it simply because it doesn't arise under Issue F. I think the Board would have an obligation to look at it anyway. But it is not essential for the development of the discovery that we are asking for, that the Board view this issue as a character issue solely. We think it is a violation of Appendix B, we think it is a quality issue, that it's a safety relayed issue and it needs to be heard in this proceeding under Issue F. And if you want to reserve the matter of whether it rises to the level of character or not to some later point in the proceeding, that's fine. We can do that and still go forward with the issue under Issue F.

We think it goes hand in glove, and that in a sense Mr. Reis is correct.

If you look at the allegation and assume for a moment it can be proven, then you have character problems that you just can't avoid.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: But right now you are calling it mostly likelihood of improper implementation?

1	MR. SINKIN: Improper implementation of the
2	quality assurance program, likely that's the deficiency.
3	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: I guess we ought to break for
4	lunch. Does anyone else have any further comments on this
5	particular matter? We'll come back to the rulemaking later
6	If not, why don't we break until about 2:00.
7	(Whereupon, at 12:45 p.m., the conference was
8	recessed, to reconvene at 2:00 p.m., this same day.)
9	
10	
11	
12	
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	

AFTERNOON SESSION

(2:00 p.m.)

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Back on the record. We would like to get, next, to the rulemaking point that the Applicant raised. I have distributed a couple of decisions which might have an impact on that.

My question is, first, in the rulemaking that is referred to, was there any indication from the Commission that adjudication -- there should be no adjudication of drug issues pending that rulemaking? Did they say anything to that effect?

MR. GUTTERMAN: Mr. Chairman, as I recall it, no, there was no discussion of whether the subjects could be considered in adjudication or not. Although I would argue that the implication of the proposal for rulemaking is that there is no NRC requirement applicable to drug control. So the implication of that negative — that negative implication would go to adjudication, too, since there are no NRC standards applicable that an adjudicatory board would get compliance with.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Would not, just in terms of generally authorizing operation, would not there have been an opportunity, if an issue were raised, or would there not be an opportunity to raise an issue, whether a reasonable assurance finding could be made in view of alleged or proven drug use of personnel involved in the project?

Could that not be raised as an issue?

MR. GUTTERMAN: Perhaps the best way to answer your question, just to make sure there's a common understanding of what it is we are contending in our motion for protective order, there were really two parts to our argument.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: You have reiterated it in your motion for summary disposition but I don't view any real difference. Maybe there is, but I haven't perceived any.

MR. GUTTERMAN: We certainly didn't intend any difference. There were two parts to the argument that were made in both places.

The first part is, looking to the fact that the Commission is conducting rulemakings, as an indication of the Commission's interpretation of its existing rules, the fact that the Commission feels the necessity for conducting a rulemaking on fitness for duty and for including control of access — including in the proposed rules for access authorization a specific requirement about drug users, the fact that the Commission has proposed both of those implies very strongly, indicates, that the Commission does not consider that its existing rules establish such standards. And certainly that would indicate that there is no such standard, in the Commission's view, in Appendix B.

26292.0

BRT

And, secondly, to the extent that CCANP is seeking to litigate the need for drug control program or terms that should be included in Applicant's current programs for controlling drug use on the site, the fact that the Commission has a rulemaking under way, in my view, suggests very strongly, and under the Douglas Point line of cases, indicates that a Licensing Board should not itself undertake to judge whether the Applicants for a license should have such a program. The Commission's regulations do not currently require such a program and the Commission, in fact, in this case, is considering on the one hand, whether it should adopt a rule; and on the other hand, whether it should perhaps deliberately stay its hand and not adopt the rule because it may be wiser to leave this matter to the industry as a matter of self-regulation.

In fact, the industry has a set of guidelines established by the Edison Electric Institute which are currently being implemented by HL&P and other utilities around the country, and the Commission is actively considering whether it ought just leave matters that way and allow the industry to develop its own set of standards.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Assuming that were the case, would you claim that a Licensing Board could not litigate, as part of its -- assuming all the contention requirements were met -- are you saying that we couldn't litigate

whether a program that involved discriminatory treatment or alleged discriminatory treatment to different groups of personnel was adequate? Does that mean we have to accept any program that industry comes up with, without inquiring into it? As part of our general reasonable assurance requirements which the Commission makes, but if we have a contention we have to make?

MR. GUTTERMAN: You sort of mixed a couple of different questions there. Let me see if I can at least explain how I sorted them out.

As far as the question whether a particular program as a program is adequate, yes, I think the fact that the Commission is conducting a generic rulemaking on whether there ought to be program, a requirement for such a program and, if so, what the requirements for such a program should be — the fact that the Commission has that under consideration, yes, that excludes licensing boards from considering the same issue. The Commission is dealing with that on a generic basis and is not leaving it for licensing boards to determine on a case-by-case basis.

Now, you asked the separate question about well, how about discriminatory application of that program? Well, I would first say --

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: That is what has been alleged.

MR. GUTTERMAN: I understand there's something

like that alleged, although I really have trouble understanding what the allegation is.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: We'll get to that later. But assuming that's alleged --

MR. GUTTERMAN: First of all, for a Licensing

Board to question -- to entertain a question about whether

a program is being properly implemented requires a

Licensing Board first to have in view some standard against

which to judge that program. That standard doesn't exist

now.

Of course, I keep hearing this word
"discriminatory," and that's a term one usually hears in an
EEO context. It's not something that comes up --

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: "Preferential," I guess, has been used. That might be proper.

"preferential" really cures it. The real question I would think a licensing board would consider is whether there are people being permitted to work on safety-related activities who, because of some rule the Commission has adopted, ought not be permitted to do that work. I don't think the rule exists. I don't think the allegation -- I'm sure it will be instantly amended to allege this, but so far as I've heard it to this point, there has been no allegation that there is anybody doing any work that they are not qualified

to do or that people have been doing work that they were not capable of doing because of something they had ingested in one way or another.

TUDGE BECHHOEFER: Are you saying, for instance, that if we had allegations that -- at an operating plant the people in control in the control room routinely used drugs and the Applicant wasn't aware -- licensee wasn't doing anything about it at all; they could care less because there was no specific prohibition -- are you saying that a licensing board that had that issue would have to ignore it? This is a specific allegation for a specific plant, for instance.

Could a licensing board make a reasonable assurance finding if they assumed that were proved?

MR. GUTTERMAN: There's a grand leap from the kinds of things that have been alleged to that, and I'm not sure I can answer that question with the crispness I'd like to because deep down inside I'm sure there is some way the NRC will come up with a basis for keeping the situation you postulate from occurring.

The NRC has not done that with Appendix B. And the proposed rulemakings that the Commission has under consideration are two ways in which the Commission is considering addressing that problem.

You recognize the Commission hasn't adopted a

rule that prohibits people from drinking alcohol on the job either. Every licensee controls that. I'm sure every licensee, as I know HL&P does, has a rule that prohibits people from being under the influence of alcohol on the job, or on company property. But I don't know of any Commission regulation that seeks to control that, and certainly there's nothing in Appendix B that mentions that.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Are you saying that if an intervenor in a case found that people were routinely overindulging in alcohol and were on the job, in that situation, they couldn't raise a contention about it?

MR. GUTTERMAN: I think what you really are postulating is somebody contending that people are not capable of doing their jobs. Whatever the reason. And, yes, a licensing board can undertake that kind of inquiry in a proper case.

I don't think we have an allegation like that here. I'm sure we'll hear one shortly.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Should we not read the -- I'm just taking it from the response to your discovery, actually, aren't they saying that management personnel are allowing certain people to use drugs? To remain on the job?

MR. GUTTERMAN: I should point out one thing that's not in the allegation so far. That is, there's no allegation that people have been under the influence of

drugs on the job or have taken drugs while they were on the job. There is no allegation of that at all.

I suspect there's no allegation of that because there would be no basis for such allegation, although that hasn't alway; stopped allegations in the past.

There's a leap here that is going on between the allegation that people have used drugs and the assumption that it affects their work performance. And there is no basis for making that leap that I know of.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: But in talking about the rulemaking, though, to get back to that, are you saying that we, even if there were such an allegation, we couldn't consider it?

MR. GUTTERMAN: What I'm saying is for the Board to consider any allegation there has to be a standard that they are testing the licensee's performance against. The whole basis for having the hearing is to determine whether this Applicant meets the Commission's requirements. There is no Commission requirement specifically directed to control of drug use at this point.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: So you are saying if we had an allegation of extensive drug use, and assuming there is some basis to it, that we couldn't even look at it, determining whether the plant should be licensed for operation? Assuming a proper contention and all that.

MR. GUTTERMAN: If you'd just give me a second, Mr. Chairman?

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Okay.

MR. GUTTERMAN: If the contention was that people weren't doing their jobs properly, there was some misperformance; yes, a licensing board can and should undertake a proper contention of that sort, assuming it meets the other requirements for getting a contention into controversy. But a contention purely that people who use drugs are employed at this site -- no, there's no standard applicable there. If the Board determined that they did or didn't, there would be no basis for judging whether the utility had behaved properly.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: How about an allegation, which is very close to what we may or may not have, but that people, officials of the company are tolerating some individuals who are to be engaged in safety-related activities, using drugs? It may or may not be today, but people who are to be -- current management, who are the same people that will be controlling operational management, are tolerating drug use today. Can we use that as a predictive of what they will do?

MR. GUTTERMAN: I don't think changing the question that way really changes the answer, Mr. Chairman. The question still has to come back to: Is there an

allegation of failure to comply with the Commission's requirements; and whether it is action of management or of somebody lower down, the question still has to be: Is the allegation that they are not complying with the Commission's requirements? They are not going to comply with the Commission's requirements?

In a situation where there is no Commission requirement there is no issue. There may be some allegation of some other characteristic of their performance that somebody thinks is improper. If it doesn't go to Commission requirements, it is not a matter for an NRC Licensing Board to consider.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Is that true, even though the conduct may have a significant impact on safety? I'm not including everything. I'm assuming the particular conduct has to have some relationship to safety.

MR. GUTTERMAN: In my experience, the Commission regulations generally go to all aspects of protecting the safety of the public from the hazards of nuclear power. So, it is hard for me to postulate a circumstance where there is no Commission regulation.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Well, talk about drug use. Let's talk about that because that's what we have.

MR. GUTTERMAN: Talk about drug use. That's the best example and keeps us from being too hypothetical about

it, and that's the example right there.

The Commission requirements that are applicable to employee performance do exist. The requirements in Appendix B for training and qualification, for checking people, people's performance, for auditing their performance. Those are the existing Commission requirements.

There is no requirement specifically directed to drug use. I mentioned this morning there are a lot of other things the Commission's regulations do not specifically address. They do not address alcohol consumption. They do not address the health of individuals. You know, somebody's mental health can affect their performance. Or their physical health; somebody can have a brain tumor; there are a lot of things that can happen to an individual that affect their performance. And the way in which those kinds of things are addressed by management of a particular utility vary from case to case. The Commission hasn't addressed specifically how a particular utility should deal with it.

Some -- one utility might have very detailed physical examinations and another utility might rely more heavily on observation by supervisors. The way the Commission gets at that is to require that there be the checking and auditing functions of Appendix B.

It is when the employee doesn't perform their job properly that the Commission's regulations step in and draw the line. To prevent that from happening, various utilities undertake different kinds of programs.

In the case of drugs, the Applicants in this case have a very stringent program for preventing -- there has been a long-term program for preventing anybody being under the influence of drugs, possessing drugs, using drugs, selling drugs on the site.

More recently they have gone to the extent of prohibiting anybody whoever uses drugs from being involved on the project.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: My question did not assume whether the program was good, bad, or indifferent. What if there were no program at all and you had extensive allegations of drug use, could an intervenor not raise the question then?

MR. GUTTERMAN: That's right. Because the Commission doesn't require such a program. There is no requirement for such a program and an allegation of that sort does not allege a violation of any Commission requirement.

JUDGE SHON: Mr. Gutterman, I would like to take another look at the notion that the rulemaking on the part of the Commission is a bar to us examining any aspect of

R

the quality of the program in a particular plant from the following standpoint: If the Commission has already started such a rulemaking and then has suspended that rulemaking, as it has here, for the specific purpose of finding out what develops, is it not even more important then for individual programs and programs devised by the industry itself to be scrutinized in just such tribunals as this to see what is developing and whether it is satisfactory, measured against the standard of adequate protection of the health and safety of the public? That is one of the things the Commission is going to find out. How often does this matter come up and how often is it decided against an Applicant, or in favor?

If they are waiting to find out what happens.

MR. GUTTERMAN: Judge Shon, I agree with you to a limited extent. I agree that, if the Commission steps back to see what happens, it has to have some mechanism for finding out what happens. That is certainly clear. But I don't agree that that mechanism is in an adjudicatory board, because the role of an adjudicatory board is to test compliance with existing requirements.

The way in which the Commission determines the success or failure of its stepping back and seeing how the industry goes about addressing the problems of fitness for duty and those related problems is through its inspection

arm. It inspects the performance of every licensee and it gets feedback in that way to see how the licensees are performing.

It cannot use an adjudicatory board to do that because the premise of every adjudication is measuring performance against a legal standard. There is no legal standard to be measured against here. I think the situation you are positing is more of a legislative inquiry, a legislative board rather than an adjudication. It's in a legislative hearing that a board inquires into something and makes a factual inquiry. An adjudication measures against a legal standard.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: I was going to ask him if I&E also didn't have to measure against -- I don't know that that was added to yours --

JUDGE SHON: I was going to ask him -
JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Okay. You ask him that.

JUDGE SHON: Does not the inspector function

also have to measure against a standard? They always seem

to, and they at least always give lip service to the notion
that they are doing exactly that.

And the second thing is, could not we investigate or could not we hear allegations that, perhaps, a developing industry standard was not being met?

Supposing an intervenor came in and said: Well, now the

industry has this standard that they are circulating for use and these people don't come anywhere near meeting that?

MR. GUTTERMAN: Let me address the last one

first, since it is closest in our mind.

I don't believe that's the case. I don't think a hearing board could conduct a hearing on compliance with an industry standard. If the hearing board could do that, that would be the hearing board standard and NRC standard.

Once the agency starts enforcing that standard, it is no longer a voluntary industry standard, it's an agency requirement. But I believe that's exactly what the Commission is not permitting to go on now, what the Commission has decided to refrain from doing.

As far as the inspection and enforcement arm, there is a limit as far as enforcement, that the agency's enforcement arm cannot take enforcement unless there's a violation of a Commission requirement. I don't believe it is the same limit as far as inspection.

The inspectors go out there and observe what is going on, and certainly there's a relationship when the Commission tries to judge whether the voluntary industry programs are being successful. Implicit in that is the underlying question of whether performance in each plant is meeting Commission requirements, and do exist.

What I am saying is, in the absence of a

requirement of the Commission that there be some
restriction about drug users, the Commission may find that
regardless of what utility programs there are, there is
compliance with the Commission's requirements on the
performance of employees, and may find that controlling
drugs is not necessary because in its experience,
performance on the job is adequately controlled through
other mechanisms such as the supervisors who watch and see
whether their employees are performing properly on the job.
Just as an example.

JUDGE SHON: If, indeed, simple compliance with existing standards and no examination of anything where an existing standard does not pertain is the rule and the law, why do we continually see required findings of the nature of: No undue hazard to public health and safety and in compliance with the Commission's regulations? If they are both exactly the same thing. I've seen it often enough.

MR. GUTTERMAN: Let me think about that for a second.

(Discussion off the record.)

JUDGE SHON: For example, in section 50.57(a), number 2 says: "The facility will operate in conformancy with the application as amended and the provisions of the Act and the rules and regulations of the Commission."

ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

And number 3 says: "There is reasonable

assurance, 1, that the activities authorized by the authorizing license can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public; and, 2, such activities will be conducted in compliance with the regulations of this chapter."

Now, if the regulations of this chapter are all that is required for health and safety, why did they put them in separately? These are things that are required for the issuance of an operating license. If they are all the same thing, it seems -- that seems an odd way to read that regulation.

What I'm suggesting is that it may be that we should listen to people who tell us that someone is not producing an adequate drug program, from one aspect or another, discriminatory or whatever it may be -- someone is not carrying out an adequate drug program which, although the Commission has no specific regulation concerning this, is a threat to the health and safety of the public, so that we could find that it is in conformity with the regulations but not that it didn't present any undue hazard to the health and safety of the public. And we have to find both separately, according to 50.57.

MR. GUTTERMAN: First of all, section 3

contrasts compliance with the regulations in this chapter -
I shouldn't say "contrasts" -- it talks about regulations

in this chapter. There are other chapters, too, I believe, that apply.

JUDGE SHON: Sure.

MR. GUTTERMAN: But aside from that, if you take the interpretation you are suggesting, Judge Shon, I think what you end up with is no restrictions at all on the Board's jurisdiction or authority. It's almost as if all the Board had to go on was the Atomic Energy Act itself, and that it can inquire into anything at all that was alleged to affect the health and safety of the public.

For example, appendix K, I guess it is, establishes certain requirements applicable to emergency core-cooling.

Under the interpretation that you are positing, any licensing board would be free to go ahead and consider whether more stringent standards ought to be imposed.

JUDGE SHON: Oh, no. I think there's a good deal -- case law and everything else, that says you can't necessarily require more stringent standards than a specific regulation requires. But where there is no regulation and there are no standards required -- I don't think that's the same at all.

MR. GUTTERMAN: Of course in the situation we have here, Judge Shon, what we have is the Commission specifically considering whether there ought to be such

standards. What I'm trying to argue to you is that here we have a case of the Commission specifically considering whether there ought to be a standard. And if the Board were to consider it in adjudication, whether this particular licensee has a program that's adequate, the Board would be allocating to itself the same consideration the Commission is now undertaking generically.

JUDGE SHON: Hardly. It's simply that where the Commission says maybe we should establish a standard, and then says: Oh, no, let's back off and see what happens; one of the things that might happen is that the adjudicatory process would function in the absence of the standard. And make just this kind of decision in the absence of a standard.

MR. GUTTERMAN: If that were the case, Judge Shon, what you would have is the NRC establishing its standards and requirements, case by case in a case law method. That is not the legal system, that is not the legal system that Congress has established and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has established for controlling the nuclear industry.

JUDGE SHON: I think we perhaps should not pursue this an awful lot further. I know an awful lot of things were established on a case-by-case standard before the Commission got around to making rules. I'm sure that

will happen in the future, too.

MR. GUTTERMAN: The only point I'm trying to make, Judge Shon, is that we have a case here where the Commission has specifically decided not to establish a rule, to defer establishing a rule for a time to see what the industry does. And if licensing boards were to step into the breach and start establishing rules, then the industry would not be establishing the rule; it would be the agency, through its licensing board arm, establishing the rules.

The Douglas Point line of cases that we cite in our motion for protective order is specifically addressed to just that point, and that whole line of cases is designed particularly to keep the rulemaking of the agency in the arm of the Commission, in the hands of the Commission and not delegate it to the adjudicatory boards.

JUDGE SHON: The portion of Rancho Seco that cited Douglas Point that you cited, that was my case.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: I was going to ask you, does anything in Rancho Seco support what you are arguing that it stands for? Rancho Seco, to me, was an attempt by an intervenor to litigate a question under the terms of the proposed rule, and I distinguish that in a couple of rulings I passed out in Midland, which I passed copies of to each of the parties. These are published decisions, particularly discussions in LBP82-118 -- I could call that

a learned point, but that would not be exactly appropriate.

I did have something to do with those decisions.

In that decision we were essentially backed by a Staff position which was saying, you could adjudicate even under -- when something was in rulemaking you could adjudicate whatever the old standards, existing standards were. Whatever those might be. Do you disagree with that?

MR. GUTTERMAN: No, Mr. Chairman. I think those

MR. GUTTERMAN: No, Mr. Chairman. I think those cases, the Midland decisions you were citing, really don't apply to the situations we have here.

In those cases what the Board was talking about was adjudicating compliance with an existing NRC requirement, either an interim rule or whatever. And what distinguishes it from the Rancho Seco case was there the rule was only proposed. It was not adopted for interim use.

In our case, there is no rule being used now.

The Commission is considering the adoption of a rule, and there is no rule actually in place against which the Applicant's performance can be measured.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Then we get back to -- isn't the current rule the ad hoc resolution of problems as they arise, in the absence of a general requirement for a program effort?

MR. GUTTERMAN: I don't believe so, Mr. Chairman.

I think there's a clear set of Commission requirements and

control of drug use is not one of them, and I don't believe
there is any authority for having an ad hoc establishment
of requirements. I think the Board's task is to measure
this licensee's performance against the established
requirements.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Mr. Gutterman, do you have anything further to state about the rulemaking? If not, we'll go on to Mr. Reis, I'd like to hear the Staff's position on rulemaking.

MR. GUTTERMAN: I'd be happy to hear the Staff's position, too.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: In the decision I passed around, we were essentially adopting the Staff position there.

MR. REIS: I don't know if you were adopting the Staff's position, but let me say that the Applicant's position is not the Staff's position.

From the point of view of whether the rulemakings that have gone forward and the hiatus in rulemaking shows that the Commission does not believe drug control is under Appendix B, I agree with the Applicant as far as that goes.

As far as saying whether Douglas Point is controlling here, I don't really believe so. In Douglas Point you had a situation, really, where the Appeal Board's

law was: Hold up where it appears that what you are doing is going to be of no effect because the Commission is going to generically set a standard. And Douglas Point, that was essentially the situation; it was shortly to be a Commission ruling. I don't think we have that situation here with the action the Commission has taken here.

I believe that at least in one other case -- and
I am not familiar with it and couldn't check it over
lunchtime -- the issue of drug use was litigated, and I
believe in Shearon Harris.

This does not mean that there should be or needs to be a program. A program is a particular Commission requirement and without that, there couldn't be. But if, for instance, it was alleged -- let's say it was alleged that, or it was shown that a bunch of operators in the control room were there 8aving a little party, be it on alcohol or a controlled substance. There is no question that there would be an undue hazard and that the Commission could take action at that point.

Well, there are some interstitial areas -- not all interstitial areas, it has to be substantial, where the boards can look and fill in, and they have in the past filled in certain areas and required more.

I think, one, though, they were reversed by the Commission eventually, was the ECCS rule, where they filled

ರ

in some material on the ECCS rule and then the Commission said: No, we don't want to go that far. But there wasn't a question of the Board's jurisdiction; it was a question of what the safety significance of that was, and the inerting, in that case, rather than ECCS, it was inerting that it was thinking of.

This does not mean that I am saying that the drug issue as it is alleged here comes in under Issue F, or under Issue C. I will get to that at the appropriate time. But I wanted to make our position clear on particularly whether it was a Douglas Point situation. It doesn't appear to be so.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Does the Staff believe that, if we were, say, to have a properly framed contention with a proper basis involving preferential treatment of people who use drugs, would the Staff say that we were not barred by the, at least the rulemaking, from considering that?

MR. REIS: I would have to see more of the wording of it to know. It's very hard to give a definitive answer.

Generally speaking, just because I said I would have to see the wording of it indicates that there may be some areas that could come in and would be amenable, should it be possible to file a late-filed contention on this subject at this time, and meet all the standards of good

on this project.

cause and timeliness and adequate basis, and showing that you have some real evidence to go forward and all those things which would have to be met first: Yes, it might be possible in some way or other to frame something.

MR. REIS: I don't have anything further to say.

MR. SINKIN: Mr. Chairman, our position as laid

out in the pleadings is that the entire issue is a red

herring and that it's not an issue at all. We are not

talking about the adequacy of the Applicant's drug

detection program. We are not talking about whether this,

the Applicants meet industry standards in the program they

have designed for the detection and prevention of drug use

The allegation says there is -- there are programs in effect for detecting and preventing drug use at this project; that those programs operated at least effectively enough to identify certain people who were involved in the sale and/or use of illegal drugs; and that once that information was gathered by the program, that the information was used in a preferential manner. And that is the issue: How the information gathered by the program was used by the Applicants.

It is not an issue as to the adequacy or inadequacy of the program itself. Even if the Commission

were doing a comprehensive rulemaking on what a drug program should be, I don't think that would foreclose litigation of an existing drug program being applied in a preferential manner. So we think the whole issue raised by the Applicants of the rulemaking for closing this issue is simply a red herring. We don't think that we are asking this Board to establish any rules as to what should be part or not part of a drug program, detection or prevention program at a nuclear site. We don't think we are developing standards through case law litigation rather than rulemaking, and we think that's a perfectly legitimate way — it has happened numerous times before — but we don't even think that's what's going on here.

I guess our essential response to this whole thing is that we think the argument is being led astray by the argument that it's relative to a rulemaking, and that is not relevant in any way to whether this should be litigated at any time in this proceeding.

JUDGE SHON: Mr. Sinkin, you say you are really not interested in the effect of the program or anything like that or the nature of the program or the standards to be applied in applying the program. And yet doesn't it seem that, at least by implication, you are suggesting that one standard to which a drug enforcement program of this sort should conform is that it should be uniformly and

1	evenhandedly applied to the operations group as well as to
2	everybody else?
3	MR. SINKIN: Yes.
4	JUDGE SHON: That this should be maybe written
5	in it somewhere?
6	MR. SINKIN: That is our assumption: that it
7	should be evenhandedly applied; yes.
8	JUDGE SHON: Well, I say that that appears to me
9	to be at least a standard of sorts that the program should
10	conform to.
11	MR. SINKIN: I would agree with you that it is a
12	standard of sorts. I can't imagine, as I think we said in
13	our pleadings, that any rulemaking by the Commission is
14	involved in deciding when Applicants should discriminate as
15	to those found using or abusing controlled substances on
16	their projects to give Applicants rules as to which
17	employees get preferential treatment. I don't think
18	there's anything in the NRC rules addressing that.
19	JUDGE SHON: I think the proposed rule is to
20	whom it does apply: to people who have controlled access
21	to certain areas. It doesn't apply to everybody else;
22	isn't that true?

MR. SINKIN: You are talking about the rule on

JUDGE SHON: Yes. Which was folded right in

23

24

25

access?

with fitness for duty. I mean the two go hand in hand.

MR. SINKIN: I don't think, since we are talking about the operations group, that the problem of access is really a problem.

JUDGE SHON: Yes. That's true.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Mr. Gutterman, do you have any response before we go on to the next section?

MR, GUTTERMAN: I just want to point out that what divides our case from the case Mr. Reis was addressing is that here the Commission is considering whether or not there ought to be a rule not, as in the containment inerting case, what the exact requirements should be. Actually, I believe that case was a case of interpreting requirements rather than really whether there should be an additional one. I thought the Commission disagreed with the interpretation applied by the Appeal Board.

As far as what's going on in Shearon Harris, as I understand it, the contention that the Licensing Board considered there was an allegation that construction work was performed improperly because some employees were under the influence of drugs. So the allegation was not about a program for controlling the use of drugs or the application of that program, it was about the adequacy of construction work. So I don't think that was a -- the same kind of contention we are dealing with here.

Other than that, I think I have said before everything I wanted to say covering the main points I wanted to make.

MR. SINKIN: I don't think that's quite accurate on Shearon Harris. The information we have is that the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board began hearings about the first of October on allegations of widespread drug use among workers at Carolina Power & Light, and that the allegations are both that the amount of drug use at Shearon Harris has been understated by CP&L, and that such drug use may have resulted in improper construction.

So, the information being gathered about drug use apparently is also being challenged at Shearon Harris.

I mean, the fact that this Shearon Harris Board is going straight into investigating drug use at the project and its possible implications for construction, I think is a direct parallel to going into drug use and looking for the implications in its operation.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Mr. Reis?

MR. REIS: That isn't the allegation here, though. It's an allegation of preferential treatment and it's a long, long chain we are talking about here. If it was an evaluation of people in the control room using controlled substances, or even antihistamines that made them asleep at the switch, it would be another matter. But

here the chain is very long. It's that some were not fired because they might have implicated those in the control room. It is very tenuous.

JUDGE SHON: But, Mr. Reis, it's not very far from the other matter that Mr. Sinkin said Shearon Harris' Board was looking at; that is, the understatement of the amount of drug usage. That is something that implies a deceptive action on the part of the company that's reporting this. That's what he's alleging.

MR. REIS: I don't know enough about it to comment on it, Judge Shon. It depends on what the understatement was.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: We don't either.

MR. REIS: If it was an understatement in a report to the NRC, then definitely it was a matter of a misrepresentation to the NRC. If it was an understatement of the public relations officer getting up and saying something to a newspaper, that's another matter.

MR. GUTTERMAN: Judge Shon, I would just like to invite the Board to inquire, in the Licensing Board panel's own records what the licensing board at Shearon Harris is looking into.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: We haven't done that. I'm sure we can find out quickly.

Shall we go on to C?

I think we want to get into whether the allegations that we have now would fit into Issue C, the portion of Issue C which we have left as an issue.

I guess the Applicant will lead off on that.

MR. AXELRAD: I'm sorry, Mr. Chairman. I didn't hear the beginning of what you said with respect to which aspect of Issue C we are looking at. We are looking at the question --

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Whether it fits into whatever portion of Issue C is left for resolution.

MR. AXELRAD: I would like to make sure what framework we are looking at. So far, no one has claimed that. This is a board raised, sua sponte question?

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: We consider the issue has been raised by Mr. Sinkin, by CCANC.

MR. AXELRAD: But he is not. He's raising Issue F.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: At this moment we are trying to see whether it fits under an existing contention.

If he -- assuming he misinterpreted Appendix B and it came under F, we are trying to see if it fits under C, and perhaps save sometime. At least his final response on contention C, we haven't discussed exactly what his rights to respond on contention C are. We are sort of under the impression that he is not precluded from putting

something in under C. And we wanted to be able to discuss it today. That's why we raised the question. We thought it might fit under C, which is -- a portion of which is still open.

MR. AXELRAD: Fine. Well, let me put the Applicant's position before you, then.

I believe it is important, just as we viewed

Issue F, in context of all the issues admitted by this

Board a number of years ago, to look at all of the issues
in context, and clearly at that time it was contemplated
that all the issues would be heard together and there was a
very specific framework of issues established.

Issue A, in essence, dealt with past actions of HL&P, and whether those past actions would indicate that HL&P did not have the necessary managerial competence or character to be granted licenses to operate the STP.

The next logical step was Issue B, which asked whether HL&P had taken sufficient remedial steps to provide assurance that it now has the competence and character to operate STP safely. And between Issue A and Issue B, we essentially had past actions of the Applicant and whether or not he has taken adequate remedial actions and whether or not, taking those two things collectively, he had the managerial competence and character to operate safely.

Issue C, then, added something very limited to

Issue B. Issue C, then, sought to focus on the plant operation for the South Texas project. It added to the Issues A and B the questions dealing with the organization for the South Texas project, and in the course of the proceeding that was interpreted by the Board and by the parties to refer to organization and staffing for operations. And the Staff's testimony and the Applicant's testimony all dealt, under Issue C, with respect to the organization and staffing for operation, and the Board, when it issued its partial initial decision, discussed organization and staffing with respect to Issue C. Not past activity, not remedial activities, it dealt with organization and staffing.

And then, when the Board, in its partial initial decision, indicated why it was reserving, stated: Well, we've looked at organization and staffing but we've looked at it in 1982, years before the plant is going to go into operation, and therefore sometime later on in this proceeding, by the time we get closer to operation, we will get an update with respect to organization and staffing. And that is all that the reservation dealt with. It dealt with the organization and staffing for operation of the South Texas project, and the affidavits that we have filed and that the Staff has filed deals with the organization and staffing for operations. It does not deal in any

fashion with respect to drug use questions or anything of that kind; nor does it need to do that, because that is not the subject of the reservation by the Board at that time.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Do you need a specific reference to drug use? There is an allegation that staffing for operations tolerates drug use -- does not that affect their qualifications to operate the plant?

MR. AXELRAD: Mr. Chairman, that is not the allegation the Intervenors have raised. The Intervenor specifically in the response to interrogatories, indicated his view that because of actions taken by the company as a result of drug investigations last year, that the company does not have the character to operate the plant.

It is exactly the kind of question we have been talking about before. He is raising a character question. The Board did not, under Issue C, by asking us and the Staff to update information with respect to organization and staffing, indicate that it was going to reopen and reconsider under Issue C any action or any activity which anybody wanted to raise which somehow dealt with the character of the company.

JUDGE LAMB: How do you view the word "commitment"?

MR. AXELRAD: Those are the ultimate conclusions. What I have tried to explain, Mr. Chairman, we have words

of that kind in each of these contentions, but there's a step, by step progression and the Board cannot conceivably have intended by asking for further information with respect to organization and staffing -- what it meant to look at was every aspect of what constitutes the type of thing you look at in determining the character in the company and its commitment to safe operation.

out anything in the partial initial decision. It did not decide Issue A, it did not decide Issue B, it did not decide Issue C. Because if there were any further questions that came up with respect to the Applicant's activities in the intervening years, and those could have come up under Issue A, and under a reopening of Issue A if that was sought, then that could automatically, under the question you just raised, be brought up under the word "commitment" in Issue C.

The only thing that was reserved was organization and staffing. I can point you to the exact words in the partial initial decision as to what you asked people to update.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Clearly, to me, organization and staffing relates to the commitment issue. The only way we are interested in an organization and staffing is to show incompetence and incommitment.

MR. AXELRAD: You will take into account the organization and staffing with respect to your ultimate decision about the ability to operate the plant safely, but you are not going to take another look at everything else that came in under Issue A or B. You did not indicate at the time you issued your initial partial decision that by the time we came to your decision that we would reexamine everything in A, B, C, D and E, because that somehow deals with the Applicant's ability to safely operate the South Texas project. You did not issue a meaningless decision in phase 1.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Suppose I tell you that at least I don't consider the alleged drug allegations as falling under A or B. And even as subject to consideration under A or B.

MR. AXELRAD: If it doesn't come under A and B, it sure as hell doesn't come under contention C. If it's a new contention Intervenor has to raise, then he's got to raise it. But Issue C, and the reserved portion of the Issue C, dealt with organization and staffing. How can you look any other way at the words of your own decision?

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Aren't you getting a challenge to the qualifications of some of the Staff?

MR. AXELRAD: I don't believe so. I don't believe so. It's a character question that he raised.

1.4

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Don't -- aren't there some character requirements for the staffing?

MR. AXELRAD: Character of management, character of the individuals who decided to allegedly give preferential treatment to operational personnel. That's what he's raising, character of the company, not the character of the operator in the control room.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: How about the character of the managerial personnel who are taking allegedly preferential actions?

MR. AXELRAD: That's the character of the company -- the character of the people within the company who have the ability to make decisions. That's what -- when we talked about the managerial competence of character, under Issue A and Issue C -- Issue B, we weren't talking about just the individual at the top of the totem pole. Obviously, we are talking about people in management positions.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: The way I viewed this continued issues is on A and B, basically with occurrences under construction and how that affected the character, and then C dealt with operation.

MR. AXELRAD: I'm sorry, Mr. Chairman, could you repeat that?

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: C, and to some extent F,

dealt with operation. And A and B are construction deficiencies and how they were or were not remedied, as the case may be. We found in terms of the matters that we were examining under A, there wasn't a character problem; save the Quadrex. But that would make A and B rather different from C, and would give a little meaning to C.

MR. AXELRAD: Mr. Chairman, let me say one thing.

I don't think that a company has two different characters,

one to construct and one to operate. Okay? The company

has management and individuals, and the individuals have a

character and a commitment to satisfy NRC requirements.

I'm not sure to what extent you would parse

Issue A so as to have it refer only to construction

deficiencies. It says: "Without regard to remedial steps

taken by HL&P, with the record of HL&P compliance with

Commission requirements" -- et cetera -- that could

reasonably be read: compliance with requirements in effect

up to the time the Board has to reach its decisions,

whether they dealt with the steps that the company was

taking at that time as the Board has put it, construction,

or with respect to these alleged activities that came up

during the construction phase that dealt with the alleged

preferential treatment of operating personnel.

I think it's a close question whether Issue A can be read that way or whether Issue A should be read more

Q

narrowly to talk about those particular construction deficiencies.

But Issue C adds nothing to Issue A or B, A and B, other than the planned organization for operation of the South Texas project. It does not raise a new or different kind of character question. And, if the intervenors are not going to seek to reopen Issue A, or perhaps more pertinently because Issue B -- because their argument, as I understand from their answers, is that we violated criterion 16 of Appendix B by failure to take proper corrective action when we found out about the problem, that sounds to me like an Issue B problem, we didn't take sufficient remedial steps. However, if they are not seeking to reopen Issue A or B, then what they are going to have to do, and I think they are already too late to do that, is to file for a new contention.

But, whatever it is that their remedy is, it does not rise under Appendix C, because that talks about the planned organization and staffing. That's all that the Board heard under Issue C, in phase 1, and no one alleged anything else was next. The Board made a decision with respect to Issue C, and left a very narrow window open for reopening, and what Mr. Sinkin is now opening does not come within that narrow window. And of course he never alleged it does either. He's on the mistaken basis that he's

talking about an Appendix B requirement and he belongs under Issue F. It's the Board that is giving him an opportunity to change his argument in midstream.

JUDGE SHON: Mr. Axelrad, of course, I wasn't on this particular Board when the decision at issue was written. But I note that in the opinion on Issue C, the Board said, and I'll read it, the last paragraph, in the section on Issue C:

"For these reasons and those more fully set forth in our findings; we conclude that there is now reasonable assurance that HL&P will have the competence and character as well as the requisite commitment to safety to operate STPs safely. This conclusion is based solely on information currently of record and will be subject to any updated information added to the record in phase 3."

That's rather broad, as far as "any updated information."

MR. AXELRAD: No, no, but look two paragraphs above that. Two paragraphs above it it says, "The NRC Staff, in its review of HL&P plants for operation, has concluded that HL&P's plant management and operating organizations meet the requirements of the applicable NRC rulings and regulations. Although this was preliminary in nature, we find no reason at this time to disagree. We anticipate, however, that at a time closer to operation,

the Applicants will update information bearing upon the organization and personnel nor operation and the Staff will review the updated information. At the time we considered Issue F, phase 3, we expect the Applicants and Staff will supplement directly with such updated information."

The Board stated that for phase 3, we will update the information bearing upon organization and personnel and that's exactly what we have done and that's exactly what has been left, is the organization and personnel question.

There is another place in this decision where the Board also refers to its expected updating. I could find for you the other place where the Board has referred to what is left open.

MR. REIS: In order that the record may be complete at this place, at this point I suggest that you look at finding 246, also.

(Discussion off the record.)

MR. AXELRAD: At page 668 of the procedure, the Board specifically says -- at the conclusion of part one of its decision, on page 668 of the printed copy, in the last sentence it says: "We also expect that during the consideration of Issue F, QA operation in phase 33, the Staff will update as appropriate the testimony dealing with Issue C, dealing with HL&P's organization for operation."

	That is exactly what the Board was talking about in Issue C,
	and that is what has to be updated, the operation for
	organization. That's exactly what has to be dealt with.
*	There was nothing else don't misunderstand me, Mr. Shon.
	I'm not suggesting that if problems came up between then
ě	and now the Intervenor doesn't have the opportunity to
1	raise that as a new question, whether it dealt with new
	issues, which means he has to reopen he has the ability
	to file those documents and it will be ruled on by the
	Board as appropriate. All we are saying is what he has
1	raised does not come within Issue F, and it does not come
	within the organization and staffing matters which we are
	left with in Issue C. What he wants to do is clearly a
3	reopening on the character question or something else.
	It's not what is before the Board right now.
	(Discussion off the record.)

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: I guess at this stage -- have the Applicants finished on this issue?

MR. AXELRAD: Yes, your Honor.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Let's hear what Mr. Reis has to say?

MR. REIS: Mr. Chairman, I certainly had interpreted the Board's decision as Mr. Axelrad had.

Particularly when I look at Issue C, and I look at it, it says "in light of," and gives two things: one is the

planned organization for operation and that is organization for operation that we are talking about; and two is alleged deficiencies in HL&P's management.

Well, that one refers back of its own terms to A and B and deals with character. So we are only dealing with organization for management. And the organization for management is the organization for management talked about, both in the printed opinion in 19 NRC at several places at the -- on page 668, where they talk about what you talked about as being expected for phase 3 -- updating for phase 3, which is, again, OA for operation, organization for operation, and in that sense, if you look at page 698, Mr. Axelrad pointed to that, particularly there, I think that's the strongest place where it says that what it's looking for is organization and personnel, not what we have been talking about, of what is going on at this time in organizing the plant, but the paper organization, the charts.

That is what was looked at to be brought in at this time. The FSAR, and the fact that you could lean on the -- rather -- I misspoke -- the SER, the Staff's SER, and that that material would be in at this stage and that you could work on that.

Further, in finding 246, it also essentially says the same thing that the two other citations I gave did.

25 say

That begins on 786 and goes over to page 788.

In essence, I don't want to take a lot of time repeating, but it is clear throughout the opinion what we were talking about in issue -- the updating of Issue C, was the updating closer to operation of the material that would be in the SER, as to the organization for operation of the plant.

JUDGE SHON: Mr. Reis, I haven't had a lot of time to go over the material that has been submitted in the update, but I notice that the Applicants submittal, at least, included a good deal of material on individuals, that is, background and things of that sort, about the crew. Education, experience and things like that, all of which are important to this point. But, suppose each and everyone of them had a stamp on the bottom of his biography that said: "Excluded from drug testing program." Would that be an important point, too? Would that be included, if he were excluded from it? This is somebody we are never going to look at.

MR. REIS: You know, I have not had an opportunity to consult with my technical staff on that question. But no doubt we do look at the education and the qualifications of these people who will have key positions for the licensing of the plant. And if it did come to our attention that somebody was unreliable for whatever cause,

yes, it would be hard to say. I don't have the ANSI standard before me, and this is the answer see standard for these key people in the plant -- I don't have it right before me -- but if they aren't thought to be reliable people, I can't sit here and say: No, there's nothing wrong with that. We are going to go ahead and license a plant. All I can say is, what you are saying, though, I want to make very clear, is a hypothetical and not the allegations that we have in connection with Issue F, and it's not what we have in this situation.

JUDGE SHON: It's rather close to what the allegation to which the Intervenor has brought for this, as I see it: that these people, regardless of what their behavior may be, are being shielded from the effects of a drug testing program. Is this not essentially what --

MR. REIS: No.

JUDGE SHON: Mr. Sinkin, isn't that essentially what you are driving at?

MR. SINKIN: Yes.

JUDGE SHON: While the allegation -- I'm not making any suggestion about its truth or lack thereof, but, in effect, Mr. Sinkin alleges that these people are not being examined according to the usual standard drug testing program that the company itself feels is necessary.

MR. REIS: No. That is not so. It is not shown

that these are people that are the ones -- where we have the organizational chart fleshed out, there is no indication that they are. That would be in the organization chart that is fleshed out.

JUDGE SHON: That's a question. The term

"operations group," was used. The Applicant has pointed

out several times there is no such thing as an operations

group. There is, of course, that detail, just who the

people are of whom the Intervenor is alleging is shielded

from the consequences of drug use. That is obscure, I must

admit, and would have to be clarified.

MR. REIS: In the SER we do pass upon the qualifications of certain key positions. It is considered in the SER. We do look at that.

What we see here, we can't -- I don't see the allegations here -- even what's in the answer to the interrogatories here -- that goes to that and shows they don't meet those qualifications of the ANSI standards, which are essentially what we evaluate against in our SER.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: I guess it's your turn.

MR. SINKIN: Thank you. First of all, in relation to --

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: First, do you even claim that what you allege does fall under what we have asked be updated under Issue C?

11.

MR. SINKIN: First of all, I was perfectly comfortable with it being under Issue F.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Assume for the moment that we would not accept it under F, take that as a given from my question --

MR. SINKIN: As a possibility. Right.

I think given the wording of Issue C, that it does deal with the organization and staffing for operations and whether there is a reasonable assurance that HL&P will have the competence and commitment to safely operate the STP, I think certainly the allegation I provided sounds in Issue C, particularly on the issue of their commitment to safely operate the STP. If what we are talking about is protecting the operations group from the consequences of drug sale and/or use, then that does not demonstrate the kind of commitment to safely operate STP that we would expect to find in an Applicant for an operating license.

I think it's taking a slightly different view of the allegation and it does fit there as well as it fits in Issue F. It is looking at a different facet, looking at it from a different perspective, and it could easily go into Issue C.

I do want to clarify one thing raised by Judge

Shon. The phrase used by the caller was "operations group."

There is something called a nuclear plant operations

department.	I don't th	nink ope	erations de	partme	nt,	
operations gr	coup are th	nat much	different	. I a	ssume	that
there was	that that	is who	the caller	had i	n mind	,
particularly	given the	nature	of the all	egatio	n.	

I noticed in the opinion that was quoted, the Board actually spoke to Issue C, and included competence, character and commitment in the opinion.

I think the difference between character and commitment is commitment is one aspect of character. So I think it is called out in Issue C, in the commitment to safely operate.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: That portion of our discussion -- would you character that reference to character only insofar as item 2, with the potential to discuss the character questions?

MR. SINKIN: I'm not clear on your question.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Well, we have two types of "in light ofs." The second incorporated peculiarities in Issues A and B. So, referring to character in our conclusions, would that not have been related to the second item, Issue C --

MR. SINKIN: You are referring to the alleged deficiencies as the second item? Is that what you mean by "the second item"?

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Yes. Which essentially

incorporates the A and B matters by reference.

MR. SINKIN: Quite possibly the character element in the opinion emerged from item 2. However, the overall reasonable assurance deals with competence and commitment to safely operate, and that's based on both items.

"commitment is not all that much different from character, and that if you wanted to include -- issue two -- I mean, Issue C gives you the opportunity, I think, to include not only the allegation but all character aspects of the allegation that come out. It's perhaps more comprehensive than Issue F.

Over and over again both the Applicants and Staff have said that the updating was on organization and staffing. Well, essentially we are updating, too, on staffing. We are updating on the management attitude towards the staff of the operations group; and that is, that they are a protected group who does not face the same disciplinary reaction as other groups when found to be in violation of project programs.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: That's Judge Shon's hypothetical.

hypothetical. I say that was Judge Shon's hypothetical.

MR. SINKIN: Right.

I don't think we are looking -- it seemed to me

that Mr. Reis was saying we are looking only at the paper organization, and I don't think we were looking only at the paper organization. We were looking at the qualifications of the personnel who were involved, or to be involved in operations. And the wording of Issue C, the -- those are aspects of the competence and commitment issue which is in Issue C.

So, on the whole we find the allegation does fit into Issue C, and perhaps better in the sense of Issue C being more comprehensive than Issue F, including commitment; but we would still argue that F deals with whether you are going to adequately implement the quality program, and you are not going to unless you have the commitment. There's case law about quality assurance has the term "commitment." Do the Applicants have the commitment to implement it? That's the issue.

All I'm saying is Issue C is a little more explicit than Issue F, as including commitment in there, but I don't see Issue F not including commitment just because the word isn't there.

(Discussion off the record.)

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Does anybody have anything further that falls into C. Then after we finish that, I think we'll take a short break after that. Why don't you -- let's finish on Issue C.

MR. AXELRAD: Fine. Just a couple of points.

One is I want to make sure that there was not any misunderstanding as to the argument I was making with respect to Issue C. I'm not suggesting that the words "competence" and "commitment" in Issue C don't include within them as what has been talked about as character. Issue C took all the information from A and B, and said when you look at all that information plus HL&P's planned organization for operation of the South Texas project, do you still find whether or not they have the compensation, commitment, character to operate the plant safely? Issue C was very, very broad. What I was saying was with the narrow issue that was left to be updated, did not deal with past deficiencies, only with the prospective planned organization for operation.

Mr. Sinkin has clearly raised a question not with respect to the future organization and staffing. He has raised a question with respect to the character of the Applicant based upon his actions in 1985, his alleged preferential treatment of people.

He has not raised, explicitly said he was not talking about the adequacy of the drug detection program, whether it meets the standards. He is not arguing at all with the fact that we now have a program in effect which tests every individual, including all operations staff,

both upon hiring as a base line with respect to past employees that there will be random testing of all employees including operation group personnel, that the program is fully adequate.

What he is raising is only an allegation based upon a past action. And that's what I say the reserved issue under Issue C does not include.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Let's take a 15-minute break. When we come back we have a number of questions to ask, Mr. Sinkin particularly, about what he is actually alleging.

(Recess.)

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Back on the record. At this point the Board would like to find out in a little more detail, if we can find out in more detail, what exactly CCANP would offer in the nature of a basis for litigation; whether what we've read in the responses to interrogatories are all that we would find, or not?

MR. SINKIN: As the answers to interrogatories set forth, Mr. Chairman, the allegation was an anonymous allegation received by CCANP, that was communicated to the NRC and other investigative agencies. The essence of what we were told is in the answers to interrogatories. There isn't any more that I can provide.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Do you know the name of the individual who made the telephone call? It's anonymous to

MR. SINKIN: Mr. Chairman, in phase 1 of this proceeding Intervenors were required to reveal their confidential sources, and as a result of that, we adopted a policy that anyone calling us was instructed that if they had any information to provide to us, they should not give us their name. They should call us and we could either assign a code name or they could just call whenever they wanted to call and we would not inquire as to their name.

In the case of this allegation, I think I recognized the voice. I would not care to speculate as to the identity of the caller. The allegation was provided anonymously. There was no name given when the allegation was given.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: If we were to indicate that we might feel free to go ahead and litigate it, what, exactly, would we have to litigate?

We could not, I don't think, just put into the record that you have an anonymous call to that effect.

Could you indicate now to the Board, for instance, the name — and I'm saying right now — could you tell the Board, alone, the name of the person, some idea that he's at all familiar with the facts that are being alleged and whether he would be willing to testify if we were to go to the hearing?

MR. SINKIN: Are you saying provide it directly to the Board but not to the other parties?

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Well, maybe as a first step. I'm not saying it would never go to the other parties. It would have to go to the other parties.

MR. SINKIN: That's what I thought.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: I'm saying how could we litigate your claim? If we should decide it fit under some category or other, how would we litigate this?

MR. SINKIN: First, grant my motion to compel so
I could get some discovery. Then we pursue that and we
gather the evidence that you'll need in order to resolve
the issue.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Are you asking us to say that an anonymous telephone call that you supplied under oath is sufficient as a basis for us to initiate -- to, in effect -- whether you call it accepting a contention or not -- but is that a sufficient basis to litigate a particular issue?

MR. SINKIN: I guess I would point out that in the Applicant's pleadings they have filed various affidavits and statements that there were, in fact, polygraph tests given during the time period that we are alleging. We have newspaper stories that there were, in fact, people fired that do link -- they have mentioned the Wackenhut investigation; the newspaper stories do link the

stories to the Wackenhut security guards; there are items that indicate that the allegation is coming from a real base of an event.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: The person might have read the newspaper.

MR. SINKIN: The person might have read the newspaper. I don't know whether the person read the newspaper or not. But the allegation that was provided was that more was going on here than met the eye.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: What I'm trying to say is:
How could we judge whether there was any substance at all
to that? Or whether it's even worth inquiring further
about?

MR. SINKIN: It's a difficult problem. I don't have the answer to that.

I think the seriousness of the allegation warrants at least permitting us to engage in the discovery we've tried to engage in and then to respond to a motion for summary disposition when we've had a chance to conduct some discovery.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Can we even -- do we even have enough, assuming this were just an initial contention and we were supplied with allegations that an anonymous phone call had revealed certain information, would we have enough even to say that the basis was adequate to admit a

contention and to permit discovery? We would have to at least have reached the point of view that there's an adequate basis for whatever was alleged before we even allowed any discovery to occur.

MR. SINKIN: I'm just trying to refresh my mind, Mr. Chairman, on the original allegations submitted by CCANP. It seems to me we filed contentions that there had been intimidation and harassment of quality control inspectors and that that information had been provided to us but we were not required to reveal the source of that information at that time. We filed it as a contention that we intended to litigate and it was accepted. The basis was information we had from inside the plant.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: I can't remember whether you revealed the name of Mr. Swayze or not. We knew about him a long time ago.

MR. SINKIN: I think that was a lot later than the acceptance of the contentions, but I'm just not real clear in my own mind.

I think there's a policy question here,

Mr. Chairman, where we are in the position where this Board
has previously ruled that we have to reveal our
confidential sources so we have adopted this instruction as
a way to protect people who want to provide information,
and they have provided it to us without a name. So we then

bring the information to the Board and the Board is left with that as a basis: We think the information is credible, we think the person is credible and the nature of the information they provided seemed credible.

MR. NEWMAN: You don't know who it is.

MR. SINKIN: That's the best we can offer.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Weren't we at least told
earlier in phase 1 that quality control inspectors had
alleged that they were being harassed? That you had direct
-- I can't remember the early stages --

MR. SINKIN: I don't either.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: It tells me that an unidentified source with no apparent relationship to the plant at all -- somebody that might have just read the newspapers and be opposed to the plant saying: I'll bet Mr. Sinkin would like to hear an allegation of this sort.

MR. SINKIN: We'l, Mr. Chairman, we took the allegation first to the office of investigations and asked them to investigate it.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: I'm aware of that.

MR. SINKIN: We did not bring it Board at that time because we wanted to allow a chance for OI to investigate before we brought any information to the Board.

When it became clear that our discovery time was going to run out and they were too busy to conduct the

investigation, we were forced to go ahead with discovery and reveal the allegation through answering interrogatories and through our discovery inquiries. I hope that some day the office of investigations will look into this matter. Until that time, the only way we have to pursue it is through discovery.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: I inquired yesterday. OI is going to give you a response. They haven't got it yet -- fairly shortly.

Did you convey to OI the substance of what is in this response to an interrogatory? Are they even looking into alleged preferential treatment of various personnel? Or are they, instead, only looking at the question of whether Region 4 was kept informed or the NRC was kept informed of drug use, drug control programs at the site?

MR. SINKIN: In the oral conversation on October 25, 1985, I communicated to the office of investigations that we had the allegation that there had been an internal investigation at the plant into the use or sale of drugs; that investigation had identified numerous personnel, through the use of lie detectors, who apparently had engaged in the use or sale of drugs; that some of those personnel were fired, some of those personnel were not fired; that those that were not fired were not fired because they would implicate the operations group; and we

discussed at that time that there was a pending issue
before the Licensing Board as to the quality assurance
program for operations which we said we thought this was
relevant to and it would be nice if there could be a speedy
investigation on that grounds; and that there and that
we were aware that the NRC did not normally investigate
drug use but that if it was an operations group that was
involved in drug use there was a clear quality concern that
might bring the NRC into such an investigation and that
protecting that group would be something that would be
obstructing the NRC. And we agreed that we would provide
to the office of investigations in writing the allegation
about the preferential treatment the drug use by
operations, excuse me, and that we would provide to the
Justice Department the allegation of obstruction of the
NRC's investigation responsibilities.

We did provide to the office of investigations the allegation just as it is set forth. It may not be word for word. It's the same allegation.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: I see. That was my inquiry, do they have before them essentially what's being brought before us. Did you give them a name?

MR. SINKIN: No. No. It was provided to them as an anonymous allegation. And they agreed to investigate it.

Start a question for litigation that we would need something more than that, would there be any way for you to really supply more, if we should determine that in order to effectively litigate something we would need at least a starting point? In litigation we would probably need a witness to come in and say, at least say what he apparently told you.

MR. SINKIN: Mr. Chairman, I think that's a very different standard than is applied normally to matters to be heard before a licensing board, that a witness has to be produced to the Licensing Board to testify to the matter before the Licensing Board accepts it for litigation. You are going into the merits.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: To some extent that may be true. But is it not true that there has to be at least enough basis to know whether there is something behind the contention? Wouldn't the adequacy of the basis depend in part on who the individual was, or the likelihood of the Licensing Board ever being able to use that information?

MR. SINKIN: We did not intend to rely on the testimony of the alleger in proving the case. I intended to rely on discovery and being able to prove the case through the questions and documents that we are seeking to have answered by the Applicants. And we do find ourselves

to compel.

in the situation of essentially conducting an investigation that no one else has taken the time to conduct for whatever reason.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: What is your point of view of,
I'll call it the alternative type of discovery which was
outlined in one of the Applicant's papers that was filed
recently. Would that -- if that were the case, would that
serve your purpose?

MR. SINKIN: I assume you are referring to something about numbers. I seem to remember them referring to that.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: I am referring to that, yes.

MR. SINKIN: I would have to refer to that,

Mr. Chairman. I don't even remember where that was.

MR. AXELRAD: In the response to the motion to

compel. Page 14 of the Applicant's response to the motion

MR. SINKIN: No. We don't find that adequate, Mr. Chairman. There may be an intermediate ground in between what we've asked for and what the Applicant's have suggested.

For example, if we can have the person tested by polygraph identified by a letter or a number to start with, with the employer of that person, their position at the project at the time they were tested, and the reasons

provided for why they were tested, the questions I don't
want to be held to this off-the-top-of-my-head list, I am
trying to move to some middle ground if they want to
know the questions asked if the problem was the
revelation of names, we perhaps can get around that by
assigning them some identifying number as long as we are
able to relate the name to the specific organization or the
number to the specific organization of that person, their
position, employer, how the allegations provided by that
person were treated, follow-ups, results of investigations,
that kind of thing, that might give us enough to resolve
the issue without going into the actual identities of the
persons involved. That is not to say we don't also want
the actual programs and procedures for the drug program,
I'm just talking about the problem of identifying people.
And all of that can be under a protective order, too. We
don't have any objection to protective orders being
fashioned that prevent the unauthorized release of any of
this information we receive.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: I would like to ask -- I would like to go to the other parties for a moment. Assume for the moment that we were to -- if we were to decide that this issue fit under C, that it wasn't a new contention as such, would we have authority to require an additional development of a basis?

1.

For instance, the matters I talked about, the name of the individual, his position or the means by which he acquired whatever knowledge that was transmitted by the anonymous phone call, and his willingness to testify. Would we have a basis? Would we have legal basis for imposing those requirements before we permitted the contention, litigation of the contention or issue or whatever it might be called to proceed any farther?

I don't need the answer to this under, if we consider it a late-filed contention because I think under the third of the criteria, we clearly could require it then. My question is: If we consider it under -- as falling under an existing contention, such as C, or even F for that matter, could we require, before we allowed it to be litigated, the additional showing that we outlined?

MR. AXELRAD: Mr. Chairman, let me parse that question in two different fashions because you put a lot into it. With respect to Issue F, we have filed a motion for summary disposition of Issue F, and the Intervenor has to respond to that motion for summary disposition and presumably the Board is going to rule as to whether or not these matters -- since that's an issue that is specifically raised under our motion for summary disposition and all the parties have to respond, the Board will rule on that question. And presumably it will use the standards with

respect to summary disposition. We don't think the
Intervenors have raised any issue under any matter of
material fact under Issue F which would preclude the grant
of a motion for summary disposition. So let me put F aside.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Put F aside for the moment. We may decide that almost as a matter of law as it is set up. But be that as it may -- assume --

MR. AXELRAD: And I think you would under our motion for summary disposition or even earlier if you wanted to.

Now, under C, the question is whether this matter comes within the area that was reserved by the Board under Issue C.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: I'm saying if you assume for this question that we find that it does, could we, prior to allowing it be litigated, require the additional specification that we have outlined, legally require?

MR. AXELRAD: What I was going to say is the answer to that question is based upon what the Board intended when it permitted -- when it required updated information and indicated that issues could be raised with respect to updated information.

With respect to the information, the similar circumstance that we had previously as to the reserved information under Issue B, the Board, in essence, treated

that as the equivalent of a motion for summary disposition. The Applicants and the Staff had filed affidavits, and the Intervenor, in order to be permitted to litigate anything with respect to the reserved issue was, in essence, required to satisfy the equivalent of the standard for a motion for summary disposition and he did not raise any issues or material fact that was proper for litigation.

Similarly, in these circumstances it would seem to me that if the Intervenor is trying to reserve this under the reserved matters under Issue C, as opposed to a new contention or reopening or something of that kind, he would have to submit sufficient information in order to be able to withstand the motion for summary disposition. He would have to submit some factual information.

Whether the particular information would have to be the name of the individual and how you acquire the information about his willingness to testify or whether some other kind of specific information would do it, I'm not certain. But clearly there has to be something other than an anonymous allegation; anonymous allegation has never been enough to permit litigation of any matter before the agency. There has to be, as the Board has pointed out before, at the very least what would be required under a contention, which is something filed with sufficient specificity and basis and with sufficient particularization

to know that there is a matter here that deserves
litigation. A bald allegation -- there are cases dealing
with this -- a bald allegation without any support is just
no basis to conduct any kind of proceeding at all.

It is very clear what the Intervenor is trying to do. He is trying to conduct a fishing expedition through discovery based upon an anonymous telephone call. He says he doesn't know who this individual is, and yet he considers the information to be credible. He doesn't know anything about the information. He doesn't know anything about this so-called preferential treatment of operating personnel. What he knows is what he has been able to read in the newspapers.

Yes, there have been guards terminated. Yes, Wackenhut, who was a contractor that provides security services, has a policy under which anyone who is implicated in use of drugs on site or off site can be terminated under Wackenhut policy. That was not the policy of the company prior to January 1 of this year. The company now has a policy under which anyone can be terminated for any drug use off site as well as on site.

If there were any project employees who were implicated with respect to off-site use before this, they were not terminated because that was not the company policy up to that time.

There were no allegations of on-site use by project personnel. The so-called preferential treatment that Mr. Sinkin is referring to is obviously either Mr. Sinkin's confusion of what the anonymous individual told him or what the anonymous individual's confusion was as to what the various policies were as applied to project.

What we have here is a whole concoction based upon an anonymous telephone call.

employees versus guards working for Wackenhut.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: You are saying if it was a Wackenhut guard that called in the complaint that somebody else who was a HL&P employee wasn't terminated, that would be expected by the way the program was set up at that time?

MR. AXELRAD: No one knows who called Mr. Sinkin and what his knowledge or what his motivation was. But the whole thrust of everything that we are hearing here is that all that Mr. Sinkin has is an anonymous telephone call without any specifics whatsoever, and that provides no basis for admission of a contention or for the Board's consideration. It for litigation. And by whatever standard, whether he uses it as a standard, standard for a new contention, standard for a contention for the first time, standard for reopening a proceeding, if it's a standard for a late-filed contention, there is no standard at all including the standard for a motion for summary

disposition. Under none of these standards would there be for litigation at a proceeding something based on a bald allegation from an anonymous source.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Would this apply as well if it were purely a new contention at the beginning of a proceeding?

MR. AXELRAD: Yes.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Would you apply the same standard?

MR. AXELRAD: Well, certainly you'd have to have specificity and basis and there has to be sufficient particularization as a part of the requirement to show there's something worth looking into.

Mr. Sinkin has said he's the only one interested in investigating this matter. That may be his curiosity, but that has nothing to do with what comes up before the Board. Maybe he properly acted by going to OI, and OI is looking into it; and if, as a result of OI's investigation, something comes up that does need to be reviewed and he gets the investigation, maybe at that time he'll have something to file. Or maybe OI, on the basis of what they are looking into, will bring to the attention of the Board there's a matter that deserves the Board's attention. But as the Board is well aware, the fact that there's a pending investigation in itself is clearly not a basis for allowing

a contention. There was an explicit Commission decision just recently.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: They said that specifically. The Commission said that in the context of reopening the record. But there may be some overall implication of what they said to other cases as well. Because they did say that -- the Commission outlined some of the reasons why OI conducts investigations. I think that was Waterford, earlier in January, something like that.

MR. REIS: Yes.

MR. AXELRAD: Yes. But in essence, what
Mr. Sinkin is saying to the Board is what he really needs
to do is conduct discovery in order for him to be able to
find out whether he really has a matter to bring to this
Board for litigation. And that is clearly not permitted.
The regulations are very specific on that point. You get a
contention admitted only on the basis of the information
that you as an intervenor have. You are not entitled to
discovery in order to be able to have a contention
introduced, and Mr. Sinkin clearly does not have even the
beginning of enough factual information in order to get a
contention admitted, and what he's telling the Board: Well,
you let me have discovery and I'll prove to you that I've
got enough for a contention. That is not the way the
system works.

Mr. Sinkin is going to have to rely upon the system as it exists and not upon the system he would like in his world.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Mr. Reis?

MR. REIS: I think the Board has ample power to do what it says, generally under .718 on the chairman's powers to control the course of proceedings.

I agree with you that Waterford dealt with reopening a hearing. But the reasoning of the Commission in Waterford is applicable here.

There, we not only had an allegation -- we had an allegation, of course here, that OI -- I&E -- or -- OI was looking into. And they said that wasn't enough to reopen a record or to start things going. And I think that is very important.

Further, they also pointed out that newspaper articles -- which is something similar here to what we have here, unnamed, anonymous sources coming in, it's not enough to open a record.

Further, we don't know whether this unnamed source, this anonymous source, whom we can't tell here has firsthand knowledge or second-hand knowledge or third-hand knowledge.

Thirdly, in Catawba, the Commission Catawba case, I think it's at 833 -- it's an '83 or '84 case, the

ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

Commission talked about it. It's reasoning is instructive:
When things come up late in a proceeding the tests are
harder. The later and the longer the proceeding has, the
more you need in the nature of showing something tantamount
to evidence in order to reopen.

We just don't have anything along that line here.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Given the 15 months or so

that we have until projected fuel loading, would this be

considered late in the proceeding? Do you look toward the

end or toward the beginning?

MR. REIS: Oh, I think you look toward the beginning of the proceeding, and I think that was so in the Catawba case, where there was talk about new contentions and whether they had to await final Staff documents or whether things were alleged on the knowledge of that time.

The talk was definitely the later in the proceeding it is, and if it isn't just the beginning of the proceeding, the more you need to have more specificity and more basis, the more you need allegations or information tantamount to evidence.

I think the Commission's reasoning is, in both the Catawba Gas, which was '83, CLI83-19, 17 NRC 1041. And in the Waterford case, which was decided in January 30th of this year, I think these things are needed.

When I look at what the Intervenor has done here

in order not to give us the name, what he says he did, he instructed people not to give their names so he could make faceless allegations to the Board and now, on the basis of these faceless allegations, he wants to bootstrap himself into a hearing? That's what I just heard.

He told people who called him up, don't give me your name because I'd have to turn it over, therefore I won't have information to give to the Board. I don't think we can conduct business this way. And so I say on the basis of what is said in his answers to interrogatories and what is the policies indicated in these cases, and also in the statement of policy by the Commission on the conduct of proceedings and the need to move them ahead and see that there are real issues set out, in 13 NRC as well -- in 13 NRC, statement of conduct on litigation proceedings, or something like that -- all these things indicate that: Yes, you have the power to require definite statements of what is there to see whether there is a basis to litigate these new things late in the proceeding.

It is true, if they are shoehorned into a present contention maybe the rules on raising new contentions need not apply. But they are new issues, and to the same extent in embarking on looking at new issues, I think you have to follow the Commission's reasoning and find that you need some definite material tantamount to

evidence before even discovery is allowed.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: If we should require further specificity or further delineation of the basis, would we be engaging in what the Appeal Board said was not proper, in, I think it was Allen's Creek, some time ago? The biomass case.

MR. REIS: In the biomass case, what was a part of the contention and basis of the contention was an office of technology report on biomass that said, in essence: Well, this looks like a very feasible technology. What we had in that case was the question of whether there was an alternate source of energy from biomass. And an Office of Congressional report said there was.

This was spelled out in the contention of Mr. Alexander in that case. Therefore, that case did not deal with what we have here. We had a basis in that case.

The Board went on in that case and said: Oh, this doesn't look real to us and we'll dismiss it because it seems off the wall. But there was a basis. And if you read the Appeal Board and you read the Board below and what was submitted with that contention, that contention had a basis. It wasn't that some scientiat at some point said maybe there was, or said there was the ability to have biomass from sea farms and convert that to -- the biomass to electricity and thus substitute for the need for the

Allen's Creek nuclear plant. You had a definite basis in a report by the Congressional branch of the office of technology. Further, it was at the beginning of the case.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Is that different from the sworn statement of an individual? A party, a lawyer --

MR. REIS: Very different. I believe there are cases of late -- and I think it was also in Waterford, though not in this opinion -- where the Board said -- the Appeal Board in that case I believe it was -- that the statements of attorneys do not create issues of fact. It must be a statement or representation -- must be a statement of the one with personal knowledge.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: I was referring to the statement of an attorney as recording the substance of an anonymous call.

MR. REIS: No. That is not enough. Because in the Waterford case -- and that was the Appeal Board Waterford case just prior to this, late last year I think -- the Appeal Board said the affidavits of attorneys that there is information that somebody told me something, that there is a reason to go forward, is not enough. It must be the affidavit of the one who can give testimony in this court.

Essentially the reason in that case that was used was any evidence in NRC proceedings must be proper

evidence in the rule -- I forget which rule it is -- which governs evidence, which says it has to be competent.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: 743, I think.

MR. REIS: If it is 743, that's fine. But whichever.

Essentially the Board said this was not competent evidence so it could not be tantamount to evidence.

The same thing, Mr. Sinkin's statement, no matter how true it is and how accurately he reported what was told to him, was nothing but hearsay and does not provide a basis to go forward.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Mr. Sinkin, do you have a response or reply?

MR. SINKIN: I may have misunderstood the Board's question. I thought the Board asked me how can we litigate this matter if we don't have more than a anonymous allegation and I responded: By allowing me discovery so we can have evidence to resolve the matter. I didn't perceive the question: How do we accept this allegation for litigation? I didn't realize that's what you were asking me. I was asking you how we go forward with litigation.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: I see.

MR. SINKIN: The information provided just now by the Applicants, that Wackenhut has a policy of anyone on

site or off site is fired and the Applicant's have, or had a different policy until recently -- I think that's in some of their pleadings, that there may be some confusion on the policies -- these are arguments to the merits. They want to represent what the policies are without allowing discovery on the policies. They want to say there's confusion on the policies without allowing any discovery as to what the policies were at various times.

Also, too, as I understand the allegation that was made, it's saying that there were people who were not fired who would have implicated the operations group. Now, the group of people who were fired were apparently Wackenhut guards.

So, as this is becoming clearer, as I'm getting some information, at least through the Applicant's affidavits and other things, it would appear that there were people fired and Wackenhut guards were the people not fired because they would implicate the operations group people.

So, if there was a preferential application of the Wackenhut policy of firing people on or off, for on- or off-site use, that may be the heart of this whole allegation that there was preferential treatment given within the Wackenhut organization in order to protect the HL&P operations organization.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: HL&P, did they have any control over how Wackenhut ran its program?

MR. SINKIN: We don't have any discovery yet, your Honor, whether they did or didn't. It's their -- security contractor and the decisions made by their security contractor are their responsibility. If they didn't exercise the responsibility, then that's another issue.

(Discussion off the record.)

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Actually, the Board has reached several decisions in conjunction with the drug allegations.

We have determined -- and we'll spell this out in more detail later -- but basically we have determined that the allegations do not fall under Issue F. Basically, that is shown by the programmatic practices that the NRC has engaged in in requiring QA programs and the existence of the rulemaking, which shows to us that the Commission doesn't consider that it falls under Appendix B, but is considering an alternate route. So we do not think that it falls under F.

Secondly, we've determined that the existence of the rulemaking does not bar litigation of the allegations under -- either under Issue C or as a new contention. But, third, we have not yet reached a decision as to whether or

26292.^ BRT

not the allegations would fall under Issue C.

Fourth, if we were to litigate the allegations as a new contention we would have to consider the five factors set forth in 2.714 for late-filed contention.

Now, we have determined that in any event, we will not accept the allegations for litigation unless we have considerably more detail as to really what the allegations are and what the basis for the claim or contention is. We had thought that the name of the individual, the basis for his or her information, the willingness of the individual to testify would be factors that would at least assist us in determining whether or not something should be litigable. We will not say that if we had that we would litigate it. But we will say that we would have to have that or an equivalent degree of particularization before we would be willing to litigate it.

Next, sixth, we believe that assuming CCANP desires to litigate this contention, it should submit information such as is outlined above, that we just spelled out. If it chooses to consider it as a new contention, it also should submit information which will allow us to evaluate the other factors of 2.714 A. We believe the information of the type we've requested would, at the very least, fall into the third criteria under 714, the ability to contribute to the record, or whatever it says.

Now, we will give CCANP the option. If CCANP wants to rely on whether or not we feel it falls into contention ${\tt C}$ --

MR. SINKIN: I didn't hear you, sir.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: We'll give you the option.

If you believe that you will take a chance as to whether we believe it falls under C, which we have not decided, you don't have to submit the 714 information, although we still would require the other type of information such as the name, basis and willingness to testify, that type of thing.

We still would require that.

If you would wish to have it considered either alone or alternatively as a new contention, you should then include also the 714 arguments, the various factors; and in either event, the other parties will have a chance to respond before we decide whether a certain thing is litigable. And until we decide an issue is litigable, we don't think we would authorize discovery.

So, insofar as the motion for protective order is based on whether the allegations fall into Issue F, I guess we grant that. I don't think we are granting all aspects of it; we are not agreeing to all the claims as to rulemaking and that type of thing. I guess we will grant the motion for protective order, insofar as it is — insofar as it relates to the allegations as an aspect of

Issue F, which is, I guess, all that is really set forth.

We are not necessarily ruling that similar discovery would not be permissible under some other issue or contention, but we are not authorizing it yet until we decide whether there is another issue or contention.

Finally, if CCANP desires to submit the name of the individual plus his or her qualifications and willingness to testify, if that is a basis for our willingness to accept the basis for contention, we will permit Mr. Sinkin to file that solely with the Board; and then if we decide that the information creates enough -- creates enough of an issue that we would otherwise consider it for litigation, we would then work out some sort of a protective order so that the information -- assuming the individual desires confidentiality --

MR. AXELRAD: I'm sorry, I didn't hear the beginning of that. Did you say submit the name of the individual only to the Board?

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: That's correct.

MR. AXELRAD: Not the information. Just the name of the individual.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: I'm not sure. To the extent that the information would include the basis for knowledge -- the basis of the individual's knowledge of the allegations, I think all of that could be submitted only to

the Board; and then if we reject the contention or the issue, we don't think it ever has to be submitted to any other party. The other parties -- their position is not being eroded.

If we decide perhaps it does create the basis for another issue, we would not rule on it until we turned over all the information to the other parties under some sort of protective order which we would work out at that time.

What we are saying is you won't be -- your positions will not be eroded without our giving you a chance to respond. But we are also saying that if the individual reveals his name only to the Board and if we decide that that person doesn't have any basis for any allegations he's making, we may return the material to Mr. Sinkin and just not reveal who it was. No one would know. I think it's really a privacy consideration which, if it developed -- we believe to effectively litigate this question, at least the source of the information and perhaps the likelihood of the individual or the willingness of the individual to make known the allegations is important.

I'm not sure, unless Mr. Sinkin comes up with some other basis for the same contention or some alternate allegation -- alternate basis for the same -- for the

allegation, I'm not sure that we should even get into litigating this.

So, basically what we are saying is we need more information. We would like to try to set a schedule for this.

Mr. Sinkin, probably if he supplies information to us in camera, you could send just a cover letter to the other parties saying that you supplied the information.

You don't have to reveal the information until we decide what it's worth. They ought to know that you have supplied us information.

To the extent you don't object to having them have the information, you can put it in whatever you send them.

Mr. Sinkin, what would be a schedule under which you could determine -- I assume at the very least you would have, to the extent you were going to rely on a person's identity, you'd have to contact them and discuss it with them, so you'll need a little time on that.

Do you have any suggestions as to timing?

MR. SINKIN: Mr. Chairman, I'm almost certain we will simply drop the allegation, but if we could have a week, that's fine.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: I want to make sure you have enough time because if you decide you may make the

allegation -- if you have to discuss it with the individual,

I want to give you enough time to do that and prepare any

paper you might want to file.

MR. SINKIN: I can almost assure you,
Mr. Chairman, that the individual will not want his name
supplied to the Board under these conditions. But I will
certainly call and ask the individual and I don't think
that will take me more than 24 hours. I'm saying a week
because that will give me a few extra days.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Okay. We'll set by March 28, you will file something, either with us, confidentially with copies of whatever you can reveal to the other parties; or alternatively, if you are dropping allegation, you can tell all the other parties.

I think another thing we ought to resolve today is -- you have an opportunity -- whether you have an opportunity to further respond to the Issue C affidavits.

MR. SINKIN: I did want to address before we get into that, the point that you raised about the option. It seems to me if the Board -- the Board has all the arguments presented by the parties on whether the issue falls under Issue C or not. If the Board is going to find it does fall under Issue C -- and I understand there's a question, do I have a chance to respond to the materials filled on Issue C. Assuming I have a chance to respond on the materials filed

on Issue C, it doesn't seem to me that there's any reason for me to do all the work to prepare a motion for a new contention if the Board is going to rule it falls under C, and I shouldn't be given an option of either filing a motion for new contention or risking whether the Board will say yes on C. I think I should be given the option of waiting to see what the Board does on C, and then if they say no on C, then it would be a signal that they consider it to be a matter for a new contention.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: We were trying to save a little time.

MR. AXELRAD: Mr. Chairman, perhaps I was confused, but it was my understanding that the type of information the Board has asked Mr. Sinkin to supply, the Board said it would need either under Issue C or as a new contention: The name of the individual, the basis for the information. Am I confused about that?

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: But the alternative was -- we would need that in any event. We would also need the other -- that goes to the third item of 714.

MR. AXELRAD: I understand, Mr. Chairman. But if Mr. Sinkin is saying he will probably drop the allegation because he doesn't want to provide that information to the Board, then what difference is there whether it's under Issue C or under a new contention?

MR. SINKIN: It would be in the eventuality I was not dropping allegation. I wanted to go back and clarify.

MR. AXELRAD: I see. I was confused.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Maybe the option is unfair.

Maybe we should wait. If you come forward with the information, then we can indicate to you how we come out on that and give you an opportunity to file further, assuming you filed within a week and then we would be able, probably by that time, to decide fairly rapidly whether we felt it fit under C or not.

(Discussion off the record.)

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: What we've decided, you can file by next Friday. We are not saying it has to be in our hands by next Friday, but you have to file it by Friday. We should be able, even assuming the mails may be slightly slow, we should -- if you decide to pursue the issue, we should be able to decide by, I'd say approximately the following Friday, maybe the Monday after that, whether we think it should be a new contention or not. And then we would give you --

MR. AXELRAD: Mr. Chairman, can you speak up, please?

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: I was saying I was going to ask Mr. Sinkin -- assuming we would say it had to be a new

contention,	if the	informat	ion gave	rise to end	ough of a
question to	create	a new co	ntention	or create a	a litigable
issue, how m	nuch fur	ther time	e might y	ou need to	address the
714 factors?	2				

MR. SINKIN: I would not need more than a week, I'm sure, to do the 714. But there's another problem that has come to my mind at this point. The Board is ordering us to take certain actions or risk losing this contention altogether. I think we are entitled to a written order from the Board and an opportunity to appeal that decision to the Appeal Board before making a final decision on whether we will comply.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: I don't think that's appealable. You'd have to get directed certification.

MR. SINKIN: I make a motion for directed certification.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: We are going to put this out in a prehearing conference order, but I think the record of this proceeding could serve.

MR. SINKIN: I don't think your microphone is on.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Oh. You are right.

Well, the ruling which will eventually be in a prehearing conference order -- we are not going to get it out today, possibly can get it out Monday or Tuesday. But I don't think that's -- I know that's not appealable as a

matter of right. And I think the Appeal Board would say that this is -- will be equally appealable after the issuance of an initial decision in phase 3 initial decision. So that my guess is that the Appeal Board would not grant directed certification. But I can't, obviously, predict everything they are going to rule on. But we think we can know, assuming you file by next Friday, whether you wish to pursue that. And you can be assured that we will not reveal -- if you file a name, we are not going to reveal it to anybody until we discuss it further with all the parties.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: If you want, you could even hand-deliver it to me and I'll put it in our safe after I read it. No one is going to have access through us, anyway. And if we decide not to accept it, we would, if you wish, return everything you sent to us.

MR. SINKIN: Okay.

MR. SINKIN: Okay.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Whether we need a further prehearing conference or whether we would work out a protective order on the telephone or not, I'm not sure. But you might want to try it on the phone.

There are some precedents for protective orders so that -- we will issue a prehearing conference order, but I think that we want the effective dates to precede that.

Just given the fact that we would very much like, if we

ever hold a hearing at all, we want to make sure it would be after the summer.

It's clear to me that we will not have a hearing starting May 6th, I think it was, no matter what we rule on all those issues. If we do admit some issues, there is going to be some discovery and, well, I just think we could announce now that there won't be a hearing starting May 6, I guess the date was.

At the very least it should -- we have to proceed so that if there should be a hearing, it will be held this summer, I think.

Concerning your response to the Issue C affidavits, we have heard something from all the parties. Does anybody have anything further to say on that before we decide? I gather the Applicants don't think Mr. Sinkin should have any further opportunity, or if any, limited to new information on the Staff affidavit.

I gather the Staff would not put those limits on it. Am I correct?

MR. REIS: The Staff would not put those limits on it, but the Staff does believe that it is limited -- of course the question is how broad Issue C is. The Applicant's affidavit and the Staff's affidavit only went to the organization and we feel that Mr. Sinkin should be responding to that.

We filed our material on the 14th. I guess, looking at the time, Mr. Sinkin would have until the 21st or whenever.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: We figured two weeks, I think. The 28th.

Will you mail or hand-serve it?
MR. SINKIN: Mail.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: 28th, plus five days, whatever that is.

MR. SINKIN: I think I figured it as April 2nd, but I could be wrong.

MR. REIS: That sounds reasonable.
(Discussion off the record.)

MR. AXELRAD: Mr. Chairman, I don't want to be arguing over just a few days, but the record should reflect that the Intervenors had our affidavit for 28 days by the time the date was due; secondly, they had the draft SER well before, which is basically very similar to the information now contained in the attachment to the affidavit that was submitted by the Staff; thirdly, the Staff's affidavit, by and large is very similar to the information that was contained in the Applicant's affidavit, so there isn't really, I don't think, any significant new information in there, and two weeks from March 14, it would seem to me to be ample. This is particularly true, I think,

in view of the Board's indication, which we fully share, that if there is going to be -- if there is going to be any phase 3 hearing, it should be held this summer; and therefore, if there are going to be any matters that have to be litigated, they should be identified as quickly as possible.

If the Intervenors had responded to at least the Applicant's affidavit, we could at least have argued those questions today and we would know what matters, if any, we were going to have to litigate on that basis.

Since that did not happen, and the Staff obviously will need some kind of opportunity to respond to whatever the Intervenors raise before the Board rules and, therefore, there's going to be an extra step involved in that chain. So that has to be taken into account.

Secondly, I think it is very important to make sure that the Intervenors understand that the information or whatever it is they do file in response to these affidavits, similarly to the practice that the Board adopted in connection with the Issue B update, the items that they identified, that they believe they should litigate, they should provide enough information as if they were responding to a motion for summary disposition so the Board would be sure that anything that is going to be litigated there is something specific that does deserve

litigation.

(Discussion off the record.)

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: The Board will accept a filing as late as April 2nd, but it should include enough of the details so that we can evaluate whether there is a genuine issue of fact to try.

That filing should not include anything about the drug issue. You don't have to spend time repeating that. We have gotten all the information we need on the drug issue plus what you are going to file in the future, on the 28th. So we don't want to hear further arguments whether or not drugs fall within contention C. I think we've got enough on that.

This other affidavit -- doesn't have to be an affidavit, but it should be information which would at least enable us to determine whether there's another legitimate issue under Issue C.

MR. SINKIN: I just want to be clear on one thing, Mr. Chairman. Does that mean that the Board is, sua sponte, considering the allegation as possibly falling under Issue C? I can certainly ask you today to please so consider it.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: No. We have considered that you have asked that. You can put that one sentence in. What I'm saying is: I don't want to hear a reiteration of

all the arguments we have heard today. The Board is not
raising this sua sponte, but the Board thought it could
conceivably fall under that. We haven't so ruled. We
haven't decided one way or the other. But since we may be
asking you to file the information, if we consider it only
as a new contention, you'll have to file something later,
but we will try to keep into account all the varied filing
dates, varying responsibilities. But, anyway, for March
28th you'll file information on drugs, and on April 2nd,
you'll file any further information on the Applicant's and
Staff affidavits.

MR. REIS: Mr. Chairman, there is one thing, one other date. You mentioned that you canceled the hearing for May 6, I take it, or indicated you were canceling the hearing.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: I don't think anybody is going to be ready to go to hearing on May 6th.

MR. REIS: There is also a testimony filing date of April 14th, and I think ought to make it clear that we don't have to file testimony on April 14th.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: That's equally clear for all parties.

If any party foresees anything to go to hearing on on May 6th, then those dates would still hold. But I don't think anybody has described to me any issue that we

1	could go to hearing on on May 6th. Correct me if I'm wrong
2	MR. AXELRAD: Mr. Chairman, if we could go back
3	to Issue C, if the Intervenors file by April 2nd,
4	Applicants would like until April 14 to respond and suggest
5	that the Staff have until April 17th to respond. April 2nd
6	is a Wednesday. April 14th would be a Monday. And April
7	17th would be a Thursday.
8	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: The Staff usually wants five
9	days.
0	MR. REIS: I would prefer five days. The 1st
1	would be fine, if that's a Monday. It would be make it
2	the 21st, instead of the 19th.
.3	(Discussion off the record.)
4	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: I guess we will set April as
.5	the date CCANP will file; April 14 the date Applicants will
.6	file; and we'll go to April 21st for the Staff response.
7	MR. AXELRAD: There's obviously the possibility
8	that as a result of all of this there will be nothing to
.9	litigate.
20	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: That's correct.
21	MR. AXELRAD: And also the possibility there
22	will be something to litigate.
23	In view of the summer schedule for a hearing,
24	and in order that people be able to plan ahead of time,

could we at least tentatively set a period of time for the

hearings this summer so that we will know how to plan accordingly?

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: I wanted to raise one other question which may or may not produce further litigation.

First I would like to inquire of Mr. Sinkin, for the record, are you going to submit anything on the -- or have you submitted anything on the hurricane design matters that we thought had to be supplemented?

MR. SINKIN: No. We have not submitted and do not intend to submit anything on the tornado missile issue.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: With respect to the hurricane issue, the issue is still open for construction -- whether the facility has been adequately constructed to withstand hurricanes. We did not grant summary disposition on that. We held that open pending issuance of the SER, and so far the SER hasn't been issued. Do we have any latest estimate on the SER?

MR. REIS: Best estimate we have right now is early April.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Early April?

MR. REIS: Early April.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: I believe we had originally considered that CCANP should have about 30 days to look over the SER. I can't remember if that went into an order or not. It may have.

MR. REIS: I don't recall it, your Honor. I don't recall it at all. Nor do I recall that it's common practice to give any general time after a SER to comment on the SER at all.

MR. AXELRAD: I assume --

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: This would be a response -- I thought, in ruling on the hurricane issue we had put a footnote in or something saying that while we wouldn't accept new information concerning design, we would consider construction information and any information filed within 30 days would not be untimely. But maybe we didn't say that. I sort of recollected we might have.

MR. AXELRAD: It seems to me, Mr. Chairman, that reviewing the portion of the SER that deals with hurricane or tornado protection would not require 30 days, and that could clearly be done by Intervenors within a period of a week from when the SER issues.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Do any of the parties have a copy of our sixth prehearing conference order? I can't remember if I put a time in there or not.

MR. GUTTERMAN: I have the order right here,
Mr. Chairman. I'm just turning through it. If it would be
faster to hand it up, I'll be happy to do that.

Let's see -- I'm reading the footnote at page 6 of the sixth prehearing conference order. There the Board

says, "Any filing by CCANP within 30 days after the release of the SER, a discussion of this subject will not be subject to timeliness objections as long as the information relied on stems from the SER."

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: That's what I had recollected.

MR. REIS: Mr. Chairman, if this hearing is

going to go on for more than another five minutes, I have

to make a phone call for a personal reason, right now.

Otherwise my wife will kill me.

(Laughter.)

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: I think we will hold to the 30 days, and also, at least today, we won't set a date for summer. We will try to discuss it shortly and maybe have a conference call. Or we may want to see whether there are any matters that are even open for litigation before we try to set a time frame for litigating that. There may not be.

I might say on the hurricane matter, construction matter, there was one newspaper article that we were supplied by Mr. Sinkin some time ago, which raised questions as to the construction of the HVAC system, and the adequacy of that to withstand tornadoes. We may ask the parties for some comments on that after the SER issues. This was supplied to us last summer as part of an article that dealt with the cooling pond, I think.

There was another statement in there concerning

construction -- something having to do with the HVAC system not being constructed adequately to withstand hurricanes. I'm not sure whether it has any validity, but we may ask the parties to tell us what they have on this subject. I haven't looked it up yet. But I'll put you on notice that we may do that.

Also, newspaper articles supplied to us during the hearings last summer. We may at least request -- it was not specific enough for us to really know what portion of the HVAC system was being referred to, and whether it will be covered in the SER or not. So we may ask the parties to try to identify what that was, whether it has any implications for construction to withstand hurricanes.

MR. REIS: Mr. Chairman, I would appreciate it if you would send me a copy of the newspaper article. I have no idea whether I ever even received it or where it might be today, if it was just a newspaper article handed out that was not formally served. I have no idea of what this is all about or what we are talking about.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: It was formally served. In fact, in my initial draft of PID 2, I referred to it, but we may want to put it out earlier because I don't know when PID 2 will come out.

MR. REIS: If it was officially served, I'm sure I can get it.

1	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: I will call you Monday, I
2	guess, or if you come downstairs, I'll even give you the
3	reference. I'll give the other parties the reference, too,
4	if you need it. But if you want to just look at it, you
5	can.
6	MR. REIS: Okay.
7	JUDGE BECHHOEFER: I can certainly give you the
8	reference and the day it was served on us because I
9	referred to it.
0	Do we have anything further? I guess we have
1	nothing further. Any other party want to raise anything?
2	I know Mr. Reis is in a hurry now.
3	MR. AXELRAD: I do want to make sure that I note
4	a couple of things.
5	One, we received today a motion from Mr. Sinkin,
6	a motion to compel document production. I assume that
7	since that dealt with the drug use questions that similarly
8	we don't have to answer that motion because that is no
9	longer within Issue F? Am I correct, Mr. Sinkin?
0	MR. SINKIN: That's correct. Having not read
1	the motion, I assume that's correct
2	. That's correct, yes.
3	MR. AXELRAD: We have a pending motion for

MR. SINKIN: I assume there's no need to respond

summary disposition of Issue F.

24

25

to that since it has been ruled that the allegation doesn't fall under Issue F.

MR. AXELRAD: I believe the only thing
Mr. Sinkin was raising under Issue F was drug use and it's
not under there. Of course, we submitted a lot of material
with our motion for summary disposition. I just don't want
the Staff to have to answer that needlessly, or Mr. Sinkin,
if in fact, in essence, Issue F is no longer with us.

I think it's up to --

(Discussion off the record.)

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: I think that although he has said he doesn't have anything to litigate under Issue F, if Mr. Sinkin should respond -- motions for summary disposition have to be satisfactory on their face. I haven't looked at it, so I don't want to preclude him from filing a response.

Certainly I would say if Mr. Sinkin doesn't respond, and the Staff certainly doesn't have to respond --

MR. REIS: The trouble is on a motion for summary disposition, the Staff's reply is due at the same time. All replies are due at the same time.

JUDGE BECHHOEFER: You are right.

MR. SINKIN: Why don't we handle that one this way: Let me look at it tomorrow, over the weekend, whatever, talk to Ed early next week and notify the parties

ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

> if we intend to respond. If we don't intend to respond, 1 2 nobody needs to respond. MR. REIS: That would be fine. 3 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: I think that's satisfactory. 4 I have skimmed it, but I haven't really read it in enough 5 detail to know whether it is satisfactory or not. 6 7 MR. AXELRAD: The only other thing I wanted to 8 ask the Board is whether you would have any ability to give 9 us any kind of an estimate as to when you might be ready to rule on the pending motions to reopen phase 2; when you 10 11 might issue the decision on phase 2; and when you might 12 rule on your order to show cause to Mr. Sinkin? 13 (Discussion off the record.) 14 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: It's hard for me to predict. 15 I would say at least another month. 16 MR. AXELRAD: On all three? 17 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Pardon? 18 MR. AXELRAD: On all three items? 19 JUDGE BECHHOEFER: Yes. I can't predict exactly.

Is there anything further? If not, the hearing hearing conference will be adjourned. We'll issue an order as soon as we can.

(Whereupon, at 5:35 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.)

25

23

24

CERTIFICATE OF OFFICIAL REPORTER

This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION in the matter of:

NAME OF PROCEEDING: HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER COMPANY, et al.

(South Texas Project, Units 1 & 2)

DOCKET NO.:

STN 50-498 OL; STN 50-499 OL

PLACE:

BETHESDA, MARYLAND

DATE:

FRIDAY, MARCH 21, 1986

were held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript thereof for the file of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

(TYPED)

JOEL BREITNER

Official Reporter
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
Reporter's Affiliation