

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Report Nos. 50-266/85016(DRS); 50-301/85016(DRS)

Docket Nos. 50-266; 50-301

License Nos. DPR-24; DPR-27


Licensee: Wisconsin Electric Power Company
231 West Michigan
Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53023

Facility Name: Point Beach, Units 1 & 2

Inspection At: Two Creeks, Wisconsin


Inspection Conducted: August 26 and 27, 1985

Inspector: W. E. Milbrot



9/16/85
Date

Approved By: W. G. Guldemond, Chief
Operational Programs Section



9/16/85
Date

Inspection Summary

Inspection on August 26 and 27, 1985 (Report No. 50-266/85016(DRS);
50-301/85016(DRS))

Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection of licensee actions on previous inspection findings, program on reactor cooling system leak rate testing and licensee actions regarding IE Bulletin 84-03. The inspection involved a total of 14 inspector-hours onsite by one NRC inspector.

Results: No violations or deviations were identified.

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DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

- *J. Zach, Manager, Point Beach Nuclear Plant
- *J. Reisenbuechler, Superintendent Technical Services
- *G. Maxfield, Superintendent, Operations
- *J. Schweitzer, Mechanical Maintenance Engineer
- W. Fromm, Nuclear Engineer
- M. Moylan, Project Engineer

*Denotes those attending the August 27, 1985 exit.

Additional plant technical and administrative personnel were contacted during the cause of the inspection.

2. Action of Previous Inspection Findings

- a. (Closed) Violation (266/85001-03(DRS); 301/85001-03(DRS)):
Calibrated stopwatches were not required by inservice testing surveillance procedures. The licensee procured several stopwatches and had them serialized and calibrated. Procedures that require the use of a stopwatch have been revised to require that the stopwatch serial number be recorded. The stopwatches are calibrated every twelve months in accordance with Test Instrument Calibration Procedure, ICP 8.1, Revision 0, and an evaluation is required if a stopwatch is found out of calibration.
- b. (Closed) Open Item (266/84-01-02(DRS)): This item documents the fact that the licensee had no documented program for the protection of ultrasonic (UT) calibration blocks. The licensee has implemented Appendix F, Revision 0, "Protection and Control of PBNP UT Calibration Standards," of Long-Term Inservice Examination Plan for Class 1, Class 2, and Class 3 Components and Systems at PBNP, Unit 1, which provides protection and control requirements of UT calibration standards during storage, in transit and when in use. The Inservice Inspection Engineer has cognizance of the standards.

3. Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Leak Rate Surveillance Review

The inspector reviewed Operating Instruction OI-55, Revision 2, "Primary Leak Rate Calculation," to ensure that acceptance criteria were specified, calculation techniques used by the licensee were adequate for determining RCS leak rate, and leak rate results were adequately evaluated and met acceptance criteria. RCS leak rate results calculated by the computer program and the manual method were well below the one GPM requirement of Technical Specification 15.3.1.D.1.

Paragraph 4 of OI-55 states, in part, "At time near end of selected time interval, adjust Tave and T(error) meter to the same reading as recorded as in time one by moving rods, or diluting or borating, if necessary."

A review of RCS leak rate data noted that final Tave and T(error) values recorded were not always adjusted as required by the procedure to be the same as the initial values recorded. Also, no information was noted on the data sheet to account for this difference. The licensee reported that reactor coolant temperature differences were incorporated into the computer calculations but not the manual calculations and to have final Tave and T(error) to read exactly the same as initial values may not always be practical because of other plant considerations. The licensee also reported that when RCS leak rate equaled one GPM, (computer or hand calculated results), a complete review of safety implications is initiated. The inspector agrees with the accuracy of the computer RCS leak rate calculations and the fact that it may not always be desirable to adjust temperature readings. However, when plant conditions are such that it is prudent not to adjust final Tave and T(error) to agree with the initial values to calculate leak rate the procedure should provide some guidance and documentation to support the decision. This item is open (266/85016(DRS); 301/85016-01(DRS)) pending action by the licensee to revise the procedure.

No violations or deviations were identified.

4. Followup on IE Bulletin 84-03, Refueling Cavity Water Fuel

As a result of Haddam Neck reactor cavity drain down event of August 21, 1984, the licensee has evaluated the potential for and consequences of a reactor cavity water seal failure at PBNP. Information regarding this review is covered in previous Inspection Reports (266/84-18(DRP); 301/84-16(DRP)). The following additional areas were reviewed by the inspector:

- a. Cavity Seal O-Ring Receipt Inspection. This inspection includes a visual inspection for apparent damage, durometer rating and dimensional check.
- b. Cavity Seal Assembly Installation Inspection. Four new O-ring seals are used for each refueling. The O-ring grooves are cleaned prior to installing the O-rings following good plant practice.
- c. O-Ring Seal Testing. After the Cavity Seal Assembly is installed the refueling cavity is flooded to just above the Seal Plate and a visual inspection for leakage is conducted. An evaluation is made to establish corrective action if leakage is noted.
- d. Reactor Cavity Drain. The licensee reported that the cavity drain line cannot be identified as seismic Category I, without conducting an engineering analysis. To support this condition the licensee installed inserts into the drain lines to reduce the pipe size. Also, a remotely operated leak limiting flapper valve has been installed over the drain line for Unit 1 and scheduled for Unit 2. The Fuel Transfer Canal drain line is seismic Category I. The Spent Fuel Pool has no drain line.

- e. Training of Refueling Personnel Regarding Cavity Seal Failure. IEB Bulletin 84-03 and licensee evaluation of the problem are required study material for all refueling personnel. This information is part of the training package.
- f. Alternate Refueling Cavity Drain Paths. PBNP uses administrative procedures to prevent the use of temporary dams and seals as a water boundary to support maintenance work.

No violations or deviations were identified.

5. Open Items

Open items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which will be reviewed further by the inspector, and which involve some action on the part of the NRC or licensee or both. Open items disclosed during the inspection are discussed in Paragraph 3.

6. Exit Interview

The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) on August 27, 1985, to discuss the scope and findings of the inspection. The licensee acknowledged the statements made by the inspector with respect to items discussed in the report. The inspector also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspector during the inspection. The licensee did not identify any such documents/processes as proprietary.