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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD

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In the Matter of )

CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY )  
and NORTH CAROLINA EASTERN )  
MUNICIPAL POWER AGENCY )

(Shearon Harris Nuclear Power )  
Plant) )

Docket No. 50-400 OL

APPLICANTS' RESPONSE TO EDDLEMAN  
PROPOSED CONTENTIONS BASED ON EXERCISE

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I. INTRODUCTION

On May 17 and 18, 1985, the pre-licensing full participation emergency planning exercise, required by 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E, § IV.F, was conducted for the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant. The exercise involved the participation of Carolina Power & Light Company, the State of North Carolina, and the four counties within the plume emergency planning zone ("EPZ") -- Wake, Chatham, Harnett and Lee Counties. By all accounts, the exercise was a success, enabling FEMA to find "reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can be taken to protect [public] health and safety" in the event of a radiological emergency at Harris." See FEMA August 7, 1985 Memorandum, To Edward L. Jordan (NRC), From Richard W. Krimm (FEMA), re: Interim Findings on Offsite Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness for the Shearon Harris Nuclear

Power Station.<sup>1/</sup> Nevertheless, on September 30, 1985, intervenor Wells Eddleman filed proposed "Contentions Based on Emergency Planning Exercise," (hereinafter "Proposed Contentions"). For the reasons stated below, Applicants oppose the admission of Mr. Eddleman's proposed contentions.

## II. STANDARDS GOVERNING LATE-FILED CONTENTIONS

The Commission's Rules of Practice, at 10 C.F.R. § 2.714, require that a petitioner set forth the basis for each contention with reasonable specificity. This standard requires that a contention state a cognizable issue with particularity, Alabama Power Co. (Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-182, 7 A.E.C. 210, 216-17 (1974), and that a petitioner provide a "reason" for its concern. Houston Lighting and Power Co. (Allens Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-590, 11 N.R.C. 542, 548 (1980).

As a general proposition, a Licensing Board should not address the merits of a contention in determining admissibility. Id. However, a contention and its basis may be scrutinized to determine if a litigable issue has been pleaded. Two purposes of the basis with specificity requirement are "to help assure at the pleading state that the hearing process is not improperly invoked," and "to assure that the proposed issues

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<sup>1/</sup> This document was a part of Board Notification 85-078 (August 21, 1985), which included the FEMA Exercise Report and the FEMA Interim Findings Report.

are proper for adjudication in that particular proceeding." Philadelphia Electric Co. (Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3), ALAB-216, 8 A.E.C. 13, 20-21 (1974). In this regard, a contention must be material to those findings which precede licensing, as set forth in 10 C.F.R. § 50.57. See Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-106, 16 N.R.C. 1649, 1654-55 (1982).<sup>2/</sup> With respect to the matters raised here by Mr. Eddleman, we note that a perfect emergency planning exercise is not a precondition for an operating license under the Commission's regulations. What is required instead is a finding of "reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency." 10 C.F.R. § 50.47(a)(1). Accordingly, an emergency planning contention is not litigable in an operating license proceeding unless it would cast doubt on this finding.

In other words, an intervenor, in setting forth the basis for its proposed contention, must establish a nexus between the

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<sup>2/</sup> Not only must the contention be relevant to the Board's ultimate findings, but it must provide a foundation sufficient to warrant further exploration. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Peach Bottom Atomic Station, Units 2 & 3), ALAB-216, 8 A.E.C. 13, 21 (1974); Duquesne Light Co. (Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 1), ALAB-109, 6 A.E.C. 243, 246 (1973). See also Seabrook Station, supra, LBP-82-106, 15 N.R.C. 1649, 1655 (citing Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-74-5, 7 A.E.C. 19, 32 n.27 (1974); rev'd sub nom., Aeschliman v. NRC, 547 F.2d 622 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rev'd sub nom., Vermont Yankee Nuclear Corp. v. NRDC, 434 U.S. 519, 553-54 (1978)), for the proposition that a contention must be sufficient to require reasonable minds to inquire further.

substance of the contention and the statutory and regulatory scope of the Board's jurisdiction. Seabrook Station, *supra*, LBP-82-106, 16 N.R.C. 1649, 1654. With respect to any safety issue (such as emergency planning), the intervenor must specify a regulation with which applicant is allegedly not complying, and must provide sufficient detail to permit the Board to determine how the regulation is being violated; or the intervenor should allege with particularity the existence and detail of a substantial safety issue on which the regulations are silent. *Id.* at 1656. This requirement is often referred to as the "legal basis" or "regulatory basis" for a contention.

Contentions may also be scrutinized to eliminate those that are based on factual inaccuracies or misrepresentations. This scrutiny is readily distinguishable from the proscription in Allens Creek, ALAB-590, *supra*. Allens Creek prohibited Licensing Boards from rebutting a source or reference proffered in support of a contention, but it did not prohibit rejecting a contention when such source material is fictitious or misrepresented. See Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-765, 19 N.R.C. 645, 652-56 (1984), in which the Appeal Board affirmed the rejection of proposed contentions, noting that "the laws of physics and the physical properties of \* \* \* unirradiated fuel \* \* \* deprive [Intervenor's] purported contentions of any credible or arguable basis"; Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-43A, 15 N.R.C. 1423, 1504-05

(1982), in which the Licensing Board rejected a contention because of factual inaccuracies in the allegations; Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-82-107A, 16 N.R.C. 1791, 1804 (1982), in which a Licensing Board rejected a contention because it seriously mischaracterized the draft environmental statement; Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), LBP-82-119A, 16 N.C.R. 2069, 2076 (1982), in which this Licensing Board rejected contentions which inaccurately described the applicants' proposals. Thus, the Licensing Board here may properly inquire into the full context of a proffered statement of factual basis. Such inquiry is in essence a determination as to whether the referenced factual basis actually exists, and whether it supports the proposed contention; the inquiry is not a determination as to whether the factual basis is "right" or "wrong."

In addition to the normal pleading requirements, 10 C.F.R. § 2.714 sets out five factors that must be balanced in admitting a late-filed contention; and a contention is untimely if it is filed later than fifteen days prior to the 10 C.F.R. § 2.751a special prehearing conference. 10 C.F.R. § 2.714(b); Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-83-19, 17 N.R.C. 1041, 1043 n.2 (1983). The five factors are:

- i) Good cause, if any, for failure to file on time.
- ii) The availability of other means whereby the petitioner's interest will be protected.
- iii) The extent to which the petitioner's participation may reasonably be expected to assist in developing a sound record.

- iv) The extent to which the petitioner's interest will be represented by existing parties.
- v) The extent to which the petitioner's participation will broaden the issues or delay the proceedings.

10 C.F.R. § 2.714(a)(1)(i)-(v).

In Catawba, supra, CLI-83-19, the Commission enunciated two fundamental principles underlying the five-factors analysis: first, a petitioner has the obligation of uncovering information in publicly available documentary material; and second, there is a substantial public interest in efficient and expeditious administrative proceedings. Id. at 1048 (citing WSTE-TV, Inc. v. FCC, 566 F.2d 333, 337 (D.C. Cir. 1977)). The Commission also adopted a three-part test for determining whether good cause exists. Good cause exists if a contention:

1. is wholly dependent upon the content of a particular document;
2. could not be advanced with any degree of specificity (if at all) in advance of the public availability of that document; and
3. is tendered with the requisite degree of promptness once the document comes into existence and is accessible for public examination.

Id. at 1043-44. Although this test specifically addresses documentary material, it is equally applicable to any other source allegedly providing new information.

Unlike the assessment of basis in determining the admissibility of a contention, evaluation of the five lateness factors entails an assessment of the merits of the claims made.

Florida Power & Light Co. (St. Lucie Plant, Unit No. 2),



CLI-78-12, 7 N.R.C. 939, 948-49 (1978). In St. Lucie, the Commission stated:

In considering untimely petitions licensing boards are required to assess \* \* \* whether the petitioner has "made a substantial showing of good cause for failure to file on time." In doing so, Boards must necessarily consider the merits of claims going to that issue.

Id. The Commission therefore upheld the consideration of affidavits.<sup>3/</sup>

Similarly, in Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-83-30, 17 N.R.C. 1132, 1141-42 (1983), a Licensing Board considered affidavits and held an on-the-record conference in assessing the lateness factors. With respect to factor (iii), the Board held: "the extent to which petitioner's participation may reasonably be expected to assist in developing a sound record is only meaningful when the proposed participation is on a significant, triable issue;" and with respect to factor (iv), the Board held, "the extent to which petitioner's participation will broaden the issues or delay a proceeding is properly balanced against the significance of the issue."<sup>4/</sup> Id. at 1143 (emphasis supplied).<sup>5/</sup>

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<sup>3/</sup> This ruling parallels the customary practice of considering affidavits for and against motions to reopen a record. See, e.g., Diablo Canyon, *supra*, ALAB-756, 18 N.R.C. 1340, in which the Appeal Board considered affidavits on a motion to reopen the record on quality assurance.

<sup>4/</sup> "If significance and triability of the issue were not inherently part of the overall balancing test for late-filed con-

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### III. APPLICATION OF THE STANDARDS

#### A. Proposed Contentions -- Basis With Specificity

Mr. Eddleman cites three documents in support of his proposed contentions -- the FEMA Exercise Report, the State's internal evaluation of the exercise, and the State's log of messages from the exercise.<sup>6/</sup> To be sure, the documents Mr.

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(Continued)

tentions, the illogical result would be that the significance of an issue could not weigh the balance in favor of admitting a late-filed contention before the close of the record, but could weigh in favor of admitting the same contention filed even later, after the close of the record." LBP-83-30, 17 N.R.C. at 1143-44.

<sup>5/</sup> See also Detroit Edison Co. (Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2, LBP-82-96, 16 N.R.C. 1408, 1429-35, aff'd, ALAB-707, 16 N.R.C. 1760, 1766 n.5 (1982)). In this case, the Licensing Board resolved an untimely petition by making findings of fact with reference to a transcript of a public hearing. The transcript had been attached to applicants' answer to the petition. The Board criticized the petitioner for failing to offer factual support for its assertions and based its rejection of the petition in part on the "clear evidence" submitted by applicants. Id. at 1432-33.

<sup>6/</sup> Mr. Eddleman has greatly increased the burden on the Board and the parties by his failure to either cite specifically, or to provide to the Board and the parties, the latter two documents on which he relies. As the Appeal Board has observed elsewhere:

The Licensing Board properly criticized [Intervenor] for failing either to cite specifically, or to provide to the Board and parties the documents on which it bases its contention. \* \* \* [I]f [Intervenor] intended to rely on certain documents as the basis for its contention \* \* \*, it was obliged to provide them to the Board

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Eddleman references note areas where emergency planning can be improved -- as well as areas where performance is praised. Yet, recognizing that there are areas where emergency planning still can be improved, FEMA nevertheless made the overall finding of adequacy required by the Commission's emergency planning regulations:

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and the parties, or, at a minimum, to describe them with reasonable specificity so as to facilitate locating them. Without the documents, the Board could hardly make a judgment as to whether they provide a basis for [Intervenor's] contention.

Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-804, 21 N.R.C. 587, 592 (1985) (emphasis supplied).

In the instant case, Applicants obtained from the State copies of the voluminous materials produced by the State in response to Mr. Eddleman's request. Applicants next reviewed those materials to determine specifically which of the documents Mr. Eddleman had cited. Applicants then provided those materials to the NRC Staff, and enclose them here for the convenience of the Licensing Board. See Attachments 1 and 2, "Evaluation Report, Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Exercise, May 17-18, 1985" (the State's internal evaluation of the exercise, hereinafter "State Exercise Report") and the State's message log and corresponding numbered State Emergency Response Team's Message Forms (which Mr. Eddleman terms "State EOC Messages"). (Note that Applicants have here enclosed only those messages which Mr. Eddleman cites or which are referenced herein.)

In late August, the NRC provided the Board and all parties with copies of Board Notification 85-078, dated August 21, 1985, re: "Interim Findings On Offsite Radiological Emergency Response Plants and Preparedness For The Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Station," which included (as Attachment 1 thereto) the "FEMA Exercise Report."

\* \* \* that the State and local emergency plans are adequate and capable of being implemented; and \* \* \* that offsite preparedness is adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can be taken to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Station in the event of a radiological emergency.

Compare FEMA August 7, 1985 Memorandum, To Edward L. Jordan (NRC), From Richard W. Krimm (FEMA), with 10 C.F.R. § 50.47(a)(1) and (2).

Mr. Eddleman's 12 proposed contentions are nothing more than a litany of select quotations and references to the three cited documents. There is no assertion that any of the items identified in the proposed contentions results in non-compliance with the applicable emergency planning regulations. Certainly Mr. Eddleman has offered no basis to undermine FEMA's finding that -- notwithstanding room for improvement in a number of areas -- the Commission's regulations have been met. Simply stated, Mr. Eddleman's proposed contentions lack "regulatory basis," for they are litigable only if asserted to be necessary for compliance with regulations. Anything more is beyond the jurisdiction of the Board. As the Catawba Licensing Board recently explained:

We are a body of limited authority with a responsibility to determine if the emergency response planning is in conformity with regulatory standards. Although we recognize Intervenor's "desire that the level of emergency preparedness for those residing near the Catawba Nuclear Station be enhanced to the maximum extent possible," our function is not to require that measures be taken which exceed the

Commission's requirements. The agency is charged with establishing standards that are adequate to preserve the public's health and safety. We accept that the Commission's laws, rules and regulations establish requirements that will accomplish the intended purpose. Our role is not to substitute other standards for those set by the Commission, which are binding upon us.

Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-84-37, 20 N.R.C. 933, 940 (1984), aff'd, ALAB-813, 22 N.R.C. 59 (1985).

Mr. Eddleman's failure to explain how (if at all) the matters identified in his proposed contentions challenge FEMA's finding is particularly grave given the reliance on that finding which is inherent in the NRC's regulatory scheme. The Commission itself has emphasized:

As a matter of practice, the Commission gives great weight to FEMA's views on the need for and adequacy of specific offsite protective planning measures.

Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), CLI-83-10, 17 N.R.C. 528, 533 (1983) (citations omitted), rev'd sub nom. (as to interpretation of 10 C.F.R. § 50.47(b)(12)), GUARD v. NRC, 753 F.2d 1144 (1985).

The Commission's reliance on FEMA's expertise is expressly embodied in the regulations, at 10 C.F.R. § 50.47(a)(2):

The NRC will base its [overall finding on emergency preparedness] on a review of the \* \* \* FEMA findings and determinations as to whether State and local plans are adequate and whether there is reasonable assurance that they can be implemented, and on the NRC assessment [of onsite preparedness]. \* \* \* In any NRC licensing proceeding, a FEMA finding will constitute a

rebuttable presumption on questions of adequacy and implementation capability.

Given the weight attached to FEMA's finding, it was incumbent upon Mr. Eddleman to provide some specific explanation for the implication that FEMA erred in making its finding of adequacy by (allegedly) underestimating the gravity of the matters he raises. Mr. Eddleman's failure to offer any such explanation renders his proposed contentions fatally defective.

Rejection of all of Mr. Eddleman's proposed contentions on the above-stated ground would be completely consistent with the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals in UCS v. NRC, 735 F.2d 1437 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The Court there invalidated an NRC rule precluding litigation of the emergency preparedness exercise. Nevertheless, the Court took pains to point out that not all exercise observations need be subject to litigation:

Our decision that the hearing requirement \* \* \* includes factual issues raised about the preparedness exercises is not overly restrictive. \* \* \* [C]ertainly the Commission can limit that hearing to issues -- not already litigated -- that it considers material to its decision.

\* \* \* [T]he hearing requirement does not unduly limit the Commission's wide discretion to structure its licensing hearings in the interests of speed and efficiency. For example, the Commission argues \* \* \* that the exercise is only relevant to its licensing decision to the extent it indicates that emergency preparedness plans are fundamentally flawed, and is not relevant as to minor or ad hoc problems occurring on the exercise day. Today, we in no way restrict the Commission's authority to adopt this as a substantive licensing standard.

734 F.2d at 1147-48 (emphasis supplied; footnotes omitted).

Thus, under the test advanced by the Commission before the Court in UCS,<sup>7/</sup> Mr. Eddleman was required to provide some basis to suggest that -- FEMA's finding notwithstanding -- the items raised in the proposed contentions evidence "fundamental flaws" in offsite emergency preparedness.<sup>8/</sup> As discussed above, Mr. Eddleman has not even attempted such a showing.

Finally, it is not clear how a hearing would further illuminate the issues Mr. Eddleman has raised. As FEMA points out, the minor deficiencies identified through the exercise

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<sup>7/</sup> The application of such a test does not preclude litigation of exercise-related contentions under other situations. For example, FEMA occasionally is not able to make a "reasonable assurance" finding, due to one or more major deficiencies identified in an exercise. Under the test advanced by the Commission (above), litigable contentions could be framed based on those deficiencies.

Similarly, even where (as here) FEMA identifies no major deficiencies (and therefore makes a "reasonable assurance" finding), an intervenor might frame a litigable contention by explaining how FEMA's finding is (allegedly) in error, and providing some basis for the assertion that FEMA has failed to appreciate the gravity of a specific problem in the exercise. Mr. Eddleman has failed to do this. Rather, he has simply compiled a "laundry list" of exercise observations, without regard to the context of those observations -- particularly the conclusions of overall adequacy.

<sup>8/</sup> The limitation of exercise-related litigation to "fundamental flaws" in preparedness is consonant with existing Commission case law on general emergency planning matters. For example, the Appeal Board has emphasized that litigation is to focus on whether the emergency plan "itself satisfies the 16 more broadly drafted standards of 10 C.F.R. § 50.47(b)." Licensing hearings are not to become "bogged down with litigation" about the details of planning. See Louisiana Power and Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), ALAB-732, 17 N.R.C. 1076, 1107 (1983).

\* \* \* can be corrected through training and additional resources. These deficiencies did not detract from the overall capability demonstrated by the State of North Carolina and Wake, Chatham, Harnett, and Lee Counties to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency. \* \* \* [FEMA Region IV] will assure completion by the State of the necessary corrective actions.

In these circumstances, where problems already are acknowledged and corrective actions committed to, there is no demonstrable advantage to the development of an evidentiary record on the subject. Mr. Eddleman does not contend that the concerns he discusses cannot be corrected.

These reasons alone compel rejection of all of Mr. Eddleman's 12 proposed contentions. Nevertheless, Applicants below present additional arguments specific to the individual proposed contentions.

#### EPX-1

Timely notification of radiation releases is not assured, e.g. in light of the approximate 42 minutes delay in notifying SEET [sic; SERT] of an uncontrolled radiation release during the exercise (State EOC evaluation by NC State Govt Evaluator). Without timely notice to emergency response personnel, the emergency management agencies cannot adequately protect the public from radiation releases.

This proposed contention lacks basis in fact. Although Mr. Eddleman accurately cites the State Exercise Report, that report is simply in error. As indicated in State EOC Message 212, the release began at approximately 12:36, and was



discussed in the State Emergency Response Team ("SERT") briefing which had commenced only moments before, at approximately 12:35. See State EOC Message 207 (which documents that briefing, and notes the report that "Release is underway, venting from Stack 1"). These messages conclusively demonstrate that the State received immediate notification of the release. The timeliness of notification is further supported by the FEMA Exercise Report, which notes, at page 8, that "[r]adiological and plant data were readily obtained from CP&L with no apparent delays or omissions." EPX-1 therefore lacks any factual basis, and must be rejected.

#### EPX-2

Communications deficiencies revealed in the exercise could have severe bad effects in a real emergency, including lack of effective communications and radiation monitoring results, lack of contact with field and ground units, etc. For example, [a] the emergency inter-system mutual aid frequency was so overloaded the state's communications evaluator stated it was "proved that there could be absolutely no communications with ground units on this frequency due to constant misuse." Other examples: [b] The Highway Patrol evaluator found "communication inadequacies; equipment . . . is not yet capable of adequately handling the impact of so many units responding to an emergency of this type."; [c] Harnett County had "insufficient telephones"; [d] "[E]xtra radio traffic overloaded personnel on duty" in Chatham County; [e] "excessive delays" in Emergency Medical Services Office receiving messages from SERT (State Emergency Response Team); [f] communications from the mobile radiation lab had to be relayed to base station at times, which "always introduces the possibility of delayed and/or incorrect information" according to the State Radiation Protection Section evaluator.

In EPX-2, Mr. Eddleman strings together a series of diverse, relatively minor communications problems, and opines (with no basis) that they "could have severe bad effects in a real emergency." In fact, the only significant communications concern identified by FEMA's comprehensive review was the need for additional telephones for Harnett County emergency response (which Applicants have denominated EPX-2(c) above). See FEMA Exercise Report, at 24-25. And, even with "far too few telephones for a 'real-world' emergency," FEMA noted that "the players at the [Harnett County] EOC made the very best of a bad physical situation. \* \* \* [W]ith the participation of the amateur radio emergency system, overall communications capabilities were good to excellent."<sup>9/</sup> FEMA Exercise Report, at 24 (emphasis supplied).

In any event, FEMA has identified the problem in Harnett County as a deficiency, and FEMA Region IV has committed to "assure completion by the State of the necessary corrective actions." See FEMA August 7, 1985 Memorandum, To Edward L. Jordan (NRC), From Richard W. Krimm (FEMA). With that exception, FEMA has determined that the regulatory standard governing emergency communications was adequately demonstrated

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<sup>9/</sup> It is worth noting that Harnett County emergency response operated out of a basement hallway, as a temporary facility for purposes of the exercise. The Assembly Room in the County Managers Office Building will serve as the County EOC in future exercises, and in the event of a real emergency. Communications facilities there will be greatly enhanced.

during the May 1985 exercise. And, even as to the situation in Harnett County, FEMA concluded that, "[a]lthough this deficiency should be corrected, the lack of this equipment is not significant enough to seriously hamper emergency response in Harnett County." FEMA Interim Findings Report, at 9. Thus, there is no regulatory basis for any part of EPX-2, and it must be rejected in its entirety.

### EPX-3

CP&L emergency medical personnel do not have adequate equipment available (e.g. splints) to treat fractures, and have not demonstrated the ability to maintain a high level of patient care while preventing contamination of themselves and the environment. (Ref: State of NC's on-site evaluation of Emergency Medical Operations).

Mr. Eddleman's reliance on the State Exercise Report as an evaluation of the capabilities of CP&L's first aid team is misplaced. Because this portion of the exercise was conducted on the Harris plant site, the state official whose comments are cited was only an observer -- not an evaluator -- of that portion of the exercise. Those with responsibility for the official evaluation of that portion of the exercise were the NRC Staff evaluators, who were likely more familiar with the objectives of that part of the exercise and the specific medical scenario presented. The NRC Staff evaluation concluded:

This area was observed to determine that arrangements were made for medical services for contaminated injured individuals as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(12), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654, Section II.L.

An inspector observed the emergency medical rescue activities at the accident scene, and treatment by the staff at the Rex Hospital. In all portions of the exercise, acceptable judgement was displayed with regard to first aid practices, decontamination of the patient, and contamination control. The inspector had no further questions in this area. No violations or deviations were identified.

NRC Inspection Report No. 50-400/85-20 (June 5, 1985).<sup>10/</sup> Indeed, even the state observer noted that the first aid team's response was "generally adequate," and that "[a]ll CP&L personnel performed professionally during the drill \* \* \*." See State Exercise Report, at 3. Accordingly, there can be no suggestion that the regulations and the regulatory guidance have not been met. EPX-3 is lacking in basis.

#### EPX-4

Lee County's decontamination training and practice are not adequate. For example, evaluation revealed that the group of decontaminators indicated "they had not been trained and were unsure what to do. They appeared to have no knowledge in the use of the instruments, no consideration was given to collecting water and attempting to control contamination. None of the personnel (knew) . . . 'when is decontamination complete'" (Lee County evaluation). This problem must be remedied by training and retesting to assure people evacuating in this area can be decontaminated and that Lee County's volunteers and other personnel are assuredly able to carry out first-class decontamination work.

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<sup>10/</sup> This inspection report was earlier referenced at page 9, note 3 of "Applicants' Response To Eddleman Proposed Contentions on Notification of State and Local Emergency Management Agencies" (August 23, 1985), and is here enclosed as Attachment 3, for the convenience of the Board.

The thrust of EPX-4 is the first sentence -- that "Lee County's decontamination training and practice are not adequate." But that sentence is not supported by the remainder of the contention, which reflects the true circumstances: for whatever reason, some of the individuals performing decontamination during the exercise "had not been trained." Thus, there is no problem with the quality of decontamination training;<sup>11/</sup> these particular individuals need only receive it. And Lee County has already committed to the training. See FEMA Public Meeting Tr. 91. The FEMA Interim Findings Report, at page 14, therefore concluded that the applicable regulatory standard "was evaluated as adequate" in the exercise.

Accordingly, EPX-4 must be rejected. It is not supported by the factual basis which Mr. Eddleman cites and, moreover, lacks regulatory basis.

#### EPX-5

Emergency siren activation is inadequate and there is no reliable means assuring that Wake County emergency response personnel will know when the sirens have been activated. Ref: Wake County evaluation by State of NC "some method should be devised to determine if emergency warning sirens have been activated"; State EOC messages 53, 122, 160, 166, 176, 182, 205; numerous areas had sirens not sounding, sounding of sirens was delayed about 40 minutes and there appeared to be initial confusion over confirmation.

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<sup>11/</sup> The quality of the training is perhaps best evidenced by the lack of problems in the other counties, where the training had been completed prior to the exercise.

As Mr. Eddleman indicates, there were a number of problems with the siren system during the exercise. What Mr. Eddleman fails to note is that the exercise was not intended to be a formal test of the siren system. Indeed, as the FEMA Interim Findings Report indicates, at page 8, "[t]he official FEMA testing of the Alert and Notification System has not yet been conducted." The sirens were activated during the exercise to provide an element of realism, to acquaint the public with the sirens' sound, and to provide an opportunity for CP&L and State and local officials to identify any problems with the newly-installed system prior to the formal FEMA testing of the system. See generally FEMA Public Meeting Tr. 77-78 (problems will be corrected before official FEMA testing of siren system). EPX-5 thus reflects fundamental misperceptions of the regulatory scheme and the purpose of the exercise and must be rejected as lacking in basis.

#### EPX-6

Management and coordination of rumor control were inadequate (FEMA exercise report, e.g. at 13, see discussion at 11-13) especially in that there was no announcement of the early Harris Lake evacuation (necessary to avoid panic, FEMA, p.12); likewise the General Emergency was not publicly announced for almost an hour after it was declared (FEMA, p.12). With the General Emergency declared but unannounced, public knowledge (e.g. from emergency personnel and radio-frequency scanners and listeners) could also spread panic. (FEMA report received 8/30/85).

As Mr. Eddleman indicates, problems were experienced with

the public information function during the course of the exercise. However, FEMA has already identified these items as deficiencies (FEMA Interim Findings Report, at 10), and FEMA Region IV has committed to "assure completion by the State of the necessary corrective actions." See FEMA August 7, 1985 Memorandum, To Edward L. Jordan (NRC), From Richard W. Krimm (FEMA). Moreover, FEMA has concluded that "[a]lthough these deficiencies should be corrected, they are not significant enough to seriously hamper emergency response." FEMA Interim Findings Report, at 11. EPX-6 must therefore be rejected.

#### EPX-7

Radiation dose assessments were not promptly communicated to State Emergency Response personnel, data files were delayed up to half an hour, and coordinates of Traffic Control Points (TCPs) were not tabulated to allow faster calculation of doses giving allowable "stay times" at those TCPs. (FEMA, pp.8-9). All such deficiencies need to be remedied to protect the health and safety of the public, which depends on accurate and timely radiation dose assessment.

A review of the language in § 2.1.2 of the FEMA Exercise Report (page 9), to which Mr. Eddleman refers, indicates that there were technical difficulties with the "hard copy" transmittal of computerized data files of dose assessment data. Nevertheless, the information necessary for decision-making was transmitted verbally on a timely basis, so that the "hard copy" transmission problems had no potential adverse impact on public health and safety. Moreover, the problem was resolved over

time, as personnel became more familiar with the system, so that the system was operating smoothly later in the second day of the exercise. See FEMA Exercise Report, § 2.1.2 (page 9). Further, FEMA has already identified the problems with "hard copy" transmission of dose assessment data as a deficiency, noting that the problem can be resolved through additional training. (FEMA Exercise Report, at 9); and FEMA Region IV has committed to "assure completion by the State of the necessary corrective actions." See FEMA August 7, 1985 Memorandum, To Edward L. Jordan (NRC), From Richard W. Krimm (FEMA). Finally, FEMA has concluded that "[a]lthough this deficiency should be corrected, it is not significant enough to seriously hinder emergency response." FEMA Interim Findings Report, at 19. Accordingly, the first part of EPX-7 lacks regulatory basis.

With respect to the tabulation of the coordinates of Traffic Control Points ("TCPs"), it should be noted that the exercise scenario did not call for projections at the TCPs. The Radiation Protection Section ("RPS") elected to add those projections to the exercise, even though the TCP coordinates had not yet been obtained from the Highway Patrol, to see if a particular part of a new computer program would function as designed. Since the exercise, RPS has been working closely with the Highway Patrol to make better use of this aspect of RPS's dose assessment capability. In any event, as the FEMA Exercise Report notes (at page 9), the delay involved in tabulating the TCP coordinates was "brief." The section of the FEMA Interim



Findings Report which relates to radiological exposure control for emergency workers therefore concluded that the applicable regulatory standard "is adequately addressed in the plans and was evaluated as adequate during the May 1985 exercise." Thus, the second part of EPX-7 is also without basis.

Accordingly, EPX-7 should be rejected in its entirety.

#### EPX-8

Emergency Broadcast System use was incomplete and ineffectively managed (FEMA, 2.3.1. (2), page 13; see p.12 discussion). Inadequacies include procedures for activation and use of the EBS (before the State assumes control); inadequate coverage of the emergency area and emergency response area, incomplete messages and instructions to the public. (Ref: FEMA report received 8/30/85 Board Notification 85-078) Numerous problems with EBS activation mentioned on pp.17-18 of the same report also need to be identified and rectified. All these problems must be resolved to ensure timely and effective notice to the public about nuclear/radiation emergencies so that the public can be protected in such emergencies.

While problems with the EBS system were initially encountered in the exercise, the problems were generally resolved with time. For example, the FEMA Exercise Report specifically notes, at page 18, that "[a]ctivation of the EBS did improve as the emergency continued." Moreover, viewed in context, the problems were relatively minor and did not impair adequate emergency response. Thus, FEMA was able to conclude that the regulatory planning standard governing public notification (including the use of the EBS system) "is adequately addressed

in the plans and was demonstrated by the State and counties during the May 1985 exercise." FEMA Exercise Report, at 8. Accordingly, EPX-8 must be rejected for lack of regulatory basis.

#### EPX-9

Radiation survey teams have a weak level of training in the use of anticontamination clothing and/or respirators (State Radiation Protection Section evaluation). This needs to be remedied to protect the health and safety of these teams and to ensure that they will be able to do their work in a timely manner.

Mr. Eddleman accurately cites the State Exercise Report, but takes his excerpt out of context. Although the state evaluator noted that additional training in the use of respirators and anti-contamination clothing would be "beneficial," he also noted that:

In general, the field teams were competent in performing their specified task in accordance with their pertinent procedures. These individuals demonstrated an adequate knowledge level concerning their responsible areas and performed with a professional manner during the exercise.

State Exercise Report, at 12 (emphasis supplied). The state evaluator concluded that "the field teams responded in a competent manner during the exercise and would be able to perform their assigned responsibility during an actual emergency." Id. This assessment of the level of training is echoed in the FEMA Exercise Report, at page 15, which indicates that "[t]eam members in general were adequately trained" (with the exception of

the need for further training on the low-volume air sampler -- the subject of EPX-10). Thus, the FEMA Interim Findings Report, at page 13, concluded that the regulatory standard governing accident assessment "was evaluated as adequate during the May 1985 exercise." Accordingly, there is no regulatory basis for EPX-9.

#### EPX-10

Protection of emergency personnel and the public from radioactive iodine is not assured because (1) low volume air samplers are deficient in calibration and flow rate information, as detailed in the NR Radiation Protection Section evaluation, and (2) there are deficiencies in the distribution of, and notification of when emergency personnel are to use, potassium iodine (KI): See, e.g., Wake County workers being notified late (after possible contamination) (Wake Co. evaluation by State of NC/Meck. Co. evaluator).

The State Exercise Report evaluation on these items generally parallels that in the FEMA Exercise Report. However, the FEMA Exercise Report is clearer on the precise nature of the calibration problem; specifically, the FEMA evaluator noted that the samplers "were last calibrated in January 1984." See FEMA Exercise Report, at 15. This matter is obviously readily rectified. Certainly it did not preclude a FEMA finding of adequacy with respect to radiation monitoring capability. See FEMA Interim Findings Report, at 13.

Moreover, although there were some problems with flow-rate information from the air sampler, the FEMA evaluator noted that

these concerns can be readily resolved through additional training. See FEMA Exercise Report, at 15. FEMA Region IV has already committed to "assure completion by the State of the necessary corrective actions." See FEMA August 7, 1985 Memorandum, to Edward L. Jordan (NRC), From Richard W. Krimm (FEMA). Further, the section of the FEMA Interim Findings Report which "specifically addresses radioiodine in air, general field monitoring capability, [and] assessment capability" concluded that the applicable regulatory standard "is adequately addressed and was evaluated as adequate during the May 1985 exercise." FEMA Interim Findings Report, at 13.

Similarly, while -- in the words of the FEMA evaluator -- "some of the personnel were weak in understanding the relationship between radioiodine exposure, the thyroid system, and the use of KI," the FEMA evaluator also noted that the concern would be readily resolved through re-training. See FEMA Exercise Report, at 29. Accordingly, the sections of the FEMA Interim Findings Report which relate to the provision of radioprotective drugs for emergency workers concluded that the regulatory standards are "adequately addressed in the plans" and were "evaluated as adequate during the May 1985 exercise." See FEMA Interim Findings Report, at 14, 15. EPX-10 thus lacks factual and regulatory basis.

EPX-11

There are numerous deficiencies in hard-copy transmission of information (see, e.g., State EOC messages 13, 14, 15, 16, 25, 34, 35, 40, 41, 57, 67, 71, 127) which must be remedied to assure timely and accurate emergency information is available to protect public health and safety.

As indicated in several of the State EOC messages which Mr. Eddleman cites, some difficulties were experienced with telecopy equipment ("hard-copy transmission of information") during the exercise. However, the difficulties must be viewed in context. While telecopies of messages are useful for record-keeping and are more convenient than hand-written notes for maintaining logs, they are not integral to effective communications. As Mr. Vance Key of the North Carolina Division of Emergency Management explained at the FEMA public meeting after the exercise, telecopy is only a backup to other faster verbal lines of communication -- telephone and two-way radio. Therefore, telecopy is unnecessary provided that the information needed for decision-making is available through one of the two primary means of communication (phone and radio), as it was in the exercise. See FEMA Public Meeting Tr. 67.

Moreover, the telecopy problems experienced in the exercise were somewhat anomalous. As one of the county emergency coordinators explained at the FEMA Public Meeting:

[T]he facsimile unit that we had was not nearly as effective as we would have liked it to have been. It worked great up until Thursay morning, and it's working great today. So, evidently, it just didn't want to work for that drill.

FEMA Public Meeting Tr. 86. Thus, the telecopy problems can be fairly characterized as "ad hoc problems occurring on the exercise day" -- precisely the type of item which is barred from litigation under the standard advanced by the Commission in the UCS case. See 735 F.2d at 1148. EPX-11 must therefore be rejected.

EPX-12

Emergency assistance needs to be upgraded to assure evacuation of people fishing, boating, camping, etc. near the Cape Fear River in Zone ('H') - see State EOC message 162, a high priority third request to get assistance.

Mr. Eddleman cites "State EOC Message 162" -- characterized as "a high priority third request" for assistance -- in support of his claim that emergency response must be upgraded to assure timely protection of people on the Cape Fear River in Zone "H". However, examination of the full record makes it clear that response to the request for assistance was timely. The first request was received at 8:49 a.m. on May 18 and was relayed to the Wildlife Resources Commission. See State EOC Message 132. The second call occurred at 9:12, and was again referred to the Wildlife Commission. See State EOC Message 143. Wildlife officers were dispatched to the Cape Fear area at 9:43 (see State EOC Message 151), although Harnett County apparently was not aware that the officers already had been dispatched when it made its third call -- the message that Mr. Eddleman cites.

Thus, reviewed in context, the record makes it clear that resources were being mustered in response to the first request for assistance, and were already being dispatched at the time the second request was received; the "high priority third request" which Mr. Eddleman cites was superfluous. Indeed, State EOC Message 126 indicates that the National Guard had aircraft over Zone H (including the Cape Fear River) between 9:45 a.m. and 10:30 a.m. Thus, the response to the Cape Fear River area was timely, particularly considering the applicable regulatory guidance, which expressly recognizes that more remote recreational areas need only be reached "on a best effort basis." See NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1 (Rev. 1), "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," at 3-16. As indicated in the FEMA Interim Findings Report, at page 8, the regulatory planning standard for public notification "is adequately addressed in the plans and was demonstrated by the State and counties during the May 1985 exercise." EPX-12 is therefore lacking in factual and regulatory basis.

#### B. The Lateness Factors

When a motion to admit late-filed contentions is filed on the eve of the closing of the record, "petitioner's burden on the section 2.714(a) factors is a heavy one." Houston Lighting and Power Co. (Allens Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-671, 15 N.R.C. 508, 511 (1982). Such is the case

at hand, since the hearing on the single remaining admitted emergency planning contention is scheduled for completion the first week of November -- only two weeks away.<sup>12/</sup>

Factor (i): Good Cause for Failure to File on Time

Mr. Eddleman asserts as good cause for the lateness of his contentions that "the information was not in [his] hands to provide the basis of these contentions" and that he has "filed within 30 days of having it." Proposed Contentions, at 5. More specifically, he asserts that he "received FOIA documents from FEMA only at the end of August 1985." Proposed Contentions, at 1. This appears to be untrue.

As the correspondence enclosed as Attachment 4 indicates, the FEMA Exercise Report was released to Mr. Eddleman on August 7, 1985, pursuant to his Freedom of Information Act request filed with FEMA by his agent, Nina Bell, of the Nuclear Information and Resource Service. Thus, the FEMA Exercise Report was available to Mr. Eddleman at least three weeks before "the end of August" -- which is, of course, when the NRC provided it to the Board and the other parties. Thus, contrary to Mr. Eddleman's assertions, those of his proposed contentions which are based on the FEMA Exercise Report (EPX-6, EPX-7, and EPX-8)

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<sup>12/</sup> Also pending before the Board are three proposed emergency planning contentions filed by Mr. Eddleman which relate to an incident at the Brunswick plant. These proposed contentions are now ripe for Board ruling.



were not filed within the allotted 30 days of the availability of the information;<sup>13/</sup> rather, they were roughly 21 days late.

Equally important, in a number of instances, information putting Mr. Eddleman on notice of the concerns raised in his contentions was publicly available prior to the availability of the documents he cites. It is obvious, therefore, that the proposed contentions are not "wholly dependent" on the content of the particular documents Mr. Eddleman references, and that he cannot claim that the contentions "could not be advanced with any degree of specificity (if at all) in advance of the public availability" of the documents he cites. Accordingly, those contentions fail the tripartite test for good cause prescribed by the Commission in Catawba. CLI-83-19, 17 N.R.C. at 1043-44.

Specifically, although Mr. Eddleman cites the State Exercise Report as a basis for EPX-2(c) (concerning the need for additional telephones for Harnett County operations), that problem was specifically identified at the post-exercise FEMA Public Meeting held on May 19, 1985 (which Mr. Eddleman attended for a time). See FEMA Public Meeting Tr. 71-72, where Mr. Myers, Director of the State Division of Emergency Management, indicated that he would respond to Mr. Eddleman's questions and then begin the "exercise critique" portion of the meeting. Mr. Eddleman chose to depart before his questions

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<sup>13/</sup> LBP-82-119A, 15 N.R.C. 2069, 2073 (1982).

were answered and before the exercise critique began. In any event, Applicants served the transcript of the FEMA Public Meeting on the Board and the parties on June 11, 1985. Because the item raised in EPX-2(c) was public knowledge as a result of the May 19, 1985 meeting or -- at a minimum -- as a result of its reflection on page 89 of the transcript of that meeting, EPX-2(c) is untimely by a matter of several months, without good cause.

Mr. Eddleman also points to the State Exercise Report as the basis for EPX-2(f) (concerning base station relay of information between field teams and the mobile radiation monitoring lab). Yet that item was identified in several places in the FEMA Exercise Report, which was available to Mr. Eddleman well before the State Exercise Report. See FEMA Exercise Report, at pages 14 (§ 2.4) and 15 (§ 2.5). Therefore, EPX-2(f) is also untimely without good cause.

Similarly, while Mr. Eddleman cites the State Exercise Report as the basis for EPX-4 (concerning the need for additional training of Lee County radiation monitoring/decontamination personnel), that matter was first raised in the May 19, 1985 FEMA Public Meeting, and is reflected on page 91 of the transcript of that meeting (served in June, 1985). This same subject was also addressed in the FEMA Exercise Report, which was made available to Mr. Eddleman on August 7, 1985. See FEMA Exercise Report at p. 5, § 1.8. Thus, EPX-4 is untimely by a matter of months, without good cause.

Mr. Eddleman cites both the State Exercise Report and several State EOC Messages as the basis for EPX-5 (concerning problems and delays in siren activation and confirmation of activation). But, again, these matters were addressed earlier at the FEMA Public Meeting, and are reflected in the transcript of that meeting. See, e.g., Tr. 41-42, 64-65 (sirens not activated though officials thought they were). The siren issues were also particularly prominent in media coverage of the exercise. See, e.g., Attachment 5 hereto. Mr. Eddleman offers no explanation as to why this long available information did not trigger his proposed contention. Moreover, the siren issues were also addressed in the FEMA Exercise Report, at page 16. Accordingly, EPX-5 also is untimely by a matter of months, without good cause.

Further, Mr. Eddleman proffers the State Exercise Report as the basis for EPX-9 (concerning additional training for field survey teams). Once again, this issue had previously been raised in the FEMA Exercise Report (at page 2, § 1.5), which was released to Mr. Eddleman more than three weeks prior to the availability of the document he cites. Absent some explanation for the delay, EPX-9 is also untimely without good cause.

Similarly, Mr. Eddleman relies on the State Exercise Report as the basis for EPX-10. But the subject matter of EPX-10 had also been addressed in the FEMA Exercise Report, which was available to Mr. Eddleman approximately three weeks before the

State Exercise Report. For example, the first part of EPX-10 (concerning low volume air samplers) was addressed in detail at pages 14 to 15 (§ 2.5) of the FEMA Exercise Report; and the second part of EPX-10 (concerning KI for Wake County personnel) was discussed at page 29 (§ 2.10.3) of the FEMA Exercise Report. Accordingly, EPX-10 too is untimely without good cause.

EPX-11 (concerning problems with telecopiers for "hard copy transmission of information") is also assertedly based on documents which the State produced to Mr. Eddleman at the end of August. But, once again, the contention could have been proposed long ago on the basis of publicly available information. For example, the telecopier problems were specifically identified at the May 19, 1985 FEMA Public Meeting. See, e.g., Tr. 67, 83, 86. The telecopier problems were also discussed in the FEMA Exercise Report, at pages 3 (§ 1.6.1), 19 (§ 2.6.1), 20 (§ 2.71), and 22 (§ 2.8.1), which was available to Mr. Eddleman well before he received the State documents. Thus, EPX-11 is also untimely without good cause.

In short, as to quite a number of his proposed contentions -- EPX-2(c), EPX-2(f), EPX-4, EPX-5, EPX-6, EPX-7, EPX-8, EPX-9, EPX-10, and EPX-11 -- Mr. Eddleman cannot show that the contention "is wholly dependent upon" the document he cites, that it "could not be advanced" prior to the availability of the document he cites, or that it was "tendered with the requisite degree of promptness" once the cited document was available. Thus, the above-listed contentions fail the Commission's

Catawba test for determining the existence of good cause. See Catawba, supra, CLI-83-19, at 1043-44. While all five factors must be balanced for all late-filed contentions, when an intervenor fails to show good cause, it must make a "compelling showing" on the other four factors. South Carolina Electric & Gas Co. (Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-642, 13 N.R.C. 881, 886 (1981), aff'd sub nom., Fairchild United Action v. NRC, 679 F.3d 261 (D.C.Cir. 1982). This Mr. Eddleman has failed to do.

Factors (ii) and (iv): The Availability of Other Means Whereby Petitioner's Interest Will Be Protected; and the Extent to Which Petitioner's Interest Will Be Represented by Existing Parties

Mr. Eddleman asserts simply that there are no other means or other parties that will protect or represent his interests in the matters he has identified. See Proposed Contentions, at 5. Mr. Eddleman's terse statement seeks to avoid the affirmative showing that he is required to make and, moreover, is quite at odds with the specific circumstances presented here.

While the Board should not simply assume that the NRC Staff and FEMA will represent intervenors' interests, Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS Nuclear Project No. 3), ALAB-747, 18 N.R.C. 1167, 1174-75 (1983), this case is different from most. Indeed, in this case, it is FEMA (or, in the case of the State Exercise Report, the State of North Carolina) which identified the concerns in the first instance.

And the FEMA Exercise Report clearly states that corrective actions will be required by FEMA. See, e.g., FEMA August 7, 1985 Memorandum, To Edward L. Jordan (NRC), From Richard W. Krimm (FEMA) (indicating that FEMA Region IV "will obtain a schedule of corrective actions" and "will assure completion by the State of the necessary corrective actions"). See also State Exercise Report, at 1-2, 16-18 (indicating willingness to address identified problem areas). In light of FEMA's expressed commitment to an active role in resolving exercise problem areas, it is reasonable to conclude that the NRC Staff/FEMA will represent Mr. Eddleman's interests here.14/

Factor (iii): The Extent to Which the Petitioner's Participation May Reasonably Be Expected to Assist in Developing a Sound Record

With respect to this factor, Mr. Eddleman offered the following argument:

I can call as witnesses the evaluators and other knowledgeable persons (e.g., exercise participants); I am able to conduct discovery and cross and direct examination and have more time available now to deal with contentions; also my health is better than it was during the safety hearing period. Without a record, of course, there is no sound record.

Proposed Contentions, at 5. This statement completely fails to

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14/ Factors (ii) and (iv) are given less weight than the other factors. South Carolina Electric & Gas Co. (Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-642, 13 N.R.C. 881, 895 (1981); Detroit Edison Co. (Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2), ALAB-707, 16 N.R.C. 1760, 1767 (1982).

satisfy Mr. Eddleman's burden on this factor. The Appeal Board has repeatedly emphasized the importance of factor (iii), stating:

when a petitioner addresses this criterion it should set out with as much particularity as possible the precise issues it plans to cover, identify its prospective witnesses, and summarize their proposed testimony.

WPPSS No. 3, supra, ALAB-747, 18 N.R.C. at 1177 (citing Mississippi Power & Light Co. (Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-704, 16 N.R.C. 1725, 1730 (1982); South Carolina Electric & Gas Co. (Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-642, 13 N.R.C. 881, 894 (1981); Detroit Edison Co. (Greenwood Energy Center, Units 2 and 3), ALAB-476, 7 N.R.C. 759, 764 (1978); Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-743, 18 N.R.C. 387, 399-400 (1983)). In ALAB-747, the petitioner had described its experience in NRC proceedings and had specifically identified a witness, but the Appeal Board found such statements "manifestly inadequate." WPPSS No. 3, supra, 18 N.R.C. at 1177.

Mr. Eddleman's offer on this factor is considerably less than that which the Appeal Board found inadequate in ALAB-747. Mr. Eddleman has failed to identify any prospective witnesses by name; indeed, there is no indication that he has even contacted "the evaluators and other knowledgeable persons (e.g., exercise participants)" he proposes as witnesses. Nor has Mr. Eddleman summarized the testimony these unidentified persons would provide, as required by the Appeal Board in WPPSS.

Certainly there is no indication that they would testify other than in support of the conclusions of the two reports -- that overall response capabilities are adequate to protect public health and safety.

Moreover, as discussed in Section III.A above, none of the matters raised in the proposed contentions undermine in any way FEMA's finding of adequate assurance. Accordingly, they do not raise a significant safety issue necessary to the sound development of the record. Under these circumstances, Mr. Eddleman's generalized offer to "call as witnesses the evaluators and \* \* \* exercise participants" falls considerably short of the effort required to assist in developing a sound record.

Finally, Applicants submit that Mr. Eddleman's performance during the hearings on safety issues in October 1984, and more recently during the emergency planning hearings in June 1985 and the drug hearings earlier this month, casts additional doubt upon his ability to contribute to a sound record. See "Memorandum and Order (Ruling on Certain Safety Contentions and Other Matters)" (January 14, 1985) at 3 ("the hearings on Mr. Eddleman's several safety contentions sometimes left us with the feeling that he had spread himself too thin"); "Memorandum and Order (Ruling on Contentions Concerning Diesel Generators, Drug Use and Harassment at the Harris Site)" (March 13, 1985) at 9-10 ("From the Board's perspective, Mr. Eddleman's contributions to this record have been uneven. Having repeatedly



bitten off more than any two people could properly chew -- despite this Board's cautions against over-extension -- Mr. Eddleman's resources have been spread too thin much of the time. For example, at various points in the fall safety hearing, it was obvious to the Board that Mr. Eddleman was only preparing his cross-examination one day in advance, or less. We expect all parties to be better prepared than that, and most are.") Thus, the third factor weighs heavily against the admission of Mr. Eddleman's proposed contentions.

Factor (v): The Extent to Which the Petitioner's Participation Will Broaden the Issues or Delay the Proceeding

As he must, Mr. Eddleman concedes that admission of any of his proposed exercise contentions will broaden the issues. Similarly, the admission of any of the contentions would delay the proceeding.

Mr. Eddleman appears to believe that a delay in the proposed fuel load date for the Harris Plant sanctions any delay in the proceeding. The fifth factor refers to a delay of the proceeding, not to delay of the operation of the facility. Enrico Fermi, supra, ALAB-707, 16 N.R.C. 1760, 1766. In Fermi, the Licensing Board rejected an argument that there was no delay because fuel loading was not scheduled for a year. Here, the record of this proceeding on all issues is scheduled for closing within a month.

Indeed, at this late date, admission of new contentions would not only substantially extend the proceeding, but it would also seriously threaten the plant's schedule. Mr. Eddleman's optimism about the ability to complete a hearing without impacting plant schedule is not justified by past experience. Although Mr. Eddleman does not detail his projection of the course of litigation, he has in the past customarily engaged in extensive and protracted discovery. The simplistic schedule he projects here affords no time for the summary disposition process, and glosses over the time required for post-hearing events such as the filing of proposed findings of fact, and Board deliberations and the preparation of a decision. Moreover, Mr. Eddleman contemplates that fuel load and low-power testing would occur while his contentions were pending -- a proposition unattractive to Applicants and the State, given the potential (however remote) of the imposition of a license condition as a result of the hearings, and the need for time to meet any such condition prior to ascension above 5% power. In sum, given the expected fuel load date for Harris (March 1986), there is a very real possibility that litigation of these proposed contentions could result in a delay in plant operation.


Accordingly, all five of the § 2.714(a) factors weigh against the admission of EPX-2(c), EPX-2(f), EPX-4, EPX-5, EPX-6, EPX-7, EPX-8, EPX-9, EPX-10 and EPX-11, and four of the five factors weigh heavily against the admission of the remaining contentions. Particularly considering the lack of

demonstrable safety significance of the proposed contentions, the "lateness factors" militate strongly against the admission of any of the contentions.

IV. CONCLUSION

For all the reasons stated above, Mr. Eddleman's twelve proposed exercise contentions must be rejected.

Respectfully submitted,

  
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
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD

In the Matter of )  
 )  
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY )  
and NORTH CAROLINA EASTERN ) Docket No. 50-400 OL  
MUNICIPAL POWER AGENCY )  
 )  
(Shearon Harris Nuclear Power )  
Plant) )

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that copies of "Applicants' Response To Eddleman Proposed Contentions Based On Exercise" (with Attachments) were served this 15th day of October, 1985, by deposit in the U.S. mail, first class, postage prepaid, upon the parties listed on the attached Service List.

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Delissa A. Ridgway

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
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Docket No. 50-400 OL

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EVALUATION REPORT

SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT EXERCISE

MAY 17 - 18, 1985

Phillip C. Riley  
Chief State Evaluator

Gil Green  
Assistant Chief State Evaluator

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INTRODUCTION

To meet the ever increasing demand for electricity in eastern North Carolina, brought about by our increased population and growth, Carolina Power & Light Company began construction many months ago of the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant.

In the planning stages of construction many local, state and company personnel began to formulate information into an emergency plan to protect our citizens in the event of a nuclear incident.

Long before Shearon Harris was to go on line or be loaded with nuclear fuel, the credibility of our emergency plan needed to be tested.

It is the sincere hope and wish of this evaluator that lessons learned during the period of May 17 and 18, 1985, will prove beneficial to each and every participant and that steps will be taken to address the identified problems. From occurrences in the past, we must learn to prevent unnecessary danger to our citizens in the future.

PURPOSE

It is the intent of this document to point out weaknesses and/or problems identified during the span of this exercise. It is not intended to deter the efforts of involved agencies; but, help in areas they themselves so openly noted.

This evaluation must sincerely thank those individuals who served as local, state and federal evaluators who so willingly shared their experiences. I also must pay tribute to those evaluators involved in those agencies appearing in this report for their honesty, concern and promptness in the completion of their assigned duties.

EVALUATION PROCEDURE

In an attempt to facilitate the overall evaluation of an exercise of this magnitude a tremendous amount of planning and coordination is obviously necessary. The procedures attempted during this specific exercise were designed to gather facts in relation to local and state agency's response to a predetermined chain of events. The overall concept of this exercise evaluation procedure was to move both state and federal evaluators in an organized manner into affected areas within a predesignated time frame. This evaluator believes we met our objective not to say without some shortcomings that can be addressed in the future. In the Summary and Recommendations sections of this document, these areas will be addressed.

SHEARON HARRIS POWER PLANT ON-SITE EVALUATION

FIRE OPERATIONS

This evaluator personally observed the initiating events occurring at the plant site which would eventually escalate to full-scale evacuation procedures. Shearon Harris Plant Fire Personnel along with responding outside fire support, must be commended. It was quite evident that training and coordination of these agencies had received a very high priority. Procedures demonstrated for the protection of personnel along with fire suppression and control efforts seemed quite adequate.

EMERGENCY MEDICAL OPERATIONS

State Evaluator, Bob Bailey, Chief, Office of Emergency Medical Services, advised that the CP&L first aid team's response to an injured victim at the plant was generally adequate. However, the personnel spent a major portion of their efforts in preventing further contamination to themselves and the environment. This is necessary and important, but patient care should also be maintained at a high level. Thought should be given to increasing psychological support given to the patient. This appeared non-existent in the initial phases of response and minimal toward the end. The team did not have a proper splint to handle the patient's fractured leg, and consideration should be given to providing the first aid team with a variety of splints and additional training in using them. All CP&L personnel performed professionally during the drill and in the exchange of the patient from plant personnel to the Apex Rescue Squad, although the time spent in transfer could have been reduced. It was concluded that this problem could be alleviated by having a CP&L EMT ride to the hospital with the off-site ambulance responder and transfer needed information en route. The Apex Rescue Squad conducted themselves professionally and responded appropriately to directions from CP&L health personnel regarding the contaminated patient.

CHATHAM COUNTY E O C

Evaluator: Ben Mabrey  
Office of Emergency Services  
Cabarrus County

The evaluator indicated that overall operations in Chatham County went well. In the initial stages extra radio traffic overloaded personnel on duty. Space available in the operations area is limited and consideration should be given to moving those individuals who must make decisions to a more isolated area. The County Coordinator did an excellent job. However, in a long term operation he would run himself to death. Evaluator suggests tht he anchor himself and let others come to him. The decontamination site visited by Mr. Mabrey was reported as exceptional.

The biggest problem encountered seemed to be two shelters opened administratively from 09:30 through 11:00. I will partially address this problem at this point and more specifically in the following recommendation section. The two areas not evaluated were not identified to both state and federal evaluators until the morning of May 16, 1985. All counties were notified to identify their areas of play two weeks prior to the exercise. Evaluation routes, car assignments and time-frames had already been finalized when notification was received. This last minute change in the original announced plan created coordination problems both to state and federal evaluators. A fully operational shelter and those two shelters were opened during the same time-frame approximately 38 road miles apart. Communication logs kept at the State EOC indicate that Chatham County EOC was notified at 08:50 Saturday May 18, 1985, that administrative shelters could not be checked and were advised that the county would handle evaluation. At 10:55 a federal evaluator was contacted but he was unable to locate the shelter because his map was not updated and Chatham County EOC could not be contacted on 155.280 because of excessive and unnecessary radio traffic. (The issue of 155.280 will be addressed in a later section.)

HARNETT COUNTY

Evaluator: J. Robert Willis  
Department of Emergency Management  
Lincoln County

The staff assigned to Harnett County did an outstanding job under extremely inadequate circumstances. The County EOC was established in a hallway in the Harnett County Courthouse. Communications presented a tremendous problem because of insufficient telephones. Harnett County sirens could not be activated because of a short-circuit in radio communications. It is highly recommended that a priority be given to an efficient EOC area.

LEE COUNTY

Evaluator: Bob Phillips, Director of Gaston County Emergency Management

Overall EOC operations during this exercise were adequate as indicated by the County Evaluator; however, problems did exist that might be considered and addressed. EOC staff was insufficient in receiving, writing and delivering messages in an acceptable time-frame. County coordinator was constantly interrupted by calls and EOC personnel who were not familiar with County Operational Plan. The use of speaker phones should be eliminated because of constant problems.

It is recommended that Lee County continue and increase its training to all agencies in emergency operations plan.

Decontamination site evaluated at US 1 and SR 1415 by NRC evaluators, revealed the following observations: This group appeared unsure of themselves and initially indicated that they had not been trained and were unsure as what to do. They appeared to have no knowledge in the use of the instruments, no consideration was given to collecting water and attempting to control contamination. None of the personnel could answer the question "when is decontamination complete?" It is recommended that training in radiological monitoring be increased and intensified in this county.

WAKE COUNTY

EVALUATOR: Wayne Broome, Operations Officer, Mecklenburg County Emergency Management

Due to the location of the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant and the potential involvement of heavily populated areas, both in Wake County and the City of Raleigh, it is

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imperative that Wake County give high priority to the constant training and updating of information to all county emergency personnel. It is recommended that specific guidelines and standard operating procedures be provided to EOC staff which would designate specific duties. A plant status board needs to be developed to quickly give all personnel an overview of plant conditions. A CP&L representative needs to be present at Wake County EOC to interpret data to eliminate confusion on plant conditions. Establishment of communications between SERT and other counties should be by some means other than speaker phones. It is suggested that the use of these phones be eliminated. A review should be made of Wake County EOC message control guidelines. Some method should be devised to determine if emergency warning sirens have been activated.

Wake County, during this exercise scenario, had the responsibility for the largest area of play; therefore, problems occurring during the entire time frame were more easily identified. It is recommended that personnel having the responsibility for overall decisions that will affect the actions of all emergency services, should be trained in the possible outcome of the affect on the emergency services already involved. If vital messages and decisions are delayed, the emergency services and others in the affected area, would be endangered. Example: DOT workers in Wake County were not notified of the need for Potassium Iodide tablets until after possible contamination due to the lapse of time between county notification and the message being delivered to the involved agencies. These same individuals should be aware of the need to not rely only on mechanical message devices to influence notification of involved personnel. Example: Messages were delayed that had been received both by telephone and radio because of mechanical breakdown of hard copy machine.

Although both State and Federal evaluators relayed that overall Wake County operations were adequate, hopefully these areas of concern can and will be addressed.

#### STATE AGENCIES

##### State Emergency Operations Center

EVALUATOR: Gill Green, Assistant Chief Evaluator with  
Division of Forest Resources

This evaluator, having been involved with all exercises of this nature in the past, gives this operation an "E" for excellent! The close working relationship with all state agencies during our recent experiences with the tornados, hurricane and fires, all in a relatively short time span, has

developed a smooth working relationship. The cooperation, respect and dedication of these agencies during this exercise and past actual occurrences is very commendable.

In both Gil's and my judgement, this exercise scenario did not really tax the capabilities of the very effective State Emergency Response Team that we now have.

Listed below are a few minor observations that need attention:

1. Telephone Communications: Speaker phones not effective. Some type of reliable communication must be maintained between all County EOC's. On several occasions, contact was lost with one or more counties. The dependence on telecopiers for hard copy verification is fine; however, initial messages could be handled much quicker by voice communication.
2. Briefings: Briefings were not started on time which caused undue confusion in the Operations Room.
3. Shelters: On Saturday at 07:46, a barrier was breached and a general emergency was declared. One shelter was set up three to five miles downwind and not evacuated because unannounced condition did not match scenario.
4. Status Board: Information on status board not provided as situations occurred. On Saturday at 13:00, status board was one hour and ten minutes behind.
5. Message Flow: On Saturday at 13:18, SERT was informed of an uncontrolled release that lasted a full 24 minutes beginning at 12:36 and ending at 13:00. (This was eighteen minutes after the release had already occurred.) Indications are that this was not a hardware problem, but information had simply not come through the system. This needs attention.

Department of Transportation

EVALUATOR: Gerald R. Fleming, Director of Occupational Safety and Emergency Planning

DOT operations during the exercise proceeded in a timely manner after initial notification. Field Operations began before 12:00 on May 17, 1985. Communication between the EOC and field divisions worked well with the use of telephone and DOT radios. It is recommended that a reporting procedure be established for use in future exercises to eliminate possible confusion at field offices due to the number of people involved. Cooperation and relationship with other state departments were excellent. This evaluator felt that

operations proceeded smoothly and efficiently. Some deficiencies that were noted are as follows:

1. Actual Road numbers and those shown on the evacuation map were not compatible.
2. Evacuation routes should be checked at periodic intervals to assure that all evacuation signs are in place. Some of the evacuation routes need to be considered more carefully. Revisions are needed to shorten routes and reduce traffic conflicts.
3. Evacuation and detour routes need to be pre-established and consider present-day traffic counts and overall conflicting problems.

North Carolina State Highway Patrol

EVALUATOR: 1st Sgt. G. S. Ake, State Highway Patrol

The State Highway Patrol committed 164 uniformed and non-uniformed personnel to this exercise. It is felt that the participation of the SHP in this exercise did test their ability to successfully evacuate residents that would be affected by an off-site radiation release. More importantly, this exercise was a very good training vehicle, one which we feel was invaluable.

The Patrol experienced the usual problems with communication inadequacies; equipment, which is designed to support our statutory mission, is not yet capable of adequately handling the impact of so many units responding to an emergency of this type. We are slowly resolving this problem, but as always, budget restrictions are a governing factor. There were the usual number of "uninformed" Troopers who were not properly briefed, or who did not retain what they were told. However, I do feel that our supervisory personnel were better informed than ever before due to our preparation and thorough pre-exercise briefing. We also found it extremely beneficial to expand our after-action briefing. It was a superb learning experience and involved every member. It allowed all an opportunity to critique the exercise; the response plan, and their participation.

A substantial number of our personnel recommended that the next exercise involve more volunteer evacuees in order to thoroughly test on-the-road activities and to make the "play" more interesting. It was also felt the exercise scenario should include events designed to better test the capabilities of each responding agency. I concur with these recommendations.

Over-all Suggestions:



1. Highway Patrol Radio equipment at the County EOC (except Wake) was not adequate. Wake County EOC used the new radio assigned to Major Richardson. We need this equipment for EOC's and Posts.
2. Printed Guidelines of procedures to be followed in personnel monitoring and vehicle monitoring in every radiological kit. Troopers forget procedures with time. These procedures could be put on laminated cards.
3. Labeling of Shearon Harris Plant map as to function and in uniform sequence. The map is confusing! Example: Wake Traffic Control Post 1, and Wake Security Roadblock could be shown as WT-1, WS-1, etc.
4. Statewide uniform format for post instructions and function of post for every nuclear plant. All Troops are doing these differently.
5. Low Range dosimeter for all Highway Patrol personnel. Emergency Management has purchased them for local law enforcement.

North Carolina National Guard

EVALUATOR: Major James T. Ellis, III, Plans Operations and Military Support Officer

Although the National Guard was not required (by exercise play) to mobilize troop units, they did provide an invaluable service in varied areas. Two helicopter aircraft were placed on stand-by. One of these aircrafts was used to transport state and federal evaluators over entire exercise site. Remaining aircraft was used to evacuate Lake Harris.

National Guard operations placed several units on standby alert and issued special instructions to units as follows:

1. Insure all mission equipment is operational.
2. Insure Alert & Notification plan is current.
3. Make tentative arrangements with vendors for purchase of rations.
4. Radimeters and Dosimeters are ready for issue.
5. NBC monitoring teams would be mobilized and sent with units. (NOTE: no agency action required, however, coordination was made with EOC and EMS to determine if NG assets were required for evacuation of injured personnel)

Recommendations

1. Exercise play should run continuously throughout the period. The start and stop of the exercise seems to lose it urgency and does not test agency effectiveness.
2. The National Guard should be permitted to install two antennas on the Administration Building to remain in place for future exercises and emergencies.
3. Request guidance or clarification with regard to National Guard mission as listed in the NC Response Plan.
4. Clarification of radio equipment for use by SERT.
5. Recommend, if at all possible, the Emergency Response Plan be reduced in size, and a contingency plan be written to cover any nuclear incident, rather than have a large plan for each facility.

The North Carolina National Guard finds this exercise and its experience in previous SERT operations, has served to bring a very close working relationship between all agencies.

North Carolina Department of Corrections

EVALUATOR: Herbert Rosenfield, Dept. of Corrections

The only assigned task for the Department of Corection during the exercise was to provide food for volunteers in shelters and for the personnel assigned to the Emergency Operations Center in Raleigh. The assignment was preliminarily made on Thursday, May 16; firm numbers given on Friday, May 17; with the actual request received during the exercise on May 18th.

During the exercise, the following meals were served:

- Friday, May 17--100 lunches to the EOC in Raleigh
- Saturday, May 18--Lee County, 106 lunches. Chatham County Shelter-50 lunches; Harnett County Shelter-125 lunches; Wake County Shelter-45 lunches; EOC Raleigh-100 lunches

Total 526 lunches

It is felt that the meals were suitable and delivered in a timely manner. We were pleased with the performance of our various units in completing this task. A problem noted with

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the system during this operation is that we did not receive a timely written request for these meals. As soon as a general emergency was declared and the need for meals was clear, a notice should have been received.

In order to assess the players response to emergencies, two messages were sent concerning possible evacuation of prisons. The responses were both written and verbal. Together they indicated a good grasp of the complexity of the problem.

Overall, the Department of Correction controller / evaluator team felt that the Department responded quite well. A considerable amount of actual work was accomplished as well as some theoretical planning. We felt satisfied with our accomplishments during the exercise.

Office of Emergency Medical Services

EVALUATOR: Bob W. Bailey, Chief, Office of Emergency Medical Services

The evaluation of the medical emergency has already been discussed in this report; however, the following comments are to be added: The OEMS personnel appropriately activated the EMS personnel, assigned personnel to the Radiation Protection Lab, county EOC's and State SERT. On Saturday, OEMS personnel went through the call-up procedures and had several providers on standby in case they were needed to back-up local county evacuations.

Having Room B-25 for only OEMS and Fire and Rescue Division worked very well. The area was very conducive to carrying out assigned activities. One area of concern that was noted by the OEMS staff was that there appeared to be excessive delays in receiving messages from SERT. It took almost an hour for messages to reach OEMS from SERT. While routine messages may be of little consequence, evacuation messages and messages pertaining to administering potassium iodine, etc., could have negative consequences if not received rapidly.

In addition to the normal activities, OEMS provided five personnel as evaluators for this drill. They were involved with evaluating roadblocks, decontamination stations and in providing communications for two state evaluators that were evaluating the Radiation Protection Section.

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Radiation Protection Section  
Division of Facility Services

EVALUATOR: Johnny D. James, Emergency Response Planner

In general, the field survey teams were competent in performing their specified task in accordance with their pertinent procedures. These individuals demonstrated an adequate knowledge level concerning their responsible areas and performed with a professional manner during the exercise.

There are some areas which could be improved to increase the overall effectiveness of the field survey teams. The areas include:

1. To facilitate loading of equipment when the field survey teams are deployed from the RPS mainoffice, a checklist would be beneficial.
2. Procedures on "when and how often" to read pocket dosimeters should be clarified for the field survey teams.
3. Some members of the field survey teams acknowledged a weak level of training in the use of respirators and/or anti-contamination clothing. Since this equipment is carried with field survey teams when deployed, it would be beneficial to increase their training in this area or limit their use of this equipment.
4. The low volume air samplers used to measure radioiodine concentrations did not display calibration data and, in addition, had conflicting information concerning expected flow rates with the filter cartridge in position. To insure confidence in this equipment during deployment, this area should be resolved.
5. Increased familiarity with the radiation detection equipment would be helpful even though an adequate knowledge level of their use existed.
6. Due to topographical differences, communications at times had to be relayed to the base station. The introduction of a relay in communications always introduces the possibility of delayed and/or incorrect information. You may want to consider positioning of the Mobile Lab at an elevated area outside of the EPZ to improve communications.

In summary, the field survey teams responded in a competent manner during the exercise and would be able to perform their assigned responsibility during an actual emergency.

Department of Natural Resources and Community Development  
Division of Environmental Management

EVALUATOR: Richard Lasater, Enforcement & Emergency  
Response Branch

Overall, the personnel performed exceedingly well in accordance with Shearon Harris Exercise Plan. Raleigh and Fayetteville Regional Office supervisors interacted with player and each other.

Emergency Management interrupted the exercise schedule by holding a divisional meeting in the EOC before allowing the re-entry discussion to begin. The major role in this plan is in the re-entry mode. Player and others were kept waiting and made to feel that the re-entry portion of the exercise was really unnecessary to the point of being given very short attention by the exercise lead agencies. When the re-entry operation was finally discussed, it was done in a very hurried manner. In the last five years, re-entry has never been practiced or paid any real attention. This should be discussed.

Civil Air Patrol

EVALUATOR: Alonzo F. Coots, Maj. CAP, NC Wing Disaster  
Preparedness Officer

As reported by the evaluator, response was timely and according to procedures; ground support and radio communications were conducted in an efficient manner; both sorties were conducted in a professional and very proficient manner; CAP cadets were used as "runners" at the State EOC and should be highly commended for their efforts and support. The evaluator felt that the following items should be discussed:

1. CAP aircraft could not contact CP&L by radio on either 47.50 or 47.58 Mhz.
2. Polaroid photos were not as well as could have been if 35mm film had been used and also because this was a drill, the aircraft was flying 1000 feet higher than in a real event.
3. CAP aircraft was not used to monitor evacuation routes and air crew was not in direct contact with SHP or with County Sheriff Departments.
4. The loud-hailer on the aircraft was not used to evacuate people in remote areas; nor, was the Forestry Service aircraft used which also was equipped with a loud-hailer.

- 5. The aerial radiological monitoring capability of the CAP was not exercised. It should be noted that the aircraft was orbiting the plant prior to the anticipated release and with the equipment aboard, could have established a minimum detectable exposure rate.
- 6. CAP crew was not prepared or requested to take air samples.
- 7. CAP air crew was not trained to make estimates of damage.
- 8. In the follow-up table top exercise it did not seem that any plans had been made to utilize either CAP or SHP, who carry CDV-777-kits) for go, no-go decisions necessary during the recovery/return phases.

The evaluator further stated that all CAP members are volunteers and he felt that their talents were under-utilized.

#### COMMUNICATIONS

EVALUATOR: Max Powell, Special Assistant to Commissioner  
NC Department of Insurance

While it appeared almost every Department involved with the exercise had their own two-way radio, coordination and workable communications between all agencies is a different story. The SHP had the only reliable source of contact; however, this system was quickly overworked by so many units being involved in this exercise. The exercise called for all local traffice to be on 155.280, which proved to be very confusing to all involved. This frequency, although assigned by FCC for inter-system mutual aid during emergencies, is being used daily for day-to-day operations by many rescue squads and even some small police departments. Any incident which requires the use of this statewide mutual aid channel will be confused due to constant misuse in this area. There must be some consideration as to how this channel can be cleaned up even if the FCC is requested to take action. On Saturday morning, May 18, 1985, the helicopter deployed to give both state and federal evaluators a look and listen at the exercise activity proved that there could be absolutely no communications with ground units on this frequency due to constant misuse.

It is recommended that Emergency Management have their communication system upgraded and put into operation. While they have a good basic console, they do not have sufficient radio contact with all agencies, nor assigned telecommuni-  
cators.

There must be a coordinated effort by the Office of Emergency Management to bring about necessary communications in times of emergencies. While this exercise had more than enough telephone lines and instruments, is it realistic to what is used in a "real world" emergency?

I strongly recommend that a committee be formed immediately to discuss and formulate a workable solution to this problem. This should be a priority item with every agency involved with SERT operations.

PUBLIC INFORMATION  
(State EOC)

EVALUATOR: Max Powell, Special Assistant to Commissioner  
NC Department of Insurance

The State EOC-PIO Center is really the hub around which information is received from the EOC and then disseminated to the Information Center for distribution to the media and the general public. To be such an important part of the overall effort, this part of the operation is greatly understaffed.

The overall efforts of the PIO section was very good; however, they were shorthanded and at times the information would swamp them, but the Lead PIO did a good job of recovering and generally stayed on top of the situation. There apparently was a good flow of information from the EOC to the Center, but felt that information from the Center back to the EOC was missing. I would recommend additional staff (PIO) at least three, runner at all times, two secretaries, record all briefings. Lead PIO be focal point for all information. Lead PIO be able to select PIO's he feels comfortable with, receive input from Media Center, additional space and a FAX Machine in the EOC is a must.

### RECOMMENDATIONS

This evaluator feels that if we are to retain credibility in this and future exercises, the Division of Emergency Management should review and address those recommendations made by agency evaluators who so freely gave their recommendations in the preceeding pages of this report.

This evaluator would hope that the purpose of this document will be for the increased efficiency of future exercises and "real world" events.

Again, I must state that this exercise went relatively smoothe at the State level. At the local level, problems encountered were justified due to this being the first exercise of this kind in this area.

The following recommendations address those problems that seem to arise most often.

1. It is requested that the Division of Emergency Management implement a study into our overall emergency communication system. In "real world" operations, both state and local EOC's are dependent on information coming in from operational areas. Operational areas are dependent on reliable information and direction from those having direction and control. This cannot be done without a reliable and coordinated communication network.
2. Realizing that information contained in our State's Emergency Plan, as related to fixed nuclear facilities, must be written to meet federal guidelines; efforts should be made to provide operational personnel with a more simplified and easily understood plan of action.
3. In future exercises, those agencies having the responsibility of implementation of traffic control points, shelters, and decontamination stations, should be informed of time-frames that follow evaluation routes. Agencies who must establish and maintain evacuation routes should have input in development of operation maps. Map used for this exercise was incorrect and confusing.
4. The use of speaker phones in this exercise created more problems than were of value. Procedure for speaker phone use should be closely looked at: moved from Operation Room, or eliminated.
5. Future scenarios should be closely studied for their realistic value with consideration to running the exercise full-term with no breaks. (At least 24 hours) This will allow all agencies to truly test their capabilities. (You do not call "time-out" in emergencies!)



6. More consideration should be given to recovery operations; this would be the major problem in a "real world" nuclear incident and should be given the same priority of operational area.

7. There should be a continued program of specialized training for all local and state emergency personnel to keep abreast of this type of an incident which is not provided in their "in-house" training. Also, continued simulated operations should be staged for SERT operations so that we may maintain our level of proficiency.

8. Deadlines given all agencies should be enforced in all areas. Evaluation procedures requiring transportation, personnel, and cost are not easily changed at the last minute. Time-frames for activity evaluation should be coordinated with evaluation team routes.


SUMMARY

In summarizing the evaluation of the Sharon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Exercise, I would like to state that I feel all agencies, both state and federal, worked together effectively, professionally and to the best of their ability. I would like to further state that it is the opinion of myself along with the other state evaluators, that in the event of an emergency at the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant that all agencies would handle the situation as well as, if not better than, this exercise. All agencies have worked together in "real-world" emergencies and have proved that the resources and personnel in North Carolina can handle most any emergency that would arise.

I would like to commend each agency and each evaluator for their honesty and willingness to outline those areas that do need improvement. Without this kind of cooperation and dedication, we could not build the type of State Emergency Response Team that we are striving to build. Each exercise will outline problems that need to be addressed and will allow us to broaden our resources and improve our Team.

A special thanks goes to Assistant Chief Evaluator, Gil Green, Chief Controller, Tonia Young, NC Highway Patrol, Office of Emergency Medical Services and the NC National Guard, for their guidance and assistance in the evaluation procedures of this exercise.

Respectfully submitted.



Phillip C. Riley  
Chief State Evaluator  
Deputy Commissioner  
NC Department of Insurance  
Fire and Rescue Services Division


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# OPERATIONS JOURNAL

Attachment 2

<b>Organization</b>	<b>Location</b>	<b>Period Covered</b>			
Division of Emergency Management	State EOC	<b>From</b>		<b>To</b>	
		<b>Hour</b>	<b>Date</b>	<b>Hour</b>	<b>Date</b>
		1115	May 17		

Entry No.	Ref. Msg #	Time		Incidents, Messages, Actions, Etc.
		In	Out	
1	1	1117		Warning message - unusual event @ 1055
				1120 notification made in EOC - SERT notification begun
2	2	1125		National Guard aircraft departing RDU - No action
3	3	1135		From Radiation Protection Service initial report - no action
4	4	1144		From Medical Examiner - No action
5	5	1146		All counties notified of unusual event - Posted
6	6	1151		SERT notified - Posted
7	7	1155		Updated warning message - no action
8	8	1200		CAP, EOC representatives - no action
9	9	1224		Weekend numbers for Temporary Housing Personnel
10	10	1227		Warning message - ALERT - Posted
11		1240		EOC Briefing - Operations Officer - Including 4 counties
12	11	1243		All counties reported receiving notification of alert
13	12	1245		Copy of EOC Briefing
14	13	1553		Chatham requests hard copy of briefing
15	14	1154		Wake requests hard copy of briefing
16	15	1250		Harnett requests hard copy of briefing
17	16	1304		Lee requests hard copy of briefing
18		1308		EOC briefing - EOC activated and assuming control of state resources - EOC procedures explained - state agencies presented briefings - DOT has started erecting evacuation route signs
19	17	1327		From Wake - could not hear briefing
20	18	1338		Harnett County PIO has arrived

<b>Name of official on duty</b> Dan Spurling - Operations Recorder	<b>Signature</b> 
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# OPERATIONS JOURNAL

Page No.  
2

No. of Pages

Organization

Location

Period Covered

Div. of Emergency Management

State EOC

From

To

Hour  
1346

Date  
5/17/85

Hour  
1503

Date  
5/17/85

Entry No.	Ref. Msg #	Time		Incidents, Messages, Actions, Etc.
		In	Out	
21	19	1340		Hard copy of EOC Briefing (1308)
22	20	1340		Warning message - ALERT - High Radiation level
23	21		1343	CAP message directing aerial photo mission and communications check
24	22		1345	Meteorological message from Dayne Brown
25	23	1350		Request for dosimeters from NCNG
26	24		1356	To CP&L - SERT & EOC status report
27	25		1357	Request from Harnett for last two briefings
28	26	1401		From amateur radio - Wake County radio operational - 1415
29	27	1410		Al Poland notified of EOC activation
30	28	1418		Message re dosimeters to NCNG
31	29	1420		R. L. Mayton CP&L Tech Rep to be notified
32	30	1425		CP&L Staff to depart to exercise location
33	31	1430		Wake County evacuating Harris Lake - Simulated
34	32	1438		EOC, Wake County, and Shearon Harris Plant - amateur radio has contact
35	33	1439		EOF at CP&L activated at 1414
36	34		1436	Hard copy of ops briefing to counties
37	35	1445		Request for hard copy of 1425 briefing by Harnett Co.
38	36		1450	CP&L Liaison to EOC 1445 (See Msg. 30)
39	37	1452		Request for helicopter from Wake County
40	38	1500		Message from Chatham - EMS to staging areas
41	39	1501		Ham Radio in Wake EOC KIME-23
42	40	1503		Request hard copy of 1430 briefing by Lee Co.

Name of official on duty

Dan Spurling - Operations Officer *Recorder*

Signature

*Dan Spurling*

# OPERATIONS JOURNAL

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No. of Pages

<b>Organization</b> Div. of Emergency Management	<b>Location</b> State EOC	<b>Period Covered</b>			
		<b>From</b>		<b>To</b>	
		<b>Hour</b>	<b>Date</b>	<b>Hour</b>	<b>Date</b>
		1504	5/17/85	1615	5/17/85

Entry No.	Ref. Msg #	Time		Incidents, Messages, Actions, Etc.
		In	Out	
43	41	1504		Request hard copy of 1430 briefing by Chatham County.
44	42	1505		Message from CP&L re site emergency
45	43	1506		Warning message update - site emergency
46	44	1440		CP&L to operations site emergency at 1425
47	45			Message to FEMA
48	46	1509		SHNPP to SERT - OUT OF SEQUENCE
49	47	1512		CP&L news release
50	48	1515		
51	49		1520	
52	50		1528	NCNG from Insurance - request for aircraft
53	51		1532	From Radiation Protection Services (RPS) - two teams
				operational
54	52		1537	Ops from Dayne Brown - activity increasing
55	53		1537	EBS sirens sounded
56	54	1540		CP&L news release
57	55	1543		Lee County requests state to assume direction & control
58	56	1555		Warning message update #7 - two barriers breached
59		1550		EOC briefing
60	57	1550		CP&L liaison to Ops update
61	58	1600		EOC from RPS - Weather update
62	59	1605		Harnett County requests State to take direction & control
63	60	1615		Request from Harnett County (ref message 59)
64	61	1615		Request from Wake County for State to take direction &
				control

Name of official on duty Dan Spurling, Operations Recorder	Signature 
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# OPERATIONS JOURNAL

<b>Organization</b>		<b>Location</b>		<b>Period Covered</b>			
Div. of Emergency Management		State EOC		<b>From</b>		<b>To</b>	
				<b>Hour</b>	<b>Date</b>	<b>Hour</b>	<b>Date</b>
				1618	5/17/85	1730	5/17/85

Entry No.	Ref. Msg #	Time		Incidents, Messages, Actions, Etc.
		In	Out	
65	62	1618		Briefing, 1545
66	63	1622		Ham operations in contact with Lee County
67	64	1625		State assumption of direction & control - 4 counties
68	65	1630		CAP mission photos
69	66	1635		Information from EOF Liaison
70	67	1635		Message from Lee County reference Message #57
71	68	1640		Severe weather report - ACTUAL
72	69	1649		Lee requests copy of message #57
73	70	1650		Crisp assumes duty as on-site ops director
74	71	1652		Message flow correction - hard copy to counties
75	72	1658		Weather update from RPS
76	73	1703		Warning message #8
77	74	1700		Message from Chatham County - population on lake 35
78	75	1715		Severe weather bulletin - ACTUAL
79	76	1724		SERT briefing at 1700
80		1730		EOC activity terminated for day to continue 0700 18 May

Name of official on duty	Signature
Dan Spurling, Operations Recorder	<i>Dan Spurling</i>

FM-49 (4/84)


# OPERATIONS JOURNAL

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No. of Pages

Organization	Location	Period Covered			
Div. of Emergency Management	State EOC	From		To	
		Hour	Date	Hour	Date
		0700	5/18/85	0812	5/18/85

Entry No.	Ref. Msg #	Time		Incidents, Messages, Actions, Etc.
		In	Out	
81		0700		18 May 1985 - EOC operational
82	77			5/17/85 - Message from Harnett - EOC closed
83	78			5/17/85 - Message from Crisp - EOF
84	79	0704		CAP Aerial photo mission
85	80	0705		MET data from CP&L
86	81	0716		Request for Commo Van - Harnett
87	82	0722		Request for message number clarification
88	83	0735		News release - SERT - Jordan Lake
89	84	0727		Commo van on way to Harnett County
90	85	0728		Wake Sheriff close and evacuate Harris Lake - 5/17
91	86	0733		Message and WX DATA from Crisp - EOF
92	87	0734		Harnett County ham radio contact with EOC
93	88	0755		CP&L news release #6 - 5/17/85
94	89	0748		Message to Harnett REF - commo van enroute
95	90	0752		Warning message #10 - SITE EMERGENCY
96	91	0755		Message from Ops to SERT - GENERAL EMERGENCY - 0746
97	92	0757		CC&PS PIO Release
98	93	0758		Message from CP&L liaison re GENERAL EMERGENCY
99	94	0806		Request from CP&L via Wake Sheriff to clear Lake Jordan
100	95	0808		Request for information on A/C vicinity 10 mile EPZ
101	96	0810		Message from PIO to SERT - phone numbers
102	97	0810		0745 Briefing
103	98	0813		Message from Harnett County - van has not arrived
104	99	0812		Message from Wake - no request for assistance

Name of official on duty Dan Spurling, Operations Recorder	Signature 
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
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No. of Pages

<b>Organization</b>	<b>Location</b>	<b>Period Covered</b>			
Div. of Emergency Management	State EOC	<b>From</b>		<b>To</b>	
		<b>Hour</b>	<b>Date</b>	<b>Hour</b>	<b>Date</b>
		0813	5/18/85		

Entry No.	Ref. Msg #	Time		Incidents, Messages, Actions, Etc.
		In	Out	
105	100	0816		From CP&L liaison - areas to be evacuated
106	101	0817		0810 Briefing
107	102	0820		SHP to SERT - KI to Troop C
108	103	0821		SHP from DHS - instruction for KI
109	104	0821		DHS to Ops - Delivery of KI to SHP
110	105	0824		0820 Briefing
111	106	0824		SHP to SERT - Traffic CP's and road blocks
112	107	0826		Warning message #10
113	108	0827		Harnett County shelters ready to go
114	109	0831		Notification to transportation - air-rail-bus
115	110	0830		Counties from Ops - movement at KI
116	111	0832		Ops from DHS - request assistance for KI movement
117	112	0835		Lee County shelters and Traffic Control stations in place
118	113	0838		From Wildlife location at A/C
119	114	0839		DHS from Ops - approval of sites in Message 11
120	115	0840		Shelter locations operational
121	116	0842		DHS from Forestry - availability at A/C
122	117	0843		SERT from SHP - all posts manned for evacuation
123	118	0847		Clarify message Form use from Wake (Broome)
124	119	0847		Ops from RPS - reason for general emergency
125	120	0843		DHS from Environmental Mgt. - A/C locations
126	121	0852		Ops from Wildlife
127	122	0854		From CP&L liaison - re siren activation
128	123	0856		From ARC - Wake Shelter location

Name of official on duty Dan Spurling, Operations Recorder	Signature 
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# OPERATIONS JOURNAL


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<b>Organization</b>	<b>Location</b>	<b>Period Covered</b>			
Div. of Emergency Management	STATE EOC	<b>From</b>		<b>To</b>	
		<b>Hour</b>	<b>Date</b>	<b>Hour</b>	<b>Date</b>
		0902	5/18/85	0943	5/18/85

Entry No.	Ref. Msg #	Time		Incidents, Messages, Actions, Etc.
		In	Out	
129	124	0902		Instructions from DHS on KI
130	125	0904		Warning message #11 - GENERAL EMERGENCY
131	126	0850		Ops from NCNG - Helicopter location
132	127	0907		Harnett County not receiving telecopy message
133	128	0908		Ops from Land Resources - A/C location (none)
134	129	0908		Lee County shelter location
135	130	0909		DHS from CAP - A/C locations sorties
136	131	0910		Ops from RPS - Equipment reports
137		0900		EOC Briefing
138	132	0911		Request from Harnett County to evacuate Cape Fear River
139	133	0911		SERT from OEMS - correction to message #46
140	134	0912		CP&L liaison - EOF status
141	135	0913		News release #7
142	136	0914		MET DATA from RPS
143	137	0913		From Harnett County - schools open
144	138	0917		CP&L liaison - WX report - KI instructions
145	139	0918		From NCNG - Aircraft availability
146	140	0927		MET DATA from RPS
147	141	0931		DHS to Ops - status of KI distribution
148	142	0930		DHS to Ops - KI distribution in Wake County
149	143	0930		Harnett County - 2nd request for assistance
150	144	0935		SERT from SHP - no traffic problems
151	145	0942		Ops from Wildlife - Jordan Lake and recreation areas evacuated
152	146	0943		From Wake County Health Director - Directions for KI distri.

Name of official on duty	Signature
Dan Spurling, Operations Recorder	

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
<b>Organization</b> Div. of Emergency Management	<b>Location</b> STATE EOC	<b>Period Covered</b>			
		<b>From</b>	<b>To</b>		
		<b>Hour</b> 0944	<b>Date</b> 5/18/85	<b>Hour</b> 1050	<b>Date</b> 5/18/85

Entry No.	Ref. Msg #	Time		Incidents, Messages, Actions, Etc.
		In	Out	
153	147	0944		From Wake DSS - Dix shelter closed - report
154	148	0947		RPS - MET DATA
155	149	0948		Warning message #12 - GENERAL EMERGENCY
156	150	0950		Shelter report from Chatham County
157	151	0953		To Harnett County from Wildlife Res. - Evacuation of Cape Fear River
158	152	0955		Crisp - DEM liaison at EOF - with summary of briefing
159	153	0957		From Chatham - Distribution of KI
160	154	0958		0915 briefing
161	155	1000		From Wake Sheriff - TCP's manned
162	156	1001		CP&L news release #8
163	157	1004		From Chatham - simulated contamination
164	158	1010		Same as #156
165	159	1012		CC&PS news release #4 (8:41 am)
166	160	1013		From SHP - areas which heard sirens and areas which did not
167	161	1023		To wildlife from Harnett - requests check on Cape Fear
168	162	1025		Third request from Harnett
169	163	1025		From SERT leader - Plant report
170	164	1030		MET DATA from RPS
171	165	1035		Chatham County shelter report
172	166	1037		Harnett County - problem with radio - REAL
173	167	1040		From SHP - KI distributed
174	168	1050		From CAP - Aerial monitoring complete - NEGATIVE
175	169	1050		From SHP - Zone A 2 mi. evacuation complete

Name of official on duty

Dan Spurling, Operations Recorder

Signature



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<b>Organization</b>  Div. of Emergency Management	<b>Location</b>  STATE EOC	<b>Period Covered</b>			
		<b>From</b>		<b>To</b>	
		<b>Hour</b> 1100	<b>Date</b> 5/18/85	<b>Hour</b> 1143	<b>Date</b> 5/18/85

Entry No.	Ref. Msg #	Time		Incidents, Messages, Actions, Etc.
		In	Out	
176	170	1100		Lee County - Food from Prisons to shelter has arrived
177	171	1102		Report from ARC - Decon stations
178	172	1100		MET DATA - RPS
179	173	1103		Wake County message #96 re evacuation
180	174	1106		Wake County message #99 - warning routes completed
181	175	1107		From SHP - Areas K, L, B, C & D - 5 mi. evacuated
182	176	1108		From Chatham County - questions on sirens
183	177	1112		To RPS from DOT - personnel status
184	178	1113		Ops from Harnett County - shelters opened
185	179	1116		Lee County food status
186	180	1118		From SHP - evacuation status
187	181	1117		CP&L liaison report
188	182	1119		Harnett County - answer to #176
189	183	1119		Warning message #14 - GENERAL EMERGENCY
190	184	1122		From ham operator re evacuation
191	185	1126		From SHP - Areas L & I 10 mi. evacuated
192	186	1126		From Harnett - shelter closed
193	187	1127		1030 briefing
194	188	1128		MET DATA from RPS
195	189	1130		From commo officer re Harnett Radio Repair
196	190	1135		Harnett County closed decon station
197	191	1142		Warning message #15 - GENERAL EMERGENCY
198	192	1143		From Harnett County - Message #8
199	193	1143		From Harnett County to Correction - Food Arrival Time

Name of official on duty Dan Spurling, Operations Recorder	Signature 
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
No. of Pages

<b>Organization</b>	<b>Location</b>	<b>Period Covered</b>			
Div. of Emergency Management	STATE EOC	<b>From</b>		<b>To</b>	
		<b>Hour</b>	<b>Date</b>	<b>Hour</b>	<b>Date</b>
		1145	5/18/85	1330	5/18/85

Entry No.	Ref. Msg #	Time		Incidents, Messages, Actions, Etc.
		In	Out	
200	194	1150		Evacuation completed in Wake County
201	195	1206		CC&PS news release #5
202	196	1218		CP&L liaison update report
203	197	1220		Wake report on evacuees (85) at Martin Middle School
204	198	1222		Wake report on evacuation
205	199	1223		Harnett has closed shelter #1
206	200	1228		Same as #199
207		1235		Briefing on release
208		1242		Sounding sirens at 1244 - varified by all four counties
209	201	1238		Amateur station - Harnett County closed
210	202	1254		MET DATA from RPS
211	203	1258		From CP&L Liaison - release contents
212	204	1258		Wake County message #115 - personnel location
213	205	1300		Amateur radio reports sirens in all 4 counties
214	206	1301		Warning message #16 - GENERAL EMERGENCY
215	207	1304		1235 Briefing
216	208	1305		MET DATA from RPS
217	209	1326		Harnett County EOC closed
218	210	1327		CP&L news release #10
219	211	1328		Exercise terminated
220	212	1330		1315 Briefing
				JOURNAL CLOSED

Name of official on duty  
Dan Spurling, Operations Recorder

Signature



# STATE EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM'S MESSAGE FORM

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Incoming	<input type="checkbox"/> Routine
<input type="checkbox"/> Outgoing	<input type="checkbox"/> Immediate

TO: State EOC  
 FROM: Chatham County  
 DATE/TIME WRITTEN: 5/17 1248  
 TEXT (Ref. Prior Msg. Number: \_\_\_\_\_): THIS IS AN EXERCISE MESSAGE

Chatham County request hard copy of  
5/17 1248 Briefing.  
Having difficulty in leaving briefing  
over Speaker Phone  
D. Cook

IF MORE SPACE IS NEEDED, USE REVERSE AND CHECK HERE

MESSAGES TO:	TO UNIT:	TO UNIT:	AGENCY/ORGANIZATION:
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	SERT TEAM LEADER/ASST.	<u>998</u> Cultural Resources	Revenue
	OPERATIONS OFFICER	Human Resources	Secretary of State
	MESSAGE OFFICER	<u>124</u> Aging	Transportation (DOT)
	PUBLIC INFO. OFFICER	Emergency Medical Services	Treasurer
		Health Services	<b>NON-GOVERNMENT AGENCIES</b>
<input type="checkbox"/>	Governor's Office	Mental Health	Amateur Radio
<input type="checkbox"/>	Administration	Radiation Protection	American Red Cross
<input type="checkbox"/>	Agriculture	Social Services	Salvation Army
<input type="checkbox"/>	Auditor	Insurance	<b>OTHERS (Specify)</b>
<input type="checkbox"/>	Commerce	Justice	<u>ADMIN OFF</u>
<input type="checkbox"/>	Utilities Commission	SBI	
<input type="checkbox"/>	Corrections	Labor	
<input type="checkbox"/>	Division of Prisons	Natural Resources and Comm. Dev.	
<input type="checkbox"/>	Crime Control & Public Safety	Environmental Management	
<input type="checkbox"/>	Civil Air Patrol	Forest Resources	
<input type="checkbox"/>	Emergency Management	Land Resources	
<input type="checkbox"/>	National Guard	Wildlife	
<input type="checkbox"/>	State Highway Patrol	Public Instruction	

# STATE EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM'S MESSAGE FORM

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Incoming	<input type="checkbox"/> Routine
<input type="checkbox"/> Outgoing	<input type="checkbox"/> Immediate

TO: EOC

FROM: Wake CO

DATE/TIME WRITTEN: \_\_\_\_\_

TEXT (Ref. Prior Msg. Number: \_\_\_\_\_) **THIS IS AN EXERCISE MESSAGE**

Request Hand Copy of 1240 Ref

*(Signature)*

IF MORE SPACE IS NEEDED, USE REVERSE AND CHECK HERE

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	SERT TEAM LEADER/ASST.		Cultural Resources		Revenue
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	OPERATIONS OFFICER		Human Resources		Secretary of State
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	MESSAGE OFFICER		Aging		Transportation (DOT)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	PUBLIC INFO. OFFICER		Emergency Medical Services		Treasurer
			Health Services		
	Governor's Office		Mental Health		Amateur Radio
	Administration		Radiation Protection		American Red Cross
	Agriculture		Social Services		Salvation Army
	Auditor		Insurance		
	Commerce		Justice		
	Utilities Commission		SBI		ADMIN OFF.
	Corrections		Labor		
	Division of Prisons		Natural Resources and Comm. Dev.		
	Crime Control & Public Safety		Environmental Management		
	Civil Air Patrol		Forest Resources		
	Emergency Management		Land Resources		
	National Guard		Wildlife		
	State Highway Patrol		Public Instruction		

# STATE EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM'S MESSAGE FORM

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Incoming	<input type="checkbox"/> Routine
<input type="checkbox"/> Outgoing	<input type="checkbox"/> Immediate

TO: EOC Operations Officer  
 FROM: Harnett Co

DATE/TIME WRITTEN: 12:53pm

TEXT (Ref. Prior Msg. Number: \_\_\_\_\_) **THIS IS AN EXERCISE MESSAGE**

Request a hard copy of briefing  
be sent to Harnett Co. by teletype

JAA

IF MORE SPACE IS NEEDED, USE REVERSE AND CHECK HERE

MESSAGE TO	TO	INIT	AGENCY
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SERT TEAM LEADER/ASST. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OPERATIONS OFFICER <input type="checkbox"/> MESSAGE OFFICER <input type="checkbox"/> PUBLIC INFO. OFFICER			Cultural Resources
			Human Resources
			Aging
			Emergency Medical Services
			Health Services
			Mental Health
			Radiation Protection
			Social Services
			Insurance
			Justice
			SBI
			Labor
			Natural Resources and Comm. Dev.
			Environmental Management
			Forest Resources
			Land Resources
			Wildlife
			Public Instruction
			Revenue
			Secretary of State
			Transportation (DOT)
			Treasurer
			Amateur Radio
			American Red Cross
			Salvation Army
			ADMIN OFF

# STATE EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM'S MESSAGE FORM

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Incoming	<input type="checkbox"/> Routine
<input type="checkbox"/> Outgoing	<input type="checkbox"/> Immediate

TO: Operations Officer

FROM: EOC

DATE/TIME WRITTEN: 12:58 4-18-85

TEXT (Ref. Prior Msg. Number: ) **THIS IS AN EXERCISE MESSAGE**

Request hand copy of briefing be transmitted to Lee County EOC.  
Text of 12:40 briefing

IF MORE SPACE IS NEEDED, USE REVERSE AND CHECK HERE

		TO: DIVISION	TO: INTER-AGENCY
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	SERT TEAM LEADER/ASST.	Cultural Resources	Revenue
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	OPERATIONS OFFICER	Human Resources	Secretary of State
<input type="checkbox"/>	MESSAGE OFFICER	Aging	Transportation (DOT)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	PUBLIC INFO. OFFICER	Emergency Medical Services	Treasurer
		Health Services	<b>NON-GOVERNMENT AGENCIES</b>
<input type="checkbox"/>	Governor's Office	Mental Health	Amateur Radio
<input type="checkbox"/>	Administration	Radiation Protection	American Red Cross
<input type="checkbox"/>	Agriculture	Social Services	Salvation Army
<input type="checkbox"/>	Auditor	Insurance	<b>OTHER</b>
<input type="checkbox"/>	Commerce	Justice	<u>ADMIN. OFF.</u>
<input type="checkbox"/>	Utilities Commission	SBI	
<input type="checkbox"/>	Corrections	Labor	
<input type="checkbox"/>	Division of Prisons	Natural Resources and Comm. Dev.	
<input type="checkbox"/>	Crime Control & Public Safety	Environmental Management	
<input type="checkbox"/>	Civil Air Patrol	Forest Resources	
<input type="checkbox"/>	Emergency Management	Land Resources	
<input type="checkbox"/>	National Guard	Wildlife	
<input type="checkbox"/>	State Highway Patrol	Public Instruction	



# STATE EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM'S MESSAGE FORM

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Incoming	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Routine
<input type="checkbox"/> Outgoing	<input type="checkbox"/> Immediate

TO: Operations officer  
 FROM: Harnett Co

DATE/TIME WRITTEN: 13:57 pm 5-17-85

TEXT (Ref. Prior Msg. Number: \_\_\_\_\_) **THIS IS AN EXERCISE MESSAGE**

Request a hard copy of  
last two briefings

EA

IF MORE SPACE IS NEEDED, USE REVERSE AND CHECK HERE

MESSAGES TO	TO LINE AGENCY	TO UNIT	AGENCY
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SERT TEAM LEADER/ASST.	Cultural Resources		Revenue
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OPERATIONS OFFICER	Human Resources		Secretary of State
MESSAGE OFFICER	Aging		Transportation (DOT)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> PUBLIC INFO <u>EA</u>	Emergency Medical Services		Treasurer
	Health Services		<b>NON-GOVERNMENT AGENCIES</b>
<input type="checkbox"/> Governor's Office	Mental Health		Amateur Radio
<input type="checkbox"/> Administration	Radiation Protection		American Red Cross
<input type="checkbox"/> Agriculture	Social Services		Salvation Army
<input type="checkbox"/> Auditor	Insurance		<b>OTHERS (Specify)</b>
<input type="checkbox"/> Commerce	Justice		
<input type="checkbox"/> Utilities Commission	SBI		
<input type="checkbox"/> Corrections	Labor		
<input type="checkbox"/> Division of Prisons	Natural Resources and Comm. Dev.		
<input type="checkbox"/> Crime Control & Public Safety	Environmental Management		
<input type="checkbox"/> Civil Air Patrol	Forest Resources		
<input type="checkbox"/> Emergency Management	Land Resources		
<input type="checkbox"/> National Guard	Wildlife		
<input type="checkbox"/> State Highway Patrol	Public Instruction		

STATE EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM'S MESSAGE FORM

<input type="checkbox"/> Incoming	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Routine
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Outgoing	<input type="checkbox"/> Immediate

TO: SERT + Wake, Chatham, Hornett, Lee EOCs

FROM: Operations officer

DATE/TIME WRITTEN: 5/17/85 1436

TEXT (Ref. Prior Msg. Number: \_\_\_\_\_): THIS IS AN EXERCISE MESSAGE

SERT Briefing:

1. Harris Lake being evacuated as precaution.
2. State Opns officer recommends county EOC hold local briefings after each state briefing
3. State agencies gave briefings
4. RPS ~~wants~~ reports CPL has upgraded to "site Emergency" - Reactor has shut down as is (on back)

IF MORE SPACE IS NEEDED, USE REVERSE AND CHECK HERE

TO: MESSAGES TO	TO: IND. AGENCY	TO: INT. AGENCY
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SERT TEAM LEADER/ASST	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Cultural Resources	<input type="checkbox"/> Revenue
<input type="checkbox"/> OPERATIONS OFFICER	<input type="checkbox"/> Human Resources	<input type="checkbox"/> Secretary of State
<input type="checkbox"/> MESSAGE OFFICER	<input type="checkbox"/> Aging	<input type="checkbox"/> Transportation (DOT)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> PUBLIC INFO OFFICER	<input type="checkbox"/> Emergency Medical Services	<input type="checkbox"/> Treasurer
	<input type="checkbox"/> Health Services	<b>NON-GOVERNMENT AGENCIES</b>
<input type="checkbox"/> Governor's Office	<input type="checkbox"/> Mental Health	<input type="checkbox"/> Amateur Radio
<input type="checkbox"/> Administration	<input type="checkbox"/> Radiation Protection	<input type="checkbox"/> American Red Cross
<input type="checkbox"/> Agriculture	<input type="checkbox"/> Social Services	<input type="checkbox"/> Salvation Army
<input type="checkbox"/> Auditor	<input type="checkbox"/> Insurance	<b>OTHERS (Specify)</b>
<input type="checkbox"/> Commerce	<input type="checkbox"/> Justice	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Wake EOC
<input type="checkbox"/> Utilities Commission	<input type="checkbox"/> SBI	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Hornett EOC
<input type="checkbox"/> Corrections	<input type="checkbox"/> Labor	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Chatham EOC
<input type="checkbox"/> Division of Prisons	<input type="checkbox"/> Natural Resources and Comm. Dev.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Lee EOC
<input type="checkbox"/> Crime Control & Public Safety	<input type="checkbox"/> Environmental Management	<input type="checkbox"/> (VIA telefax)
<input type="checkbox"/> Civil Air Patrol	<input type="checkbox"/> Forest Resources	<input type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/> Emergency Management	<input type="checkbox"/> Land Resources	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CL
<input type="checkbox"/> National Guard	<input type="checkbox"/> Wildlife	
<input type="checkbox"/> State Highway Patrol	<input type="checkbox"/> Public Instruction	

ATTACH TO MSG # 3

BRIEFING - STATE EOC - 1430 - May 17, 1985

Briefing conducted by James Munns, Operations Officer, as follows:

ALERT status with no further communications from Shearon Harris. CP&L EOF was activated at 1400.

The alert status was issued at 1315 - high radiation readings.

There is no change in the weather.

Wake County EOC has authorized evacuation of Harris Lake as a precautionary measure.

The agencies were polled as follows:

- Highway Patrol - no change.
- Transportation - no change.
- Insurance - no change.
- National Guard - no change.
- EMS - no change.
- Human Resources - no change.

Amateur Radio Operators are in contact with Wake County EOC and Shearon Harris.

Red Cross has placed personnel on stand-by alert in all four counties.

CAP has an aircraft airborne to take aerial photographs, if necessary, of plant and plant area.

Briefing conducted by Dayne Brown as follows:

1425 message received from CP&L EOF that the alert had been upgraded to a site emergency.

Weather is standing.

Reactor was shut-down at 1350 and is going into cool-down.

*[Handwritten signature]*

# STATE EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM'S MESSAGE FORM

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Incoming	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Routine
<input type="checkbox"/> Outgoing	<input type="checkbox"/> Immediate

TO: Operation Off

FROM: Hamett Co.

DATE/TIME WRITTEN: 14:45 pm

TEXT (Ref. Prior Msg. Number:                     ) **THIS IS AN EXERCISE MESSAGE**

Request a hard copy of 14:25 pm briefing and to verify site emergency at plant

*JAA*

*no copies*

IF MORE SPACE IS NEEDED, USE REVERSE AND CHECK HERE

INITIALS	AGENCY	TO	INITIALS	AGENCY
	SERT TEAM LEADER/ASST.			Cultural Resources
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	OPERATIONS OFFICER			Human Resources
	MESSAGE OFFICER			Aging
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	PUBLIC INFO. OFFICER			Emergency Medical Services
				Health Services
	Governor's Office			Mental Health
	Administration			Radiation Protection
	Agriculture			Social Services
	Auditor			Insurance
	Commerce			Justice
	Utilities Commission			SBI
	Corrections			Labor
	Division of Prisons			Natural Resources and Comm. Dev.
	Crime Control & Public Safety			Environmental Management
	Civil Air Patrol			Forest Resources
	Emergency Management			Land Resources
	National Guard			Wildlife
	State Highway Patrol			Public Instruction
				Revenue
				Secretary of State
				Transportation (DOT)
				Treasurer
				Amateur Radio
				American Red Cross
				Salvation Army
				OTHERS (Specify)

# STATE EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM'S MESSAGE FORM

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Incoming	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Routine
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Outgoing	<input type="checkbox"/> Immediate

TO: E.O.C.

FROM: Lee County

DATE/TIME WRITTEN: 2:43: 4-18-85

TEXT (Ref. Prior Msg. Number: \_\_\_\_\_): **THIS IS AN EXERCISE MESSAGE**

Please send hard copy of 2:30 briefing to Sanford/ Lee County EOC.

*209940  
NO COPIES*

IF MORE SPACE IS NEEDED, USE REVERSE AND CHECK HERE

INITIALS	TO	DATE	AGENCY	TO	INITIALS	AGENCY
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			SERT TEAM LEADER/ASST.			Cultural Resources
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			OPERATIONS OFFICER			Human Resources
			MESSAGE OFFICER			Aging
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			PUBLIC INFO. OFFICER			Emergency Medical Services
						Health Services
			Governor's Office			Mental Health
			Administration			Radiation Protection
			Agriculture			Social Services
			Auditor			Insurance
			Commerce			Justice
			Utilities Commission			SBI
			Corrections			Labor
			Division of Prisons			Natural Resources and Comm. Dev.
			Crime Control & Public Safety			Environmental Management
			Civil Air Patrol			Forest Resources
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			Emergency Management			Land Resources
			National Guard			Wildlife
			State Highway Patrol			Public Instruction

# STATE EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM'S MESSAGE FORM

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Incoming	<input type="checkbox"/> Routine
<input type="checkbox"/> Outgoing	<input type="checkbox"/> Immediate

TO: State EOC  
 FROM: Chatham Co.  
 DATE/TIME WRITTEN: 5/17 1445  
 TEXT (Ref. Prior Msg. Number: \_\_\_\_\_): **THIS IS AN EXERCISE MESSAGE**

Request hard copy on briefing 1435-5/17

Chatham Co. received Site Area Emergency at 1425

Wanted no copies N. Check

IF MORE SPACE IS NEEDED, USE REVERSE AND CHECK HERE

TO	INT	AGENCY	TO	INT	AGENCY
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		SERT TEAM LEADER/ASST.			Cultural Resources
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		OPERATIONS OFFICER			Human Resources
		MESSAGE OFFICER			Aging
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		PUBLIC INFO. OFFICER			Emergency Medical Services
					Health Services
		Governor's Office			Mental Health
		Administration			Radiation Protection
		Agriculture			Social Services
		Auditor			Insurance
		Commerce			Justice
		Utilities Commission			SBI
		Corrections			Labor
		Division of Prisons			Natural Resources and Comm. Dev.
		Crime Control & Public Safety			Environmental Management
		Civil Air Patrol			Forest Resources
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		Emergency Management			Land Resources
		National Guard			Wildlife
		State Highway Patrol			Public Instruction
					Revenue
					Secretary of State
					Transportation (DOT)
					Treasurer
					Amateur Radio
					American Red Cross
					Salvation Army

# STATE EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM'S MESSAGE FORM

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Incoming	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Routine
<input type="checkbox"/> Outgoing	<input type="checkbox"/> Immediate

TO: STATE EOC

FROM: County EOC's

DATE/TIME WRITTEN: 1437 5/17/85

TEXT (Ref. Prior Msg. Number: THIS IS AN EXERCISE MESSAGE)

1537  
EBS Sirens were sounded at 1437 hr.

IF MORE SPACE IS NEEDED, USE REVERSE AND CHECK HERE

MESSAGES TO:	TO INFO AGENCY	TO INFO AGENCY
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SERT TEAM LEADER/ASST.	<i>JS</i> Cultural Resources	Revenue
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OPERATIONS OFFICER	<i>JS</i> Human Resources	Secretary of State
MESSAGE OFFICER	Aging	Transportation (DOT)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> PUBLIC INFO. OFFICER	<i>JS</i> Emergency Medical Services	Treasurer
	Health Services	<b>NON-GOVERNMENT AGENCIES</b>
	Governor's Office	Amateur Radio
	Administration	American Red Cross
	Agriculture	Salvation Army
	Auditor	<b>OTHER AGENCIES</b>
	Commerce	
	Utilities Commission	
	Corrections	
	Division of Prisons	
	Crime Control & Public Safety	
	Civil Air Patrol	
	Emergency Management	
	National Guard	
	State Highway Patrol	
	Insurance	
	Justice	
	SBI	
	Labor	
	Natural Resources and Comm. Dev	
	Environmental Management	
	Forest Resources	
	Land Resources	
	Wildlife	
	Public Instruction	

# STATE EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM'S MESSAGE FORM

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Incoming	<input type="checkbox"/> Routine
<input type="checkbox"/> Outgoing	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Immediate

TO: OPNS  
 FROM: CPXL LIAISON DUNMIRE  
 DATE/TIME WRITTEN: 5/17/85 1545

TEXT (Ref. Prior Msg. Number:                     ): **THIS IS AN EXERCISE MESSAGE.**

- INFO RECEIVED FROM EOC LIAISON CRISP
- ① PLANT IN SHUT DOWN PROCESS
  - ② HARRIS LAKE BEING EVACUATED
  - ③ COOLING FROM HOT SHUTDOWN
  - ④ DEPRESSURATION GOING ON
  - ⑤ 2 BARRIERS BREACHED
  - ⑥ FUEL LEAKING
  - ⑦ PROBLEM WITH CLADDING
  - ⑧ AUX. <sup>FEED WATER</sup> PUMP A IS OUT
  - ⑨ PROJECTING RAIN - NON ON RADAR

**\***

IF MORE SPACE IS NEEDED, USE REVERSE AND CHECK HERE  W. TOWARD SE

INITIALS	MESSAGES TO	NO	INITIALS	NO	INITIALS	AGENCY	NO	INITIALS	AGENCY
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	SERT TEAM LEADER/ASST.					Cultural Resources			Revenue
	OPERATIONS OFFICER					Human Resources			Secretary of State
	MESSAGE OFFICER					Aging			Transportation (DOT)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	PUBLIC INFO. OFFICER		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			Emergency Medical Services			Treasurer
						Health Services			<b>NON-GOVERNMENT AGENCIES</b>
	Governor's Office					Mental Health			Amateur Radio
	Administration		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		Radiation Protection			American Red Cross
	Agriculture					Social Services			Salvation Army
	Auditor					Insurance			<b>OTHERS (Specify)</b>
	Commerce					Justice		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<u>Wake EOC</u>
	Utilities Commission					SBI		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<u>Chatham EOC</u>
	Corrections					Labor		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<u>Hornet EOC</u>
	Division of Prisons					Natural Resources and Comm. Dev.		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<u>LEE EOC</u>
	Crime Control & Public Safety					Environmental Management			
	Civil Air Patrol					Forest Resources			<u>(via Telefax)</u>
	Emergency Management					Land Resources		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<u>C2 (B2)</u>
	National Guard					Wildlife			
	State Highway Patrol					Public Instruction			

V. ROBIN CALVERT OF 18 REM OFFSITE



# STATE EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM'S MESSAGE FORM

<input type="checkbox"/> Incoming	<input type="checkbox"/> Routine
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Outgoing	<input type="checkbox"/> Immediate

TO: EOC

FROM: Lee County

DATE/TIME WRITTEN: 4:35 4-18-85

TEXT (Ref. Prior Msg. Number:           ): **THIS IS AN EXERCISE MESSAGE**

Lee County has not received message #57  
as yet -- supposedly transmitted to Lee Co.  
at 15:45 hours

*Being transmitted*

IF MORE SPACE IS NEEDED, USE REVERSE AND CHECK HERE

ALL MESSAGES TO:	TO	INIT	AGENCY	TO	INIT	AGENCY
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			SERT TEAM LEADER/ASST.			Cultural Resources
			OPERATIONS OFFICER			Human Resources
			MESSAGE OFFICER			Aging
			PUBLIC INFO. OFFICER			Emergency Medical Services
						Health Services
			Governor's Office			Mental Health
			Administration			Radiation Protection
			Agriculture			Social Services
			Auditor			Insurance
			Commerce			Justice
			Utilities Commission			SBI
			Corrections			Labor
			Division of Prisons			Natural Resources and Comm. Dev.
			Crime Control & Public Safety			Environmental Management
			Civil Air Patrol			Forest Resources
			Emergency Management			Land Resources
			National Guard			Wildlife
			State Highway Patrol			Public Instruction
						Revenue
						Secretary of State
						Transportation (DOT)
						Treasurer
						Amateur Radio
						American Red Cross
						Salvation Army
						OTHERS (Specify)

# STATE EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM'S MESSAGE FORM

Incoming

Routine

Outgoing

Immediate

TO: Lee County - Notices

FROM: EOC Operations

DATE/TIME WRITTEN: 1649 17 May 85

TEXT (Ref. Prior Msg. Number:                     ): **THIS IS AN EXERCISE MESSAGE**

As a result of messages being delivered improperly, no hard copies were delivered. Message flow has been clarified & will result in hard copy.

IF MORE SPACE IS NEEDED, USE REVERSE AND CHECK HERE

TO: MESSAGE TO	TO: UNIT	TO: AGENCY
SERT TEAM LEADER/ASST.	Cultural Resources	Revenue
OPERATIONS OFFICER	Human Resources	Secretary of State
MESSAGE OFFICER	Aging	Transportation (DOT)
PUBLIC INFO. OFFICER	Emergency Medical Services	Treasurer
	Health Services	
Governor's Office	Mental Health	Amateur Radio
Administration	Radiation Protection	American Red Cross
Agriculture	Social Services	Salvation Army
Auditor	Insurance	
Commerce	Justice	<i>V. Lee Co Liaison</i>
Utilities Commission	SBI	
Corrections	Labor	
Division of Prisons	Natural Resources and Comm. Dev.	
Crime Control & Public Safety	Environmental Management	
Civil Air Patrol	Forest Resources	
Emergency Management	Land Resources	
National Guard	Wildlife	
State Highway Patrol	Public Instruction	

# STATE EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM'S MESSAGE FORM

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Incoming	<input type="checkbox"/> Routine
<input type="checkbox"/> Outgoing	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Immediate

TO: OPUS

FROM: LIAISON DUNMIRE

DATE/TIME WRITTEN: 0848

TEXT (Ref. Prior Msg. Number: \_\_\_\_\_): **THIS IS AN EXERCISE MESSAGE**

LIAISON CRISP CALLED TO ADVISE THAT  
A PROBLEM MAY EXIST CONCERNING  
SIRENS - FEDS ARE CHECKING THE CLOCK.  
AS CRISP WAS TALKING - COUNT DOWN  
FOR SIREN ACTIVATION WAS TAKING  
PLACE (0846) IN EOC.

IF MORE SPACE IS NEEDED, USE REVERSE AND CHECK HERE

ALL MESSAGES TO:	TO INIT	AGENCY	TO INIT	AGENCY
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SERT TEAM LEADER/ASST.		Cultural Resources		Revenue
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OPERATIONS OFFICER		Human Resources		Secretary of State
<input type="checkbox"/> MESSAGE OFFICER		Aging		Transportation (DOT)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> PUBLIC INFO. OFFICER		Emergency Medical Services		Treasurer
<b>OTHER AGENCIES</b>		Health Services	<b>NON-GOVERNMENT AGENCIES</b>	
<input type="checkbox"/> Governor's Office		Mental Health		Amateur Radio
<input type="checkbox"/> Administration		Radiation Protection		American Red Cross
<input type="checkbox"/> Agriculture		Social Services		Salvation Army
<input type="checkbox"/> Auditor		Insurance	<b>OTHERS (Specify)</b>	
<input type="checkbox"/> Commerce		Justice		
<input type="checkbox"/> Utilities Commission		SBI		
<input type="checkbox"/> Corrections		Labor		
<input type="checkbox"/> Division of Prisons		Natural Resources and Comm. Dev.		
<input type="checkbox"/> Crime Control & Public Safety		Environmental Management		
<input type="checkbox"/> Civil Air Patrol		Forest Resources		
<input type="checkbox"/> Emergency Management		Land Resources		
<input type="checkbox"/> National Guard		Wildlife		
<input type="checkbox"/> State Highway Patrol		Public Instruction		

# STATE EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM'S MESSAGE FORM

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Incoming	<input type="checkbox"/> Routine
<input type="checkbox"/> Outgoing	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Immediate

TO: ~~STATE~~ OPERATIONS OFF

FROM: NATIONAL GUARD

DATE/TIME WRITTEN: 18 MAY 85, 0850 HRS

TEXT (Ref. Prior Msg. Number: # 95

NATIONAL GUARD WILL HAVE UH-1H HELICOPTER  
 WITH THREE CREW MEMBERS AND EIGHT PASSENGERS  
 IN FOLLOWING AREAS: B, L, J, I, H AT 0945  
 TILL 1030 HRS.

IF MORE SPACE IS NEEDED, USE REVERSE AND CHECK HERE

TO	INITIALS	AGENCY	TO	INITIALS	AGENCY
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		Cultural Resources			Revenue
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		Human Resources			Secretary of State
		Aging			Transportation (DOT)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		Emergency Medical Services			Treasurer
	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Health Services			NON-GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
		Mental Health			Amateur Radio
		Radiation Protection			American Red Cross
		Social Services			Salvation Army
		Insurance			OTHERS (Specify)
		Justice			
		SBI			
		Labor			
		Natural Resources and Comm. Dev.			
		Environmental Management			
		Forest Resources			
		Land Resources			
		Wildlife			
		Public Instruction			

# STATE EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM'S MESSAGE FORM

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Incoming	<input type="checkbox"/> Routine
<input type="checkbox"/> Outgoing	<input type="checkbox"/> Immediate

TO: Message Officer

FROM: Harnett Co.

DATE/TIME WRITTEN: 8:53am 5-18

TEXT (Ref. Prior Msg. Number: \_\_\_\_\_): **THIS IS AN EXERCISE MESSAGE**

Harnett Co is not receiving messages from EOC room to telecopy in PAT Tyndalls office.


JAT

IF MORE SPACE IS NEEDED, USE REVERSE AND CHECK HERE

ALL MESSAGES TO:	TO INIT.	AGENCY	TO INIT.	AGENCY
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SERT TEAM LEADER/ASST.		Cultural Resources		Revenue
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OPERATIONS OFFICER		Human Resources		Secretary of State
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> MESSAGE OFFICER		Aging		Transportation (DOT)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> PUBLIC INFO. OFFICER		Emergency Medical Services		Treasurer
<b>AGENCY</b>		Health Services		<b>NON-GOVERNMENT AGENCIES</b>
<input type="checkbox"/> Governor's Office		Mental Health		Amateur Radio
<input type="checkbox"/> Administration		Radiation Protection		American Red Cross
<input type="checkbox"/> Agriculture		Social Services		Salvation Army
<input type="checkbox"/> Auditor		Insurance		<b>OTHERS (Specify)</b>
<input type="checkbox"/> Commerce		Justice	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<u>ADMIN OFFICER</u>
<input type="checkbox"/> Utilities Commission		SBI		
<input type="checkbox"/> Corrections		Labor		
<input type="checkbox"/> Division of Prisons		Natural Resources and Comm. Dev.		
<input type="checkbox"/> Crime Control & Public Safety		Environmental Management		
<input type="checkbox"/> Civil Air Patrol		Forest Resources		
<input type="checkbox"/> Emergency Management		Land Resources		
<input type="checkbox"/> National Guard		Wildlife		
<input type="checkbox"/> State Highway Patrol		Public Instruction		

# STATE EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM'S MESSAGE FORM

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Incoming	<input type="checkbox"/> Routine
<input type="checkbox"/> Outgoing	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Immediate



TO: see checks below

FROM: Hornell EOC

DATE/TIME WRITTEN: \_\_\_\_\_

TEXT (Ref. Prior Msg. Number: THIS IS AN EXERCISE MESSAGE)

see attached

IF MORE SPACE IS NEEDED, USE REVERSE AND CHECK HERE

ALL MESSAGES TO:	TO	INIT	AGENCY	TO	INIT	AGENCY
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SERT TEAM LEADER/ASST.			Cultural Resources			Revenue
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OPERATIONS OFFICER			Human Resources			Secretary of State
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> MESSAGE OFFICER			Aging			Transportation (DOT)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> PUBLIC INFO. OFFICER			Emergency Medical Services			Treasurer
<b>TO INIT</b>	<b>AGENCY</b>		Health Services			<b>NON-GOVERNMENT AGENCIES</b>
	Governor's Office		Mental Health			Amateur Radio
	Administration		Radiation Protection			American Red Cross
	Agriculture		Social Services			Salvation Army
	Auditor		Insurance			<b>OTHERS (Specify)</b>
	Commerce		Justice			
	Utilities Commission		SBI			
	Corrections		Labor			
	Division of Prisons		Natural Resources and Comm. Dev.			
	Crime Control & Public Safety		Environmental Management			
	Civil Air Patrol		Forest Resources			
	Emergency Management		Land Resources			
	National Guard	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Wildlife <u>MPR</u>			
	State Highway Patrol		Public Instruction			

#3

INCOMING  
 OUTGOING

HARNETT COUNTY  
EMERGENCY OPERATING CENTER  
MESSAGE FORM

NO.

TO: State EOC

DATE-TIME: 5-18-85  
08:49

FROM: Henry Johnson, Harnett Co.

Request Wildlife assistance  
to evacuate boaters on Cape  
Fear River - Zone H

SIGNATURE: Jean L. Parker

DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY: Harnett Emerg. Mgmt.

REMARKS:

# STATE EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM'S MESSAGE FORM

Incoming

Routine

Outgoing

Immediate

TO: SERT OPNS OFFICER

FROM: HARNETT Co. EOC

DATE/TIME WRITTEN: 5-18-85 0912

TEXT (Ref. Prior Msg. Number: \_\_\_\_\_): **THIS IS AN EXERCISE MESSAGE**

SECOND Request - See Attached

John Mag. sent to Wildlife to take care of this

IF MORE SPACE IS NEEDED, USE REVERSE AND CHECK HERE

ALL MESSAGES TO:	TO	INIT	AGENCY	TO	INIT	AGENCY
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SERT TEAM LEADER/ASST.			Cultural Resources			Revenue
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OPERATIONS OFFICER			Human Resources			Secretary of State
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> MESSAGE OFFICER			Aging			Transportation (DOT)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> PUBLIC INFO. OFFICER			Emergency Medical Services			Treasurer
			Health Services			<b>NON-GOVERNMENT AGENCIES</b>
			Mental Health			Amateur Radio
			Radiation Protection			American Red Cross
			Social Services			Salvation Army
			Insurance			<b>OTHERS (Specify)</b>
			Justice			
			SBI			
			Labor			
			Natural Resources and Comm. Dev.			
			Environmental Management			
			Forest Resources			
			Land Resources			
			Wildlife <u>SOC</u>			
			Public Instruction			



# 4

INCOMING

OUTGOING

HARNETT COUNTY  
EMERGENCY OPERATING CENTER  
MESSAGE FORM

NO.

TO: State EOC atten: *Jeff Ant* DATE-TIME: 5-18-85  
FROM: Harnett EOC 9:12

This is second request.  
Request Wildlife assistance to evacuate  
boats on Cape Fear River for Zone H

SIGNATURE: *Joan L. Parker*

DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY: *Emerg. Mgmt.*

REMARKS:

# STATE EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM'S MESSAGE FORM

<input type="checkbox"/> Incoming	<input type="checkbox"/> Routine
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Outgoing	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Immediate

TO: HARNETT COUNTY <sup>ENG. MST.</sup> - HENRY JOHNSON & CECIL LOGAN

FROM: GENE ABERNETHY - WILDLIFE

DATE/TIME WRITTEN: 5-18-85 9:45AM

TEXT (Ref. Prior Msg. Number: \_\_\_\_\_): TELEPHONE CONSERVATION RECEIVED  
FROM CECIL LOGAN AT 9:41AM, REQUESTING  
WILDLIFE OFFICER NOTIFY & EVACUATE FISHERMEN &  
BOATERS ON CAPE FEAR RIVER.  
- MSG. #132 RECEIVED AT 9:43AM REQUESTING SAME  
- (SIMULATED) - WILDLIFE OFFICERS DISPATCH VIA  
RADIO TO SCENE TO PUMPNCL EVACUATION IMMEDIATELY.

IF MORE SPACE IS NEEDED, USE REVERSE AND CHECK HERE

INITIALS	TO	INIT.	AGENCY	TO	INIT.	AGENCY
<i>BJ</i>	SERT TEAM LEADER/ASST.		Cultural Resources			Revenue
<i>BJ</i>	OPERATIONS OFFICER		Human Resources			Secretary of State
<i>BJ</i>	MESSAGE OFFICER		Aging			Transportation (DOT)
<i>BJ</i>	PUBLIC INFO. OFFICER		Emergency Medical Services			Treasurer
			Health Services			<b>NON-GOVERNMENT AGENCIES</b>
	Governor's Office		Mental Health			Amateur Radio
	Administration		Radiation Protection			American Red Cross
	Agriculture		Social Services			Salvation Army
	Auditor		Insurance			<b>OTHERS (Specify)</b>
	Commerce		Justice	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<i>W</i>	<i>Harnett Co. EOC</i>
	Utilities Commission		SBI	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<i>W</i>	<i>VIA TELEPHONE</i>
	Corrections		Labor	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<i>W</i>	<i>ADMIN OFFICE</i>
	Division of Prisons		Natural Resources and Comm. Dev.			
	Crime Control & Public Safety		Environmental Management			
	Civil Air Patrol		Forest Resources			
	Emergency Management		Land Resources			
	National Guard	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Wildlife			
	State Highway Patrol		Public Instruction			

# STATE EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM'S MESSAGE FORM

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Incoming	<input type="checkbox"/> Routine
<input type="checkbox"/> Outgoing	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Immediate

TO: SERT

FROM: SHP

DATE/TIME WRITTEN: 5/18/85 1010 HRS

TEXT (Ref. Prior Msg. Number: \_\_\_\_\_):

AREAS THAT DID NOT HEAR SIRENS  
L-15 L-16 L-17 L-18

AREAS THAT DID HEAR SIRENS

L-2 L-20


IF MORE SPACE IS NEEDED, USE REVERSE AND CHECK HERE

MESSAGE TO	TO UNIT	AGENCY	TO UNIT	AGENCY
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SERT TEAM LEADER/ASST.		Cultural Resources		Revenue
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OPERATIONS OFFICER		Human Resources		Secretary of State
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> MESSAGE OFFICER		Aging		Transportation (DOT)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> PUBLIC INFO. OFFICER		Emergency Medical Services		Treasurer
		Health Services		<b>NON-GOVERNMENT AGENCIES</b>
		Mental Health		Amateur Radio
		Radiation Protection		American Red Cross
		Social Services		Salvation Army
		Insurance		<b>OTHERS</b>
		Justice		
		SBI		
		Labor		
		Natural Resources and Comm. Dev.		
		Environmental Management		
		Forest Resources		
		Land Resources		
		Wildlife		
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> State Highway Patrol		Public Instruction		

162

# STATE EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM'S MESSAGE FORM

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Incoming	<input type="checkbox"/> Routine
<input type="checkbox"/> Outgoing	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Immediate



TO: see checked below

FROM: \_\_\_\_\_

DATE/TIME WRITTEN: \_\_\_\_\_

TEXT (Ref. Prior Msg. Number: \_\_\_\_\_): **THIS IS AN EXERCISE MESSAGE**

*see attached*

IF MORE SPACE IS NEEDED, USE REVERSE AND CHECK HERE

ALL MESSAGES TO:	TO	INIT	AGENCY	TO	INIT	AGENCY
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SERT TEAM LEADER/ASST.			Cultural Resources			Revenue
<input type="checkbox"/> OPERATIONS OFFICER			Human Resources			Secretary of State
<input type="checkbox"/> MESSAGE OFFICER			Aging			Transportation (DOT)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> PUBLIC INFO. OFFICER			Emergency Medical Services			Treasurer
<input type="checkbox"/>			Health Services			<b>NON-GOVERNMENT AGENCIES</b>
<input type="checkbox"/>			Mental Health			Amateur Radio
<input type="checkbox"/>			Radiation Protection			American Red Cross
<input type="checkbox"/>			Social Services			Salvation Army
<input type="checkbox"/>			Insurance			<b>OTHERS (Specify)</b>
<input type="checkbox"/>			Justice			
<input type="checkbox"/>			SBI			
<input type="checkbox"/>			Labor			
<input type="checkbox"/>			Natural Resources and Comm. Dev.			
<input type="checkbox"/>			Environmental Management			
<input type="checkbox"/>			Forest Resources			
<input type="checkbox"/>			Land Resources			
<input type="checkbox"/>		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Wildlife <i>Alar</i>			
<input type="checkbox"/>			Public Instruction			

INCOMING

HARNETT COUNTY

OUTGOING

EMERGENCY OPERATING CENTER

MESSAGE FORM

NO. 5

TO: Wildlife  
FROM: Henry Johnson, Harnett EOC  
High Priority

DATE-TIME: 5-18-85  
10:21

Third Request

Request assistance from Wildlife to assist in Alert & Notification & evacuation in Cape Fear River in Zone "H" for boaters, fisherman & campers. And Boy Scout Troop.


SIGNATURE: Joan L. Parker

DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY: Harnett Emerg. Mgmt.

REMARKS:

# STATE EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM'S MESSAGE FORM

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Incoming	<input type="checkbox"/> Routine
<input type="checkbox"/> Outgoing	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Immediate



TO: Operations Off.

FROM: Harnett Co.

DATE/TIME WRITTEN: 10:31 am 5-18

TEXT (Ref. Prior Msg. Number: \_\_\_\_\_): **THIS IS AN EXERCISE MESSAGE**

Harnett Co. is having problems on their 760 radios. Repair peeps are on scene. They need a test when repairs complete. Situation started after co. activated alarm sirens for exercise. The situation is real!

AK

IF MORE SPACE IS NEEDED, USE REVERSE AND CHECK HERE

ALL MESSAGES TO:	TO	INIT	AGENCY	TO	INIT	AGENCY
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	SERT TEAM LEADER/ASST.		Cultural Resources			Revenue
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	OPERATIONS OFFICER		Human Resources			Secretary of State
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	MESSAGE OFFICER		Aging			Transportation (DOT)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	PUBLIC INFO. OFFICER		Emergency Medical Services			Treasurer
			Health Services			<b>NON-GOVERNMENT AGENCIES</b>
	Governor's Office		Mental Health			Amateur Radio
	Administration		Radiation Protection			American Red Cross
	Agriculture		Social Services			Salvation Army
	Auditor		Insurance			<b>OTHERS (Specify)</b>
	Commerce		Justice			
	Utilities Commission		SBI			
	Corrections		Labor			
	Division of Prisons		Natural Resources and Comm. Dev			
	Crime Control & Public Safety		Environmental Management			
	Civil Air Patrol		Forest Resources			
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Emergency Management	<u>Commo Officers</u>				
	National Guard		Wildlife			
	State Highway Patrol		Public Instruction			

# STATE EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM'S MESSAGE FORM

Incoming

Routine

Outgoing

Immediate

TO: Oper. Off.

FROM: Chatham County

DATE/TIME WRITTEN: 11:03

TEXT (Ref. Prior Msg. Number:           ) **THIS IS AN EXERCISE MESSAGE**

If there is a release will  
sites be sounded?

If so, which zones?

IF MORE SPACE IS NEEDED, USE REVERSE AND CHECK HERE

TO	INIT	AGENCY	TO	INIT	AGENCY
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		SERT TEAM LEADER/ASST.			Cultural Resources
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		OPERATIONS OFFICER			Human Resources
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		MESSAGE OFFICER			Aging
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		PUBLIC INFO. OFFICER			Emergency Medical Services
					Health Services
		Governor's Office			Mental Health
		Administration			Radiation Protection
		Agriculture			Social Services
		Auditor			Insurance
		Commerce			Justice
		Utilities Commission			SBI
		Corrections			Labor
		Division of Prisons			Natural Resources and Comm. Dev.
		Crime Control & Public Safety			Environmental Management
		Civil Air Patrol			Forest Resources
		Emergency Management			Land Resources
		National Guard			Wildlife
		State Highway Patrol			Public Instruction
					Revenue
					Secretary of State
					Transportation (DOT)
					Treasurer
					Amateur Radio
					American Red Cross
					Salvation Army
					OTHERS (Specify)

# STATE EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM'S MESSAGE FORM

Incoming

Routine

Outgoing

Immediate

TO: HARNETT CNTY

FROM: Ops. Officer

DATE/TIME WRITTEN: 1117 18 Mar 85

TEXT (Ref. Prior Msg. Number: 176): **THIS IS AN EXERCISE MESSAGE**

*Yes! Sirens will be sounded for entire  
EAS area. Zones that are  
affected will be identified*

IF MORE SPACE IS NEEDED, USE REVERSE AND CHECK HERE

MESSAGE TO:	TO:	INITIALS:	AGENCY:	TO:	INITIALS:	AGENCY:
<i>R</i> SERT TEAM LEADER/ASST.			Cultural Resources			Revenue
<i>S/M</i> OPERATIONS OFFICER			Human Resources			Secretary of State
MESSAGE OFFICER			Aging			Transportation (DOT)
<i>R</i> PUBLIC INFO. OFFICER			Emergency Medical Services			Treasurer
			Health Services			<b>NON-GOVERNMENT AGENCIES</b>
Governor's Office			Mental Health			Amateur Radio
Administration			Radiation Protection			American Red Cross
Agriculture			Social Services			Salvation Army
Auditor			Insurance			<b>OTHERS (Spec)</b>
Commerce			Justice			<i>HARNETT</i>
Utilities Commission			SBI			<i>sent via TELETYPE</i>
Corrections			Labor			
Division of Prisons			Natural Resources and Comm. Dev.			
Crime Control & Public Safety			Environmental Management			
Civil Air Patrol			Forest Resources			
Emergency Management			Land Resources			
National Guard			Wildlife			
State Highway Patrol			Public Instruction			



**STATE EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM'S MESSAGE FORM**

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Incoming	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Routine
<input type="checkbox"/> Outgoing	<input type="checkbox"/> Immediate



TO: OPS Operator STATE EOC

FROM: Amateur Radio

DATE/TIME WRITTEN: 1258 18 May

TEXT (Ref. Prior Msg. Number: \_\_\_\_\_): ~~THIS IS AN EXERCISE MESSAGE.~~


Have confirmation via amateur radio that sirens were sounded in Wake, Lee, Harnett and Chatham counties at 12:42 PM

IF MORE SPACE IS NEEDED, USE REVERSE AND CHECK HERE

TO	INIT	AGENCY	TO	INIT	AGENCY
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		SERT TEAM LEADER/ASST			Cultural Resources
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		OPERATIONS OFFICER			Human Resources
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		MESSAGE OFFICER			Aging
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		PUBLIC INFO. OFFICER			Emergency Medical Services
					Health Services
		Governor's Office			Mental Health
		Administration			Radiation Protection
		Agriculture			Social Services
		Auditor			Insurance
		Commerce			Justice
		Utilities Commission			SBI
		Corrections			Labor
		Division of Prisons			Natural Resources and Comm. Dev.
		Crime Control & Public Safety			Environmental Management
		Civil Air Patrol			Forest Resources
		Emergency Management			Land Resources
		National Guard			Wildlife
		State Highway Patrol			Public Instruction
					<b>NON-GOVERNMENT AGENCIES</b>
					Amateur Radio
					American Red Cross
					Salvation Army
					<b>OTHERS (Specify)</b>

# STATE EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM'S MESSAGE FORM

<input type="checkbox"/> Incoming	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Routine
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Outgoing	<input type="checkbox"/> Immediate



TO: State of Utah, Lee, Harriet Co. EOCs

FROM: SERT HQ 9/5

DATE/TIME WRITTEN: 5-18-85 1304

TEXT (Ref. Prior Msg. Number: \_\_\_\_\_) **THIS IS AN EXERCISE MESSAGE**

See Attached Briefing @ 1235  
5-18-85

IF MORE SPACE IS NEEDED, USE REVERSE AND CHECK HERE

ALL MESSAGES TO:	TO INIT	AGENCY	TO INIT	AGENCY
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SERT TEAM LEADER/ASST.		Cultural Resources		Revenue
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OPERATIONS OFFICER		Human Resources		Secretary of State
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> MESSAGE OFFICER		Aging		Transportation (DOT)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> PUBLIC INFO. OFFICER		Emergency Medical Services		Treasurer
<b>TO INIT</b>		Health Services		<b>NON-GOVERNMENT AGENCIES</b>
		Mental Health		Amateur Radio
		Radiation Protection		American Red Cross
		Social Services		Salvation Army
		Insurance		<b>OTHERS (Specify)</b>
		Justice	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<u>State Co. EOC</u>
		SBI	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<u>Utah Co. EOC</u>
		Labor	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<u>Lee Co. EOC</u>
		Natural Resources and Comm. Dev.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<u>Harriet Co. EOC</u>
		Environmental Management		
		Forest Resources	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<u>ADMIN OFFER</u>
		Land Resources		<u>VIA TELEVISION</u>
		Wildlife		
		Public Instruction		

BRIEFING - STATE EOC - 1235 - May 18, 1985

James Munns, Operations Officer, reports as follows:

RELEASE IS UNDERWAY venting from Stack 1. Dayne Brown assumes that it is an uncontrolled release but because it is venting from a stack, monitoring capabilities are good.

Weather - wind is from 45<sup>0</sup> at 10 mph - temperature is 71<sup>0</sup> - Stability Class C.

All persons affected by the leakage have been sheltered or evacuated.

Confirmation from all agencies that there are no SERT or other emergency personnel still in the affected areas. The counties were polled and all county workers are also clear.

Dayne Brown - dose projection at this time is not life threatening. Asked that all agencies reconfirm personnel clear. Done.

1244 - all county sirens were sounded.

Highway Patrol requests that if an agency requests assistance from HP personnel for re-entry, there will be a 10 min. delay for administration of KI and dose projection. Health Services advises there was not sufficient doseage released for administration of KI.

Dayne Brown - worst case evaluation - "no problem". No thyroid PAG exceeded. BUT unless there is a compelling reason, emergency personnel are to stay out of the area. If request is received to send emergency personnel into area, check with Mr. Brown first. All counties were polled to make sure this message was received. All confirmed.

# STATE EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM'S MESSAGE FORM

<input type="checkbox"/> Incoming	<input type="checkbox"/> Routine
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Outgoing	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Immediate

TO: See checked below

FROM: OPNS

DATE/TIME WRITTEN: \_\_\_\_\_

TEXT (Ref. Prior Msg. Number: \_\_\_\_\_): **THIS IS AN EXERCISE MESSAGE**

see att

IF MORE SPACE IS NEEDED, USE REVERSE AND CHECK HERE

ALL MESSAGES TO:	TO INIT	AGENCY	TO INIT	AGENCY
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SERT TEAM LEADER/ASST.		Cultural Resources		Revenue
<input type="checkbox"/> OPERATIONS OFFICER		Human Resources		Secretary of State
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> MESSAGE OFFICER		Aging		Transportation (DOT)
<input type="checkbox"/> PUBLIC INFO. OFFICER		Emergency Medical Services		Treasurer
TO INIT	AGENCY	NON-GOVERNMENT AGENCIES		
<input type="checkbox"/>	Governor's Office	Health Services		Amateur Radio
<input type="checkbox"/>	Administration	Mental Health		American Red Cross
<input type="checkbox"/>	Agriculture	Radiation Protection		Salvation Army
<input type="checkbox"/>	Auditor	Social Services		
<input type="checkbox"/>	Commerce	Insurance		OTHERS (Specify)
<input type="checkbox"/>	Utilities Commission	Justice		
<input type="checkbox"/>	Corrections	SBI		
<input type="checkbox"/>	Division of Prisons	Labor		
<input type="checkbox"/>	Crime Control & Public Safety	Natural Resources and Comm. Dev.		
<input type="checkbox"/>	Civil Air Patrol	Environmental Management		
<input type="checkbox"/>	Emergency Management	Forest Resources		
<input type="checkbox"/>	National Guard	Land Resources		
<input type="checkbox"/>	State Highway Patrol	Wildlife		
		Public Instruction		

IEFING - STATE EOC - 1315 - May 18, 1985

James Munns, Operations Officer, as follows:

Release which occurred began at 1236 and terminated 1300 which lasted 24 minutes. It was an uncontrolled release.

Considering wind speed, release will clear the 10 mi. MPZ at 1400.

Sheltering should occur for food supplies located downwind.

Dayne Brown, as follows:

Release occurred from the reactor auxillary building vent.

Dose projection data - does not appear that protective action guide for thyroid has been exceeded even at the site boundary.

BUT if any personnel were in the immediate downwind area of plant Mr. Brown wants to know.

EXERCISE OVER 1120.



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
REGION II  
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.  
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323

JUN 05 1985

CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO. HARRIS NPP		DATE
1	M. S. Bess	6/10/85
1	T. G. S. S. S.	
1	E. J. Johnson	
1	J. L. Willis	
1	R. G. Black	
1		
1		

SHEARON HARRIS N. P. P.  
Carolina Power and Light Company  
ATTN: Mr. E. E. Utley  
Executive Vice President  
Power Supply and Engineering  
and Construction  
411 Fayetteville Street  
Raleigh, NC 27602

Gentlemen:

SUBJECT: REPORT NO. 50-400/85-20


On May 16-19, 1985, NRC inspected activities authorized by NRC Construction Permit No. CPPR-158 for your Shearon Harris facility. At the conclusion of the inspection, the findings were discussed with those members of your staff identified in the enclosed inspection report.

Areas examined during the inspection are identified in the report. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of selective examinations of procedures and representative records, interviews with personnel, and observation of activities in progress.

Within the scope of the inspection, no violations or deviations were identified.

Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact us.

Sincerely,

  
David M. Verrilli, Chief  
Reactor Projects Branch 1  
Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure:  
Inspection Report No. 50-400/85-20

cc w/encl:  
R. A. Watson, Vice President  
Harris Nuclear Project  
R. M. Parsons, Project General Manager



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
REGION II  
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.  
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323  
JUN 05 1985

Report No.: 50-400/85-20

Licensee: Carolina Power and Light Company  
411 Fayetteville Street  
Raleigh, NC 27602

Docket No.: 50-400

License No.: CPPR-158

Facility Name: Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant

Inspection Conducted: May 16-19, 1985

Inspectors: JR Decker 6/3/85  
T. R. Decker Date Signed  
JR Decker for 6/3/85  
J. L. Kreh Date Signed

Accompanying Personnel: G. Stoetzel  
C. Hawley  
F. McManus  
D. Schultz

Approved by: W. E. Cline 6/3/85  
W. E. Cline, Chief Date Signed  
Emergency Preparedness  
Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards

SUMMARY

Scope: This routine, unannounced inspection entailed 149 inspector-hours onsite in the area of an emergency preparedness exercise.

Results: No violations or deviations were identified.

## REPORT DETAILS

### 1. Persons Contacted

#### Licensee Employees

- \*R. A. Watson, Vice President Harris Nuclear Project
- \*J. L. Willis, Plant General Manager
- \*E. E. Utley, Executive Vice President
- \*B. J. Furr, Vice President - OT & TS
- \*C. S. Bohanan, Director - Regulatory Compliance
- \*R. G. Black, Director Emergency Preparedness
- \*J. M. Collins, Manager - Operations
- \*J. R. Sipp, Manager - Environmental and Radiation Control
- \*C. Gibson, Assistant to the General Manager
- \*T. C. Morton, Electrical/Instrumentation and Control Maintenance  
Supervisor
- \*H. R. Banks, Manager - Corporate Quality Assurance
- \*A. C. Tollison, Manager - Nuclear Training
- \*J. B. Hudson, Project Specialist - License Training
- \*J. R. Bohannon, Director Special Projects
- \*R. B. Starkey, Manager, Environmental Services
- \*W. W. Webster, Manager, R&CS Section
- \*D. B. Waters, Principal Engineer - Operations
- \*J. P. Thompson, Operations Supervisor
- \*R. T. Garner, Shift Foreman
- \*H. R. Goodwin, Senior Specialist - Emergency Preparedness
- \*E. M. Bean, Corporate Communications - Emergency Preparedness Communications
- \*D. E. Hollar, Associate General Counsel
- \*A. L. Garrou, Senior Specialist - Emergency Preparedness
- \*B. W. Morgan, Senior Specialist - Health Physics
- \*J. H. Smith, Director - Nuclear and Simulator Training
- \*R. M. Coats, Assistant to Group Executive - Fossil Generation and Power  
Transmission
- \*E. E. Johnson, Principal Specialist - Document Services
- \*J. W. McDuffee, Radiation Control Supervisor
- \*A. Klemp, Operations Quality Control Supervisor
- \*C. E. Rose, Operations Quality Control Supervisor
- \*D. R. Elkins, Radiation Control Foreman
- \*W. H. Batts, Maintenance Supervisor
- \*M. E. Jackson, Project Engineer - Maintenance
- \*H. Lipa, Environmental and Chemistry Supervisor
- \*S. Hamilton, Manager - Construction Procurement and Contracts

Other licensee employees contacted included engineers, technicians, operators, mechanics, and office personnel.



## NRC Resident Inspectors

\*G. Maxwell  
\*R. Prevatte

\*Attended exit interview

## 2. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on May 19, 1985, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings listed below. No dissenting comments were received from the licensee.

The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.

## 3. Exercise Scenario (82301)

The scenario for the emergency exercise was reviewed to determine that provisions had been made to test the integrated capability and a major portion of the basic elements existing within the licensee, State and local organizations emergency plans and staff as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.F and specific criteria in NUREG-0654, Section II.N.

The scenario was reviewed in advance of the scheduled exercise date and was discussed with licensee representatives on several occasions. While no major problems with the scenario were identified during the review, several inconsistencies became apparent during pre-exercise practice drills. To preclude the possibility that the inconsistencies might detract from the licensee's overall performance, a new scenario was developed prior to the exercise. The new scenario was consistent with the previously established timelines and was reviewed by the inspectors and the licensee controller organization. All scenario questions were resolved prior to the exercise.

No violations or deviations were identified.

## 4. Assignment of Responsibility (82301)

This area was observed to determine that primary responsibilities for emergency response by the licensee have been specifically established and that adequate staff was available to respond to an emergency as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(1), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.A, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654, Section II.A.

The inspectors observed that specific emergency assignments had been made for the licensee's emergency response organization and that there was adequate staff available to respond to the simulated emergency. The initial

response organization was augmented by designated licensee representatives and the capability for long-term or continuous staffing of the emergency response organization was demonstrated. The inspector had no further questions in this area.

No violations or deviations were identified.

5. Onsite Emergency Organization (82301)

The licensee's onsite emergency organization was observed to determine that the responsibilities for emergency response were unambiguously defined, that adequate staffing was provided to insure initial facility accident response in key functional areas at all times, and that the interfaces were specified as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.A, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654, Section II.B.

The inspectors observed that the initial onsite emergency organization was well defined and that adequate staff was available to fill key functional positions within the emergency organization. Augmentation of the initial emergency response organization was accomplished through mobilization of off-shift personnel and Corporate assistance. The on-duty Shift Supervisor assumed the duties of Site Emergency Coordinator promptly upon the initiation of the simulated emergency and directed the response until relieved by the Plant General Manager. The inspectors had no further questions in this area.

No violations or deviations were identified.

6. Emergency Response Support and Resources (82301)

This area was observed to determine that arrangements for requesting and effectively using assistance resources have been made, that arrangements to accommodate State and local staff at the licensee's near-site Emergency Operations Facility have been made, and that other organizations capable of augmenting the planned response have been identified as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.A, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654, Section II.C.

State and local staff were accommodated at the near-site Emergency Operations Facility. Licensee contact with offsite organizations was prompt and assistance resources from various agencies were prepared to assist in the simulated emergency. The inspector had no further questions in this area.

No violations or deviations were identified.

7. Emergency Classification System (82301)

This area was observed to determine that a standard emergency classification and action level scheme was in use by the licensee as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.C, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654, Section II.D.

An inspector observed that the emergency classification system was in effect as stated in the Radiological Emergency Plan and in the Implementing Procedures. The system appeared to be adequate for the classification of the simulated accident and the emergency procedures provided for initial and continuing mitigating actions during the simulated emergency. The inspector had no further questions in this area.

No violations or deviations were identified.

8. Notification Methods and Procedures (82301)

This area was observed to determine that procedures have been established for notification by the licensee of State and local response organizations and emergency personnel, and that the content of initial and follow-up messages to response organizations had been established; and means to provide early notification to the populace within the plume exposure pathway have been established as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b); 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.D, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654 Section II.E.

The prompt notification system (PNS) for alerting the public within the plume exposure pathway was in place and operational. The system was activated during this exercise to simulate warning the public of significant events occurring at the reactor site. The inspector had no further questions in this area.

No violations or deviations were identified.

9. Emergency Communications (82301)

This area was observed to determine that provisions existed for prompt communications among principal response organizations and emergency personnel as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654, Section II.F.

Communications among the licensee's emergency response facilities and emergency organization and between the licensee's emergency response organization and offsite authorities were good. No communication related problems were identified during this exercise.

No violations or deviations were identified.

#### 10. Public Education and Information (82301)

This area was observed to determine that information concerning the simulated emergency was made available for dissemination to the public as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(7), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.D, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654, Section II.G.

Information was provided to the media and the public in advance of the exercise. The information included details on how the public would be notified and what initial actions they should take in an emergency. A rumor control program was also in place. A Corporate and Plant Media Center was established and was well equipped and coordinated. The inspector had no further questions in this area.

No violations or deviations were identified.

#### 11. Emergency Facilities and Equipment (82301)

This area was observed to determine that adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support an emergency response were provided and maintained as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654, Section II.H.

The inspectors observed the activation, staffing and operation of the emergency response facilities and evaluated equipment provided for emergency use during the exercise.

- a. Control Room - An inspector observed that Control Room personnel acted promptly to initiate emergency response to the simulated emergency. Emergency procedures were readily available and the response was prompt and effective. The inspector had no further questions in this area.
- b. Technical Support Center (TSC) - The TSC was activated and staffed promptly upon notification by the Site Emergency Coordinator of the simulated emergency conditions leading to an Alert emergency classification. The TSC staff appeared to be knowledgeable concerning their emergency responsibilities and TSC operations proceeded smoothly. The TSC appeared to have adequate equipment for the support of the assigned staff. The inspectors had no further questions in this area.
- c. Operations Support Center (OSC) - The OSC was staffed promptly upon activation by the Site Emergency Coordinator. An inspector observed that teams were formed promptly, briefed, and dispatched efficiently. The inspector had no further questions in this area.
- d. Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) - The EOF is located at the Shearon Harris Energy and Environmental Center, about two miles from the reactor site. The facility appears to be adequately designed, equipped and staffed to support an emergency response. The inspector had no further questions in this area.

- e. Corporate Emergency Operations Center (CEOC) - The CEOC is located in the Raleigh Corporate offices. The facility appears to be adequately equipped and staffed to support an emergency response. The inspector had no further questions in this area.

No violations or deviations were identified.

## 12. Accident Assessment (82301)

This area was observed to determine that adequate methods, systems and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition were in use as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.B, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654, Section II.I.

The accident assessment program includes both an engineering assessment of plant status and an assessment of radiological hazards to both onsite and offsite personnel resulting from the accident. During the exercise, the engineering accident assessment team functioned effectively in analyzing the plant status so as to make recommendations to the Site Emergency Coordinator concerning mitigating actions to reduce damage to plant equipment, to prevent release of radioactive materials, and to terminate the emergency condition.

Radiological assessment activities are spread over several groups. A group in the TSC was estimating the radiological impact in the plant based on inplant monitoring and onsite measurements. Radiological effluent data was received in the TSC. The TSC and EOF calculations were done in parallel and compared on a timely basis both with each other and with the results obtained by the State of North Carolina. The results were also compared with the data obtained in the EOF from the offsite monitoring groups.

The dose assessment methods incorporated both detailed meteorological parameters and inplant data to predict the consequences of a radiological release and to evaluate the actual (simulated) release. Default values were available for use should there be any question concerning the reliability of the meteorological instrumentation. The inspector had no further questions in this area.

A helicopter was used to transport field teams as well as for aerial monitoring. No procedures defining aerial monitoring practices were observed to be used. The inspector discussed aerial plume tracking with licensee representatives, including proper procedures such as:

(1) contamination surveys of the helicopter following flight in a plume, (2) description of personnel dosimetry for flight crews, (3) development of maps appropriate for aerial tracking, and (4) radio use (and equipment) consistent with ground teams. The licensee agreed to evaluate the aerial plume tracking system to determine if improvements were necessary. This exercise weakness will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection (50-400/85-20-01).

No violations or deviations were identified.

13. Protective Responses (82301)

This area was observed to determine that guidelines for protective actions during the emergency, consistent with Federal guidance, were developed and in place, and protective actions for emergency workers, including evacuation of nonessential personnel, were implemented promptly as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10), and specific criteria in NUREG-0654, Section II.J.

An inspector verified that the licensee had and used emergency procedures for formulating protective action recommendations for offsite populations within the 10 mile emergency planning zone. The licensee's protective action recommendations were consistent with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and other criteria, and notifications were made to the appropriate State and local authorities within the 15-minute criteria.

An inspector observed that protective actions were instituted for onsite emergency workers which included periodic radiation surveys in the facility, evacuation of nonessential personnel, and consideration of the issuance of potassium iodide to essential personnel. The inspector had no further questions in this area.

No violations or deviations were identified.

14. Radiological Exposure Control (82301)

This area was observed to determine that means for controlling radiological exposures, in an emergency, were established and implemented for emergency workers and that they included exposure guidelines consistent with EPA recommendations as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(11), and specific criteria in NUREG-0654, Section II.K.

An inspector noted that radiological exposures were controlled throughout the exercise by issuing emergency workers supplemental dosimeters and by periodic surveys in the emergency response facilities. Exposure guidelines were in place for various categories of emergency actions and adequate protective clothing and respiratory protection were available and used as appropriate. The inspector had no further questions in this area.

No violations or deviations were identified.

## 15. Medical and Public Health Support (82301)

This area was observed to determine that arrangements were made for medical services for contaminated injured individuals as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(12), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654, Section II.L.

An inspector observed the emergency medical rescue activities at the accident scene, and treatment by the staff at the Rex Hospital. In all portions of the exercise, acceptable judgement was displayed with regard to first aid practices, decontamination of the patient, and contamination control. The inspector had no further questions in this area.

No violations or deviations were identified.

## 16. Recovery and Reentry Planning (82301)

This area was observed to determine that general plans were made for recovery and re-entry as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(13), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.H., and specific criteria in NUREG-0654, Section II.M.

The licensee developed general plans and procedures for re-entry and recovery which addressed both existing and potential conditions. The plan contained the position/title, authority and responsibilities of each key individual in the recovery organization. A separate staff was employed to develop the recovery plan. The inspector had no further questions in this area.

No violations or deviations were identified.

## 17. Exercise Critique (82301)

The licensee's critique of the emergency exercise was observed to determine that deficiencies identified as a result of the exercise and weaknesses noted in the licensee's emergency response organization were formally presented to licensee management for corrective actions as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654, Section II.N.

The exercise critique was conducted after the conclusion of the exercise. Licensee management, key exercise participants, and NRC representatives were present. The licensee discussed areas of the exercise in which items for possible improvement were identified. The inspectors determined that the critique was comprehensive and adequately addressed weaknesses identified in the licensee's emergency response program during this exercise.

A public critique was held on May 19, 1985. Representatives from licensee management, the State, local governments, Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the NRC presented their preliminary findings on the exercise.

No violations and deviations were identified.

18. Federal Evaluation Team Report (82301)

The report by the Federal Evaluation Team (Regional Assistance Committee and Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region IV staff) concerning the activities of offsite agencies during the exercise will be forwarded by separate correspondence.

No violations or deviations were identified.



Ms. Nina Bell  
Assistant Director  
Nuclear Information and Resource Service  
1346 Connecticut Avenue N.W., 4th Floor  
Washington, D.C. 20036

[July 11, 1985]

Dear Ms. Bell:

This is in response to your letter of June 11, 1985, and subsequent telephone conversation with Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) staff on June 25, 1985, on behalf of Wells Eddleman, in which you requested, under the Freedom of Information Act, documents relating to the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant radiological emergency response exercise on May 17-18, 1985.

As indicated to you by phone, all of the material requested, except one enclosure, had to be obtained from either our FEMA Region IV office or the State of North Carolina Division of Emergency Management. I'll respond directly to the four items as listed in your letter:

1. Enclosure # 1 entitled "N.C. EXERCISE INSTRUCTIONS for the SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, MAY 17-18, 1985" contains the objectives and scenario used in the May 1985 emergency response exercise.
2. Enclosure # 2 contains all of the evaluation criteria and/or assessment guidelines used by FEMA Region IV to evaluate the May exercise.
3. Enclosure # 3 is the transcript of the public meeting/critique held the afternoon of May 19, 1985, at the Apex Senior High School, Laura Duncan Road, Apex, North Carolina. The exercise evaluation report for the May 17-18, 1985, Shearon Harris exercise and the FEMA interim findings on offsite Radiological Emergency Response Preparedness for the Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant are now being completed. They will be sent to you in a few days concurrent with FEMA's furnishing them to the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
4. FEMA does not have an established policy regarding the access of persons intervening before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to areas used in the exercise, meetings, and critiques in general and for the Shearon Harris 1985 exercise in particular. Since State and local facilities are used, any policy would be appropriately established by either State and/or local governmental authorities.

Enclosures  
As Stated

Sincerely,

Samuel W. Speck  
Associate Director  
State and Local Programs and Support

cc:

Ms. Nina Bell  
Assistant Director  
Nuclear Information and Resource Service  
1346 Connecticut Avenue N.W., 4th Floor  
Washington, D.C. 20036

AUG 7 1985


Dear Ms. Bell:

This is in further response to your letter of June 11, 1985, and our subsequent letter of reply dated July 11, 1985, in which you requested, under the Freedom of Information Act, documents relating to the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Station radiological emergency response exercise on May 17-18, 1985.

We stated in the July 11, 1985, letter that the exercise evaluation report for the May 17-18, 1985, Shearon Harris exercise and the FEMA interim findings on offsite radiological emergency response preparedness for the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Station would be sent to you concurrent with FEMA's furnishing them to the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). They are both enclosed, along with our transmittal letter to the NRC.

Enclosures  
As Stated

Sincerely, \*



Richard W. Krim  
Assistant Associate Director  
Office of Natural and Technological  
Hazards Programs

## Nuclear plant response tested

# Drill results hailed

By KYLE MARSHALL  
Times staff writer

The emergency drill near the Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant that kept local law enforcement officers busy over the weekend has been termed a success by local officials and Carolina Power & Light Co.

J. Russell Capps, Wake director of emergency management, said the two-day drill testing the response capabilities of emergency teams exceeded his expectations.

"I was very pleased," he said today. "I don't know of any hitch at all in the field. It fully exceeded our expectations."

A spokesman for CP&L called the exercise a "tremendous success" because it gave local emergency management teams and the utility a chance to work together in preparing the emergency response.

"As far as the company personnel and the off-site personnel are concerned, they all exhibited a high level of professionalism," said Elizabeth M. Bean.

But David H. Martin of Raleigh, energy committee chairman of the Conservation Council of North Carolina, which opposes nuclear power, said the drill was not an adequate preparation for a possible emergency.

"The problem with this drill is that it's not a realistic approach to

the situation," he said today. One concern is that the emergency planning zone that includes all areas within a 10-mile radius of the plant is not big enough, Martin said.

"The 10-mile limit has no scientific basis at all," he said. "If you have a severe accident, there's no way to tell whatsoever whether you're going to get radiation within 10, 20, or even 50 miles."

The drill was required by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission before a commercial operation license for the plant can be granted to CP&L. The \$3 billion plant, located about 20 miles southwest of Raleigh, is scheduled to begin producing electricity by September 1986.

Capps and Ms. Bean both said that NRC representatives, as well as officials present from the Federal Emergency Management Agency, were pleased with the drill. The two agencies will release a full report on the exercise within a few weeks.

Ms. Bean said it wouldn't be possible to estimate how much the drill cost CP&L to organize and carry out because of the large number of people involved. As many as 4,000 state and local officials, CP&L personnel, health agency workers, federal nuclear regulators and citizen volunteers had some connection with the exercise.

The drill tested the effectiveness of emergency response plans by CP&L, the state Division of Emergency Management and law enforcement teams from Wake, Harnett, Chatham and Lee counties. It also was intended to test the coordination of news conferences and statements to see if the public would be adequately informed in the event of an emergency.

The mock emergency started Friday with the announcement of a small fire in a building near the plant, and escalated into a full-blown nuclear emergency before

## AS SUCCESS

ending on Saturday with a radiation leak.

At a public hearing on the drill yesterday, held at Apex Senior High School, several residents said the only problem they noticed was that the emergency sirens in the area either didn't work or weren't loud enough. The sirens are sounded to warn citizens to turn on their radios and televisions for further information on the emergency.

Ms. Bean said some of the sirens around the plant have not yet been installed or tested.

# Officials describe emergency test as

## success

Despite some problems with sirens, officials evaluating Carolina Power & Light Company's two-day mock emergency at the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant at New Hill have described the test as a success.

Russell Capps, coordinator for Wake County's Emergency Management Office, noted that Wake County's sirens failed to sound during a scheduled drill on Friday, but he added that the sirens did work effectively on Saturday.

"We aren't sure of the reason why they didn't work (on Friday)," Capps said. "They did work twice on Saturday."

Overall, Capps described the test as a success and said participating emergency agencies excelled in their tasks.

Capps made his remarks at a public hearing held at Apex Senior High School Sunday afternoon. Officials from CP&L and federal, state and county government held the meeting to critique the drill and to answer questions submitted by the public.

Area fire, police and rescue personnel did not attend Sunday's meeting, but they, too, in interviews Monday described the test as a success. They said they expect to meet with emergency planning officials at a later date to evaluate the drill in depth.

The drill was one step in CP&L's attempt to obtain a

license for the Harris plant, which is scheduled to begin commercial operation in September 1986. In addition to the mock emergency, the public hearing was required as a part of the licensing process.

During the hearing Glenn C. Woodard Jr. of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) said the exercise generally was successful, although he added that further training of emergency personnel might be necessary. FEMA evaluates the capability of state

and local governments to respond to nuclear emergencies and passes its critique to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

"We feel the exercise was successful, and it adequately demonstrated the ability of off-site personnel to respond should there be an emergency at the Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant," Woodard said.

The mock emergency started Friday morning with the announcement of a pretended fire at the plant. The scenario continued to worsen throughout the day until a site emergency was declared at 2:25 p.m.

At 3:10 p.m. on Friday CP&L issued to area media sources a simulated bulletin announcing that higher-than-normal levels of radioactivity were building inside the plant's containment building. Sirens were scheduled to sound in the four counties (Wake, Lee, Harnett and

Chatham) with land within a 10-mile radius of the plant.

On Saturday, the emergency continued to escalate until an evacuation of residents living in a five-mile radius of the plant would have been called for in an actual occurrence. Sirens sounded throughout a 10-mile radius of the plant to alert residents to turn on their radios or televisions for further information carried over the Emergency Broadcast System.

The sirens were to alert the public that radiation gas was leaking from a stack, or large chimney, at the plant. The make-believe leak was contained within half an hour, and the simulation ended at 1:35 p.m.

At Sunday's hearing on the drill Jessie O'Briant of New Hill brought a list of names of 51 people who live within five miles of the plant and who said the sirens were not loud enough.

Mrs. O'Briant said she was concerned that residents would not have heard the sirens at all if the drill had been held at night, when people are asleep, or if it had occurred in cold weather, when people keep their doors and windows closed.

"We didn't think much about it when they (CP&L) tested the sirens a while back, because we thought they weren't going full blast," Mrs. O'Briant said. "We're not protesting the plant. We just want the sirens to be loud enough to wake us up. In

the winter with the kids talking and the TV on, you wouldn't hear it."

James L. Willis, the plant's general manager, said the 62 sirens within the 10-mile radius of the plant were designed to provide a noise level sufficient to alert residents. The sirens also are placed close enough together to provide some overlapping sound if one should fail to activate, he said.

Willis said CP&L officials would test the siren near Mrs. O'Briant's home.

Also, a FEMA official told Mrs. O'Briant that the sirens have not been officially tested, and when they are tested the federal agency will conduct a telephone survey to find out where people are not hearing the sirens and where the "dead spots" are.

In addition, Willis said backup systems are provided through local fire, rescue and police personnel to alert the public.

In Fuquay-Varina area emergency personnel traveled throughout local zones affected by the alert and announced over public address systems that residents should turn on their radios or televisions for more information.

# Nuclear plant 'test' emergency conducted

BY ED MENNINGER

Repeatedly made crystal clear to the population of this area at a public hearing in Apex Sunday afternoon is the fact that everyone concerned in any way with the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant west of Apex is totally prepared to handle any

emergency situation which may ever occur at this installation.

Some 70 persons attended a critique and review at Apex High School of the pre-licensing exercise which tested emergency preparedness within a 50-mile radius of the plant Friday and Saturday. Emergen-

cy management directors in the four affected counties reported on preparations which have been made in their respective counties. They include Wake, Lee, Harnett and Chatham Counties.

Speaking for Harnett, Henry G. Johnson said about 1400 persons in Buckhorn and Hector's Creek Townships reside within the critical 10-mile radius area from the plant. The county Social Services department would be in charge of sheltering the county health department would have a role in determining whether any water and food supplies have been contaminated by radiological emissions, emergency warnings would emanate from Sheriff Lewis Rosser's communications center in the courthouse, the volunteer fire and rescue units have been extensively trained in this particular respect for the past half year, Johnson advised.

James Willis, speaking for Carolina Power & Light Co., emphasized that the chances for an "incident" at the plant "are extremely remote," but such a possibility does exist and IF (that was the afternoon's big word) it comes to pass the public needs to know what to do in any emergency and to be assured in advance that local officials are prepared to combat

any situation. In this respect the company will be distributing a total information booklet to the public this fall, and annually the booklet will be updated and distributed a new, Willis explained.

Lillington and most of Harnett County are well within the 50-mile "ingestion exposure pathway" surrounding the plant which is one of three in this state, but any "incident" at the plant would not necessarily affect the whole area, it was pointed out.

In noting this fact, state emergency management director Vance E. Kee explained that the state's plan for a situation calls for local management with the state assisting. But if the governor eventually declares a situation a "disaster" case then the state office would take charge of all directions and controls with county officials assisting.

Kee reviewed the state's over-all plan at some length, and later an overview of the area's situation by the Federal Emergency Management Agency was presented. After the eight designated speakers had concluded their presentations, questions from the audience, which had been solicited before the meeting's start, were answered by the panel.

A system of warning sirens has been set up throughout the 10-mile area, and a woman from Newhill which is located within two miles of the plant complained that during the exercise last weekend she couldn't hear the sirens nearest to her residence. Willis assured her that they would be checked as perhaps being defective.

Another woman asked how the emergency planning might work if a situation arose when many workers might be unavailable to help with it. "Lady, we're so well trained that we'll succeed even with a short staff," moderator Joseph F. Myers replied.