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MIDDLE SOUTH UTILITIES SYSTEM

May 24, 1983

W3I83-0189
Q-3-A35.07.81

Mr. John T. Collins, Regional Administrator, Region IV
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000
Arlington, Texas 76012

SUBJECT: Waterford SES Unit No. 3
Docket No. 50-382
Significant Construction Deficiency No. 81
"Shelf Life Exceeded on Cable
Splice and Termination Tape"
First Interim Report

REFERENCE: Telecon dated April 27, 1983 from M. A. Livesay to C. Oberg

Dear Mr. Collins:

In accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50.55(e), we are hereby providing two copies of the Interim Report of Significant Construction Deficiency No. 81, "Shelf Life Exceeded on Cable Splice and Termination Tape". This item was previously identified as PRD 116.

If you have any questions, please advise.

Very truly yours,

F. J. Drummond
Project Support Manager - Nuclear

FJD/MAL:keh

Attachment

cc: 1) Director
Office of Inspection & Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

2) Director
Office of Management
Information and Program Control
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

3) Mr. E. L. Blake

4) Mr. W. M. Stevenson

IE-27
1/1

INTERIM REPORT OF
SIGNIFICANT CONSTRUCTION DEFICIENCY NO. 81
"SHELF LIFE EXCEEDED ON CABLE SPLICE & TERMINATION TAPE"

INTRODUCTION

This report is submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.55(e). It describes a deficiency in splices and terminations made on power and control cables utilizing Okonite #35, T-95 tapes, and "Nuclear Splice Cement". The problem is considered reportable under the requirements of 10CFR50.55(e). To the best of our knowledge, this problem has not been identified to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission pursuant to 10CFR21.

DESCRIPTION OF PROBLEM

Shipments of Okonite #35, T-95 tapes, and "Nuclear Splice Cement" were received at Waterford #3 between March, 1979 and December, 1980. Okonite has stated that the #35 tape has a shelf life of two years, T-95 tape has a shelf life of one year, and the splice cement has a shelf life of one year. Splices and terminations have been made with these tapes from the receipt dates through May, 1983, in some cases exceeding the maximum shelf life. No controls exist to prevent the use of tape which has exceeded the maximum shelf life.

SAFETY IMPLICATIONS

Failure of the tape and/or cement could cause the affected splice(s) to open and/or short circuit, thus rendering safety system(s) inoperable.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Engineering evaluation of this problem is ongoing. Samples of medium and low voltage terminations and splices made with tape from the oldest shipment will be provided to Okonite for dielectric testing. The results of these tests will determine if the shelf life of Okonite #35, T-95 tape, and "Nuclear Splice Cement" can be extended to include the quantities already used at Waterford 3. We anticipate completion of testing by July 1, 1983. A Final Report or update will be submitted to the USNRC no later than July 22, 1983.

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