GPU Nuclear

GPU Nuclear
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Writer's Direct Dial Number:

March 4, 1983

Mr. Ronald C. Haynes, Administrator
Region I
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, PA 19406

Dear Mr. Haynes:

Subject: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Docket No. 50-219
Licensee Event Report
Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/83-06/03L

This letter forwards three copies of a Licensee Event Report (LER) to report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/83-06/03L in compliance with paragraph 6.9.2.b.2 of the Technical Specifications.

Very truly yours,

Peter B. Fiedler
Vice President and Director
Oyster Creek

PBF:jal
Enclosures

cc: Director (40 copies)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Director (3)
Office of Management Information and
Program Control
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

NRC Resident Inspector
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Forked River, NJ 08731

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OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
Forked River, New Jersey 08731

Licensee Event Report
Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/83-06/03L

Report Date

March 4, 1983

Occurrence Date

February 6, 1983

Identification of Occurrence

Operation in a degraded mode permitted by limiting condition for operation as specified in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 3.5.B.3, when the low flow switch for Standby Gas Treatment System fan 1-9 failed to sense a low flow condition therefore preventing system II valves from closing. This item is reportable per paragraph 6.9.2.b.2 of the Technical Specifications.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence

The plant was operating at steady state power.

Mode Switch Position		Run
Power:	Core	803.5 MWt
	Electrical	232 MWe

Description of Occurrence

On Sunday, February 6, 1983 at 2100 hours, during the execution of the Standby Gas Treatment System ten hour operability test in the system I preferential mode, valves V-28-24, V-28-27 and V-28-30 failed to close after fan 1-9 tripped as part of the normal system line-up. System I was declared out of sevice. At 2205 hours an operability and flow test was completed in the system II preferential mode with system II functioning normally.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence

The apparent cause of this occurrence was moisture accumulation in fan 1-9 low flow switch sensing lines. This moisture and possible icing due to outdoor temperatures below freezing, prevented the flow switch from sensing a low flow condition with fan 1-9 off.

During normal system operation, valves V-28-24, V-28-27 and V-28-30 would close with a low flow condition sensed by fan 1-9 low flow switch.

Analysis of Occurrence

The Standby Gas Treatment System filters and exhausts the reactor building atmosphere to the stack during secondary containment isolation condition with a minimum release of radioactive materials from the reactor building to the environs.

The safety significance of this event is minimized as the Standby Gas Treatment System was operational in the system II preferential mode in the event that a demand for system operation had occurred.

Corrective Action

The low flow switch sensing lines for system I were blown out with nitrogen to remove existing moisture and the low flow switch was checked for proper operation. On Monday, February 7, 1983 at 0220 hours an operability and flow test was completed in the system I preferential mode with system I returned to service.

As a preventative maintenance measure, at 0251 hours, low flow switch sensing lines for system II were blown out with nitrogen and the low flow switch was checked for proper operation. System II was returned to service following an operability and flow test.

Failure Data

Dwyer Instruments, Inc.

Catalog# 1637-.25

Michigan City, Indiana

Switch was repaired and not replaced