

DOCKETED COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES Bureau of Regulatory Counsel Room 505 Executive House 2 NOV 30 All:32 P. O. Box 2357 Harrisburg, Pa. 17120 FFICE OF SECRETARY DOCKETING & SERVICE BRANCH



November 29, 1982

BY EXPRESS MAIL

Nunzio J. Palladino, Chairman Victor Gilinsky, Commissioner John F. Ahearne, Commissioner Thomas M. Roberts, Commissioner James K. Asselstine, Commissioner

> Re: In the Matter of Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1) Docket No. 50-289 (Restart)

Dear Chairman Palladino and Members of the Commission:

By Order dated November 15, 1982, the Commission left open the record for immediate effectiveness comments in this proceeding until November 30, 1982. The Commonwealth appreciates this additional opportunity to respond to arguments made by other parties. In addition, the Commission afforded the Commonwealth an opportunity to supplement its responses to questions posed by the Commission during the oral presentations. (Tr. 136).

All of the questions posed by the Commission during the November 9, 1982 oral presentations were answered by Ms. Straube and Mr. Belser in accordance with the Commonwealth's previously established positions, and require no modifications. However, due to the nature of the dosimetry question and time limitations during the hearing, the responses to this question were, at best, incomplete. For a more complete statement of the Commonwealth's position that adequate supplies of permanent record dosimeters for emergency workers must be supplied prior to restart, I would encourage you to review the Commonwealth's Petition For Partial Review Of ALAB-698 (November 12, 1982).

Commissioner Ahearne asked why TLDs are "sufficiently essential that...it cannot possibly be done." (Tr. 139). It is not the Commonwealth's position that, absent TLDs, a viable emergency response at TMI-1 is impossible. However, as stated in the Commission's emergency planning rule (10 C.F.R. §50.47), the appropriate standard is whether there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public, including emergency workers, will be protected during an emergency. As explained in the Petition for Partial Review of ALAB-698, without permanent record dosimeters, there is no reasonable assurance of an accurate and reliable measurement of the radiological doses actually received by private

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citizens responding to an emergency at TMI-1. In addition, the Commonwealth cannot predict that there is reasonable assurance that sufficient numbers of emergency workers will respond to an incident at TMI without being provided a full complement of dosimetry, as specified in the emergency plans.

Finally, the Commonwealth wishes to respond to only one point raised by other parties. The NRC staff and FEMA, in response to a question posed by the Commission, stated that their position on dosimetry for emergency workers was explicitly established in the Susquehanna operating license proceeding. (Tr. 165-66). This is not completely accurate. First, while the Staff in the Susquehanna proceeding stated that total radiological exposures could be obtained by accurately reading and recording data from self-reading dosimeters, it also stated that the preferred dosimetry for emergency workers includes the use of TLDs. Second, the FEMA findings on planning and preparedness for the Susquehanna facility specifically conditioned its approval of the implementability of the Susquehanna emergency plan on the procurement of adequate supplies of TLDs. Thus, FEMA and the NRC Staff establish one standard for dealing with Licensing Boards, Appeal Boards, and the Commission (No TLDs required for plant operation) while setting a more stringent requirement for approval of the Commonwealth's emergency plans (TLDs necessary). Therefore, the Staff's representation to the Commission that it has clearly stated a consistent position on dosimetry requirements for emergency workers is in error.

Thank you again for this opportunity to supplement the Commonwealth's comments on the immediate effectiveness of the ASLB decisions on TMI-1 restart. To summarize the Commonwealth's previously stated positions, restart should not be allowed until all individuals on GPU's staff with a demonstrated lack of integrity are prohibited from operating TMI-1, until Licensee demonstrates the competence of its operator training staff, and until adequate supplies of permanent record dosimeters are provided to support the emergency response at IMI-1.

Very truly yours,

Robert av. adles

Robert W. Adler Assistant Counsel Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

cc: IMI-1 Service List (First Class Mail)