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February 1, 1994  
JPN-94-007

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Attn: Document Control Desk  
Mail Stop P1-137  
Washington, DC 20555

SUBJECT: James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant  
Docket No. 50-333  
1992 In-Service Inspection


Reference: NYPA letter, R. E. Beedle to NRC (JPN-93-021), dated March 26, 1993,  
"In-Service Inspection Summary Report, 1992 Refuel Outage  
(Reload 10/Cycle 11)."

Dear Sir:

This letter responds to an NRC request for additional information regarding the In-Service Inspection Summary Report submitted with the referenced letter. The information was requested in a December 14, 1993 telecon between the Authority and NRC staff, and subsequently clarified in a January 10, 1994 telecon. The requested information is presented in the attachments to this letter.

If you have any questions, please contact Mr. J. A. Gray, Jr.

Very truly yours,



W. A. Josiger  
Acting Executive Vice President  
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Attachments: 1. Response to NRC Questions  
2. Commitment Summary

cc: Next page

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## ATTACHMENT 1 to JPN-94-007

### Response to NRC Questions on in-Service Inspection Summary Report James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant

#### NRC Question

The section on the jet pump beam UT examination identified a crack indication on the No. 18 jet pump hold-down beam. How was this condition resolved ?

#### Response

All of the twenty jet pump hold-down beams were replaced during the 1992 outage with new design BWR/4 beams fabricated from Inconel X-750. The replacement beams were subjected to a high temperature aging heat treatment, and installed with a lower preload to reduce stress levels. The heat treatment and lower preload reduce the susceptibility of the material to intergranular stress corrosion cracking.

#### NRC Question

The table in the report titled "In-Vessel Visual Inspection Summary of Inspections Performed, Spring 1992," identified that a review was required for several of the inspection observations. Provide the results of these reviews.

#### Response

The required reviews were performed several days after the inspections by a level III inspector and documented on the examination data sheets. This documentation was not included in the In-Service Inspection Summary Report. Future In-Service Inspection Summary Reports will clarify the resolution of any open or "review required" inspection findings. The following response refers to the inspections by page number and tape count number as they appear in the table.

1. Page 7, Tape Count 0400-0173:

Linear indications across the "B" Core Spray sparger weld No. 19 were reported in the initial inspection. A review by GE and NYPA level III inspectors determined the indications to be non-relevant.

2. Page 9, Tape Count 4084-4290:

Four bent feedwater nozzles were identified during the spring 1990 in-vessel inspection. Each of the four nozzles was damaged at the top of the orifice. In each case, the upper tip of the orifice was flared upward. The elbows did not appear to be bent. An evaluation concluded that there was no apparent reduction in flow area of any of the nozzle orifices, and repairs were not necessary. The nozzles may have

been deformed after being contacted by the shroud head. The spring 1992 inspection also identified the same nozzle deformation. A review by a GE level III inspector determined the condition to be unchanged from the 1990 inspections, and are therefore acceptable based on the 1990 evaluation.

3. Page 12, Tape Count 0070-1276 & 0055-1572:

Fine cracking was observed on the upper steam dryer support ring at the locations identified on the table. There are several short indications near the bottom of the steam dryer support ring that are generally oriented in a vertical direction. There are numerous indications located near the top or bottom of the support ring that are oriented approximately in a horizontal direction. While the video tape does not provide sufficient information to calculate the precise length of the cracks, it appears that the cracks are several feet in length.

All of the indications are within approximately one inch of welds, which, according to a General Electric evaluation, are consistent with the cracks observed at other reactors. The evaluation concluded that the indications on the steam dryer support ring are due to the same combination of surface cold work and fabrication (rolling and welding) stresses as those observed at other reactors.

These indications were first reported during the spring 1990 inspection. An evaluation performed by General Electric concluded that the dryer support is a non-safety related component with large structural margins because it is a non-pressure retaining component fabricated from a tough material. The evaluation concluded that repairs were not necessary. The indications identified during the spring 1992 inspection and those identified during the 1990 inspection were compared and the indications were determined to be similar in size. Therefore the current condition of the steam dryer support ring is acceptable based on the 1990 evaluation, and reviews by GE and NYPA level III inspectors. The Authority will inspect the same region during the next refuel outage and evaluate any significant change in its condition.

4. Page 24, Tape Count 0952-1067; Page 25, Tape count 12133-2550; and Page 26, Tape Count 0000-1990:

The observations were reviewed by a GE level III inspector and found to be non-relevant. The small debris identified in these three inspection observations was probably removed since the same personnel involved with the in-vessel inspections are also involved with the removal of debris noted during the inspection. However, loose part removal or analysis is not documented in the ISI reports since this activity is not part of the in-vessel inspection program. Debris identified during future in-vessel inspections will be formally reported to the station operations group responsible for loose part retrieval and analysis.

ATTACHMENT 2 to JPN-94-007

SUMMARY OF COMMITMENTS  
James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant

<u>Commitment Number</u>	<u>Commitment</u>	<u>Due Date</u>
JPN-94-007-01	Perform an in-vessel visual inspection of the upper steam dryer support ring. Evaluate any significant change in its condition from previous inspections.	Next refueling outage (Reload 11)
JPN-94-007-02	Formally report debris identified during the in-vessel inspections to the station operations group responsible for loose part retrieval and analysis.	Next in-vessel inspection
JPN-94-007-03	Clarify the resolution of any future open or "review required" inspection finding listed in the In-Service Inspection Summary Report.	Next In-Service Inspection Summary Report