GPU Nuclear

GPU Nuclear
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Writer's Direct Dial Number:

August 3, 1982

Mr. Ronald C. Haynes, Administrator
Region I
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, PA 19406

Dear Mr. Haynes:

Subject: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Docket No. 50-219
Licensee Event Report
Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/82-37/01T

This letter forwards three copies of a Licensee Event Report to report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/82-37/01T in compliance with paragraph 6.9.2.a.6 of the Technical Specifications.

Very truly yours,

Peter B. Fiedler
Vice President and Director
Oyster Creek

PBF:lse
Enclosures

cc: Director (40 copies)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Director (3)
Office of Management Information and
Program Control
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

NRC Resident Inspector
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Forked River, NJ 08731

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OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
Forked River, New Jersey 08731

Licensee Event Report
Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/82-37/01T

Report Date

August 3, 1982

Discovery Date

July 19, 1982

Identification of Occurrence

On July 19, 1982, it was identified that a procedural error existed which removed the capability to automatically isolate an Isolation Condenser as required by Technical Specifications, Table 3.1.1, Item H.

This event is considered to be a Reportable Occurrence as defined by Technical Specifications, paragraph 6.9.2.a.6.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence

The plant was in various operating modes during the time the condition existed.

Description of Occurrence

During the performance of the Isolation Condenser Isolation Test and Calibration (Procedure 609.3.002), the first actions the operators take is to open the supply breakers for the normally open valves, thus preventing automatic isolation of the system. This is done because the logic for isolation is a one out of four, and a test of any one sensor will initiate isolation. This procedural error will inhibit the automatic isolation function of the affected isolation condenser.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence

The cause of the occurrence is attributed to procedural inadequacy.

Analysis of Occurrence

The purpose of the isolation condenser is to depressurize the reactor and to remove decay heat and maintain water inventory in the event the main condenser is unavailable as a heat sink. The line break sensors isolate the system if a pipe rupture should occur during operation.

However, under the precautions and limitations section of Procedure 609.3.002, the need for operator manual action was recognized as follows: "During periods that the isolation condenser isolation valves supply breakers are open, when the isolation condensers are required to be operable, operators shall stand by at respective motor control centers to close supply breakers immediately upon command from control room." The possibility exists that during a pipe rupture the operator could not perform this function at the local motor control centers. The isolation function would then be rendered inoperable.

Corrective Action

The procedure will be revised to alter the method of testing and place the isolation condenser under test in a safe (isolated) condition as allowed by Technical Specifications, Table 3.1.1, Item H.

Additionally, all other surveillance procedures of this nature will be reviewed to determine whether or not a similar situation exists.