

E. D. Dean III Vice President – Plant Hatch Plant Edwin 1 Hatch 11028 Hatch Parkway North Baxley, GA 31513 912 537,5859 tel 912 366 2077 fax

MAR 0 2 2020

Docket Nos.: 50-366

NL-20-0230

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555-0001

### Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Unit 2 Primary Containment Penetration Exceeded Maximum Allowable Primary Containment Leakage Rate (La)

Ladies and Gentlemen:

In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i)(B), 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(ii)(A), and 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(v)(C), Southern Nuclear Operating Company hereby submits the enclosed Licensee Event Report.

This letter contains no NRC commitments. If you have any questions, please contact the Hatch Licensing Manager, Jimmy Collins at 912.537.2342

Respectfully submitted,

E. D. Dean Vice President – Hatch

EDD/JEL/SCM

Enclosure: LER 2020-001-00

Cc: Regional Administrator, Region II NRR Project Manager – Hatch Senior Resident Inspector – Hatch RTYPE: CHA02.004

## Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Unit 2

Licensee Event Report 2020-001-00

# Primary Containment Penetration Exceeded Maximum Allowable Primary Containment Leakage Rate (La)

Enclosure

LER 2020-001-00

NRC	FORM	366
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#### U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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### LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See Page 2 for required number of digits/characters for each block) (See NUREG-1022, R.3 for instruction and guidance for completing this form http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1022/r3/) APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 03/31/2020 Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request 80 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the locating process and fed back to industry. Send comments requiring burden estimate to the information Services Branch. (T-2 F43), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mail to Infocollecta.Resource@mc.gov, and to the Deek Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Artiss, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104). Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to Impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the INRC may not contact or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

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3. Page

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2. Docket Number

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Primary Containment Penetration Exceeded Maximum Allowable Primary Containment Leakage Rate (La)

5. Event Date 6. LER Number 7. Report Da						Date													
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9. Operating Mode 11. This Report is Submitted Purs									suan	uant to the Requirements of 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply)									
			20.2	201(1	<b>)</b>		20	.2203(a)	(3)(i)			5	0,73(a)(2)(ii)(A)			50.73(a	)(2)(vii	ii)(A)	
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	20.2203(a)(2)(i)				50	.36(c)(1)	(i)(A)	11		5	0.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)		E	50.73(a)(2)(x)					
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Yes (If yes, complete 15. Expected Submission Date) V							15. Expected Submission Date												

Abstract (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 14 single-spaced typewritten lines)

On January 4, 2020 at 1109 EST, with Unit 2 operating at 100% rated thermal power, it was determined that the maximum allowable primary containment leakage rate (La) as defined in 10CFR50, Appendix J, "Primary Reactor Containment Leakage Testing for Water-Cooled Power Reactors", had been exceeded under postulated accident conditions.

Engineering troubleshooting efforts identified the degraded primary containment penetration and noted that leakage past two primary containment isolation valves (PCIVs) was causing La to be exceeded under postulated accident conditions. Additional valves downstream of the PCIVs were closed to return primary containment back to operable status.

The cause of the PCIV failures is currently unknown and will be determined during valve disassembly during a planned outage. At that time, the PCIVs will be repaired and returned to operable status.

<form>         Note 2010       U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION       APPROVED BY OME: N.O. 3150-0140       EXTRABLES: 0.031(2020)         Note 2010       Canadian and the commentance of the complexity of the instance of the complexity of the complexity of the complexity of the instance of the complexity of the complexity</form>												
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Construction       Construction <td< td=""><td>CONTINUATION S</td><td>HEET</td><td></td><td colspan="7">lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Information Services Branch (T-2 F43), U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mail to Infocollects.Resource@ncc.gov and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of</td></td<>	CONTINUATION S	HEET		lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Information Services Branch (T-2 F43), U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mail to Infocollects.Resource@ncc.gov and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of								
Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Unit 2       05000-       366       Yean       Scutemptal.       Rev         Bewin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Unit 2       05000-       366       001       -       00         NARRATIVE       EVENT DESCRIPTION       00       001       -       00         Perform S0, Appendix J., "Primary Reactor Containment Leakage rate (La) as specified in the Technical Specifications and defined in 10 CFR 50, Appendix J., "Primary Reactor Containment Leakage resting for Water-Cooled Power Reactors", had been exceeded under postulated accident conditions. This represented a failure of the referenced perform solar containment thergity. Compensatory measures were implemented to close and deactivate isolation valves downstream of the Primary Containment Integrity. Compensatory measures were anglemented to close and deactivate isolation valves downstream of the Primary Containment Integrity. Compensatory measures were safety-related and constructed to ASME Section III Class 2 with satisfactory Local Leak Rate Tests (LLRTs).         Failed Components Information:       Master Parts List Number: 2748F319 and 2748F320         Maufacturer: Fisher Controls Company       Model 9220         Type: Isolation Valves       Type: Isolation Valves         This event is also reportable per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(0)(C) for an event or condition that is needed to contol the release of radicative material.       This event has been classified as a Safety Michano Valves         Their event is also reportable per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(0)(C) for an event or condition that is neceded to contof the release of radicative material.				collection does not display a currently	y valid OMB	control	number, the NF	C may no	ot conduct or			
Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Unit 2       05000-       366       100       NUMBER       NO.         NARRATIVE         EVENT DESCRIPTION       On January 4, 2020, at 109 EST, with Unit 2 operating at 100% rated thermal power, it was determined that the maximum allowable primary containment leakage rate (La) as specified in the Technical Specifications and defined in 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, "Primary Reactor Containment Leakage Testing for Water-Cooled Power Reactors", hed been exceeded under postulated accident conditions.       Engineering troubleshooting efforts identified that leakage past the drywell ventilation penetration inboard and outboard isolation valves downstream of the Primary Containment Isolation valves (PGIVa) (ISV) to isolate the leaking penetration and return primary containment integrity. Compensatory measures were inplemented to close and deactivate isolation valves downstream of the Primary Containment Isolation valves (PGIVa) (ISV) to isolate the leaking penetration and return primary containment to parable status. The downstream valves are safety-related and constructed to ASME Section II Class 2 with satisfactory Local Leak Rate Tests (LLRTs).         Failed Components Information:       Master Parts List Number: 2748F319 and 2748F320         Manufacturer: Fisher Controls Company       Model Number: Model 9220         Type: Isolation Valves       This event is also reportable per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) due to one of the plant's principle safety barriers being seriously degraded. This event is also reportable per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(K) for a newnor condition that could have prevented tillilliment of a safety function that is needed to control the release of radioactive material. This event has been classified as a Safety System Functional F	1. FACILITY NAME	2.	DOCK	ET NUMBER		1			DEV			
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NRC FORM 366A (04-2018) Page 2 of 3	La under postulated accident conditions. However, the primary containment leakage rate was below the level required to significantly impact the Core Damage Frequency and Large Early Release Frequency and was of low safety consequence. Additionally, any leakage past the degraded PCIVs during an actual event would have been filtered											
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NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULA	TORY COM	AISSION	APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 03/31/2020								
(24-2018) LICENSEE EVENT REP CONTINUATION S (See NUREG-1022, R.3 for Instruction and guidance for http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nurege	HEET completing th	Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request 80 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Information Services Branch (T-2 F43). U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 2055-0001, or by e-mail to Infocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Dask Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104). Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.									
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	05000-			YEAR	REV NO.						
Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Unit 2	05000-		366	2020	- [	NUMBER 001	-	00			
NARRATIVE											
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS During an upcoming planned outage, the reference PREVIOUS SIMILAR ISSUES On February 7, 2017, with Unit 2 in a refueling failed LLRT. On February 19, 2017, while still isolation valve failed LLRT. This condition re- containment integrity due to both PCIVs in this The cause of the PCIVs exceeding La was at found on both valves. Corrective actions inclu- PCIVs. A satisfactory LLRT was subsequent	g outage, t I in the refu presented a s penetrati tributed to uded replac	he same Jeling ou a failure on flow inadequ cing the	e drywell ventilation pen utage, the same drywell of the associated penel path exceeding La. ate conditions related to ring assemblies and ad	etration ventilati tration to	inboa on pe o mair c sea	rd isola netratic itain pri	n outb mary that w	oard			
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NRC FORM 366A (04-2018)					Page	3	of				