U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I

Report No. 50-213/90-18

Docket No. 50-213

License No. DPR-61

Licensee: Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company
P.O. Box 270
Hartford, Connecticut 06141

Facility Name: Haddam Neck Plant

Inspection At: Haddam, Connecticut

Inspection Conducted: September 26, 1990

Type of Inspection: Special, Fitness-For-Duty

Inspector: G. C. Smith, Senior Physical Security Inspector — date: 10/5/90

Approved by: R. R. Keimig, Chief, Safeguards Section
Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards — date: 10/10/90

Inspection Summary: Special Fitness-For-Duty Inspection (Inspection No. 50-213/90-18)

Areas Inspected: Follow-up on a licensee-reported Fitness-For-Duty related event.

Results: One apparent violation was identified relative to the failure to conduct a for-cause fitness-for-duty test.

DETAILS

1. Key Persons Contacted

*J. Stetz, Nuclear Station Director
*D. Roy, Nuclear Services Director
*G. Hallberg, Manager-Nuclear Security
M. Nericco, Registered Nurse
J. Houff, Operations Assistant

USNRC

*J. Shedlosky, Senior Resident Inspector
*A. Asars, Resident Inspector

*present at exit interview

The inspector also interviewed other licensee personnel.

2. Follow-up on FFD Event

a. Background - On September 13, 1990, the licensee notified the resident inspector that a Fitness-For-Duty (FFD)-related event had occurred earlier that day. The event resulted when a plant employee was not subjected to for-cause testing when his appearance and actions indicated that he was potentially unfit for duty. The employee was permitted to leave the plant without being tested as required by the Northeast Utilities' FFD program, which was developed and being implemented to meet 10 CFR 26.

As a result of this event, and one other event that was reported from the Millstone Station on September 19, 1990, an inspector was dispatched to review the circumstances of both events and two additional inspectors were dispatched on September 24 to conduct the initial inspection of the Northeast Utilities' FFD program, in accordance with TI 2515/106. The NRC's initial inspection of the FFD program, and its implementation, is documented in NRC Region I Combined Inspection Report Nos. 50-245/90-22, 50-336/90-24, 50-423/90-22 and 50-213/90-17. The inspection of the Millstone Station FFD-related event is documented in NRC Region I Combined Inspection Report Numbers 50-245/90-24, 50-336/90-26 and 50-423/90-26.

b. NRC Review - On September 26, 1990, an on-site inspection of the Haddam Neck event was conducted. The inspection included a review of documentation related to the event and applicable portions of the Northeast Utilities' (NU) FFD Policy and Manual, interviews with key FFD program administrators and personnel involved in the event, and discussions with the NRC inspectors who were conducting the initial inspection of the Northeast Utilities' FFD program.

c. NRC Findings - The inspector reviewed the circumstances surrounding the incident and determined the following sequence of events.

At about 7:00 a.m., on September 13, 1990, a plant employee reported for work at the plant. His supervisor noticed that the employee's appearance and actions were unusual. The supervisor notified the station nurse of his observations and requested guidance. The nurse informed the supervisor to obtain the opinion of a second supervisor regarding the employee's condition, in accordance with the FFD Manual. The supervisor contacted a second supervisor who did not observe the employee, but advised the first supervisor to keep the employee in his office under observation. Before the employee's supervisor had the opportunity to confine the employee to his office, the employee left the office and went to a shop area where he met a plant maintenance employee. The maintenance employee also observed that the employee's appearance and manner were unusual and notified his (the maintenance employee's) supervisor of the observation. That supervisor did not observe the employee, but called the suspect employee's supervisor and told him to get the employee out of the plant. The employee's supervisor subsequently directed the employee to leave the plant. The employee's supervisor then called the supervisor he had first contacted and told him that he had sent the employee home. That supervisor disagreed with that action, notified the nurse of what had transpired and unsuccessfully attempted to intercept the employee before he left the plant. The station nurse notified plant management of the incident. Plant management then initiated a review of the event and notified the NRC resident inspector at about 1:00 p.m.

Additionally, the inspector determined that:

1) The employee's supervisor was the only supervisor to observe the employee's condition. This supervisor had not received the initial supervisory FFD training required by the NU FFD Policy and Manual and, at the time of the event, was not aware that an attempt should be made to have a second supervisor observe an employee suspected of being unfit for duty. Further review by the inspector found that there were five other supervisors at the Haddam Neck Plant who had not received the required initial FFD supervisory training. Failure to provide the required training to all supervisors is discussed further in NRC Region I Combined Inspection Report Nos. 50-245/90-22, 50-336/90-24, 50-423/90-22 and 50-213/90-17.

2) When the employee's supervisor contacted a second supervisor (who had received the FFD supervisory training), he was told to keep the employee in his office and observe him. This direction was not in accordance with the NU FFD Policy and Manual. The second supervisor should have made an attempt to observe the

employee and then, in consultation with the employee's supervisor, determine if a for-cause FFD test was warranted.

3) The maintenance employee who interacted with the employee took the appropriate action and notified his supervisor. His supervisor (who also had received supervisory FFD training) did not respond in accordance with the NU FFD Policy and Manual when he told the employee's supervisor to get the employee off-site.

4) When the employee returned to work on the day after the event occurred, he was directed to the Medical Review Officer (MRO) who interviewed him. The MRO concluded, based on observation and the interview, that there was no medical reason to restrict the employee from returning to work. The MRO did not require the employee to undergo a FFD test as part of the medical evaluation.

d. Summary

The employee who was potentially unfit for duty was observed by two plant employees, his supervisor and a non-supervisor. Based on behavioral observation, both had reason to believe that the individual was potentially unfit for duty. The supervisor apparently was not aware of the course of action prescribed by the licensee's FFD Policy and Manual because he had not received supervisory FFD training. Two other supervisors who had received supervisory FFD training were made aware that an employee was potentially unfit for duty but did not respond in accordance with the licensee's FFD Policy and Manual.

Title 10 CFR Part 26 requires licensees authorized to operate a nuclear power reactor to implement a Fitness-For-Duty (FFD) program that complies with that Part. Northeast Utilities certified to the NRC in a December 18, 1989 letter that it had implemented the required FFD program on December 1, 1989.

Following review of this event, the inspector determined that the following applicable FFD Policy and Manual Sections were consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 26:

- Northeast Utilities System, Personnel Policy and Procedures-Fitness-for-Duty, NUP-90

- Northeast Utilities, Fitness-For-Duty Manual (FFDM) Sections:

  - 000.1, Fitness-for-Duty Program
  - 004.1, Training
  - 005.1, Sample Collection, Initial Screen and Substance Cutoff Limits
  - 009.1, Response to Unusual or Aberrant Behavior
  - 010.1, 10 CFR 26 Post Accident and For Cause Testing

However, failure to implement the NU Policy and Manual and to test for-cause when the observed behavior of an individual within the protected area indicated a potentially unfit for duty condition is an apparent violation of 10 CFR Part 26.24(a)(3).

Another apparent violation involving the failure to provide the required supervisory FFD training in accordance with 10 CFR Part 26.22 is cited in NRC Region I Combined Inspection Report Nos. 50-245/90-22, 50-336/90-24, 50-423/90-22 and 50-213/90-17.

5. Exit Meeting

The inspector met with the licensee representatives identified in paragraph 1 at the conclusion of the inspection on September 26, 1990. At that time the purpose, scope and findings of the inspection were presented.