U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

REPORT NO: 50-333/93-18

DOCKET NO: 50-333

LICENSEE NO: DPR-59

LICENSEE: New York Power Authority
P. O. Box 41
Lycoming, New York 13093

FACILITY: James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant

LOCATION: Scriba, New York

DATES: September 7-10, 1993

INSPECTOR: John G. Caruso 9/29/93
John G. Caruso, Operations Engineer Date
Performance Programs Section
Operations Branch, Division of Reactor Safety

APPROVED BY: N J Blumberg 9/29/93
Norman J. Blumberg, Chief Date
Performance Programs Section
Operations Branch, Division of Reactor Safety

Inspection Summary: Inspection from September 7-10, 1993 (Report No. 50-333/93-18)

Areas Inspected: Routine announced inspection of open Fire Protection/Appendix R Program items from Inspection Reports 50-333/92-80, 92-14, 93-06, and licensee commitments made in NYPA correspondence sent to the NRC, including JPN-91-050, JPN-92-023, JPN-92-063, JPN-93-036. Also included was a plant tour and interviews of firewatches stationed in the plant.

Results: The corrective actions taken by NYPA to close the Fire Protection Appendix R Program items reviewed were generally good including, for example, development of a Design Basis Document and Fire Protection Program Plans, implementation of cable and raceway management software and implementation of portable radios for use between fire brigade members. The plant tour found generally good housekeeping and combustible controls and fire watches were found to be knowledgeable of their responsibilities.

One violation for failure to implement adequately the Fire Protection Program procedures was identified during this inspection period. Examples involved two failures to implement adequately the procedure for control of combustible materials (Section 2.2.3). Several unresolved items were also opened to allow administratively the tracking of incomplete corrective actions related to violations that were closed in this report (Sections 2.5 and 2.6).

DETAILS

1.0 PERSONS CONTACTED

Attachment 1 provides a listing of persons contacted during this inspection.

2.0 REVIEW FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM/APPENDIX R OPEN ITEMS (92701)

2.1 Scope

An inspection was performed to verify that previously-identified Fire Protection Program/Appendix R open items and commitments have been resolved and satisfied. These Fire Protection Program/Appendix R open items and commitments include: (1) Diagnostic Evaluation Team followup items, unresolved items, and violations identified in NRC inspection report 50-333/92-80; (2) Post-startup items that the licensee committed to complete in NYPA letter JPN-92-023; (3) Long-Term (LT) Fire Protection actions, NYPA committed to complete in letter JPN-91-050; and (4) Related Fire Protection Program actions NYPA committed to complete in letter JPN-93-036.

A plant tour was conducted that included portions of the Reactor and Turbine buildings. The tour found generally good housekeeping and combustible controls present in the plant. In addition, three compensatory fire watches in the plant were interviewed and found to be knowledgeable of their responsibilities.

2.2 NYPA Commitments JPN-93-036, "Fire Protection Improvement Program Schedule Revision"

NYPA committed to complete the following four post-startup items in the status report attachment 1, section VII, to letter JPN-93-036, dated May 19, 1993.

2.2.1 (Closed) Item A.1, "Assess the Use of Radios for Communication from Fire Brigade Member to Fire Brigade Member"

This item was originally identified in NRC Inspection Report 92-80, Section 2.1.1 (DET Item 6); Section 2.4.2.3.4; and Section 2.5.3.2. In addition, this item was previously reviewed and updated in NRC Inspection Reports 92-14, Section 6.9.3, and 93-06, Section 6.3.1.5.

The assessment, which is discussed in NYPA memorandum, JTS-93-0393, dated June 30, 1993, states that testing and use of portable radios by fire brigade members occurred on June 23, 1993, during two fire drills. Radios are now available and used during fire brigade drills. The inspector reviewed this memorandum and interviewed the Fire Protection Supervisor and the Fire Protection Training Instructor concerning the use of portable radios by fire brigade members. These individuals indicated the use of portable

radios during fire drills has significantly improved communication between brigade members. The inspector observed that the Fire Protection Supervisor had the radios available for brigade use. This item is closed.

2.2.2 (Closed) Item A.2, "Assess the Use of Radios for Communication Between the Fire Brigade and the Control Room."

This item was originally identified in NRC Inspection Report 92-80, Section 2.1.1 (DET Item 6); Section 2.4.2.3.4; and Section 2.5.3.2. In addition, this item was previously reviewed and updated in NRC Inspection Reports 92-14, Section 6.5.3, and 93-06 Section 6.3.1.5.

The inspector reviewed NYPA memorandum NED-FAB-93-326, dated September 3, 1993, that states that the current communication methods (i.e., Gaitronics System, Telephone System, Sound Powered Headset System, Runners-if necessary) have been demonstrated during past fire drills to be more than adequate. The memorandum further states, that there is no need to establish radio communications capability between the Control Room and the Fire Brigade Leader. The corporate licensing group further stated that there was no existing requirement for NYPA to have such a radio system. The inspector, during a previous inspection (92-14), verified that NYPA did not have an existing Fire Protection Program license requirement for such a communications system. This item is closed.

2.2.3 (Closed) Item B, "For the Waste Material Storage Area on Elevation 272 of the Turbine Building Track Bay Area, Revise WACP-10.1.10 and 10.1.14 to Incorporate a Better Interface Between the FitzPatrick Fire Protection Group and [Radiological and Environmental Services] RES to Adequately Control Combustibles in the Area."

In NRC Inspection Report 92-80, Section 2.5.2, dated August 15, 1992, the accumulation of combustibles in the Turbine Building Track Bay Interim Waste Storage Area was listed as an example of the licensee's failure to implement adequately the license condition requirements for the control of combustibles (EEI 333/92-80-15B). In NRC Inspection Report 93-06, (Section 6.3.1.2), dated May 14, 1993, this area was again reviewed, and it was determined that the combustible control procedures established for this area could be further improved. In letter, JPN-93-036, dated May 19, 1993 (Attachment 1, Section VII, Item B), the licensee committed to revise Work Activity Control Procedures (WACP) 10.1.10 and 10.1.14 to incorporate a better interface between the FitzPatrick Fire Protection Group and Radiological and Environmental Services (RES) to control adequately the combustibles in this area.

The inspector reviewed procedure WACP-10.1.14, "Disposal of Waste Oil, Chemicals and Material," Revision 4, dated April 28, 1993. WACP-10.1.14 states in Section 5.3 that the RES Environmental Engineer is responsible to perform a weekly inventory of combustible and flammable waste materials located at the Turbine Building Track Bay Interim Waste Storage Area and provide results of weekly inventory to the fire protection supervisor for fire

loading calculations (Attachment 4 of this procedure provides INTERIM WASTE STORAGE INVENTORY LOG forms). During a review of the completed weekly inventory forms, the inspector noted that the fire loading calculations had not been completed by the Fire Protection System Engineer as required. These calculations provide the data to allow the Fire Protection Supervisor to evaluate the quantity of combustible and flammable materials (i.e., fire hazards) present in the Turbine Building Track Bay Interim Waste Storage Area as required by procedure WACP-10.1.10, Section 8.2. Upon notification of this concern, the licensee took prompt action to complete all calculations to bring their records (i.e., Interim W .e Storage Logs) current prior to the end of the inspection. This subject will be discussed further below.

The inspector also reviewed WACP-10.1.10, "Control of Combustibles and Flammable Materials," Revision 7, dated April 20, 1993. The inspector found that this procedure had not been fully implemented. Technical Specifications (TS) 6.8 (A) requires that written procedures for the Fire Protection Program shall be established, implemented, and maintained. WACP-10.1.10, which, in part, implements TS requirements, directs the Fire Protection Supervisor in Section 6.3.7 to establish Alert and Action levels for the various transient combustible storage areas in the plant. The licensee failed to establish Alert and Action levels for the various transient combustible storage areas in the plant as identified in step 7.3.2.A of this procedure (i.e., includes Turbine Building Track Bay Interim Storage Area as well as six other transient combustible storage areas). This is the first example of a violation for the licensee's failure to implement fully their administrative procedure for control of combustibles. Upon notification of this concern, the licensee took prompt action to establish **interim** Alert and Action levels for these areas issued as "DRAFT" memorandum JTS-93-05-81, dated September 9, 1993. However, the licensee stated that these levels have not yet been invoked and additional time is needed to evaluate fully and resolve this problem.

Procedure WACP-10.1.10 also requires (Section 8.2) the Fire Protection Supervisor, with assistance from the Fire Protection System Engineer to evaluate the quantity of combustible and flammable materials in the combustible storage areas. The procedure further requires that the evaluations compare the quantity of materials present in each area to the Alert and Action levels established for each area and, when these levels are exceeded, notify responsible individuals. As discussed above, the completed calculations from the weekly Interim Waste Storage Logs provide the data to allow the Fire Protection Supervisor to evaluate the quantity of combustible and flammable materials (i.e., fire hazards) present in the Turbine Building Track Bay Interim Storage Area as required by this procedure. Since these calculations were not completed and the Alert and Action levels were not established as discussed earlier, the licensee was unable to perform evaluations of the various combustible storage areas in the plant as required by this procedure. This is the second example of a violation of requirements to implement procedures (VIO 333/93-18-01). The inspector's review concluded that these procedures provide an adequate program for control of combustibles in the Turbine Track Bay Interim Storage Area, as well as the other transient combustible storage areas in the plant, when these procedures are fully implemented. In

addition, the licensee agreed to reevaluate WACP-10.1.10 and consider further procedure revisions to identify the methods used to ensure timely resolution of situations where the Alert or Action levels are exceeded and also to state specifically the periodicity of the evaluations required in section 8.2. The licensee's Item B is closed and superseded by this violation. The inspector had no further questions.

2.2.4 (Closed) Item D, "Assess the Need for Band Indicators for Such Readings as Motor Speed, Generator Frequency, etc., for Meters on Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) B and D Control Panels in the North EDG Switchgear Room"

This item was originally identified in NRC Inspection Report 92-80, Section 2.4.2.3.4, as part of Unresolved Item 333/92-80-12. In NRC Inspection Report 92-14, Section 2.14 Unresolved Item 333/92-80-12 was reviewed and closed; however, this part of Unresolved Item was reopened as a new Item D, which the licensee committed to resolve in status report attachment, section VII to letter, JPN-93-036.

The inspector reviewed NYPA memorandum, NED-AJB-93-096, dated April 20, 1993. The memorandum states that band indication for the local diesel generator instruments are not required since Abnormal Operating Procedure, AOP-43, "Plant Shutdown from Outside the Control Room," provides adequate direction to establish the correct values for frequency, voltage, and synchronization to successfully bring the diesel on line for any configuration of bus power availability without the reliance of acceptable band indicators. The inspector reviewed AOP-43 and verified that the procedure provided adequate direction. In addition, the memorandum states that operators are trained to recognize if and when any of these parameters fall out of their acceptable band. This item is closed.

2.3 NYPA Post-Startup Commitments from JPN-92-023

NYPA committed to complete the following post-startup actions in letter, JPN-92-023, dated May 27, 1992. These items were previously tracked as part of Unresolved Item 92-80-02. These items are currently being tracked as Inspector Followup Items (IFIs).

2.3.1 (Closed) IFI 92-14-02, Item 2.1.1 and IFI 92-14-14, Diagnostic Evaluation Team (DET) Item 5, "Perform a Design Basis Reconstitution of the Fire Protection Program and Systems"

The licensee issued, "Design Basis Document for Fire Protection 076," Revision 0, issued July 27, 1993. This document is divided into eleven sections that include, for example, Water Supply and Distribution System, fixed Fire Suppression Systems, Fire Detection and Alarm Systems, Emergency Lighting System and Shutdown Communications System. The inspector reviewed this document for general format and performed a sample review of two of the eleven sections (Water Supply and Distribution System and Shutdown Communications System). The licensee stated in memorandum CM-VW-93-246, dated September 9, 1993, that discrepancies generated during the development of the Design Basis Document (DBD)

between design documents or missing design records were considered open items and were screened for safety significance. These DBD open items are being tracked as Design Document Open Items (DDOIs) by the Configuration Management Group at White Plains. There were approximately fifty outstanding DDOIs against the DBD at the time of the inspection. Several of these items may require plant modifications to resolve, which could extend completion of all outstanding items out as far as the first quarter of 1995 during the next scheduled refueling outage. Each open item includes action statements and an operability review (for Priority I items). The DBD and accompanying open items reflect a comparison of the design basis with the current licensing basis.

The inspector's review did not identify any deficiencies and concluded that this document appears to provide an adequate design basis. However, resolution of the open items previously discussed will be necessary to ensure full compliance with the current licensing basis. This document will require continued revision as program changes are implemented and as necessary to resolve the open items identified. This item is closed based on the licensee's issuance of a Design Basis Document.

In letter JPN-91-050, dated September 13, 1991, NYPA committed to complete a number of Long-Term (LT) Fire Protection actions. Inspection Report 50-333/92-80 addressed these long-term items in section 2.2.2 as part of URI 333/92-80-02. Long-term items LT-02 (II.F.1.b) and LT-19(X.C.5) are redundant or equivalent items that are also closed based on issuance of the fire protection Design Basis Document.

In addition, DET Item 5, Section 2.1.2, of NRC Report 92-80 also discussed a fire protection reference manual that will be closed as part of the next item discussed in this report (IFI 92-14-5, Fire Protection Plan).

2.3.2 (Closed) IFI 92-14-5, Item 2.2.3 and IFI 92-14-14, DET Item 5, "Consolidate the Existing Fire Protection Elements into a Single Comprehensive Fire Protection Program, Develop a Fire Protection Program Plan and, if Necessary, Develop an Action Plan to Resolve any Findings."

The licensee issued the, "Fire Protection Plan for James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant," Revision 0, issued June 30, 1993. The inspector reviewed this document for conformance to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.48. The inspection review identified no deficiencies and concluded that this document appears to conform to the requirements established in 10 CFR 50.48. The inspector also reviewed licensee memorandum, NED-FAB-93-332, dated September 9, 1993. This memorandum states that the basis for development of the Fire Protection Plan included 10 CFR 50.48; 10 CFR 50, Appendix R; Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A; Operating License, including Amendment 47 - Safety Evaluation Report. Technical Specifications and Nuclear Plant Fire Protection Functional Responsibilities, Administrative Controls and Quality Assurance, which are part of the current licensing basis. The corporate Nuclear Fire Protection Engineering Group is currently planning to revise the fire protection plan in March 1994 following the completion of the scheduled fire hazard analysis and NFPA code compliance walkdown.

The consolidation of the fire protection elements into a single comprehensive fire protection program also included updating the Fire Protection Reference Manual. The inspector reviewed, "Fire Protection Reference Manual," Revision 1, issued August 31, 1993. This

document provides a consolidated reference of the various fire protection program commitments and descriptive information provided to the NRC. This document is intended to facilitate future fire protection configuration activities to help ensure continued conformance to fire protection/Appendix R program commitments and requirements is maintained. Currently, the corporate nuclear fire protection engineering staff indicated that they are planning to revise the Fire Protection Reference Manual in December 1993 following the completion of the Fire Hazard Analysis. The inspector identified no deficiencies in this document and concluded that this document appeared to provide an adequate fire protection reference document provided that it is maintained current as program changes are implemented. This item is closed.

In letter, JPN-91-050, dated September 13, 1991, NYPA committed to complete a number of Long-Term (LT) Fire Protection actions. Inspection Report 50-333/92-80 addressed these long-term items in Section 2.2.2 as part of URI 333/92-80-02. Long-term items LT-05 (II.F.1.e), LT-09 (IV.F.1), and LT-10 (VII.G.1) are redundant or equivalent items to those items described above that are also closed based on issuance of the Fire Protection Plan and the Fire Protection Reference Manual.

2.3.4 (Closed) Item 2.2.1, "Implement Newly-Purchased Cable and Raceway Management Software, Including Appendix R Module."

The Appendix R analysis (which was developed from cable and raceway management software and Appendix R module) was completed in October 1992 by EPM, the hard copy of the analysis fills 25 volumes of data, including logic development, cable/raceway information, component data, and safe shutdown analysis. On October 26, 1992, NYPA letter JPN-92-064 transmitted the licensee's report, "Safe Shutdown Capability Reassessment." The new Appendix R analysis was reviewed previously in NRC Inspection Report 92-14, Section 6.1.

The inspector reviewed the implementation of the cable and raceway management software program with the Technical Manager from Engineering Planning and Management, Inc. (EPM) and the head of the Nuclear Corporate Fire Protection Engineering Group. The inspector reviewed various features of the program. The inspector also reviewed EPM/NYPA project procedure P718-000-001, Revision 0, issued July 23, 1993. This document establishes the guidelines to be used in maintaining the FitzPatrick Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis and its supporting documentation to account for equipment upgrades and modifications. Currently, the cable and raceway management software and Appendix R module are controlled by NYPA. However, NYPA has contracted with EPM to continue evaluating FitzPatrick plant modifications for their effect on the Separation Analysis in accordance with procedure P718-000-001 and the various aspects of the analysis are then updated as required. EPM will continue to provide this service until NYPA personnel have been trained and a NYPA procedure is developed and in place. This item is closed based on implementation of a cable and raceway management software, including Appendix R module.

In letter JPN-91-50, dated September 13, 1991, NYPA committed to complete a number of Long-Term (LT) Fire Protection actions. Inspection Report 50-333/92-80 addressed these long-term items in Section 2.2.2 as part of URI 333/92-80-02. Long-term item LT-21(X.C.7) is an equivalent item to the item discussed above and is also closed based on implementation of cable and raceway management software, including Appendix R module.

2.3.4 (Closed) Long-Term Item LT-06, II.F.2.a, "Fire Penetration Baseline Inspection."

In letter, JPN-91-050, dated September 13, 1991, NYPA committed to complete a number of long-term items. This item was previously reviewed in NRC Inspection Report 92-14, Section 2.8, Unresolved Item 50-333/92-80-07A. In report 92-14, all related actions were evaluated as being complete with the exception of issuance and verification of the fire barrier penetration drawings. Corporate Nuclear Fire Protection Engineering staff representatives stated during interviews that all fire barrier penetration drawings were verified and issued by June 30, 1993. The Fire Protection drawing series (FPSSK) includes over one thousand fire barrier penetration drawings. The inspector reviewed six typical revised FPSSK drawings and assessed these as satisfactory with no apparent deficiencies. This item is closed.

2.4 NYPA Commitments from NRC Enforcement Conference

NYPA committed to complete the following two post-startup actions in the status report attachment 1, section VI, to letter JPN-93-036, dated May 19, 1993. These items address previous commitments that were made by the licensee at the NRC Enforcement Conference held on June 24, 1992, and documented in NRC letter July 10, 1992, which forwarded the results of this meeting.

2.4.1 (Closed) Item 1, LER 92-015, Appendix R, "Reanalysis Reveals Deficiencies."

The licensee was requested and committed to issue a supplement to Licensee Event Report (LER) 92-15 to provide a detailed technical evaluation and analysis of the safety significance for each of the Appendix R deficiencies identified. The inspector reviewed LER 92-015-01, "Safety Significance of Appendix R Deficiencies," issued with NYPA letter, JAFP-93-0324, dated June 16, 1993. The inspector also reviewed report number JAF-RPT-MISC-00865, "Report on the Pre-1992 Safe Shutdown Capability," dated June 4, 1993. The LER and associated report concluded safe shutdown could have been achieved for fires in each fire area. The strength of symptom-based Emergency Operating Procedures, operator knowledge, and training were adequate to overcome the deficiencies in the Appendix R analysis and the associated Abnormal Operating Procedures (AOP) AOP-43, "Plant Shutdown from Outside the Control Room," and AOP-28, "Operation During Plant Fires." The inspector's review identified no deficiencies and concluded that these documents provide an adequate evaluation and analysis of the safety significance for each of the Appendix R deficiencies identified. This item is closed.

2.4.2 (Closed) Item 2, "Provide an Assessment of the Failure to Respond to the Recommendations of Generic Letter 86-10."

The inspector reviewed NYPA letter and attachment, JPN-93-027, dated April 12, 1993, providing an assessment of NYPA's implementation of the Recommendations of Generic Letter 86-10. In this letter, the licensee presented several reasons why the recommendations of Generic Letter 86-10 were not implemented and concluded not implementing the recommendations of Generic Letter 86-10 would not have resulted in an inability to safely shut down the plant. The letter also stated that NYPA has implemented, or is in the process of implementing, the recommendations of Generic Letter 86-10.

In addition, NYPA has established procedure NLG-21, "Assessment of and Response to NRC Generic Letters," to assure that a documented assessment is conducted for Generic Letters that do not require a written response. The inspector reviewed Nuclear Licensing Guideline, NGL-21, issued December 4, 1992. At the time of the inspection, the licensee had not effectively used this procedure in reviewing the five generic letters received since the procedure had been issued. The Director of Nuclear Licensing - BWR indicated he would reevaluate the use of this procedure (i.e., Revision 1 to this procedure was issued on September 20, 1993) and ensure licensing personnel were indoctrinated in its use. He also indicated that all five generic letters received had been properly reviewed and dispositioned, although the guideline, NGL-21, had not been effectively utilized in conducting these reviews. The inspector reviewed licensee records documenting the completion of these reviews and concluded that the licensee reviews of these generic letters appeared to be adequate. This item is closed.

2.5 (Closed) Violation (EEI 333/92-80-15A, 15B, 15C, 15D, 15E, 15F)

This violation dealt with NYPA's failure to implement an effective Fire Protection Program as required by Amendment No. 47 to the FitzPatrick Operating License Condition, 2.C.(3). All but one part of this multi-part violation was reviewed and closed (i.e., EEI 333/92-80-15A, 15B, 15C, 15D, 15E) previously in Inspection Report 50-333/93-06, Section 6.3.

The part of the violation that remained open (EEI 333/92-80-15F) dealt with NYPA's failure to develop and maintain adequate fire fighting preplans as required by FitzPatrick Operating License Condition 2.C(3). This is discussed in NRC Inspection report 50-333/92-80, section 2.5.3.4. In NYPA letter JPN-92-023, "Fire Protection Improvement Program," Attachment 1, item 1.7.3, NYPA committed to improve existing fire fighting preplans prior to plant startup. This item was reviewed and closed in NRC Inspection Report 50-333/92-14, Section 6.7.3. NYPA committed to further upgrade fire fighting preplans following plant startup with a target completion date of March 1993 (JPN-92-023, item 2.2.4). In JPN-92-063, NYPA's response to the Notice of Violation, Section III.A, example 6, page 20, NYPA described the corrective actions that will be taken to avoid further violations. In NYPA letter JPN-93-036, "Fire Protection Improvement Program Schedule Revision," dated May 19, 1993, NYPA provided a revised date of September 1993 to complete the upgrade of

the fire fighting preplans. At the time of this inspection NYPA had completed drafting the upgraded preplans and were in the process of reviewing for final issue. This report is opening a new unresolved item to allow administratively for tracking of incomplete corrective actions related to the original violation and to allow closing of the violation (EEI 333/92-80-15A, 15B, 15C, 15D, 15E, 15F). This unresolved item will remain open pending completion of NYPA's corrective actions and review by the NRC (URI 333/93-18-02).

2.6 (Closed) Violation (EEI 333/92-80-06A, 06B, 06C, 06D)

All but one part of this multi-part violation was reviewed and closed (i.e., EEI 333/92-80-06A, 06C, 06D) previously in Inspection Report 50-333/93-06, Section 6.3.

The part of the violation that remained open (EEI 333/92-80-06B) dealt with NYPA's failure establish adequate suppression systems in the East and West cable tunnels. This is discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-333/92-80, Section 2.4.1.3. In NYPA letter, JPN-92-032, the Power Authority requested a temporary exemption for the West Cable Tunnel Spray System while the modifications on the East and West cable Tunnels are being completed. The NRC granted the exemption in an NRC letter dated September 10, 1992. In JPN-92-063, NYPA's response to the Notice of Violation, Section IV.1, page 29, NYPA described the corrective actions that will be taken to avoid further violations. In NYPA letter, JPN-93-036, "Fire Protection Improvement Program Schedule Review," dated May 19, 1993, Attachment 1, Item 1.3.2, NYPA committed to modify and or install the Cable Tunnel Spray System by December 1993 (JPN-92-023, Attachment 1, Item 1.3.2, provided NYPA's original commitment to resolve this problem). At the time of this inspection, work was in progress and the modifications are currently scheduled to be completed by December 1993. This report is opening a new unresolved item to allow administratively for tracking of incomplete corrective actions related to the original violation and to allow closing of the violation (EEI 333/92-80-06A, 06B, 06C, 06D). This unresolved item will remain open pending completion of NYPA's corrective actions and review by the NRC (URI 333/93-18-03).

3.0 EXIT MEETING

The inspector met with licensee personnel (denoted in Attachment 1) at the conclusion of the inspection, on September 10, 1993, at FitzPatrick. The inspector summarized the inspection scope and inspection findings at that time. During the exit interview, the inspector discussed the examples of the apparent violation for failure to implement Fire Protection Program procedures that were identified during this inspection period.

Attachment: Persons Contacted

ATTACHMENT 1

PERSONS CONTACTED

New York Power Authority

*B. Barrett, General Manager - Operations
*A. Bartlik, Sr. Fire Protection Engineer
*R. Beedle, Executive V.P. Nuclear Generation
*F. Bloise, Nuclear Eng. Dept. Fire Protection Supervisor
*M. Colomb, General Manager - Support Services
*J. Hoddy, BWR Licensing
*G. Hofer, Licensing Engineer
*D. Lindsey, General Manager - Maintenance
R. Locy, Operations Manager
*W. McDonald, Fire Protection Supervisor
*L. Retzer, Fire and Safety Manager - WPO
*H. Salmon, Resident Manager
D. Simpson, ORG
*G. Tasick, Quality Assurance Manager
*G. Tiner, Fire Training
*D. Wallace, Technical Services Manager
S. Wilkie, NED Fire Protection
*A. Zaremba, ORG/LIC Manager

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*W. Cook, Senior Resident Inspector

*Denotes those at the exit meeting on September 10, 1993

During the course of this inspection, the inspector contacted other members of the licensee's Fire, and Technical Department staffs.