JUN 2 9 1990

Docket No. 50-456 Docket No. 50-457

Commonwealth Edison Company ATTN: Mr. Cordell Reed Senior Vice President Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690

Gentlemen:

This refers to an investigation performed by the NRC Office of Investigations (01) at your facility. A copy of the synopsis of Investigation Report 03-87-011 is enclosed with this letter for your information. During this investigation, certain of your activities appeared to be in violation of NRC requirements. You will be notified by separate correspondence of our decision regarding enforcement action based on the findings of this inspection. No written response is required until you are notified of any proposed enforcement action.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules and Practices," Part 2, Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter and enclosure will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.

If you have any questions regarding the aforementioned matters, please contact Martin Farber of my staff at 708-790-5500.


Sincerely,

Edward S.

Edward G. Greenman, Director Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure: OI Investigation Report 03-87 011 Synopsis

See Attached Distribution



9007100338 900629 PDR ADOCK 05000456

APTACHED CONCURRENCE RIII Pawlik

PDC





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
Original signed by E. C. Greenman

Edward G. Greenman, Director Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure: OI Investigation Report 03-87-011 Synopsis

See Attached Distribution





RIII Shafer R111 Greenman

## Commonwealth Edison Co.

Distribution cc w/enclosure: T. J. Maiman, Vice President. **PWR** Operations T. Kovach, Nuclear Licensing Manager S. Hunsader, Nuclear Licensing Administrator R. E. Querio, Station Manager D. E. Cooper, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor DCL/DCB (RIDS) Licensing Fee Management Branch Resident Inspector, RIJ1 Braidwood Resident Inspector, R!II Byron D. W. Cassel, Jr., Esq. Richard Hubbard J. W. McCaffrey, Chief, Public Utilities Division H. S. Taylor, Quality Assurance Division E. Chan, OGC G. Berry, OGC Stephen P. Sands, NRR Robert Newmann, Office of Public Counsel, State of Illinois Center J. Lieberman, OE J. Goldberg, OGC J. Partlow, NRR.

## SYNOPSIS

On June 12, 1987, the NRC Region III Administrator requested that the Office of Investigations (OI) initiate an investigation relating to an allegation that a Commonwealth Edison Company (CECo) engineer falsified a preoperational (preop) test at the Braidwood Station (Braidwood) and that CECo management failed to take prompt action to correct the alleged problem.

On June 23, 1987, OI initiated an investigation into the alleged October 1984 falsification violation. This investigation has failed to develop direct evidence to support the allegation of falsification of test data for the diesel fuel oil transfer system (DO-12), but has developed evidence which circumstantially supports the improper testing of that system by one test engineer. It could not, however, be established whether that particular engineer intentionally failed to properly test the system or rather failed to adequately test because of negligence, inexperience, or incompetence.

The Braidwood document tion of the DO-12 system indicates that by October 22, 1985, sufficient a minorest oversy over that system existed for the preop test supervisor to direct the retest of the entire system. The preop supervisor, however, had information from several sources as early as October 1984 which indicated the DO-12 system had operability deficiencies which were not documented in the preop test package. That supervisor chose to ignore the concerns raised by the station technical staff, the test review board, and the project engineering division, and refused to take corrective action until October 22, 1985, when the test falsification allegation had been documented.