

GPU Nuclear
P.O. Box 388
Forked River, New Jersey 08731
609-693-6000
Writer's Direct Dial Number:

June 10, 1982


Mr. Ronald C. Haynes, Administrator
Region I
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, PA 19406

Dear Mr. Haynes:

Subject: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Docket No. 50-219
Licensee Event Report
Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/82-27/03L

This letter forwards three copies of a Licensee Event Report to report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/82-27/03L in compliance with paragraph 6.9.2.b.2 of the Technical Specifications.

Very truly yours,


Peter B. Fiedler
Vice President & Director
Oyster Creek

PBF:lse
Enclosures

cc: Director (40 copies)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Director (3)
Office of Management Information and
Program Control
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

NRC Resident Inspector (1)
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Forked River, NJ 08731

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OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
Forked River, New Jersey 08731

Licensee Event Report
Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/82-27/03L

Report Date

June 10, 1982

Occurrence Date

May 12, 1982

Identification of Occurrence

Liquid poison pump "B" was taken out of service for corrective maintenance for approximately seven hours. This constitutes operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation as specified in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 3.2.C.3.

This event is considered to be a reportable occurrence per Technical Specifications, paragraph 6.9.2.b.2.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence

The reactor was critical in the "RUN" mode.

Thermal Power: 1270 MWt
Electrical Power: 418 MWe

Description of Occurrence

Routine visual inspection by operators led to the discovery of an oil puddle directly below the lube oil fill port of the "B" liquid poison pump. It was suspected that the oil had been forced from the crankcase (out the fill port) due to leakage of borated water from the piston chamber into the crankcase.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence

Further investigation of "B" liquid poison pump stuffing box revealed that the 1" drain line had become plugged with crystalized boron. The drain plug in the stuffing box is intended to provide an effluent route for normal leakage of water through the piston connecting rod shaft seals to the stuffing box. This caused the stuffing box to fill with borated water. This water in turn entered the crankcase and forced oil from the crankcase sightglass/fill port.

Analysis of Occurrence

The liquid poison system utilizes two redundant pumps and is a vital backup system serving as an alternate means of shutting down the reactor in the event of a total failure of the control rod drive (CRD) system. In the event of such a failure, the boron solution in the liquid poison system is injected directly into the reactor vessel in order to absorb the neutrons needed for the continuation of the fission process.

As the redundant pump was operable, the safety significance is considered minimal.

Corrective Action

Liquid poison pump "B" was tagged out of service. The oil was changed out of the crankcase and the stuffing box drain line was cleared. The pump was returned to service approximately seven hours after being taken out of service.

The "A" liquid poison pump stuffing box was checked to verify that the drain line was clear.

In the future, the cover plate from the stuffing box will be routinely removed and a visual inspection performed by Operations personnel for water level in the stuffing box. A high level will indicate inadequate drainage.