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April 14, 1982

Mr. Ronald C. Haynes, Administrator
Region I
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, PA 19406



Dear Mr. Haynes:

Subject: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Docket No. 50-219
Licensee Event Report
Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/82-15/03L

This letter forwards three copies of a Licensee Event Report to report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/82-15/03L in compliance with paragraph 6.9.2.b.1 of the Technical Specifications.

Very truly yours,

Peter B. Fiedler
Vice President & Director
Oyster Creek

PBF/kdk
Enclosures

cc: Director (40)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Director (3)
Office of Management Information
and Program Control
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

NRC Resident Inspector (1)
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Forked River, N. J. 08731

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OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
Forked River, New Jersey 08731

Licensee Event Report
Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/82-15/03L

Report Date

April 14, 1982

Occurrence Date

March 15, 1982

Identification of Occurrence

During surveillance testing the delay time for air ejector isolation valve closure was found to be greater than the value given in the Technical Specifications, Note (e) to Item 1. of Table 3.1.1.

This event is considered to be a reportable occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 6.9.2.b.1.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence

The plant was in the cold shutdown condition.

Description of Occurrence

During performance of the "Off-gas Holdup valve V-7-31 Isolation Test" (Surveillance Procedure 630.2.002) on March 15, 1982, timer RN28 timed out in excess of the Technical Specification limits. The desired time delay is 15 +0/-1 minutes. The as found condition was 15 minutes and 28 seconds, or 28 seconds in excess of Technical Specifications limits.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence

The apparent cause of occurrence was attributed to instrument setpoint drift and inadequate surveillance procedure guidelines.

Surveillance procedure 630.2.002 instructs the instrument technician that the required setpoint is to be 15 +0/-1 minutes. While this setpoint acceptance criteria fulfills Technical Specification requirements at the time of calibration, it does not provide any leeway for possible future instrument drift.

The timer was last calibrated during the 1980 refueling outage and was left at the "as found" setpoint of exactly fifteen (15) minutes. Since the timer setpoint was left at the uppermost boundary specified in the surveillance pro-

cedure, which also corresponded to the maximum Technical Specification setpoint limit, the instrument drift that occurred between surveillance tests resulted in the Technical Specification violation.

Analysis of Occurrence

The Off-gas Monitoring system continuously monitors the radioactivity of the effluent gases removed from the main condenser by the steam jet air ejector system. Trip settings alarm high radiation levels and initiate a time delay assembly for closure of the off-gas system isolation valve, V-7-31.

When the radiation levels of the off-gas approach the average stack release rate limit, an alarm is activated. At approximately ten times this limit, a signal is initiated to close the isolation valve, V-7-31, after a 15 minute delay. The volume of the off-gas line provides a 30 minute holdup time. Therefore, automatic isolation occurring up to 30 minutes after the high radiation signal prevents high activity from being discharged from the stack. The time delay allows time for the operator to evaluate the data and prevent an unwarranted isolation and reactor shutdown. Since the delay time for isolation valve closure exceeded the 15 minute delay by only 28 seconds the safety significance of this event is considered minimal.

Corrective Action

The timer (RN28) was reset to trip within the Technical Specification limit of 15 minutes.

The schedule for the "Off-gas Hold-up valve V-7-31 Isolation Test" (Procedure 630.2.002) has been modified so that the surveillance will be performed prior to each startup and the surveillance procedure will be changed in order to account for future possible setpoint drift.

Failure Data

Timer: GE Model No. TSA-21.