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May 21, 1990

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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PLANT HATCH - UNIT 1
NRC DOCKET 50-321
OPERATING LICENSE DPR-57
SPECIAL REPORT 90-002
FIRE RATED ASSEMBLIES INOPERABLE
FOR LONGER THAN 14 DAYS RESULT IN
SPECIAL REPORT AS REQUIRED BY FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS

Gentlemen:

In accordance with the requirements of the Plant Hatch Unit 1 Technical Specifications Section 6.9.2, and the Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA), Appendix B, Georgia Power Company is submitting the enclosed Special Report (SR) concerning an event where fire rated assemblies were inoperable for longer than 14 days. This event occurred at Plant Hatch - Unit 1.

Sincerely,

W. G. Hairston, III
W. G. Hairston, III

RPG/CLT/et

Enclosure: SR 50-321/1990-002

c: (See next page.)

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ENCLOSURE

PLANT HATCH - UNIT 1
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A. REQUIREMENT FOR REPORT

This report is required by Unit 1 Technical Specifications section 6.9.2. This section of the Technical Specifications states that special reports for fire protection equipment operating and surveillance requirements shall be submitted as required by the Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA) and its Appendix B requirements.

The FHA, Appendix B, section 1.1.1, states that fire rated assemblies separating portions of redundant systems important to safe shutdown within a fire area shall be operable. ACTION statement b. of FHA, Appendix B, section 1.1.1, allows for the fire rated assembly(s) to be inoperable for up to 14 days from identification of the condition. If this time is exceeded, a special report is required.

The fire rated assemblies addressed in this report affected only Unit 1 and became non-functional at a time when all fuel had been removed from the Unit 1 reactor vessel core. In such a condition it is not possible for a fire to affect safe shutdown capability. The same conservative actions were taken when the conditions were identified as would have been taken had the fire barriers been required to be operable. However, the 14 day time limit for inoperability did not begin until commencement of fuel loading. On 4/25/90, 14 days following the commencement of fuel loading, the fire rated assemblies had not yet been restored. Thus, this special report is required.

B. UNIT STATUS AT TIME OF EVENTS

On 3/27/90, Unit 1 was undergoing a refueling outage. As of 3/2/90, all fuel had been removed from the reactor vessel and was stored in the Spent Fuel Pool. Reloading of the Unit 1 reactor core began on 4/11/90 with the first fuel bundle being inserted at approximately 0230 CST. On 4/25/90, Unit 1 was still in the Refuel mode.

ENCLOSURE (Continued)

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C. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

This report describes two events. The first event pertains to a fire rated assembly which was breached in a controlled manner to support Unit 1 outage work. The second event concerns damage to cable tray fire wrapping during outage work activities on nearby plant equipment. Because of extensive on-going outage activities, the affected fire rated assemblies could not be returned to operable status within the required 14 days.

On 3/28/90, at approximately 1100 CST, licensed plant operations personnel declared portions of the Recirculation Pump Motor Generator (MG) Set room wall inoperable. Portions of the fire protection wall in fire zones 1210 and 1211 were removed in a controlled manner to provide access for the removal of the MG Set Rotor in support of outage related work activities. Deficiency Card 1-90-2667 was written to document the condition as required by the plant's administrative control procedures. Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 1-90-257 was initiated on 3/28/90 and an hourly fire watch was established as required by the FHA, Appendix B, section 1.1.1, ACTION a. On 4/25/90, portions of the Recirculation Pump MG Set room walls were still breached.

On 3/27/90, at approximately 1320 CST, licensed plant operations personnel declared electrical raceways ESS-I-3302 and ESS-I-3303 inoperable. The fire wrapping and cable tray hanger support for the affected raceways were damaged during outage work involving disassembly of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Outboard Injection valve 1E11-F017A. The subject raceways supply power and control cables to 1E11-F017A, and are located in fire zone 1205F. Deficiency Cards 1-90-1842 and 1-90-2668 were written to document the condition as required by the plant's administrative control procedures. Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 1-90-253 was initiated on 3/27/90 and an hourly fire watch was established as required by the FHA, Appendix B, section 1.1.1, ACTION a.

ENCLOSURE (Continued)

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D. CAUSE OF EVENT

Removal of portions of the Recirculation Pump MG Set room walls supported necessary outage related work. This work included removal, reconditioning, and reinstallation of the M/G Set Rotor and removal and replacement of existing cables.

The fire barrier for raceways ESS-I-3302 and ESS-I-3303 was rendered inoperable as a result of personnel error. The affected cable tray support and fire wrappings were inadvertently damaged during outage work activities performed on the 1E11-F017A valve and valve motor actuator.

E. ANALYSIS OF EVENT

Licensed plant operations personnel declared the fire rated assemblies inoperable and established the required fire watches to ensure compliance with the FHA section 1.1.1, ACTION a. The action statement requires that:

With one or more of the ... required fire rated assemblies and/or sealing devices (as stated in section 1.1.1) inoperable, within 1 hour establish a continuous fire watch on at least one side of the affected assembly(s) and/or sealing device(s) or verify the operability of fire detectors on at least one side of the inoperable assembly(s) and sealing device(s) and establish an hourly fire watch patrol.

In the case of the Recirculation Pump MG Set room wall, the fire rated assembly was breached in a controlled manner using administrative controls. In both cases fire watches were established and all requirements of the FHA were met. These steps ensured that, were a fire to occur, it would be promptly detected and extinguished. Additionally, linear heat detectors mounted in the affected fire zones were operable at the time of the events and would have performed as designed in the unlikely event of a fire.

Furthermore, in the highly unlikely event of an undetected fire rendering the control scheme for 1E11-F017A inoperable, the redundant loop of RHR was available to maintain shutdown cooling.

Based on the above information, it is concluded that these events had no adverse impact on nuclear safety.

ENCLOSURE (Continued)

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F. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

1. The affected fire rated assemblies were declared inoperable, and an hourly fire watch was initiated.
2. The removed portions of the Recirculation Pump Motor Generator Set room wall will be reinstalled and returned to operable status upon completion of the rotor maintenance work. This will occur prior to startup from the current Unit 1 refueling outage (approximately 6/2/90).
3. The personnel involved in damaging the cable tray fire wrap were counseled.
4. The fire wrap for raceways ESS-1-3302 and ESS-1-3303 was repaired and returned to operable status on 5/9/90.