



Commonwealth Edison
 72 West Adams Street, Chicago, Illinois
 Address Reply to: Post Office Box 767
 Chicago, Illinois 60690 - 0767

000 13

May 1, 1989

Mr. A. Bert Davis
 Regional Administrator
 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
 Region III
 799 Roosevelt Road
 Glen Ellyn, IL 60137

Subject: LaSalle County Station Units 1 and 2
 Response to Inspection Report Nos.
 50-373/89007 and 50-374/89007
NRC Docket Nos. 50-373 and 50-374

References (a): E.G. Greenman letter to Cordell Reed dated
 March 21, 1989

(b): W.E. Morgan letter to A.B. Davis dated
 April 5, 1989

Dear Mr. Davis:

This letter is in response to the special inspection conducted by Messrs. S. DuPont, R. Kopriva, D. Butler, R. Mendez, and P. Shemanski of certain activities associated with the March 2, 1989 event at LaSalle County Station Units 1 and 2. Reference (a) required a written response of the findings and conclusions associated with the March 2 event. This was transmitted in Reference (b).

Commonwealth Edison was additionally requested to respond to the unresolved items identified in Sections 5 and 6 of the inspection report. The Commonwealth Edison Company's response to the unresolved items is provided in the Attachment.

If you have any further questions regarding this matter, please direct them to this office.

Very truly yours,

Wagne E Morgan

W. E. Morgan
 Nuclear Licensing Administrator

lm

Attachment

cc: NRC Resident Inspector - LSCS
 P.C. Shemanski - Project Manager, NRR

0102T

9005220256 890501
 PDR ADOCK 05000373
 Q PDC

IEol
 11
 MAY 3 - 1989

UNRESOLVED ITEM: 373/89007-01
374/89007-01

- ... The AIT requested records relating to the testing of the OCB and the SAT. The licensee stated that the power factor test (doble test) and the travel test (timing) of the phase B 4-6 OCB had been performed but the results were not documented. The inspector was informed that oil samples from the 4-6 OCB and the Unit 2 SAT were acceptable, although no records were available for review at the site. Additionally, the licensee has not located the power factor testing records for the Unit 2 SAT. The lack of documented test result data associated with large electrical equipment is considered to be an unresolved item.
- ... The AIT attempted to review records relating to testing of the lightning arrester. The licensee indicated that the lightning arresters were tested by CECO Operating Analysis Department (OAD) but the data was not recorded. In addition, acceptance criteria for testing the lightning arrester was not available. The failed arrester was sent to the manufacturer (General Electric) for analysis to determine the failure mechanism. The licensee has committed to make the results available to the NRC. Since large electrical equipment is routinely tested by CECO OAD and testing data is not recorded or maintained, this is considered to be an unresolved item.

RESPONSE:

- Doble Tests of OCB 4-6 were performed on March 9, 1989, after the defective B phase bushing was replaced, and documented by System Operational Analysis Department (Attachment A).
- Travel Tests (timing) of OCB 4-6 were performed on March 7, 1989, after the defective B phase bushing was replaced and documented by Southern Division Operational Analysis Department (Attachment B).
- Oil samples from OCB 4-6 were tested and the results documented by Southern Division Substation Construction Department (Attachment C).
- Oil samples from Unit 2 SAT were tested on March 3, 1989 and the results documented by System Materials Analysis Department (Attachment D).
- The Unit 2 SAT was not power factor tested during this event. Insulation resistance tests (megger) and transformer turns ratio tests (TTR) were performed on March 3, 1989, and the test results documented by Southern Division Operational Analysis Department (Attachment E). Megger and TTR tests, and not power factor tests, are normally used in the diagnosis of a transformer trip out.

- As per the manufacturer's instruction manual regarding the testing of lightning arresters "These arresters do not require testing ... There is no single field test which will indicate the complete operating characteristics of the arrester." (Attachment F) The replacement lightning arrester and the original lightning arrester were not tested by either Southern Division Operational Analysis Department or System Operational Analysis Department.

0102T

DOUBLE INSULATION TESTS
CIRCUIT BREAKER

DOUBLE ENGINEERING COMPANY
WATERTOWN, MASS.
FORM MH-CB173

COMPANY C.E. DATE 3-9-81
 LOCATION OF TESTS Sta. 1 Fallow AIR TEMP. 40°F OIL TEMP.
 CIRCUIT BREAKER Bus. Cont. 4-6 WEATHER Sunny % HUM. 60
 BREAKER MFR. West. TYPE 362-111-31 AGE 1776
 BREAKER SERIAL NO. 4-38Y4702 KV 345 AMPS. 2000
 DATE LAST INSP. DATE LAST TEST 5-7-80 LAST TEST SHEET NO. 1-85
 BUSHING MFR. West. BUSHING (TYPE-FORM-DWG NO.) " 0 "

TCK = .90

BUSH NO.	BUSHING SERIAL NO.	SIDE	PHASE OF BUSBAR	FEET INS IN PARALLEL	TEST KV	EQUIVALENT 10 KV READINGS						% POWER FACTOR		COLLAR TEST (WATTS/CURRENT)	INSUL. TIO. RATIO	
						MICROAMPERES			WATTS			MEASURED	COR. 20°C			
						METER READING	MULTIPLIER	MICRO-AMPERES	METER READING	MULTIPLIER	WATTS					
CIRCUIT BREAKER OPEN	1	26	A	—	10	23.5	.1	2.35	17.5	.02	.35	1.49	1.34		G	
	2	28	A	20	8	10	28	.1	2.80	4.25	.1	4.25	1.52	1.37		G
	3	7	B	—	10	23.5	.1	2.35	18	.02	.36	1.53	1.38		G	
	4	20	B	20	8	10	24	.1	2.4	3.75	.1	3.75	1.56	1.41		G
	5	22	C	—	10	23.5	.1	2.35	15.5	.02	.31	1.32	1.19		G	
	6	21	C	20	8	10	28	.1	2.8	4	.1	.40	1.43	1.29		G
CIRCUIT BREAKER CLOSED	TANK 1		A	20	8	10	50.5	.1	5.05	4	.1	.40	.79	.71	- .375	XG
	TANK 2		B	20	8	10	46	.1	4.6	19.5	.02	.39	.85	.76	- .345	XG
	TANK 3		C	20	8	10	50.5	.1	5.05	18	.02	.36	.71	.64	- .350	XG


OTHER TESTS

LINE NO.	TEST	RESULTS
1		
2		
3		
4	7	B — 10 76 .02 1.52 7.5 .01 .05 .51 .44 404
5	7	B — 2 26 1 2.6 7 .2 1.4 .54 .48 6870
6		
7		
8		
9		
10		
11		
12		
13		
14		
15		
16		

ATTACHMENT
A

N.P.
P.F. 01
415 416
7254

KEY TO BUSHING NO.



REMARKS
* Bushing #3 Ser. no. 7 is a replacement.

KEY TO INSULATION RATING		KEY TO INSULATION RATING	
BUSHINGS-INSULATORS-ETC.	WOOD MEMBERS-OIL-ETC.	WINDINGS	
0=GOOD	X0=GOOD	W0=GOOD	
D=DETERIORATED	XD=DETERIORATED	W0=DETERIORATED	
I=INVESTIGATE	XI=INVESTIGATE	WI=INVESTIGATE	
B=BAD (REMOVE OR RECONDITION)	XB=BAD (REMOVE OR RECONDITION)	WB=BAD (REMOVE OR RECONDITION)	

277 4- (12.4) 1-87 (12.4) AT

3-7-89

ADLR/ADH

LaSalle STA 1 345 KV B-T 4-6

CLOSE/TRIP TIMING TEST

AIR PRESURE 250

CLOSE TIMES

TRIAL	AØ	BØ	CØ
1	270 ms	274 ms	277 ms
2	263	265	273
3	267	270	278

TRIP COIL #1

TRIP COIL #1 TIMES

TRIAL	AØ	BØ	CØ
1	33.0 ms	33.4 ms	33.2 ms
2	32.7	33.4	32.9
3	32.9	33.5	33.0

TRIP COIL #2 TIMES

TRIAL	AØ	BØ	CØ
1	33.1 ms	33.3 ms	32.4 ms
2	33.4	33.3	32.5
3			

TRAVEL TIME

AØ CLOSE $\frac{5FT}{SEC}$ TRIP $\frac{15.4}{SEC}$

BØ CLOSE $\frac{5}{SEC}$ TRIP $\frac{16.3}{SEC}$

CØ CLOSE $\frac{5}{SEC}$ TRIP $\frac{16}{SEC}$


OVER ALL CLOSE CYCLES

AØ 13.5

BØ 13.5 CØ 13.5

ATTACHMENT

B




3-7-89
ADLR / R.D.H.

Case 7A

Trip 1 15

Trip 2 15A



TRAVEL TESTS ANALYSIS

T 4-6

9:30 PM Cφ CCI $\frac{1''}{1.8N} \times \frac{60N}{SEC} \times \frac{1ft}{12''} = 5 \frac{ft}{SEC}$

* TC1 $\frac{2.5''}{2N} \times \frac{60N}{SEC} \times \frac{1ft}{12''} = 18.75 \frac{ft}{SEC}$ 3"-10.5"

$\frac{9''}{2.5N} \times " \times " = 18.0 \frac{ft}{SEC}$ 5"-14"

$\frac{4''}{4.5N-3.25N} \times " \times " = 16.0 \frac{ft}{SEC}$ 1"-5"

9:49 PM

Bφ CCI $\frac{1''}{1N} \times " \times " = 5 \frac{ft}{SEC}$

$\frac{4''}{4.8"-3.25"} \times " \times " = 12.9 \frac{ft}{SEC}$ 1"-5"

$\frac{4''}{4.7"-3.3"} \times " \times " = 14.3 \frac{ft}{SEC}$ 1.25"-5.25"

$\frac{5.75''}{1.5N} \times \frac{60N}{SEC} \times \frac{1ft}{12''} = 19.2 \frac{ft}{SEC}$ 3"-9.75"

Aφ CCI $\frac{1''}{19.6-18.6} \times " \times " = 5 \frac{ft}{SEC}$

TC1 $\frac{4''}{1.3N} \times " \times " = 15.4$ 1.25"-5.25"

STATION _____
CIRCUIT BREAKER NO. 4-6-24
TESTER _____
DATE 3-7-41

TYPE _____

FORM CC-5010
P.O. Box 11, Baltimore, Md.

RETURN TO FILE
JOLET IIQ - DAB


TRAVEL 1 SPACE = 1/4 INCH

TIME-CYCLES
0 HIGH 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
0 LOW 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32

RETURN TO FILE

STATION _____ CIRCUIT BREAKER NO. 4-6 TYPE _____
 TESTER _____ DATE 3-7-57 FORM CC-50

RETURN TO FILE
 JOLIEF IIIQ CA



TRAVEL IN SPACES, INCH

TIME-CYCLES

HIGH 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
 LOW 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30

10x

22

STATION _____

CIRCUIT BREAKER NO. 4-6 CB

TYPE WESTINGHOUSE (10)

FORM CC-501

TESTER _____


DATE 5-7-84

FORM CC-501

RETURN TO FILE
JULIET HQ - OAD



TIME-CYCLES	
0 HIGH	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
0 LOW	2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32



RETURN TO FILE

ATTACHMENT

C

April 11, 1989

Subject: LaSalle Station AIT Report Unresolved items
50-373/89007-01, 50-374/89007-01

Mr. R. M. Hennigan:

Information regarding Southern Division Substation Construction Activities related to the March 2, 1989 trip of SAT 242 has been received from Mr. K. Faber, Southern Division Substation Construction Superintendent.

Substation Construction personnel tested the insulating oil in all three phases of 345 KV bus tie 4-6 as it was removed from and returned to the circuit breaker. Breakdown values for A, B and C phases respectively were 24 KV, 21 KV and 23 KV on removal; 32 KV, 32 KV and 33 KV on return. These tests were documented and data is on file at the Southern Division Substation Construction office.

R. B. Benvenuti
R. B. Benvenuti
Gen. Substation Supt.
T & D Construction

RBB/mc

0142m

cc: K. E. Faber

c8778 2-

SYSTEM MATERIALS ANALYSIS DEPARTMENT REPORT
ON
TRANSFORMER OIL SURVEILLANCE

Location LASALLE STA. Line or Unit # AUX 242 Division SOUTHERN
Make G.E. KVA 65,000 Serial # A547985 Benchmark 5/78

Report No.
Sample Date
Analysis Date

2					
3-3-89					
3-3-89					

Atmospheric
Data

Percent By Volume

Combustibles
CO₂
O₂

0.10					
0.1					
5.5					

Gas-in-Oil
Data

Parts Per Million By Volume

Hydrogen
Methane
Ethane
Ethylene
Acetylene
Carbon Monoxide
Carbon Dioxide
Oxygen
Nitrogen
% Total Gas

<50					
NF					
NF					
NF					
NF					
18					
465					
<500					
78,400					
7.9					

ATTACHMENT
D

Supplemental
Analysis

Water Content, ppm
Dielectric
Strength, kv

—					
45					

Report No.

2					
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Additional Information

Purged
Trip-Out
Benchmark

✓					

Interpretation of Results

Normal Condition

✓					
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Corona Discharge
Cellulose Involvement
Arcing
Overheating (< 150°C)
Overheating (150-200°C)
Overheating (200-300°C)
Conductor Overheating
Overloaded Joints/
Circulating Currents

NOTE: If interpretations appear serious, comments will be made below, and appropriate people notified.

Comments:

Reported By:
Date:
Approved By:
Approved By:
Approved By:

RLM					
3-3-89					
BO					

Copies to: Division Operating Manager
Division OAD Engineer

Station Manager
SSC - LaSalle
Proc. Superintendent

SEED Manager
SOAD Manager
SSC SUPT.



NUCLEAR WORK REQUEST



STA. No. L 87994 V/N. NUMBER 4

EQUIPMENT NAME: SAT Transformer U-2 242 UNIT: 2 LOCATION: Outside Tank U-2 EPN: 2AP91E SYSTEM: AP

EM/WORK REQUEST: 2 SAT TRANSFORMER 242 TRIPPO. Investigate cause of Trip and Repair.

ATTACHMENT

TESTED BY: R.A. Dowd /DATE: 3/3/89 TEST REQUIRED: YES NO OAD N BY: OP TS MM EM IM

EPT. ASSIGNED: C.A.D. Verify proper operation

IM IM EM OTHER: C.A.D. SUP. APPR.: R.A. Dowd /DATE: 3/3/89 MO DA YR: 3 0

PRIORITY: 4 LOAD REDUCTION: YES NO UNIT OUTAGE: SHORT REFUEL HCT COLD SPECIAL

SAFETY RELATED: YES NO REGULATORY RELATED: YES NO MODIFICATION: YES NO CODE WORK: YES NO ASME CLASS: IF ALL FOUR NO'S ARE CHECKED * APPROVALS/+ COMPLETION ARE NOT REQ'D

ENGR. APPR.: R.A. Dowd /DATE: 3-3-89 FIRE HAZARD REVIEW: NONE PROCEDURE SPECIAL

T. DEPT. APPR.: Ronald Lee Dowd /DATE: 3/3/89 ALARA ACTION: NOT APPLICABLE NOT REQUIRED REQUIRED

ACTION: R.A. Dowd /DATE: 3/3/89 EQ.: YES NO ROUTINE MAINT.

WORK INSTRUCTIONS: Assist S.O.A.D. in Troubleshooting, Repairing and Testing of the U-2 SAT transformer AS REQUIRED. Document lifting/lowering leads on LAP-1700-1 Rev. 39 pg. 2 of 2.

WORK ANALYST: R.A. Dowd CODE: N PARTS CHECKED AND FOUND AVAILABLE: PARTS ASSEMBLED IN STOREROOM UNDER THIS W.R. NO.: JOB CODE: C W.O. FUNCTION NO.: 54181-2567 SUB-DIVISION: 7

INT. / PACS APPR.: Ronald Lee Dowd /DATE: 3/3/89 ATTACHED DOCUMENTATION REQUIREMENTS: Other

VIEW / CSCO, QA: Ronald Lee Dowd /DATE: 3/3/89 VERIFY: NA TRAVELER: YES NO PROCEDURE: YES NO RED TAGS: YES NO DOC. CHK. LIST: YES NO

WORK ASSIGNED TO: MAINT. FOREMAN- R. Cassin CODE: MAINT. FOREMAN- V. D.V. CODE: SPECIAL PART NO'S AND TOOLS USED: Access - PTF 44174 SE 204437

SCHEDULED START DATE: 1/1 MO DA YR: 1 1 SERIAL NO. OF ITEM INSTALLED: 022400SD 051403SD

FT AUTHORIZATION TO RT WORK: R. Nelson /DATE: 03/03/89 WORK PERFORMED: See Subst. Maint. critical yellow sheets and white sheet page 1 to 3

RELEASE / CECO, QA: R. Nelson /DATE: 03/03/89 FOREMAN COMP.: R. Nelson /DATE: 03/03/89

PROVED COMPLETION: R.D.H. /DATE: 3/4/89 DR NO.:

WORK REQUEST PACKAGE COMPLETE

- STAPLE TAG HERE -

Transformer # 242 SAT
 Drawings 1E-2-4000NF

Megger

megger voltage: 2500 VDC
 acceptance criteria: 1 megohm/kV + 1 megohm

- | | |
|--|--------------|
| 1. High to ground (low side grounded) | 1000 megohms |
| X winding) 2. low to ground (high side grounded) | 975 megohms |
| Y winding) 3. low to ground (high side grounded) | 750 megohms |

10 min. megger results ✓ attached Megger QA # 0524085
 052710L

TTR

TTR QA # 27340350

Expected Ratio

$$\frac{\text{Primary Voltage} \times \sqrt{3}}{\text{Secondary Voltage} \times \sqrt{3}} = \frac{345 \times \sqrt{3}}{6.9 \times \sqrt{3}} = 50$$

$$\frac{345 \times \sqrt{3}}{4.16 \times \sqrt{3}} = 82.932$$

Windings

Readings

Red Blk	Red Blk		
1, H ₁ -H ₀	to	X ₁ -X ₀	82.821
2, H ₂ -H ₀	to	X ₂ -X ₀	82.877
3, H ₃ -H ₀	to	X ₃ -X ₀	82.88

} 4.16 kV

Windings

Readings

Red Blk	Red Blk		
1, H ₁ -H ₀	to	Y ₁ -Y ₀	49.081
2, H ₂ -H ₀	to	Y ₂ -Y ₀	49.114
3, H ₃ -H ₀	to	Y ₃ -Y ₀	49.116

} 6.9 kV

Evaluations

Megger Results ✓ acceptable
 TTR Results ✓ acceptable


Joe J. Fowles 3/3/89

Unit 5 sub-station
Megger and TTR test

Transformer Winding Connections

Transformer # 242 sat

Vector Diagram



Winding Connections

Readings

	Red	Blue	Red	Blue		
1	H ₁	- H ₀	X ₁	- X ₀	49.081	} 4.16 KV
2	H ₂	- H ₀	X ₂	- X ₀	49.114	
3	H ₃	- H ₀	X ₃	- X ₀	49.116	
1	H ₁	- H ₀	X ₁	- X ₀	82.821	} 6.9 KV
2	H ₂	- H ₀	X ₂	- X ₀	82.877	
3	H ₃	- H ₀	X ₃	- X ₀	82.880	

TEN MINUTE MEGGER

WORK REQUEST L 87994

DATE: 3 / 3 / 89

EQUIPMENT NAME: SAT HIGH SIDE 242

EQUIPMENT NO. : _____

MEGGER POINTS: HIGH SIDE TO GRD

DATA

MEGGER VOLTAGE: _____

<u>MINUTES</u>	<u>READING</u>	<u>MULTIPLIER</u>	<u>MEGOHMS</u>
0.00	<u>50</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>250</u>
0.50	<u>150</u>		<u>750</u>
1.00	<u>175</u>		<u>875</u>
2.00	<u>175</u>		<u>875</u>
3.00	<u>180</u>		<u>900</u>
4.00	<u>180</u>		<u>900</u>
5.00	<u>180</u>		<u>900</u>
6.00	<u>190</u>		<u>950</u>
7.00	<u>200</u>		<u>1000</u>
8.00	<u>200</u>		<u>1000</u>
9.00	<u>200</u>	↓	<u>1000</u>
10.00	<u>200</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>1000</u>

60:30 SEC RATIO:

$$\frac{875}{250} = 1.16$$

POLARIZATION INDEX (10:1 MIN RATIO):

$$\frac{1000}{875} = 1.14$$

MEGGER QA NO. 0527101

EVALUATION: RESULTS: ACCEPTABLE, NOT ACCEPTABLE

R. H. Haines 3/3/89
OAD ENGINEER

TEN MINUTE MEGGER

WORK REQUEST 287994

DATE: 3 / 3 / 89

EQUIPMENT NAME: SAT 242
 EQUIPMENT NO.: Y WINDING (ABC'S TIED)
 MEGGER POINTS: Y WINDING TO GROUND

DATA

MEGGER VOLTAGE: 2500 VDC

<u>MINUTES</u>	<u>READING</u>	<u>MULTIPLIER</u>	<u>MEG OHMS</u>
0.00	<u>170</u>	<u>.5</u>	<u>850</u>
0.50	<u>175</u>		<u>875</u>
1.00	<u>200</u>		<u>1000</u>
2.00	<u>175</u>		<u>875</u>
3.00	<u>125</u>		<u>625</u>
4.00	<u>135</u>		<u>675</u>
5.00	<u>150</u>		<u>750</u>
6.00	<u>150</u>		<u>750</u>
7.00	<u>150</u>		<u>750</u>
8.00	<u>150</u>		<u>750</u>
9.00	<u>150</u>	<u>↓</u>	<u>750</u>
10.00	<u>150</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>750</u>

60:30 SEC RATIO:

$$\frac{1000}{875} = 1.14$$

POLARIZATION INDEX (10:1 MIN RATIO):

$$\frac{750}{1000} = .75$$

MEGGER QA NO. 0524085D

EVALUATION: RESULTS: ACCEPTABLE, NOT ACCEPTABLE

R. Human
 OAD ENGINEER

X WINDING ≠ HIGH SIDE GROUND

WORK REQUEST 687994

DATE: 3/3/89

EQUIPMENT NAME: SAT 242

EQUIPMENT NO.: X WINDING (A, B, C Ø's TIED)

MEGGER POINTS: X WINDING TO GRD

DATA

MEGGER VOLTAGE: 2500 VDC

<u>MINUTES</u>	<u>READING</u>	<u>MULTIPLIER</u>	<u>MEG OHMS</u>
0.00	<u>150</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>750</u>
0.50	<u>150</u>		<u>750</u>
1.00	<u>160</u>		<u>800</u>
2.00	<u>170</u>		<u>850</u>
3.00	<u>175</u>		<u>875</u>
4.00	<u>180</u>		<u>900</u>
5.00	<u>180</u>		<u>900</u>
6.00	<u>195</u>		<u>975</u>
7.00	<u>195</u>		<u>975</u>
8.00	<u>195</u>		<u>975</u>
9.00	<u>195</u>	<u>↓</u>	<u>975</u>
10.00	<u>195</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>975</u>

60:30 SEC RATIO: $\frac{800}{750} = 1.06$

POLARIZATION INDEX (10:1 MIN RATIO) $\frac{975}{800} = 1.2$

MEGGER QA NO. 05240850

EVALUATION: RESULTS: ACCEPTABLE, NOT ACCEPTABLE

K. Higgins 3/3/89
O&D ENGINEER

Y WINDING ≠ HIGH SIDE GROUND



INSTRUCTIONS

 GEK 24127
 Supersedes GEK-21269

ALUGARD[®] II STATION ARRESTERS MODEL 9L11M-SERIES 3-312 KV MODEL 9L16B-SERIES ABOVE 312 KV

CAUTION: THE EQUIPMENT COVERED BY THESE INSTRUCTIONS SHOULD BE INSTALLED AND SERVICED ONLY BY COMPETENT PERSONNEL FAMILIAR WITH GOOD SAFETY PRACTICES. THIS INSTRUCTION IS WRITTEN FOR SUCH PERSONNEL AND IS NOT INTENDED AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR ADEQUATE TRAINING AND EXPERIENCE IN SAFE PROCEDURES FOR THIS TYPE OF EQUIPMENT.

The ALUGARD II Station Arrester is of single-phase design, suitable for outdoor service. Three arresters are required for three-phase installations. Smaller, lower-rated models are shipped assembled, while the larger, higher-rated models consist of four to six individual units which must be assembled. The arresters require no testing before being placed in service, and are completely self-supporting.

Each ALUGARD II arrester unit contains a number of THYRITZ[®] valve and alurite gap elements permanently sealed in a porcelain housing provided with pressure-relief construction. Metal end fittings, cemented to the housing, provide a means for bolting the arrester units together or to a foundation.

APPLICATION

Arresters are designed to limit surge voltages to a safe value by discharging the surge current to ground, and to interrupt the power-frequency follow current. The ability to interrupt power-follow current is limited to applications where the power-frequency voltage at the arrester never exceeds the arrester's continuous or short-time rating. In case of doubt concerning application, consult your local General Electric Company representative.

INSTALLATION

INITIAL INSPECTION

ALUGARD II arresters are designed to withstand severe shipping shocks. In addition, each unit is shipped in a carefully designed container. If the crate or carton shows signs of rough handling upon receipt, the porcelain housing should be inspected for chips or cracks. If damage is apparent, the arrester should not be installed. Claims for such damage should be registered immediately with the common carrier.

The model number and continuous voltage rating of each complete arrester are identified on the nameplate which is attached to the lower end fittings. The nameplate information should be checked against the shipping memorandum. At any time it is necessary to correspond with the General Electric Company, complete nameplate data should be furnished in order to expedite replies.

LOCATION

Install the arrester electrically as close as practicable to the apparatus being protected. Keep line and ground connections short and direct.

FOUNDATION

The footings of all outdoor piers or supports should extend below the frost line and be elevated above the ground line sufficiently to meet personnel safety requirements.

ASSEMBLY

Single-unit Arresters

Each arrester, except those requiring grading rings, is shipped completely assembled. When grading rings are needed, bolt them securely on the line end, before electrical connections are made.

All single-unit ratings can be suspension mounted if the line connection is made to the top of the arrester. The top cap of each standard ALUGARD II unit has provisions for attaching an insulator clevis fitting. Special ALUGARD II arresters rated 258 kV and below can be supplied for rigid suspension mounting from station structural members.

Install the arrester on the foundation, using care to see that it is perpendicular, shimming under one or two feet if necessary. It is important that all three feet rest solidly on the foundation before the foundation bolts are drawn down to avoid unnecessary stresses in the castings. Tighten the bolts firmly. The opening for pressure-relief should be oriented so as to minimize damage to adjacent equipment by incandescent gases in the remote event of arrester failure.

These instructions do not purport to cover all details or variations in equipment nor to provide for every possible contingency to be met in connection with installation, operation or maintenance. Should further information be desired or should particular problems arise which are not covered sufficiently for the purchaser's purposes, the matter should be referred to the General Electric Company.

ATTACHMENT

F

GEK-84827, ALUGARD II STATION ARRESTERS

Multi-unit Arresters

It is important that the individual arrester units be erected in the exact order specified on the outline drawing shipped with each arrester. The model number of the arrester unit is given on the unit nameplate which is attached to the bottom end casting. The base unit also bears the larger arrester nameplate.

Install the base unit on the foundation, using care to see that it is perpendicular, shimming under one or two feet if necessary. It is important that all three feet rest solidly on the foundation before the foundation bolts are drawn down to avoid unnecessary stresses in the castings. Tighten the bolts firmly. The opening for pressure-relief should be oriented so as to minimize damage to adjacent equipment by incandescent gases in the remote event of arrester failure.

Select the next unit carefully by reference to the outline drawing and bolt it securely to the base unit. The end fittings are carefully affixed at the factory to assure parallelism, so no further shimming should be required provided it was carefully done when the base unit was installed.

The line terminal cap has a central lifting hole and it may be used, if desired, as an aid to erection by bolting it temporarily to each unit in turn.

Be sure to install the grading rings at the points called for on the outline drawing.

LINE AND GROUND CONNECTIONS

Connect the arrester ground to the apparatus ground and the main station ground, utilizing a reliable common ground network of low resistance.

Connection to the line should be made through a suitable line connector. Line connections should be made in such a manner that no excessive mechanical stress is placed on the arrester. When connecting the arrester to an energized line, it is imperative that a quick, positive, continuous action be made to avoid possible damage to the arrester.

CAUTION: ALWAYS BE CERTAIN THAT THE GROUND CONNECTION IS FIRMLY MADE BEFORE CONNECTING THE ARRESTER TO AN ENERGIZED LINE. IF AN INSULATING UNIT IS USED AT THE GROUND END TO PERMIT USE OF A DISCHARGE COUNTER, THE DISCHARGE COUNTER MUST BE CONNECTED (OR THE INSULATING UNIT SHORTED OUT) BEFORE CONNECTING THE ARRESTER TO AN ENERGIZED LINE.

CLEARANCE

The term "clearance" means the actual distance between any parts of the arrester at line potential and any object at ground potential or other phase potential.

GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY, PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT PRODUCTS DEPARTMENT, PITTSFIELD, MASS. 01201

Clearances listed in the appropriate outline print packed with each arrester are the minimum recommended for conventional outdoor substations. Arresters rated 96 kV and below may be enclosed completely using the same clearance values. The values shown are suitable for altitudes up to 3300 feet (1000 meters). At higher altitudes, add 3 percent for each additional 1000 feet of elevation. The arrangement of the foundation plans shown on the outlines can be modified if proper clearances are maintained.

ALTITUDE

3-48 kV models 9L11M arresters can be used from 0-18,000 feet altitude.

50-312 kV arresters can be used from 0-10,000 feet altitude. ALUGARD II arrester sealing would allow these units to be applied to 18,000 feet, but they must be limited to 10,000 feet because reduction of air density increases the possibility of external flashover on these 9L11MCHA series arresters.

ALUGARD II arresters, 9L15B series can be used from 0-10,000 feet altitude.

PERIODIC INSPECTION AND MAINTENANCE

Before inspecting or handling, disconnect the arrester from line and, as a safety precaution, ground the line end. *Remove this temporary ground before reconnecting the arrester onto the line.*

ALUGARD II arresters require no special care. They may be hot-washed, subject to the usual care and techniques used in hot-washing insulation to avoid external flashover.

These arresters do not require testing, and no test which applies power voltage in excess of maximum arrester voltage rating should be made without consulting the General Electric Company. There is no single field test which will indicate the complete operating characteristics of the arrester.

PORCELAIN TOP UNITS

Porcelain top arresters with center line terminals are available and are particularly suited for use in metal cubicles. These arresters can be mounted in any position when installed in a reasonably clean and dry indoor location.

DISCHARGE COUNTERS

An insulating base is required when installing a discharge counter with arresters. Both of these are accessories and are described in Handbook Section 9920. Install the discharge counter and insulating base as shown on the outline drawing furnished with the counter.

IMPORTANT: AN ARRESTER MUST CONSIST OF UNITS WITH IDENTICAL SERIAL NUMBERS.

The following report details the analysis of the lightning arrester which was sent to the manufacturer (General Electric) to determine the failure mechanism.

On Monday, April 10, 1989, Gregg Mathewson of System Electrical Engineering Department witnessed in the teardown of the subject lightning arrester in the GECO factory in Pittsfield, Massachusetts.

On the day of the incident at LaSalle Station visible external evidence was found to indicate that the arrester had failed internally. The area around the top expulsion port was darkened and metallic splatter was found on the porcelain at the area of the top expulsion port. No evidence of external flashover to the base of the arrester was found. It was surmised by all at the site that the arrester failed internally.

However, upon disassembly of the arrester at the factory, no evidence of internal failure was found. The internal spark gaps were all intact. Also, the top and bottom expulsion ports and seals were intact and had not operated.

The factory inspection conclusively indicated that the arrester had not failed internally (Attached).

On Thursday, April 13, 1989, Messrs. L.R. Yule and R.F. Cameron of the System Electrical Engineering Department met with Steve Samolinski from LaSalle Station Technical Staff. The area around the SAT 242 transformer was inspected in an attempt to locate flash marks on grounded objects near the SAT 242 transformer CO lightning arrester. A brass nozzle on the deluge system near the CO arrester showed definite signs of recent flashover burning as viewed through a 50 power telescope.

It is our conclusion that an external CO to ground flashover occurred from the CO arrester top can and grading ring to the grounded deluge system brass nozzle. It is further postulated that conductive debris was blown across this area to cause the flashover. (The air clearance is too great to cause flashover in air for the protective level of this lightning arrester.) Attached is a copy of weather data obtained from LaSalle Station indicating that the wind direction at the 33 foot level was from the East at a speed of approximately 22 MPH the proper direction to support this postulation.

Additionally, the following clarification needs to be made in reference to Page 15 of the AIT report concerning this incident. In the second paragraph of Section 4 of the report, it states that this incident caused a "catastrophic" failure of the lightning arrester. It should be noted that the utility industry generally reserves the word "catastrophic" when applied to arrester failures to indicate the arrester porcelain was shattered and strewn over the area of the incident. This clarification is made so as to identify that there was not a violent failure of the lightning arrester.

2002
3/2/89

Label	Description	Unit	Value
L117	DRYWELL HUMIDITY	% RH	22.844
L118	DRYWELL PRESSURE	PSIG	0.000
L122	SUPP POOL WATER TEMP MW	DEGF	57.027
L123	SUPP POOL WATER TEMP SE	DEGF	57.402
L124	SUPP POOL WATER LEVEL	IN.	-1.085
L128	SUPP POOL PRESSURE	PSIG	0.003
C229	TOTAL CONDEN POLISH FLOW	GPM	19765.000
F458	COND DEMIN 1A FLOW	GPM	3387.500
F459	COND DEMIN 1B FLOW	GPM	3196.250
F460	COND DEMIN 1C FLOW	GPM	3336.250
F461	COND DEMIN 1D FLOW	GPM	3376.250
F462	COND DEMIN 1E FLOW	GPM	3280.000
F463	COND DEMIN 1F FLOW	GPM	3188.750
F464	COND DEMIN 1G FLOW	GPM	0.000
C090	HEAT REJ TO COND	MBTU/H	6513.312
C091	CIRC WTR TEMP RISE	DEGF	30.933
C092	COND SATST TEMP DIF	DEGF	45.307
C093	COND LEAST TEMP DIF	DEGF	14.374
C094	LCS MEAN TEMP DIF	DEGF	26.944
C095	ACT HT TRANS COEF	DEGF	254.459
C096	CIRC WTR VELOCITY	FT/SEC	4.770
C097	TH HEAT TRANS RATE	DEGF	363.730
C098	CLEANLINESS FACTOR	DEGF	0.700
F285	LINE A COND INLET	DEGF	43.069
F286	LINE B COND INLET	DEGF	43.294
F359	LINE A COND OUTLET	DEGF	81.399
F360	LINE A COND OUTLET	DEGF	77.672
F361	LINE A COND OUTLET	DEGF	76.568
F362	LINE A COND OUTLET	DEGF	81.262
F363	LINE B COND OUTLET	DEGF	82.229
F364	LINE B COND OUTLET	DEGF	79.467
F365	LINE B COND OUTLET	DEGF	77.396
F366	LINE B COND OUTLET	DEGF	84.577
C024	DIESEL GEN POWER	MW	0.000
E424	DG 0 KWATTS	KW	0.219
E425	DG 1A KWATTS	KW	-0.219
Y235	EHC FLUID	PSIG	1615.625
I236	EHC FLUID	DEGF	117.635
A847	WIND DIRECT AT 375FT	DGREES	442.461
A848	WIND DIRECT AT 200FT	DGREES	448.875
A849	WIND SPEED AT 375FT	M. P. H.	27.844
A850	WIND SPEED AT 200FT	M. P. H.	25.937
A851	DIFF TEMP AT 33FT/375	DEGF/F	-1.094
A852	WIND SPEED AT 33FT	M. P. H.	22.484
A853	WIND DIRECT AT 33FT	DGREES	87.412
A854	TEMP AT 33FT	DEGF	24.260
F289	HTR 16A EXT	PSIG	278.875
F290	HTR 16B EXT	PSIG	277.875
F291	HTR 15A EXT	PSIG	121.062
F292	HTR 15B EXT	PSIG	122.187
F293	HTR 15C EXT	PSIG	121.562
F294	HTR 14A EXT	PSIG	63.719
F295	HTR 14B EXT	PSIG	64.250
F296	HTR 14C EXT	PSIG	65.625
F297	HTR 13A EXT	PSIG	32.625
F298	HTR 13B EXT	PSIG	32.922
F299	HTR 13C EXT	PSIG	33.672

GENERAL ELECTRIC'S FORMAL REPORT ON

THE DISASSEMBLY AND INSPECTION OF

THE 9L11MHA264 ALUGARD STATION ARRESTER

MEMORANDUM

Disassembly and inspection of an Alugard 9L11MHA264
arrester returned from service by Commonwealth Edison Co.
S/N 48007, Date Code L76

This report discusses observations and conclusions made during disassembly of the arrester with the customer representative Mr. Gregg Mathewson present on 4/10/89.

Description of the unit, including past history.

The subject arrester was installed on phase C of the unit 2 Sys.Aux. Tr.242 of the LaSalle County Generating Station. In approximately 1984 it was found that the Tr.142 and 242 arresters had been installed and operated since installation without the proper grading rings and at that time corrective action was taken. The lack of a grading ring will result in higher than normal voltage across the upper gaps causing some degradation in the sparkover characteristics, a higher than normal operating temperature of the upper grading rods, and a likelihood of internal corona in the internal upper portion of the arrester at normal operating voltage. On 02-28-89, at 23:02 Hrs the station tripped on differential. Note that the arrester is outside of the differential zone, so an arrester failure should not cause differential tripping. The station record showed that for 18 sec. before tripout there was a ground current indication of ≥ 200 amps. The record showed a pole disagreement on breaker opening. The event oscillogram shows 4.5 cycles of fault current coincidental with a collapse of the C phase voltage and in addition a half cycle collapse of the B phase voltage just prior to breaker opening. The fault current is listed on the oscillogram as 4875 amps although the available was stated to be 46 Ka. Upon inspection of the station after the event the upper end of this C phase arrester was "smoked up" in the vicinity of the pressure relief port indicating operation of the upper pressure relief port (See attached photo #1). Also noted was a cracked bushing on the breaker. The breaker was repaired, the arrester replaced, and the station was then reenergized successfully. At the time of the event there was reported to be some rain and the temperature was probably about 40F.

Disassembly of the arrester

A visual inspection confirmed extensive "smoking" of the upper end of the housing in the area of the pressure relief port so it was assumed without further investigation that venting had indeed occurred and the arrester was then opened by melting off the lower end casting. The lower gasket was found in the proper position and in excellent condition (Photo # 2) and there was no burning or arc marks of any kind on the lower aluminum sealing plate (Photo # 3). The lower three arrester sections were removed through the bottom end and found to be in generally very good condition with no indication of any failure arc (Photos # 4,5,6). The only deterioration noted was that the nylon washers used to

secure the epoxy glass clamping rods had become brittle from oxidation to the point where they mechanically gave way and released the tension in the stack assemblies. The effect of this was that the stacks tended to fall apart when removed from the housing as seen in the photos; however, there would be no adverse effect in the erect unopened arrester because the compression springs in the assembly act to captivate everything in place. That is, the tie rods only serve the purpose of facilitating arrester assembly and stabilizing the internal parts during shipment. The grading capacitors in this Arrester were Erie units, code 05266, with the brown encapsulant introduced to cure the problem with ozone imbrittelment experienced with some of the earlier red units. As expected they showed no degradation even though there was obviously much ozone present as evidenced by the yellow color of the nylon washers.

The upper end casting was melted off next to facilitate removal of the upper internal unit and to inspect the gasket seal and lead pressure relief diaphragm. This gasket was also in excellent shape and the seal had not been violated. That is, the lead pressure relief diaphragm had not ruptured or vented in any way. Photo # 7 shows the interior of the upper and lower sealing systems as they were when removed and photos # 8 and 9 are of the inside and outside faces respectively of the disassembled parts of the upper sealing and pressure relief system.

At this point then it was obvious that this arrester had not failed and must not have contributed to the event. The arrester contained 44 gaps and, counting from the bottom, gaps 1, 11, 21, and 44 were removed, tested for sparkover, and dissected. The results of the tests were:

<u>Gap #</u>	<u>R.N. Start</u>	<u>S.O.</u>	<u>Normal S.O.</u>
1	6.0 Kv	13.5-14.5	Approx 14
11	7.5 Kv	9.03-9.15	Approx 9.1
21	7.5 Kv	8.97-9.03	Approx 9.1
44	8.0 Kv	13.6-14.1	Approx 14

The test values are essentially normal, indicating little or no deterioration and this would be expected from the fine appearance of the internal parts. Particularly significant are the results on gaps 11 and 21 which are control gaps and are in as good as new condition. The end plates were then removed from the gaps revealing, as seen in photo # 10, that the electrodes and arc chambers were also like new. In fact a close inspection of these parts indicate that either the arrester never experienced a discharge or, at the worst, any operations it did see were very benign.

Photos # 11 and 12 show details of the arc damage to the upper housing and in particular photo # 11 reveals that although of course a high current arc did contact the housing it did not significantly mark the top petticoat and hence could hardly have originated anywhere near the upper relief vent. There was considerable residue deposited on the housing which appeared to be primarily organic and with numerous splatters of copper. The organic deposit led to speculation that the arc may have involved a loose insulated

lead and Mr Mathewson took some wipes from the surface to see if it could be identified by chemical analysis. Photo # 13 of the upper end fitting shows evidence of small arc marks or splatters but no evidence of a high current arc termination. Photo # 14 is of one of the grading ring mounting ears of the upper end fitting and shows an indication that a heavy current may have flowed between the casting and the grading ring mounting strap. Perhaps the external arc current flowed through the arrester drop lead then to the casting and the grading ring and then off the ring to some adjacent object.

Summary

The arrester had not failed and did not vent and therefore is not considered to be the cause of the event. The internal parts were in excellent condition except for severe oxidation of some organic parts, particularly the nylon tie rod retaining washers. The washers at the upper end were in far worse shape than those at the lower end probably both because operation without a grading ring would cause internal corona in the upper part and thus generate ozone which is a strong oxidizer and also because the upper parts would be the warmest, also enhanced by the lack of a grading ring. It must be emphasized however that in spite of the severe oxidation of some organics the writer does not believe that this had any significant effect on the reliability and viability of the arrester. All of the important parts including the gaps, grading circuits, valve elements, and seals were essentially unaffected. It is the writer's recommendation that the lack of grading rings should not be considered as having compromised the reliability of the remaining arresters.



J S Kresge
(consultant)
4/19/89

Photo # 1





Photo #2



01 0

Photo # 3





Photo # 4







Photo # 5



LOWER TIER
SECTION
1950

Photo # 6

Photo # 7






Photo # 8

Photo #4






44



21



11



11

Photo # 10

Photo # 11



Photo # 12




Photo #13



Photo #14






LA SALLE STATION SAT 242

PHOTO # 1 of 3 4/14/89

DELUGE ELBOW INVOLVED IN CP
LIGHTNING ARRESTER EXTERNAL
FLASHOVER.

L A SALLE STATION SAT 242
PHOTO # 2 OF 3 4/14/89
(SAME DESCRIPTION AS PHOTO # 1)



LASALLE STATION SAT 242
PHOTO # 3 OF 3 4/11/81
(SAME DESCRIPTION AS PHOTO # 1)



UNRESOLVED ITEM: 373/89007-02
374/89007-02

... The AIT discussed with the licensee, the availability of reliable sequence of event information. The licensee had no formal policy to ensure that when one unit's process computer was on alternate power supply for UPS maintenance that the other unit's process computer was not out of service for maintenance or on its alternate power supply. This would also apply to the Hathaways. The licensee has initiated an action item to review the AIT's concern. Review of the licensee's actions is considered an unresolved item.

RESPONSE:

The policy for the Process Computer and Hathaway sequence of events recorder Power Supply (PS) has been revised. The status of each PS will be recorded in the shift operator rounds package. If the PS is in bypass, a work request will be initiated or verified to be outstanding to ensure the problem is corrected. PS work requests which require the PS to be placed in bypass will be classified as priority B1. If the work requires the Unit to be placed in a different condition to complete the work (e.g., Unit must be in shutdown), the work will be performed at the next opportunity of sufficient duration. An engraved sign will be placed by the Hathaways power supply breaker requiring that the shift supervisor be notified prior to changing over to the alternate supply.