

123 Range Road
Wilton CT 06897
December 15, 1989

Mr. Kane
Division of Reactor Products
Region I U.S. NRC
King Of Prussia Pa. 19406

RE: May 15, 1989 letter and subsequent response

Dear Mr. Kane,

I am writing to you to ask for some additional information regarding a letter that I sent you. I was confused by your response. I would like to resubmit the letter for more in depth answers.

I would also like to make it clear that I am sending you this letter as an individual and do not represent either the Duxbury Nuclear Matters Committee or the Duxbury Emergency Response Committee.

Recently, I discovered that the original letter that I sent you was the unedited version that I pulled inadvertently from my computer. For the sake of continuity, I have decided to continue using it. I do hope the format does not prove to be too difficult. I apologize for my many misspellings and typing errors. I also would like to reemphasize that the original letter does not reflect the full Town of Duxbury Nuclear Matters Committee. That particular letter reflects the concern of two members of that committee, the rest of the committee has not commented on the report yet. Indeed Ms. Fleming would like it to be clear that she is not a member of any committee I have very recently submitted my letter to the Town of Duxbury's Nuclear Matters Committee and hope that they will have additional questions and do a more formal inquest.

Finally, I have added two additional names to the cc. list. They are there as interested parties and are not part of any allegation.

ccall the attached
George Mulley NRC Investigator General's Office
Chairman Kenneth Carr Nuclear Regulatory Commission

*Sincerely yours,
Mary L. Dinow*

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REF

15 Jeremiah Drive
Duxbury Ma 02332
May 15, 1989

Wm Kane, Director
Division of Reactor Projects
Region I U.S. NRC
King of Prussia Pa. 19406

Subject: The Augmented Inspection Team report (AIT) RIC1 Low pressure piping at the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station and two related issues to PNFS

Mr. Kane,

As committee members of the Town of Duxbury Nuclear Matters Committee several of us have reviewed the above report. We submit the following questions for further clarification and comments.

1. The category "off normal". Would you please be specific about the regulatory status of this classification. Is this a REDO terminology? If so would you please state what NRC category the event would be classified as? Is this according to tech specs?

2. We are confused as to the exact number of people involved in the incident. Would you please tell us who was in the control room at the start of the incident? Who left the control room and went to the RIC1 quard? Who was the HF that arrived in the reactor building that did not have a key card time? In your answer could you include the qualifications and liscence numbers (both the NRC and Commonwealth).

Also would you please give specific details regarding the experience and training of the Nuclear Watch engineer? the Nuclear Operations Supervisor? the Reactor Operator? The lead I&C Technician? the two other I&C technicians sent to the RIC1 logic pannels? The two operators who did the "tag outs". Please be specific to the type of experience on a Mark I boiling Water reactor that these men have and how long they have worked for the Boston Edison Company?

3. It has been noted that this off normal event had the potential to develop into a Loss of Coolant type scenario. We would appreciate clarification on the actual number of incidents (no matter what the classification) that PNFS has had? We have been assured that a Loss of Coolant Accident is extremely unlikely. What is the statistical data that substantiates this claim? Is the history of PNFS in these matters reflected into those numbers?

4. Was the steam that came as the result of the RIC1 off normal incident radioactive? was there any air born

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contamination during the duration of the incident and the subsequent investigation?

5. On Wednesday ,May 10,1989 a local lobster man noticed steam coming from the stacks of Pilgrim I station. Local monitors substantiated higher numbers for background radiation readings?We were told that FNFS was in cold shut down at that time. Was FNFS venting on that date? If not what was the steam in the stack?

6.On Thursday May 11,1989 a man who first killed his wife and subsequently stole a plane from Logan airport . He then proceeded to " Buzz" Logan and the entire South Shore area for a number of hours. Selectwoman Alba Thompson has confirmed that a plane was cited in Plymouth and that the local Plymouth airport had been armed.Reports were that this plane was cited at the beginning of Rodey Hill Road less than 1/2 mile from FNFS.

Our concern focuses on the security at FNFS at that time.Was the NRC notified of the incident? What precautions are presently in place to deter any such maniacs?

Thankyou for your continued interest in the PILGRIM I NUCLEAR POWER STATION saga. Your prompt written response (ten working days) would be appreciated.

Sincerely Yours,
Mary A. Dinan
Jane Fleming (EVAC leader)
Kate D'Brien

CC Senator Edward Kennedy
Senator John Glenn
Ted Kopel
Peter Agnes
Neil Johnson

cc (S)Natl



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
475 ALLENDALE ROAD
KING OF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19406

RECEIVED

JUN 19 1989

TOWN OF DUXBURY
BOARD OF SELECTMEN

JUN 14 1989

Ms. Mary Dinan
15 Jeremiah Drive
Duxbury, Massachusetts 02332

Dear Ms. Dinan:

I am responding to the letter of May 15, 1989, to Mr. William Kane, Director, Division of Reactor Projects from you, Ms. Jane Fleming and Ms. Kate O'Brien. In that letter you requested detailed information, primarily concerning an April 12, 1989, event at the Pilgrim Station involving the reactor core isolation coring (RCIC) system. Much of the information requested is contained in NRC Augmented Inspection Team (AIT) Report Number 50-293/89-80, available in your Local Public Document Room (LPDR). A copy of the AIT report is enclosed for your convenience. I believe a careful review of this document will answer many of your questions. Since the information contained is substantial in volume and technical in nature, I will attempt to provide a brief summary in response to each of your six areas of interest.

1. Classification of the Event

The licensee's emergency plan contains the criteria used to determine if a plant event warrants notification of offsite agencies and the appropriate level of onsite response. The April 12, 1989, event during which the RCIC system pump suction piping was pressurized did not meet the significance threshold which would require declaration of an Unusual Event, the lowest level of emergency plan event classification. This determination was supported by the licensee's analysis at the time of the event, and was subsequently confirmed by the NRC AIT. As a conservative measure the licensee maintains an internal notification procedure encompassing events of minor significance not requiring classification by the emergency plan, but of potential interest to licensee management, the NRC and other parties. In this instance the licensee determined that notification in accordance with their internal procedure was warranted, categorized the transient as an "Off-Normal" event, and implemented the planned notifications. No declaration was required by the licensee's emergency plan in this case. A complete description of this area is included in NRC AIT Report, Section 9.6.

2. Licensed Operator Shift Staffing and Qualifications, and Plant Technical Staff Qualifications

The attached NRC AIT report includes a complete description of the relevant aspects of this event and a detailed chronology. The number of licensed operators on shift and in the control room before, during and following the event was evaluated and found to be acceptable. The names and license numbers of the individuals involved is not germane to understanding of the event.

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cc Carlson

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
475 ALLENDALE ROAD
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JUN 14 1989

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The NRC has established minimum education and experience requirements for licensed operators, as well as other members of the plant technical staff. These requirements are used to screen operator license candidates prior to administration of any license exam. The qualifications and training of the plant technical staff are routinely evaluated as part of the ongoing NRC inspection program. The level of experience and training of the licensed operators at Pilgrim was extensively reviewed during the NRC Integrated Assessment Team Inspection (IATI) prior to authorizing plant restart. This review is documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-293/88-21 and noted that the experience of the Pilgrim operating staff constitutes a significant strength. Specific aspects of personnel training which could have contributed to the subject event were also reviewed during the recent AIT and are discussed in the report.

3. Relative Significance of the Event, the Occurrence of Past Similar Events, and the Probability of Reactor Accidents in General

The NRC AIT concluded that this transient was minor since several barriers remained intact to mitigate the effects of a potential intersystem loss of coolant. The Team also concluded that the event did not constitute an accident precursor.

As described in the AIT report one similar occurrence involving the high pressure coolant injection system occurred at Pilgrim during 1983. This event was evaluated in 1983, and was revisited by the recent AIT to assess the applicability of past corrective actions to the recent problem.

Potential accident sequences and their relative probabilities have been the subject of extensive NRC and industry study. This large volume of information has been used to draw generic insights regarding accident probability. In addition, many licensees have initiated plant-specific probabilistic risk studies and utilized the results to improve individual plant designs and operating practices. Boston Edison has implemented a plant-specific study which considers existing industry experience and data, as well as the Pilgrim plant design and operating history. This analysis indicates that the probability of a significant accident occurring at Pilgrim is extremely low.

JUN 14 1989

4. Contamination of the RCIC Pump Room as a Result of the Steam Released to the Room During the Transient

During the transient water was discharged from the RCIC system into the surrounding area of the reactor building. Upon discharge some of the water flashed to steam. The source of the water is the main feedwater system, and as a result both the water and the steam would contain some radioactive contaminants. Release of the fluid resulted in contamination of the general area and a brief period during which airborne contamination was present. While this is not a desirable circumstance, the reactor building is designed to tolerate leaks such as this without any resultant release to the environment. Plant personnel are trained to deal with conditions that include potential airborne contamination, and are monitored to ensure that protective measures have prevented any significant inhalation of contamination.

5. Steam Noted by a Local Citizen Emminating from the Pilgrim Plant on May 10, 1989

The design of a boiling water reactor such as Pilgrim does not include provisions which would allow the release of nuclear steam to the environment during normal operations. During the time period in question the plant remained in cold shutdown, so no nuclear steam was being generated. There are two small oil fueled boilers used for heating buildings, and several diesel generators located onsite. It is possible that the individual you reference may have noted steam or exhaust emissions from one of these sources.

6. Security Planning for the Pilgrim Site

The NRC requires that each licensee maintain and implement a security plan. This includes a contingency plan designed to provide for security force response to potential threats. While restrictions governing the control of safeguards information prohibit any detailed discussions in this letter, these plans do include measures addressing external assault. The Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Part 73 outlines the regulatory requirements and performance standards used to evaluate the adequacy of licensee security plans.


Ms. Mary Dinan

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JUN 14 1989

Please review the attached AIT report, I believe it will answer many of your questions. Other reports, such as the referenced IATI report, are also readily available in the LPDR. If significant questions remain after reviewing this document, please contact me via telephone at (215) 337-5146. I hope this has been responsive to your request.

Sincerely,



A. Randy Blough, Chief
Reactor Projects Section No. 3B
Division of Reactor Projects

Attachment:

As stated

cc w/o Attachment (but w/Incoming Letter):

Public Document Room (PDR)

Local Public Document Room (LPDR)

~~Chairman, Board of Selectmen, Duxbury~~

Chairman, Board of Selectmen, Plymouth

Chairman, Board of Selectmen, Carver

Chairman, Board of Selectmen, Marshfield

Chairman, Board of Selectmen, Kingston

Chairman, Board of Selectmen, Bridgewater

Mayor, City of Taunton

R. Bird, Senior Vice President - Nuclear, Boston Edison Company

P. Agnes, Assistant Secretary of Public Safety, Commonwealth of Massachusetts