NRC FO	AM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
	LICENSEE EVENT REPORT
•	CONTROL BLOCK:
01	I I D R S 2 0 0 - 0 0 - 0 0 3 4 1
	REPORT L 6 0 5 0 0 2 3 7 0 6 0 1 8 1 8 0 6 0 4 8 1 9 SOURCE 60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 98 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80
0 2	During normal operations, with DTS 300-2 in progress, CRD E-8 exceeded Tech. Spec.
03	3.3.C.2 limit of 7 seconds. The rod was inserted to 00 and taken out of service.
04	The safety significance was minimal since the rod responded to normal and scram signals.
05	There was no effect on public health or safety. This is the first occurrence of this
06	type at Dresden.
07	L
08	9 SYSTEM CAUSE CAUSE 80
	$\begin{array}{c} code \\ \hline code \\ \hline R \\ \hline 3 \\ \hline 10 \\ \hline 11 \\ \hline 11 \\ \hline 11 \\ \hline 12 \\ \hline 20 \\ \hline $
	Image: Second
	ACTION FUTURE EFFECT SHUTDOWN TAKEN ACTION ON PLANT METHOD HOURS (22) SUBMITTED FORM SUB, SUPPLIER MANUFACTURER
	CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)
[1 [0]	The cause of this event was a sticking 502-0505-115 stram solehold valve. The valve
	was rebuilt and satisfactorily tested. The CRD was returned to service and tested, all
12	times were well within Tech. Spec. limits. Scram testing per DTS 300-2 will continue to
13	be performed every 16 weeks during operation.
14	L
, , 	ACILITY N POWER OTHER STATUS 30 METHOD OF DISCOVERY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION 32
7 8	INVITY CONTENT 12 13 44 46 46 80
16	LEASED OF RELEASE AMCUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)
17	PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION 39 0 0 0 37 2 38 N/A
7 8	9 PERSONNEL INJURIES 13 80
1 3	N/A N/A
[1]	TYPE DESCRIPTION N/A
7 8	PUBLICITY (15) BO
20	
81	06170208 P. Holland 942-2920 Ext. 462

## ATTACHMENT TO LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 81-032/01T-0 COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY (CWE) DRESDEN UNIT 2 (ILDRS 2) DOCKET 050-237

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During normal operations, with DTS 300-2 Control Rod Drive Scram Testing in progress, CRD E-8 exceeded Tech. Spec. 3.3.c.2 limit of 7 seconds. The rod was inserted to position "00" and electrically disarmed. The safety significance was minimal since the rod responded to normal and scram signals. There was no effect on public health or safety. This is the first occurrence of this type at Dresden.

The cause of the event was a sticking scram pilot solenoid valve, S02-0305-118. This prevented full opening of the scram valves and increased the time required for full insertion. The valvo was rebuilt with no specific deficiences noted and subsequently tested satisfactorily. CRD F-8 was placed back in service and scram tested, all times were well within Tech. Sec. limits. Scram Testing per DTS 300-2 will continue to be performed every 16 weeks during operation.