

RESPONSE SHEET

TO: Annette Vietti-Cook, Secretary
FROM: CHAIRMAN SVINICKI
SUBJECT: COMSECY-18-0016: Request Commission Approval to Use the Direct Final Rule Process to Revise the Testing and Reporting Requirements in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix H, Reactor Vessel Material Surveillance Program Requirements (RIN 3150-AK07)

Approved XX Disapproved _____ Abstain _____ Not Participating _____

COMMENTS: Below XX Attached XX None _____

I approve the staff's request to use the direct final rule process to revise the testing and reporting requirements in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix H, and to publish the *Federal Register* notice in Enclosure 2, subject to the attached edits. I further approve the staff's request to close several tickets related to the previous rulemaking effort and open a new ticket for the direct final rule. I approve the proposed regulatory basis, subject to minor corrections, clarifications, and modifications, as noted in the attached version.



SIGNATURE

1 / 2 / 2019

DATE

Entered on "STARS" Yes No _____

KLS Edits

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

10 CFR Part 50

[NRC-2017-0151]

RIN 3150-AK07

Reactor Vessel Material Surveillance Program

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Regulatory basis; availability.

SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is publishing a regulatory basis to support a rulemaking that would amend the NRC's regulations for the light-water power reactor vessel material surveillance programs. The rulemaking would reduce the regulatory burden associated with the testing specimens contained within surveillance capsules, and reporting the surveillance test results. The NRC has completed a regulatory basis that demonstrates there is sufficient justification to proceed with rulemaking. The NRC is providing the basis for rulemaking for public information, but is not seeking public comment on the regulatory basis at this time.

DATES: The regulatory basis is available **[INSERT DATE OF PUBLICATION IN THE FEDERAL REGISTER]**.

ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID **NRC-2017-0151** when contacting the NRC about the availability of information for this action. You may obtain publicly-available information related to

this action by any of the following methods:

- **Federal Rulemaking Web Site:** Go to <http://www.regulations.gov> and search for Docket ID **NRC-2015-0070**. Address questions about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher; telephone: 301-415-3463; e-mail: Carol.Gallagher@nrc.gov. For technical questions, contact the individual listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of this document.

- **NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS):** You may obtain publicly-available documents online in the ADAMS Public Documents collection at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html>. To begin the search, select "[ADAMS Public Documents](#)" and then select "[Begin Web-based ADAMS Search](#)." For problems with ADAMS, please contact the NRC's Public Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or by e-mail to pdr.resource@nrc.gov. The regulatory basis can be accessed in ADAMS at accession number ML18057A005.

- **NRC's PDR:** You may examine and purchase copies of public documents at the NRC's PDR, Room O1-F21, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Stewart Schneider, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; telephone: 301-415-4123, e-mail: Stewart.Schneider@nrc.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Background

Appendix H, "Reactor Vessel Material Surveillance Program Requirements" (Appendix H), to part 50 of title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* (10 CFR), "Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities," requires light-water nuclear power reactor

licensees to have a reactor vessel (RV) material surveillance program to monitor changes in the fracture toughness properties of the RV materials adjacent to the reactor core. Unless it can be shown that the end of design life neutron fluence is below certain criteria, the NRC requires licensees to implement an RV materials surveillance program that tests irradiated material specimens that are located in test capsules in the RVs. The program evaluates changes in material fracture toughness and thereby assesses the integrity of the RV. For each capsule withdrawal, the test procedures and reporting requirements must meet the requirements of American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) E 185-82, "Standard Recommended Practice for Conducting Surveillance Tests for Light-Water Cooled Reactor Vessels," to the extent practicable for the configuration of the specimens in the capsule. The design of the surveillance program and the withdrawal schedule must meet the requirements of the edition of ASTM E 185 that is current on the issue date of the ASME Code to which the reactor vessel was purchased. Later editions of ASTM E 185, up to and including those editions through 1982, may be used. In sum, the surveillance program must comply with ASTM E 185, as modified by appendix H to 10 CFR part 50. The number, design, and location of these surveillance capsules within the RV are established during the design of the program, before initial plant operation.

Appendix H to 10 CFR part 50 also specifies that each capsule withdrawal and the test results must be the subject of a summary technical report to be submitted within one year of the date of capsule withdrawal, unless an extension is granted by the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. The NRC uses the results from the surveillance program to assess licensee submittals related to pressure-temperature limits in accordance with appendix G, "Fracture Toughness Requirements," to 10 CFR part 50, ~~"Fracture Toughness Requirements,"~~ and to assess pressurized water reactor licensee's compliance with § 50.61, "Fracture toughness requirements for protection against pressurized thermal shock events," or § 50.61a,

“Alternate fracture toughness requirements for protection against pressurized thermal shock events.”

In 2001, the NRC began a rulemaking to revise appendix G to 10 CFR part 50 (RIN 3150-AG98; NRC-2008-0582) to eliminate the pressure-temperature limits related to the metal temperature of the RV closure head flange and vessel flange areas. The NRC expanded the rulemaking scope in 2008 to include revisions to appendix H to 10 CFR part 50, because the fracture toughness analysis required by appendix G to 10 CFR part 50 relies on data obtained from the RV material surveillance program established under appendix H to 10 CFR part 50.

In COMSECY-14-0027, “Rulemaking to Revise Title 10, *Code of Federal Regulations*, Part 50, Appendix H, ‘Reactor Vessel Material Surveillance Program Requirements,’” issued on June 25, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14077A472 (not publicly available)), the NRC staff requested Commission approval to separate the rulemaking activities to revise appendices G and H to 10 CFR part 50, and to proceed immediately with rulemaking for appendix H to 10 CFR part 50.

In staff requirements memorandum (SRM) to COMSECY-14-0027, dated August 8, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14220A184 (not publicly available)), the Commission approved the staff’s recommendation to proceed with a separate rulemaking for appendix H to 10 CFR part 50. The SRM to COMSECY-14-0027 directed the NRC staff to begin the appendix H to 10 CFR part 50 rulemaking independent of the completion date or conclusions of the appendix G to 10 CFR part 50 technical basis development activities.

II. Discussion

The NRC has prepared a regulatory basis to support a rulemaking that would amend the NRC’s testing and reporting requirements in appendix H to 10 CFR part 50. In the regulatory

basis, the NRC concluded that it has sufficient justification to proceed with rulemaking to amend appendix H to 10 CFR part 50.

Testing Requirements. Appendix H to 10 CFR part 50 requires RV surveillance programs to include Charpy impact specimens from welds, base metal, and the weld heat-affected zone materials and tensile specimens from welds and base metal materials. The NRC is proposing to conduct a rulemaking to reduce the testing of some specimens and eliminate the testing of other specimens that do not provide meaningful information to assess RV integrity. This decision is based on substantial material data, knowledge, and experience attained through the many years of RV surveillance program implementation. Specifically, the requirements to test weld heat-affected zone specimens and examine thermal monitors would be eliminated. Also, the NRC is proposing to reduce the number of tensile specimens that require testing and specify that testing correlation monitor material is optional. The proposed changes would reduce the burden to licensees for specimen testing, without having an adverse effect on public health and safety and the environment.

Reporting Requirements. Appendix H to 10 CFR part 50 requires licensees to submit test results to the NRC no later than one year after capsule withdrawal. As stated in the 1983 rulemaking (48 FR 24008; May 27, 1983), the primary purposes of the requirement are timely reporting of test results and notification of any problems. At the time of the 1983 rulemaking, there was a limited amount of data from irradiated materials from which to estimate embrittlement trends of RVs at nuclear power plants; thus, making it crucial for the timely reporting of test results. An extensive amount of embrittlement data now exists, and embrittlement mechanisms are well-understood. The one-year reporting requirement has become a hardship for some licensees because of the implementation of integrated surveillance programs (which require significant coordination among multiple licensees and hot-cell laboratories) and because capsules with higher neutron fluence levels may need longer periods

of radioactive decay before capsule shipping and testing can be performed. As a result, licensees have been requesting an additional 6 months to submit reports. To reduce the burden on licensees to prepare these extension requests and for the NRC to review and approve these requests, the NRC is proposing rulemaking to increase the reporting period from one year to 18 months. This change would not have an adverse effect on public health and safety and the environment.

Rulemaking Process. The NRC has evaluated the planned amendments to appendix H to 10 CFR part 50 and has determined that, if implemented, there would not be an adverse effect on public health and safety and the environment. In addition, the NRC has analyzed the costs to conduct this rulemaking and has determined that the most efficient approach is to use the direct final rule process. This abbreviated process would minimize the use of agency resources and potentially allow the revised requirements to become effective sooner, thus providing licensees the benefits of the rule change soon. Although the NRC does not anticipate receiving public comments that are significant and adverse, the NRC's rulemaking process for this action will provide the public an opportunity to comment on the direct final rule. Read more about the direct final rule process on the NRC's public Web site, at <https://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/rulemaking/rulemaking-process/direct-final-rule.html>.

III. Publicly-Available Documents

As the NRC continues its ongoing rulemaking effort to revise the requirements for a reactor vessel materials surveillance program, the NRC is making documents publicly available on the Federal rulemaking Web site, www.regulations.gov, under Docket ID NRC-2017-0151. The current status of this rulemaking effort, as well as other NRC planned rulemaking activities, can be found on the NRC public Web site at <https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/rulemaking-ruleforum/active/RuleIndex.html>.

The NRC may post additional materials relevant to this rulemaking at www.regulations.gov, under Docket ID NRC-2017-0151. Please take the following actions if you wish to receive alerts when changes or additions occur in a docket folder: (1) navigate to the docket folder (NRC-2017-0151); (2) click the "Email Alert" link; and (3) enter your email address and select how frequently you would like to receive emails (daily, weekly, or monthly).

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this day of , 2018.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Annette Vietti-Cook
Secretary for the Commission.

[KLS Edits](#)

Rulemaking for Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50— Reactor Vessel Material Surveillance Program Requirements—Regulatory Basis

RIN Number: 3150-AK07
NRC Docket ID: NRC-2017-0151

[ENTER DATE HERE]



Thus, the Charpy impact specimen¹ became the standard to assess the change in fracture toughness in ferritic steels.

The fracture toughness of RV materials decreases with decreasing temperature and decreases with increasing irradiation from the reactor. The decrease in fracture toughness due to neutron irradiation is referred to as "neutron embrittlement." The fracture toughness of RV materials is determined by using fracture toughness curves in the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code, which are indexed to the reference temperature for nil-ductility transition (RT_{NDT}), as specified in ASME Code Section II. To account for the effects of neutron irradiation, the increase in RT_{NDT} is equated to the increase in the 30 ft-lb index temperature from tests of Charpy-V notch impact specimens irradiated in capsules as a part of the surveillance program. The surveillance program includes Charpy impact specimens of the base and weld metals for the RV in each surveillance capsule. These surveillance capsules are exposed to the same operating conditions as the RV, and because the capsules are located closer to the reactor core than the RV inner diameter, the surveillance specimens are generally exposed to higher neutron irradiation levels than those experienced by the RV at any given time.

As a result, the test specimens generally reflect changes in fracture toughness due to neutron embrittlement in advance of what the RV experiences and provide insight to the future condition of the RV. Therefore, the NRC instituted RV material surveillance programs as a requirement of Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50, so that the placement and testing of Charpy impact specimens in capsules between the inner diameter vessel wall and the core can provide data for assessing and projecting the change in fracture toughness of the RV.

For those RVs that require a material surveillance program,² its purpose is to monitor changes in the fracture toughness properties of materials in the beltline region³ of the RV and to use this information to analyze the RV integrity. Surveillance programs are designed not only to examine the current status of RV material properties but also to predict the changes in these properties resulting from the cumulative effects of irradiation.

The determination as to whether a commercial nuclear power RV requires a material surveillance program under Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50 was made at the time of plant licensing. If this program was required, the surveillance program was designed and

Commented [A1]: Revise to cover New Reactors.

¹ A bar of metal, or other material, having a V-groove notch machined across the 10mm thickness dimension.

² Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50 requires a material surveillance program for reactor vessels in which the peak neutron fluence at the end of the design life will exceed 1×10^{17} neutrons/centimeter-squared (n/cm^2) with energy greater than one million electron volts ($E > 1$ MeV). The test data obtained from this material surveillance program is used to demonstrate compliance with Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50, for the reactor vessel beltline materials.

³ Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50 defines the beltline region as the region of the reactor vessel (shell material including welds, heat-affected zones (HAZs), and plates or forgings) that directly surround the effective height of the active core and adjacent regions of the reactor vessel that are predicted to experience sufficient neutron radiation damage to be considered in the selection of the most limiting material with regard to radiation damage. This definition in Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50 is applicable to all RV vessel ferritic materials with projected neutron fluence values greater than 1×10^{17} n/cm^2 ($E > 1$ MeV), and this fluence threshold remains applicable for the design life as well as throughout the licensed operating period.

implemented at that time using the existing requirements. Certain aspects of the program, such as the specific materials to be monitored, the number of required surveillance capsules to be inserted in the RV, and the initial capsule withdrawal schedule were designed for the original licensed period of operation (i.e., 40-years). Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50 required three, four, or five surveillance capsules to be included in the design of reactor material surveillance programs for the original licensed period of operation, based on the irradiation sensitivity of the material used to fabricate the RV. Most plants have included several additional surveillance capsules beyond the number required by Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50. These capsules which are referred to as standby capsules. The surveillance program for each RV provides assurance that the plant's operating limits (e.g., the pressure-temperature limits) continue to meet the provisions in Appendix G of Section XI of the ASME Code, as required by Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50. The program also provides assurance that the RV material upper shelf energy meets the requirements of Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50. These assessments are used to ensure the integrity of the RV.

Commented [A2]: Verify that this is accurate. The number of capsules is in the same table in ASTM E185-82 that the staff is characterizing as providing only a recommended withdrawal schedule; why does the staff not consider the minimum number of capsules from that table a recommendation rather than a requirement?

To assess the integrity of each RV, the material properties of the RV materials must be determined. The properties of these materials in the unirradiated condition are assessed by using the ASME Section III provisions, and changes in the properties due to irradiation are monitored using the surveillance program. As a result, the unirradiated material properties of the RV materials are necessary to measure the irradiation shift of the tested surveillance materials. This measurement is important, because it provides an indication of the embrittlement in the RV itself and generally provides the ability to assess future projections of RV integrity, because the surveillance capsules and test specimens typically experience a higher neutron fluence level than the RV.

The changes in material properties due to irradiation are a function of the initial chemistry of the RV base metal, weld wire, and weld flux that were used in the fabrication of the RV, particularly the copper and nickel contents of the material, as well as the effect of neutron exposure on these same materials. These properties become the input data that are used in the assessment of the RV's structural integrity to meet the requirements of Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50; 10 CFR 50.61, "Fracture Toughness Requirements for Protection Against Pressurized Thermal Shock Events"; and 10 CFR 50.61a, "Alternate Fracture Toughness Requirements for Protection Against Pressurized Thermal Shock Events." Under Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50, limits⁴ are placed on the operation of nuclear power plants to ensure that brittle failure of the RV does not occur. The surveillance capsules, which contain these Charpy impact specimens, are periodically withdrawn and tested during the licensed period of operation of a reactor and evaluated to determine the effect of radiation on the RV steel. Based on these test results, adjustments to the technical specifications—either in the pressure-temperature operating limits for the plant or in the operating procedures required to meet the limits—are made as necessary.

In addition to the Charpy impact specimens Beyond for determining the embrittlement in the RV using Charpy impact specimens, the surveillance capsules typically contain neutron dosimeters, thermal monitors, and tension specimens.⁵ Surveillance capsules may also contain correlation monitor material (CMM), which is a material with composition, properties, and response to

⁴ The Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50 limits include the Charpy upper shelf energy requirement, the pressure-temperature limits, and the minimum temperature requirement.

⁵ Tension specimens have a standardized sample cross-section, with two shoulders and a gage (section) in between.

radiation that have been well-characterized. The overall accuracy of neutron fluence measurements is dependent upon knowledge of the neutron spectrum. Therefore, a variety of neutron detector materials (dosimetry wires) are included in each surveillance capsule and used in the determination of neutron fluence for the vessel. The thermal monitors that are placed in the capsules (e.g., low melting point elements or eutectic alloys) are used to identify the irradiated specimen temperature.

Reactor material surveillance programs and capsule withdrawal schedules were initially designed based on the original 40-year operating license. However, as a means to comply with 10 CFR Part 54, "Requirements for Renewal of Operating Licenses for Nuclear Power Plants," and demonstrate that neutron embrittlement of the RV will be adequately managed during extended operation, licensees have maintained their surveillance programs required by Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50 as supplemented by additional guidance. The NRC documented this guidance in the original NUREG-1801, "Generic Aging Lessons Learned (GALL) Report," issued 2001 (NRC, 2001); NUREG-1801, Revision 1, issued 2005 (NRC, 2005); and Revision 2, issued 2010 (NRC, 2010)," for plants operating for 60 years; and in NUREG-2191, "Generic Aging Lessons Learned for Subsequent License Renewal (GALL-SLR) Report," issued 2017 (NRC, 2017d), for plants operating for 80 years. Therefore, the RV material surveillance programs are ongoing programs that extend beyond the original license of a nuclear power plant (i.e., license renewal to operate for 60 years and for subsequent license renewal (SLR) to operate for 80 years). The objective of the surveillance program during the license renewal and SLR periods is to continue monitoring changes in fracture toughness properties of the RV materials through the operating life of the plant to ensure the integrity of the RV. As such, there are no aspects of the surveillance program that are uniquely affected by license renewal or SLR.

Since the withdrawal schedule of surveillance capsules was based on plants operating during the original 40-year license term, it may be necessary for standby capsules or capsules containing reconstituted specimens (i.e., specimens of previously tested capsules) to be incorporated into the RV material surveillance program to provide monitoring during plant operation beyond the original 40-year license term. As an additional alternative, NUREG-1801 (original and Revisions 1 and 2) and NUREG-2191 indicated that applicants may join an integrated surveillance program (ISP), which is further discussed in Section 1.2.2. of this document. Because of the maturity of RV material surveillance programs in the existing operating fleet, the vast majority of the surveillance capsules that were inserted into the RV for the original licensed period of operation have already been withdrawn and tested. In addition, a portion of the existing operating fleet has also withdrawn and tested surveillance capsules that account for the license renewal period efrom 40 to 60 years of plant operation.

1.2.2 Types of Reactor Vessel Material Surveillance Programs

Plant-Specific Programs

In plant-specific programs, the surveillance capsules located within the RV of a plant contain specimens taken from materials used in fabricating the beltline of the RV that are located within the RV of that plant. These capsules are then periodically withdrawn according to an NRC-approved withdrawal schedules and the specimens are tested to monitor the reduction in fracture toughness caused by neutron irradiation that has occurred during the operation of that specific plantRV. Under Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50, the testing procedures and reporting requirements must meet the American Society for Testing and Materials International (ASTM) E 185-82, "Standard Practice for Conducting Surveillance Tests for Light-Water Cooled

Nuclear Power Reactor Vessels," to the extent practicable for the configuration of the specimens in the capsule. The design of the surveillance program and the withdrawal schedule must meet the requirements of the ASTM E 185 that is current on the issue date of the ASME Code to which the RV was purchased. Later editions of ASTM E 185, up to and including those editions through 1982, may be used. In sum, the surveillance program must comply with ASTM E 185, as modified by Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50.

Integrated Surveillance Programs (ISP)

As an alternative to a plant-specific program, Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50 permits the use of an ISP that requires review and approval by the NRC before implementation. In an ISP, the representative materials chosen for surveillance for a reactor are irradiated in one or more other reactors that have similar design and operating features. The data obtained from these test specimens may then be used in the analysis of other plants participating in this program. Under Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50, the testing procedures and reporting requirements must meet ASTM E 185-82, to the extent practicable for the configuration of the specimens in the capsule.

Currently, the NRC has approved the following ISPs for use in the United States:

- Boiling Water Reactor Vessels and Internals Program (BWRVIP) Integrated Surveillance Program
- Master Integrated Reactor Vessel Surveillance Program (MIRVSP)

BWRVIP ISP

Before the implementation of the BWRVIP ISP, many of the boiling-water reactor (BWR) plants did not have surveillance material that represented the limiting plate or weld material of the subject RV. Given these limitations, the Supplemental Surveillance Program was introduced in the late 1980s to obtain additional BWR surveillance data on well-characterized BWR vessel materials. This program successfully filled in gaps in the existing plant-specific surveillance programs to match the BWR fleet limiting beltline materials. The BWRVIP utilities concluded that an ISP would provide significant benefits over the current individual surveillance programs. The BWRVIP utilities identified two primary benefits of the ISP: (1) the quality of BWR surveillance data would be improved, and (2) the overall costs to the BWR fleet would be reduced. In 1998, the BWRVIP developed an ISP that combined all the separate U.S. BWR plant-specific surveillance programs into a single integrated program, using host reactor capsules containing select representative materials and added data from the ongoing Supplemental Surveillance Program. The ISP resulted in a better representation of the limiting beltline materials for each plant, while reducing the number of capsules to be tested.

The NRC approved the implementation of the BWRVIP ISP by letter dated February 1, 2002, for the original license of applicablethe plants in BWRVIP-86-A, by letter dated February 1, 2002 (BWRVIP, 2002; includes the NRC approval letter), and for the period of extended operation (i.e., license renewal) by letter dated February 24, 2006, in BWRVIP-116-A, by letter dated February 24, 2006 (BWRVIP, 2006—proprietary).

MIRVSP

In 1976, the capsule holders in a number of Babcock & Wilcox (B&W) 177-Fuel Assembly (FA) plants were found to be damaged, and subsequent inspections revealed that all of the capsule

Commented [A3]: How will this work for a new power reactor purchasing an RV after the effective date of ASTM E185-16? That is the edition of E185 that is current now, but it is not incorporated by reference in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix H. It is not eliminated by the clause regarding "later editions of ASTM E 185 may be used, but including only those editions through 1982" because it isn't a "later edition" for a new reactor, it's the current version.

Based upon the Vogtle 3 & 4 UFSAR and FSER, it appears that their surveillance programs are based upon ASTM E185-82, though there seem to be more than the 5 capsules recommended in ASTM E185-82, Table 1.

holders were damaged to some extent from cracking caused by flow-induced vibration. Furthermore, all of the early vintage B&W designed RVs were fabricated using the submerged arc welding process and welding consumables that resulted in welds that were sensitive to fast neutron exposures (i.e., the Linde 80 class of materials).

The MIRVSP was developed in 1977 for the B&W 177-FA plants as the result of the two conditions described above to augment the existing plant-specific RV material surveillance programs and share information among plants. Following its development, the program was modified in 1988 to include Westinghouse Nuclear Steam Supply System plants with RVs manufactured by B&W, because they have essentially identical welds (i.e., the Linde 80 class of materials) as the B&W 177-FA plants. The MIRVSP is involved in continuing the plant-specific surveillance programs to monitor the long-term effects of neutron irradiation on the RV materials and uses specially designed higher fluence and supplementary weld metal surveillance capsules to study the effects of irradiation on specially selected weld metals.

The NRC approved the implementation of the MIRVSP by letter dated June 11, 1991, which isas detailed in BAW-1543, Revision 3, by letter dated June 11, 1991. BAW-1543, Revision 4 (MIRVSP, 1993), was essentially the same as Revision 3, with the exception of an update to some of the units' withdrawal schedules. Seven supplements have been issued since BAW-1543, Revision 4; in general, the supplements included updates to fluence values and to the surveillance capsule insertion and withdrawal schedules, deleted certain plants from the program, and incorporated the disposal plan for stored surveillance capsules.

1.2.3 Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50 Rulemaking Effort

In 2001, the NRC began a rulemaking to revise Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50 (RIN 3150-AG98; NRC Docket ID: NRC-2008-0582) to eliminate the pressure-temperature limits related to the metal temperature of the RV closure head flange and vessel flange areas. The NRC expanded the rulemaking scope in 2008 to include revisions to Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50, because the fracture toughness analysis required by Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50 relies on data obtained from the RV material surveillance program established under Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50.

In COMSECY-14-0027, "Rulemaking to Revise Title 10, *Code of Federal Regulations*, Part 50, Appendix H, 'Reactor Vessel Material Surveillance Program Requirements,'" issued on June 25, 2014 (NRC, 2014a, not publicly available), the NRC staff requested Commission approval to separate the rulemaking activities to revise both Appendices G and H to 10 CFR Part 50, and to proceed separately with rulemaking for Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50.

The Commission in its staff requirements memorandum (SRM) to COMSECY-14-0027, dated August 8, 2014 (NRC, 2014b, not publicly available), approved the staff's recommendation to proceed with a separate rulemaking for Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50. The SRM to COMSECY-14-0027 directed the staff to begin the Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50 rulemaking independent of the completion date or conclusions of the Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50 technical basis development activities. Subsequently, the Commission directed the staff in SRM-SECY-16-0009, "Recommendations Resulting from the Integrated Prioritization and Re-Baselining of Agency Activities," dated April 13, 2016 (NRC, 2016), to stop all work on the development of the technical basis for a potential change to Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50.

2.0 Existing Regulatory Framework

2.1 Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50

2.1.1 Current Requirements under Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50

Light-water RVs are fabricated from low-alloy steel, which can become less ductile, and thereby more susceptible to unstable fracture because of the cumulative effects of neutron irradiation. Under Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50, an RV material surveillance program is required for RVs for which the peak neutron fluence at the end of the design life of the vessel will exceed 10^{17} n/cm² ($E > 1.0$ MeV). The purpose of the material surveillance program required by Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50 is to monitor changes in the fracture toughness properties of ferritic materials in the RV beltline region of light-water nuclear power reactors that result from exposure of these materials to neutron irradiation and the thermal environment. Under this material surveillance program, fracture toughness test data are obtained from irradiated material specimens exposed in surveillance capsules, which are withdrawn periodically from the RV.

The activities addressed as part of designing an RV material surveillance program include selecting materials to be monitored by the surveillance program, selecting appropriate test specimen types and numbers of specimens, establishing the number of capsules and their placement in the RV; and developing the surveillance capsule withdrawal schedule. The activities addressed as part of the conduct of an RV material surveillance program include maintaining a surveillance capsule withdrawal schedule, periodically withdrawing capsules, performing tests on the specimens contained in the capsules, and reporting the test results.

The design of this material surveillance program and the withdrawal schedule must meet the requirements of the edition of ASTM E 185 that is current on the issue date of the ASME Code when the RV was purchased. Later editions of ASTM E 185, up to and including those editions through 1982 (ASTM E 185-82), may be used. Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50 specifically incorporates by reference ASTM E 185-73, "Standard Recommended Practice for Surveillance Tests for Nuclear Reactor Vessels"; ASTM E 185-79, "Standard Practice for Conducting Surveillance Tests for Light-Water Cooled Nuclear Power Reactor Vessels"; and ASTM E 185-82, "Standard Practice for Conducting Surveillance Tests for Light-Water Cooled Nuclear Power Reactor Vessels." In sum, the surveillance program must comply with ASTM E 185, as modified by Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50. The proposed withdrawal schedule, including any changes to the withdrawal schedule, must be submitted to and approved by the NRC, before implementation.

Commented [A4]: This does accurately reflect the current wording of Appendix H, but doesn't address any limitation to ASTM E185-82 for the current ASME code when the RV was purchased.

Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50 requires that surveillance specimen capsules be located near the inside RV wall in the beltline region so that the specimen irradiation history duplicates, to the extent practicable, the neutron spectrum, temperature history, and maximum neutron fluence experienced by the RV inner surface. Furthermore, the design and location of the surveillance capsule holders must permit insertion of replacement capsules.

For each capsule withdrawal, the test procedures and reporting requirements must meet the requirements of ASTM E 185-82, to the extent practicable for the configuration of the specimens in the capsule. This is to ensure that the changes in mechanical properties of the ferritic RV materials can be evaluated and to provide experimental data to benchmark against dosimetry calculations.

As an alternative to a plant-specific material surveillance program, Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50 permits the development of an ISP, which requires approval by the NRC, on a case-by-case basis. An ISP involves representative materials chosen for surveillance for a reactor being irradiated in one or more other reactors that have similar design and operating features. Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50 requires that an ISP incorporate the following criteria:

- The reactor in which the materials will be irradiated and the reactor for which the materials are being irradiated must have sufficiently similar design and operating features to permit accurate comparisons of the predicted amount of radiation damage.
- Each reactor must have an adequate dosimetry program.
- There must be adequate arrangements for data sharing among plants.
- There must be a contingency plan to ensure that the surveillance program for each reactor will not be jeopardized by operating at a reduced power level or by an extended outage of another reactor from which data are expected.
- There must be substantial advantages to be gained, such as reduced power outages or reduced personnel exposure to radiation, as a direct result of not requiring surveillance capsules in all reactors in the set.

For an ISP, Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50 does not permit a reduction in the requirements for the number of materials to be irradiated, the specimen types, or the number of specimens per reactor, nor is a reduction in the amount of testing permitted unless previously authorized by the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, or the Director, Office of New Reactors, as appropriate.

Following each withdrawal and testing of a surveillance capsule, the test results must be the subject of a technical report, which must include the data required by ASTM E 185 and the results of all fracture toughness tests conducted on the beltline materials in the irradiated and unirradiated conditions. The report must be submitted to the NRC within one year of the date of capsule withdrawal, unless an extension is granted by the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor.

2.1.2 Current Regulatory Guidance for Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50

Initial 40-Year-Operating-License-Period of Operation

Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50 requires that RVs have their beltline materials monitored by a surveillance program complying with ASTM E 185. Specifically, the design of the surveillance program and the withdrawal schedule must meet the requirements of the edition of the ASTM E 185 that is current on the issue date of the ASME Code to which the RV was purchased. Later editions of ASTM E 185, up to and including those editions through 1982, may be used. In sum, the surveillance program must comply with ASTM E 185, as modified by Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50. Furthermore, the test procedures and reporting requirements must meet the requirements of ASTM E 185-82 to the extent practicable for the configuration of the specimens in the capsule for each capsule withdrawal.

ASTM E 185 contains the necessary procedures and guidelines for the design of a surveillance program. Specifically, this includes the selection of RV materials to be monitored and the

contents within the surveillance capsule, the means to encapsulate these contents and the location of the surveillance capsules within the RV. ASTM E 185 also contains the necessary procedures and guidelines for measuring and testing the contents of the surveillance capsule, and for reporting the results to the NRC; specifically, measuring the mechanical properties and radiation exposure conditions, and determining the irradiation effects. Under Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50 and ASTM E 185, the surveillance program and the withdrawal schedule were originally established and designed for the initial 40-year operating license of a nuclear power plant (see Section 7.6.2 of ASTM E 185-79 and ASTM E 185-82).

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Renewal of Operating License—License Renewal and Subsequent License Renewal

To renew its operating license or combined license for plant operation beyond 40-years, a licensees must comply with the regulations in 10 CFR Part 54 and demonstrate that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended function of systems, structures and components within the scope of 10 CFR Part 54 will be maintained consistent with the current licensing basis. Thus, licensees have continued to use their surveillance programs required by Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50 as supplemented by additional guidance, to demonstrate that embrittlement on the RV will be adequately managed during extended operation.

Therefore, RV material surveillance programs are an ongoing programs that extends beyond the original license of a nuclear power plant (i.e., during license renewal to operate for 60 years and potentially for during SLR to operate for 80 years). The objective of the surveillance program during extended plant operations remains the same as it was during the initial 40-year operating license, which is to continue monitoring changes in fracture toughness of the RV materials to ensure the integrity of the RV. As such, there are no aspects of the surveillance program that are uniquely affected by license renewal and SLR.

Because the withdrawal schedule of surveillance capsules was initially based on plant operation during the original 40-year license term, it may be necessary for standby capsules or capsules containing reconstituted specimens (i.e., specimens from previously tested capsules) to be incorporated into the RV material surveillance program to provide monitoring during plant operation beyond the original 40-year license term. As an additional alternative, applicants may join an ISP. NUREG-1801, Revision 2 (NRC, 2010), contains guidance for licensees seeking plant operation for 60 years, while guidance for licensees seeking plant operation for 80 years is in NUREG-2191 (NRC, 2017d).

2.1.3 History of Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50

As published in the *Federal Register* on July 3, 1971 (36 FR 12697), the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) issued for public comment a proposed rulemaking to add to 10 CFR Part 50 a new Appendix G, "Fracture Toughness Requirements," and new Appendix H, "Reactor Vessel Material Surveillance Program Requirements." The AEC stated that the purpose of the proposed amendments was to specify minimum fracture toughness requirements for ferritic materials of pressure-retaining components of the reactor coolant pressure boundary for boiling and pressurized-water power reactors and to require surveillance of the fracture toughness specimens of the RV material by periodic tests. ~~These amendments to 10 CFR Part 50 only applied to boiling and pressurized-water power reactors.~~

The AEC indicated that the proposed amendments to add Appendices G and H to 10 CFR Part 50 would specify minimum fracture toughness requirements needed to ensure that

Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50 has undergone several revisions following the issuance of the 1973 final rule. The significance of these amendments has varied from strictly administrative changes to the revision of surveillance program requirements. Further details about the substantive changes are described below.

As published in the *Federal Register* on September 26, 1979 (44 FR 55328), the Commission amended Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50 to permit greater flexibility in meeting the surveillance program requirements and to simplify requirements by substituting references to national standards that had already been incorporated by reference into the NRC's regulations. The Commission revised Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50, paragraph II.C.2, to no longer prohibit attachment of surveillance capsules to the RV wall, because, for some vessel designs, the advantages of attachment to the wall (fewer problems in achieving the desired lead factor and the structural integrity of the capsule holder) outweighed the disadvantage of concern for RV integrity. Furthermore, the Commission added requirements to state that, if capsule holders are attached to the vessel wall, the attachments must meet ASME Code requirements for construction and inspection of permanent structural attachments to RVs. Additionally, the Commission revised Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50 to remove the fixed limits on lead factor (i.e., the ratio of neutron flux at the capsule to the maximum flux at the RV inner wall) of greater than one but less than three. The Commission explained that enforcement of the then-present requirement would require modification of certain designs that had satisfactorily met all surveillance and structural requirements in service. Furthermore, safety concerns were satisfied by retention of the general requirement on the lead factor.

As published in the *Federal Register* on May 27, 1983 (48 FR 24008), the Commission amended 10 CFR Part 50 to clarify the applicability of the requirements to all plants, modify certain requirements, and shorten and simplify these regulations by more extensively incorporating by reference appropriate national standards. Specifically, Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50 was revised to incorporate ASTM E 185-73, E 185-79, and E 185-82 by reference. The Commission also revised the proposed requirement that surveillance reports be submitted within 90 days after completion of testing to require submittal of these reports within one year of capsule withdrawal, unless an extension is granted by the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. This revision still accomplished the primary purposes of this requirement for timely reporting of test results and notification of any problems.

As published in the *Federal Register* on December 19, 1995 (60 FR 65475), the Commission amended Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50 to remove the provision for ISPs that permitted the reduction in the amount of testing if the initial results agreed with the predictions. The Commission described the other principal change as a clarification of the editions of ASTM E 185 that apply to the various portions of the material surveillance programs. The Commission explained that a surveillance program consists of two essential parts: (1) the design of the program and (2) the subsequent testing and reporting of results from the surveillance capsules. Once the NRC approves the design of a surveillance program, it cannot be changed without prior approval. However, the testing and reporting requirements are updated, along with technical improvements made to ASTM E 185. The Commission revised Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50 so that, for each capsule withdrawal, the test procedures and reporting requirements must meet the requirements of ASTM E 185-82 to the extent practicable for the configuration of the specimens in the capsule.

Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50 has had several other amendments; however, these changes were administrative in nature. Further details regarding these changes appear in 41 FR 6256,

41 FR 16445, 51 FR 4030~~36~~, 53 FR 43419, 57 FR 61785, 59 FR 50688, 68 FR 7539~~088~~, and 73 FR 57~~2309~~.

2.2 ASTM Standards for Reactor Vessel Material Surveillance Programs

Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50 incorporates by reference ASTM E 185-73, ASTM E 185-79, and ASTM E 185-82. These standards provide procedures for monitoring the radiation-induced changes in the mechanical properties of ferritic materials in the beltline of light-water cooled nuclear power RVs and include guidelines for designing a minimum surveillance program, selecting materials, and evaluating test results. The purpose of this surveillance program is to monitor changes in the properties of actual vessel materials caused by long-term exposure to the neutron radiation and temperature environment of the given RV.

The aspects of ASTM E 185 on designing an RV material surveillance program can be grouped into the following four categories:

- (1) test material
- (2) test specimens
- (3) irradiation conditions
- (4) capsules and withdrawal schedule

Since its incorporation into Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50, ASTM E 185 was revised in 2002 to divide the contents of the standard so that ASTM E 185 provided the details on RV material surveillance program design, while ASTM E 2215, "Standard Practice for Evaluation of Surveillance Capsules from Light-Water Moderated Nuclear Power Reactor Vessels," contained details on surveillance capsule testing and evaluation. The aspects for surveillance capsule testing and evaluation specified in ASTM E 185 and, ultimately, in ASTM E 2215, can be grouped into the following five categories:

- (1) characterization of the reactor environment
- (2) materials to test and specimen testing
- (3) test data evaluation
- (4) adjustment of the capsule withdrawal schedule
- (5) retention of tested specimens

2.2.1 Changes to the ASTM Standards

The operation of commercial light-water nuclear power plants since the 1970s provided empirical evidence of the effects of irradiation embrittlement on RV steels. This, combined with a better scientific understanding of irradiation embrittlement, prompted revisions and updates to the ASTM requirements for surveillance monitoring programs. The 2016 edition of ASTM E 185 and ASTM E 2215 are the most up-to-date versions for these standards.

During this rulemaking effort, the NRC staff assessed incorporating by reference the 2016 editions of ASTM E 185 and ASTM E 2215 into Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50. Section 4.2 includes this assessment.

2.2.2 Differences in ASTM Standards Related to Aspects Required by Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50

The NRC staff reviewed the 1973, 1979, and 1982 editions of ASTM E 185 to determine whether there were any differences in requirements that would affect the regulatory topics addressed during this rulemaking effort. These aspects are related to the inclusion and testing of heat-affected zone (HAZ) specimens, tension specimens, CMM, and thermal monitors in surveillance capsules.

Test Materials and Test Specimens

The 1973, 1979, and 1982 editions of ASTM E 185 consistently specify that the surveillance test materials shall be prepared from samples taken from the actual materials used in fabricating the bellline of the RV and that these surveillance test materials shall include the base metal, butt weld, and weld HAZ. Furthermore, these three editions of ASTM E 185 consistently require 12 Charpy impact specimens for base metal, weld metal, and weld HAZ, per capsule, in the irradiated condition; and 15 Charpy impact specimens for base metal, weld metal, and weld HAZ in the unirradiated condition.

The 1973 edition of ASTM E 185 only required tension specimens if the predicted increase in transition temperature of the RV steel is greater than 37.8 degrees Celsius (C) (100 degrees Fahrenheit (F)) or where the calculated peak neutron fluence ($E > 1$ MeV) of the RV is greater than 5×10^{18} n/cm². Specifically, ASTM E 185-73 required two tension specimens for base metal and weld metal, per capsule, in the irradiated condition and three tension specimens for base metal and weld metal in the unirradiated condition. On the other hand, ASTM E 185-79 and ASTM E 185-82 required three tension specimens for base metal and weld metal, per capsule, in the irradiated condition and three tension specimens for base metal and weld metal in the unirradiated condition, regardless of the predicted increase in transition temperature of the RV steel.

Because Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50 incorporates, by reference, the 1973, 1979, and 1982 editions of ASTM E 185, it is likely that there is a variation between the contents of surveillance capsules (i.e., presence of tension specimens and number of tension specimens) in the current operating fleet. This is because the test material requirements in the current operating fleet were established during the design of the plant's surveillance programs, which may have occurred before the issuance of the 1973 final rule that incorporated the 1973 edition of ASTM E 185 and its subsequent amendment in 1995 that incorporated the 1979 and 1982 versions of ASTM E 185.

As published in the *Federal Register* on December 19, 1995 (60 FR 65476~~5~~), the Commission revised Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50 such that, for each capsule withdrawal, the test procedures and reporting requirements must meet the requirements of ASTM E 185-82 to the extent practicable for the configuration of the specimens in the capsule. Thus, any variations in requirements and recommendations for testing specimens in the 1973, 1979, and 1982 editions of ASTM E 185 are not significant.

Correlation and Thermal Monitors

The 1973 edition of ASTM E 185 specified that the testing of specimens should be modified as outlined in ASTM E 184, "Recommended Practice for Effect of High-Energy Radiation on the Mechanical Properties of Metallic Materials," which recommends that a metal specimen from a

standard reference material be used to correlate one irradiation experiment with another. This is done so that the mechanical property changes of the reference material may serve as a relative standard for estimating exposure. In the 1979 and 1982 editions of ASTM E 185, correlation monitors are explicitly categorized as optional for inclusion in surveillance capsules and are discussed within the ASTM standard instead of being cited in a secondary reference. Consistently, these three editions of ASTM E 185 only recommend the inclusion of CMMs in surveillance capsules.

The 1973, 1979, and 1982 editions of ASTM E 185 consistently specify the insertion of thermal monitors within surveillance capsules. These three editions of ASTM E 185 proposed the use of low melting point elements or eutectic alloys, instead of instrument monitors, to detect significant variations in exposure temperature to provide evidence of the maximum exposure temperature of the specimens. These monitor materials should be selected to indicate unforeseen capsule temperatures.

2.3 Material Surveillance Data Required by Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50

The material surveillance data required to be submitted to the NRC under Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50 is used for the purposes listed below.

2.3.1 10 CFR 50.60, "Acceptance Criteria for Fracture Prevention Measures for Light-Water Nuclear Power Reactors for Normal Operation"

In 10 CFR 50.60, the NRC requires licensees of light-water nuclear power reactors to meet the fracture toughness requirements of Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50 and the material surveillance program requirements in Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50. The regulations permit these licensees to use alternatives to the requirements, as described in Appendices G and H to 10 CFR Part 50, when the NRC grants an exemption under 10 CFR 50.12, "Specific Exemptions," ~~and-or~~ 10 CFR 52.7, "Specific Exemptions."

2.3.2 10 CFR 50.61, "Fracture Toughness Requirements for Protection Against Pressurized Thermal Shock Events," and 10 CFR 50.61a, "Alternate Fracture Toughness Requirements for Protection Against Pressurized Thermal Shock Events"

The operational characteristics of PWRs makes them susceptible to a severe transient identified as pressurized thermal shock (PTS). PTS events are characterized by a small break loss of coolant accident as an initiating event, followed by rapid cooling (i.e., thermal shock) of the internal vessel surface from safety injection, which is then coupled with repressurization of the reactor coolant system. With a sufficiently embrittled RV, the combination of cold vessel surface, high thermal stresses and high pressure can cause the brittle propagation of small cracks in the RV, potentially resulting in propagation of a through-wall crack and possible failure of the vessel. As a condition of their license, PWRs must demonstrate compliance with 10 CFR 50.61 or 10 CFR 50.61a to ensure that they do not approach the levels of embrittlement that make them susceptible to failure due to PTS.

In 10 CFR 50.61, the NRC requires the estimation of the reference temperature for PTS (i.e., RT_{PTS}) of the steels in the RV beltline using the end of license neutron fluence levels, and demonstration that the RV RT_{PTS} values are below the screening criteria specified in the rule.

The continued need to include HAZ material in RV material surveillance programs was more recently investigated in a paper written by Koichi Masaki, Jinya Katsuyama, and Kunio Onizawa, "Study on the Structural Integrity of RPV Using PFM Analysis Concerning Inhomogeneity of the Heat-Affected Zone" (Masaki, K, et al., 2013). This paper investigated the features of HAZ inhomogeneity in RV steels to determine the need for surveillance test specimens of HAZ materials in Japan. The authors performed a structural integrity assessment of the inhomogeneous distribution of fracture toughness for HAZ materials using a probabilistic fracture mechanics analysis code and determined the following:

- The HAZ region close to the weld metal has coarse grain HAZ that has high toughness, causing arrest of postulated cracks.
- The HAZ region close to base metal has fine grain HAZ that is continuously distributed along the fusion line such that if crack initiation occurs in the region, crack arrest may not occur.

This outcome is expected metallurgically, because the HAZ is a tempered version of the plate or forging and, as such, it should exhibit superior fracture toughness compared to the plate or forging. This was also demonstrated by T.U. Marston and W. Server in "Assessment of Weld Heat-Affected Zones in a Reactor Vessel Material" (Marston, T.U. and W. Server, 1978), which determined that for the conditions evaluated in the paper, the HAZs of the nuclear quality welds have higher fracture toughness than those of the parent base material.

For these reasons, the NRC staff is proposing to pursue rulemaking that would result in (1) current RV material surveillance programs not being required to test and report results for HAZ specimens and include HAZ specimens in reconstituted or new surveillance capsules, and (2) new RV material surveillance programs not being required to include HAZ specimens during the design of the program.

3.2 Tension Specimens

The second regulatory topic investigated during this rulemaking effort reduces the number of tensions specimens required (1) in new and reconstituted surveillance capsules and (2) for testing in existing surveillance capsules.

The editions of ASTM E 185 currently incorporated by reference in Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50 specify the following with respect to tensile testing:

- For unirradiated material, tension specimens shall be tested for both the base and weld material at specified temperatures.
- For irradiated material, tension specimens shall be included for both the base and weld material and tested at specified temperatures.
- Tensile testing shall be conducted in accordance with ASTM Method E8 and recommended practice ASTM E21.

The variation of tensile properties (e.g., yield strength, tensile strength, and elongation) with test temperatures is established by testing tension specimens over a range of temperatures. Performing tensile tests both before and after irradiation permits quantification of the hardening

effect of irradiation using the increase in yield strength, or ΔYS . NRC regulations have no requirements related to strength properties. Furthermore, the NRC regulations do not specify an approach to directly assess RV integrity from strength properties. Tensile data provides an indication of the radiation-induced strength property changes in the RV material and serves as a consistency check relative to Charpy data; in particular for cases where the Charpy data show unexpected or inconsistent trends with prior data.

For example, general correlations between shifts in fracture transition temperature and ΔYS have been identified (McElroy, R.J., and A.L. Lowe, Jr., 1996). If the data from the Charpy tests are inconsistent, the trends described in the cited paper make it possible to predict the shift in transition temperature from the change in yield strength due to embrittlement. In this case, a comparison of the change in yield strength with the Charpy data could provide additional information to gain an understanding of the causes for inconsistent results.

Furthermore, in the event that optional fracture toughness testing is conducted, tensile data is needed for the calculation of relevant fracture parameters (e.g., J-integral). However, the inclusion of fracture toughness specimens in surveillance capsules is optional per ASTM E 185-82. For instance, ASME Section XI Code Case N-629 provides an alternative to the methods in Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50 to allow the use of fracture toughness data in developing a master curve reference temperature (T_0) for ferritic materials in place of RT_{NDT} . Regulatory Guide 1.147, "Inservice Inspection Code Case Acceptability, ASME Section XI, Division 1," incorporates this code case by reference into 10 CFR 50.55a. To use this alternative, the yield strength of the material, which is determined from tests of tensile specimens, is required at the proper embrittlement level.

Past experience (Westinghouse 2015—proprietary) has demonstrated that the differences in the test temperatures specified in ASTM E 185 can be small, which could yield small differences in tensile properties (e.g., the irradiated mid-range transition temperature and the upper end Charpy transition temperature can be close in value). Therefore, the requirement to test three specimens per material at the specified temperatures could produce redundant tensile information. However, eliminating one test temperature and testing at room temperature and service temperature at all irradiation levels allows for the comparison of the change in strength properties from both irradiation and temperature.

Based on its evaluation the NRC staff is proposing to pursue rulemaking that would result in a reduction to the number of required tensile tests and tension specimens in surveillance capsules. Specifically, current RV material surveillance programs would only be required to test one tension specimen at room temperature and one tension specimen at service temperature for all materials and irradiation levels. The disposition of the remaining tension specimens in existing surveillance capsules, if any, would be at the discretion of the licensee. Furthermore, the number of tension specimens required for reconstituted and new surveillance capsules would align with the two test temperatures described above for current RV material surveillance programs and new RV material surveillance programs.

3.3 Correlation Monitor Material

The third regulatory topic investigated during this rulemaking effort is to specify that testing of CMM is optional if this material is included in existing, new, and reconstituted surveillance capsules.

A CMM is a prototypical RV material that has been fabricated to maximize homogeneous behavior, has been used in many surveillance capsules and has an established trend from extensive testing (ASTM DS 54; IAEA, 2001; Stallman, 1987). The purpose of a CMM in a surveillance capsule is to provide reference data for comparison to the established trends for the CMM. The intent of the CMM reference data is to demonstrate that the irradiation conditions of the surveillance capsule have provided embrittlement in the CMM comparable to the established trend for the CMM. Thus, this provides additional information to understand the results from the RV materials in the surveillance capsule. The CMM is selected so that it has a comparable composition and processing history to the RV material. The editions of ASTM E 185 currently incorporated by reference in Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50 specify that it is optional to include CMM in surveillance capsules. These editions of ASTM E 185 do not explicitly indicate whether or not CMMs shall be tested if they were optionally included in a surveillance capsule. However, ASTM E 185 contains reporting requirements for supplemental or additional specimens (which include the CMM specimen) if testing is performed. Therefore, it is ambiguous whether CMM testing is required even though they are optional to include in surveillance capsules.

In practice, the testing of CMM has demonstrated variability in the measured material properties of the CMM, which has limited the practical use of the data. Several references (Stallman, 1987; Wang, 1996; and Wallin, 1999) have shown that the fitted CMM data are in general agreement with the predictions of NRC Regulatory Guide 1.99, "Radiation Embrittlement of Reactor Vessel Materials," Revision 2, issued May 1988 (NRC, 1988); however, the raw CMM data exhibit significant scatter.

Based on its evaluation, the NRC staff is proposing that this rulemaking effort would not affect the design of RV material surveillance programs nor the optional inclusion of CMM in surveillance capsules. Furthermore, the proposed rule would specify that testing of CMM is optional even if it is included in surveillance capsules.

3.4 Thermal Monitors

The fourth regulatory topic investigated during this rulemaking effort eliminates the requirements for (1) including temperature monitors in new and reconstituted surveillance capsules and (2) examining temperature monitors in existing surveillance capsules.

ASTM E 185 specifies that the surveillance capsules shall include one set of temperature monitors that are located within the capsule where the specimen temperature is predicted to be the maximum, and additional sets of temperature monitors may be placed at other locations to characterize the temperature profile. ASTM E 185 further specifies that the maximum exposure temperature of the surveillance capsule materials shall be determined, and, if a discrepancy greater than 14 degrees C or 25 degrees F occurs between the observed and the expected capsule exposure temperatures, an analysis of the operating conditions shall be conducted to determine the magnitude and duration of these differences. The standard specifies reporting of the temperature monitor results and an estimate of the maximum capsule exposure temperature.

Irradiation temperature is one of the parameters that is closely correlated with the effects of neutron embrittlement of RV steels, with lower embrittlement measured at higher irradiation temperatures within a range close to the standard operating temperature of 288 degrees C (550 degrees F). Therefore, knowledge of the irradiation temperature history of surveillance

capsules is important to ensure that the surveillance data are properly interpreted and do not portray a non-conservative estimate of the RV neutron embrittlement.

Typically, the temperature monitors used in surveillance capsules are high purity, low melting point elements, or eutectic alloys. They are targeted to melt at specific temperatures, normally somewhat in excess of the planned operating temperature, to identify the highest temperature seen by the surveillance capsule. Some of these temperature monitors are housed in glass tubes (Westinghouse, 2011); others are in tubular aluminum alloy crucibles, which are stacked in a stainless-steel holder tube and inserted into machined locations within the aluminum spacer blocks inside the capsule (Lowe, 1999). The latter are evaluated using radiography (Lowe, 1999). These temperature monitors provide an indication of whether the melt temperature was observed but do not provide a time-based exposure history of the monitor; thus, they are a "go/no-go" indication of the maximum surveillance capsule temperature.

Use of temperature melt wire monitors to identify the peak capsule temperature does not provide information on the actual time-based temperature exposure conditions of the surveillance capsule, which is important to properly interpret the surveillance data. This merely indicates the highest temperature experienced by the surveillance capsule, not the duration of the exposure at that temperature. As described in Lowe's paper (Lowe, 1999), several things can complicate the interpretation of the information from temperature melt wire monitors. The first complication results when the surveillance capsule experiences a short duration thermal transient that increases the coolant inlet temperature. This could result in a positive indication from the temperature melt wire monitors, which is insignificant to the overall exposure conditions of the surveillance capsule, and not to the radiation response of the test specimens located within the surveillance capsule. A second complication is caused by possible interpretation issues, where apparent "melting" of the temperature melt wire monitors is actually caused by long-term exposure of the monitor to temperatures near, but below, its melting point, and a resulting creep mechanism, which causes slumping of the monitor in its crucible (Lowe, 1999).

Commented [A6]: Missing word here; should this be "and not important to" or something like that?

As an alternative to temperature melt wire monitors, an estimate of the average capsule temperature during full power operation for each reactor fuel cycle would provide the irradiation temperature history of the surveillance capsule. In a typical pressurized-water reactor and boiling-water reactor, the coolant inlet temperature and the recirculation temperature, respectively, provides a reasonable estimate of the capsule irradiation temperature history. To date, licensees have been able to determine the irradiation temperature history of surveillance capsules to properly interpret the data based on the plant parameters that are already being monitored.

Based on its evaluation, the NRC staff proposing to pursue rulemaking that would result in (1) current RV material surveillance programs not being required to test and report results for thermal monitors and include thermal monitors in reconstituted or new surveillance capsules, and (2) new RV material surveillance programs not being required to include thermal monitors during the design of the program.

3.5 Surveillance Test Results Reporting

The fifth regulatory topic investigated during this rulemaking effort extends the time period given to a licensee following each capsule withdrawal to submit the technical report containing the test results required by ASTM E 185 and Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50.

Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50 currently requires that within one year of the date of the surveillance capsule withdrawal, a summary technical report be submitted to the NRC that contains the data required by ASTM E 185, and the results of all fracture toughness tests conducted on the beltline materials in the irradiated and unirradiated conditions, unless an extension is granted by the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

This one-year limit was adopted in Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50 on July 26, 1983, and is described in the *Federal Register* (48 FR 24008). The primary purpose of this requirement when it was first implemented was the timely reporting of test results and notification of any problems determined from surveillance tests. At that time, timely reporting of surveillance data was crucial, because there was a limited amount of available data from irradiated materials from which to estimate embrittlement trends. The number of commercial light-water reactors operating in the United States and the associated number of years of operation since this requirement was first adopted have increased significantly. This has led to an extensive amount of embrittlement data and knowledge of the mechanisms associated with embrittlement of the RV; thus, there is a reduced need for prompt reporting of the test results.

The one-year requirement to submit a report following each capsule withdrawal is a challenge for some licensees, particularly those participating in the BWRVIP ISP. Implementation of this ISP requires significant coordination among the multiple licensees participating in the program. In general, these licensees are continuing to request a six-month extension to the one-year reporting requirement and to date, the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, has approved these requests. In addition, as surveillance capsules remain in the RV to achieve higher neutron fluence levels to support plant operation through 60 years and 80 years, longer periods of radioactive decay may be necessary before the capsule can be shipped to hot-cell laboratories to perform testing.

The purpose of proposing a rulemaking change to the reporting requirement is to reduce the regulatory burden for licensees to submit and for the NRC to review these routine extension requests, while still ensuring adequate protection of public health and safety ~~and the environment~~. Furthermore, increasing the time given to licensees to submit a summary report following each capsule withdrawal from 1 year to 18 months is appropriate, because (1) sufficient embrittlement data currently exists and the mechanisms associated with embrittlement of the RV are well understood, and (2) this is a reasonable accommodation of the extension period requested previously by licensees.

Based on its evaluation, the NRC staff proposes to pursue rulemaking that would result in reactor licensees being afforded 18 months following the withdrawal of a surveillance capsule to submit ~~its~~the capsule report to the NRC. Thus, reactor licensees participating in the BWRVIP ISP would no longer need to routinely request extensions to the reporting requirements due to administrative challenges, and the NRC would review fewer requests.

4.0 Description of Options

This section considers three options to amend the requirements of Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50 that the NRC staff is proposing associated with test specimens contained within surveillance capsules and the reporting of surveillance test results. These three options include (1) the no action (status quo), (2) rulemaking to incorporate by reference the latest editions of ASTM E 185 and ASTM E 2215 into Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50, and (3) rulemaking to revise Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50, and are described below. In order to reduce the regulatory burden on the reactor licensees and to the NRC, as described in Section 3.0, the NRC staff is proposing these changes to the regulations while still ensuring protection of public health and safety and the environment.

4.1 Option 1: No Action (Status Quo)

This option would maintain the current requirements in Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50 (i.e., status quo) and the specimens and testing required by ASTM E 185-73, E 185-79, and E 185-82, as applicable. Licensees would continue to (1) test Charpy impact specimens for the weld HAZ; (2) test tension specimens for the weld metal and base metal at various temperatures; (3) test correlation monitors, if they were included; and (4) examine thermal monitors in each surveillance capsule in accordance with ASTM E 185-82, to the extent practicable. Licensees needing additional time to submit their surveillance capsule reports would continue to submit extension requests for NRC review and approval.

4.2 Option 2: Rulemaking To Incorporate by Reference the Latest Editions of ASTM E 185 and ASTM E 2215 into Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50

The latest edition of ASTM E 185 referenced by Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50 is the 1982 edition that contains guidelines for designing an RV materials surveillance program and evaluating test results. Subsequently, in 2002, these guidelines were separated so that ASTM E 185 provides the guidelines for designing an RV materials surveillance program while a new standard, ASTM E 2215, contains guidelines on evaluating the RV material surveillance program test results. The NRC staff explored the possibility of incorporating by reference the latest edition of both ASTM E 185 and E 2215 (i.e., the 2016 editions) into Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50. Reactor license applicants seeking approval for the design of their RV material surveillance program before plant operation would be required to use the 2016 edition of these ASTM standards.

The NRC staff reviewed ASTM E 185-82, ASTM E 185-16, and ASTM E 2215-16 to compare the standards and distinguish the aspects that are constituted as requirements and recommendations. The purpose of this review was to determine the additional requirements associated with the 2016 edition of these ASTM standards when compared to the requirements currently in Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50 to determine whether these additional requirements were necessary to ensure adequate protection of public health and safety ~~and the environment~~. This review identified the following significant aspects required by the 2016 edition of ASTM E 185 and ASTM E 2215 that are not requirements in the current regulations:

- ASTM E 185-16 may require the inclusion of additional surveillance capsules (i.e., program and standby capsules) in the RV material surveillance program.

- ASTM E 185-16 requires the testing of one additional surveillance capsule during the first 40 years of reactor operation.
- ASTM E 185-16 requires the inclusion and testing of two additional RV materials (i.e., limiting base and weld metal materials from the geometric beltline) within each surveillance capsule.
- ASTM E 185-16 requires the inclusion and testing of fracture toughness specimens from the limiting RV materials.
- ASTM E 2215-16 permits the use of ASTM E 900, "Guide for Predicting Radiation-Induced Transition Temperature Shift in Reactor Vessel Materials," and other neutron-fluence-related references, which contain calculational methods that the NRC has not assessed.

Based on its review of the requirements established in ASTM E 185-16 and ASTM E 2215-16, the NRC staff determined that adopting and implementing these ASTM Standards would create a significant and unnecessary burden for reactor applicants and licensees without a corresponding benefit to public health and safety ~~and the environment~~. To require inclusion and testing of additional surveillance capsules, RV materials from the beltline, and fracture toughness specimens from the limiting RV materials would be an overly conservative approach to monitor the change in material properties of the RV. Furthermore, the additional requirements in these ASTM standards are beyond the NRC's current regulatory framework and approved methods to assess RV integrity. Based on the significant quantity of data from surveillance programs required by Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50, extensive research programs conducted on neutron embrittlement and RV integrity, and the adequacy of the existing surveillance programs, there is no technical basis to require additional surveillance capsules, surveillance materials and surveillance specimens beyond the current requirements. The addition of these requirements would not have a corresponding benefit to public health and safety and the environment. A minimum of 13 possible conditions on the use of these ASTM standards were identified to offset the unnecessary burden from the additional required guidelines without a cost-justified increase in protection. Thus, the NRC staff could not justify imposing such requirements from ASTM E 185-16 and ASTM E2215-16 on reactor license applicants seeking approval for the design of their RV material surveillance program before plant operation.

Significant NRC resources would have been necessary to quantify the exact cost burden to licensees associated with the use of ASTM E 185-16 and ASTM E 2215-16. This activity was not performed because of the considerable unnecessary burden to reactor applicants, as outlined above, without a benefit to public health and safety, and they are not necessary to adequately assess the RV integrity under the NRC's regulatory framework and currently approved methods.

At a public meeting on June 1, 2017 (NRC, 2017a), the NRC staff presented the impacts of incorporating ASTM E 185-16 and ASTM E 2215-16 into Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50, as compared to the current regulations. The NRC staff presented order-of-magnitude estimates on the cost burden to licensees associated with using ASTM E 185-16 and ASTM E 2215-16, which included the required inclusion and testing of (1) additional surveillance capsules, (2) RV materials from the beltline and limiting non-beltline materials, and (3) fracture toughness specimens from the limiting RV materials. The NRC staff also described aspects of the 2016 edition of the ASTM E 185 and E 2215 that would be considered for conditions if this

Affected Facilities

The NRC staff estimates that the final rule will cover all U.S. commercial light-water reactor operating units and units under construction.⁹ However as of April 2018, the following plants have announced plans to permanently shut down before their license expiration:

- Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station plans to shut down by October 31, 2018.
- Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station plans to shut down by June 1, 2019.
- Three Mile Island Nuclear Station Unit 1 plans to shut down on or about September 30, 2019.
- Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Unit 1 plans to shut down by May 31, 2020.
- Indian Point Nuclear Generating Units 2 and 3 plan to shut down by April 30, 2021.
- Perry Nuclear Power Plant Unit 1 plans to shut down by May 31, 2021.
- Beaver Valley Power Station Units 1 and 2 plan to shut down by October 31, 2021.
- Palisades Nuclear Plant plans to shut down by spring of 2022.
- Diablo Canyon Power Plant Units 1 and 2 plan to shut down in 2025.

The analysis evaluates the incremental costs and benefits on a per-unit basis for all operating units with the exception of those facilities that have announced early cessation of operations. Additionally, some units have completed their capsule withdrawals under their RV material surveillance program and would not experience any burden reduction.

Identification of Affected Attributes

The NRC staff evaluated the following attributes in support of this regulatory basis.

- NRC implementation
- Industry implementation
- Industry operation
- NRC operation

5.1.1 NRC Implementation

The NRC's development and implementation of proposed changes to Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50, through a rulemaking would result in incremental costs to the NRC. These costs include the activities listed in Table 3.

5.1.1.1 Option 1 – No Action: NRC Implementation Costs

This option would have no incremental impact on the NRC. However, the NRC staff would continue to review test results from capsule specimens that do not provide beneficial surveillance data or support direct regulatory needs to assess and monitor embrittlement on the RV. Furthermore, the NRC staff would continue to review extension requests for submittal of test results within one year of the capsule withdrawal that have generally been associated with licensees participating in the ISPs.

⁹ This analysis does not include reactor units that have received a construction permit or a combined license that are not currently under construction.

the significant coordination needed among multiple licensees participating in the ISP and with hot-cell laboratories.

5.1.2.2 Option 3A – Standard Notice-and-Comment Rule Process: Industry Implementation Costs

The NRC staff assumes that there are little to no industry implementation costs for rulemaking material review and comment because of the noncontroversial nature of the proposed changes.

5.1.2.3 Option 3B – Direct Final Rule Process: Industry Implementation Costs

The NRC staff assumes that there are little to no industry implementation costs for rulemaking material review and comment because of the noncontroversial nature of the proposed changes.

5.1.3 Industry Operations Cost

The industry would avert costs in Options 3A and 3B resulting from the following and as further described below:

- HAZ specimens
 - Eliminate the requirement for inclusion of weld HAZ specimens.
 - Eliminate the requirement for testing weld HAZ specimens.
- Tension Specimens
 - Reduce the number of tension specimens included in surveillance capsules (new or reconstituted).
 - Reduce the requirement for testing tension specimens.
 - Specify the required test temperatures for irradiated materials (i.e., at room temperature and service temperature).
- CMM
 - Specify that CMM testing is not required.
- Thermal Monitors
 - Eliminate the requirement for inclusion of thermal monitors.
 - Eliminate the requirement for examining thermal monitors.
- Surveillance Test Results Reporting
 - Extend submittal of surveillance capsule reports to 18 months after the withdrawal of the capsule.

Heat-Affected Zone Specimens

Licensees of operating reactor units would realize incremental savings if they are no longer required to test HAZ test specimens upon the withdrawal of each surveillance capsule and if they are no longer required to include HAZ test specimens in reconstituted or new surveillance capsules.

Applicants for a reactor license that will seek NRC review and approval for an RV material surveillance program would realize incremental savings if they are not required to include HAZ test specimens in new surveillance capsules.

Based on industry input, the NRC staff estimates that the cost for HAZ specimen testing is \$7,500 per withdrawn capsule.

Tension Specimens

Licensees of operating reactor units and applicants for a reactor license that will seek NRC review and approval for an RV material surveillance program would realize incremental savings, resulting from the reduction in the number of required tensile tests and tension specimens in surveillance capsules. The disposition of the remaining tension specimens in existing surveillance capsules, if any, would be at the discretion of the licensee.

Specifically, licensees of operating reactor units would only be required to test one tension specimen at room temperature and one tension specimen at service temperature for all materials and irradiation levels. The disposition of the remaining tension specimens in existing surveillance capsules, if any as mentioned above, would be at the discretion of the licensee. Furthermore, the number of tension specimens required for reconstituted and new surveillance capsules would align with the two test temperatures described above for licensees of operating reactor units and applicants for a reactor license that will seek NRC review and approval for an RV material surveillance program.

Based on ASTM E 185-82, each capsule is required to contain three tension specimens for each material (i.e., base and weld). The proposed rule would eliminate testing of one of these three specimens for each material. The remaining two specimens for each material would still require testing at the test temperatures specified above. The NRC staff assumed that the cost to test two tension specimens is two-thirds of the cost to test the three required specimens, for each material (e.g., one-third of the current tensile test cost would be averted).

Based on industry input, the NRC staff estimates that the cost for tension specimen test averted cost is \$2,500 per withdrawn capsule, based on the assumption that one-third of the current tensile test would no longer require testing and that the cost for tensile testing is \$7,500 per withdrawn capsule.

Correlation Monitor Materials

Licensees of operating reactor units and applicants for a reactor license that will seek NRC review and approval for an RV material surveillance program would realize incremental savings. This would result from explicitly specifying that testing of CMM specimens, if they are included in existing, reconstituted or new surveillance capsules, is optional upon the withdrawal of a surveillance capsule.

Based on industry input, the NRC staff estimates that the cost for CMM specimen testing is \$7,500 per withdrawn capsule. However, since CMM specimens are optionally included in surveillance capsules, the NRC staff assumed that only 40 percent of the remaining surveillance capsules contain CMM specimens. The NRC staff's assumption is based on a sampling of surveillance capsule reports submitted by the licensees.

Thermal Monitors

Licensees of operating reactor units would realize incremental savings if they are no longer required to (1) examine thermal monitors upon the withdrawal of each surveillance capsule and (2) include thermal monitors in reconstituted or new surveillance capsules.

Applicants for a reactor license that will seek NRC review and approval for an RV material surveillance program would realize incremental savings if they are not required to include thermal monitors in new surveillance capsules.

Based on industry input, the NRC staff estimates that the cost for thermal monitor testing is \$2,500 per withdrawn capsule.

Surveillance Test Results Reporting

Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50 requires light-water nuclear power reactor licensees to have an RV material surveillance program to monitor changes in the fracture toughness properties of the RV materials adjacent to the reactor core. The NRC requires licensees to periodically test irradiated material specimens from test capsules in their RVs to evaluate changes in material fracture toughness properties to assess the integrity of the RV. The program must meet the design, test procedures, and reporting requirements of ASTM E 185-82, or earlier editions. The number, design, and location of these surveillance capsules within the RV are established during the design of the program before initial plant operation.

As part of this rulemaking effort, the NRC staff is proposing that reactor licensees having an NRC-approved RV material surveillance program would be permitted an additional 6 months to submit their report of surveillance testing following the withdrawal of each surveillance capsule, compared to the current Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50 requirements.

Those licensees that participate in an ISP; specifically, operating BWRs, would no longer need to submit routine extension requests for the report on surveillance testing following each capsule withdrawal to accommodate internal processes established by the BWRVIP (i.e., committee review process). These licensees would be relieved of the administrative and financial burden associated with submitting the usual extension requests.

Applicants for a reactor license that will seek NRC review and approval for an RV material surveillance program will have 18 months to submit the report of surveillance testing following the withdrawal of each surveillance capsule.

Based on industry input, the NRC staff estimates that the cost for a licensee to prepare and submit a schedule extension request for a surveillance capsule test report is \$20,000. Based on a review of previously submitted schedule requests and proprietary industry information, the NRC staff estimates that 16 schedule extension requests will be averted for the years 2020 to 2041 and 15 schedule extension requests will be averted for the years 2022 to 2041.

5.1.3.1 Option 1 – No Action: Industry Operation Costs

This option would have no incremental impact on the industry. However, some reactor licensees would continue to be required to prepare and submit extension requests for submittal of test results within one year of the capsule withdrawal that have generally been associated with licensees participating in ISPs.

5.1.3.2 Option 3A – Standard Notice-and-Comment Rule Process: Industry Operation Costs

Under this option, the operating reactor units with remaining capsules would begin to realize the averted cost savings in year 2022, after the final rule becomes effective in late 2021. Based on

these standards into Appendix H of 10 CFR Part 50; and (2) quantify the cost burden to licensees associated with their use. Because of this estimated high level of effort, without a corresponding benefit to public health and safety, this option was not considered viable.

Under Option 3, the NRC would undertake a rulemaking effort to revise the underlying regulations to alleviate the burden to existing licensees and to future applicants with no adverse impact to public health and safety and the environment, as follows:

- HAZ specimens
 - Eliminate the requirement for inclusion of weld HAZ specimens.
 - Eliminate the requirement for testing weld HAZ specimens.
- Tension Specimens
 - Reduce the number of tension specimens included in surveillance capsules (new or reconstituted).
 - Reduce the requirement for testing tension specimens.
 - Specify the required test temperatures for irradiated materials (i.e., at room temperature and service temperature).
- CMM
 - Specify that CMM testing is not required.
- Thermal Monitors
 - Eliminate the requirement for inclusion of thermal monitors.
 - Eliminate the requirement for examining thermal monitors.
- Surveillance Test Results Reporting
 - Extend submittal of surveillance capsule reports to 18 months after the withdrawal of the capsule.

This option achieves the objective of maximizing the burden reduction for the RV material surveillance program, while maintaining a comparable level of safety. This option also has the advantage of relative simplicity to implement. The NRC staff considered two rulemaking processes for its implementation. Option 3A is the standard notice-and-comment rule process, in which the NRC would prepare and issue a regulatory basis and proposed rule for public comment before preparing and issuing a final rule. Option 3B is the direct final rule process, in which the NRC would prepare the final and companion rules to revise the testing and reporting requirements in Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50.

Table 10 shows that under Option 3A, the NRC implementation costs under the standard notice-and-comment rule process when compared to the savings associated with the burden reduction to the licensees and the NRC would be slightly cost beneficial. Based on this estimate, Option 3A (standard notice-and-comment rule process) results in estimated NRC implementation costs between (\$347,484) using a 7-percent discount rate and (\$336,220) using a 3-percent discount rate. Option 3B (direct final rule process) results in estimated costs to the NRC that range from (\$202,236) using a 7-percent discount rate to (\$173,224) using a 3-percent discount rate. Because the direct final rule process would use less agency resources, the NRC costs for Option 3B are approximately \$145,000 less than that required for Option 3A when using a 7-percent discount rate.

The NRC staff also observed that the remaining number of surveillance capsules in the existing fleet of commercial nuclear power reactors is only a small fraction of the total number that have already been withdrawn and tested because of the maturity of RV material surveillance programs. Therefore, the opportunity to reduce licensee burdens associated with the RV

6.0 Stakeholder Involvement

Since 2013, activities related to the Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50 rulemaking have been discussed at many public meetings and other interactions between the NRC and stakeholders, as detailed below.

American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code Committee Meetings

The NRC staff regularly attend and participate in quarterly ASME Code committee meetings. These committees are responsible for developing, revising, and maintaining ASME codes and standards. The NRC staff provides regular status updates of NRC activities related to the Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50 proposed rulemaking to attendees of the ASME Section XI, Working Group on Operating Plant Criteria. The ASME meetings are open to the public, and status updates of the Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50 proposed rulemaking appear on the meeting agenda, thereby allowing any interested parties to participate.

NRC Public Meetings Involving Reactor Vessel Material Surveillance Program for Subsequent License Renewal

Following the issuance of SLR guidance documents (i.e., the GALL-SLR Report and the SRP-SLR) for public comment, the NRC staff held several public meetings (Category 2 and Category 3) to discuss the NRC staff's resolution of public comments. Several of the meetings discussed the Reactor Vessel Material Surveillance Programs for Subsequent License Renewal, as it relates to this rulemaking. [Table 11](#) provides the meeting dates at which the public comments related to Reactor Vessel Material Surveillance Programs were discussed and the Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) accession numbers for the meeting-related documents.

Table 11 NRC Public Meetings Involving Reactor Vessel Material Surveillance Programs for Subsequent License Renewal

Date	Meeting	Reference (ADAMS Accession No.)
4/26/2016	Public Meeting To Discuss Comments on the Mechanical Sections of the Draft Subsequent License Renewal Guidance Documents	ML16119A236
6/1/2016	Public Meeting To Discuss Comments on the Electrical and Mechanical Sections of the Draft Subsequent License Renewal Guidance Documents	ML16180A027
6/23/2016	Public Meeting To Discuss Potential Optimization of the Subsequent License Renewal Application Review Process and Guidance Documents	ML16204A137
7/28/2016	Public Meeting To Discuss Comments on the Mechanical Sections of the Draft Subsequent License Renewal Guidance Document	ML16218A432
9/15/2016	Public Teleconference with the Nuclear Energy Institute To Discuss Current and Subsequent License Renewal Topics	ML16267A068

NRC Public Meetings Involving Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50 Rulemaking

Each year, the NRC staff holds a Category 2 public meeting to discuss reactor pressure vessel issues and the materials programs. Also held annually is a Category 2 public meeting to

RESPONSE SHEET

TO: Annette Vietti-Cook, Secretary
FROM: Commissioner Baran
SUBJECT: COMSECY-18-0016: Request Commission Approval to Use the Direct Final Rule Process to Revise the Testing and Reporting Requirements in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix H, Reactor Vessel Material Surveillance Program Requirements (RIN 3150-AK07)

Approved Disapproved Abstain Not Participating

COMMENTS: Below Attached None

Entered in "STARS"

Yes

No



SIGNATURE

10/18/18

DATE

**Commissioner Baran's Comments on COMSECY-18-0016,
"Request for Commission Approval to Use the Direct Final Rule Process to Revise the
Testing and Reporting Requirements in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix H,
Reactor Vessel Material Surveillance Program Requirements"**

In this paper, the NRC staff recommends preparing a direct final rule to revise the testing and reporting requirements in Appendix H relating to reactor vessel material surveillance programs. Specifically, the staff proposes "to reduce the testing of some specimens and eliminate the testing of other specimens that do not provide meaningful information to assess [reactor vessel] integrity." The staff also proposes to provide licensees an additional six months to submit capsule test results because the current one-year reporting deadline poses challenges due to (1) the implementation of integrated surveillance programs that involve coordination with multiple licensees and laboratories and (2) the need for longer periods of radioactive decay for some capsules with higher neutron fluence levels. Otherwise, the staff has found that the 1982 American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) standard works well and does not propose to incorporate the latest standard from 2016 into Appendix H.

I found the explanations in the regulatory basis document for the staff's proposed revisions to be reasonable. Accordingly, I support proceeding with a rulemaking to make those revisions to Appendix H. Because the staff views the 2016 ASTM standard as presenting best practices rather than suggested regulatory requirements, I agree that it is not necessary to incorporate the 2016 standard into the regulation. Although the potential for up to 80 years of operation with subsequent license renewal heightens the importance of long-term reactor vessel material surveillance, the staff addresses this regulatory need through the Generic Aging Lessons Learned Report revision and the subsequent license renewal application review process. Incorporating the 2016 ASTM standard into the regulation would not meet this regulatory need because the standard does not explicitly address subsequent license renewal.

As no stakeholders have expressed opposition to the proposed Appendix H revisions to date, I approve proceeding with the development of a direct final rule. I also approve publication of the draft *Federal Register* notice announcing the public availability of the regulatory basis document, subject to the attached edits. Once the Commission has issued its direction on this paper, the staff should take the appropriate ticketing actions to reflect the Commission's decisions.

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

10 CFR Part 50

[NRC-2017-0151]

RIN 3150-AK07

Reactor Vessel Material Surveillance Program

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Regulatory basis; availability.

SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is publishing a regulatory basis to support a rulemaking that would amend the NRC's regulations for the light-water power reactor vessel material surveillance programs. The rulemaking would reduce the regulatory costsburden associated with the testing specimens contained within surveillance capsules, and reporting the surveillance test results. The NRC has completed a regulatory basis that demonstrates there is sufficient justification to proceed with rulemaking. The NRC is providing the basis for rulemaking for public information, but is not seeking public comment on the regulatory basis at this time.

DATES: The regulatory basis is available **[INSERT DATE OF PUBLICATION IN THE FEDERAL REGISTER]**.

ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID **NRC-2017-0151** when contacting the NRC about the availability of information for this action. You may obtain publicly-available information related to

Testing Requirements. Appendix H to 10 CFR part 50 requires RV surveillance programs to include Charpy impact specimens from welds, base metal, and the weld heat-affected zone materials and tensile specimens from welds and base metal materials. The NRC is proposing to conduct a rulemaking to reduce the testing of some specimens and eliminate the testing of other specimens that do not provide meaningful information to assess RV integrity. This decision is based on substantial material data, knowledge, and experience attained through the many years of RV surveillance program implementation. Specifically, the requirements to test weld heat-affected zone specimens and examine thermal monitors would be eliminated. Also, the NRC is proposing to reduce the number of tensile specimens that require testing and specify that testing correlation monitor material is optional. The proposed changes would reduce the ~~costs~~burden to licensees for specimen testing, without having an adverse effect on public health and safety and the environment.

Reporting Requirements. Appendix H to 10 CFR part 50 requires licensees to submit test results to the NRC no later than one year after capsule withdrawal. As stated in the 1983 rulemaking (48 FR 24008; May 27, 1983), the primary purposes of the requirement are timely reporting of test results and notification of any problems. At the time of the 1983 rulemaking, there was a limited amount of data from irradiated materials from which to estimate embrittlement trends of RVs at nuclear power plants; thus, making it crucial for the timely reporting of test results. An extensive amount of embrittlement data now exists, and embrittlement mechanisms are well-understood. The one-year reporting requirement has become a hardship for some licensees because of the implementation of integrated surveillance programs (which require significant coordination among multiple licensees and hot-cell laboratories) and because capsules with higher neutron fluence levels may need longer periods of radioactive decay before capsule shipping and testing can be performed. As a result, licensees have been requesting an additional 6 months to submit reports. To reduce the

[costsburden](#) on licensees to prepare these extension requests and for the NRC to review and approve these requests, the NRC is proposing rulemaking to increase the reporting period from one year to 18 months. This change would not have an adverse effect on public health and safety and the environment.

Rulemaking Process. The NRC has evaluated the planned amendments to appendix H to 10 CFR part 50 and has determined that, if implemented, there would not be an adverse effect on public health and safety and the environment. In addition, the NRC has analyzed the costs to conduct this rulemaking and has determined that the most efficient approach is to use the direct final rule process. This abbreviated process would minimize the use of agency resources and potentially allow the revised requirements to become effective sooner, thus providing licensees the benefits of the rule change soon. Although the NRC does not anticipate receiving public comments that are significant and adverse, the NRC's rulemaking process for this action will provide the public an opportunity to comment on the direct final rule. Read more about the direct final rule process on the NRC's public Web site, at <https://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/rulemaking/rulemaking-process/direct-final-rule.html>.

III. Publically-Available Documents

As the NRC continues its ongoing rulemaking effort to revise the requirements for a reactor vessel materials surveillance program, the NRC is making documents publicly available on the Federal rulemaking Web site, www.regulations.gov, under Docket ID NRC-2017-0151. The current status of this rulemaking effort, as well as other NRC planned rulemaking activities, can be found on the NRC public Web site at <https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/rulemaking-ruleforum/active/RuleIndex.html>.

The NRC may post additional materials relevant to this rulemaking at www.regulations.gov, under Docket ID NRC-2017-0151. Please take the following actions if

RESPONSE SHEET

TO: Annette Vietti-Cook, Secretary
FROM: Commissioner Burns
SUBJECT: COMSECY-18-0016: Request Commission Approval to Use the Direct Final Rule Process to Revise the Testing and Reporting Requirements in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix H, Reactor Vessel Material Surveillance Program Requirements (RIN 3150-AK07)


Approved Disapproved Abstain Not Participating

COMMENTS: Below Attached None

I approve the staff's request to use the direct final rule process to revise the testing and reporting requirements in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix H, and to publish the *Federal Register* notice in Enclosure 2, subject to the attached edits. In addition, I approve the staff's request to close several tickets related to the previous rulemaking effort and open a new ticket for the direct final rule.

Entered in STARS

Yes
No



Signature

19 November 2018

Date

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

10 CFR Part 50

[NRC-2017-0151]

RIN 3150-AK07

Reactor Vessel Material Surveillance Program

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Regulatory basis; availability.

SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is publishing a regulatory basis to support a rulemaking that would amend the NRC's regulations for the light-water power reactor vessel material surveillance programs. The rulemaking would reduce the regulatory burden associated with the testing of specimens contained within surveillance capsules, and reporting the surveillance test results. The NRC has completed a regulatory basis that demonstrates there is sufficient justification to proceed with rulemaking. The NRC is providing the basis for rulemaking for public information, but is not seeking public comment on the regulatory basis at this time.

DATES: The regulatory basis is available **[INSERT DATE OF PUBLICATION IN THE FEDERAL REGISTER]**.

ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID **NRC-2017-0151** when contacting the NRC about the availability of information for this action. You may obtain publicly-available information related to

this action by any of the following methods:

- **Federal Rulemaking Web Site:** Go to <http://www.regulations.gov> and search for Docket ID **NRC-2015-0070**. Address questions about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher; telephone: 301-415-3463; e-mail: Carol.Gallagher@nrc.gov. For technical questions, contact the individual listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of this document.

- **NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS):** You may obtain publicly-available documents online in the ADAMS Public Documents collection at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html>. To begin the search, select "[ADAMS Public Documents](#)" and then select "[Begin Web-based ADAMS Search](#)." For problems with ADAMS, please contact the NRC's Public Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or by e-mail to pdr.resource@nrc.gov. The regulatory basis can be accessed in ADAMS at accession number ML18057A005.

- **NRC's PDR:** You may examine and purchase copies of public documents at the NRC's PDR, Room O1-F21, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Stewart Schneider, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; telephone: 301-415-4123, e-mail: Stewart.Schneider@nrc.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Background

Appendix H, "Reactor Vessel Material Surveillance Program Requirements" (Appendix H), to part 50 of title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* (10 CFR), "Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities," requires light-water nuclear power reactor

licensees to have a reactor vessel (RV) material surveillance program to monitor changes in the fracture toughness properties of the RV materials adjacent to the reactor core. Unless it can be shown that the end of design life neutron fluence is below certain criteria, the NRC requires licensees to implement a materials surveillance program that tests irradiated material specimens that are located in testsurveillance capsules in the RVs. The program evaluates changes in material fracture toughness and thereby assesses the integrity of the RV. For each capsule withdrawal, the test procedures and reporting requirements must meet the requirements of American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) E 185-82, "Standard Recommended Practice for Conducting Surveillance Tests for Light-Water Cooled Reactor Vessels," to the extent practicable for the configuration of the specimens in the capsule. The design of the surveillance program and the withdrawal schedule must meet the requirements of the edition of ASTM E 185 that is current on the issue date of the ASME Code to which the reactor vessel was purchased. Later editions of ASTM E 185, up to and including those editions through 1982, may be used. In sum, the surveillance program must comply with ASTM E 185, as modified by appendix H to 10 CFR part 50. The number, design, and location of these surveillance capsules within the RV are established during the design of the program, before initial plant operation.

Appendix H to 10 CFR part 50 also specifies that each capsule withdrawal and the test results must be the subject of a summary technical report to be submitted within one year of the date of capsule withdrawal, unless an extension is granted by the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. The NRC uses the results from the surveillance program to assess licensee submittals related to pressure-temperature limits in accordance with appendix G to 10 CFR part 50, "Fracture Toughness Requirements," and to assess pressurized water reactor licensee's compliance with § 50.61, "Fracture toughness requirements for protection against

pressurized thermal shock events,” or § 50.61a, “Alternate fracture toughness requirements for protection against pressurized thermal shock events.”

In 2001, the NRC began a rulemaking to revise appendix G to 10 CFR part 50 (RIN 3150-AG98; NRC-2008-0582) to eliminate the pressure-temperature limits related to the metal temperature of the RV closure head flange and vessel flange areas. The NRC expanded the rulemaking scope in 2008 to include revisions to appendix H to 10 CFR part 50, because the fracture toughness analysis required by appendix G to 10 CFR part 50 relies on data obtained from the RV material surveillance program established under appendix H to 10 CFR part 50.

In COMSECY-14-0027, “Rulemaking to Revise Title 10, *Code of Federal Regulations*, Part 50, Appendix H, ‘Reactor Vessel Material Surveillance Program Requirements,’” issued on June 25, 2014 (~~ADAMS Accession No. ML14077A472~~ (not publicly available)), the NRC staff requested Commission approval to separate the rulemaking activities to revise appendices G and H to 10 CFR part 50, and to proceed immediately with rulemaking for appendix H to 10 CFR part 50.

In staff requirements memorandum (SRM) to COMSECY-14-0027, dated August 8, 2014 (~~ADAMS Accession No. ML14220A184~~ (not publicly available)), the Commission approved the staff’s recommendation to proceed with a separate rulemaking for appendix H to 10 CFR part 50. The SRM to COMSECY-14-0027 directed the NRC staff to begin the appendix H to 10 CFR part 50 rulemaking independent of the completion date or conclusions of the appendix G to 10 CFR part 50 technical basis development activities.

II. Discussion

The NRC has prepared a regulatory basis to support a rulemaking that would amend the NRC’s testing and reporting requirements in appendix H to 10 CFR part 50. In the regulatory

basis, the NRC concluded that it has sufficient justification to proceed with rulemaking to amend appendix H to 10 CFR part 50.

Testing Requirements. Appendix H to 10 CFR part 50 requires RV surveillance programs to include Charpy impact specimens from welds, base metal, and the weld heat-affected zone materials and tensile specimens from welds and base metal materials. The NRC is proposing to conduct a rulemaking to reduce the testing of some specimens and eliminate the testing of other specimens that do not provide meaningful information to assess RV integrity. This decision is based on substantial material data, knowledge, and experience attained through the many years of RV surveillance program implementation. Specifically, the requirements to test weld heat-affected zone specimens and examine thermal monitors would be eliminated. Also, the NRC is proposing to reduce the number of tensile specimens that require testing and specify that testing correlation monitor material is optional. The proposed changes would reduce the burden to licensees for specimen testing, without having an adverse effect on public health and safety and the environment.

Reporting Requirements. Appendix H to 10 CFR part 50 requires licensees to submit test results to the NRC no later than one year after capsule withdrawal. As stated in the 1983 rulemaking (48 FR 24008; May 27, 1983), the primary purposes of the requirement are timely reporting of test results and notification of any problems. At the time of the 1983 rulemaking, there was a limited amount of data from irradiated materials from which to estimate embrittlement trends of RVs at nuclear power plants; thus, making it crucial for the timely reporting of test results. An extensive amount of embrittlement data now exists, and embrittlement mechanisms are well-understood. The one-year reporting requirement has become a hardship for some licensees because of the implementation of integrated surveillance programs (which require significant coordination among multiple licensees and hot-cell laboratories) and because capsules with higher neutron fluence levels may need longer periods

of radioactive decay before capsule shipping and testing can be performed. As a result, licensees have been requesting an additional 6 months to submit reports. To reduce the burden on licensees to prepare these extension requests and for the NRC to review and approve these requests, the NRC is proposing rulemaking to increase the reporting period from one year to 18 months. This change would not have an adverse effect on public health and safety and the environment.

Rulemaking Process. The NRC has evaluated the planned amendments to appendix H to 10 CFR part 50 and has determined that, if implemented, there would not be an adverse effect on public health and safety and the environment. In addition, the NRC has analyzed the costs to conduct this rulemaking and has determined that the most efficient approach is to use the direct final rule process. This abbreviated process would minimize the use of agency resources and potentially allow the revised requirements to become effective sooner, thus providing licensees the benefits of the rule change sooner. Although the NRC does not anticipate receiving public comments that are significant and adverse, the NRC's rulemaking process for this action will provide the public an opportunity to comment on the direct final rule. Read more about the direct final rule process on the NRC's public Web site, at <https://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/rulemaking/rulemaking-process/direct-final-rule.html>.

III. Publically-Available Documents

As the NRC continues its ongoing rulemaking effort to revise the requirements for a reactor vessel materials surveillance program, the NRC is making documents publicly available on the Federal rulemaking Web site, www.regulations.gov, under Docket ID NRC-2017-0151. The current status of this rulemaking effort, as well as other NRC planned rulemaking activities, can be found on the NRC public Web site at <https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/rulemaking-ruleforum/active/RuleIndex.html>.

The NRC may post additional materials relevant to this rulemaking at www.regulations.gov, under Docket ID NRC-2017-0151. Please take the following actions if you wish to receive alerts when changes or additions occur in a docket folder: (1) navigate to the docket folder (NRC-2017-0151); (2) click the "Email Alert" link; and (3) enter your email address and select how frequently you would like to receive emails (daily, weekly, or monthly).

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this day of , 2018.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Annette Vietti-Cook
Secretary for the Commission.

RESPONSE SHEET

TO: Annette Vietti-Cook, Secretary
FROM: Commissioner Caputo
SUBJECT: COMSECY-18-0016: Request Commission Approval to Use the Direct Final Rule Process to Revise the Testing and Reporting Requirements in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix H, Reactor Vessel Material Surveillance Program Requirements (RIN 3150-AK07)

Approved X Disapproved Abstain Not Participating


COMMENTS: Below X Attached X None

Approved, subject to the attached edits.

Entered in STARS

Yes X

No



Signature

1/2/2019

Date

AXC Comments:

I am encouraged by staff efforts to identify areas within our regulations where there is unnecessary regulatory burden and to propose actions to remove the unnecessary burden without impacting public health and safety. Such is the case with the proposal to modify existing 10 CFR 50, Appendix H. In the subject proposed rulemaking, the staff is proposing non-mandatory relaxations in the technical areas of surveillance capsule testing and in the administrative area of test report submittal schedules. The staff also provided their assessment of the cost and benefits of several options and determined that the direct final rule option provided the best approach to achieve the projected industry benefits in the shortest amount of time. Based on the stakeholder interactions to date, the staff does not anticipate any significant and adverse comments that could result in the need to withdraw the direct final rule. Therefore, based on the information presented in the staff documents provided to the Commission, I approve the staff's request to use the direct final rulemaking process to revise the testing and reporting requirements contained in 10 CFR 50, Appendix H.

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

10 CFR Part 50

[NRC-2017-0151]

RIN 3150-AK07

Reactor Vessel Material Surveillance Program

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Regulatory basis; availability.

SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is publishing a regulatory basis to support a rulemaking that would amend the NRC's regulations for the light-water power reactor vessel material surveillance programs. The rulemaking would reduce the unnecessary regulatory burden associated with the testing of certain specimens contained within surveillance capsules, and reporting the surveillance test results. The NRC has completed a regulatory basis that demonstrates there is sufficient justification to proceed with rulemaking. The NRC is providing the basis for rulemaking for public information, but is not seeking public comment on the regulatory basis at this time.

DATES: The regulatory basis is available **[INSERT DATE OF PUBLICATION IN THE FEDERAL REGISTER]**.

ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID **NRC-2017-0151** when contacting the NRC about the

availability of information for this action. You may obtain publicly-available information related to this action by any of the following methods:

- **Federal Rulemaking Web Site:** Go to <http://www.regulations.gov> and search for Docket ID **NRC-2015-0070**. Address questions about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher; telephone: 301-415-3463; e-mail: Carol.Gallagher@nrc.gov. For technical questions, contact the individual listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of this document.

- **NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS):** You may obtain publicly-available documents online in the ADAMS Public Documents collection at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html>. To begin the search, select "[ADAMS Public Documents](#)" and then select "[Begin Web-based ADAMS Search](#)." For problems with ADAMS, please contact the NRC's Public Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or by e-mail to pdr.resource@nrc.gov. The regulatory basis can be accessed in ADAMS at accession number ML18057A005.

- **NRC's PDR:** You may examine and purchase copies of public documents at the NRC's PDR, Room O1-F21, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Stewart Schneider, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; telephone: 301-415-4123, e-mail: Stewart.Schneider@nrc.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Background

Appendix H, "Reactor Vessel Material Surveillance Program Requirements" (Appendix H), to part 50 of title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* (10 CFR), "Domestic

Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities,” requires light-water nuclear power reactor licensees to have a reactor vessel (RV) material surveillance program to monitor changes in the fracture toughness properties of the RV materials adjacent to the reactor core. Unless it can be shown that the end of design life neutron fluence is below certain criteria, the NRC requires licensees to implement a materials surveillance program that tests irradiated material specimens that are located in surveillance test capsules in the RVs. The program evaluates changes in material fracture toughness and thereby assesses the integrity of the RV. For each capsule withdrawal, the test procedures and reporting requirements must meet the requirements of American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) E 185-82, “Standard Recommended Practice for Conducting Surveillance Tests for Light-Water Cooled Reactor Vessels,” to the extent practicable for the configuration of the specimens in the capsule. The design of the surveillance program and the withdrawal schedule must meet the requirements of the edition of ASTM E 185 that is current on the issue date of the ASME Code to which the reactor vessel was purchased. Later editions of ASTM E 185, up to and including those editions through 1982, may be used. In sum, the surveillance program must comply with ASTM E 185, as modified by appendix H to 10 CFR part 50. The number, design, and location of these surveillance capsules within the RV are established during the design of the program, before initial plant operation.

Appendix H to 10 CFR part 50 also specifies that each capsule withdrawal and the test results must be the subject of a summary technical report to be submitted within one year of the date of capsule withdrawal, unless an extension is granted by the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. The NRC uses the results from the surveillance program to assess licensee submittals related to pressure-temperature limits in accordance with appendix G to 10 CFR part 50, “Fracture Toughness Requirements,” and to assess pressurized water reactor licensee’s compliance with § 50.61, “Fracture toughness requirements for protection against

pressurized thermal shock events,” or § 50.61a, “Alternate fracture toughness requirements for protection against pressurized thermal shock events.”

In 2001, the NRC began a rulemaking to revise appendix G to 10 CFR part 50 (RIN 3150-AG98; NRC-2008-0582) to eliminate the pressure-temperature limits related to the metal temperature of the RV closure head flange and vessel flange areas. The NRC expanded the rulemaking scope in 2008 to include revisions to appendix H to 10 CFR part 50, because the fracture toughness analysis required by appendix G to 10 CFR part 50 relies on data obtained from the RV material surveillance program established under appendix H to 10 CFR part 50.

In COMSECY-14-0027, “Rulemaking to Revise Title 10, *Code of Federal Regulations*, Part 50, Appendix H, ‘Reactor Vessel Material Surveillance Program Requirements,’” issued on June 25, 2014 (~~ADAMS Accession No. ML14077A472~~ (not publicly available)), the NRC staff requested Commission approval to separate the rulemaking activities to revise appendices G and H to 10 CFR part 50, and to proceed immediately with rulemaking for appendix H to 10 CFR part 50.

In staff requirements memorandum (SRM) to COMSECY-14-0027, dated August 8, 2014 (~~ADAMS Accession No. ML14220A184~~ (not publicly available)), the Commission approved the staff’s recommendation to proceed with a separate rulemaking for appendix H to 10 CFR part 50. The SRM to COMSECY-14-0027 directed the NRC staff to begin the appendix H to 10 CFR part 50 rulemaking independent of the completion date or conclusions of the appendix G to 10 CFR part 50 technical basis development activities.

II. Discussion

The NRC has prepared a regulatory basis to support a rulemaking that would amend the NRC’s testing and reporting requirements in appendix H to 10 CFR part 50. In the regulatory

basis, the NRC concluded that it has sufficient justification to proceed with rulemaking to amend appendix H to 10 CFR part 50.

Testing Requirements. Appendix H to 10 CFR part 50 requires RV surveillance programs to include Charpy impact specimens from welds, base metal, and the weld heat-affected zone materials and tensile specimens from welds and base metal materials. The NRC is proposing to conduct a rulemaking to reduce the testing of some specimens and eliminate the testing of other specimens that do not provide meaningful information to assess RV integrity. This decision is based on substantial material data, knowledge, and experience attained through the many years of RV surveillance program implementation. Specifically, the requirements to test weld heat-affected zone specimens and examine thermal monitors would be eliminated. Also, the NRC is proposing to reduce the number of tensile specimens that require testing and specify that testing correlation monitor material is optional. The proposed changes would reduce the costs burden to licensees for specimen testing, without having an adverse effect on public health and safety and the environment.

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of radioactive decay before capsule shipping and testing can be performed. As a result, licensees have been requesting an additional 6 months to submit reports. To reduce the costs burden on licensees to prepare these extension requests and for the NRC to review and approve these requests, the NRC is proposing rulemaking to increase the reporting period from one year to 18 months. This change would not have an adverse effect on public health and safety and the environment.

Rulemaking Process. The NRC has evaluated the planned amendments to appendix H to 10 CFR part 50 and has determined that, if implemented, there would not be an adverse effect on public health and safety and the environment. In addition, the NRC has analyzed the costs to conduct this rulemaking and has determined that the most efficient approach is to use the direct final rule process. This abbreviated process would minimize the use of agency resources and potentially allow the revised requirements to become effective sooner, thus providing licensees the benefits of the rule change sooner. Although the NRC does not anticipate receiving public comments that are significant and adverse, the NRC's rulemaking process for this action will provide the public an opportunity to comment on the direct final rule. Read more about the direct final rule process on the NRC's public Web site, at <https://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/rulemaking/rulemaking-process/direct-final-rule.html>.

III. Publically-Available Documents

As the NRC continues its ongoing rulemaking effort to revise the requirements for a reactor vessel materials surveillance program, the NRC is making documents publicly available on the Federal rulemaking Web site, www.regulations.gov, under Docket ID NRC-2017-0151. The current status of this rulemaking effort, as well as other NRC planned rulemaking activities, can be found on the NRC public Web site at <https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/rulemaking-ruleforum/active/RuleIndex.html>.

The NRC may post additional materials relevant to this rulemaking at www.regulations.gov, under Docket ID NRC-2017-0151. Please take the following actions if you wish to receive alerts when changes or additions occur in a docket folder: (1) navigate to the docket folder (NRC-2017-0151); (2) click the "Email Alert" link; and (3) enter your email address and select how frequently you would like to receive emails (daily, weekly, or monthly).

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this day of , 2018.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Annette Vietti-Cook
Secretary for the Commission.

**FRN: REACTOR VESSEL MATERIAL SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM
DATED:**

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ADAMS Accession Numbers: PKG: ML18057A000; COMSECY: ML18057A002; Regulatory Basis: ML18057A005; FRN: ML18057A003. WITS: SRM-CMSY140027-1 * via e-mail

OFFICE	NMSS/DRM/RRPB/PM	NMSS/DRM/RRPB/RS	NMSS/DRM/RASB/TL*	NMSS/DRM/RRPB/BC
NAME	SSchneider	GLappert	JShepherd	MKhanna
DATE	02/22/2018	02/28/2018	03/13/2018	03/20/2018
OFFICE	NMSS/DRM/D	RES/DE/D	NRR/DSS/D*	NRR/DMLR/D*
NAME	PHolahan	BThomas	MGavrilas (VCusumano for)	GWilson
DATE	04/18/18	05/01/2018	05/04/2018	04/30/2018
OFFICE	NRO/DEI/D*	RES/D*	NRO/D*	OGC – NLO* Contingent on rectification of "legal" comments
NAME	FAkstulewicz	MWeber (BThomas for)	FBrown	TBarczy
DATE	04/27/2018	05/16/2018	05/10/2018	06/01/2018
OFFICE	NMSS/DRM/RASB/BC *	NRR/D	EDO	
NAME	CBladey (JShepherd- Vladimir for)	BHolian	MDoane	
DATE	05/07/2018	06/22/2018		

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RESPONSE SHEET

TO: Annette Vietti-Cook, Secretary
FROM: Commissioner Wright
SUBJECT: COMSECY-18-0016: Request Commission Approval to Use the Direct Final Rule Process to Revise the Testing and Reporting Requirements in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix H, Reactor Vessel Material Surveillance Program Requirements (RIN 3150-AK07)

Approved Disapproved Abstain Not Participating

COMMENTS: Below Attached None

I approve the staff's request to use the direct final rule process to revise the testing and reporting requirements in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix H, "Reactor Vessel Material Surveillance Requirements." I also approve the publication of the draft *Federal Register* notice, subject to the attached edits.

My approval is based on the staff's conclusions that the revised testing and reporting requirements would reduce unnecessary regulatory burden on reactor licensees without adversely affecting public health and safety and that significant and adverse public comments are not expected on this rulemaking. I appreciate the staff's efforts to use the most efficient approach to meet the agency's mission.

Once the Commission has issued its direction on this paper, the staff should take the appropriate ticketing actions to reflect the Commission's decisions.

Entered in STARS

Yes
No

Catherine Karatas for DAW
Signature
11/2/19
Date

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

10 CFR Part 50

[NRC-2017-0151]

RIN 3150-AK07

Reactor Vessel Material Surveillance Program

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Regulatory basis; availability.

SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is publishing a regulatory basis to support a rulemaking that would amend the NRC's regulations for the light-water power reactor vessel material surveillance programs. The rulemaking would reduce the regulatory burden associated with the testing of specimens contained within surveillance capsules, and reporting the surveillance test results. The NRC has completed a regulatory basis that demonstrates there is sufficient justification to proceed with rulemaking. The NRC is providing the basis for rulemaking for public information, but is not seeking public comment on the regulatory basis at this time.

DATES: The regulatory basis is available **[INSERT DATE OF PUBLICATION IN THE FEDERAL REGISTER]**.

ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID **NRC-2017-0151** when contacting the NRC about the availability of information for this action. You may obtain publicly-available information related to

licensees to have a reactor vessel (RV) material surveillance program to monitor changes in the fracture toughness properties of the RV materials adjacent to the reactor core. Unless it can be shown that the end of design life neutron fluence is below certain criteria, the NRC requires licensees to implement a materials surveillance program that tests irradiated material specimens that are located in [test-surveillance](#) capsules in the RVs. The program evaluates changes in material fracture toughness and thereby assesses the integrity of the RV. For each capsule withdrawal, the test procedures and reporting requirements must meet the requirements of American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) E 185-82, "Standard Recommended Practice for Conducting Surveillance Tests for Light-Water Cooled Reactor Vessels," to the extent practicable for the configuration of the specimens in the capsule. The design of the surveillance program and the withdrawal schedule must meet the requirements of the edition of ASTM E 185 that is current on the issue date of the ASME Code to which the reactor vessel was purchased. Later editions of ASTM E 185, up to and including those editions through 1982, may be used. In sum, the surveillance program must comply with ASTM E 185, as modified by appendix H to 10 CFR part 50. The number, design, and location of these surveillance capsules within the RV are established during the design of the program, before initial plant operation.

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