


TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA. TENNESSEE 37401



September 26, 1977

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection and Enforcement Region II 230 Peachtree Street, NW., Suite 1217 Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 3 - DOCKET NO. 50-296 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-68 - REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE REPORT BFR0-50-296/7717

The enclosed report provides details concerning the primary containment isolation valve 3-FCV-77-2A on the drywell floor drain sump pump discharge line which would not operate as required by Technical Specification 3.7.D.l during routine operability checks. This report is submitted in accordance with Browns Ferry unit 3 Technical Specifications. Section 3.7.2.b.(2).

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

H. S. Fox

Director of Power Production

Enclosure

cc (Enclosure):

Director (3)

Office of Management Information and Program Control U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555

Director (40)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

	LIUENSEE EVENT HEPUHT	
i	CONTROL BLOCK: [PLEA PRINT ALL REQUIRED INFORMATIO	נאס
<u> </u>		•
可冒	CATEGORY REPORT REPORT DOCKET NUMBER CONT 1 1 1 1 0 5 0 - 0 2 9 6 0 7 7 7 0 9 9 2 2 7 7 57 58 59 50 61 61 68 69 74 75	7 80
	EVENT DESCRIPTION,	*
可是	(SEE ATTACHMENT)	لِـ
頭	9 (BFRO-50-296/7717)	80
ㅂ	9	80
嘓	9	닒
頭		
<u> </u>		90
· 回习.	SYSTEM CAUSE COMPONENT CODE COMPONENT COMPONEN	80
	CAUSE DESCRIPTION - ;	٠.
圓	(SEE ATTACHMENT)	80
09		Ĭ
10		B0
8	9 FACRITY METHOD OF	ᇷ
777	STATUS % POWER OTHER STATUS DISCOVERY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION	
111	E 0 6 1 NA B Routine Operation 9 10 12 13 44 45, 46	80 80
	FORM OF ACTIVITY CONTENT	
1 2	Z Z NA NA NA	
. 8	9 10 11 44 45; PERSONNEL EXPOSURES	80
 -	NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION	
13	9 11 12 13	80
_	PERSONNEL INJURIES	
1 4	NUMBER DESCRIPTION	1
8		<u>80</u>
	OFFSITE CONSEQUENCES	
1 5 8	NA NA	 80
	LOSS OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY	_
16	TYPE DESCRIPTION NA NA	i
. 8		<u>80</u> ,
สล	PUBLICITY	ı
<u> 기기</u> .		뜅
	ADDITIONAL FACTORS	
18	NA .	ال
8	9	<u>80</u>
19		
В	9	BO

EVENT DESCRIPTION (Continued):

During routine operability checks, primary containment isolation valve 3-FCV-77-2A on the drywell floor drain sump pump discharge line would not operate as required by Technical Specification 3.7.D.1. Reactor operation was continued by deactivating the valve in the closed position as allowed by Technical Specification 3.7.D.2. Repairs were made by fixing a cracked air line oiler and replacement of a sticking flow solenoid valve in the air supply to the FCV-77-2A air operator. Previous solenoid failures are reported on BFAO-7351W and BFAO-50-260/7414W:

CAUSE DESCRIPTION (Continued) -

The air supply line oiler cracked, thus losing lubrication to the solenoid control valve (FSV-77-2A). Lack of lubrication caused FSV-77-2A to fail to operate properly; therefore, the primary containment isolation valve was inoperable. The oiler was manufactured by Dyna-Quip # LI-11-6, model M7; the solenoid valve is a Versa model VSG-3521.