

I 04/08/78

REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)
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SUBJECT:

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FORWARDING LICENSEE EVENT REPT (RO 50-296/78-006) ON 04/10/78 CONCERNING
ELECT CONNECTOR CARRYING THERMOCOUPLE CIRCUITS MONITORING PRIMARY CONTAINMENT
ATMOSPHERIC TEMP. WAS NOT INCLUDED AS PART OF THE MODIFICATION WHICH
QUALIFIED THE CONNECTOR ASSEMBLIES

PLANT NAME: BROWNS FERRY - UNIT 3

REVIEWER INITIAL: XJM
DISTRIBUTOR INITIAL: *al*

***** DISTRIBUTION OF THIS MATERIAL IS AS FOLLOWS *****

INCIDENT REPORTS
(DISTRIBUTION CODE A002)

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DISTRIBUTION: LTR 45 ENCL 45
SIZE: 1P+1P+1P

CONTROL NBR: 781180131

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TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401

APR 24 1978

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INSPECTION
SERVICES UNIT

INSPECTION
SERVICES

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region II
230 Peachtree Street, NW., Suite 1217
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 3 -
DOCKET NO. 50-296 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-68 - REPORTABLE
OCCURRENCE REPORT BPRO-50-296/786

The enclosed report provides details concerning an electrical connector carrying thermocouple circuits monitoring primary containment atmospheric temperature which was not included as part of the modification which qualified the connector assemblies for an accident environment. This report is submitted in accordance with Browns Ferry unit 3 Technical Specification 6.7.2.a.(9).

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

REGULATORY DOCKET FILE COPY

H. S. Fox
Director of Power Production

Enclosure (3)

cc (Enclosure):

Director (3)

Office of Management Information and Program Control

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Washington, DC 20555

Director (40)

Office of Inspection and Enforcement

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Washington, DC 20555

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Report Number : BFRO-50-296/786

Report Date: April 19, 1978

Occurrence Date: April 10, 1978

Facility : Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant - Unit 3

Identification of Occurrence

During verification of the temperature versus time profile used in the post-accident environmental qualification testing for electrical connector assemblies on unit 3, Division of Engineering Design employees noted that the TVA response to AEC question 12.2.16 dated March 25, 1971, committed TVA to monitoring primary containment atmospheric temperature. It has been determined that the circuits for these temperature sensors on unit 3 contain an electrical connector assembly within primary containment that was not included as part of the modification which qualified the connector assemblies for an accident environment. (Refer to LER BFRO-50-296/784.)

The circuit is used to annunciate when a drywell atmospheric temperature of 281° F or higher still exists 30 minutes after an incident begins (drywell pressure exceeds 2 psig).

Conditions Prior to Occurrence

Unit at approximately 95-percent power.

Description of Occurrence

An electrical connector carrying thermocouple circuits monitoring primary containment atmospheric temperature was not included as part of the modification which qualified the connector assemblies for an accident environment.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence

Design deficiency.

Analysis of Occurrence

The connector assembly is an environmental-resistant Amphenol 69R series and contains only thermocouple cable. Due to the very low voltage and current associated with thermocouples, electrical failure of the connector assembly is very unlikely. There was no effect on the public health or safety.

Corrective Action

The connector was replaced with a qualified splice during a unit outage which began on April 15, 1978.

JGD:SGS
4/20/78



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