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REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS) DISTRIBUTION FOR INCOMING MATERIAL 50-296

REC: OREILLY J P

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ORG: FOX H S TN VALLEY AUTH DOCDATE: 04/24/78 DATE RCVD: 04/28/78

DOCTYPE: LETTER NOTARIZED: NO COPIES RECEIVED SUBJECT: FORWARDING LICENSEE EVENT REPT (RO 50-296/78-006) ON 04/10/78 CONCERNING ELECT CONNECTOR CARRYING THERMOCOUPLE CIRCUITS MONITORING PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERIC TEMP. WAS NOT INCLUDED AS PART OF THE MODIFICATION WHICH QUALIFIED THE CONNECTOR ASSEMBLIES

PLANT NAME: BROWNS FERRY - UNIT 3

REVIEWER INITIAL: XJM DISTRIBUTOR INITIAL:

********************* DISTRIBUTION OF THIS MATERIAL IS AS FOLLOWS *******************

INCIDENT REPORTS (DISTRIBUTION CODE A002)

FOR ACTION:

BR CHIEF LEAR**W/4 ENCL

INTERNAL:

REG FILE**W/ENCL I & E**W72 ENCL SCHROEDER/IPPOLITO**W/ENCL NOVAK/CHECK**W/ENCL KNIGHT**W/ENCL HANAUER**W/ENCL EISENHUT**W/ENCL SHAO**W/ENCL KREGER/J. COLLINS**W/ENCL K SEYFRIT/IE**W/ENCL NRC PDR**W/ENCL MIPC**W/3 ENCL HOUSTON**W/ENCL EEB**W/ENCL BUTLER**W/ENCL TEDESCO**W/ENCL BAER**W/ENCL VOLLMER/BUNCH**W/ENCL ROSA**W/ENCL

EXTERNAL: LPDR'S ATHENS, AL**W/ENCL TIC**W/ENCL NSIC**W/ENCL ACRS CAT B**W/16 ENCL

> COPIES NOT SUBMITTED PER REGULATORY GUIDE #10.1

DISTRIBUTION: LTR 45 ENCL 45 SIZE: 1P+1P+1P CONTROL NBR: 781180131

THE END

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TENNESSEÉ VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401

APR 24 1978

Mr. Jamos P. O'Reilly, Director U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection and Enforcement Region II 230 Peachtree Street, NN., Suite 1217 Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 3 -DOCKET NO. 50-296 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-68 - REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE REPORT BFR0-50-296/786

The enclosed report provides details concerning an electrical connector carrying thermocouple circuits monitoring primary containment atmospheric temperature which was not included as part of the modification which qualified the connector assemblies for an accident environment. This report is submitted in accordance with Browns Ferry unit 3 Technical Specification 6.7.2.a.(9).

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

H. S. Fox Director of Power Production

Enclosure (3) cc (Enclosure): Director (3) Office of Management Information and Program Control U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555

Director (40) Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555



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Lage BFA85 10/5/77 NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (7.77) LICENSEE EVENT REPORT **EXHIBIT A** CONTROL'BLOCK: | JO (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION) 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 3 4 1 1 1 1 0 0 51 ALBRF 30 0 0 ٦° 0 1 LICENSEE CODI CONT 0 1 EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10) | An electrical connector carrying thermocouple circuits monitoring primary 0 2 [3] <u>Containment atmospheric temperature was not included as part</u> of the modification which qualified the connector 04 assemb1 for accident environ an 05 | ment. There was no effect on the public health or safetv previous 06 report concerning connectors on unit 3 was reported in BFR0-50-296/784. 07 SYSTEM CODE CAUSE CAUSE COMP. SUBCODE VALVE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE CODE 0 9 BO A B PENETR 1216 பர 18 SEQUENTIAL OCCURRENCE REPORT REVISION D REPORT NUMBER EVENT YEAR REPORT NO. COOE TYPE NO. 7<u>8</u> 0 0 6 011 T 01 ົ່ງເ 32 HOURS (22) COMPONENT ANUFACTURE ATTACHUSENT SUBMITTED PRIME COMP. ACTION FUTURE EFFECT ON PLANT METHO FORMS N @ 13 20 L 🛞 A | 3 | 8 | 0 | 3 E B F B 130 110 15 16 CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27) The cause was a design deficiency. 10 The connector is an environmental. $\Box \Box \Box$ resistant Amphenol type 69R series and contains only the thermocouple Due to the very low voltage and current associated with thermo-| cable. 12 couples, electrical failure of the connector assembly is unlikely The 111 connector was replaced with a qualified splice during a unit outage which began on April 15, 1978. METHOD OF DISCOVERY FACILITY OTHER STATUS S POWER UISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32) E 2 0 95 3 D' (3) Notification by design personnel 1 5 N/A 17 ACTIVITY CONTENT 80 AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY 35 OF RELEASE LOCATION OF RELEASE (36) RELEASED N/A N/A 1 6 10 83 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER DESCRIPTION (39) TYPE 5 N/A 1 7 PERSONNEL INJURIES 80 DESCRIPTION (41) NUMBER 00000 N/A 1 8 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43) DESCRIPTION 3 (47) N/A 19 PUBLICITY NRC USE ONLY DESCRIPTION (45) N 4 N/A 20 10 NAME OF PREPARER. PHONE: *Revision

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Report Number : BFRO-50-296/786 Report Date: April 19, 1978 Occurrence Date: April 10, 1978 Facility : Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant - Unit 3

Identification of Occurrence

During verification of the temperature versus time profile used in the postaccident environmental qualification testing for electrical connector assemblies on unit 3, Division of Engineering Design employees noted that the TVA response to AEC question 12.2.16 dated March 25, 1971, committed TVA to monitoring primary containment atmospheric temperature. It has been determined that the circuits for these temperature sensors on unit 3 contain an electrical connector assembly within primary containment that was not included as part of the modification which qualified the connector assemblies for an accident environment. (Refer to LER BFR0-50-296/784.)

The circuit is used to annunciate when a drywell atmospheric temperature of 281° F or higher still exists 30 minutes after an incident begins (drywell pressure exceeds 2 psig).

Conditions Prior to Occurrence

Unit at approximately 95-percent power.

Description of Occurrence

An electrical connector carrying thermocouple circuits monitoring primary containment atmospheric temperature was not included as part of the modification which qualified the connector assemblies for an accident environment.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence -

Design deficiency.

Analysis of Occurrence

The connector assembly is an environmental-resistant Amphenol 69R series and contains only thermocouple cable. Due to the very low voltage and current associated with thermocouples, electrical failure of the connector assembly is very unlikely. There was no effect on the public health or safety.

Corrective Action

The connector was replaced with a qualified splice during a unit outage which began on April 15, 1978.

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