

# UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III 2443 WARRENVILLE RD. SUITE 210 LISLE, ILLINOIS 60532-4352

July 27, 2018

Mr. Christopher R. Church Site Vice President Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Northern States Power Company, Minnesota 2807 West County Road 75 Monticello, MN 55362–9637

SUBJECT: MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT—NRC INTEGRATED

INSPECTION REPORT 05000263/2018002

Dear Mr. Church:

On June 30, 2018, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an integrated inspection at your Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant. On July 10, 2018, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. Don Barker and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

Based on the results of this inspection, the NRC did not identify any issues. Further, inspectors documented a licensee-identified violation which was determined to be of very low safety significance in this report. The NRC is treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violation or significance of the NCV, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555–0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant.

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This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at <a href="http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html">http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html</a> and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding."

Sincerely,

/RA/

Kenneth Riemer, Chief Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects

Docket No. 50–263; 72–058 License No. DPR–22

Enclosure: Inspection Report 05000263/2018002

cc: Distribution via ListServ®

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Letter to Christopher Church from Kenneth dated July 27, 2018

SUBJECT: MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT—NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000263/2018002

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## U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

#### **REGION III**

Docket No: 50–263; 72–058

License No: DPR-22

Report No: 05000263/2018002

Enterprise Identifier: I-2018-002-0022

Licensee: Northern States Power Company, Minnesota

Facility: Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant

Location: Monticello, MN

Dates: April 1 through June 30, 2018

Inspectors: P. Zurawski, Senior Resident Inspector

D. Krause, Resident Inspector

T. Go, Health Physicist

G. Hanson, Senior Emergency Preparedness Inspector

Approved by: K. Riemer, Chief

Branch 2

**Division of Reactor Projects** 

#### **SUMMARY**

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring licensee's performance by conducting an integrated quarterly inspection at the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to <a href="https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html">https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html</a> for more information. NRC and self-revealed findings, violations, and additional items are summarized in the table below. Licensee-identified non-cited violations are documented in report section: 71114.05—Correction of Emergency Planning Weaknesses.

# **List of Findings and Violations**

No findings or violations were identified.

## **Additional Tracking Items**

Туре	Issue Number	Title	Report Section	Status
LER	05000263/2017–006–01	Loss of Reactor Protection System Scram Function During Main Steam Isolation Valve Channel Functional Tests Due to Use of a Test Fixture	71153 (Other Activities- Baseline)	Closed

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#### **PLANT STATUS**

Monticello began the inspection period operating at approximately 100 percent power and operated at or near full power for the reminder of the inspection period, with the following exceptions. Power was subsequently returned to 100 percent after completion of each activity.

- May 8, 2018—Power was reduced to approximately 98 percent for a control rod pattern adjustment;
- June 2, 2018—Power was reduced to approximately 75 percent for control rod scram time testing and quarterly turbine testing; and
- June 21, 2018—Power was reduced to approximately 80 percent for a packing adjustment and partial valve stroking on "C" outboard main steam isolation valve.

#### **INSPECTION SCOPES**

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at <a href="http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html">http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html</a>. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, "Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase." The inspectors performed plant status activities described in IMC 2515 Appendix D, "Plant Status" and conducted routine reviews using IP 71152, "Problem Identification and Resolution." The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

#### **REACTOR SAFETY**

#### 71111.01—Adverse Weather Protection

#### Summer Readiness (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated summer readiness of offsite and alternating current (AC) power systems on April 23, 2018.

# External Flooding (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated readiness to cope with external flooding on April 23, 2018.

## 71111.04—Equipment Alignment

## Partial Walkdown (4 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:

(1) Upper 4 kV Switchgear Room during 11 EDG out of service for maintenance on April 09, 2018;

- (2) 12 Control Rod Drive (CRD) Pump with 11 CRD Pump out of service for maintenance on April 30, 2018;
- (3) 1 AR Transformer with 1R Transformer out of service for maintenance on May 03, 2018; and
- (4) Standby Liquid Control Post Inservice Testing (IST) Surveillance Lineup on May 10, 2018.

## 71111.05Q—Fire Protection Annual/Quarterly

## **Quarterly Inspection** (5 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated fire protection program implementation in the following selected areas:

- (1) A.3–14–C; Fire Zone 14–C; Turbine Building Railroad Car Shelter on April 23, 2018;
- (2) A.3–34; Fire Zone 34; East Electrical Equipment and 13 Diesel Generator on April 23, 2018;
- (3) A.3–37; Fire Zone 37; Transformers on April 24, 2018;
- (4) A.3–03–C; Fire Zone 03–C; West Reactor Vessel Instrument Rack on April 13, 2018; and
- (5) A.3–01–D; Fire Zone 01–D; Reactor Building 896' Tank Room on May 02, 2018.

#### 71111.11—Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

#### Operator Requalification (1 Sample)

The inspectors observed and evaluated SEG # RQ-SS-63 (Control Valve Oscillations with a Stuck Open SRV and SDVS Failing Open Requiring Blowdown) on May 14, 2018.

#### Operator Performance (2 Samples)

The inspectors observed and evaluate the following:

- (1) Operator Risk Management during Control Room closed circuit television replacement on April 12, 2018; and
- (2) Downpower to 75 percent for reactivity adjustments and turbine valve testing on June 02, 2018.

#### 71111.12—Maintenance Effectiveness

#### Routine Maintenance Effectiveness (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of routine maintenance activities associated with the following equipment and/or safety significant functions:

(1) Reactivity management events on May 21, 2018.

#### Quality Control (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated maintenance and quality control activities associated with the

following equipment performance issues:

(1) Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Maintenance Work Window on May 15, 2018.

#### 71111.13—Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (7 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities:

- (1) 11 Circulating Water Pump Trip Bypass Due to Sudden Indicated Intake Level Drop on April 25, 2018;
- (2) 12 Residual Heat Removal/Service Water (RHRSW) Pump Failed Inservice Testing on April 02, 2018;
- (3) Partial Loss of Control Room Lighting on May 07, 2018;
- (4) MUX–AM97 Plant Process Computer Intermittent Loss Affecting Core Thermal Power Data on May 09, 2018;
- (5) Blown Fuse on Y-71 Inverter on May 10, 2018;
- (6) Unidentified Leakage troubleshooting activities on June 27, 2018; and
- (7) "C" Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) Packing Leak, Down Power and Packing Consolidation on June 21, 2018.

#### 71111.15—Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments (5 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:

- (1) Small Oil Leak on High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) Booster Pump on April 02, 2018;
- (2) 12 RHRSW Pump Low Differential Pressure on April 09, 2018;
- (3) High Pressure Core Injection (HPCI) and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) Equipment in MCC's 311 and 312 do not Account for Radiation Environment Qualification on May 03, 2018;
- (4) HPCI and RCIC Steam Isolation Valves do not account for conductive heat rise in Equipment Qualification on May 30, 2018; and
- (5) Essential Service Water flow margin and uncertainty Evaluation on May 22, 2018.

## 71111.18—Plant Modifications (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:

(1) Internal Flooding Seismic Upgrade on June 27, 2018.

# 71111.19—Post Maintenance Testing (6 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the following post maintenance tests:

- (1) 13 ESW Pump Pre-Service Post Maintenance Test (PMT) on April 04, 2018;
- (2) D3A Battery Charger 13 PMT on April 06, 2018;
- (3) SW to V-EAC-14B Check Valve PMT on April 16, 2018;
- (4) LC 108 Transformer X108, Ops: B.09.07–05 PMT on May 04, 2018;
- (5) RCIC Torus Outboard Suction (MO-2101) PMT on May 15, 2018; and

(6) 12 Core spray Pimp flow channel calibration PMT on May 21, 2018.

## 71111.22—Surveillance Testing

The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:

## Routine (3 Samples)

- (1) 0030; ECCS High Drywell Pressure Sensor test on April 12, 2018;
- (2) 0003; Drywell High Pressure SCRAM Test and Group 2, 3 & SCTMT Isolation Test and Calibration Procedure on April 16, 2018; and
- (3) OPS-FSW-0255-11-III-4; 14 ESW Pump Flow on April 17, 2018.

#### <u>In-service</u> (1 Sample)

(1) OPS-0255-02-III; Standby Liquid Control Pump Inservice Testing on May 09, 2018.

## <u>Containment Isolation Valve</u> (1 Sample)

(1) Reactor Building to Torus Vacuum Breaker Timing Step not obtained on 1st Attempt on April 17, 2018.

# 71114.05—Correction of Emergency Planning Weaknesses and Deficiencies

#### Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the maintenance of the emergency preparedness program for the Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability on June 05, 2018.

#### 71114.06—Drill Evaluation

#### Emergency Planning Drill (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated a station blackout and extended loss of emergency alternating current power drill on April 25, 2018.

#### RADIATION SAFETY

# 71124.08—Radioactive Solid Waste Processing and Radioactive Material Handling, Storage, and Transportation

## Radioactive Material Storage (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's radioactive material storage.

#### Radioactive Waste System Walk-down (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's radioactive waste processing facility during plant walkdowns.

#### Waste Characterization and Classification (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's radioactive waste characterization and classification.

#### Shipment Preparations (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's radioactive material shipment preparation processes.

#### Shipment Records (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's non-excepted package shipment records.

#### OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE

#### 71151—Performance Indicator Verification (3 Samples)

The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:

- (1) MS05: Safety System Functional Failures (SSFFs) Sample (04/01/2017–03/31/2018);
- (2) BI02: Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Leak Rate (04/01/2017–03/31/2018); and
- (3) BI01: Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Specific Activity (04/01/2017–03/31/2018).

#### 71152—Problem Identification and Resolution

#### Semiannual Trend Review (1 Sample)

The inspectors reviewed items documented in the licensees corrective action program between November 1, 2017 and April 30, 2018 for trends that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue.

(1) Licensee corrective action documents generated from November 2017 through April 2018; on April 30, 2018.

#### Annual Follow-Up of Selected Issues (1 Sample)

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:

(1) CAP 6486 ("Aging Management Program") and CAP 10713 ("Cable Jacket Degradation Issues") associated with degraded wiring found on safety related components on June 29, 2018.

#### 71153—Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion

#### Licensee Event Reports (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports which can be accessed at <a href="https://lersearch.inl.gov/LERSearchCriteria.aspx">https://lersearch.inl.gov/LERSearchCriteria.aspx</a>:

(1) Licensee Event Report (LER) 05000263/2017–006–01, "Loss of Reactor Protection System Scram Function during Main Steam Isolation Valve and Turbine Stop Valve Channel Functional Tests due to Use of a Test Fixture" on May 24, 2018.

#### **INSPECTION RESULTS**

#### 71114.05—Correction of Emergency Planning Weaknesses and Deficiencies

#### Licensee Identified Non-Cited Violation

71114.05

This violation of very low safety significance was identified by the licensee and has been entered into the licensee corrective action program and is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

#### **Enforcement:**

Violation: Title 10 CFR 50.54(q)(2) requires that a holder of a nuclear power reactor operating license follow and maintain the effectiveness of an emergency plan that meets the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E and the planning standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b). Title 10 CFR Part 50.47(b)(8) requires, in part, that a licensee must provide and maintain adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support the emergency response plan.

Contrary to the above requirements, on March 23, 2018, the licensee identified the site failed to maintain the effectiveness of the emergency plan by not providing and/or maintaining equipment capable of measuring the Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health (IDLH) concentrations for several toxic chemicals as required to properly classify an Alert Emergency Action Level (EAL). Specifically, while performing an emergency equipment inventory, the licensee identified that detector tubes (Draeger tubes) available to measure chlorine gas concentrations were not capable of measuring the IDLH concentration of 10 ppm required to identify the threshold level for classifying an Alert EAL (HA 3.1) since the measurement range of the available sample tubes was 50–500 ppm.

The inability to properly classify the Alert EAL represented a Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability and resulted in the licensee's submission of Event Notification Report # 53298 in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). An immediate extent of condition review performed by the licensee identified additional deficiencies in adequate sampling methods for determining IDLH concentrations for Butadiene, Ethylene Dichloride, and Gasoline. Additionally, the licensee identified that in April 2015 there was missed opportunity to correct this deficiency when an Emergency Preparedness (EP) Coordinator, performing a Control Room Emergency Equipment Inventory, identified the need to order and replace the existing chlorine detector tubes. The EP Coordinator added the incorrect detector tubes to the existing inventory form without validating the tubes' detection range and accuracy to ensure it was capable of detecting the IDLH threshold concentration level of 10 ppm.

Upon identification of the issue, the licensee implemented compensatory measures for determining the EAL classification and entered the issue into the corrective action program (CR 501000009876). On May 08, 2018, the licensee implemented the site's new EAL classification procedure that was developed using NEI 99–01, Revision 6, which does not require atmospheric sampling (use of detection tubes) for classification of EAL HA 3.1.

Significance/Severity Level: Using IMC 0609, Appendix B, "Emergency Preparedness Significance Determination Process, Table 5.8–1, the inspectors determined this finding was

of very low safety significance (Green) because a significant amount of equipment necessary to implement the E-plan was not available or functional to the extent that any key ERO member could not perform his/her assigned functions, in the absence of compensatory measures (Degraded Planning Standard), specifically the ability to accurately classify the Alert EAL. Determining the finding significance using IMC 0609, Appendix B, Table 5.4–1, results in the same finding significance (very low significance) since the performance deficiency would have rendered an EAL initiating condition ineffective such that the Alert would have been declared in a degraded manner.

Corrective Action Reference: 501000009876, "CR Toxic Gas Detector Tube."

#### 71152—Problem Identification and Resolution

Observation 71152

As part of a routine review of daily licensee corrective actions, the inspectors noted a potential increasing trend with Cable Jacket and Wire Degradation Issues within the context of the Aging Management Program. As a result, the inspectors performed a more in-depth review of some selected CAPs as an annual inspection sample.

No findings/weaknesses: The inspectors selected condition reports 501000010713, "Intermediate Range Monitor computer point shield wire found cut", 501000006486, "Wire found with broken strands at lug", and 501000000127, "Broken Wire Strands on MO–2013 Limit Switch", to ensure implementation of the CAP adequately supported nuclear safety.

The licensee initiated CAP 501000010713 for an IRM computer point shield wire connection being cut on April 13, 2018, CAP 501000006486 to document that the stranded wire on the HPCI turbine speed control system had numerous broken wire strands at the lug on December 18, 2017, and CAP 501000000127 for broken wire strands on RHR MO–2013 (LPCI outboard Isolation valve) limit switch on June 27, 2017. As appropriate, the inspectors verified corrective action program attributes (problem identification, evaluation/prioritization, operability, reportability, extent of condition, and completion/effectiveness of corrective actions) associated with these and other condition reports. The inspectors discussed the corrective actions and associated evaluations with licensee personnel.

Inspector reviews of the CAP determined that numerous repairs had occurred on multiple systems since mid-June 2017 with no common cause. The inspectors determined licensee actions to investigate, document, monitor, and report the damaged cables/wires have been adequate. Overall the inspector review concluded the licensee adequately implemented its corrective action process. The inspectors will continue to monitor both cable/wire damage events and trend rates and licensee actions.

#### 71153—Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion

Closure of LER 05000263/2017–006–01, Loss of Reactor Protection System	71153
Scram Function During Main Steam Isolation Valve Channel Functional Tests	
Due to Use of Test Fixture	
No findings or violations were identified.	

#### **EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS**

The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was controlled to protect from public disclosure. No proprietary information was documented in this report.

- On June 08, 2018, the inspector presented the radioactive waste and storage inspection results to Mr. K. Scott, Director of Site Operations, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On July 10, 2018, the inspectors presented the quarterly integrated inspection results to Mr. D. Barker, Director of Site Performance & Operations Support, and other members of the licensee staff.

#### **DOCUMENTS REVIEWED**

#### 71111.01—Adverse Weather

- 1150; Summer Checklist; Revision 72
- 1478; External Flood Monthly and Annual Surveillance; Revision 18
- 4 AWI-04.02.01; Revision 29
- A.6; Acts of Nature; Revision 56

## 7111.04Q—Equipment Alignment

- 2117; Plant Prestart Checklist Control Rod Drive System; Revision 11
- 2173; Plant Prestart Checklist, AC Power System Plant; Revision 24
- NF-36298-1; Electrical Load Flow One-line Diagram; Revision 115
- NH-36253; P&ID Standby Liquid Control System; Revision 80
- NH-88662; Transformer 1AR 13.8KV Structure Elect. and Ground Layout; Revision 77
- NX-7879-22; Standby Liquid Control System Sys 11; Revision 5

## 71111.05Q—Fire Protection

- A.3–34; Fire Zone 34 Strategy, East Electrical Equipment Room & 13 Diesel Generator Enclosure and Day Tank Room; Revision 15
- A.3-37; Fire Zone 37 Strategy, Transformers; Revision 15
- A.3-01-D; Reactor Building Tank Room; Revision 8
- A.3-03-C; Vessel Instrument Rack Area, Elev 962'; Revision 10
- A.3–14–C; Fire Zone 14–C Strategy, Railroad Car Area (Turbine Building); Revision 5

#### 71111.11Q—Licensed Operator Requalification

- SEG# RQ-SS-63; Control Valve Oscillations with a Stuck Open SRV and SDVS Failing Open Requiring Blowdown); Revision 0
- 0081; Control Rod Drive SCRAM Insertion Time Test; Revision 72
- WO 700033399; FINE-PVD7, Replace SPDS Monitor; April 12, 2018
- 2300; Reactivity Adjustment; June 02, 2018

#### 71111.12—Maintenance Effectiveness

- 0062; RCIC Steam Line High Area Temperature Test and Calibration Procedure; Revision 32
- 0074; Control Rod Drive Exercise; Revision 67

- 4847–PM; GE 7700 Line Motor Control Center Maintenance Procedure; Revision 32
- 4900–01–PM; PM for Limitorque Motor Operated Valves; Revision 42
- CAP 501000012231; Bank 2 Rods Fail to Insert during 0074
- CAP 501000012258; RMCS Failure Procedure Unclear
- CAP 501000012696; SR Grease Past Expiration Date
- OSP-RCI-0060; RCIC Hi Steam Flow Pressure Sensor Test and Calibration; Revision 9
- WO 00394889 Material Issue Ticket 97583000; Mobil Grease 28; March 17, 2011
- WO 7000027996 Material Issue Ticket 4900077032; January 03, 2018
- WO 700024043 Material Issue Ticket 4900082668; Grease Mobilux EP0; May 15, 2018
- WO 700024811 Material Issue Ticket 4900082573; IGESAR-1 Gasket; May 14, 2018
- WO 700024971; Monthly Control Rod Drive Exercise; May 19, 2018
- Work Plan 7000026915-0010; Repair Oil Leak, RCIC Pump; Revision 1
- Work Plan 700027996-0010; Pump Low Flow Relay 6541786-1; Revision 3

# 71111.13—Maintenance Risk Assessment and Emergent Work

- 0000-A; Operations Daily Log Mode 1; Revision 102
- 0255-05-III-2A; Comprehensive 12 RHRSW Pump and Valve Tests; Revision 32
- 3448; Fuse Replacement Information Form; Revision 11
- ACMP 501000002977; ACMP Drywell Unidentified Leakage Rising Trend; October 03, 2017
- B.04.01–05, H–4; Ops Man Rise in Unidentified Drywell Leakage; Revision 39
- B.08.11-05; Ops Man Diesel Oil System System Operation; Revision 41
- B.09.13-05; Instrument AC and Uninterruptable AC Distribution System; Revision 32
- CAP 501000005378; NOS: 01-036 Calculation has Out-of-Date Refs
- CAP 501000009616; Potential Adverse Trend in CR Lighting
- CAP 501000010105; P-109B #12 RHRSW Pump Low Differential Pressure
- CAP 501000010159; IST Calculation does not Match 0255-05-III-2A
- CAP 501000010560; DW Leakage Inaccurate on Plant Status
- CAP 501000011148; Abnormal Trend in 11 Circulating Water Pump Basin Level Indication
- CAP 501000011243; Potential Abnormal Stilling Well Response
- CAP 501000011674; Partial Loss of Control Room Lighting
- CAP 501000011723; MUX AM97 Intermittent Loss Affecting CTP
- CAP 501000011763; Failed PMT for AM97 Module
- CAP 501000011774; Blown Fuse Indication on Y-71 Inverter
- CAP 501000012880; Steam Leak from Valve Packing on AO-2-86C
- CAP 501000013725; Small Step Change in Unidentified Leakage
- FP-OP-REP-01; Event Reporting and Notification Process; Revision 6
- FP-OP-RSK-01; Risk Monitoring and Risk Management; Revision 9
- ODMI 501000002977; ODMI Type-2 Drywell Unidentified Leakage; Revision 2
- POD 5000002887298; MSIV "C" Pack Leak 501000012880; Revision 1
- QF–0565; Maintenance Rule Functional, MSPI, and Equipment Reliability Clock Reset Failure Evaluation; May 09, 2018
- WO 700039151; Circulating Water Basin Level Investigation; April 26, 2018
- WO 700039151-0010; Work Plan Circulating Water Basin Level Investigation; Revision 0
- WO 700040010; PMT MUX AM97 Intermittent; May 08, 2018
- WO 700040265; PMT MUX AM97 Intermittent; May 09, 2018
- WO 700040295; Blown Fuse Indication; May 09, 2018
- WO 700040770; AO-2-86C, Adjust Packing; June 21, 2018

#### 71111.15—Operability Evaluations

- CAP 501000001962; Process Fluid Heat Rise on RCIC
- CAP 501000002002; Process Fluid Heat Rise on HPCI
- CAP 501000010105; P-109B #12 RHRSW Pump Low Differential Pressure
- CAP 501000010214; Small Oil Leak on HPCI Booster Pump
- CAP 501000011518; Issues with MCC-31/312 Env Qualification
- CAP 501000012257; ESW Flow Margin and Uncertainty Evaluation
- CAP 501000012766; Thermography Results of HPCI/RCIC MOVs
- EE 60800000032; EQ Material Evaluation of HPCI and RCIC Steam Line Isolation Valves;
   Revision 0
- EQ 98-022; General Electric MCSS (DOR) (EC 28021); Revision 1
- FP-OP-ACM-01; Adverse Condition Monitoring Plan Process; Revision 1
- FP-WM-LMP-01; Leak Management Process; Revision 0
- NX-7822-22-7A; MNGP RCIC Turbine Reset Motor (HO-7) MO-2080; Revision A
- POD 500000279598; Process Fluid Heat Rise on HPCI/RCIC; August 17, 2017
- POD 500000286765; POD RHRSW/EDG-ESW Flow; Revision 0

#### 71111.18—Modifications

- EC 28405; Seismic Upgrade for Internal Flooding Sensitive Piping; Revision 0
- FRC 6EQVENG28405–01; Field Change Request Temporary Support for FPW13–6"-HB; January 24, 2018

#### 71111.19—Post Maintenance Testing

- WO 700009795; 12 Core Spray Pump Flow Channel Calibration/PMT; May 21, 2018
- WO 700024043; RCIC Torus Suction Outboard Valve MO-2101PMT; May 15, 2018
- WO 700032957; 13 ESW Pump PMT/Return to Service; April 03, 2018
- WO 700022447; Charger, D3A (13) Battery PMT; April 06, 2018
- WO 700034041; SW to V-EAC-13B Check Valve PMT; April 16, 2018
- WO 700023062; LC-108 Transformer X108 PMT/RTS; May 04, 2018
- B.09.07-05; Ops Man 480 Volt Station Auxiliary System Operation; Revision 53

#### 71111.22—Surveillance Test

- 0141; Reactor Building to Torus Vacuum Breaker Operability Check; Revision 37
- B.03.05–05; Ops Man Standby Liquid Control System; Revision 17
- CAP 501000010567; Timing Step not Obtained on 1st Attempt
- CAP 501000010785; Burnish Contacts 1-2 & 3-4 on 5A-K4D
- CAP 501000011810; SBLC Test Water Dirty
- QF–0565; Maintenance Rule Functional, MSPI, and Equipment Reliability Clock Reset Failure Evaluation; April 09, 2018
- QF–0937; Preconditioning Evaluation for AO–2379 Suppression Chamber Vacuum Relief Air Operated Valve; No Date
- WO 700022418; 0030, ECCS Hi Drywell Pressure Sensor Test; April 12, 2018
- WO 700022829; 0003 DW Hi Pr SCRAM & GR 2,3,& SCTMT ISL Test; April 16, 2018
- WO 700022919; 0255-11-III-4, 14 ESW Pump Flow Test; April 16, 2018
- WO 700023972; SBLC Quarterly Pump and Valve Tests; May 9, 2018

# 71114.05—Correction of Emergency Planning Weaknesses and Deficiencies

- CAP 501000009876; CR Toxic Gas Detector Tube
- 5791–900-04; Control Room Emergency Equipment Inventory; Revision 30
- ACE 501000009876; Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability; May 17, 2018

## 71114.06—Drill Evaluation

- EP Drill Scenario; Station Blackout and Extended Loss of Emergency Alternating Current; April 25, 2018

# 71124.08—Radioactive Solid Waste Processing and Radioactive Material Handling, Storage, and Transportation

- 2017 10CFR61 Database Update Documentation; dated July 28, 2017
- A–RW–MNGP–2017–1; 2017 Nuclear Oversight MNGP Radwaste Audit; dated October 30, 2017
- B.07.03–05; Processing of Phase Separators or Spent Resin Tank Using Centrifuge/Hopper; Bypass to Radwaste RDS–1000 Dewatering System Operation; Revision 28
- CAP 501000003722; NOS Identified Characterization Issues for Radwaste During an Audit of the Program
- CAP 501000003744; Nuclear Oversight Identified (NOS) Radwaste Shipping Document Errors
- CAP 501000003900; NOS Identified Incomplete Documentation for RW Shipment No. 16–19
- CAP 501000004071; NOS Finding of Incomplete Documentation Radwaste Shipment During Radwaste Program Audit
- CAP 501000010442; Opportunity for Improvement in the Radwaste Shipping Procedure
- CAP 501000010991; Dose Rates in the 962' Radwaste Pump Room were Five Times Higher than Normal Conditions
- CAP 501000012441; Radwaste Building Differential Pressure Issue
- CAP 501000012996; NRC Inspector Identified Discrepancies in Shipping Documents
- CAP 501000013009; NRC Inspector Identified Discrepancies in Shipping Documentation February 22, 2017
- FP-RP-RW-04; Creating Radioactive Fleet Procedure; Revision 0
- FP-RP-RW-05; Type B Radioactive Shipments Procedure; Revision 0
- Shipment No. 17-12; OLNC Coupon Shipment to GE Hitachi; UN2913 SCO-II; dated
- Shipment No. 17-38; SRVs Shipment to NWS Technologies; dated April 26, 2017
- Shipment No. 17–42; One C–Van and Eight B25 Boxes to Unitech Services; UN3321 LSA–II; dated May 01, 2017
- Shipment No. 17–57; Incore Lights to Westinghouse; UN2913 SCO-II; dated May 30, 2017
- Shipment No. 17–73; One C–Van and Four B25 Boxes to Unitech Services; UN3321 LSA–II; dated July 24, 2017
- Shipment No. 17–84; One Resin Liner Containing Condensate Resin; UN3321 LSA–II; dated September 05, 2017
- Shipment No. 18–27; One Laundry C–Van to Unitech Services; UN2912 LS–I; dated May 10, 2018
- Shipment No. 18–28; One S/L Container and Eight B25 Boxes to Unitech Services; UN2912 LSA–I; dated May 29, 2018
- Shipment No. 18–29; One Lead Lined Box and Two Eight Foot Metal Boxes; UN3321 LSAII; dated May 29, 2018
- Shipment No. 18–29; One Lead Lined Box and Two Eight Foot Metal Boxes to Energy Solution Bear Creek; UN3321 LSA–II; dated May 29, 2018

 WO–00421785; Process and Ship T–36A/B RWCU Phase Separator Tank to Liner; dated September 19, 2016

## 71151—Performance Indicator Verification

- 0533; Containment Sump Flow Measurement Instrumentation; Revision 30
- CAP 500001560179; RCS Leakage KPI Trend for May 2017
- CAP 500001560179: RCS Leakage KPI Trend for May 2017
- CAP 501000000363; Drywell Floor Drain Sump
- CAP 501000000363; Drywell Floor Drain Sump
- CAP 501000002977; Drywell Floor Sump ROC Rising Trend
- CAP 501000002977; Drywell Floor Sump ROC Rising Trend
- CAP 501000003434; Indicated Unidentified DW Leakage High
- CAP 501000003434; Indicated Unidentified DW Leakage High
- CAP 501000004830; KPI High DW Unidentified Leakage
- CAP 501000004830; KPI High DW Unidentified Leakage
- CAP 501000005172; Drywell Equipment Drain Sump
- CAP 501000005172; Drywell Equipment Drain Sump
- CAP 501000006020; RCS Leakage KPI Rounds Data Entry Error
- CAP 501000006020; RCS Leakage KPI Rounds Data Entry Error
- CAP 501000010284; RW Drywell Equipment Drain Sump Pump Flow
- CAP 501000010284; RW Drywell Equipment Drain Sump Pump Flow
- FP-PA-PI-01; Performance Indicator Control; Revision 12
- FP-PA-PI-02; NRC/INPO/WANO Performance Indicator Reporting; Revision 13
- FP-R-PI-01; Preparation of NRC Performance Indicators; Revision 6
- Monticello Station Log Entries; April 2017 through March 2018
- NE 99-02; Regulatory Assessment PI Guideline; Revision 7
- PRA-CALC-17-006; MNGP PRA Input to the MSPI Basis Document; Revision 0
- PRA-CALC-17-006; MNGP PRA Input to the MSPI Basis Document; Revision 0
- QF–0445; NRC Data Collection and Submittal RCS Specific Activity (January 2017 through April 2018); Various Dates
- QF–0445; NRC Data Collection and Submittal RCS Total Leakage (April 2017 through March 2018); Various Dates
- QF–0445; NRC Data Collection and Submittal RCS Total Leakage (April 2017 through March 2018); Various Dates
- QF–0445; NRC Data Collection and Submittal Safety System Functional Failures (SSFF) (April 2017 through March 2018); Various Dates
- QF–0445; NRC Data Collection and Submittal Safety System Functional Failures (SSFF) (April 2017 through March 2018); Various Dates

#### 71152—Problem Identification and Resolution

- CE 500000282867; Condition Evaluation for HPCI Turbine Speed Governor EGM Wire Found with Broken Strands (AR 501000006486); January 23, 2018
- POD 501000006486; HPCI Turbine Speed Governor EGM Wire Found with Broken Strands (AR 501000006486); January 05, 2018
- Various CAPs; November 01, 2017 through April 30, 2018
- WO 700002323; IRM System Inoperable; March 16, 2018

# 71153—Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion

 L–MT–18–025; LER 2017–006–01; Loss of Reactor Protection System Scram Function During Main Steam Isolation Valve and Turbine Stop Valve Chanel Functional Tests due to Use of a Test fixture; April 04, 2018