




REGULATORY DOCKET FILE COPY



ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION • 89 EAST AVENUE, ROCHESTER, N.Y. 14649

LEON D. WHITE, JR.
VICE PRESIDENT

May 2, 1978

RECEIVED DISTRIBUTION SERVICES UNIT
1978 MAY 5 AM 10 12
US HRC DISTRIBUTION SERVICES BRANCH
TELEPHONE AREA CODE 716 46-2700

Mr. Boyce H. Grier, Director
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region I
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Subject: LER 78-005/01T-0, unplanned reactivity insertion of more than 0.5% $\Delta K/K$ while subcritical
R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, Unit No. 1
Docket No. 50-244

Dear Mr. Grier:

In accordance with Technical Specifications, Article 6.9.2.a(4), if subcritical, an unplanned reactivity insertion of more than 0.5% $\Delta K/K$, the attached report of Reportable Occurrence 78-005, 14-day, is hereby submitted. Two additional copies of this letter and the attachment are enclosed.

Very truly yours,

L. D. White, Jr.

Attachment

cc: Dr. Ernst Volgenau (40)
Mr. William G. McDonald (3)

781240052

A002
5/11

NOTICE

RECEIVED

RECEIVED



F 05/05/78

REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)
DISTRIBUTION FOR INCOMING MATERIAL 50-244

REC: GRIER B H
NRC

ORG: WHITE L D
ROCHESTER GAS & ELEC

DOC DATE: 05/02/78
DATE RCVD: 05/05/78

DOCTYPE: LETTER NOTARIZED: NO COPIES RECEIVED
SUBJECT: LTR 1 ENCL 1

FORWARDING LICENSEE EVENT REPT (RO 50-244/78-005/01T-0) ON 04/19/78
CONCERNING UNLICENSED OPERATOR OPENED THE WRONG DI RESIN OUTLET VALVE AND
THEN OPENED THE CORRECT VALVE PRIOR TO CLOSING THE FIRST ONE... W/ATT.

PLANT NAME: RE GINNA - UNIT 1 REVIEWER INITIAL: XJM
DISTRIBUTOR INITIAL: *AL*

***** DISTRIBUTION OF THIS MATERIAL IS AS FOLLOWS *****

INCIDENT REPORTS
(DISTRIBUTION CODE A002)

FOR ACTION: BR CHIEF ZIEMANN**W/4 ENCL

INTERNAL:	REG FILE**W/ENCL	NRC PDR**W/ENCL
	I & E**W/2 ENCL	MIPC**W/3 ENCL
	SCHROEDER/IPPOLITO**W/ENCL	HOUSTON**W/ENCL
	NOVAK/CHECK**W/ENCL	EEB**W/ENCL
	KNIGHT**W/ENCL	BUTLER**W/ENCL
	HANAUER**W/ENCL	TEDESCO**W/ENCL
	EISENHUT**W/ENCL	BAER**W/ENCL
	SHAO**W/ENCL	VOLLMER/BUNCH**W/ENCL
	KREGER/J. COLLINS**W/ENCL	ROSA**W/ENCL
	K SEYFRIT/IE**W/ENCL	


EXTERNAL: LPDR'S
 ROCHESTER, NY**W/ENCL
 TIC**W/ENCL
 NSIC**W/ENCL
 ACRS CAT B**W/16 ENCL

COPIES NOT SUBMITTED PER
REGULATORY GUIDE 10.1

DISTRIBUTION: LTR 45 ENCL 45 CONTROL NBR: 781240052
SIZE: 1P+1P+1P

***** THE END *****





CONTROL BLOCK: _____ (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

[0][1] N Y R E G I [2] 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 [3] 4 1 1 1 1 [4] [5]
7 8 9 LICENSEE CODE 14 15 LICENSE NUMBER 25 26 LICENSE TYPE 30 57 CAT 58

CON'T
[0][1] REPORT SOURCE [L] [6] 0 5 0 0 0 2 4 4 [7] 0 4 1 9 7 8 [8] 0 5 0 2 7 8 [9]
7 8 60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

[0][2] During resin removal from the A deborating DI operator erroneously opened both A and B
[0][3] deborating DI resin outlets thereby creating path for reactor makeup water to the reactor
[0][4] coolant system which was in refueling mode. Before error was corrected, primary loop
[0][5] boron concentration decreased from 2140 ppm to 2072 ppm. This resulted in an un-
[0][6] planned reactivity insertion of more than 0.5%ΔK/K (T.S. 6.9.2.a(4)); however the
[0][7] primary loop boron was not reduced below the 2000 ppm required for refueling mode
[0][8] operation.

[0][9] SYSTEM CODE CAUSE CODE CAUSE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE COMP. SUBCODE VALVE SUBCODE
[P][C] [11] [A] [12] [B] [13] V A L V E X [14] [D] [15] [X] [16]
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 18 19 20

[17] LER/RO REPORT NUMBER [EVENT YEAR] [7][8] [] [23] [0][0][5] [] [27] [0][1] [] [31] [0] [32]
21 22 23 24 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
ACTION TAKEN FUTURE ACTION EFFECT ON PLANT SHUTDOWN METHOD HOURS [22] ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED NPRD-4 FORM SUB. PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
[H][18][G][19] [Z][20] [Z][21] [0][0][0][0] [Y][23] [N][24] [Z][25] [Z][9][9][9][26]
33 34 35 36 37 40 41 42 43 44 47

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

[1][0] Unlicensed operator opened the wrong resin outlet valve and then opened the correct
[1][1] valve prior to closing the first one. Operator instructed to follow procedure. Procedure
[1][2] change instituted to increase clarity.
[1][3]
[1][4]

[1][5] FACILITY STATUS [H] [28] % POWER [0][0][0] [29] OTHER STATUS [NA] [30] METHOD OF DISCOVERY [A] [31] DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION [Operator observation] [32]
7 8 9 10 12 13 44 45 46 80

[1][6] ACTIVITY CONTENT [Z] [33] [Z] [34] AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY [NA] [35] LOCATION OF RELEASE [NA] [36]
7 8 9 10 11 44 45 80

[1][7] PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION [0][0][0] [37] [Z] [38] [NA] [39]
7 8 9 11 12 13 80

[1][8] PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER DESCRIPTION [0][0][0] [40] [NA] [41]
7 8 9 11 12 80

[1][9] LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE DESCRIPTION [Z] [42] [NA] [43]
7 8 9 10 80

[2][0] PUBLICITY ISSUED DESCRIPTION [N] [44] [NA] [45] NRC USE ONLY
7 8 9 10 80 90 96

NAME OF PREPARER Carl H. Peck


PHONE: 716/546-2700, ext. 291-205

Attachment to LER 78-005/01T-0
Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation
R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, Unit No. 1
Docket 050-0244

During performance of Procedure S-4.5.9, an auxiliary operator was in the process of removing resin from the "A" deborating demineralizer to the "B" spent resin storage tank. The procedure was written so that it could be used to sluice resins from either "A" or "B" demineralizers. The operator opened the "B" demineralizer resin outlet valve, then, realizing his error, he opened the "A" demineralizer outlet without reclosing the "B" outlet. This created a path for reactor makeup water to the reactor coolant system, which was in the refueling mode. After realizing the second error, the operator reclosed the "B" outlet.

The Shift Foreman stopped the sluicing procedure and obtained a primary system boron analysis which indicated a boron concentration decrease from 2140 ppm B to 2072 ppm B. This corresponded to an unplanned reactivity insertion of more than 0.5% $\Delta K/K$ (T.S. 6.9.2.a(4)); however, the primary loop boron was not reduced below the 2000 ppm B required for refueling mode operation.

The operator checked the procedure and the proper flow path before continuing with the procedure. The operator was orally instructed on the importance of following procedures rigorously. The Operations Engineer directed all Shift Foremen to impress the same upon their personnel. Because of the confusion stemming from the dual-use procedure that procedure was deleted and replaced by separate procedures, one for each deborating demineralizer.



CONTROL BLOCK: (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

Licensee Code: N Y R E G I License Number: 00-000000-000000 License Type: 411111 CAT 58

Report Source: L Docket Number: 05000244 Event Date: 030478 Report Date: 033178

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10) During routine round operator found "A" Diesel Generator (DG) pre-lube pump off. Further investigation showed its motor control center (MCC) 1H de-energized as MCC 1C supply breaker to 1H was tripped. Although loss of pre-lube pump does not affect capability of DG to start, availability of "A" DG fuel transfer pump was affected (T.S.6.9.2.b(2)). "A" DG was still capable of auto-start with at least 3 hr. fuel in day tank. "B" DG was also available for auto-start and pre-start check was initiated to place it in operation; however, corrective action was completed and MCC 1H was re-energized before start completed.

System Code: EE Cause Code: E Cause Subcode: A Component Code: CKTBK Comp. Subcode: A Valve Subcode: Z LER/RO Report Number: 78 Event Year: 78 Sequential Report No.: 004 Occurrence Code: 03 Report Type: L Revision No.: 0 Action Taken: B Future Action: Z Effect on Plant: Z Shutdown Method: Z Hours: 0000 Attachment Submitted: N NRPD-4 Form Sub.: Y Prime Comp. Supplier: N Component Manufacturer: W120

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27) A poor electrical connection caused thermal device trip. Cable was cut back 3 in. and a new connection made to breaker. This is an isolated case as tightness of connections is verified during annual maintenance to preclude such events. Control Room annunciation of inoperable status of MCC 1H and MCC 1J will be part of the proposed "Diesel Generator Inoperative" annunciators discussed in our November 16, 1977 letter.

Facility Status: E % Power: 100 Other Status: NA Method of Discovery: B Discovery Description: Operator inspection round

Activity Released: Z Content of Release: Z Amount of Activity: NA Location of Release: NA

Personnel Exposures: 000 Type: Z Description: NA

Personnel Injuries: 000 Description: NA

Loss of or Damage to Facility: Z Type: NA

Publicity Issued: N Description: NA