

ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION • 89 EAST AVENUE, ROCHESTER, N.Y. 14649

TELEPHONE
AREA CODE 716 546-2700

Ginna Station
February 23, 1976

Reg. Files 50-244

Mr. James P. O'Reilly
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Directorate of Regulatory Operations
Region 1
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Subject: Reportable Occurrence 476-03: Abnormal Degradation of Steam
Generator Tubes

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

This is to confirm my phone call to Mr. John Hannon, on February 27, 1976, to report Abnormal Occurrence #76-08 at Ginna Station.

A program of planned eddy current examination was conducted on both loop "A" and "B" steam generators at the Ginna Station from February 15th to February 27, 1976, during the present refueling turbine maintenance outage. This program specified examinations at 400 KHZ to detect and measure potential tube defects and at 25 KHZ to provide a profile of sludge deposits.

A 100 percent inspection of both steam generators (hot and cold legs) was performed. As a result of this effort, 39 tubes were explosively plugged in the "A" steam generator and 2 in the "B" steam generator. These tubes had exhibited tube wall deterioration in excess of 40 percent.

Very truly yours,

Charles E. Platt

Charles E. Platt
Superintendent

CEP:dg

cc: Mr. G. J. Swarthout, RG&E Corp.
Mr. L. D. White, Jr., RG&E Corp.



RE

ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION • 89 EAST AVENUE, ROCHESTER, N.Y. 14604

TELEPHONE
546 2700

Ginna Station
March 9, 1976

Mr. James P. O'Reilly
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Directorate of Regulatory Operations
Region 1
631 Park Ave.
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

SUBJECT: Reportable Occurrence 476-11: Control Room Charcoal Filter Damper
Improperly Positioned

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

This is to confirm my phone call to Mr. Bert Davis on March 8, 1976, to report the improper positioning of one of the two dampers for the control room charcoal filter system.

While conducting a flow check on the control room charcoal filter system on 3-8-76, it was discovered that one of the two dampers that controls 25% of the control room air flow through the charcoal filters during a radiation emergency was in the wrong position. This condition allowed one of the two dampers to always be closed so that the recirculation of 25% of the control room air through the charcoal filter was not possible.

A trouble card was issued and work is being done today to correct the problem.


Very truly yours,

Charles E. Platt

Charles E. Platt
Superintendent

EP:dl

cc: Mr. G. J. Swarthout, RG&E Corp.
Mr. L. D. White, Jr., RG&E Corp.



NRC DISTRIBUTION FOR PART 50 DOCKET MATERIAL

FILE NUMBER
INCIDENT REPORT

TO: J.P.O'Reilly

FROM: Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp.
Rochester, N.Y.
L.D. White, Jr,

DATE OF DOCUMENT
3-1-76

DATE RECEIVED
3-8-76

LETTER
 ORIGINAL
 COPY

NOTORIZED
 UNCLASSIFIED

PROP

INPUT FORM

NUMBER OF COPIES RECEIVED
1

DESCRIPTION
Ltr. trans the following.....

PLANT NAME: RE Ginna # 1

ENCLOSURE
Reportable Occurrence # 76-07, on 2-7-76,
Concerning Relays for Train "A" Containment
isolation and containment ventilation isolation
failure to latch...

(1 Cy. Recieved)

NOTE: IF PERSONNEL EXPOSURE IS INVOLVED
SEND DIRECTLY TO KREGER/J. COLLINS

SAFETY	FOR ACTION/INFORMATION	ENVIRO	RKB 3-11-76
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> BRANCH CHIEF:	Purple		
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> W/3 CYS FOR ACTION			
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> LIC. ASST:	Sheppard		
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> W/ CYS			
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ACRS 16 CYS	XXXXXXXXX/SENT TO LA		

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION			
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> REG FILE			
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NRC PDR			
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> I & E (2)			
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> MTPC (3)			
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SCHROEDER/IPPOLITO			
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> HOUSTON			
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NOVAK/CHECK			
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> GRIMES/SCHWENCER			
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CASE			
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> F. WILLIAMS			
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> HANAUER			
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> TEDESCO/MACCARY			
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> EISENHUT			
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> BAER			
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SHAO			
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> VOLLMER/BUNCH			
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> KREGER/J. COLLINS			

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION	CONTROL NUMBER
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> EPDR: Lyons & Rochester N.Y.	2239
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> TIC	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NSIC	




ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION • 89 EAST AVENUE, ROCHESTER, N.Y. 14649

LEON D. WHITE, JR.
VICE PRESIDENT

TELEPHONE
AREA CODE 716 546-2700

Regulatory Docket File

March 1, 1976



Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region I
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Subject: Reportable Occurrence 76-07 (30-day report), Relays for
Train "A" containment isolation and containment ventilation
isolation failure to latch.
R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, Unit No. 1
Docket No. 50-244

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

In accordance with Technical Specifications, Article 6.9.2b, the attached
report of Reportable Occurrence 76-07, 30-day, is hereby submitted. Two
additional copies of this letter and the attachment are enclosed.

Very truly yours,


L. D. White, Jr.

Attachment

cc: Mr. Ernst Volgenau (30)
Mr. William G. McDonald (3)



2239



LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: 1 2 3 4 5 6

[PLEASE PRINT ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION]

LICENSEE NAME	LICENSE NUMBER	LICENSE TYPE	EVENT TYPE
01 NYREG1	00-000000-00	41111	03
7 8 9 14 15	25 26 30	31 32	

CATEGORY	REPORT TYPE	REPORT SOURCE	DOCKET NUMBER	EVENT DATE	REPORT DATE
01 CONT	L	L	050-0244	020776	030176
7 8 57 58	59 60	61 68	69 74	75 80	

EVENT DESCRIPTION

02 During valve alignment verification following manual containment isolation (CI) and con-
 03 tainment ventilation isolation (CVI) in preparation for ILRT, sump A discharge AOV had
 04 not closed. Investigation revealed that MG-6 relays in "A" safeguards train for CI and
 05 CVI would not latch and would drop back on release of pushbutton. Train "B" functioned
 06 properly. There has been no previous failure of this (cont'd. under Additional Factors)

SYSTEM CODE	CAUSE CODE	COMPONENT CODE	PRIME COMPONENT SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER	VIOLATION
07 IB	B	RELAYX	N	W120	N
7 8 9 10	11	12 17	43	44 47	48

CAUSE DESCRIPTION

08 Westinghouse Electric Corp. type MG-6 relays, style 289B363A11, 125 VDC, were found
 09 with improper latch screw factory adjustment. Removed relays were adjusted and stored
 10 as spares. Remaining MG-6 relays in safeguard racks will be checked during safe-

FACILITY STATUS	% POWER	OTHER STATUS	METHOD OF DISCOVERY	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION
11 H	000	NA		NA
7 8 9	10 12 13	44	45 46	80

FORM OF ACTIVITY RELEASED	CONTENT OF RELEASE	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY	LOCATION OF RELEASE
12 Z	Z	NA	NA
7 8 9	10 11	44	45 80

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

NUMBER	TYPE	DESCRIPTION
13 000	Z	NA
7 8 9 11	12	13 80

PERSONNEL INJURIES

NUMBER	DESCRIPTION
14 000	NA
7 8 9 11	12 80

OFFSITE CONSEQUENCES

15	NA
7 8 9	80

LOSS OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY

TYPE	DESCRIPTION
16 Z	NA
7 8 9 10	80


PUBLICITY

17	NA
7 8 9	80

ADDITIONAL FACTORS

18 (cont'd. from Event Description) type. Identical replacement relays from original spare
 19 parts inventory were adjusted, tested, installed and retested satisfactorily by qualified
 test personnel. (Reportable Occurrence 76-07, 30-day)

NAME: E. Clair Edgar PHONE: 716/546-2700, ext. 291-223



Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
 Region 1
 131 Park Avenue
 King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

SUBJECT: Reportable Occurrence #76-05: Abnormal degradation of primary containment components discovered while doing the containment integrated leakage rate test.

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

~~This is to confirm my phone call to Mr. John Hannon this morning to give him~~
 information on Reportable Occurrence #76-05.

Pressurization of the containment for the containment integrated leakage rate test began at 1600 hours on Saturday, February 7. The 35 psig pressure was established at 0800 hours on Sunday, February 8, 1976. After maintaining the 35 psig pressure for approximately five hours, it became apparent that there was excessive leakage through several containment penetrations. Further investigation found the components that were responsible for the excessive leakage to be:

- (1) Containment Purge Supply Valve - Inside Containment
- (2) Containment Purge Exhaust Valves
- (3) Motor Operated Valves #813 & #814 - Reactor Support Cooling
- (4) Check Valve #1713 - Nitrogen supply to the Reactor Coolant Drain Tank

~~Repairs are underway to the above listed valves. The containment integrated leakage rate test will be resumed as soon as repairs are completed.~~

Very truly yours,

Charles E. Platt

Charles E. Platt
 Superintendent

JEP/dg

cc: G. J. Swarthout, RG&E Corp.
 J. F. Sweet, RG&E Corp.

L. D. Waite, RG&E Corp..
 C. V. Hartlieb, RG&E Corp.

