

# Temporary Overhead Crane Failure at Arkansas Nuclear One

Workshop on Sharing Operating Experience from Rigging, Lifting and Load Handling Events

IAEA Headquarters 27-30 November 2017




## **Outline**

- Overview of site and planned lift
- Discussion of the event
- Response actions
- Lessons learned (some confirmed)
- Recovery
- References



#### **Overview**




# **Arkansas Nuclear One**


Russellville, Arkansas



## **Unit 1 Stator Replacement**

## Computer Modelling





Lift

Stator weight ~525 tons (~477,000 kg)


Move

Travel path ~90 ft (27 m) horizontal ~29 ft (9 m) vertical



# **Unit 1 Stator Replacement**

#### **Animation of Planned Lift**





# **Event Summary**

#### Sunday, March 31

Lift begins 0639:

0750: Crane fails, immediate loss of offsite power to Unit 1

(switchgear damaged), Unit 2 reactor coolant pump trip (vibration-induced) and reactor trip, fire piping ruptured


0923:


Breaker failure from water leakage causes Unit 2 partial loss of offsite power and loss of instrument air to both units

Notification of Unusual Event Declared 1033:

#### Saturday, April 6

Offsite power restored to Unit 1 using temporary modifications







# **NRC** Response

- Senior Resident Inspector immediately responded to control room on site
- Emergency response mode decision
- Coordination with OSHA
- Performed risk evaluation of event to determine inspection response
- Augmented Inspection Team (second-highest reactive inspection) commenced April 8
- Repair/recovery inspections prior to restart



#### **Cause Evaluation**

- From NRC Augmented Inspection Team Follow Up Inspection Report:
  - The overhead temporary hoisting assembly was not properly designed
  - The associated calculation was not reviewed
  - The assembly was not load tested



#### **Lessons Learned**


- Personnel Safety for Suspended Loads
  - Be aware the area of impact could be more than beneath the suspended load from falling hoist/crane members or other damaged equipment
  - Installed/available cameras can be used to limit observers in the area






- Collateral Damage Possible from Chain Reaction Events
  - Water from ruptured piping
  - Power failures
- Expect Complications to Response and Recovery
  - Blocked access routes
  - Personnel injuries/fatalities













- Full Consideration of Plant Risk
  - Watch for complacent attitudes associated with high consequence/low probability events
- Control of Vendors and Contractors
  - In U.S., the licensee retains ultimate responsibility
  - Additional contractor organizations may be needed for technical review

\*\*For inspectors: know how the licensee verifies compliance





- Inspector Response to Significant Events Involving Fatalities/Injuries
  - Maintain awareness of operator mindset
    - Significant emotional event
    - Licensee management actions to ensure operators remain focused on tasks
  - Be familiar with alternate access routes within the plant
  - Coordination with other government agencies



- Maintain Open and Frequent Internal and External Communications
  - Coordinate with public affairs representatives and other local/federal government agencies
  - Social media a significant and increasing factor: help public affairs representatives stay in front



# **Damaged Stator Removal**





# **Turbine Deck Repair**





# **Load Test of Replacement Crane**





#### References

- NRC Event Number 48869; Notification of Unusual Event Declared Due to a Breaker Explosion in the Protected Area
- Arkansas Nuclear One NRC Augmented Inspection Team Report 05000313; 05000368/2013011 (ADAMS ML13158A242)
- Arkansas Nuclear One NRC Augmented Inspection Team Follow Up Report 05000313; 05000368/2013012 (ADAMS ML14083A409)
- Information available on the NRC website <u>www.nrc.gov</u>
- Investigation of the March 31, 2013 Temporary
  Overhead Crane Collapse At Arkansas Nuclear One
  Power Plant In London/Russellville, AR OSHA
  (www.osha.gov/doc/engineering/pdf/2013\_r\_04.pdf)