




Commonwealth Edison
Dresden Nuclear Power Station
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Morris, Illinois 60450
Telephone 815/942-2920

D. Landon

REGULATORY DOCKET FILE COPY

October 21, 1977



50-249

BBS LTR #980-77

James G. Keppler, Regional Director
Directorate of Regulatory Operations - Region III
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, IL 60137

Reportable Occurrence Report #77-040/03L-0 is hereby submitted to your office in accordance with Dresden Nuclear Power Plant Technical Specification 6.6.B.2.b., conditions leading to operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation.

B.B. Stephenson
Station Superintendent
Dresden Nuclear Power Station

BBS:d1z

Enclosure

CC: Director of Inspection & Enforcement
Director of Management Information & Program Control
File/NRC

OCT 25 1977

773060115

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: [1][2][3][4][5][6] 1

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

[0][1] [I][L][D][R][S] 3 [2] 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 [3] 4 1 1 1 1 [4] [5] 7 8 9 14 15 25 26 30 57 CAT 58

CON'T [0][1] REPORT SOURCE [L] [6] 0 5 0 0 0 2 4 9 [7] 0 9 2 4 7 7 [8] 1 0 2 1 7 7 [9] 7 8 60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES 10

[0][2] During normal operation circuit breaker for service water makeup valve (MO-3-4102) to
[0][3] the isolation condenser was found in off position on two separate occasions. Event
[0][4] reportable under T.S.6.6.B.2.b. Safety significance minimal since two additional
[0][5] sources of makeup water available if needed. Event is not a repetitive occurrence.
[0][6]
[0][7]
[0][8]

[0][9] SYSTEM CODE [C][E] 11 CAUSE CODE [X] 12 CAUSE SUBCODE [Z] 13 COMPONENT CODE [C][K][T][B][R][K] 14 COMP. SUBCODE [A] 15 VALVE SUBCODE [Z] 16 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 18 19 20

17 LER/RO REPORT NUMBER [7][7] 21 22 EVENT YEAR 23 SHUTDOWN METHOD [] 24 SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. [0][4][0] 26 OCCURRENCE CODE [0][3] 28 29 REPORT TYPE [L] 30 REVISION NO. [0] 32

ACTION TAKEN [X] 18 FUTURE ACTION [Z] 19 EFFECT ON PLANT [Z] 20 PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER [L] 25 33 34 35 43 ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED [Y] 23 NRPD-4 FORM SUB. [N] 24 COMPONENT MANUFACTURER [G][0][8][0] 26 41 42 43 44 47

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 27

[1][0] Cause of event due to personnel error. Breaker immediately reset. To prevent re-
[1][1] currence breaker has been latched in the on position. This will not prevent normal
[1][2] breaker operation.
[1][3]
[1][4]

[1][5] FACILITY STATUS [E] 28 % POWER [0][9][0] 29 OTHER STATUS [NA] 30 METHOD OF DISCOVERY [A] 31 DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION [Operator Observation] 32 7 8 9 10 12 13 44 45 46 80

[1][6] ACTIVITY CONTENT [Z] 33 AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY [NA] 35 LOCATION OF RELEASE [NA] 36 7 8 9 10 11 44 45 80

[1][7] PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER [0][0][0] 37 TYPE [Z] 38 DESCRIPTION [NA] 39 7 8 9 11 12 13 80

[1][8] PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER [0][0][0] 40 DESCRIPTION [NA] 41 7 8 9 11 12 80

[1][9] LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE [Z] 42 DESCRIPTION [NA] 43 7 8 9 10 80

[2][0] PUBLICITY ISSUED [N] 44 DESCRIPTION [NA] 45 7 8 9 10 80

NRC USE ONLY

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 77-040/03L-0
COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY (CWE)
DRESDEN UNIT 3 (ILDRS-3)
DOCKET # 50-249

On September 24, 1977, at 1325 hours the control room operator noticed that neither position indication light on control panel 903-3 for valve MO3-4102 was lit. This valve is the service water makeup valve for the isolation condenser. When it was determined that the light bulb was not burned out, an operator was sent to the breaker and discovered it was in the off position.

The breaker was immediately returned to the on position. On September 29, 1977, the control room operator reported to the Shift Engineer that this same breaker had tripped. The operator performed procedure DOP 040-1 "Station Motor Operated Valves." The breaker was reset and the valve was cycled 3 times successfully. A work request (WR #8634) was issued to investigate the problem.

Upon investigation, it was discovered that the valve had not been operated, and probably had not "Tripped" due to valve motor operator problems. It was decided that the breaker was probably in the "OFF" position, rather than tripped as was originally reported to the Shift Engineer. It was also noted that the breaker required only a small amount of force exerted upon it to make it go from "on" to "off". The breaker is located about waist high in a narrow passageway on Bus 39-1 in the reactor building, and may have been inadvertently bumped to the off position. To prevent recurrence, the breaker was latched in the "on" position by cutting a notch in the breaker housing into which a sliding metal tab on the breaker handle fits. This will prevent the breaker from being inadvertently turned off in the future. The breaker will still trip as required when latched in this manner in the event a legitimate trip signal is received.

This event had minimal consequences because there are two additional supplies of makeup water to the emergency condenser. Since the operators normally scan the console each shift, the breaker in both instances was not off for more than one shift.

The corresponding breaker on Unit Two will also be latched in this manner. The Unit Two breaker is located in a similar location.

These are the first occurrences of this event at Dresden, and it has not recurred since the breaker has been latched.