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Brian R. Sullivan Site Vice President – JAF

JAFP-16-0123 August 3, 2016

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555-0001

Subject:

LER: 2016-003, Concurrent Opening of Reactor Building Airlock Doors James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Docket No. 50-333 License No. DPR-59

Dear Sir or Madam:

This report is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C).

There are no new regulatory commitments contained in this report.

Questions concerning this report may be addressed to Mr. William Drews, Regulatory Assurance Manager, at (315) 349-6562.

Sincerely For Sullivan (Acting) fian R. Sullivan

Site Vice President

BRS/WD/ds

Enclosure: JAF LER 2016-003, Concurrent Opening of Reactor Building Airlock Doors

cc: USNRC, Region I Administrator USNRC, Project Manager USNRC, Resident Inspector INPO Records Center (ICES)

NRC FO	RM 366		U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION						N A	APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 10/31/2018								
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)								E R S B in R D O re	Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to Infocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.									
1. FACIL	1. FACILITY NAME									2. DOCKET NUMBER 3. PAGE								
James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant								05000333					1 OF 3					
4. TITLE Concurrent Opening of Reactor Building Airlock Doors																		
5. E		DATE	6. LER NUMBER			7. REPORT			RT DA	ATE 8. OTHER FACI			CILITI	ILITIES INVOLVED				
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTI NUMBEF	IAL R	REV NO.	MONTH	DAY		YEAR								NUMBER
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					50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)			OTHER Specify in Abstract below or i				below or in	NRC Form 366A					
	ONTACT					12. LICI	ENSEE C	ONTA	CT F	or th	IIS L	LER						
Mr. Willia	am Dre	ws, Regu	latory Ass	urance N	lanag	er								315-3	349-656	3ER (In 2	clude A	vrea Code)
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14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED 15. EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR										YEAR								
YES (If yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)																		
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On the morning of June 7, 2016, while operating at 100% power, workers opened doors concurrently when entering a secondary containment access airlock. The individuals involved each closed their respective doors upon encountering this unexpected condition; however, the result was a brief inoperability of secondary containment.																		
This resulted in an 8 hour reportable event. The Resident Inspector was notified, and an Event Notification was made pursuant to 10 CFR $50.72(b)(3)(v)(C)$ due to a condition at the time of discovery that prevented the fulfillment of the Secondary Containment safety function (Reference ENS 51985). Following the event, the doors functioned properly, and no deficiencies were noted with either door.																		
There were no radiological releases associated with this event.																		

					Pag	e 2 of 3			
NRC FORM 366A	U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY CO	OMMISSION	APPROVED BY O	MB: NO. 3150-01	04 EXPIRES	: 10/31/2018			
	LICENSEE EVENT REPOR	Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to Infocollects Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.							
1. FACILITY NAME		2. DOCKET NUMBER			3. LER NUMBER				
James A. FitzP	atrick Nuclear Power Plant	0500	0 – 333	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV N0.			
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NARRATIVE

Background

The Secondary Containment [EIIS identifier: NG] boundary surrounds the primary containment and refueling equipment. The boundary forms a control volume to contain, dilute, and hold up fission products. The Secondary Containment consists of four systems which include the Reactor Building, the Reactor Building Isolation and Control System, the Standby Gas Treatment System, and the Main Stack. Secondary Containment is designed to provide containment for postulated design basis accident scenarios: loss-of-coolant accident and refueling (fuel handling) accident. Since pressure may increase in Secondary Containment relative to the environmental pressure, support systems are required to maintain a differential pressure vacuum such that external atmosphere would leak into containment rather than fission products leak out.

The systems which maintain a differential pressure vacuum inside Secondary Containment include the normal Reactor Building Ventilation and Cooling (RBV) System [VA] (during normal plant operations) and the safety-related Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) System [BH] for post-accident conditions.

Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.6.4.1.3 requires one Secondary Containment access door in each access opening to remain closed. Failure to meet this SR results in the Secondary Containment Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) not being met, and requires the Secondary Containment to be declared Inoperable.

Event Description

On June 7, 2016, with the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (JAF) operating at 100 percent power, members of the Maintenance and Security departments simultaneously entered the northeast Secondary Containment airlock on Reactor Building Elevation 272'. This resulted in the concurrent opening of the airlock doors. This condition was corrected within approximately two (2) seconds. At the time of the closure of either door, secondary containment integrity was restored as the SR for one door closed was met, and no other SRs (such as negative pressure) were being exceeded.

For the condition in which Secondary Containment did not meet the Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.6.4.1.3 for at least one door in secondary containment access opening being closed, the TS Limiting Condition of Operation (LCO) 3.6.4.1 required action was to restore secondary containment to Operable status in 4 hours.

An NRC notification was made via ENS 51985. This Licensing Event Report (LER) is being submitted per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of safety function to control the release of radioactive material.

Event Analysis

Timeline of Events on 6/7/2016

1030 Personnel entered the northeast Reactor Building Elevation 272' airlock simultaneously, and the condition was corrected within approximately two (2) seconds.
1110 Condition Report (CR-JAF-2016-01996) initiated.
1307 NRC notified via ENS 51985

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Cause

Secondary Containment access openings are equipped with green indicating lights that are lit when the opposing access opening door is fully shut. None of the parties involved indicated they observed the green indicating light not being lit prior to opening the airlock door. Therefore, the cause of this condition was determined to be simultaneous opening of the doors.

Similar Events

Internal Events

LER 2015-004-00, Concurrent Opening of Reactor Building Airlock Doors; Condition Report: CR-JAF-2015-04146, September 17, 2015

External events:

Quad Cities Nuclear Generating Station: LER 2015-008, Interlock Doors Opened Simultaneously Cause Loss of Secondary Containment

Duane Arnold Energy Center: LER 2015-003-01, Both Doors in Secondary Containment Airlock Opened Concurrently

Corrective Actions

Completed Actions

- Both airlock doors (24R-272-5 & -6) on the northeast Reactor Building Elevation 272' Secondary Containment airlock were closed within approximately two (2) seconds.
- Condition Report initiated (CR-JAF-2016-01996); NRC notified via ENS 51985.
- Installed cameras and monitors on both sides of the northeast Reactor Building Elevation 272' Secondary Containment airlock. This will allow verification that the opposing door will not be simultaneously opened.

Safety Consequence and Implications

Actual Consequences

There were no actual consequences of this event relative to nuclear, industrial, or radiological safety.

Potential Consequences

The Secondary Containment differential pressure remained more negative than 0.25 inches of water vacuum while this condition existed. Therefore, there are no potential consequences of this event relative to nuclear, industrial, or radiological safety.

References

- Condition Report: CR-JAF-2016-01996, June 7, 2016, Concurrent Opening of Secondary Containment Access Airlocks
- Technical Specification 3.6.4.1