# Load Drop Analysis for Spent Fuel Cask Handling Operations Kewaunee Power Station

June 28, 2016
License Amendment Request Pre-Application NRC Presentation
Dominion Energy Kewaunee





## **Agenda**

- Meeting Objectives
- Cask Handling Operations Current Licensing Basis (CLB)
- NAC International Secure Lift System
- Basis for Requesting Prior NRC Approval
- Load Drop Analysis
- License Amendment Request (LAR)
- Questions




## **Meeting Objectives**

- Discuss basis and need for LAR submittal
- Discuss proposed cask handling methods
- Discuss LAR submittal and supporting information required for NRC review
- Develop a clear understanding of any NRC concerns
- Respond to NRC Questions



#### **Cask Handling Operations**


Auxiliary Building Cross Sectional View (looking South)





# **Cask Handling Operations**

View from Spent Fuel Pool Elevation (looking North)





# **Cask Handling Operations**





**Views from Spent Fuel Pool Elevation (looking North)** 



#### **Cask Handling Operations CLB (cont.)**

- 10 CFR 50 Fuel Handling Facility (Auxiliary Building)
  - Storage Canister Loading (Spent Fuel Pool)
  - Storage Canister Processing (Cask Decontamination Area)
  - Storage Canister Transport (Truck Bay)
- Auxiliary Building (AB) Crane
  - Single-failure-proof upgrade (LA 205)
  - NUREG-0612 / NUREG-0554 guidance
  - USAR includes additional detail and clarifications




#### **Cask Handling Operations CLB (cont.)**

#### Heavy Loads Program

- Cask handling in/around the SFP (TRM) (LA 200)
- Cask handling requires a single-failure-proof handling system when using AB Crane (USAR)
  - Special lifting devices (NUREG-0612 / ANSI 14.6-1993)
  - Slings (NUREG-0612 / ASME B30.9-2003)
  - Interfacing lift points (NUREG-0612)
  - USAR includes additional details and clarifications
- Cask load drop not considered credible and accident removed from licensing basis (LA 200)
- Relied on for spent fuel protection



# **NAC Secure Lift System**





#### **NAC Secure Lift System (cont.)**

- Special Lifting Devices
  - Secure Lift Yoke
  - Chain Hoist Assembly Top Bracket
  - TSC Adapter Plate
  - Single-failure-proof handling system devices (NUREG-0612 / ANSI 14.6-1993)
- Chain Hoist Assembly is not a Special Lifting Device



#### **NAC Secure Lift System (cont.)**

- Chain Hoist Assembly (CHA) (ASME B30.16-2007)
  - Critical Load Handling Equipment (ASME NUM-1-2009)
    - Type IB (Enhanced Safety Features)
      - » Design factors 10:1
      - » Redundant braking and two-block protection
      - » Important to Safety Category B component (QA Program)
      - » Rigorous testing, including 300% (MCL) load test
    - Not Type IA (Single-Failure-Proof Features)
  - Equipment not acceptable within a nuclear singlefailure-proof handling system (NUREG-0612 or NUREG-0554)



#### **Basis for Prior NRC Approval**

- Heavy Loads Current Licensing Basis Resolution
  - NUREG-0612 alternatives:
    - Single-failure-proof equipment; or
    - Load drop analysis demonstrating satisfactory outcomes (non-single-failure-proof equipment)

Single-Failure-Proof Alternative	Disadvantages (to CHA)
Free Standing Stability Analysis / Slings	ALARA, Complexity, Schedule
Seismic Restraint / Slings	Industrial Safety, ALARA, Building Capacity, Space Limitations, Schedule
Dual Reeve Electric Hoist	Complexity, Space Limitations, Crane Capacity Margin, Schedule




#### **Basis for Prior NRC Approval (cont.)**

- Add Cask (TSC) Load Drop Accident into CLB
  - Use of non-single-failure-proof NAC chain hoist assembly
  - 10 CFR 50.59(c)(2) requires prior NRC approval
    - Accident of a different type (TSC load drop) than previously evaluated
    - Malfunction of equipment important to safety (CHA)
      with a different result (impact loading to the truck bay
      structure) than previously evaluated
  - 10 CFR 72.48 does not require revision to MAGNASTOR current licensing basis




### **Load Drop Analysis**





### **Auxiliary Building Cross Sectional View**





- Configuration Analyzed
  - Loaded TSC/MTC and empty VCC in stack up position on HHT
  - HHT positioned and leveled for transfer operation on Auxiliary Building Truck Bay concrete floor
- Analysis Methodology
  - 3-D Solid Finite Element Model
     (LS-DYNA Nonlinear Time-History Analysis)
  - ANSYS Simulation software
  - ASME Code Section III Appendix F criteria
  - NUREG-0612 Appendix A guidance



- Analysis Methodology (cont.)
  - Conservative TSC Drop heights
    - 18.25 ft (base case) through 27.5 ft (150% base case)
  - HHT gap heights at 3 and 4 inches
  - Maximum TSC payload and associated dropped component weights included
  - Secondary impacts conservatively modeled with HHT, fuel, fuel basket and TSC bottom plate
  - Flexural energy in HHT and impact damping conservatively ignored



- Additional Evaluations
  - Storage canister spent fuel sub-criticality
  - Storage canister passive cooling
  - Auxiliary building truck bay floor stability
    - Structural capacity margin
  - Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) integrity
    - Simplified limit states analysis methodology
  - Affect on SSCs supporting SFP functions



- Results (preliminary)
  - Storage canister confinement integrity maintained
  - Concrete cask passive cooling adequate
  - Storage canister and concrete cask remain upright on transport trailer (floor stability)
  - Auxiliary Building Crane maintains control of MTC (no secondary drop accident)
  - Spent fuel pool (SFP) integrity maintained
  - SFP support equipment unaffected



#### **License Amendment Request**

- Add Cask (TSC) Load Drop Analysis into CLB
  - Narrow applicability and scope
    - Applies ONLY when away from Spent Fuel Pool (SFP)
    - Applies ONLY for MAGNASTOR TSC transfer operations between MTC and VCC

Chain Hoist Assembly Lifts (110 Ton Capacity / 55 Tons MCL)				
Component Lifted	Weight (Tons)	Area		
Transportable Storage Canister (TSC)	49	Truck Bay (stack up only)		

All other cask handling requirements unchanged



#### License Amendment Request (cont.)

- Supporting load drop analyses
  - Proprietary finite element model
  - Auxiliary Building Structural Evaluation
  - No Radiological Consequences
- Proposed Kewaunee USAR revision
  - Intermediate lift device design requirements and safety features
  - Testing, inspection and maintenance standards for use
  - Drop analyses descriptions and references



#### License Amendment Request (cont.)

#### Proposed TRM revision

- New section to ensure analysis parameters are satisfied
- Compensatory measures for nonconforming conditions
- Technical verification prior to lifting a loaded TSC
- Schedule
  - Target submittal in late July
- Request expedited review
  - Provide details required for efficient NRC review
  - Planned decommissioning (PSDAR) activities affected

# **Questions?**





# **List of Acronyms**

ALARA	As Low As Reasonably Achievable	MTC	MAGNASTOR Transfer Cask
CoC	<u>Certificate of Compliance</u>	NAC	Nuclear Assurance Corporation (NAC
CLB	<u>Current Licensing Basis</u>	Internationa	International, Inc.)
DEK	<u>D</u> ominion <u>E</u> nergy <u>K</u> ewaunee (Dominion)	NRC	<u>N</u> uclear <u>R</u> egulatory <u>C</u> ommission
		QA	Quality Assurance
FSAR	<u>F</u> inal <u>Safety Analysis Report</u>	SFP	Spent Fuel Pool
HHT	<u>H</u> eavy <u>H</u> aul <u>T</u> railer	SLY/CHA	Secure-Lift Yoke and Chain Hoist Assembly
ISFSI	SFSI <u>Independent Spent Fuel Storage</u> <u>Installation</u>		
		SSC	System, Structure, Component
KPS	Kewaunee Power Station	TRM	<u>T</u> echnical <u>R</u> equirements <u>M</u> anual
LA	<u>L</u> icense <u>A</u> mendment	TSC	<u>T</u> ransportable <u>S</u> torage <u>C</u> anister
LAR	<u>L</u> icense <u>A</u> mendment <u>R</u> equest	USAR	<u>U</u> pdated <u>S</u> afety <u>A</u> nalysis <u>R</u> eport
MAGNASTOR®	Modular Advanced Generation Nuclear All-purpose STORage	VCC	<u>V</u> ertical <u>C</u> oncrete <u>C</u> ask
MCL	<u>M</u> aximum <u>C</u> ritical <u>L</u> ift		