

Tennessee Valley Authority, Post Office Box 2000, Spring City, Tennessee 37381

June 13, 2016

10 CFR 50.73

ATTN: Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555-0001

> Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 2 Facility Operating License No. NPF-96 NRC Docket No. 50-391

Subject: Licensee Event Report 391/2016-001-00, Loss of Automatic Containment Isolation for the Steam Generator Blowdown Sampling Lines

This submittal provides Licensee Event Report (LER) 391/2016-001-00. This LER provides details concerning improper use of electrical jumpers that led to a loss of automatic containment isolation for the Steam Generator Blowdown Sampling Lines. This report is being submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii).

Please direct any questions concerning this matter to Gordon Arent, WBN Licensing Director, at (423) 365-2004.

Respectfully,

Paul Simmons Site Vice President Watts Bar Nuclear Plant

Enclosure cc: See Page 2 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 June 13, 2016

cc (Enclosure):

NRC Regional Administrator - Region II NRC Senior Resident Inspector - Watts Bar Nuclear Plant

NRC FORM 366 U.S. NL CAR REGULATORY COMMISSION										APPRO	OVE	ED BY JAB: NO	. 3150-010	4		EXPIF	RES:	10/31/2018
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)										Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to Infocollects. Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.								
1. FAC	LITY NA	ME								2. DO	Ck	(ET NUMBER		3. P	AGE	Janiireanna		
Wat	Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 2										05000391 1 OF 6							
4. TITL	E																	
Los	s of Au	itomatic	Contair	nment	Isolatio	n for t	he Stea	ım Gei	nera	ator B	lov	wdown Sam	pling Lin	es				
5. EVENT DATE 6. LER NUMBER 7. REPORT D										ATE 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED								
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQU NU	JENTIAL MBER	REV NO.	MONTH	DAY		YEAR		FACILITY NAME	N/A			N/.	DOCKET NUMBER	
04	14	2016	2016	- 0	01	00	06	13		2016		FACILITY NAME	N/A			N//	DOCKE A	ET NUMBER
9. OPE	RATING	MODE	11.	THIS R	EPORT IS	S SUBI	VITTED F	PURSU	ANT	TO TH	IE F	REQUIREMEN	TS OF 10	CFR	§: (Checl	c all ti	hat a	pply)
			20	.2201(b)		20.2	2203(a)((3)(i)			50.73 (a)(2)(ii)(A)	50.73(a)(2				viii)(A)
	3		20.2201(d)				20.2203(a)(3)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)			50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)			viii)(B)
	Ŭ		20.2203(a)(1)			20.2203(a)(4)			(4)			50.73(a)(2)(iii)			50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)			
			20.2203(a)(2)(i)			50.36(c)(1)(i)(A			(i)(A))		50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)			50.73(a)(2)(x)			
10. PO	NER LE	VEL	20.2203(a)(2)(ii)			50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)	50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)				7:	3.71(a	a)(4)		
			20.2203(a)(2)(iii)				50.36(c)(2)				50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)				73.71(a)(5)			
			20)(2)(iv)	50.46(a)(3)(ii)					50.73 (a)(2)(v)(C)		7:	3.77(a	a)(1)			
	0		20	.2203(a)(2)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(i)(A))	50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)				73.77(a)(2)(i)			i)
			20		50.73(a)(2)(i)(B))	⊠ 50.73(a)(2)(vii)				73.77(a)(2)(ii)			ii)		
							50.7	73(a)(2)	(i)(C))			Specify	cify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A				366A
	CONTACT					12. L	ICENSEE	CONT	АСТ	FOR 1	THI	S LER						
Rob	ert Clar	rk, Licer	nsing En	ginee	r								11	LEPHO		(Inclu		ea Code)
		,	13. COM	PLETE	ONE LIN	E FOR	EACH C	OMPO	NEN	T FAIL	UR		D IN THIS	REPO	<u>423-3</u> DRT	05-1	818	i
CAUS	E	SYSTEM	СОМР	ONENT	MANU FACTU	J- RER	REPORTA TO EPI	BLE	C	CAUSE		SYSTEM	COMPON	ENT	MANU- FACTUR	ER	REF	PORTABLE
14. SUP	PLEMEN	NTAL REI		PECTE	L D							15. EXI	PECTED		MONTH	DA	Y	YEAR
	ES (If yes	s, complet	te 15. EXF	PECTEL	SUBMIS	SION	DATE)		С			SUB	MISSION					
ABSTRA	CT (Limit	to 1400 sp	aces, i.e., a	approxim	ately 15 sir	ngle-spa	ced typew	ritten line	es)		-							
From	March	n 18, 20	16, whe	n Wat	ts Bar N	luclea	r Plant	Unit 2	first	t ente	ree	d Mode 4 to	April 14	, 201	16 with th	ne pl	ant	in
Mode	e 3, it w natic a	/as dete nd man	ermined ual closi	that a	the con	on pro tainm	hibited ent isol:	by leo ation v	chni valve	ical Sj es and	peo d ti	cifications (he sample i	S) exist	ed. Valve	During ti as for the	his ti Ste	me	both
Gene	erator E	Blowdow	n (SGB	D) sa	mpling li	ines w	ere dis	abled	due	e to im	ipr	operly instal	led elec	trical	l jumpers	s in ti	he v	valve
contr	ol circu	uits. The	mispla	ced ju	mpers b	ypass	sed the	Phase	A	contai	inn	nent isolatio	n signal	s, the	e auto/m	anua	al sta	art
Phas	e A sig	ne Auxi Inal is u	sed to c	ontrol	potentia	al rele	ase of r	adioa	onu ctive	e mate	ve eria	al to the env	viron in t	ntaini ne ev	vent of a	Des	n on sian	a Bases
Accio	lent. T	he AFV	v pump	auto/n	nanual s	start s	ignals a	ire use	ed to	o isola	ate	the SGBD	sampling	line	es to pres	serve	e ste	am
gene open	rator in or clos	ventory	ition from	eal-in n the i	circuits main co	are us ntrol r	sed to a	illow th ⁻his ev	ne o vent	perat	or rre	to manually	position	the	valves ir	eith ت The	ner t	he vas no
loss	of safe	ty functi	on.					110 0 0	ont						nicenty.	1110		10
The i pursu	solatio uant to	n valves 10 CFR	s for the 50.73(a	SGBE a)(2)(i)) sample (B) and	e lines 10 C	s were r FR 50.7	returne 73(a)(2	ed to 2)(vi	o serv ii)(B) a	vice and	e on April 14 d (C).	, 2016.	This	event is	bein	ig re	eported

				Pag	je 2 of 6
NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULAT	ORY COMMISSION	APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 315	0-0104	EXPIRE	S: 10/31/2018
	ORT (LER) HEET	Estimated burden per response to comp lessons learned are incorporated into comments regarding burden estimate to F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commis Infocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to t NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Ma used to impose an information collection NRC may not conduct or sponsor, an collection.	by with this may the licensing the FOIA, Pl sion, Washing the Desk Offic inagement and n does not dis d a person is	andatory collection request: 8 g process and fed back the rivacy and Information Colle gton, DC 20555-0001, or by er, Office of Information and d Budget, Washington, DC 2 play a currently valid OMB of s not required to respond the	30 hours. Reported to industry. Send ctions Branch (T-5 r internet e-mail to Regulatory Affairs, 20503. If a means xontrol number, the to, the information
1. FACILITY NAME	2. DOC	KET NUMBER		3. LER NUMBER	R
			YEAR		REV
Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 2	05000391		2016	- 001	- 00
NARRATIVE					
	IS BEFORE THE	EVENT			
Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) U	nit 2 was in Mode	e 3 at zero percent rateo	l therma	l power.	
II. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT					
A. Event					
(SGBD) {EIIS:KN} sampling lin for the SGBD Sample Isolation were taken to the close position installed that bypassed the Ph system {EIIS:BA} pump auto/r were installed prior to entering Generator Sampling in Hot Sa	nes to normal alig n Valves (SIVs) a on, the valves mo (red) when releas hase A containme nanual start signa Mode 4 in accor ample Room (Mod	inputing to restore only 2 gnment, it was discovered and the Containment Iso mentarily indicated clos ed. All affected valves ent isolation signals, the als and the control valve dance with Chemistry p des 2-6), Rev 5. The affe	ed that w lation Va ed (gree had elec auxiliary seal-in rocedur ected va	when the hand sw alves (CIVs) {Ell- en) and then imm ctrical jumpers in r feedwater (AFV circuits. The jum e 2-CM-6.60, Ste lives are listed be	vitches S:ISV} nediately correctly V) npers eam elow:
Train-A Inboard SGBD SIVs	Train-B Outbo CIVs	ard			
2-FCV-43-54D 2-FCV-43-56D 2-FCV-43-59D 2-FCV-43-63D	2-FCV-43-55 2-FCV-43-58 2-FCV-43-61 2-FCV-43-64				
Inboard containment isolation located in the closed system in Train-B CIVs (listed above). T closed and only opened to obt and to meet the single failure outboard CIVs when the AFW Isolation Signal but this is a se CIVs were in violation of Tech the CIVs to be Operable in Mo 2016 (1832 EDT), when WBN isolation valves were returned 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), "Any operatii Specifications,' and 10 CFR 5 Trains or Channels." B. Inoperable Structures, Co	provisions for the nside containmer he SIVs located i ain chemistry sat criteria the SIVs a pumps are runni condary function nical Specificatio odes 1, 2, 3, and Unit 2 first enter to service. This on or condition w 0.73(a)(2)(vii)(B)	e SGBD Sampling Syste at while outboard contair nside containment are r mples when required. H are designed to automat ng. The SIVs will also c b. Due to the misplaced j n (TS) 3.6.3. "Containm 4. The duration of inope ed Mode 4, to April 14, 2 event is being reported hich was prohibited by t and (C), "Common Cau	em are p nment is not CIVs owever, ically cla lose on a umpers ent Isola erability 2016 (22 pursuar he plant se Inope o the Ev	rovided by Train olation is provide . They are norma to conserve SG ose along with th a Phase A conta , the inoperable ation Valves," tha was from March 234 EDT) when t to 10 CFR 's Technical erability of Indep	-A SIVs ed by the ally level inment outboard at require 18, he endent
There were no additional	structures, compo	onents or systems that c	contribut	ed to this event.	

							Paç	je 3 of 6			
NRC FORM 366A	U	.S. NUCLEAR	REGULAT	ORY COMMISSION	APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3	150-0104	EXPIRE	S: 10/31/2018			
	ICEN: C	SEE EVEI ONTINUA	NT REP TION S	ORT (LER) HEET	Estimated burden per response to co lessons learned are incorporated in comments regarding burden estimate F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comi Infocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and i NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of used to impose an information collec NRC may not conduct or sponsor, collection.	mply with this m to the licensin to the FOIA, F mission, Washir to the Desk Offit Management an tion does not di and a person	andatory collection request: ig process and fed back to rivacy and Information Colle gton, DC 20555-0001, or by cer, Office of Information and Budget, Washington, DC 2 ghaly a currently valid OMB of is not required to respond	80 hours. Reported o industry. Send ictions Branch (T-5 γ internet e-mail to I Regulatory Affairs, 20503. If a means control number, the to, the information			
1. FACILITY NAME				2. DO(3. LER NUMBER	R			
						YEAR	SEQUENTIAL	REV			
Watts Bar Nuclea	ar Plan	it, Unit 2		05000391		2016	- 001	- 00			
NARRATIVE		¢.									
C.	Date	es and Appro	oximate T	imes of Occurre	nces						
Date		Time (EDT) Even	ıt							
03/18	8/16	1832	Ente	red Mode 4 with	inoperable CIVs						
03/30	J/16 2/16	1639	Ente	rea Mode 3 with	inoperable CIVs						
04/02	8/16	0433	Re-e	ntered Mode 3 w	with inoperable CIVs						
04/14	4/16	1700	Main	tenance discove	red CIVs for the SGBD	sampling	lines inoperable	Э			
			with	plant in Mode 3.	Entered LCO 3.6.3, Co	ndition C					
04/14	4/16	2234	Exite	d TS LCO 3.6.3,	Condition C.						
D.	Man	ufacturer an	d Model	Number of Comp	oonents that Failed						
	Ther	re were no c	omponer	it failures. The in	operable CIVs were du	e to hum	an error.				
E.	Othe	er Systems o	or Second	lary Functions Af	ffected						
	No	other system	ns or fund	tions were affect	ted.						
F.	Meth	nod of discov	very of ea	ach Component or System Failure or Procedural Error							
	The sam	failure of the ple lineup.	e CIVs to	close was discov	vered during attempts t	oy mainte	nance to restore	SGBD			
G	. Failu	ire Mode an	d Effect o	of Each Failed Co	omponent						
	The elect AFW contr imm posit mair	inability to c trical jumper / pump auto rol valve sea ediately retu tion. Bypass n control room	lose the (s used in /manual s al-in circu rn to the ing the so m.	CIVs for the SGB the valve contro start signal but al it. Bypassing the open position wh eal-in circuits def	D sampling lines was of I circuits. The misplace so the Containment Phe control valve seal-in of the hand switches reated the ability to man	due to imper ase A Iso ircuits ca were rele nually clo	proper installation s not only bypas blation signal and used the valves ased from the clo se the CIVs from	n of the sed the d the to osed i the			
H.	Ope	rator Actions	3								
	Upoi for C isola	n identifying Operation (L0 Ition valve in	the failur CO) 3.6.3 operable	e to close the Cl , Condition C, "C ," was entered.	Vs for the SGBD samp one or more penetration	ling lines n flow pat	, (TS) Limiting Co hs with one cont	ondition ainment			
I.	Auto	matically an	d Manua	lly Initiated Safet	y System Responses						
	The activ	condition de vation.	scribed i	n this report did r	not result in any automa	atic or ma	inual safety syste	ems			

						Pag	je 4 of 6		
NRC FORM	366A	U.S. NUCLEAR REGULAT	ORY COMMISSION	APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 315	0-0104	EXPIRE	S: 10/31/2018		
(11-2015)		CONTINUATION S	ORT (LER) HEET	Estimated burden per response to complessons learned are incorporated into comments regarding burden estimate to F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commit Infocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Ma used to impose an information collection NRC may not conduct or sponsor, an collection.	per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Rep are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. ng burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections Branch r Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-m rce@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory A 50-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a m n information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control numbe nduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the inform				
1. FACILITY	NAME		2. DOC	KET NUMBER		3. LER NUMBER	२		
Watts Bar	[.] Nuclear	Plant, Unit 2	05000391		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO.		
					2010		- 00		
	CAUSE	OF THE EVENT							
	Α.	The cause of each compo	onent or system f	ailure or personnel error	, if know	/n.			
	B.	was due to improper insta jumpers not only bypasse Isolation signals and the of the reason why the valves released from the closed The cause(s) and circums Chemistry procedure 2-C AFW pump auto/start sign safety related systems, al In particular, Revision 5 w implementation. Lack of fic contribute to procedure no	allation of the jum d the AFW pump control valve seal s immediately retr position. stances for each M-6.60, Revision hals. This event long with a lack o vas not coordinate ormal procedure oncompliance.	pers used in the valve of running contacts but al -in circuits. Bypassing th urned to the open position human performance related 5, specified the wrong the was attributed to a lack of peer checking, during ed with the Electrical En- preparer training and inst	ontrol ci so the C one contro on when ated roo erminal of proce the proc gineerin adequat	rcuits. The mispl containment Pha of valve seal-in c the hand switch t cause. points for bypas dural compliance edure revision p g Group prior to e system knowle	aced se A ircuits is les were sing the e for rocess.		
IV.	ANALY During second loss of sample approxi the use are inst jumpers running signal. alignmen release	SIS OF THE EVENT plant operation, SG sampl ary leakage is within limits SG inventory are isolated, , 11 liters of sample must l mately 8 gallons per hour of jumpers. To allow a SG alled around the open con s allow the SIVs and the C , but will not prevent the is On March 14, 2016, when ent, the hand switches for t tarily indicated closed (great d. At that time it was dete	es for each stean When the AFW including SG blo be purged throug (gph). In Mode 3 sample to be ta tacts for the AFW IVs for the SGBD colation of the sam n attempting to re the SIVs and CIV een) and then imm rmined that the ju	n generator are taken ev 7 System is in service, flow wdown and SG samplin h the sample line. The s 1, with AFW secured, a when in Modes 2-4 when 7 pumps using chemistry sampling lines to reman nple flow path from a Physic s were placed in the clow nediately returned to the sumpers were not propert	very 72 l bw paths g. To ol ample fi SG sam the AF\ y proced in open base A c sampling sed pos e open p y installe	hours to verify pr s that could resul otain a represent owrate for each ple can be taker <i>N</i> is in service, ju lure 2-CM-6.60. with the AFW pu containment isola g lines to normal ition, the valves osition (red) whe ed.	timary to It in a SG is without umpers These imps ition		

The CIVs for the SGBD sampling lines are required to be Operable per TS in Modes 1-4. With the jumpers improperly installed, the CIVs were disabled. The SGBD Sampling System for Unit 2 credits a closed system inside containment as the first containment boundary with automatic isolation valves located outside containment as the second containment boundary. While the CIVs in question were prevented from automatic closure, the closed system inside containment remained operable and manual flow control valves located downstream of the defeated outboard CIVs were available to provide redundant isolation if necessary. Accordingly, the containment isolation safety function was not lost. However, defeating the automatic and manual closure of the outboard CIVs represents a condition prohibited by TS.

The SIVs and the CIVs in the SGBD sampling lines also serve as redundant isolation valves to prevent potential loss of SG inventory that could impact the AFW function following an accident or plant

					0.0404	Pag	ge 5 of 6
NRC FORM (11-2015)	366A	CENSEE EVENT REP CONTINUATION S	ORT (LER) HEET	Estimated burden per response to com lessons learned are incorporated into comments regarding burden estimate t F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commi Infocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of M used to impose an information collection NRC may not conduct or sponsor, an collection.	ply with this m o the licensin o the FOIA, P ssion, Washin the Desk Offic anagement an on does not dis nd a person i	andatory collection request: to g process and fed back to rivacy and Information Colle gton, DC 20555-0001, or by eer, Office of Information and d Budget, Washington, DC 2 splay a currently valid OMB of s not required to respond	80 hours. Reported o industry. Send ctions Branch (T-5 y internet e-mail to I Regulatory Affairs, 20503. If a means control number, the to, the information
1. FACILITY	NAME		2. DOC			3. LER NUMBER	2
. Watts Ba	r Nuclea	r Plant, Unit 2	05000391		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO.
					2010	- 001	- 00
	transie CIVs w samplin shut do remova of radio the abi represe	nt. As discussed above ma vere available to isolate the ng, when in use, is small (8 own the reactor and mainta al of residual heat is not an pactive material is not credi lity to mitigate the conseque ent a common cause inope	nual flow control SGBD sampling gph). With the <i>i</i> in a safe shutdow issue. With no in ble. The small lo ences of an accie rabilty of indeper	valves located downstru- lines if required. In add AFW in service and no c wn condition was not imp rradiated fuel in the Unit oss of SG inventory wou dent. However, the loss indent trains.	eam of t lition, SC lecay he pacted. 2 core, 2 core, Id not ha of both	he defeated outb S inventory loss of eat on Unit 2, the With no core ded an uncontrolled i ave adversely im trained isolation	board due to ability to cay heat, release pacted valves
V.	ASSES	SMENT OF SAFETY CON Availability of systems or	ISEQUENCES	could have performed t	he same	e function as the	
VI	B. C.	components and systems The WBN Unit 2 design of boundary with automatic i boundary. While the disa sampling lines, a containne remained operable for mit 43-60A, B, C, and D) dow sampling lines to maintain For events that occurred we needed to shutdown the re- control the release of radii SG inventory loss due to a decay heat on Unit 2, the was not impacted. With re- irradiated fuel in the Unit 2 The small loss of SG inve- consequences of an accid For failure that rendered a from the discovery of the The containment isolation on April 14, 2016 at appro- 2234 EDT, which was app	that failed during redits a closed sy solation valves is bled CIVs preven nent isolation bo tigating Design B instream of the C in containment int when the reactor eactor and main oactive material, sampling, when i ability to shut do to core decay he 2 core, an uncon intory would not is dent. a train of a safety failure until the tr is valves for the S portion at the solution proximately 1700 E	g the event. ystem inside containment ocated outside containment ocated outside containment ocated outside containment ocated outside containment ocated outside containment ocated outside containment undary for the closed sy bases Accidents. In add CIVs were available to ment regrity and preserve SG was shut down, available tain safe shutdown concerned or mitigate the consequent in use, is small (8 gph). when the reactor and main trolled release of radioal have adversely impacted or system inoperable, and cain was returned to server SGBD sampling lines were DT and were returned to urs and 34 minutes.	nt as the lient as the stem ins ition, flow anually i inventor ility of sy liences o With AF ntain a so liences o With AF ntain a so ctive ma d the abi estimate vice.	first containment the second containt side containment w control valves isolate the SGBE y if necessary. ystems or compo- emove residual h f an accident W in service and afe shutdown co of an issue. With terial is not cred lity to mitigate th e of the elapsed to yered to be inope- e on April 14, 201	at inment C (FSV- D onents heat, d no ndition n no ible, ie iime iime
	This ev tracked	vent was entered into the To d under condition report (CP	ennessee Valley R) 1160910.	Authority Corrective Ac	tion Prog	gram and is bein	g

					Paç	je 6	of 6			
NRC FORM 366A (11-2015)	U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATO CENSEE EVENT REP CONTINUATION S	ORY COMMISSION ORT (LER) HEET	APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 10/31/24 Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Rep lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections Branch F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-m Infocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory A NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a rr used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control numbe NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the inform collection.							
1. FACILITY NAME		2. DOC	KET NUMBER		3. LER NUMBER	२				
				YEAR	SEQUENTIAL		REV			
Watts Bar Nuclea	r Plant, Unit 2	05000391		2016	- 001	-	NO. 00			
NARRATIVE										
А.	Immediate Corrective Acti	ons								
	The electrical jumpers we	re removed and	the SIVs and the CIVs v	vere retu	Irned to service.					
В.	Corrective Actions to Prev	ent Recurrence								
	Revised Procedure 2-CM- incorporate revised jumpe effectiveness of this correct Ascension Testing. This a performed the intent of 2-0	6.60, "Steam Ge r control and app ctive action will b ssessment will d CM-6.60.	enerator Sampling in Ho propriate departmental p le assessed at the conc etermined whether the p	t Sample procedur lusion of procedu	e Room (Modes re reviews. The f the Unit 2 Powe re revisions corre	2-6) er ectly	," to			
VII. ADDIT	IONAL INFORMATION									
A.	Previous similar events at	the same plant								
	On March 21, 2008, with V block the Safety Injection not been removed. The ju with Instrument Maintenar required in Modes 1, 2, 3, plant entered TS LCO 3.0	Watts Bar Unit 1 in Mode 3 it was discovered that jumpers installed to n (SI) automatic actuation logic in the Sold State Protection System had jumpers were installed during Cycle 8 Refueling Outage in accordance ance Instruction ((IMI) 99.040. The SI automatic actuation function is 3, and 4 per TS 3.3.2, Table 3.3.2-1, Function 1.b. Upon discovery the .0.3.								
	With the plant in Modes 3 inoperable for approximate Notification Number 4408 inadequacy (i.e., the step	and 4, both train ely 33 hours and 5. The event was removing the jun	s of the SI automatic ac 38 minutes. The event attributed to a combina nper did not required ve	tuation l was rep tion of t rification	ogic were rende ported under NR poth procedural and personnel	red C Ev erro	vent or.			
B.	Additional Information									
	None.									
C.	Safety System Functional	Failure Conside	ration							
	This condition did not results isolation boundary for the capable of mitigating a De downstream of the defeate maintain containment interto mitigate a design bases	ult in a safety sys closed system ir esign Bases Acci ed CIVs were av grity and to preso s event.	tem functional failure be nside containment remain dent. Additional flow con ailable to isolate the SG erve SG inventory if the	ecause a ined ope ntrol valv BD sam AFW pu	a containment erable and was ves located pling lines to umps were requir	red				
D.	Scrams with Complication	s Consideration								
	There was no scram asso	ciated with this e	event.							
VIII. COMM	IITMENTS									

None.