



**UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION**

REGION III
2443 WARRENVILLE RD. SUITE 210
LISLE, IL 60532-4352

September 16, 2015

Mr. Eric McCartney
Site Vice President
NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC
6610 Nuclear Road
Two Rivers, WI 54241

**SUBJECT: POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 - EVALUATIONS OF
CHANGES, TESTS, AND EXPERIMENTS AND PERMANENT PLANT
MODIFICATIONS BASELINE INSPECTION REPORT 05000266/2015010;
05000301/2015010**

Dear Mr. McCartney:

On August 28, 2015, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an Evaluations of Changes, Tests, and Experiments and Permanent Plant Modifications inspection at your Point Beach Nuclear Plant. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results which were discussed on August 28, 2015, with you, and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

The NRC inspectors documented one finding of very-low safety significance (Green) in this report. This finding was determined to involve a violation of NRC requirements. However, because of its very-low safety significance, and because the issue was entered into your Corrective Action Program, the NRC is treating the issue as a Non-Cited Violation (NCV) in accordance with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the subject or severity of the Non-Cited-Violation, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001, with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Point Beach Nuclear Plant.

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In accordance with Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* (10 CFR) 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding," of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC's Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html> (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Robert C. Daley, Chief
Engineering Branch 3
Division of Reactor Safety

Docket Nos. 50-266; 50-301
License Nos. DPR-24; DPR-27

Enclosure:
IR 05000266/2015010; 05000301/2015010
w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

cc w/encl: Distribution via LISTSERV®

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Docket No: 50-266; 50-301
License No: DPR-24; DPR-27

Report No: 05000266/2015010; 05000301/2015010

Licensee: NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC

Facility: Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2

Location: Two Rivers, WI

Dates: August 10 – 28, 2015

Inspectors: Jorge J. Corujo-Sandín, Reactor Inspector (Lead)
Mark T. Jeffers, Reactor Inspector
Michael A. Jones, Reactor Inspector

Approved by: Robert C. Daley, Chief
Engineering Branch 3
Division of Reactor Safety

Enclosure

SUMMARY

Inspection Report 05000266/2015010, 05000301/2015010; 08/10/2015 – 08/28/2015; Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2; Evaluations of Changes, Tests, and Experiments and Permanent Plant Modifications.

This report covers a 2-week announced baseline inspection on evaluations of changes, tests, and experiments and permanent plant modifications. The inspection was conducted by Region III based engineering inspectors. One finding was identified by the inspectors. The finding was considered a Non-Cited Violation (NCV) of U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulations. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (i.e., Greater than Green, or Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, "Significance Determination Process." Cross-cutting aspects were determined using IMC 0310, "Aspects Within the Cross Cutting Areas." Findings for which the Significance Determination Process does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. All violations of NRC requirements are dispositioned in accordance with the NRC's Enforcement Policy dated July 9, 2013. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 5, dated February 2014.

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

- Green. The inspectors identified a finding of very-low safety significance, and an associated NCV of Title 10, *Code of Federal Regulations*, Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," for the licensee's failure to evaluate for potential gas intrusion from the spray additive tank into the containment spray (CS) system during the injection phase of a design-basis accident. As part of immediate corrective actions, the licensee entered the concern in the Corrective Action Process as AR 2068569, and performed an evaluation which determined no air entrainment is expected to occur during the injection phase.

The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of equipment performance, and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, air intrusion into the CS system could affect the operability of the CS pumps by causing degraded performance and/or air binding of the pumps. The finding screened as having very-low safety significance. Specifically, the finding was a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating structure, system, or component (SSC), however, based on the evaluation performed by the licensee the SSC maintained its operability. Based on the timeframe of the violation the inspectors did not identify a cross-cutting aspect associated with this finding. (Section 1R17.1b)

REPORT DETAILS

1. REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity

1R17 Evaluations of Changes, Tests, and Experiments and Permanent Plant Modifications (71111.17T)

.1 Evaluation of Changes, Tests, and Experiments

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed 7 safety evaluations performed pursuant to Title 10, *Code of Federal Regulations* (CFR), Part 50, Section 59, to determine if the evaluations were adequate, and that prior U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approval was obtained as appropriate. The inspectors also reviewed 16 screenings where licensee personnel had determined that a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation was not necessary. The inspectors reviewed these documents to determine if:

- the changes, tests, and experiments performed were evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59 and that sufficient documentation existed to confirm that a license amendment was not required;
- the safety issue requiring the change, tests or experiment was resolved;
- the licensee conclusions for evaluations of changes, tests, and experiments were correct and consistent with 10 CFR 50.59; and
- the design and licensing basis documentation was updated to reflect the change.

The inspectors used, in part, Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 96-07, "Guidelines for 10 CFR 50.59 Implementation," Revision 1, to determine acceptability of the completed evaluations, and screenings. The NEI document was endorsed by the NRC in Regulatory Guide 1.187, "Guidance for Implementation of 10 CFR 50.59, Changes, Tests, and Experiments," dated November 2000. The inspectors also consulted Part 9900 of the NRC Inspection Manual, "10 CFR Guidance for 10 CFR 50.59, Changes, Tests, and Experiments."

This inspection constituted 7 samples of evaluations and 16 samples of screenings and/or applicability determinations as defined in Inspection Procedure (IP) 71111.17-04.

b. Findings

Failure to Evaluate Containment Spray System for Potential Gas Intrusion

Introduction: The inspectors identified a finding of very-low safety significance (Green), and an associated Non-Cited Violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," for the licensee's failure to evaluate for potential gas intrusion from the spray additive tank into the containment spray (CS) system during the injection phase of a design-basis accident (DBA).

Description: On January 11, 2008, the NRC requested each addressee of Generic Letter (GL) 2008-01 to evaluate its Emergency Core Cooling Systems, decay heat removal, and CS systems licensing basis, design, testing, and corrective actions to

ensure that gas accumulation was maintained less than the amount that would challenge the operability of these systems, and take appropriate actions when conditions adverse to quality were identified. The licensee's original actions to address these requests were, in part, to perform design reviews to identify and address gas intrusion mechanisms. Vortexing was among the gas intrusions mechanisms identified by GL 2008-01.

Per its design bases, the CS system would operate during both the injection phase and recirculation phase of certain DBA. However, the inspectors identified the licensee had failed to evaluate the CS system against potential gas intrusion during the injection phase, under design bases conditions. Specifically, during the injection phase one of CS design bases functions is to transfer sodium hydroxide (NaOH) from the spray additive tank (SAT) to the containment sump. This function is required to maintain adequate pH level in the sump in order to prevent chloride induced stress corrosion cracking and maintain iodine in the iodate form that will stay in solution. To accomplish this function the CS system is aligned to two separate suction sources, the SAT and the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST). The inspectors noted the licensee had evaluated for potential gas intrusion, including vortex prevention, from the RWST but had failed to evaluate for potential draining or vortex formation on the SAT during the injection phase.

The inspectors discussed their concerns with the licensee and preliminary results showed the SAT could be completely drained and air ingested into the CS system. This concern was entered into the Corrective Action Program (CAP) as AR 2068569. A follow-up evaluation was performed by the licensee and determined the SAT would not drain down and no air entraining vortex should form. As a result the licensee determined the CS system remained operable.

Analysis: The inspectors determined the failure to evaluate for potential gas intrusion from the SAT into the CS system during the injection phase of a DBA was contrary to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," and was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of equipment performance, and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, air intrusion into the CS system could affect the operability of the CS pumps by causing degraded performance and/or air binding of the pumps.

The inspectors determined the finding could be evaluated using the Significance Determination Process in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, "Significance Determination Process," Attachment 0609.04, "Initial Characterization of Findings." Specifically, the inspectors used IMC 0609, Appendix A, "Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power", Exhibit 2, "Mitigating Systems Screening Questions", issued June 19, 2012, and answered "yes" to Question A.1. The finding was a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating structure, system, or component (SSC), but the SSC maintained its operability. Specifically the licensee evaluated the CS system and determined the SSC remained operable. As a result, the finding screened as having a very-low safety significance, i.e., Green.

The inspectors did not identify a cross-cutting aspect associated with this finding. Specifically, the decision to not evaluate the injection phase was taken around the 2008 timeframe when the licensee was responding to the GL 2008-01. As a result the inspectors determined this finding was not representative of the licensee's current performance.

Enforcement: Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," requires, in part, that measures shall be established to assure that design control measures shall provide for verifying or checking the adequacy of design, such as by the performance of design reviews, by the use of alternate or simplified calculation methods, or by the performance of a suitable testing program.

Contrary to the above, as of August 28, 2015, the licensee had not verified the adequacy of the CS design. Specifically, the licensee failed to evaluate for potential gas intrusion into the CS system due to drain down and/or vortexing in the SAT during the injection phase of a DBA.

This violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. The violation was entered into the licensee's CAP as AR 2068569. As part of immediate corrective actions the licensee performed an evaluation which determined the SAT would not drain down and no air entraining vortex should form. As a result the licensee determined the CS system remained operable. (NCV 05000266/2015010-01; 05000301/2015010-01, Failure to Evaluate Containment Spray System for Potential Gas Intrusion).

.2 Permanent Plant Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed seven permanent plant modifications that had been installed in the plant during the last 3 years. This review included in-plant walkdowns for; portions of the Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation modification; reroute of transformer 1X04 low voltage side power cables modification; portions of the CS system associated with modified procedures; and the (G-05) gas turbine generator including control cabinets, supporting equipment, including batteries, support diesels, piping, supports, and the air inlet weather hood structure. The modifications were selected based upon risk significance, safety significance, and complexity. The inspectors reviewed the modifications selected to determine if:

- the supporting design and licensing basis documentation was updated;
- the changes were in accordance with the specified design requirements;
- the procedures and training plans affected by the modification have been adequately updated;
- the test documentation as required by the applicable test programs has been updated; and
- post-modification testing adequately verified system operability and/or functionality.

The inspectors also used applicable industry standards to evaluate acceptability of the modifications. The list of modifications and other documents reviewed by the inspectors is included as an Attachment to this report.

This inspection constituted seven permanent plant modification samples as defined in IP 71111.17-04.

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES

4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution

.1 Routine Review of Condition Reports

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed several corrective action process documents that identified or were related to 10 CFR 50.59 evaluations and permanent plant modifications. The inspectors reviewed these documents to evaluate the effectiveness of corrective actions related to permanent plant modifications and evaluations of changes, tests, and experiments. In addition, corrective action documents written on issues identified during the inspection were reviewed to verify adequate problem identification and incorporation of the problems into the corrective action system. The specific corrective action documents that were sampled and reviewed by the inspectors are listed in the attachment to this report.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA6 Management Meetings

.1 Exit Meeting Summary

On August 28, 2015, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. McCartney, and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee personnel acknowledged the inspection results presented and did not identify any proprietary content. The inspectors confirmed that all proprietary material provided to the inspection team was identified and will be dispositioned in accordance with applicable processes.

ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee

- S. Aerts, Performance Improvement Manager
- D. DeBoer, Plant Manager
- F. Eichhorst, Design Engineering Configuration Management Supervisor
- D. Forter, Manager of Projects
- R. Harrsch, Engineering Director
- D. Jensen, Design Engineering
- K. Kinjerski, Procedures Supervisor
- T. Lohr, Reactor Operator
- E. McCartney, Site Vice President
- A. Nash Design Engineering Supervisor
- R. Parker, Chemistry Manager
- M. Rosseau, Electrical / I&C Design Supervisor
- G. Strharsky, NOS Manager
- R. Webber, Operations Director
- P. Wild, Design Engineering Manager
- J. Wilson, Maintenance Director
- B. Woyak, Licensing Manager

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

- D. Oliver, Senior Resident Inspector

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED

Opened and Closed

05000266/2015010-01; 05000301/2015010-01	NCV	Failure to Evaluate Containment Spray System for Potential Gas Intrusion (Section 1R17.1b)
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Discussed

None

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

The following is a list of documents reviewed during the inspection. Inclusion on this list does not imply that the NRC inspectors reviewed the documents in their entirety, but rather, that selected sections or portions of the documents were evaluated as part of the overall inspection effort. Inclusion of a document on this list does not imply NRC acceptance of the document or any part of it, unless this is stated in the body of the inspection report.

10 CFR 50.59 EVALUATIONS

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
2010-002-01	EC 13251 - Reroute of 1X04 Low Voltage Side Power Cables to Façade, Rev. 1	05/22/12
2011-001	1A-01 and 1A-02 Loss of Voltage Relay Setpoint Changes	04/13/11
2011-003-01	Raise EOP Setpoint O.2 (RWST Level to Stop Spray Pumps) to 17% - Radiological Consequence	03/19/12
2011-004	Raise EOP Setpoint O.2 (RWST Level to Stop Spray Pumps) to 17% - Containment Pressure & Temperature	05/29/11
2012-004	EC 260347 - 120V Vital Cable Short Circuit Protection for Units 1 and 2	11/04/12
2013-001	Unit 1 and Unit 2 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbine Replacement	10/02/13
2014-004	EC 277545 "RCP Seal Replacement"	00

10 CFR 50.59 SCREENINGS

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
2006-0275	Replacement of Potentially Overdutied Breakers and/or Fuses in MCCs 1B-31, 2B-11, B-33, B-44, B-45, B-46, and B-47	05/02/07
2010-0186	"At-Risk" Installation to Replace Portions of Power Cables from 1X-04 to Façade	09/23/10
2011-0093	AST Related RWST EOP Setpoint Changes	05/28/11
2012-0077	LIC 1756890, FSAR 6.1 and FSAR 9.2 Revision to Add GL 2008-01 Discussion	05/17/12
2012-0177-01	Replace Fuses D72-18-07, D72-22-08, D72-22-10	10/13/13
2012-0119	EC 260347 - 120V Vital Cable Short Circuit Protection for Units 1 and 2	10/29/12
2012-0199	Revision to IT08A Following Establishment of 1MS-2082 IST Acceptance Criteria	12/06/12
2013-0023	CHANGE FSAR TABLE 9.1-1, COMPONENT COOLING SYSTEM COMPONENT DATA	02/15/13
2013-0043	Revise OI 168 "Emergency Diesel Generator Operability"	07/10/13
2013-0046	G-05 Vibration Monitor: Enable Trip Multiplier Function for Resonant Speed Range	03/08/13
2014-0033	EC 281270 - Add 60th Cell to Batteries D-05 and D-06	03/24/14
2014-0203-01	EOP-1.3: Transfer to Containment Sump Recirculation – Low Head Injection	12/18/14

10 CFR 50.59 SCREENINGS

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
2014-0158	EC 27745 "RCP Seal Replacement"	00
2014-0170	Emergency Diesel Generator Operability	09/20/14
2015-0002	Revise AOP-8F for INPO IER L1-11-2 Requirements	01/15/15
2015-0004	Revised AOP-8F for Area Radiation Monitor (72.48)	01/15/15
2013-0024	Revise TRM 3.7.7, OI 70, TS 33, TS 34, AOP13A, AOP-8F, FSAR 9.6.1, OI I55, PC 97 Parts 1-8 and 1(2)-SOP-VNCC-001-4 to Allow 85F SW Inlet Temperature and to Specify Operability Limits on Low Pump Bay Level for the G01/G02 EDGs and the Lower Elevations CFCs	03/15/13
2015-0029	Revise Normal And Adverse Containment Pressurizer Level Values In EOP 3.1-3, 3.2, 3.3	00
2015-0032	Revise AOP-22 Step 1.c RNO to 60 Hz	04/06/15

CALCULATIONS

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
CN-SEE-III-08-10	Point Beach Units 1 and 2 RHRS Cooldown Analysis for EPU to 1806 MWT NSSS Power	03
CN-TA-07-133	Evaluation of an Increased Delay for the Reactor Coolant Pump Undervoltage Reactor Trip Function at Point Beach Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2	02
N-92-005	125 VDC Coordination Analysis	02
N-93-056	D05 DC System Sizing, Voltage Drop and Short Circuit Calculation	07
N-93-059	D106 DC System Sizing, Voltage Drop and Short Circuit Calculation	08
13-298	2012 CCW Heat Exchangers HX-012A/B Thermal Performance Test Results Report	00
13-316	2011 CCW Heat Exchangers HX-012A/B Thermal Performance Test Results Report	00
13-323	2009 SFP Heat Exchanger HX-013A/B Thermal Performance Test Results	11/14/13
13-326	2012 SFP Heat Exchanger HX-013A/B Thermal Performance Test Results	11/20/13
2002-0003	Service Water System Design Basis	04
2003-0046	Battery Chargers Sizing and Current Limit Set Point	04
2005-0037	Spent Fuel Pool Anti-Siphon Provisions	00
2005-0054	Control Building GOTHIC Temperature Calculation	06
2008-005	4.16 KV 7 480 V Loss of Voltage and Underfrequency Relay Setting	02
2007-0002	Emergency Diesel Generator Frequency Uncertainty Calculation	00
2009-0012	Extended Power Uprate (EPU) Related EOP Setpoint Calculations	00
2010-0027	Miscellaneous Level EOP Setpoint Calculations	03

CALCULATIONS

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
2010-01716	Eductor Analysis – Ingestion of Air into Containment Spray Pump Suction	00
2013-0020	PAB Scenarios for Fukushima Coping	00
129187-E-0030	Cable Ampacity De-Rating Calculation	04

CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM DOCUMENTS INITIATED DURING INSPECTION

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date</u>
02068569	2015 MOD/50.59 NRC Inspection Review of SW Temp Increase	08/20/15
02069124	Eval 2013-001 Contains Typos	08/24/15
02069296	NRC 50.59 / MOD Inspection: Analysis of SAT Emptying	08/25/15
02069400	DBD For CC not Maintained	09/28/15
02069630	NRC 50.59 / MOD Inspection: Potential for Error	---
02069693	OI-169 EDG Operability Potentially Confusing	08/26/15
02069856	TRM 3.7.7	08/27/15
02069859	Discrepancy in CC HX Fouling	08/27/15

CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date</u>
98-0036	IST Program Does Not List Requirement to Exercise and Stroke Time Spray Additive Tank Valves	01/06/98
01221210	Degraded Seat Material on Unit 1 SI-854 Check Valves	09/15/95
01316511	Appendix R Associated Circuits 120VAC Coordination Concern	04/21/07
01659682	Fuse Replace for D72-22-08 and -22-10, D72-18-07 and -18-10	06/10/11
01756590	Possible FSAR Update in Response to GL 2008-01	04/19/12
01794746	Preconditioning Issue in IT-08A TDAFP Test	08/17/12
01891067	COMP-NA CR SITE DRAWING AND PROCEDURE CHANGES POST MODIFICATIONS	07/22/13
01904504	Clarify FSAR 7.4.3 & 10.2 Re: AFWP Suction Transfer to SW	09/17/13
01943408	FSAR Overstates Docketed Design Bases	02/25/14
01950740	DC Calculation Issues Identified	03/22/14
01979452	Historical 50.59 Evaluations Did Not Identify FSAR Impact	07/28/14
01985361	Additional Performance Issues with 50.59 Products	08/19/15
01996270	CLB Updates are Not Timely	10/05/14
01998626	Revise FSAR Section 8.1.4 to Update Ref. 2	10/13/14
02032684	AOP-22 Unit 1 - (LAR 4/20/2015) RFI 4/16	03/16/15
02037428	Plant Changed Without an EC or 50.59	04/24/15
02038568	RCP No. 1 Seal EOP Setpoint Not Updated Since 1995	04/07/15

DRAWINGS

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Revision</u>
E-6 Sheet 1	Single Line Diagram - 125V DC Dist. System	66
MCKK00000143, Sheet 3	P&ID Auxiliary Coolant System	43
MCKK00000422, Sheet 2	P&ID Auxiliary Coolant System	22
MESK00000259, Sheet 1	P&ID Safety Injection System	54
MSFK00000271, Sheet 1	P&ID Auxiliary Coolant System	71
MSIK00000165, Sheet 2	P&ID Safety Injection System	55
MSIK00001248, Sheet 3	P&ID Safety Injection System	48

MODIFICATIONS

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Revision</u>
EC 008075	Replacement of Potentially Overduty Breakers and/or Fuses in MCCs 1B-31, 2B-11, B-33, B-44, B-45, B-46, and B-47	00
EC 013251	Reroute of 1X04 Low Voltage Side Power Cables to Façade	00
EC 260287	REPLACEMENT OF ACCIDENT FAN COOLER HOSES WITH ALTERNATE DESIGN FLEX	00
EC 260313	UNIT 2 CONTAINMENT SUMP A LEVEL TRANSMITTER REPLACEMENT	01
EC 260347	120V Vital Cable Short Circuit Protection for Units 1 and 2	01
EC 260579	0P-032E-M, SW Pump Motor Equivalency	00
EC 260795	125 VDC Power Supply Reconfiguration for Unit 1 Turbine Auto-Stop Trip (AST) / Emergency Trip (ET) Control Circuits	00
EC 260820	Install Test Switches for 4.16kV Bus Loss of voltage Relays - Unit 2	00
EC 261461	Install Test Switches for 4.16kV Bus Loss of voltage Relays - Unit 1	00
EC 261964	P-032D-M SW PUMP MOTOR REPLACED WITH SPARE MOTOR (+)	00
EC 270973	Westinghouse/Cutler Hammer DHP-VR Breaker Enhancements	01
EC 271690	Evaluation of an Increased Delay for the Reactor Coolant Pump Undervoltage Reactor Trip Function at Point Beach Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2	01
EC 276487	Revise RWST Low-Low Level Alarm Setpoint in STPT 11.1 and Other Affected Documents Per CALC PBNP-IC-02-004-A	00
EC 276803	NRC Order Fukushima Strategy - Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Upgrade	02

MODIFICATIONS

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Revision</u>
EC 277206	Replace Fuses D72-18-07, D72-18-10, D72-22-08, D72-22-10	01
EC 277545	RCP Seal Replacement	00
EC 281270	D-05 and D-06 Battery Addition	02

OTHER DOCUMENTS

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
DBD-11	Safety Injection & Containment Spray Pump Design Bases Document	22
EC 278678	G-05 Vibration Monitor: Enable Trip Multiplier Function for Resonant Speed Range	00
Evaluation 00456339	Commercial Grade Dedication - Fast Acting Fuse	02/12/14
FPTE-2007-001	Technical Evaluation of Associated Circuit by Common Power Supply and by Common Enclosure	04/30/07
WEP-98-017	Containment Pressure and Temperature Increase During Recirculation Due to Loos of RHR Heat Exchanger Cooling	03/05/98
WO 40127282 07	H52-DHPVR2000-3; Breaker Overhaul	03/27/14
WO 40202961 01	D-06 Battery Modified Performance Test	01/21/14
WO 40220768	G-05 Apply Vib Trip Block to Turbine Resonant Speed Range	03/08/13
WO 40301275 01	D-06/Connect 60th Cell into Battery D-06 Per EC 281270	04/25/14
WO 40301276 01	D-05/Connect 60th Cell into Battery D-05	06/18/14
WO 40302871 01	D-05 / D-07, Battery Surveillance Tests	07/15/14
WO 40344232 01	125V, Station Tech Spec Batteries Weekly Inspection	08/03/15
2013-0013	Change FSAR Table 9.1-1, "Component Cooling System Component Data"	02/15/13

PROCEDURES

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Revision</u>
---	Gas Accumulation Management Program	03
AOP 22	EDG Load Management	15
EOP 0.1	Reactor Trip Response	31
EOP-1.3 Unit 1	Transfer to Containment Sump Recirculation – Low Head Injection	52
OI 168	Emergency Diesel Generator Operability	20
RMP 9046-4	Seven Day Pilot Cell Battery Surveillance	15
STPT 5.3	Pressurizer Pressure and Level Control	11
TS 84	Emergency Diesel Generator G-04 Monthly	34

LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

ADAMS	Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
CAP	Corrective Action Program
CFR	<i>Code of Federal Regulations</i>
CS	Containment Spray
DBA	Design-Basis Accident
DRP	Division of Reactor Projects
DRS	Division of Reactor Safety
GL	Generic Letter
IMC	Inspection Manual Chapter
IP	Inspection Procedure
NCV	Non-Cited Violation
NEI	Nuclear Energy Institute
NRC	U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
PARS	Publicly Available Records System
RWST	Refueling Water Storage Tank
SAT	Spray Additive Tank
SSC	Structure, System, and Component

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Sincerely,

/RA/

Robert C. Daley, Chief
Engineering Branch 3
Division of Reactor Safety

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