U.S. Department of Homeland Security
FEMA Region I
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FEMA

January 29, 2015

NRC Headquarters
Document Control Desk
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555-0001

To Whom it May Concern:

Enclosed is a copy of the final report for the Seabrook Station Hostile Action Based (HAB) plume exercise that was evaluated on November 5, 2014.

The Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the State of New Hampshire and local emergency response organizations successfully demonstrated their capabilities to implement off-site radiological emergency response plans and procedures. Based on the evaluation of this exercise by federal evaluators, there were no deficiencies. There were no Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA). There was one prior ARCA from the 2012 plume exercise that was successfully re-demonstrated and closed. There were five planning issues identified and subsequently closed.

State and local preparedness remains adequate to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of the Seabrook Power Station and provides reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can be taken off-site in the event of a radiological emergency.

If you have any questions regarding this matter, please feel free to contact me at 617-832-4731, John Rice at (617) 956-7509, or Barbara Thomas at (617) 832-4703.

Sincerely,

Steve L. Colman
Regional Assistance Committee Chair

Enclosure

E-copy: NRC Region I

IX49
RGN I

Seabrook Station

After Action Report/ Improvement Plan

Exercise Date - November 05, 2014

Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program

FEMA

Published January 29, 2014

Seabrook Station
After Action Report/Improvement Plan

Published January 29, 2014

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On November 5, 2014 the U.S Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Preparedness Directorate, National Preparedness Division, Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Region I conducted a Hostile Action Based exercise of the 10-mile plume exposure pathway zone around Seabrook Nuclear Power Station.

Out-of-sequence demonstrations of schools, host community schools, daycares and nursing homes were also conducted per the new 8-year exercise cycle. The purpose of the exercise and the out-of-sequence demonstrations was to assess the level of State and local preparedness in responding to a radiological emergency at Seabrook Nuclear Power Station. The exercise and out-of- sequence demonstrations were held in accordance with FEMA's policies and guidance concerning the exercise of State and local radiological emergency response plans (RERP) and procedures.

DHS wishes to acknowledge the efforts of the many individuals in The State of New Hampshire, The Commonwealth of Massachusetts, local communities and private and volunteer organizations that participated in this exercise.

Protecting the public health and safety is the full-time job of some of the exercise participants and an additional assigned responsibility for others. Still others have willingly sought this responsibly by volunteering to provide vital emergency services to their communities. Cooperation and teamwork of all the participants were evident during this exercise.

This report contains the final evaluation of the biennial exercise and the out of sequence activities.

SECTION 1: EXERCISE OVERVIEW

1.1 Exercise Details

Exercise Name
Seabrook Station

Type of Exercise
Plume

Exercise Date
November 05, 2014

Program
Department of Homeland Security/FEMA Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program

Scenario Type
Radiological Emergency

1.2 Exercise Planning Team Leadership

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1.3 Participating Organizations

Agencies and organizations of the following jurisdictions participated in the Seabrook Station exercise:

State Jurisdictions

STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
New Hampshire Amateur Radio Emergency Service
New Hampshire Bureau of Emergency Medical Services
New Hampshire Department of Administrative Services
New Hampshire Department of Agriculture
New Hampshire Department of Education
New Hampshire Department of Environmental Services
New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services, Emergency Services Unit
New Hampshire Department of Homeland Security and Emergency Management
New Hampshire Department of Information Technology
New Hampshire Department of Resources and Economic Development
New Hampshire Department of Safety, Commissioner's Office
New Hampshire Department of Safety, Division of Fire Safety
New Hampshire Department of Transportation
New Hampshire Division of Public Health Services

New Hampshire Fish and Game Department
New Hampshire Governor's Office
New Hampshire Homeland Security and Emergency Management
New Hampshire Joint Information Center Public Information Officer
New Hampshire National Guard
New Hampshire Public Information Officer
New Hampshire State Police
New Hampshire State Police Troop A
New Hamshire Department of Homeland Security and Emergency Management
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
Massachusetts Field Monitoring Team 1 (MA DPH)
Massachusetts 2-1-1
Massachusetts Department of Public Health
Massachusetts Department of Transportation
Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency
Massachusetts Joint Information Center Public Information Officer
Massachusetts National Guard
Massachusetts State Police

Risk Jurisdictions

STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE RISK JURISDICTIONS
Town of Brentwood Department of Public Works
Town of Brentwood Board of Selectmen
Town of Brentwood Fire Department
Town of Brentwood Police Department
City of Portsmouth Emergency Management
City of Portsmouth Fire Department
City of Portsmouth Health Dept
City of Portsmouth Human Resource Dept
City of Portsmouth IT Dept
City of Portsmouth Police Department
City of Portsmouth Public Works Dept
City of Portsmouth School Department
City of Portsmouth Welfare Dept
Town of East Kingston Emergency Operations Center

Town of East Kingston Fire Department
Town of East Kingston Highway Department
Town of East Kingston Police Department
Town of East Kingston Town Selectman
Town of Exeter Board of Selectmen
Town of Exeter Department of Public Works
Town of Exeter Emergency Management Agency
Town of Exeter Fire Department
Town of Exeter Hospital
Town of Exeter Parks and Recreation Department
Town of Exeter Police Department
Town of Exeter Public Health Cordinator
Town of Exeter Public Safety Dispatch Unit
Town of Exeter Public Schools
Town of Exeter Town Manager
Town of Greenland Department of Public Works
Town of Greenland Police Department
Town of Greenland Town Office Staff
Town of Hampton Falls Board of Selectmen
Town of Hampton Falls Emergency Management
Town of Hampton Falls Fire Department
Town of Hampton Falls Highway and Road Agent
Town of Hampton Falls Police Department
Town of Hampton Town Department of Buildings
Town of Hampton Town Emergency Management
Town of Hampton Town Emergency Medical Services
Town of Hampton Town Fire Department
Town of Hampton Town Police Department
Town of Hampton Town Public Works Department
Town of Kingston Police Department
Town of Rye Department of Public Works
Town of Rye Fire Department
Town of Rye Municipal Government
Town of Rye Police Department

Town of South Hampton Board of Selectmen
Town of South Hampton Clerk
Town of South Hampton Fire Department
Town of Kensington Elementary School
Town of Kensington Fire Department
Town of Kensington Police Department
Town of Kensington Road Agent
Town of New Castle
Town of North Hampton
Town of Newfields
Town of Newton Board of Selectmen
Town of Newton Fire Department
Town of Newton Police Department
Town of Newton School System
Town of Newton Town Clerk
Town of Newton Transportation Department
Town of Seabrook Code Enforcement
Town of Seabrook Emergency Management Director
Town of Seabrook Emergency Management Staff
Town of Seabrook Fire Department
Town of Seabrook Police Department
Town of Seabrook Public Works
Town of Seabrook Schools Representative
Town of Seabrook Selectmen
Town of Seabrook Town Manager
Town of Seabrook Transportation Officer
Town of Seabrook Water Department
Town of Stratham
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS RISK JURISDICTIONS
City of Amesbury Department of Public Works
City of Amesbury Emergency Managment Agency
City of Amesbury Fire Department
City of Amesbury Harbormaster
City of Amesbury Mayor

City of Amesbury Police Department
City of Amesbury Public Health Department
City of Amesbury RACES Sector 1 Easy
City of Amesbury Schools Superintendent
Town of Merrimac Emergency Management
Town of Merrimac Fire Department
Town of Merrimac olice Department
Town of Merrimac Public Works
Town of Newbury Department of Public Works
Town of Newbury Fire Department
Town of Newbury Police Department
Town ofNewbury Town Administration
Town of Newburyport Department of Public Safety Highway Division
City of Newburyport Emergency Management
City of Newburyport Fire Department
City of Newburyport Harbor Master
City of Newburyport Police Department
Town of Salisbury Department of Public Works
Town of Salisbury Emergency Management
Town of Salisbury Fire/Rescue
Town of Salisbury Police Department
Town of Salisbury Town Manager
Town of West Newbury Board of Health
Town of West Newbury Council on Aging
Town of West Newbury Department of Public Works
Town of West Newbury Emergency Management Agency
Town of West Newbury Fire Department
Town of West Newbury Police Department
Town of West Newbury Water Department

Support Jurisdictions

City of Manchester Fire Department
City of Manchester Health Department
City of Manchester Housing and Redevelopment Authority
City of Manchester Information Services

City of Manchester Public Works
City of Manchester School District
City of Manchester Security Department
City of Manchester Transit Authority
City of Manchester Water Authority
City of Dover Fire Department
City of Dover Police Department
City of Rochester City Administration Office
City of Rochester Fire Department
City of Rochester Police Department
City of Rochester School District
Rockingham County Dispatch
Rockingham County Sheriff's Department

Private Organizations

American Medical Response
NextEra Energy

Federal Jurisdictions

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Federal Emergency Management Agency
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
United States Coast Guard

SECTION 2: EXERCISE DESIGN SUMMARY

2.1 Exercise Purpose and Design

The FEMA Region I evaluated the Hostile Action Based exercise on November 5, 2014, to assess the capabilities of local emergency preparedness organizations in implementing their Radiological Emergency Response Plans (RERPs) and procedures to protect the public health and safety during a radiological emergency involving Seabrook Nuclear Power Station. The purpose of this report is to present the results and findings on the performance of the offsite response organizations (OROs) during a simulated radiological emergency in HSEEP format.

2.2 Exercise Objectives, Capabilities and Activities

The exercise objectives, capabilities, and activities are noted in the extent of play agreement, included in Appendix Section.

2.3 Scenario Summary

The exercise scenario was developed to evaluate the response of the exercise participants to a radiological emergency. The scenario is listed in Appendix: Exercise Plan

SECTION 3: ANALYSIS OF CAPABILITIES

3.1 Exercise Evaluation and Results

This section contains the results and findings of the evaluation of all jurisdictions and functional entities that participated in the November 5, 2014 Hostile Action Based exercise, conducted to test the offsite emergency response capabilities of the State and local governments in the Seabrook Nuclear Power Station 10-Mile Emergency Planning Zone.

Each jurisdiction and functional entity was evaluated on its demonstration of criteria contained in the exercise evaluation areas as outlined in the Federal , Volume 67, No. 80 "FEMA – Radiological Emergency Preparedness: Exercise Evaluation Methodology" (April 25, 2002).

Detailed information on the evaluation area criteria and the extent of play agreement for the exercise are included as appendices to this report.

3.2 Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation

The matrix presented in the table on the following pages presents the status of all exercise evaluations area criteria that were scheduled for demonstration during the drill by all participating jurisdictions and functional entities. Exercise criteria are listed by number and demonstration statuses of those criteria are indicated by use of the following letters:

M - Met (No Deficiency or ARCAs assessed and no unresolved ARCAs from prior exercise)
A - ARCA assessed or unresolved ARCA from previous exercises
D - Deficiency assessed
P - Plan Issues
N – Not Demonstrated

Table 3.1 - Summary of Exercise Evaluation (5 pages)

DATE: 2014-11-05 SITE: Seabrook Station, NH M: Met, A: ARCA, D: Deficiency, P: Plan Issue, N: Not Demonstrated		NH SEOC	NH SS EOF	NH SS IFO	NH State Police	Rockingham Dispatch	NH SS JIC	NH SS FMT-1	NH SS FMT-2	Brentwood EOC	East Kingston EOC	Exeter EOC	Greenland EOC
Emergency Operations Management													
Mobilization	1a1	M	M	M	M	M	M	N	N	M	M	M	M
Facilities	1b1	M	M	M		M	M			M	M	M	M
Direction and Control	1c1	M		M	M		M			M	M	M	M
Communications Equipment	1d1	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1	M	M	M	M		M	M	M	M	M	M	M
Protective Action Decision Making													
Emergency Worker Exposure Control	2a1	M											
Dose Assessment & PARs & PADs for the Emergency Event	2b1	P	M										
Dose Assessment & PARs & PADs for the Emergency Event	2b2	M											
PADs for the Protection of persons with disabilities and access/functional needs	2c1	M											
Radiological Assessment and Decision-making for the Ingestion Exposure Pathway	2d1												
Radiological Assessment & Decision-making Concerning Post-Plume Phase Relocation, Reentry, and Return	2e1												
Protective Action Implementation													
Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1		M	M		M		M	M	M	M	M	M
Implementation of KI Decision for Institutionalized Individuals and the Public	3b1		M							M	M	M	M
Implementation of Protective Actions for persons with disabilities and access/functional needs	3c1									M	M	M	M
Implementation of Protective Actions for persons with disabilities and access/functional needs	3c2									M	M	M	M
Implementation of Traffic and Access Control	3d1									M	M	M	M
Implementation of Traffic and Access Control	3d2					M				M	M	M	M
Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Decisions	3e1												
Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Decisions	3e2												
Implementation of Post-Plume Phase Relocation, Reentry, and Return Decisions	3f1												
Field Measurement and Analysis													
RESERVED	4a1												
Plume Phase Field Measurement and Analyses	4a2		M										
Plume Phase Field Measurement and Analyses	4a3							M	M				
Post Plume Phase Field Measurements and Sampling	4b1												
Laboratory Operations	4c1												
Emergency Notification and Public Info													
Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System	5a1	M				M							
RESERVED	5a2												
Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System	5a3												
Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System	5a4												
Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media	5b1	M		M			M						
Support Operations/Facilities													
Monitoring, Decontamination, and Registration of Evacuees	6a1												

Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Workers and their Equipment and Vehicles	6b1												
Temporary Care of Evacuees	6c1												
Transportation and Treatment of Contaminated Injured Individuals	6d1												

Table 3.1 - Summary of Exercise Evaluation (Continued. page 2/5)

DATE: 2014-11-05 SITE: Seabrook Station, NH M: Met, A: ARCA, D: Deficiency, P: Plan Issue, N: Not Demonstrated		Hampton EOC	Hampton Falls EOC	Kensington EOC	Kingston NH EOC	New Castle EOC	Newfields EOC	Newton EOC	North Hampton EOC	Portsmouth EOC	Rochester EOC	Rye EOC	Seabrook EOC
Emergency Operations Management													
Mobilization	1a1	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
Facilities	1b1	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
Direction and Control	1c1	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	P	M	M
Communications Equipment	1d1	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
Protective Action Decision Making													
Emergency Worker Exposure Control	2a1												
Dose Assessment & PARs & PADs for the Emergency Event	2b1												
Dose Assessment & PARs & PADs for the Emergency Event	2b2												
PADs for the Protection of persons with disabilities and access/functional needs	2c1												
Radiological Assessment and Decision-making for the Ingestion Exposure Pathway	2d1												
Radiological Assessment & Decision-making Concerning Post-Plume Phase Relocation, Reentry, and Return	2e1												
Protective Action Implementation													
Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M		M	M
Implementation of KI Decision for Institutionalized Individuals and the Public	3b1	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M		M	M
Implementation of Protective Actions for persons with disabilities and access/functional needs	3c1	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M		M	M
Implementation of Protective Actions for persons with disabilities and access/functional needs	3c2	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M		M	M
Implementation of Traffic and Access Control	3d1	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
Implementation of Traffic and Access Control	3d2	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M		M	M
Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Decisions	3e1												
Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Decisions	3e2												
Implementation of Post-Plume Phase Relocation, Reentry, and Return Decisions	3f1												
Field Measurement and Analysis													
RESERVED	4a1												
Plume Phase Field Measurement and Analyses	4a2												
Plume Phase Field Measurement and Analyses	4a3												
Post Plume Phase Field Measurements and Sampling	4b1												
Laboratory Operations	4c1												
Emergency Notification and Public Info													
Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System	5a1												
RESERVED	5a2												
Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System	5a3												
Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System	5a4												
Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media	5b1												
Support Operations/Facilities													
Monitoring, Decontamination, and Registration of Evacuees	6a1												

Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Workers and their Equipment and Vehicles	6b1												
Temporary Care of Evacuees	6c1												
Transportation and Treatment of Contaminated Injured Individuals	6d1												

Table 3.1 - Summary of Exercise Evaluation (Continued. page 3/5)

DATE: 2014-11-05 SITE: Seabrook Station, NH M: Met, A: ARCA, D: Deficiency, P: Plan Issue, N: Not Demonstrated		South Hampton EOC	Stratham EOC	Dover EOC	Dover MS RC Ops	Dover MS RC Dosimetry	Dover MS RC Portal & Sec Mon	Dover MS RC Fem Decon	Dover MS RC Male Decon	Dover MS RC KI	Dover MS RC Regn	Dover MS RC Vehicles
Emergency Operations Management												
Mobilization	1a1	M	M	M	M							
Facilities	1b1	M	M	M	M							
Direction and Control	1c1	M	M	M	M							
Communications Equipment	1d1	M	M	M	M							
Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1	M	M	M	M							
Protective Action Decision Making												
Emergency Worker Exposure Control	2a1											
Dose Assessment & PARs & PADs for the Emergency Event	2b1											
Dose Assessment & PARs & PADs for the Emergency Event	2b2											
PADs for the Protection of persons with disabilities and access/functional needs	2c1											
Radiological Assessment and Decision-making for the Ingestion Exposure Pathway	2d1											
Radiological Assessment & Decision-making Concerning Post-Plume Phase Relocation, Reentry, and Return	2e1											
Protective Action Implementation												
Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1	M	M			M		M	M			
Implementation of KI Decision for Institutionalized Individuals and the Public	3b1	M	M							M		
Implementation of Protective Actions for persons with disabilities and access/functional needs	3c1	M	M									
Implementation of Protective Actions for persons with disabilities and access/functional needs	3c2		M									
Implementation of Traffic and Access Control	3d1	M	M	M								M
Implementation of Traffic and Access Control	3d2	M	M									
Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Decisions	3e1											
Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Decisions	3e2											
Implementation of Post-Plume Phase Relocation, Reentry, and Return Decisions	3f1											
Field Measurement and Analysis												
RESERVED	4a1											
Plume Phase Field Measurement and Analyses	4a2											
Plume Phase Field Measurement and Analyses	4a3											
Post Plume Phase Field Measurements and Sampling	4b1											
Laboratory Operations	4c1											
Emergency Notification and Public Info												
Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System	5a1											
RESERVED	5a2											
Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System	5a3											
Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System	5a4											
Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media	5b1											

Support Operations/Facilities												
Monitoring, Decontamination, and Registration of Evacuees	6a1					M	M	M	M		M	
Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Workers and their Equipment and Vehicles	6b1						M					M
Temporary Care of Evacuees	6c1											
Transportation and Treatment of Contaminated Injured Individuals	6d1											

Table 3.1 - Summary of Exercise Evaluation (Continued. page 4/5)

DATE: 2014-11-05 SITE: Seabrook Station, NH M: Met, A: ARCA, D: Deficiency, P: Plan Issue, N: Not Demonstrated		Manchester EOC	Fun After School	MA SEOC	MA R1 EOC	MA SS JIC	MA SS FMT-1	MA SS FMT-2	Amesbury EOC	Merrimac EOC	Newbury EOC	Newburyport EOC
Emergency Operations Management												
Mobilization	1a1	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
Facilities	1b1	M			M	M			M	M	M	M
Direction and Control	1c1	M		M	M	M			M	M	M	M
Communications Equipment	1d1			M	M	M			M	M	M	M
Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1	M		M	M	M			M	M	M	M
Protective Action Decision Making												
Emergency Worker Exposure Control	2a1			M								
Dose Assessment & PARs & PADs for the Emergency Event	2b1			M								
Dose Assessment & PARs & PADs for the Emergency Event	2b2			M								
PADs for the Protection of persons with disabilities and access/functional needs	2c1			M	M							
Radiological Assessment and Decision-making for the Ingestion Exposure Pathway	2d1											
Radiological Assessment & Decision-making Concerning Post-Plume Phase Relocation, Reentry, and Return	2e1											
Protective Action Implementation												
Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1				M				M	M	M	M
Implementation of KI Decision for Institutionalized Individuals and the Public	3b1		M		M				M	M	M	M
Implementation of Protective Actions for persons with disabilities and access/functional needs	3c1				M				M	M	M	M
Implementation of Protective Actions for persons with disabilities and access/functional needs	3c2		M		M				M	M	M	M
Implementation of Traffic and Access Control	3d1	P			M				M	M	M	M
Implementation of Traffic and Access Control	3d2				M				M	M	M	M
Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Decisions	3e1											
Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Decisions	3e2											
Implementation of Post-Plume Phase Relocation, Reentry, and Return Decisions	3f1											
Field Measurement and Analysis												
RESERVED	4a1											
Plume Phase Field Measurement and Analyses	4a2											
Plume Phase Field Measurement and Analyses	4a3											
Post Plume Phase Field Measurements and Sampling	4b1											
Laboratory Operations	4c1											
Emergency Notification and Public Info												
Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System	5a1			M					M	M	M	M
RESERVED	5a2											
Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System	5a3											
Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System	5a4											
Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media	5b1			M		M			M	M	M	M
Support Operations/Facilities												
Monitoring, Decontamination, and Registration of Evacuees	6a1											
Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Workers and their Equipment and Vehicles	6b1											

Temporary Care of Evacuees	6c1											
Transportation and Treatment of Contaminated Injured Individuals	6d1											

Table 3.1 - Summary of Exercise Evaluation (Continued. page 5/5)

DATE: 2014-11-05 SITE: Seabrook Station, NH M: Met, A: ARCA, D: Deficiency, P: Plan Issue, N: Not Demonstrated		Salisbury EOC	West Newbury EOC	MA 211 Center	MA State Police Assembly- Troop A	Seabrook ICP	Building Block School	Langdon Place of Exeter	Kingston Child Center	The Village Preschool	Hampton Falls Child Care Center	The Learning Tree
Emergency Operations Management												
Mobilization	1a1	M	M			M	M	M	M	M	M	M
Facilities	1b1	M	M									
Direction and Control	1c1	M	M			P						
Communications Equipment	1d1	M	M	M		M						
Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1	M	M	M		M						
Protective Action Decision Making												
Emergency Worker Exposure Control	2a1											
Dose Assessment & PARs & PADs for the Emergency Event	2b1											
Dose Assessment & PARs & PADs for the Emergency Event	2b2					M						
PADs for the Protection of persons with disabilities and access/functional needs	2c1											
Radiological Assessment and Decision-making for the Ingestion Exposure Pathway	2d1											
Radiological Assessment & Decision-making Concerning Post-Plume Phase Relocation, Reentry, and Return	2e1											
Protective Action Implementation												
Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1	M	M			M						
Implementation of KI Decision for Institutionalized Individuals and the Public	3b1	M	M		M		M	M	M	M	M	M
Implementation of Protective Actions for persons with disabilities and access/functional needs	3c1	M	M									
Implementation of Protective Actions for persons with disabilities and access/functional needs	3c2	M	M				M	M	M	M	M	M
Implementation of Traffic and Access Control	3d1	M	M									
Implementation of Traffic and Access Control	3d2	M	M									
Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Decisions	3e1											
Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Decisions	3e2											
Implementation of Post-Plume Phase Relocation, Reentry, and Return Decisions	3f1											
Field Measurement and Analysis												
RESERVED	4a1											
Plume Phase Field Measurement and Analyses	4a2											
Plume Phase Field Measurement and Analyses	4a3											
Post Plume Phase Field Measurements and Sampling	4b1											
Laboratory Operations	4c1											
Emergency Notification and Public Info												
Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System	5a1	M	M									
RESERVED	5a2											
Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System	5a3											

Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System	5a4											
Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media	5b1	M	M	M								
Support Operations/Facilities												
Monitoring, Decontamination, and Registration of Evacuees	6a1											
Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Workers and their Equipment and Vehicles	6b1											
Temporary Care of Evacuees	6c1											
Transportation and Treatment of Contaminated Injured Individuals	6d1											

3.3 Criteria Evaluation Summaries

3.3.1 Massachusetts Jurisdictions

3.3.1.1 Massachusetts State Emergency Operations Center

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.1, 2.b.2, 2.c.1, 5.a.1, 5.b.1.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.1.2 MA Region I EOC

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.b.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.c.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.1.3 MA (SS) Field Monitoring Team-1

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None

g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.1.4 MA (SS) Field Monitoring Team-2

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.1.5 MA Media Center

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 5.b.1.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.2 Risk Jurisdictions

3.3.2.1 Amesbury Local EOC

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.b.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.a.1, 5.b.1.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None

g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.2.2 Merrimac Local EOC

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.b.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.a.1, 5.b.1.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.2.3 Newbury Local EOC

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.b.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.a.1, 5.b.1.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: 1.e.1.

ISSUE NO.: 57-14-1e1-P-04

CRITERION: Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, KI, and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations.

CONDITION: The Town of Newbury Seabrook Emergency Response Plan position binders by job function contained outdated procedures (2011 instead of 2014). Additionally, outdated forms were in the forms file box and emergency worker dosimetry kit box (e.g. Emergency Worker Exposure Forms).

POSSIBLE CAUSE: Available controlled copy binders with complete Seabrook Station Radiological Emergency Response Plan and the Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency Resource Manual contained up to date procedures and forms. They were labeled as controlled copies, the position binders were not labeled as such (e.g. binder for Radiological Officer, Communications Officer, etc). The individual

or agency that issues and keeps the procedures up to date may not be aware that procedures and forms are in additional binders and files and should be updated when the large controlled binders are updated.

REFERENCE: NUREG 0654, P.5

EFFECT: Without appropriate document version control, emergency responders cannot be assured that they are taking appropriate actions in response to a radiological emergency.

RECOMMENDATION: Update position binders and replace appropriate forms. Ensure the process for procedure version control is updated to include the position binders and forms.

e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.2.4 Newburyport Local EOC

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.b.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.a.1, 5.b.1.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.2.5 Salisbury Local EOC

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.b.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.a.1, 5.b.1.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None

d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.2.6 West Newbury Local EOC

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.b.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.a.1, 5.b.1.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.3 Support Jurisdictions

3.3.3.1 MA State Police Assembly- Troop A

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 3.b.1.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.4 New Hampshire Jurisdictions

3.3.4.1 NH State Emergency Operations Center

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.b.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.2, 2.c.1, 5.a.1, 5.b.1.

b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: 2.b.1.

ISSUE NO.: 57-14-2b1-P-01

CRITERION: Appropriate PARs are based on available information on plant condition, field monitoring data, and licensee and ORO dose projections, as well as knowledge of onsite and offsite environmental conditions.

CONDITION: The NH Implementing Procedures for State Agencies Accident Assessment Team (AAT) procedure has not been properly updated to reflect recent changes dictating performance of AAT functions at the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) in Newington rather than the State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) in Concord. The current procedure, dated April 2011 still directs personnel to travel to the SEOC and report directly to the SEOC Radiological Health Technical Advisor (RHTA) rather than to the EOF, and the EOF RHTA.

POSSIBLE CAUSE: Failure to update plans and procedures when changing implementation strategies and protocols

REFERENCE: NUREG-0654 I.8, I10 NH Implementing Procedures for State Agencies, Attachment #A, Accident Assessment Team.

EFFECT: If accident assessment personnel had followed the existing procedure, they would have reported to the wrong location, resulting in delays and/or inability to perform assigned functions.

RECOMMENDATION: Revise NH Implementing Procedures for State Agencies, Accident Assessment Team procedure to reflect current practices and correct inaccurate information and AAT interface references associated with the SEOC.

e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: 1.c.1.

ISSUE NO.: 67-13-1c1-A-01

ISSUE: The State of New Hampshire Emergency Operations Center (EOC) placed conflicting weather information in blocks 7 and 8 of their Form 301B EOC Report Numbers 5-8, causing confusion for stakeholders who received them.

For example, Form 301B #005 reported in Block #7 ("Present Meteorological Conditions") a wind speed of 4.18 mph from a wind direction of 216.7 degrees. Form 301B #006 reported in Block #7 a wind speed of 4.20 mph from a direction of 148.6 degrees and in Block #8 ("Extended Weather Forecast"), reported the Emergency Classification Level rather than the extended weather forecast. Form 301B #007 again reported in Block #7 a wind direction from 148.6 degrees, but Block #8 reported the wind from the southwest.

CORRECTIVE ACTION DEMONSTRATED:

g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.4.2 NH (SS) Emergency Operations Facility

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.b.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.b.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 4.a.2.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: 4.a.2.

ISSUE NO.: 57-12-4a2-A-01

ISSUE: The New Hampshire Field Monitoring Team 1(FMT 1) did not receive sufficient direction to support characterization of the release. FMT1 never received direction to find the leading edge of the plume. The sample locations of 3.2, 3.7 and 3.8 provided by the Monitoring Team Coordinator (MTC) to the FMT 1 Team Lead never allowed FMT1 to encounter any reading above background. Both air samples

taken by FMT 1 were taken in background areas.

CORRECTIVE ACTION DEMONSTRATED: During the November 5, 2014 Seabrook Station Hostile Action Based (HAB) exercise, the HAB exercise did not have a radiological release, FEMA staff and New Hampshire staff developed a radiological plume inject for the Monitoring Team Coordinator (MTC) and the Field Monitoring Teams (FMTs) . The two injects were implemented at the termination of the HAB exercise. Both teams were instructed to find a the sample point that was ten times background which indicated plume edge. The MTC in coordination with the Accident Assessment group identified locations for the field teams to traverse nearbthat would enable them to characterize the plume and find an area that was ten times background. This was satisfactorily accomplished by both FMTs finding the plume and taking air samples that had a low level of radioactivity on the samples. This was performed in accordance with plans and procedures.

g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.4.3 NH Incident Field Office (SS)

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.b.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 5.b.1.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.4.4 NH State Police Communications Center, NH State Warning Point

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None

e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.4.5 Rockingham County Dispatch Center

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.b.1, 1.d.1, 3.a.1, 3.d.2, 5.a.1.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.4.6 NH (SS) Joint Information Center

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.b.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 5.b.1.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.4.7 NH (SS) Field Monitoring Team-1

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 4.a.3.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: 1.a.1.
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None

g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.4.8 NH (SS) Field Monitoring Team-2

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 4.a.3.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: 1.a.1.
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.4.9 MA (SS) Joint Information Center

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.b.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 5.b.1.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.5 Risk Jurisdictions

3.3.5.1 Brentwood Local EOC

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.b.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: 3.a.1.

ISSUE NO.: 57-12-3a1-P-03

ISSUE: During the conduct of the Seabrook Station (SS) Exercise on April 17, 2012, the Brentwood New Hamphire Emergency Operations Center (EOC) assigned a Radiological Defense (RADEF) Officer who had never been in the position before. The RADEF Officer did not understand his role in providing a briefing on dosimetry and potassium iodide (KI)to emergency workers before dispatching them to the field. He issued the dosimetry and KI without a briefing.

CORRECTIVE ACTION DEMONSTRATED:

ISSUE NO.: 57-12-3a1-?-02

ISSUE: (Not found in the database!)

CORRECTIVE ACTION DEMONSTRATED:

g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.5.2 East Kingston Local EOC

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.b.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.5.3 Exeter Local EOC

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.b.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.5.4 Greenland Local EOC

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.b.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.5.5 Hampton Local EOC

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.b.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.5.6 Hampton Falls Local EOC

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.b.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.5.7 Kensington Local EOC

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.b.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.5.8 Kingston NH Local EOC

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.b.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: 3.a.1.

ISSUE NO.: 57-12-3a1-P-05

ISSUE: The RADEF Officer at the Kingston Emergency Operations Center (EOC) failed to supply potassium iodide (KI) tablets with a briefing to the entire facility

staff as per Kingston Plans and Procedures.

CORRECTIVE ACTION DEMONSTRATED:

g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.5.9 New Castle Local EOC

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.b.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.5.10 Newfields Local EOC

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.b.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: 3.a.1.

ISSUE NO.: 57-12-3a1-A-07

ISSUE: The primary RADEF Officer in the Town of Newfields was unavailable and the alternate RADEF Officer substituted during the exercise. The alternate RADEF Officer was not familiar with zeroing the dosimetry. The Alternate RADEF Office did not brief the officer of the need to contact the officer's immediate supervisor when the 200mR reading was reached. The Alternate RADEF Officer did not brief the side effects of Potassium Iodide during the breifing until prompted by another staff member. The Alternate RADEF Officer did not understand the meaning of the

5 R turn back value and did not emphasize the turn back value meaning to the officer.

CORRECTIVE ACTION DEMONSTRATED: During the exercise demonstration, the RADEF/Health Officer showed familiarity with zeroing the direct-reading dosimeters. He also demonstrated an understanding of the radiation dose reporting thresholds and briefed EOC personnel on the need to contact him if the dose reporting thresholds were reached. In addition, he provided the correct instructions for the use of KI, including possible side effects. These activities were carried out in accordance with the Town of Newfields Radiological Emergency Response Plan and the previous exercise issue 57-12-3a1-A-07 was closed.

ISSUE NO.: 57-12-3a1-?-06

ISSUE: (Not found in the database!)

CORRECTIVE ACTION DEMONSTRATED:

g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.5.11 Newton Local EOC

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.b.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.5.12 North Hampton Local EOC

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.b.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.5.13 Portsmouth Local EOC

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.b.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: 3.a.1.

ISSUE NO.: 57-12-3a1-A-08

ISSUE: Following RADEF Officer distribution of dosimetry kits to the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) staff, his emergency worker briefing was inadequate.

The Radiological Officer summarized the briefing using the Job Aid and gave inadequate information to emergency workers. The Radiological Officer's Job Aid conflicted with the Briefing Form the State provided to the EOC, which contains all information needed for emergency worker exposure control. The Radiological Officer also skipped important information that emergency workers needed to be briefed on prior to being deployed to the field (the Radiological Officer did not read off the Briefing Form that the State had provided to all EOCs)- the Radiological Officer did not address the 175mR exposure limit; only stated to notify the EOC when the dosimeter reaches 1R. Furthermore, the Radiological Officer provided inaccurate information pertaining to women and did not request that female workers

who may be occupationally exposed (i.e., those who work in the restricted area at a nuclear power plant or at a hospital or other facility and whose occupation carries with it the potential for some radiation exposure) are counseled to make a declaration in writing if they are or think that they may be pregnant.

The Radiological Officer also had a Job Aid that conflicted with the Briefing Form that the State provided to the Emergency Operations Center.

The Radiological Officer was also using Rev 13 for Form 305A, which is out of date. Rev 14 Forms are the most up to date and and FEMA approved forms for emergency workers.

The Emergency Operations Center also had the wrong inventory form for the emergency worker kits. The one provided was out of date.

CORRECTIVE ACTION DEMONSTRATED: This ARCA was succesfully demonstrated during the 2014 SS HAB exercise on November 5, 2014. All activities described in the demonstration criterion were carried out in accordance with the plans, procedures, and extent-of-play agreement.

g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.5.14 Rye Local EOC

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.b.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.5.15 Seabrook Local EOC

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.b.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.5.16 South Hampton Local EOC

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.b.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.d.1, 3.d.2.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: 3.a.1.

ISSUE NO.: 57-12-3a1-P-09

ISSUE: Revision 14 of form 350A contains incorrect information

CORRECTIVE ACTION DEMONSTRATED: In the current version of Town of South Hampton's Radiological Emergency Plan dated 2014, the 350 A form has been removed as part of the plan revision.

g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.5.17 Stratham Local EOC

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.b.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.5.18 Hampton: Fun After School Program

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.2.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.5.19 Seabrook Police Incident Command Post

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.b.2, 3.a.1.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: 1.c.1.

ISSUE NO.: 57-14-1c1-P-05

CRITERION: Key personnel with leadership roles for the ORO provide direction and control to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible.

CONDITION: There was concern over the attention to worker safety in the Incident

Command Post. The Incident Command Post personnel did not receive dosimetry until after a General Emergency was declared. Additionally, the security at the command post was not given direction on who should be allowed access, which could allow an adversary into their midst.

POSSIBLE CAUSE: Seabrook Police Department should have been involved in planning from the very beginning of the process.

REFERENCE: K.3.a The organization shall make provisions for 24-hour-a-day capability to determine doses received by emergency personnel.

EFFECT: Personnel could have received unecessary dose, or put in other unecessary danger.

RECOMMENDATION: With the Incident Command Post located so close to the reactor building, it is imperative that personnel receive dosimetry as soon as possible. Assure security of the ICP by having a credentialling process or specific roster of known personnel. IC should request clearing/closing of beaches and waterways ASAP to prevent additional attacks on the plant. Alternative locations for the ICP should be considered.

e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.5.20 Building Block School

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.2.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.5.21 Langdon Place of Exeter

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.2.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.5.22 Kingston Child Center

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.2.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.5.23 The Village Preschool

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.2.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.5.24 Hampton Falls Child Care Center

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.2.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.5.25 The Learning Tree

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.2.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.6 Support Jurisdictions

3.3.6.1 Rochester Local EOC

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.b.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.d.1.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: 1.c.1.

ISSUE NO.: 57-14-1c1-P-03

CRITERION: Key personnel with leadership roles for the ORO provide direction and control to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible.

CONDITION: A table on the top of page 22 of the Rochester Host Community Plan (2014 edition) is missing the x-axis labels. Thus, there is no indication of which EOC/Community element is responsible for which of the listed Emergency Response Functions.

NOTE: This is a STATE of New Hampshire Planning Issue [RECOMMENDATION]

POSSIBLE CAUSE: When the State-prepared/disseminated plan was reduced in size, it's very possible that the x-axis tables were accidentally deleted.

REFERENCE: 2.a.

EFFECT: There was no effect on the exercise play by Rochester personnel - however, there could be issues/confusion when/if the city develops position-specific procedures or plans.

This table would also apply to non-REP planning efforts the city develops to ensure continuity of those planning efforts across all incident responses.

RECOMMENDATION: The State of New Hampshire should review the subject table on page 22 and make necessary corrections, then republish the page as a change document.

e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.6.2 Dover Local EOC

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.b.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.d.1.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None

d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.6.3 Dover MS Reception Center Operations

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.b.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.6.4 Dover MS Reception Center Dosimetry

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 3.a.1, 6.a.1.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.6.5 Dover MS Reception Center Portal & Secondary Monitoring

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 6.a.1, 6.b.1.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None

f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.6.6 Dover MS Reception Center Female Mon/Decon

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 3.a.1, 6.a.1.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.6.7 Dover MS Reception Center Male Mon/Decon

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 3.a.1, 6.a.1.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.6.8 Dover MS Reception Center KI Decision

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 3.b.1.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.6.9 Dover MS Reception Center Registration

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 6.a.1.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.6.10 Dover MS Reception Center Vehicle Mon/Decon

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 3.d.1, 6.b.1.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.6.11 Manchester Local EOC

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.b.1, 1.c.1, 1.e.1.
b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
c. DEFICIENCY: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: 3.d.1.

ISSUE NO.: 57-14-3d1-P-02

CRITERION: Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel.

CONDITION: The City of Manchester, New Hampshire (NH) procedure has the

written descriptions for the Dover, NH traffic control points instead of the Manchester, NH.

POSSIBLE CAUSE: When updating the procedure the Dover information was inadvertently used instead of the Manchester information.

REFERENCE: NUREG – 0654, J.10.g

City of Manchester, NH Radiological Emergency Response for Nuclear Facilities Plan Host Community, May 2014, Attachment A

EFFECT: Although the maps are correct for the traffic control points the written description of the traffic control points may cause some confusion when it is necessary to dispatch police officers to the desired locations.

RECOMMENDATION: 1. Verify the traffic control point locations and update the City of Manchester, NH Radiological Emergency Response for Nuclear Facilities Plan Host Community procedure to reflect the actual verbal description of the traffic control points.
2. Train the appropriate staff on any procedure revisions made for the traffic control point locations.

e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

SECTION 4: CONCLUSION

APPENDIX A: BEST PRACTICES

1. Demonstrated Strengths

Summary: Demonstrated Strengths

Description: NH State Emergency Operations Center

• The staff in the NH SEOC was knowledgeable and worked very well as a team. The Director relied on the expertise of the staff to assist her to make informed and appropriate decisions to protect the people of New Hampshire. There was strong internal collaboration between the NH SEOC Director and the SEOC staff members, most notably, the dialogue between the Unified Command, Operations and Planning staffs. Regular meetings between SEOC decision-making personnel were held in a dedicated SEOC conference room, which minimized distractions while facilitating exchange of needed information and viewpoints, aiding in the ability to formulate protective action recommendations in a timely manner. Additionally, the Public Information Officer and Communication Officer and their staff had great teamwork and collaboration. Both teams were very efficient with their work; they were very proactive in preparation of assignments and always timely with the completion of their tasks.

NH (SS) Emergency Operations Facility

• Excellent teamwork

• Constant reference to plans and procedures

NH Incident Field Office (SS)

• Local Liaisons demonstrated outstanding service to local communities by providing clear instructions and assistance for a number of aspects of the emergency response, including: WebEOC navigation, making requests for assistance from state and/or neighboring communities, and general situational awareness. Many liaisons went above and beyond to track down information for local communities.

• Local Liaisons had a genuine team mentality and were continually looking out for one another to insure that no liaison missed important activities.

NH State Police Communications Center, NH State Warning Point

• The New Hampshire State Police Dispatch Shift Supervisor demonstrated a commendable level of knowledge and familiarity of plans and procedures while carrying out his notification

responsibilities. Emergency information was relayed clearly, accurately and in a timely manner.

Rockingham County Dispatch Center

- No demonstrated strengths

NH (SS) Joint Information Center

- No demonstrated strengths

NH (SS) Field Monitoring Team-1

- The New Hampshire Rad Health Laboratory maintains supplies of older radiation survey equipment, including Eberline RO-2s and Eberline E-140Ns. These instruments were within current calibration and provide backup instrumentation to replace malfunctioning or contaminated primary equipment, to equip additional monitoring and survey teams, and to compare performance and readings of primary instrumentation.

NH (SS) Field Monitoring Team-2

- No demonstrated strengths

Brentwood Local EOC

- The Brentwood Emergency Management Director provided outstanding leadership, including providing accurate, up to date materials for each staff position, sharing information as available to create a common operating picture, and clearly inspiring confidence in the Selectmen present as well as among his staff.

East Kingston Local EOC

- The East Kingston Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Emergency Management Director (EMD) showed excellent command and control. Several of the staff, including the EMD, was new to their positions; however, the entire EOC staff clearly demonstrated knowledge of their positions and responsibilities. They used their checklists and collaborated with each other on similar tasks.

Exeter Local EOC

- The Town of Exeter, New Hampshire did an outstanding job integrating real time public alert and notifications into their EOC operations by updating the towns cable access channel with a drill message that both informed the public that the EOC was activated as part of the drill and

validated the ability to access, update and control this public access television station from the EOC in an actual emergency.

• The Town of Exeter, New Hampshire should be commended for their integration of public and private sector stakeholders into their EOC in order to better foster a whole of community environment. Exeter had representatives from Exeter Hospital, a major city medical facility and employer and Philips Exeter Academy, a large private boarding school with an extensive international student presence, integrated into their EOC operations allowing for rapid communication and coordination between these non-government stakeholders and town leadership.

Greenland Local EOC
• No demonstrated strengths

Hampton Local EOC
• No demonstrated strengths

Hampton Falls Local EOC
• Hampton Falls Selectmen were present throughout the exercise in the EOC; their relationship with the EMD was one of obvious mutual trust and respect. All decisions were discussed thoroughly among this group and decisions were ultimately based on which actions resulted in the highest level of safety for the public. The EMD demonstrated an extraordinary command presence while maintaining a calm and reserved demeanor. His leadership was laudable and his operational methods assured total cooperation from every responding agency.

Kensington Local EOC
• No demonstrated strengths

Kingston NH Local EOC
• The Kingston, NH Police Chief injected a situation whereby a passenger train was disabled within their community. This prompted lively discussion of what to do with the 80 passengers on board. The pros and cons of responsibility and liability were debated.

New Castle Local EOC
• The New Castle EOC personnel functioned as a well-trained and well-experienced integrated

team in all areas. Each individual displayed expertise in executing his/her responsibilities and duties.

Newfields Local EOC

• The personnel in the Newfields EOC demonstrated adherence to procedures and good teamwork.

• The Emergency Management Director assisted by the Police Chief demonstrated effective leadership skills in the management of the EOC response.

• The laminated poster-sized copies of the Dosimetry-KI Report Form utilized by the RADEF/Health Officer enhanced his dosimetry briefing and were effective tools to enable a better understanding of his instructions by the EOC staff.

Newton Local EOC

• No demonstrated strengths

North Hampton Local EOC

• The Emergency Management Director (EMD), at the North Hampton Emergency Operations Center (EOC), demonstrated a strong ability to resolve conflicts. Communications between the North Hampton EOC and the Local Liaison at the Incident Field Office (IFO) was lost. To resolve this breakdown, the EMD used alternative phone numbers with no success. Then he directed the Fire Chief to use the State WebEOC to notify them of the problem. Communications were re-established with the Liaison at the IFO and there was no loss of information flow.

Portsmouth Local EOC

• The Portsmouth EOC Emergency Management Director demonstrated excellent leadership leading up to and during the 2014 Seabrook Station Hostile Action Based Evaluated Exercise. He has continued to stress the importance of training and staff participation in drills and exercises. This was evident, as all positions were manned and staff was fully engaged throughout the entire exercise.

Rochester Local EOC

• The EOC staff has worked together for a long time. They are familiar with each other's strengths and fully understand the process.

Rye Local EOC

- No demonstrated strengths

Seabrook Local EOC

- The Town of Seabrook Emergency Management Director (EMD) provided consistent, accurate, and ongoing details through briefings to the EOC staff concerning the incident at Seabrook Station. The EMD continued to provide necessary information to his staff throughout the exercise, provided opportunities for feedback from each Emergency Support Function (ESF) position, and maintained excellent direction and control that contributed to a successful response by the Town of Seabrook.

- The Town of Seabrook Police Department demonstrated the capability to provided protection and security to their staff and the public through an actual incident at the police dispatch center. At the beginning of the exercise an individual identified as a serious threat to the public was observed parked outside of the Town of Seabrook Police Station. While observing and identifying the suspect on camera, the dispatcher notified back-up law enforcement officers as a precaution to respond to the entrance of the police station. Unknown to law enforcement of the intentions of the individual, four law enforcement officers greeted the suspect outside of the police station and took him into custody without incident.

South Hampton Local EOC

- The South Hampton response organization used the HAB exercise to train some of the next generation of responders. It's extremely heartening to see young people taking an active role in response organizations.

Stratham Local EOC

- Each of the distributed DRDS and TLDs has a unique identifying serial number and bar code. The Radiological Officer has provided a personal bar code reader to read and record the bar codes on each of the devices. The serial numbers are then automatically entered onto the spreadsheet. This innovative process assures that each device is expressly linked to particular individuals and avoids potential errors.

- For a community of approximately 7,500 residents, Stratham Town has an EOC worthy of a much larger municipality. To its credit, several years ago the Town invested heavily in constructing a modern facility to provide a location to manage any hazards that might occur in

Town. The main EOC is a large room sufficient to readily handle all possible staff, with sophisticated electronics for both wired and wireless Internet connections, flat-screen displays on the walls displaying WebEOC and other data, a well-equipment side communications room, fully handicapped accessible via an elevator to the second floor, convenient restrooms, and various other conveniences. The facility was well designed to facilitate interaction among the staff to assure a coordinated community response.

Dover Local EOC

- No demonstrated strengths

Manchester Local EOC

- The Manchester EOC has purchased fifty (50) LED light signs which will be used to display emergency messages in the Manchester city area on a real-time basis to advise of the emergency status or actions to be taken.

Massachusetts State Emergency Operations Center

- The Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency (MEMA) demonstrated its expertise in responding to an incident at Seabrook Station. The leadership was insightful and efficient, and MEMA staff members at all levels were clearly highly skilled in their positions. The Public Affairs Officer and his staff were proactive in modifying the sheltering in place News Release template to more accurately reflect a non-release situation. The dispatchers completed their notifications in record time. All players displayed their commitment to public safety and their dedication to accomplishing the task at hand.

MA Region I EOC

- No demonstrated strengths

MA (SS) Joint Information Center

- The Massachusetts Public Information Officer (PIO) and Assistant PIOs were successful, efficient, and flexible in fulfilling their duties and disseminating information to the media. The staff was very well organized, promptly dealt with communication complications, and provided the most up-to-date information about events underway during media briefings to ensure their constituents were aware of all situations.

MA (SS) Field Monitoring Team-1

• No demonstrated strengths

MA (SS) Field Monitoring Team-2

• No demonstrated strengths

Amesbury Local EOC

• The City of Amesbury Emergency Operations Center staff commitment to safety of the public is shown through dedication and knowledge of emergency response.

Merrimac Local EOC

• No demonstrated strengths

Newbury Local EOC

• No demonstrated strengths

Newburyport Local EOC

• No demonstrated strengths

Salisbury Local EOC

• Briefings were conducted frequently and in a very professional manner with full participation by all.

West Newbury Local EOC

• No demonstrated strengths

MA Media Center

• The staff and director of United Way MA 211 clearly demonstrated their knowledge of plans and procedures for handling the various types of telephone calls from citizens in the Seabrook Power Station Emergency Planning Zone.

Seabrook Police Incident Command Post

• No demonstrated strengths

APPENDIX B: EXERCISE TIMELINE

Table 1 - Exercise Timeline
DATE: 2014-11-05, SITE: Seabrook Station, NH

Emergency Classification Level or Event	Time Utility Declared	NH SEOC	NH SS EOF	NH SS IFO	Rockingham Dispatch	NH SS JIC	Brentwood EOC
Unusual Event	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Alert	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Site Area Emergency	0756	0812	0804	0821	0807	0814	0811
General Emergency	0921	0936	0923	0946	0947	0942	0945
Simulated Rad. Release Started	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Simulated Rad. Release Terminated	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Facility Declared Operational		0815	0839	0736	0750	0840	0730
Governor's Declaration of State of Emergency		0822	N/A	0822	N/A	0922	0841
Declaration of Local Emergency		N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Exercise Terminated		1035	1031	1035	1035	1030	1032
Precautionary Actions: Close Parks & Beaches		N/A	0837	0954	N/A	0853	0841
Precautionary Actions: Restrict Water Traffic		0841	N/A	0954	N/A	1003	N/A
Precautionary Actions: Restrict Rail Traffic		0937	N/A	0954	N/A	1003	0945
Precautionary Actions: Restrict Airspace		0937	N/A	0954	N/A	1003	0954
Precautionary Actions: Shelter Livestock, Stored Feed & Water		0841	N/A	0954	N/A	0853	0841
1st A & N Decision:		0837	N/A	0842	0841	0853	0841
1st Siren Activation		0849	N/A	0849	0849	0853	0849
1st EAS Message		0852	N/A	0852	0852	0853	0852
2nd A & N Decision:		0948	0948	0955	0952	1003	0954
2nd Siren Activation		1000	1000	1000	1000	1003	1000
2nd EAS Message		1003	1003	1003	10003	1003	1003
KI Administration Decision: Emergency Workers Advised to take KI		N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
KI Administration Decision: General Public Advised to take KI		N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
KI Administration Decision: Emergency Workers Advised NOT to take KI		N/A	0948	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
KI Administration Decision: General Public Advised NOT to take KI		N/A	0948	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

Table 1 - Exercise Timeline
DATE: 2014-11-05, SITE: Seabrook Station, NH

Emergency Classification Level or Event	Time Utility Declared	East Kingston EOC	Exeter EOC	Greenland EOC	Hampton EOC	Hampton Falls EOC	Kensington EOC
Unusual Event	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Alert	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Site Area Emergency	0756	0814	0814	0813	0814	0812	0810
General Emergency	0921	0945	0949	0954	0945	0950	0945
Simulated Rad. Release Started	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Simulated Rad. Release Terminated	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Facility Declared Operational		0815	0830	0817	0823	0815	0810
Governor's Declaration of State of Emergency		0841	0822	0854	0841	0843	0842
Declaration of Local Emergency		N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	0852	N/A
Exercise Terminated		1037	1035	1040	1039	1039	1038
Precautionary Actions: Close Parks & Beaches		0841	0841	0854	0954	0958	0958
Precautionary Actions: Restrict Water Traffic		0841	0841	0854	0954	0843	0842
Precautionary Actions: Restrict Rail Traffic		0954	0954	1001	0954	0958	0958
Precautionary Actions: Restrict Airspace		0954	0954	1001	0954	0958	0958
Precautionary Actions: Shelter Livestock, Stored Feed & Water		0841	0841	0854	0841	0843	0846
1st A & N Decision:		N/A	0845	0854	0841	0843	0845
1st Siren Activation		0842	0849	0849	0849	0849	0849
1st EAS Message		0842	0852	0852	0852	0852	0852
2nd A & N Decision:		N/A	0954	1001	0954	N/A	0958
2nd Siren Activation		0954	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000
2nd EAS Message		0954	1003	1003	1003	1003	1003
KI Administration Decision: Emergency Workers Advised to take KI		N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
KI Administration Decision: General Public Advised to take KI		N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
KI Administration Decision: Emergency Workers Advised NOT to take KI		N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
KI Administration Decision: General Public Advised NOT to take KI		N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

Table 1 - Exercise Timeline
DATE: 2014-11-05, SITE: Seabrook Station, NH

Emergency Classification Level or Event	Time Utility Declared	Kingston NH EOC	New Castle EOC	Newfields EOC	Newton EOC	North Hampton EOC	Portsmouth EOC
Unusual Event	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Alert	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Site Area Emergency	0756	0812	0815	0819	0815	0814	0815
General Emergency	0921	0950	0945	0945	0935	0950	0948
Simulated Rad. Release Started	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Simulated Rad. Release Terminated	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Facility Declared Operational		0814	0737	0738	0735	0815	0823
Governor's Declaration of State of Emergency		N/A	0841	0845	0841	0847	0908
Declaration of Local Emergency		N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Exercise Terminated		1037	1037	1035	1032	1040	1039
Precautionary Actions: Close Parks & Beaches		N/A	N/A	N/A	0954	0849	0843
Precautionary Actions: Restrict Water Traffic		0841	N/A	N/A	0841	0849	0843
Precautionary Actions: Restrict Rail Traffic		0954	N/A	N/A	0954	0950	0843
Precautionary Actions: Restrict Airspace		N/A	N/A	N/A	0954	0950	0843
Precautionary Actions: Shelter Livestock, Stored Feed & Water		0841	N/A	0845	0841	0849	0843
1st A & N Decision:		N/A	N/A	0845	N/A	N/A	0843
1st Siren Activation		0849	0849	0849	0841	0849	0849
1st EAS Message		N/A	0852	N/A	0914	0852	0852
2nd A & N Decision:		N/A	N/A	0945	N/A	N/A	0957
2nd Siren Activation		1000	1000	1000	0955	1000	1000
2nd EAS Message		N/A	1003	1003	1017	1003	1003
KI Administration Decision: Emergency Workers Advised to take KI		N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
KI Administration Decision: General Public Advised to take KI		N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
KI Administration Decision: Emergency Workers Advised NOT to take KI		N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
KI Administration Decision: General Public Advised NOT to take KI		N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

Table 1 - Exercise Timeline
DATE: 2014-11-05, SITE: Seabrook Station, NH

Emergency Classification Level or Event	Time Utility Declared	Rochester EOC	Rye EOC	Seabrook EOC	South Hampton EOC	Stratham EOC	Dover EOC
Unusual Event	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Alert	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Site Area Emergency	0756	0836	0816	0821	0811	0811	0826
General Emergency	0921	0950	0945	0931	0950	0945	0926
Simulated Rad. Release Started	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Simulated Rad. Release Terminated	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Facility Declared Operational		0850	0821	0740	0814	0815	0845
Governor's Declaration of State of Emergency		0844	0841	0822	0841	0822	0841
Declaration of Local Emergency		N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Exercise Terminated		1041	1038	1032	1040	1035	1038
Precautionary Actions: Close Parks & Beaches		0957	0841	0840	0854	0811	0954
Precautionary Actions: Restrict Water Traffic		0844	0841	0954	0954	0945	0841
Precautionary Actions: Restrict Rail Traffic		0957	1000	0954	0954	0954	0954
Precautionary Actions: Restrict Airspace		0957	1000	0954	0954	0954	0954
Precautionary Actions: Shelter Livestock, Stored Feed & Water		0844	0841	0840	0954	0822	0841
1st A & N Decision:		0844	0841	0840	0841	0822	0843
1st Siren Activation		0844	0849	0849	0849	0849	0849
1st EAS Message		0844	0852	0852	0852	0852	0852
2nd A & N Decision:		0957	0954	0954	0954	0954	0956
2nd Siren Activation		0957	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000
2nd EAS Message		0957	1003	1003	1003	1003	1003
KI Administration Decision: Emergency Workers Advised to take KI		N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
KI Administration Decision: General Public Advised to take KI		N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
KI Administration Decision: Emergency Workers Advised NOT to take KI		N/A	N/A	0954	N/A	N/A	N/A
KI Administration Decision: General Public Advised NOT to take KI		N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

Table 1 - Exercise Timeline
DATE: 2014-11-05, SITE: Seabrook Station, NH

Emergency Classification Level or Event	Time Utility Declared	Manchester EOC	MA SEOC	MA RI EOC	MA SS JIC	Amesbury EOC	Merrimac EOC
Unusual Event	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Alert	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Site Area Emergency	0756	0814	0801	0815	0814	0807	0810
General Emergency	0921	0950	0929	0954	0942	0939	0935
Simulated Rad. Release Started	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Simulated Rad. Release Terminated	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Facility Declared Operational		0855	0807	0811	0840	0811	0820
Governor's Declaration of State of Emergency		0954	0925	0925	0925	0925	0925
Declaration of Local Emergency		N/A	N/A	0851	N/A	0851	N/A
Exercise Terminated		1039	1055	1057	1030	1039	1058
Precautionary Actions: Close Parks & Beaches		N/A	0837	0844	0849	0849	N/A
Precautionary Actions: Restrict Water Traffic		N/A	N/A	0844	0849	0849	N/A
Precautionary Actions: Restrict Rail Traffic		N/A	N/A	0845	N/A	N/A	N/A
Precautionary Actions: Restrict Airspace		N/A	N/A	0845	N/A	N/A	N/A
Precautionary Actions: Shelter Livestock, Stored Feed & Water		N/A	1025	N/A	N/A	1013	N/A
1st A & N Decision:		N/A	0837	0843	N/A	0839	0907
1st Siren Activation		N/A	0849	0849	0849	0849	0849
1st EAS Message		N/A	0852	0852	0852	0852	0852
2nd A & N Decision:		0954	0948	0954	N/A	N/A	N/A
2nd Siren Activation		1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	N/A
2nd EAS Message		1003	1003	1003	1003	1003	N/A
KI Administration Decision: Emergency Workers Advised to take KI		N/A	1025	1025	N/A	N/A	1048
KI Administration Decision: General Public Advised to take KI		N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
KI Administration Decision: Emergency Workers Advised NOT to take KI		N/A	0948	N/A	N/A	1013	N/A
KI Administration Decision: General Public Advised NOT to take KI		N/A	0948	1047	N/A	N/A	N/A

Table 1 - Exercise Timeline
DATE: 2014-11-05, SITE: Seabrook Station, NH

Emergency Classification Level or Event	Time Utility Declared	Newbury EOC	Newburyport EOC	Salisbury EOC	West Newbury EOC
Unusual Event	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Alert	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Site Area Emergency	0756	0811	0809	0815	0808
General Emergency	0921	0944	0942	0943	0944
Simulated Rad. Release Started	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Simulated Rad. Release Terminated	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Facility Declared Operational		0811	0823	0815	0820
Governor's Declaration of State of Emergency		0925	0945	0929	0937
Declaration of Local Emergency		0926	0950	0930	0908
Exercise Terminated		1102	1058	1057	1058
Precautionary Actions: Close Parks & Beaches		0846	0845	0845	0844
Precautionary Actions: Restrict Water Traffic		0846	0845	0845	0844
Precautionary Actions: Restrict Rail Traffic		N/A	N/A	N/A	0844
Precautionary Actions: Restrict Airspace		N/A	N/A	N/A	0844
Precautionary Actions: Shelter Livestock, Stored Feed & Water		1023	1051	1025	0844
1st A & N Decision:		0843	0837	0845	0844
1st Siren Activation		0849	0849	0849	0849
1st EAS Message		0852	0852	0852	0852
2nd A & N Decision:		0958	0953	0955	0944
2nd Siren Activation		1000	1000	1000	1000
2nd EAS Message		1003	1003	1003	1003
KI Administration Decision: Emergency Workers Advised to take KI		1055	1051	1025	1050
KI Administration Decision: General Public Advised to take KI		N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
KI Administration Decision: Emergency Workers Advised NOT to take KI		N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
KI Administration Decision: General Public Advised NOT to take KI		N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

APPENDIX C: EXERCISE EVALUATORS AND TEAM LEADERS

DATE: 2014-11-05, SITE: Seabrook Station, NH

LOCATION	EVALUATOR	AGENCY
NH State Emergency Operations Center	Rosemary Samsel Mario Vigliani Miriam Weston	ICFI ICFI FEMA RII
NH (SS) Emergency Operations Facility	Timothy Harris III *Martin Vyenielo Kenneth Wierman	Department of Homeland Security FEMA RIII FEMA HQ
NH Incident Field Office (SS)	*Cara Christianson-Riley	FEMA RVII
NH State Police Communications Center, NH State Warning Point	*James Greer	ICFI
Rockingham County Dispatch Center	*Laura Forrest Thomas Gahan	FEMA RII ICFI
NH (SS) Joint Information Center	*Patricia Gardner	FEMA - HQ
NH (SS) Field Monitoring Team-1	*Michael Howe	FEMA HQ
NH (SS) Field Monitoring Team-2	*Michael Shuler	FEMA RIII
Massachusetts State Emergency Operations Center	Deborah Blunt *Ingrid Pierce Bruce Swiren	ICFI FEMA RI ICFI
MA Region I EOC	*Darren Bates Ronald Bonner Robert O'Sullivan	FEMA HQ ICFI FEMA - RI
MA (SS) Joint Information Center	*Rebecca Fontenot Bruce Foreman	FEMA HQ FEMA HQ
MA (SS) Field Monitoring Team-1	*Anthony Honnellio	EPA
MA (SS) Field Monitoring Team-2	*Johanna Berkey	FEMA RIX
MA Media Center	*Robert Swartz	FEMA RI
Brentwood Local EOC	William Palmer *Laurel Ryan	ICFI FEMA RIX
East Kingston Local EOC	Robert Lemeshka *Lee Torres	ICFI FEMA RIII
Exeter Local EOC	Frank Cordaro *Ryan Jones	ICFI FEMA - RI
Greenland Local EOC	Thomas Essig *David Petta	ICFI ICFI
Hampton Local EOC	*Brian Hasemann Samuel Nelson	FEMA RII ICFI
Hampton Falls Local EOC	*Mark Dalton James Hickey	ICFI ICFI
Kensington Local EOC	*Paul Nied Michele Skiermont	ICFI ICFI
Kingston NH Local EOC	Sonia Eischen *Marynette Herndon	ICFI ICFI
New Castle Local EOC	Michael Burriss *Daryl Thome	ICFI ICFI
Newfields Local EOC	*Reggie Rodgers Cheryl Weaver	ICFI ICFI
Newton Local EOC	*David Jacobson Meg Swearingen	ICFI ICFI
North Hampton Local EOC	Robert Duggleby *Kent Tosch	ICFI ICFI

Portsmouth Local EOC	*Taneeka Hollins Matthew Wiedemer	FEMA RI FEMA RIII
Rye Local EOC	*Gary Goldberg John Zeidler	ICFI ICFI
Seabrook Local EOC	Korkean Dulgerian *Joseph Suders	FEMA RII FEMA RIII
South Hampton Local EOC	*Joseph Keller Brenda Rembert	ICFI ICFI
Stratham Local EOC	*Danny Loomis Michael Meshenberg	ICFI ICFI
Hampton: Fun After School Program	*Brian Kennedy	FEMA
Amesbury Local EOC	Clark Duffy *Brian Kennedy	ICFI FEMA
Merrimac Local EOC	David Kayen *Bill Webb	ICFI FEMA RX
Newbury Local EOC	*Marcy Campbell Richard Fournier	ICFI ICFI
Newburyport Local EOC	*Jill Leatherman Rebecca Thomson	ICFI ICFI
Salisbury Local EOC	*Terry Blackmon John Wiecjorek	ICFI ICFI
West Newbury Local EOC	*Gary Bolender Michael Henry	ICFI ICFI
Seabrook Police Incident Command Post	*Bridget Ahlgrim Larry Broockerd	FEMA HQ FEMA HQ
Building Block School	Brian Kennedy	FEMA
Langdon Place of Exeter	Brian Kennedy	FEMA
Kingston Child Center	Brian Kennedy	FEMA
The Village Preschool	Brian Kennedy	FEMA
Hampton Falls Child Care Center	Brian Kennedy	FEMA
The Learning Tree	Brian Kennedy	FEMA
Rochester Local EOC	John McGough *Clayton Spangenberg	FEMA - RI ICFI
Dover Local EOC	*Robert Noecker Richard Watts	ICFI ICFI
Dover MS Reception Center Operations	Brian Kennedy	FEMA
Dover MS Reception Center Dosimetry	Brian Kennedy	FEMA
Dover MS Reception Center Portal & Secondary Monitoring	Brian Kennedy	FEMA
Dover MS Reception Center Female Mon/Decon	Brian Kennedy	FEMA
Dover MS Reception Center Male Mon/Decon	Brian Kennedy	FEMA
Dover MS Reception Center KI Decision	Brian Kennedy	FEMA
Dover MS Reception Center Registration	Brian Kennedy	FEMA
Dover MS Reception Center Vehicle Mon/Decon	Brian Kennedy	FEMA
Manchester Local EOC	Alan Bevan *Wes Ryals	ICFI ICFI
MA State Police Assembly- Troop A	*Brian Kennedy	FEMA

* Team Leader

APPENDIX D: EXERCISE PLAN

WITHHOLD FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSURE CONFIDENTIAL (until 11/6/14)

CFE 14-05

November 5

2014

In the interest of assuring that the health and safety of the general public is protected in the event of an accident at Seabrook Station, and to meet the requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix E, NextEra Energy plans and conducts training drills.

CFE 14- 05

WITHHOLD FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSURE CONFIDENTIAL (until 11/6/14)

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SCENARIO REVIEW AND APPROVAL

Drill / Exercise Title: CFE 14- 05 (drill / exercise title) Date(s): November 5, 2014

1. The following Emergency Response Organization (ERO) facilities will be activated in this drill / exercise:

☒	Simulator Control Room	☒	AlternativeTechnical Support Center
☒	AlternativeOperational Support Center	☒	Emergency Operations Facility
☒	JIC / ENC	☐	Remote Monitoring Area
☐	Onsite Assembly Area	☐	Offsite Laboratory

2. The following ERO objectives will be demonstrated in this drill / exercise.

See attached drill package

3. The following initiating events will be used in this drill / exercise.

See attached drill package .

4. To support scheduled implementation, please complete all reviews by: _____

I have reviewed the attached drill / exercise scenario material, and concur that the scenario:

- is adequate to support demonstration of the intended objectives.
- me ets the scenario reuse criteria of the Emergency Preparedness Drill and Exercise Procedure.

EP Manager / Supervisor: _____ Date: 9/3/14

I have reviewed the attached drill / exercise scenario material, and concur that the selected scenario events are acceptable for development and implementation.

Plant General Manager / Station Director: _____ Date: _____

Site Vice President: _____ Date: _____

A. Objectives and Extent-of-Play

Withhold from Public Disclosure

Scope

On November 5, 2014, an NRC-evaluated Hostile Action-Based (HAB) Exercise will be conducted at Seabrook Station, which is designed to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F. The primary purpose of this Exercise is to demonstrate Seabrook Station's capability to protect the health and safety of the public during a HAB event. This Drill will evaluate the integrated capability of the Emergency Response Organization responding to a Hostile Action event. A portion of the Radiation Emergency Plan's basic elements will also be evaluated. The expected emergency classification and related notification will be evaluated for the Drill/Exercise Performance Indicator.

The postulated HAB emergency will require mobilization and response of onsite and offsite personnel to evaluate their capability to respond in an actual HAB emergency. Since Seabrook Station has opted to demonstrate its Alternative Emergency Response Facilities for this Exercise (reference NEI 06-04 Rev. 2, Appendix A, Objective #10), the HAB event is simulated to occur on a Saturday morning.

The Alternative Technical Support Center (ATSC), Alternative Operational Support Center (AOSC), Emergency Operations Facility (EOF), and Joint Information Center (JIC), all located at 108 Corporate Drive in Portsmouth, NH, will be operational to support activities. The Simulator Control Room, located at the Operations Training Center, will be used in place of the actual Control Room. A Drill-NRC Control Cell will be used to simulate the requisite Control Room and ENS Communicator communications. A Drill-CAS/SAS cell will be located in General Office Building (GOB), to be used in lieu of actual CAS/SAS for onsite Security-related communications and coordination, and for Drill injects as necessary to progress the scenario. Associated phone numbers or extensions can be found in the "Participant Instructions" section of this Drill Book, and will be made available to Exercise participants.

The simulated Hostile Action attack will require activation and operation of an Incident Command Post (ICP), from which resources from Offsite Response Organizations (OROs) will be coordinated. The designated ICP in the GOB to be the ICP for this Exercise.

ERDS will be activated and used to provide plant data during this Exercise.

Given that the focus of a HAB response is communication and coordination between Control Room, Security, the ERO, and the ICP, it was not necessary to include actual resources of the offsite response organizations in the Exercise. Therefore, response by EMS, fire, law enforcement, etc. inside the protected area will be simulated via Drill injects.

Given that the scenario is to occur on a Saturday morning, Exercise participation on site will be limited to what would be a normal shift staff:

Operations in the Simulator Control Room

5 Nuclear System Operators

1 Shift Chemist

Withhold from Public Disclosure
1 Health Physics Technician

The required Security complement.

All Exercise-related public address announcements will begin with "this is a Drill Message" and end with "this is a Drill Message-- All personnel not involved in the Drill please disregard this message." This is being done to allow the balance of the plant contingent not involved in the Exercise to conduct normal plant business while the above-listed shift staff personnel carry out the onsite portion of the Exercise needed to support the Exercise objectives.

There will be very limited Drill play within the Plant. However, personnel may be requested by the Control Room, and later the ERO, to respond to various locations or equipment for assessments, troubleshooting, and maintenance. Such activities are expected to be coordinated between Security and the Control Room onsite, with law enforcement and the ICP, and later with the ERO to ensure adequate protection of personnel from any remaining adversaries after such time as all known adversaries are neutralized. Such requests may come before the arrival of offsite repair teams onsite, in order to provide the Control Room and the ERO an earlier assessment of repair needs and priorities, or the more timely completion of a high-priority task. However, the scenario encourages the need for repair teams to be dispatched from the ATSC/AOSC.

It should be noted that weaponry, attack targets, numbers of adversaries, etc. included in this scenario are not part of the Design Basis Threat.

CFE 14- 05 OBJECTIVES

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:s are based upon Nuclear Regulatory Commission requirements provided in 10CFR50, Appendix E, *Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Production and Utilization Facilities*, and inspection criteria listed in the NRC Inspection Manual. al guidance provided in NUREG 0654, FEMA-REP-1, Rev 1, *Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants,* was used in developing the objectives.

: specific drill objectives are described in the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Drill and Exercise Manual, Chapter 3. NexteraEnergy Nuclear Fleet Planning Standards are described in EP-AA-101-1000, *NUCLEAR DIVISION DRILL AND PROCEDURE.*

: evaluation criterion for each objective is provided to event Controllers in section B.

-AA-101-1000 NING STANDARD FR 50.47(b)(#)]	EP-AA-101-1000 OBJECTIVE		DECRIPTION	EPDE OBJECTIVE	FACILITY
ssignment of esponsibility	1	Command and Control	Demonstrate the ability to provide overall command and control of the emergency response by initiating, coordinating and implementing timely and effective decisions during the event. Additionally, demonstrate the management of the ERFs by providing command and control within each facility.		
	2	Operational Agreements	Demonstrate the coordination of the implementation of emergency measures and the exchange of information between the utility and Federal, State and local agencies and other support organizations having an emergency response role within the EPZ.		
	3	Continuous Operations	Demonstrate the capability to establish and maintain continuous (24 hour) operations for a protracted period.	**A.7** Demonstrate the ability to mobilize the station emergency response organization and activate station emergency response facilities in a timely manner.	EOF TSC
nsite Emergency rganization	3	Line of Succession	Demonstrate the ability to transfer overall command and control of the emergency response.	**A8.** Demonstrate the ability of on-shift personnel to implement the station emergency plan and to transfer appropriate emergency-related functions to other emergency response organization personnel.	CR TSC EOF
otification Methods nd Procedures	1	Offsite Notifications*	Demonstrate the ability to notify the offsite Emergency Response Organizations consistent with the classification scheme including the verification of messages in a timely manner.	**A7.** Demonstrate the ability to mobilize the station emergency response organization and activate station emergency response facilities in a timely manner.	CR TSC EOF
	2	ERO Notification	Demonstrate the ability to alert, notify and mobilize ERO personnel.	**A7.** Demonstrate the ability to mobilize the station emergency response organization and activate station emergency response facilities in a timely manner.	CR Guard Island
ublic Education And formation	1	Primary Media Accommodations	Demonstrate the ability to provide points of contact and physical locations for use by the news media at the Joint Information Center.	**A4.** Demonstrate the ability to gather, assess, coordinate, and disseminate information regarding station emergency conditions and emergency response activities.	JIC
	2	Media Briefing	Demonstrate the ability of the Corporate Spokespersons to brief the media in a clear, accurate and timely manner.	**A15** Demonstrate the ability to coordinate the preparation, review and release of public information, and to provide timely and accurate information to the media	JIC

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-AA-101-1000 NING STANDARD :FR 50.47(b)(#)]	EP-AA-101-1000 OBJECTIVE		DECRIPTION	EPDE OBJECTIVE	FACILITY
	3	Exchange of Public Information	Demonstrate timely exchange of public information among designated agency spokespersons.	and general public.	JIC
nergency Facilities id Equipment	1	TSC Support Of Emergency Operations	Demonstrate the adequacy of the TSC to support emergency response activities.	**A7.** Demonstrate the ability to mobilize the station emergency response organization and activate station emergency response facilities in a timely manner.	TSC
	2	EOF Support Of Emergency Operations	Demonstrate the adequacy of the EOF to support emergency response activities.	**A7.** Demonstrate the ability to mobilize the station emergency response organization and activate station emergency response facilities in a timely manner.	EOF
	3	OSC Support Of Emergency Operations	Demonstrate the adequacy of the OSC to support emergency response activities.	**A7.** Demonstrate the ability to mobilize the station emergency response organization and activate station emergency response facilities in a timely manner.	OSC
	6	Meteorological Data	Demonstrate the ability to obtain current and forecasted meteorological information from primary as well as back-up and alternate sources.	No Specific Correlation	TSC EOF
:cident Assessment	1	Accident Recognition And Assessment*	Demonstrate the ability to provide initial values and continuing assessment throughout the course of an accident as well as the parameter values which correspond to the initiating conditions for EALs and PARs.	**A1, P11.** Demonstrate the ability to recognize station conditions and parameter trends as emergency plan initiating conditions, and to develop potential solutions for placing the station in a safe, stable condition.	CR TSC EOF
ONDUCT DRILLS ND EXERCISE	1	EXERCISE / DRILL PREPARATION	Demonstrate the capability to prepare a scenario drill or exercise package to allow for training and testing of stations Emergency Response Plan.		N/A
	2	EXERCISE / DRILL EVALUATION	Demonstrate the capability to conduct drill / exercise and evaluate performance.		
OSTILE ACTION ASED EVENT (NEI 5-04, APPENDIX A)	1		Demonstrate the ability to implement the emergency plan during a hostile action-based event.		TSC EOF OSC CR ICP CAS / SAS
	2		Demonstrate the ability to classify an emergency during a hostile based drill or exercise.		TSC CR
	3		Demonstrate the ability to notify offsite response agencies during a hostile based drill or exercise.		EOF CR

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·AA-101-1000 \IING STANDARD :FR 50.47(b)(#)]	EP-AA-101-1000 OBJECTIVE		DECRIPTION	EPDE OBJECTIVE	FACILITY
	4		Demonstrate the ability to make a protective action recommendation offsite during a hostile based drill or exercise.		TSC EOF CR
	5		Demonstrate the ability to make initial notifications to law enforcement and other first-responder agencies during a hostile action-based event.		CR CAS / SAS
	6		Demonstrate the ability to communicate threat-related information to the NRC during a hostile action-based event.		TSC EOF CR
	7		Demonstrate the ability of on-shift Operations and Security personnel to coordinate response actions among themselves, and with the Incident Commander and local law enforcement agency (LLEA) personnel.		TSC CR ICP CAS / SAS
	8		Demonstrate the ability of on-shift Operations and Security personnel to coordinate with the Incident Commander for deployment of on-site and offsite first-responders in a post-attack environment.		TSC CR ICP CAS / SAS
	9		Demonstrate the ability to coordinate implementation of on-site radiation protection measures for offsite first-responders with the ICP.		TSC EOF OSC ICP
	10		Demonstrate the ability of the Emergency Response Organization (ERO) to support operation of an Incident Command Post (ICP).		TSC EOF OSC CR ICP
	11		Demonstrate the ability to coordinate mobilization of the Emergency Response Organization (ERO) with Security and the ICP.		TSC OSC ICP CAS / SAS
	12		Demonstrate the ability of the Emergency Response Organization (ERO) to coordinate in-plant and on-site response actions with Security and the Incident Command Post (ICP).		
	13		Demonstrate the ability of the ERO to activate alternative facilities		TSC OSC

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·AA-101-1000 NING STANDARD .FR 50.47(b)(#)]	EP-AA-101-1000 OBJECTIVE		DECRIPTION	EPDE OBJECTIVE	FACILITY
	14		As appropriate to the scenario, coordinate deployment of fire and medical response resources between the ICP, on-site ERO facilities, and Security.		TSC OSC ICP CAS / SAS
	15		Demonstrate the ability to account for on-site personnel in a post-attack environment.		CAS / SAS
	16		Demonstrate the ability to perform an assessment of offsite radiological consequences as appropriate to the scenario events.		EOF
	17		Demonstrate the ability of the ERO to coordinate the development and release of public information in a post-attack environment.		JIC

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Rules

The following general rules have been established to delineate the extent of play for responders to meet drill objectives.

The exercise will be conducted on November 5, 2014. Responders will not be informed of the sequence of events or any aspect of the scenario.

The exercise will postulate conditions necessitating the declaration of emergency classifications in accordance with the Seabrook Station Radiological Emergency Plan and Emergency Response Procedures.

Scenario data will be available real time, provided from the simulator.

Responder - An emergency responder who performs assigned functions during a drill and exercise.

Controller - An individual responsible for facilitating the progress of a drill or exercise (e.g., by passing a message), observing responder performance, and assessing whether objectives have been demonstrated. They will also assure the continuity of the scenario by initiating actions through pre-scripted messages, or as directed by the Drill Manager.

Evaluator - Individual assigned to a drill or exercise whose function is to assess the performance of responders against drill objectives. Controllers often perform this function.

Observer / Visitor –Personnel who serve no control or participatory function related to the event. These personnel should not interface with responders. They shall direct all questions to a CONTROLLER.

Some responders may insist that certain parts of the scenario are unrealistic. The controllers have the authority with approval of the Drill Manager to clarify any questions regarding scenario content. In some cases, it may become necessary for a controller to countermand responder actions to preserve the continuity and objectives of the event. Responders must accept the controllers word as final and proceed as directed.

Scenario events are hypothetical. Any portions of the scenario depicting plant system operational transients are simulated events. NO scenario actions involve the operation of plant systems or components or affect generation capability. To help delineate such actions all scenario messages **must** be proceeded and followed by the words: **"THIS IS A DRILL".**

Participation of personnel directly involved in responding to an emergency condition should be carried out to the extent necessary to meet the scope and objectives, including the deployment of radiological monitoring teams, emergency repair/damage control teams, and other emergency workers. All actions are to be performed, as much as possible, as if it were an actual emergency. Actions should be identified to the controller for guidance as to whether to play them out or simulate them.

Coaches, when identified on the event roster, are not meant to be an adjunct to the designated position responder. Coaches should provide guidance when required, but should ensure the response position is not a team of two.

If an actual situation occurs that requires a group to terminate its participation in the exercise, Drill Manager will be notified,

All personnel shall comply with all Federal, State and local laws. More specifically, traffic laws, such as speed limits, will be observed. Additionally, event participants will adhere to all station access, safety and radiation protection requirements.

All personnel will avoid endangering public or private property, members of the general public, or the environment. It is the responsibility of all players, controllers and evaluators to correct any unsafe conditions that arise during the exercise.

All participants will take part in a critique session in their emergency response facility immediately upon termination of scenario activities.

Termination Criteria:

1. The exercise may be terminated under any of the following conditions:
    a. All objectives are satisfactorily demonstrated;
    b. An actual onsite or offsite emergency develops; and/or
    c. Available time has expired.
2. The following personnel may request temporary suspension or termination of the onsite portion of the exercise:
    a. Shift Manager
    b. Plant General Manager
    c. Executive Management
3. Decisions to temporary suspend or terminate a exercise should be coordinated through the Drill Manager.

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VISITOR OBSERVATION RULES

Visitors should request access to a facility at least one week prior to the drill.

Access requests for Seabrook Station ERO facilities should be directed to the Seabrook Station EP Department. Requests to visit New Hampshire, Massachusetts or Maine facilities should be addressed to the appropriate State emergency management agency.

The number of visitors to a facility may be limited, or in some cases visitors mah be prohibited.

Visitors will not be allowed to travel in any event-related vehicle.

Unless approved by the Drill Manager, no photography or taping of events by visitors will be permitted. Note-taking is acceptable. Visitors may not take any event-related documentation (or copies thereof)) without authorization from the Drill Manager.

The visitor shall comply with these instructions and any further verbal directions provided by escort, if assigned, and from facility drill controllers. Violation of these instructions or directions may result in the visitor's expulsion from the facility.

Visitors shall comply with security requirements at the facility during the drill, including sign-in and sign-out requirements.

Visitors will wear proper identification at all times. At the EOF, visitors will be required to obtain a "Visitor" ID badge and proximity card from Access Control to allow transit to the Joint Information Center. These items must be returned to Access Control at the end of the drill.

Visitors shall not interact with or assist responders during the course of the event. They must take care not to cause congestion or noise which distracts players and controllers from their tasks.

Visitors shall not operate any equipment (including telephones) without permission.

During the event, the Drill Manager has final authority regarding visitor access, conduct and expulsion.

B. Participant Instructions

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B.1 Responder Briefings

GENERAL

If, for any reason you are unable to fill your assigned role on the day of the drill, notify your supervisor as soon as possible and remind him/her that you are a participant in the drill and to contact the drill manager in the simulator x2609 to coordinate a replacement participant .

Real-time response — ERO personnel should proceed to their facilities only after being notified of the emergency; DO NOT pre-stage or report early. Proceed to your assigned facility upon the first means of notification of the event.

Drillsmanship:

- All communications should be prefaced and concluded with "This is a drill".
- Stay engaged in the drill.
- Ensure Controllers understands the basis key decisions made by you or your team.

Do Not Bring any uncontrolled material to the drill. You are expected to use the procedures that are maintained in the facilities.

The site siren will not be sounded to notify station personnel of the emergency.

The LAN-based PC messaging system will be used to notify personnel of the commencement of the event

Operational, Radiological and Meteorological Data:

- **MUST BE OBTAINED FROM AN MPCS or PC TERMINAL CONNECTED TO THE SIMULATOR**
- **CONTROLLERS WILL PROVIDE SPECIFIC RADIOLOGICAL OR METEOROLOGICAL DATA TO RESPONDERS.**

In order to present opportunities for demonstration of some drill objectives, this scenario may contain radiological data that is "disconnected" from operational parameters. For example, certain radiological data may be artificially elevated or presented in a time-compressed fashion. While being aware of this condition, players are expected to assess, and respond to, the data as presented. Questions should be directed to a controller.

Drill related calls:

Calls to the "Control Room" should be directed to the Simulator

Shift Manager	(603) 474-9521 x2608
Unit Supervisor (603) 474-9521	(603) 474-9521 x2991
Work Control Supervisor	(603) 474-9521 x2911 or x2912

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DO NOT call the Online/Outage Control Center (OCC) with drill-related information or requests *unless directed to do so by a drill controller.*

DO NOT call vendors with drill-related requests. Calls for vendor services or support should be directed to 603-468-3859. Record the time of any requested action and projected completion times on ER 2.0E forms.

All routine industrial and radiological safety requirements shall be followed. If any participant sees a potential or actual conflict between drill "realism" and safety, safety ALWAYS has priority.

Players are expected to coach each other in regard to safety and human performance tool use. There is recent drill OE of our HU tool use (specifically 3-way communication) not being up to our standards. Let's help each other keep our standards high.

If additional personnel are needed, do NOT call these individuals directly. All callouts of additional personnel must be coordinated through the Maintenance Coordinator and the Administrative Services Coordinator per established procedural guidance.

Controllers may provide performance improvement coaching during this drill so long as it does not affect the Classification, Notification or PAR assessment. Additionally, specific positions may have assigned coaches for this event. These coaches should not directly answer questions from others for their player. This is not a team of two, but one individual mentoring the other.

Simulator data will be available to LAN PC's (via SDS) and MPCS terminals.

The Personal Computers (PC's) in the TSC, OSC and EOF can be connected to the Simulator SDS by performing the following actions:

1. Locate the "***Simulator SDS for Windows***" icon on the PC desktop. Double-click / open it.
2. When connected, "SIMULATOR" will appear in the lower right-hand corner of the SDS display.
3. If you have questions, contact G. Spaide at x7865 BEFORE the drill. Please realize that there are a limited number of "Simulator SDS for Window" links. Use only if required to support your facility action.
4. Remember to close any drill/simulator SDS windows after the drill has ended.

A post-drill critique will be conducted. The goal of the critique process is to self-identify any weaknesses or deficiencies, and opportunities for improvement. Be frank and self-critical during the critique. During the 2012 graded exercise, an incorrect PAR was made which was not identified or critiqued, ultimately resulting in a white finding. All players are expected to attend their facility critique and provide input.

Make your drill comments clear and specific, recommending solutions when possible. Drill comments should be identified as 'Enhancements' (nice to do) or 'Deficiencies' (need to do in order to maintain the effectiveness of the facility).

Each facility manager is expected to work with the facility lead controller to identify significant issues. In some cases, additional ARs may be required for unique issues or concerns identified during the critique. For these items, participants are expected to write ARs prior to the end of the day. Simplifying the drill

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AR process is meant to streamline the review of critique issues and in no way is meant to discourage any individual from writing an AR.

Emergency facilities must be returned to their original state of readiness.

Control Room (Simulator)

The NRC Emergency Response Data System **(ERDS) will not be activated** from the Simulator.

Telephone notifications to the States will be made using the Nuclear Alert System (NAS) or designated backup methods. Callback from the Health Departments to the Simulator Control Room is not expected.

NRC Drill/Exercise Performance Indicator (**DEP**) – Performance opportunities in this drill **will** count towards the DEP Indicator for Seabrook. Performance in the following areas affects this indicator.

- Emergency Classifications
- State Notifications
- Protective Action Recommendations

Remember wind shifts, stability class changes, and dose assessment changes can affect Protective Action Recommendations (PARs). Multiple PAR notifications may be required after the declaration of a General Emergency. Each counts as a DEP opportunity. CFD 12-01 OE-missed DEP-AR 1728341.

After control board walkdowns, the WCS will be sequestered outside of the simulator to simulate their normal work location in the OCC.

SIMULATOR CONTROL ROOM ER 1.2 A EXPECTATIONS:

- Announce **UPDATE** for EAL declaration.
- Notify GI Security per checklist and direct pager activation. The specific phone to use will be identified during the pre-job brief.
- When plant announcement is made in the simulator, a controller will notify the US in actual Control Room and request notification of station personnel via Gaitronics of any declaration announcement.
- Complete State Notification and give to WCS to make the Nuclear Alert System (NAS) phone call.
- The drill NAS phone has been placed on CP295 cabinet. This is a live phone to State warning points. Follow the appropriate checklist.
- If NAS phone fails, the backup unit is available in the Simulator. If that also fails, proceed to use phone line 2911 or 2912 to notify each State separately per the checklist.
- A Fire Brigade Leader has been scheduled to be a Control Room Communicator. Calls to the NRC (control cell) should be made using phone line 2911 or 2912.
- Completed copies of the State Notification Fact sheet, ER2.0B, and the NRC form, ER 2.0D, must be given to the Simulator Controller ASAP to allow transmittal to the TSC.

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Technical Support Center

NRC Drill/Exercise Performance Indicator (**DEP**) – Performance opportunities in this drill **will** count towards the DEP Indicator for Seabrook. Performance in the following areas affects this indicator.

- Emergency Classifications
- State Notifications
- Protective Action Recommendations

TSC responders need NOT ask for Shift Manager permission to enter the Control Room. Respond as you would in an actual emergency - quietly enter the Control Room and proceed directly to the TSC. Do not forget your dosimetry.

Assembly Area simulation/interface - The Maintenance Coordinator should call the Assembly Area Coordinator at the Assembly Area to request additional response personnel. As requested, the Assembly Area Coordinator will call-out personnel and direct them to report to a specified emergency response facility.

A control cell (staffed by a controller) has been established to take initial and follow-up notifications to the NRC. When ready to make NRC notifications, the ENS Communicator should call 603-468-3859. Do not use the existing facility ENS FTS phones circuit.

The **ENS Communicator** should use **603-468-3859** on the 2 line phone to simulate calls to NRC. The Controller will direct the player to callback within a pre-designated time (e.g., 20 minutes).

WebEOC software links have been installed on the Site Emergency Director's (SED) personnel computer in the TSC. It is imperative that the Site Emergency Director notify the Response Manager before an update is posted so that Response Manager can update the EOF and Joint Information Center staff before it is displayed on the facility monitors. A copy of Supplemental Material 11-04, Web EOC Classification Board Instructions, has been placed at the SED and RM work stations. Questions or concerns, please contact P. Casey (X7221) before the drill.

Color 11x17 Classification chart (i.e., ER 1.1A, B, and C) tear-away pads have been placed at the Emergency Operations Manager's work station in the TSC. This supplements the black and white copies assigned to multiple player files in both facilities.

Emergency Offsite Facility

NRC Drill/Exercise Performance Indicator (**DEP**) – Performance opportunities in this drill **will count** towards the DEP Indicator for Seabrook. Performance in the following areas affects this indicator.

- Emergency Classifications
- State Notifications
- Protective Action Recommendations

Color 11x17 Classification chart (i.e., ER 1.1A, B, and C) tear-away pads have been placed at the Technical Assistant's work station in the EOF. This supplements the black and white copies assigned to multiple player files in both facilities.

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Remember wind shifts, stability class changes, and dose assessment changes can affect Protective Action Recommendations (PARs). Multiple PAR notifications may be required after the declaration of a General Emergency. Each counts as a DEP opportunity. CFD 12-01 OE-missed DEP-AR 1728341.

The ERO Technical Liaison should document any actions driven by the scenario using ER 2.0E form. Do NOT actually call RCDC, MEMA, and Maine State Police, NHPUC, and the State Technical Liaisons for this drill as they are not participating.

A control cell (staffed by a controller) has been established to take initial and follow-up notifications to the NRC. When ready to make NRC notifications, the HPN Communicator should call 603-468-3859. Do not use the existing facility HPN FTS phones circuit.

The **HPN communicator** should dial **603-468-3859** to simulate calls to NRC. The Controller will direct the player to callback within a pre-designated time (e.g., 25 minutes). The Controller can call this phone line directly.

National Weather Service (NWS) - in order to test actual capabilities, EOF radiological assessment personnel should contact the NWS when required by Procedure ER 3.3 to obtain a current meteorological forecast. When the call is completed, a controller will provide a forecast to be used for drill purposes.

Assembly Area simulation/interface - The Administrative Services Coordinator should call the Assembly Area Coordinator at the Assembly Area to request additional response personnel. As requested, the Assembly Area Coordinator will call-out personnel and direct them to report to a specified emergency response facility.

Operations Support Center

The dispatch of OSC teams should be performed to the maximum practical extent (i.e., simulation of activities should be minimized). This means:

- Obtain needed tools, parts, equipment, etc. unless precluded by size or other considerations
- Obtain needed documents
- A team should travel along the specified route to the assigned destination.
- A repair team should arrive at the assigned destination and visually locate the component to be repaired. Once the component is positively identified and access to it confirmed, the team may return to the OSC.
- DO NOT enter any PROTECTED TRAIN or GUARDED EQUIPMENT area or room; discuss simulated entry with a controller. Protected Train on the day of this event Is 'B'.
- DO NOT direct or allow any operation of plant equipment, unless specifically directed to do so by a drill controller.

OSC personnel should use the **1B** (RP) radio channel. Precede and end all communications with "This is a drill message"

Field Monitoring Teams

Upon logging into **WebEOC**, Field Monitoring Teams should select "**Seabrook-Training 2014**" from the Incident drop down menu.

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Assembly Area

Assembly Area simulation/interface - The Maintenance Coordinator and Administrative Services Coordinator should call the Assembly Area Coordinator at the Assembly Area to request additional response personnel. As requested, the Assembly Area Coordinator will call-out personnel and direct them to report to a specified emergency response facility.

In order to minimize drill impacts on normal station work activities, it may be necessary for the Assembly Area Controller to dispatch simulated personnel to a facility, e.g., additional mechanics reporting to the OSC. If this is done, the Assembly Area Coordinator will clearly indicate that the dispatched personnel are being simulated. The individual requesting the dispatch of the simulated personnel should ensure each simulated person's name is entered on the appropriate accountability board form, etc.

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B.2 GENERAL CONTROLLER GUIDANCE

Each controller will be provided a scenario package that corresponds to their respective assignments. It is the responsibility of the controller to become familiar with the scenario, appropriate implementing procedures, message and mini-scenario implementation responsibilities, exercise documentation requirements and any assignment-specific information prior to the event. The controller package must be considered "CONFIDENTIAL" until the drill / exercise is completed.

Each controller will be requested to attend appropriate training or briefing sessions before each drill. Any questions regarding the scenario or assignments should be discussed at this time. Each controller should ensure they are familiar with location(s) required by their assignment.

Controllers must wear appropriate badges, specifically identifying themselves as controllers.

Direct players to inform controllers if any actions are going to deviate from plant procedures.

Controllers must keep a detailed narrative of their observations throughout this event. The narrative should note the time, location, activity, and player responses. Additional data may be required by the event scenario or the evaluation forms. A master copy of the narrative is provided as an attachment to this section (ATT B-3) make additional copies as needed. Controllers should refrain from including personal bias, unsupported opinions or conjecture in this narrative.

With exception of classification, notification, and protective action recommendations (DEP opportunities), controllers may discuss the proper use of scenario data or expected responses with players (coaching is allowed). When significant coaching is required it must be noted on the controller event narrative log to ensure that gaps are evaluated during the critique process.

Controllers should ensure that interaction between responders and observers (visitors) does not occur. This may include the establishment of visitor areas in the emergency response facilities.

Controllers will capture comments from event responders relating to realism of scenario to be evaluated in the critique. It is the responsibility of the Facility Lead Controllers to clarify any questions that may arise during the exercise.

Controllers will ensure that any inquiries originating from the general public or news media as a result of exercise activities are immediately passed to the Drill Manager who will notify the appropriate public information personnel.

Controllers will comply with instructions from the Drill Manager and the Facility Lead Controllers. Unless otherwise instructed by the Drill Manager or Facility Lead Controllers, all messages and data should be issued at their designated times and/or as described in the event scenario.

Contingency Messages will be used if a responder fails to take a major expected action (e.g., make an emergency classification) as indicated in the scenario outline. The Controller will give the contingency message to the designated responder and explain in as much detail as necessary what actions the responder is expected to perform. Contingency messages are used to keep the drill on schedule. The necessity to use a contingency message must be documented in the controller's observations.

The Drill Manager is the only individual who may authorize deviations from the scenario.

Controllers are expected to coach each other, and players, specifically in regard to safety and human performance tool use.

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Controllers should be at their assigned locations as follows:

Simulator: 0700 All Other Facilities: 0730

Controllers should synchronize their watches with the SDS/Main Plant Computer System (MPCS) time display AFTER the PC SDS display or MPCS terminal has been "swapped" to the Simulator. This will typically be completed 30 minutes prior to the exercise start time.

The NRC is not participating in this drill. Calls to the NRC should be made over the simulated Emergency Notification System (ENS) and the Health Physics Network (HPN).

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B.3 LEAD FACILITY CONTROLLER GENERAL GUIDANCE

The Lead Facility Controller is the controller responsible for a group of controllers at a specific facility or location.

Their responsibilities include:

Direction and coordination of drill / exercise activities within the facility in accordance with the event scenario.

Keeping the Drill / Exercise Manager informed of significant or unexpected events occurring within the facility.

Capturing the significant comments during the facility critique following the drill / exercise.

Distributing and collecting attendance sheets and responder comment forms.

Collecting drill / exercise related records generated within the facility.

Preparing the evaluation results using the input of assigned controller /evaluators.

Initiating a Facility Critique following the conclusion of a drill or exercise.

Ensuring that drill / exercise events are conducted safely, specified objectives are adequately evaluated prior to drill / exercise termination and conduct of the drill / exercise does not compromise the operation of the station.

Assisting the Lead Controller in development of the drill / exercise report, including the recommendation of corrective actions needed to address deficiencies.

Ensuring corrective action program documents are written as appropriate.

Clarifying any questions that may arise during the exercise from controllers or responders.

During the period preceding the arrival of the players, the Lead Controller should lead a Job Site Huddle with the other facility controllers to review roles, responsibilities, expectations, handoffs, etc.
Lead Facility Controllers should ensure that players remain engaged in the event activities during any distractions, specifically when lunch is served.

Some exercise players may insist that certain parts of the scenario are unrealistic. Facility Lead Controllers will clarify any questions that may arise during the exercise.

Any inquiries originating from the general public or news media as a result of exercise activities should be immediately passed to the Drill Manager who will notify the appropriate public information personnel.

Lead Facility Controllers should contact the Drill Manager at x2609 within 30 minutes of the exercise start time to verify communications links and exercise readiness.

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B.3.1 CONTROL ROOM LEAD CONTROLLER (SIMULATOR)

1. Complete position checklist
2. Following the critique, provide a performance assessment of the facility's objectives by completing the appropriate objective matrix.

   When determining whether, and to what degree, an objective was met, controllers should compare observed performance against the listed performance attributes.

3. Lead Facility Controllers should provide the following materials to the Drill / Exercise Manager.

   A. Responder-generated documents
   B. Drill / Exercise Controller Logs (EP-AA-101-1000-F04)
   C. Critique results, including easel paper or white board transcription notes (if used)
   D. ERO Comment Forms (EP-AA-101-1000-F03)
   E. Completed objective performance assessment matrix
   F. A brief verbal or written summary of drill highlights and key issues

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Before Drill/Exercise

- ☐ Copy messages and data sheets as needed
- ☐ Obtain controller identification (armbands, badges, etc)
- ☐ Make copies of Drill/Exercise Controller Logs
- ☐ Make copies of ERO Comment Forms & Critique Review Points
- ☐ Ensure spare battery for 4-way link is obtained and charged.

After Drill/Exercise is Terminated

- ☐ Make announcement per drill message
- ☐ Pass out copies of ERO Comment Form and Critique Review Points.
- ☐ Conduct Drill/Exercise Critique per section 2 of controller package.
- ☐ Collect all Seabrook Station ERO Comment Forms
- ☐ Collect all Drill/Exercise Controller Logs
- ☐ Collect all player logs and documentation
- ☐ Inspect facility to determine if it has been restored to the degree practical.
- ☐ Remind Operations controller to return station portable radio
- ☐ Verify that Computer Engineering has swapped ERF MPCS displays back to the real plant computer
- ☐ Remind simulator operator to verify "island" status, i.e., no active communication links to outside world.

Day of Drill/Exercise

- ☐ Conduct Job Site Huddle with other facility controllers, and distribute controller badges
- ☐ Review simulator setup with simulator operator
  - Correct Protected Train is specified on MCB and MPCS displays
  - Station portable radio available on USS desk
  - Verify that ERF SDS/MPCS terminals are receiving simulator data
  - Turn on ERDS modem if needed
  - Phones installed; SM - 2608, USS - 2991, 4-way link, Lead Controller - 2609
  - MPCS clock set to real time
  - Speaker phone in booth using extension 2608
  - Forms/packets have been checked
  - Simulator Gai-Tronics volume is turned up
  - Tags are hung per scenario
  - Shift turnover sheets prepared
  - Simulator annunciator alarms are on and RDMS alarms are off
  - Op check the NAS line
  - Use different NSO names - on-shift crew vs. those responding to OSC
  - Drill Primary Responders listed on duty board
- ☐ Conduct a briefing with the Operations crew.
- ☐ Brief the Control Room on the following items.
  - Conduct a walk-thru of the phone communications for the exercise
  - Actions required by ER 1.2—including:
    - Security –
    - Control Room to make PA announcements
    - Faxing of ER 2.0B and ER 2.0D
  - Drill-related radio traffic
  - Drill-related calls to the Control Room should be re-directed to the Simulator
- ☐ Review expected actions with each controller.
- ☐ Periodically check in with Drill Manager on status of objective demonstrations

CFE 14- 05
Controller Instructions

B.3.2. TSC - LEAD CONTROLLER

1. Complete position checklist
2. Ensure that a Gaitronics announcement is made when event is terminated to ensure all site personnel are notified.
3. Following the critique, Facility Lead Controllers should provide a performance assessment of their facility's objectives by completing the appropriate objective matrix.

   When determining whether, and to what degree, an objective was met, controllers should compare observed performance against the listed performance attributes.

4. Lead Facility Controllers should provide the following materials to the Drill / Exercise Manager.

   A. Responder-generated documents
   B. Drill / Exercise Controller Logs (EP-AA-101-1000-F04)
   C. Critique results, including easel paper or white board transcription notes (if used)
   D. ERO Comment Forms (EP-AA-101-1000-F03)
   E. Completed objective performance assessment matrix
   F. A brief verbal or written summary of drill highlights and key issues

CFE 14- 05 TSC LEAD CONTROLLER CHECKLIST

Before Drill/Exercise

- ☐ Copy Initial Conditions Message and Player Telephone Directory.
- ☐ Obtain controller identification (armbands, badges, etc).
- ☐ Make copies of Drill/Exercise Controller Logs.
- ☐ Make copies of ERO Comment Forms & Critique Review Points.

After Drill/Exercise is Terminated

- ☐ Make announcement regarding the following:
  - Workstation restoration/facility cleanup
  - Assembly and collection of documentation
  - Facility critique
- ☐ Request the Control Room to announce that the drill/exercise has been terminated.
- ☐ Pass out copies of ERO Comment Form and Critique Review Points.
- ☐ Conduct Drill/Exercise Critique per section 2 of controller package.
- ☐ Collect all Seabrook Station ERO Comment Forms
- ☐ Collect all Drill/Exercise Controller Logs
- ☐ Collect all player logs and documentation
- ☐ Inspect facility to determine if it has been restored to the degree practical.
- ☐ Ensure that all simulator-driven SDS windows are closed (i.e., no SDS running).
- ☐ Request the Health Physics controller to return the drill electronic dosimeters to the HP Control Point.
- ☐ Provide verbal or written summary of drill results to the Drill Manager.
- ☐ Provide all drill documentation to the Drill Manager.

Day of Drill/Exercise

- ☐ Establish communications with Drill/Drill Manager.
- ☐ Conduct Job Site Huddle with other facility controllers, and distribute controller badges
  - ☐ Review expected actions with each controller.
  - ☐ Review messages and mini-scenarios for TSC-based personnel. Assign messages to controllers. Instruct controllers to notify you before messages are passed.
  - ☐ Review objective assignments with controllers - who will watch for what.
- ☐ Distribute Initial Conditions Message and Player Telephone Directory to all position workstations.
- ☐ Verify that MPCS terminal is receiving simulator data and has correct time.
- ☐ Review expected actions with each controller.
- ☐ Remind SED and EOM not to talk with real Control Room staff - call the Simulator
  - Shift Manager x2608
  - Unit Supervisor x2991
- ☐ Ensure that the TSC Work Control Supervisor has the drill instruction set for establishing the 4-way link with the simulator.
- ☐ Inform the ENS Communicator to use the ENS commercial telephone line for calls to the NRC Control Cell. The communicator is NOT to use the ENS telephone on the FTS circuit.
- ☐ Periodically check in with controllers on status of objective demonstrations
- ☐ Notify Drill/Drill Manager when all objectives have been met.
- ☐ When directed by the Drill Manager, terminate TSC drill/exercise play by informing the Site Emergency Director.

CFE 14- 05
Controller Instructions

B.3.3 OSC - LEAD CONTROLLER

1. Complete position checklist
2. Clearly identify the OSC "play" area within the Health Physics Access Control Point
3. Following the critique, Facility Lead Controllers should provide a performance assessment of their facility's objectives by completing the appropriate objective matrix.

   When determining whether, and to what degree, an objective was met, controllers should compare observed performance against the listed performance attributes.

4. Lead Facility Controllers should provide the following materials to the Drill / Exercise Manager.

   A. Responder-generated documents
   B. Drill / Exercise Controller Logs (EP-AA-101-1000-F04)
   C. Critique results, including easel paper or white board transcription notes (if used)
   D. ERO Comment Forms (EP-AA-101-1000-F03)
   E. Completed objective performance assessment matrix
   F. A brief verbal or written summary of drill highlights and key issues

CFE 14- 05 OSC LEAD CONTROLLER CHECKLIST

Before Drill/Exercise

- ☐ Copy Initial Conditions Message.
- ☐ Obtain controller identification (armbands, badges, etc).
- ☐ Make copies of Drill/Exercise Controller Logs.
- ☐ Make copies of ERO Comment Forms & Critique Review Points.
- ☐ Review objective assignments with controllers - who will watch for what

After Drill/Exercise is Terminated

- ☐ Make announcement regarding the following:
  - Workstation restoration/facility cleanup
  - Assembly and collection of documentation
  - Facility critique
- ☐ Pass out copies of ERO Comment Form and Critique Review Points.
- ☐ Conduct Drill/Exercise Critique per section 2 of controller package.
- ☐ Collect all Seabrook Station ERO Comment Forms
- ☐ Collect all Drill/Exercise Controller Logs
- ☐ Collect all player logs and documentation
- ☐ Inspect facility to determine if it has been restored to the degree practical.
- ☐ Ensure that all simulator-driven SDS windows are closed (i.e., no SDS running).
- ☐ Provide verbal or written summary of drill results to the Drill Manager.
- ☐ Provide all drill documentation to the Drill Manager.

Day of Drill/Exercise

- ☐ Establish communications with Drill/Drill Manager.
- ☐ Conduct Job Site Huddle with other facility controllers, and distribute controller badges
- ☐ Review expected actions with each controller.
- ☐ Review messages and mini-scenarios for OSC-based personnel. Assign messages to controllers. Instruct controllers to notify you before messages are passed.
- ☐ Review objective assignments with controllers - who will watch for what.
- ☐ Distribute Initial Conditions Message and Player Telephone Directory to all position workstations.
- ☐ Clearly identify the OSC "play" area within the RP Access Control Point.
- ☐ Verify that MPCS terminal is receiving simulator data and has correct time.
- ☐ Periodically check in with controllers on status of objective demonstrations
- ☐ Notify Drill/Drill Manager when all objectives have been met.
- ☐ When directed by the Drill Manager, terminate OSC drill/exercise play by informing the OSC Coordinator.

CFE 14- 05
Controller Instructions

B.3.3 EOF - LEAD CONTROLLER

1. Complete position checklist
2. Ensure the PA system is used for all briefings and the facility critique.
3. Following the critique, Facility Lead Controllers should provide a performance assessment of their facility's objectives by completing the appropriate objective matrix.

   When determining whether, and to what degree, an objective was met, controllers should compare observed performance against the listed performance attributes.

4. Lead Facility Controllers should provide the following materials to the Drill / Exercise Manager.
   - Responder-generated documents
   - Drill / Exercise Controller Logs (EP-AA-101-1000-F04)
   - Critique results, including easel paper or white board transcription notes (if used)
   - ERO Comment Forms (EP-AA-101-1000-F03)
   - Completed objective performance assessment matrix
   - A brief verbal or written summary of drill highlights and key issues

CFE 14- 05 EOF LEAD CONTROLLER CHECKLIST

Before Drill/Exercise

- ☐ Copy Initial Conditions Message and Player Telephone Directory.
- ☐ Obtain visitor list, badges and visitor rules.
- ☐ Make copies of Drill/Exercise Controller Logs.
- ☐ Make copies of ERO Comment Forms & Critique Review Points.

After Drill/Exercise is Terminated

- ☐ Make announcement regarding the following:
  - Workstation restoration/facility cleanup
  - Assembly and collection of documentation
  - Facility critique
- ☐ Pass out copies of ERO Comment Form and Critique Review Points.
- ☐ Conduct Drill/Exercise Critique per section 2 of controller package.
- ☐ Collect all Seabrook Station ERO Comment Forms
- ☐ Collect all Drill/Exercise Controller Logs
- ☐ Collect all player logs and documentation
- ☐ Inspect facility to determine if it has been restored to the degree practical.
- ☐ Ensure that all simulator-driven SDS windows are closed (i.e., no SDS running).
- ☐ Turn off MPCS local printer.
- ☐ Ensure all appliances are turned off in both the EOF and IFO (e.g., coffee makers, PCs, copy machines, space heaters, etc.).
- ☐ Turn off lights.
- ☐ Secure all exterior doors.
- ☐ Provide verbal or written summary of drill results to the Drill Manager.
- ☐ Provide all drill documentation to the Drill Manager.

Day of Drill/Exercise

- ☐ Establish communications with Drill Manager.
- ☐ Obtain controller identification (armbands, badges, etc). Located at AA/FFD workstation.
- ☐ Place "drill in progress" signs in front of EOF so public can see. Located in garage.
- ☐ Conduct Job Site Huddle with other facility controllers, and distribute controller badges
- ☐ Review expected actions with each controller.
- ☐ Review messages and mini-scenarios for EOF-based personnel. Assign messages to controllers. Instruct controllers to notify you before messages are passed.
- ☐ Review objective assignments with controllers - who will watch for what.
- ☐ Distribute Initial Conditions Message and player telephone directory to all position workstations.
- ☐ Verify that MPCS terminal is receiving simulator data and has correct time.
- ☐ Have the Radiological Assessment Controller inform the HPN Communicator to use the HPN commercial telephone line for drill-related notifications. The communicator is NOT to use the HPN telephone on the FTS circuit.
- ☐ Brief the Security Coordinator on expectations for arriving visitors.
- ☐ Periodically check in with controllers on status of objective demonstrations.
- ☐ Notify Drill/Drill Manager when all objectives have been met.
- ☐ When directed by the Drill/Drill Manager, terminate EOF drill/exercise play by informing the Response Manager.

CFE 14- 05
Controller Instructions

B.3.4 JIC – LEAD CONTROLLER

1. Complete position checklist
2. Following the critique, Facility Lead Controllers should provide a performance assessment of their facility's objectives by completing the appropriate objective matrix.

   When determining whether, and to what degree, an objective was met, controllers should compare observed performance against the listed performance attributes.

3. Lead Facility Controllers should provide the following materials to the Drill / Exercise Manager.

   A. Responder-generated documents
   B. Drill / Exercise Controller Logs (EP-AA-101-1000-F04)
   C. Critique results, including easel paper or white board transcription notes (if used)
   D. ERO Comment Forms (EP-AA-101-1000-F03)
   E. Completed objective performance assessment matrix
   F. A brief verbal or written summary of drill highlights and key issues

CFE 14- 05
Controller Instructions

JOINT INFORMATION CENTER CONTROLLER EXPECTATIONS

1. There are two types of controllers: facility operation controllers and mock news media.
2. Documentation of assignments as described below must be maintained by all controllers.

FACILITY OPERATION CONTROLLERS:

Lead Controller Responsibilities -

- Activation
- Command & Control
- Key Message Development
- NextEra Seabrook Station Interface with Offsite PIOs
- Evaluator/Observer Management

Controller # 2 - _____

- Intra-facility information flow from operations room throughout Joint Information Center
- Monitor all MRC room activities
- Information flow between MC & EOF
- Media Relations/Rumor Control processes
- Document distribution (bulletins, news statements, press releases)
- Back-up to lead controller

Controllers #3 & 4 _____

- Media Briefing Room activation & maintenance
- Ensuring mock media continue to make calls to the Media Relations Room (incl. During conferences)
- Log news conferences:
  - Start/finish
  - Open commitments/unaddressed issues/rumors addressed
  - Organization and Control
- Mock Media Management
  - "Media" are facilitating player performance; while being moderately challenging
  - "Media" stay within the bounds

MOCK NEWS MEDIA

As reporters, you will be expected to "recreate" the scenario based on your experience at the Joint Information Center. Restructure the event in your log by documenting the info that you receive at the Joint Information Center:

- Stagger arrival times
- Call the Information Line throughout drill
- Upon entry to Joint Information Center, ask questions about the facility
- Ask when the next news conference will be held; can you get interviews
- Don't be satisfied with long gaps of time
- Leave the building and come back; re-register as someone else
- Keep the Media Relations phones going; even during press conferences ({Always precede calls with "THIS IS A DRILL"}
- Plant misinformation based on other news sources
- Use THIS IS A DRILL throughout the exercise prior to engaging in questions
- Always ask for explanation of acronyms or other "nukespeak".
- **"Media" are facilitating player performance; while being moderately challenging**
- Repeat the questions; ask them in a different manner; ask for recap of events
- Don't be satisfied with unanswered questions; follow-up
- Play off of information presented; make up questions
- Generate misinformation to be asked of the Media Relations personnel and determine if it is addressed in subsequent news conference.

CFE 14- 05 JOINT INFORMATION CENTER LEAD CONTROLLER CHECKLIST

Before Drill/Exercise

- ☐ Copy Initial Conditions Message and Player Telephone Directory.
- ☐ Obtain visitor list, badges and visitor rules.
- ☐ Obtain controller identification (armbands, badges, etc).
- ☐ Make copies of Drill/Exercise Controller Logs.
- ☐ Make copies of ERO Comment Forms & Critique Review Points.

After Drill/Exercise is Terminated

- ☐ Make announcement regarding the following:
  - Workstation restoration/facility cleanup
  - Assembly and collection of documentation
  - Facility critique
- ☐ Pass out copies of ERO Comment Form and Critique Review Points.
- ☐ Conduct Drill/Exercise Critique per section 2 of controller package.
- ☐ Collect all Seabrook Station ERO Comment Forms
- ☐ Collect all Drill/Exercise Controller Logs
- ☐ Collect all player logs and documentation
- ☐ **Ensure that no drill messages are recorded on the Seabrook Information Line.**
- ☐ Inspect facility to determine if it has been restored to the degree practical.
- ☐ Ensure all appliances are turned off (e.g., coffee makers, PCs, copy machines, space heaters, etc.).
- ☐ Turn off lights.
- ☐ Secure all exterior doors.
- ☐ Provide verbal or written summary of drill results to the Drill Manager.
- ☐ Provide all drill documentation to the Drill Manager.

Day of Drill/Exercise

- ☐ Establish communications with Drill/Drill Manager.
- ☐ Conduct Job Site Huddle with other facility controllers, and distribute controller badges
- ☐ Review expected actions with each controller.
- ☐ Review messages and mini-scenarios for JIC-based personnel. Assign messages to controllers. Instruct controllers to notify you before messages are passed.
- ☐ Review objective assignments with controllers - who will watch for what.
- ☐ Distribute Initial Conditions Message and player telephone directory to all position workstations.
- ☐ Periodically check in with controllers on status of objective demonstrations.
- ☐ Notify Drill/Drill Manager when all objectives have been met.
- ☐ When directed by the Drill/Drill Manager, terminate Joint Information Center drill/exercise play by informing the Emergency News Manager.

CFE 14- 05
Controller Instructions

B.3.5 ASSEMBLY AREA – LEAD CONTROLLER

You will call out personnel and direct them to facilities, as requested

Callout of craft/shift/bargaining unit workers is to be simulated

Call Operations Department if licensed operators are requested

Do not call the Help Desk for computer-related assistance

No actual reporting if remaining drill play time is less than 60 minutes (for onsite responders) or 90 minutes (for offsite responders).

Phone numbers:	Maintenance Coordinator	x3961
	Admin Services Coordinator	x4561
	Others - Emergency Response Telephone Directory	

In order to minimize exercise impacts on normal station work activities, it may be necessary for the Assembly Area Coordinator to dispatch simulated personnel to a facility, e.g., additional mechanics reporting to the OSC. If this is done, the Assembly Area Coordinator should clearly indicate that the dispatched personnel are being simulated. The individual requesting the dispatch of the simulated personnel should ensure each simulated person's name is entered on the appropriate accountability board, form, etc.

CFE 14- 05
Controller Instructions

B.3.6 GUARD ISLAND CONTROLLER

The Guard Island Controller shall ensure that:

- The site siren **is not** sounded.
- Drill emergency pager messages (text or numeric) are sent by the Security Officer activating the ERO pagers. The numeric drill-use pager codes are listed below. [*Critical peer check - see Operating Experience in CR #04-08167*]

Unusual Event	712
Alert	713
Site Area Emergency	714
General Emergency	715

- "This is a drill" messages are sent by the Security Officer activating the LAN messaging system - see EMS menu for drill-related messages.

- Following the critique, Facility Lead Controllers should provide a performance assessment of their facility's objectives by completing the appropriate objective matrix.

  When determining whether, and to what degree, an objective was met, controllers should compare observed performance against the listed performance attributes.

- Lead Facility Controllers should provide the following materials to the Drill / Exercise Manager.

  A. Responder-generated documents
  B. Drill / Exercise Controller Logs (EP-AA-101-1000-F04)
  C. Critique results, including easel paper or white board transcription notes (if used)
  D. ERO Comment Forms (EP-AA-101-1000-F03)
  E. Completed objective performance assessment matrix
  F. A brief verbal or written summary of drill highlights and key issues

ATT B-1 ERO CONTROLLER ORGANIZATION

Simulator Control Room		
Drill Manager	E. Spaide x2609	
Operations	B. Bryant	x2993
Simulator Operator		x2993
Technical Support Center		
Command and Control	R. Duarte	x3956/3957 (Fax x7990)
Operations Support	B. Bradburry	
Technical Assessment	P. Tutinas	
Technical Assessment	R. Noble	
Radiological Assessment	D. Flahardy	
Operational Support Center		
Command and Control	J. Kennish	x3965
Radiological Controller	C. Ellis	
Emergency Repair Team (IC)	E. Gregg	
Emergency Repair Team (IC)	R. Evans	
Emergency Repair Team (MM)	K. Schoff	
Emergency Repair Team (MM)	D. J. Antonellis	
Chem Lab/WRGM Team	TBD	
Chem Lab/WRGM Team	TBD	
Assembly Area Coordinator	N/A	x2400 or 603-773-7692 603-773-7655 fax
Security		
Command and Control	M. Hambrook	x8053
CAS		X TBD
SAS		X TBD
Security Command Center		
Emergency Operations Facility/Control Cell		
Command and Control	J. Sobatka	603-468-3885
Technical Assessment	S. Samstag	
Technical Liaison	M. Toole	
Radiological Assessment - EOF Coordinator	P. Casey	
Radiological Assessment – Dose Assessment	D. Robinson	x4571
Field Team No. 1	M. Nadeau	
Field Team No. 2	R. Jones	
Industry Contacts	P. Willoughby	TBD
Joint Information Center		
Command and Control	N. Durand	603-468-3854
Media	R. McCabe	
	M. Mitchell	
	TBD	

CFE 14- 05

Controller Instructions

ATT B-2 ERO TELEPHONE DIRECTORY

EXTERNAL ORGANIZATIONS

Remember to use "This is a Drill..."

American Nuclear Insurers	Actual contacts should be made to ANI.
Assembly Area Coordinator -	x2400 (603)-773-7692
INPO	Actual contacts should be made to the INPO emergency operations center.
National Weather Service	Actual contacts should be made to the NWS.
Nuclear Energy Institute	Actual contacts should be made to NEI.
NRC Emergency Notification System (ENS)	Control cell number 603-468-3857
NRC Health Physics Network (HPN)	Control cell number 603-468-3857
Nuclear Electric Insurance Limited/ Nuclear Mutual Limited	Actual contacts should be made to NEIL/NML.
PSNH Dispatcher	Control cell number 603-468-3859
RSCS	Control cell number 603-468-3859
State Notifications	Use actual numbers.
Westinghouse	Control cell number 603-468-3859
Other Vendor Contacts	Control cell number 603-468-3859

CONTROL ROOM POSITIONS

1.	**Shift Manager**	(603) 474-9521 x 2608
2.	**Unit Supervisor**	(603) 474-9521 x 2991

ATT B-3 TYPICAL DRILL / EXERCISE CONTROLLER LOG

TYPICAL DRILL / EXERCISE CONTROLLER LOG

Drill / Exercise: CFE 14- 05 Drill / Exercise Date: November 5, 2014

Controller's Name (print):_____

Controller's Location / Assignment: _____

Observations should include the proper and effective use of procedures, equipment and personnel. Comments concerning drill performance should document: the time of observation, personnel or equipment involved, procedures involved, and the impact that the condition had on the ability of the player organization to meet its objectives.

TIME	OBSERVATION

ATT B-4 Drill Participant Comment Form

Drill Participant Feedback

Did the procedures provide adequate guidance and direction for you to perform the tasks assigned to your function? ☐ YES ☐ NO
If NO, please provide comments:

Was the necessary equipment available and operable to support your assigned activities? If NO, please provide comments: ☐ YES ☐ NO

Did this drill illustrate your need for additional training for the position you have been assigned? ☐ YES ☐ NO
If YES, please provide comments:

Did this drill enhance your proficiency in your assigned position and as an emergency responder? ☐ YES ☐ NO
If NO, please provide comments:

Please provide any additional comments regarding the drill or your training that were not addressed above:

Name (Optional):	Date: November 5, 2014
Facility:	Position:

B.4 FACILITY CRITIQUE PROCESS

Controllers should avoid any commitments that are beyond the authority of the controller organization. Solutions are not the focus of the critique.

1. Following termination of the drill, Facility Lead Controllers should perform the following actions:
   A. ALWAYS use microphone, when available.
   B. Make announcement per message D.23
   C. Distribute Drill Participant Feedback Form, B-4, and Drill / Exercise Critique Review Points (located in this section) or equivalent, to all responders.
   D. Direct responders to take the following actions.
      (1) Save all materials for review
      (2) Restore their facilities / areas to the original state of readiness.
      (2) Conduct a self-critique, by functional area, during the period before the facility critique. Drill / Exercise Critique Review Points should be used to stimulate discussion.
      (3) Designate a spokesperson, as appropriate for each functional area to present the self-critique results in the combined facility critique.
   E. Assign a scribe to ensure comments are captured.
2. While responders are self-critiquing, controllers should caucus in a separate area and summarize their observations. Keep this meeting brief and focus on the more significant issues.

   The formal facility critique cannot begin until controllers have rejoined the responders.
3. Each Facility Manager (or lead controller in their absence) will facilitate a critique of drill activities at his/her assigned emergency response facility. This should be done in the following manner.
   A. As appropriate, set up a display of the items for discussion.
   B. Announce that the critique has started, and briefly explain the process and goal.
      (1) We want to self-identify all weaknesses and deficiencies. Discuss importance of being self critical.
      (2) Provide the ERO examples of a Risk Significant Planning Standard and what it means from a regulatory standpoint, critique process and overall importance as it relates to the protection of the health and welfare of the public.
      (3) Identify Strengths as appropriate.

(4) Every responder should feel comfortable sharing successes and challenges as it relates to their team's performance. Discuss importance of everyone being involved by providing written or verbal critique comments.

(5) Discuss that all written material from the facility (checklists, logs, faxes, etc.) will be collected at the end of the critique.

C. Review the scenario with the responders.

D. Solicit feedback and comments from each functional area in the facility (e.g., command and control, technical assessment / support, radiological assessment / support, repair and corrective actions, administrative support, etc.).

E. Closely monitor the conduct and progress of the critique, and provide direction as needed to ensure a self-critical / thorough review. Additional focus should be provided on areas associated with RSPS.

F. Resist rationalizing actual performance vs. expected performance, ensure the timeframes for events are captured and compared between actual and expected.

(1) Ensure that all deviations from the scenario expected performance are portrayed to the Drill / Exercise Manager for evaluation.

G. At the critique conclusion, summarize the preliminary results:

(1) Status of Major Objectives
- Command and Control
- Facility Activation
- Onsite Protective Measures
- Augmentation
- Inter and Intra facility communications
- Adequacy and Use of Procedures
- Equipment
- Human Performance Tools
- Effectiveness of Critique
- Other

(2) NEI 99-02 Performance Indicator opportunities: emergency classification, State notifications, and PARs. State that these results are preliminary and subject to further review by the EP Department. If there is any doubt / question about the results of an opportunity, state that the result is Indeterminate and that the EP Department will determine the opportunity outcome.

(3) Accident Assessment

H. Ensure that all critique comments are captured (e.g., scribe, easel, ERO Comment Forms, etc.). All individuals should have the opportunity to provide comments during the critique.

Responders should generate ARs prior to the end of business that day for any critique items deemed needed during the critique.

4. Following the critique, Facility Lead Controllers should provide a performance assessment of their facility's objectives by completing the appropriate objective matrix.
   A. When determining whether, and to what degree, an objective was met, controllers should compare observed performance against the listed performance attributes.
5. Lead Facility Controllers should provide the following materials to the Drill / Exercise Manager. This meeting may take place following the drill or exercise (same day or next day).
   A. Responder-generated documents
   B. Drill / Exercise Controller Logs (EP-AA-101-1000-F04)
   C. Critique results, including easel paper or white board transcription notes (if used)
   D. Drill Participant Feedback Forms
   E. Completed objective performance assessment matrix
   F. A brief verbal or written summary of drill highlights and key issues
6. The Drill / Exercise Manager will review the expected results from the scenario (state / local notification forms) against the actual forms and determine if the drill or exercise DEP opportunities (notification forms) were appropriately completed. Use guidance provided in NEI 99-02 and EP-AA-101-1000

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ATTACHMENT 2
TYPICAL FACILITY DRILL CRITIQUE PROCESS
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Facility Critique Process Agenda

Review with the Facility lead by Facility Manager (or designee)

- Importance for returning the facility to a state of readiness
- Overview of the Critique Process
  - Importance of being Self Critical and Identify Issues
  - Importance of everyone being involved by providing written or verbal critique comments
  - Assign a scribe to make sure comments are captured
  - Capture copies of all written material from facility (checklists, logs, faxes, etc.)
- Review the Scenario with the Responders (may be performed by Lead Controller)

Status of Risk Significant Planning Standards

- Classification of Emergencies
- Notification
- Protective Action Recommendations
- Accident Assessment

Review Performance for Strengths / Opportunities

- Facility Leader / responder comments
- Controller comments

Status of Objectives

- Command and Control
- Facility activation
- Onsite Protective Measures
- Augmentation
- Inter and Intra facility communications
- Adequacy and Use of Procedures
- Equipment
- Human Performance Tools
- Effectiveness of Critique
- Other

Summary of Preliminary DEP (as appropriate)

Management Observer and Oversight Comments

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ATTACHMENT 2
TYPICAL FACILITY DRILL CRITIQUE PROCESS
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Critique Tool

C. Scenario Description and Timeline

NARRATIVE SUMMARY

The plant is operating at 100% power, Middle of Life, equilibrium Xenon and Samarium.

It is a Saturday morning. For Drill/Exercise purposes, it is Saturday, 11/05/14. Crew turnover is just completing in the Control Room. [RATIONALE: Seabrook Station has elected to establish off-shift hours for this Evaluated Exercise]

METEOROLOGICAL DATA: It is a sunny day, with no rain or severe weather in the forecast. Winds direction is from 225° at 7 mph, with ocassional gusts to 10 mph with an "D" Stability Class. Wind direction, speed, and stability class will remain constant throught the Exercise window.

The Barometric Pressure is 30.2 and steady, with a Probability of Precipitation of <10%. Todays high temperature will be 40° F, with a Low Temp of 23° F.

Spent Fuel Pool time to reach 200° F is 27.6 hours. (IER 11-2)

EQUIPMENT OUT OF SERVICE: The Newington Line (369) is out of service for breaker replacement at Newington. Estimated time to completion is 3 days.

EXPECTED ACTION: The Operational Plan is to maintain 100% Power.

Scenario:

Prior to T=0, Adversary Team #1 puts in at the Farm Lane boat launch in Seabrook. This is witnessed by a fisherman who is unable to report it until he gets back. The team meanders through the salt marsh avoiding security detection.

A van is observed parked on the North Access Road, when Security arrives to investigate the van is driven to the 'A' parking lot, parked under the tower for the SCOBIE line and detonates an explosive device. This explosion damages the tower and removes this line from service leaving the WARD HILL line as the only offsite power supply.

The explosion also injured the owner controlled area patrol that had followed the van, his exact status will remain unknown. This attack in the Owner Controlled Area will require Security to declare a CODE RED condition and the declaration of an ALERT by the Control Room. The CODE RED declaration will result in immediate notification of LLEAs.

During this period adversary teams one and two are approaching the protected area. Commensurate with the explosion in the parking lot, the adversary teams storm the protected area. Team one approaching from the southeast using hand carried bulk charges to explosively breach PA Gate 2 and gain entrance to the Protected Area.

Team two initiates suppressive fire on the Defensive Positions in the SW corner of the PA while explosively breaching the SOCA & PA fence near the Cooling Tower. This team reaches the SEPS Diesel Generators and plants explosive devices on both SEPS-Diesel Generator Enclosures. The device on SEPS-

DG-2B does not activate during this scenario and the generator reamains functional. SEPS- DG-2A is destroyed. Adversary Team 2 is neutralized by SFMs while attempting to make movement into the Waste Process Building.

This attack on the protected area will require the declaration of a Site Area Emergency, since the attack in the Owner Controlled Area and the Protected area happen concurrently, the Site Area Emergency should be declared.

The Control Room will implement OS1290.03, Response to a Security Event requiring a reactor trip and entry in E-0, Reactor Trip / Safety Injection.

Team 1 proceeds to the Service Water Pump house (SWPH). While en route surrounding defensive positions are targeted by rocket propelled grenade launchers (RPG). The CAS Operator receives report of Security Force Member (SFMs) engagements from the SWPH prior to losing contact with the SFMs. The status of these Security Force Members is not immediately known. The adversary team gains access to the SWPH through the East door.

The ERO is activated per OS1290.03, Response to a Security Event. The ERO is directed to report to ALTERNATIVE facilities.

The adversaries in the SWPH detonate a large satchel charge in the SWPH, damaging SW piping. The blast damage results in Service Water transferring to the cooling tower. When this transfer occurs the Control Room operators will note a lowering Cooling Tower level requiring them to secure the Cooling Tower Pumps.

A General Emergency will be declared.

If Service Water Pumps are secured Primary Component Cooling Water temperature will slowly increase requiring alternative cooling to components. The Control Room will consider aligning alternate cooling to the Coolant Charging Pump in order to maintain charging to the Reactor Coolant Pump Seals. This will require Control Room-Security coordination for safe travel for an NSO to travel to the Primary Auxiliary Building.

The damage to the B Train Service Water Piping is repairable, but this will not be known until team investigates damage.

The status of the adversaries in the SWPH will not be known until investigated.

Law enforcement will form an Incident Command Post, with the Chief of Police for Seabrook, NH or his designee as Incident Commander, from which to allocate the necessary resources and support to mitigate the Hostile Action event. As resources become available (EMS, fire, law enforcement teams, EOD, etc.), they will be simulated staged at a designated offsite staging area, in accordance with ICP direction. They will be briefed on the physical and radiological hazards that may be present. Immediate Plant needs of the ICP will be a perimeter sweep, establishment of perimeter control and access

restrictions, EMS for the injured Security Force Members, and Explosives and Ordinates Disposal for undetonated explosives.

After the adversaries are contained in the SWPH, Security will be able to support NSO alignment of alternate cooling to the charging pump and other tasks the Control Room may require. At this point the ICP should be coordinating sweeps of affected areas.

It is at this time that explosion debris induced insulator damage results in the loss of the Ward Hill Line. This will result in a loss of offsite power. Prior to the loss of power SFM reports unusual arcing in the 'high yard'. Both Diesel Generators will start, as will the 'B' SEPS Diesel Generator. The Control Room will follow the guidance in E-0 and recognize the lack of cooling water to the Diesel Generators. They will consult with Engineering on a course of action, it is anticipated that the Diesel Generators will be secured. The 'B' SEPs Diesel Generator is available to power bus 6.

This loss of offsite power will require a General Emergency Declaration, but will not be declared as a General Emergency is currently in effect.

Security reports to the Control Room that all known adversaries have been neutralized. Security and the Control Room discuss the attack with law enforcement, including immediate needs and any radiation protection requirements. Security will report that 3 SFMs are wounded. Control Room coordinates with Security and ICP to establish safe or protected route(s) of travel within and out of the PA for response and support organizations such as EMS. Since all known adversaries are neutralized, the Control Room will also be coordinating with Security and LLEA for safe travel of Nuclear System Operators and available discipline personnel to investigate damage.

The STED will turn over to the Site Emergency Director (SED), and the Alternative TSC, Alternative OSC, and EOF will be activated in accordance with Emergency Response procedure. For purposes of this Exercise, only designated personnel will respond. If this were an actual emergency, all ERO members would respond, and ongoing 24-hour ERO coverage would be established along with current facility activation. The Joint Information Center at the EOF will also be activated within this approximate timeframe, though various PIOs may arrive sooner. The ERO will initiate coordination of repair teams to be sent to site for assessment and eventual restoration of Service Water. Repair teams will be briefed, and their escorted/protected travel discussed and coordinated. However, repair teams will not actually be transported on site for this Exercise, only simulated.

Repair teams will be briefed at the Alternative OSC, and their safe/protected travel to the plant will be simulated. Repair teams will be simulated to have arrived on site. Simulated assessments and success paths will be communicated to the ERO via Drill Messages.

Just prior to Exercise termination, it will be reported by repair teams that the B-Train Service Water piping has been repaired, and will be restored shortly. The Exercise will be terminated when the objectives are satisfied or have had the opportunity to be satisfied.

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

1.	Van explodes in 'A' Lot, removing SCOBIE line from service
2.	Adversaries in Protected Area, plant explosives on SEPS Diesel Generators and Enter SWPH
3.	Explosion in SWPH, Service Water swaps to Cooling Tower, but unavailable
4.	Loss of offsite power, SEPS-DG-2B available

SHIFT TURNOVER INFORMATION

WORLD CLASS PERFORMANCE

11/5/14 0700

OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT TURNOVER

• Plant Status

- Plant Is In Mode **1** At 100 % Power
- The Security Threat Level Is **Yellow**

Protected Train

A

Current PRA Risk is **Green**

Aggregate Risk is **6** **Low**

• Reactivity

- RCS Boron Concentration is **1058** ppm.
- *Performing* A **300** *Gal* **Dilution** *Every 3 Hours.*
- Rod Control Is In **Auto** With Control Bank "D" at 230 steps.
- RCS Tave Band (Deg. F): **589 – 589.3**
- Dilution Amount Required To Raise Tave By 1 Deg. F (Gal): **218**
- Boration Amount Required To Lower Tave By 1 Deg F (Gal): **38**
- SG Blowdown Lineup: **Hotwells** **At 60** GPM/SG
- Cation Run (Minutes): Mids – **6** Days – **6** Cation Flowrate: **Full Flow**
- Turbine Controls: Make adjustments as required to maintain the 8 Hour thermal power between 3646.0 MW and 3647.9 MW. The 1 Hour thermal power average will be maintained below 3648 MW.
- Control Rods will be manipulated per Reactor Engineering recommendations and will normally be left in automatic control. Utilize OS1000.10 Fig. 11, Rod Motion Checklist.

• ODI 56 Values For NEPEX Contingency Downpower

- Amount Of Boration Needed To Reduce Output To 1200 MWE Net (C6123) Is **124** Gal.
- Amount Of Boration Needed To Reduce Output To 800 MWE Net (C6123) Is **694** Gal.

[redacted]

11/5/14 0:00
By: rsm0m53

TURNOVER INFORMATION

1. Discuss the expected amount and frequency of routine reactivity manipulations to maintain steady state power operations.

2. Discuss the attached Shift Reactivity Plan

[redacted]

[redacted]

Today 06:35
By:

[redacted]

Today 06:35 *TURNOVER INFORMATION*
By:

[redacted]

Today 06:35 *TURNOVER INFORMATION*
By:

[redacted]

Today 06:35 *TURNOVER INFORMATION*
By:

[redacted]

Today 06:35 *TURNOVER INFORMATION*
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Today 06:35 *TURNOVER INFORMATION*
By:

[redacted]

Today 06:35 *TURNOVER INFORMATION*
By:

[redacted]

Today 06:35 *TURNOVER INFORMATION*
By:

-
- Comments, problems, operator workarounds, etc.

DRILL SIMULATOR SCENARIO INSTRUCTIONS - CFE 14- 05		
Simulator Setup	☐ RESET Simulator to IC 30 ☐ SELECT: **Scenario** ☐ SELECT: **EP** ☐ SELECT: **1405 Setup** ☐ SELECT: **Run**	
	☐ Place Tag on MOD-3J-69	**Newington line out of service**
	☐ SELECT: **Scenario** ☐ SELECT: **EP** ☐ SELECT: **1405 Met Data** ☐ SELECT: **Run**	
	VERIFY Simulator clock is synchronized with real time.	
128 **0741** **T=11**	☐ SELECT: **Scenario** ☐ SELECT: **EP** ☐ SELECT: **1405 Loss of Scobie** ☐ SELECT: **Run**	Loss of Scobie line After explosion Control Room enters OS1210.05, Dropped Rod
0747 **T=17**	☐ SELECT: **Scenario** ☐ SELECT: **EP** ☐ SELECT: **1405 Loss of Ward Hill** ☐ SELECT: **Run**	

DRILL SIMULATOR SCENARIO INSTRUCTIONS - CFE 14- 05		
0904 **T=94**	When required by Control Room Actions, swap CS-P-2B to alternate cooling: ☐ SELECT:**RF List** ☐ SELECT:**Primary Component Cooling** ☐ SELECT: **rfCC020, CS-P-2B ALTERNATE COOLING SOURCE** ☐ SELECT a Final Value of **FP** ☐ SELECT: **Insert**	Swaps CS-P-2B to Fire Protection.

Timeline: *CFE 14- 05*

INITIAL CONDITIONS:	The plant is operating at 100% power, Middle of Life, equilibrium Xenon and Samarium. It is a Saturday morning. For Drill/Exercise purposes, it is Saturday, 11/05/14. Crew turnover has just completed in the Control Room. METEOROLOGICAL DATA: It is a sunny day, with no rain or severe weather in the forecast. Winds direction is from 225° at 7 mph, with ocassional gusts t0 10 mph with an "D" Stability Class. Wind direction, speed, and stability class will remain constant throught the Exercise window. The Barometric Pressure is 30.2 and steady, with a Probability of Precipitation of <10%. Todays high temperature will be 40º F, with a Low Temp of 23º F. Spent Fuel Pool time to reach 200° F is 27.6 hours. (IER 11-2) EQUIPMENT OUT OF SERVICE: Newington Line (369) is out of service for breaker replacement at Newington. Estimated time to completion is 3 days. Risk is YELLOW. EXPECTED ACTION: The Operational Plan is to maintain 100% Power. --- Phone communications will be per ATT B-2 and mini scenario E.1. **Security escorts will not be available for operations activitiies until directed by the Scenario (@ T=36)**	
	CR LEAD Controller: Verify Simulator Initial Conditions Established.	
Upon Arrival	Controllers provide Initial conditions personnel as they respond to their assigned facilities	**Message D.1 for Control Room , D.2 for Non-Control Room Personnel.**

Timeline: *CFE 14- 05*

T= Prior to Drill Window	Adversary Team #1 puts in at the Farm Lane boat launch in Seabrook. This is witnessed by a fisherman who is unable to report it until he gets back. The team meanders through the salt marsh avoiding security detection.	
ATTACK Phase (15 – 30 mins0		
	CR LEAD Controller: After board walkdown, the sequester the WCS outside of the simulator.	**Sequester WCS outside of simulator for 3 mins after any event is initiated which would require his return to the control room.** **Ensure adequate delay on his return.**
0730	**TSC LEAD Controller:** Ensure US announces drill start	**Message D.3**
T=0 **~0730**	Operations Crew takes the Shift in the Simulator Control Room. The Security oncoming shift begins their morning briefing. **EXPECTED ACTION:** None	

Timeline: *CFE 14- 05*

T~7 **~0737**	**EVENT DESCRIPTION:** • Guard Island observes (via CCTV) a white van driving down the North Access road and parking on the north side of the road, east of the checkpoint. • Adversary Team 1 consisting of six individuals, has traversed the marsh and is staged in the scaffold storage facility on the southeast side of the site near Gate 2. • Adversary Team 2 consisting of three individuals, approaches the protected area fence from the nature trail on the SW side of the site using the marsh as cover. *DRILL MSG D.4: (This is a Drill Message.)* CAS:*"We picked up a white van speeding down the North Access road before parking on the north side of the road, east of the checkpoint."* *(This is a Drill Message.)* **EXPECTED ACTION(s):** • Adversary team has not been detected by anyone – no action • Security Owner Controlled Area (OCA) Patrol dispatched to investigate van.	**Message D.4**

Timeline: *CFE 14- 05*

T~10 ~0740	**EVENT DESCRIPTION:** • As the OCA Patrol nears the van on the North Access Road, the van departs at a high rate of speed, heading east on the north access road. The OCA patrol gives chase and the van comes stops in the east side of the "A" parking lot, north of the towers for the WARD HILL and SCOBIE lines. *DRILL MSG D.5: (This is a Drill Message.)* OCA: *"CODE GRAY, the white van took off heading toward Alpha Lot. No license plates visible. Standby for further information." (This is a Drill Message.)* *DRILL MSG* D.6*: (This is a Drill Message.)* OCA: *"I have visual on white van. He's stopped by the VBS under the highlines." (This is a Drill Message.)* **EXPECTED ACTION(s):** • Adversary Team threat unkown – no action • Security declares a CODE Gray condition.	**Message D.5** **Message D.6**

Timeline: *CFE 14- 05*

T~11 **~0741**	**EVENT DESCRIPTION:** • As the OCA patrol arrives, the driver of the van detonates an explosive device. The detonation is focused upwards, damaging the tower for the SCOBIE line,causing it to fall to the north. The lines on this tower were severed in the explosion. The explosion distributes a large amount of debris throughout the parking lot and the HIGH YARD. There is a large black cloud of smoke rising from the parking lot. • The OCA patrol was severely injured in the explosion, unable to respond on the radio. *DRILL MSG* D.7: *(This is a Drill Message.)* Controller: *"You hear/see a large explosion. OCA patrol appears damaged on camera and is non-responsive on radio." (This is a Drill Message.)* **EXPECTED ACTION(s):** • Adversary Team has not been detected – no action • Security declares a CODE RED condition. CR/LLEA notified of code declaration as a result of a large explosion in the OCA near the switchyard/VBS with the OCA patrol believed to be disabled/neutralized.	**Message D.7**
T~12 **~0742**	**EVENT DESCRIPTION:** LLEA Notification • Notifies LLEA of Attack *Expected Message:* *(This is a Drill Message.)* CAS: *"This is SGT Smith at Seabrook Station. A CODE RED has been declared. We have a large vehicle explosion in the OCA near the switchyard. One of our OCA Patrols appears down."* *(This is a Drill Message.)* **EXPECTED ACTION(s):** • LLEA Notification **Objective:** ***Demonstrate the ability to make initial notifications to law enforcement and other first-responder agencies during a hostile action-based event.***	

Timeline: *CFE 14- 05*

T~13 ~0743	**EVENT DESCRIPTION:** Control Room Notification • Notifies the Control Room of Attack • CAS controller ensures that X2991 is used to reach the Unit Supervisor *Expected Message: (This is a Drill Message.)* CAS to CR: *"Control Room, this is SGT Smith. A CODE RED has been declared. We have a large vehicle explosion in the OCA near the switchyard. One of our OCA Patrols appears down. LLEA has been notified." (This is a Drill Message.)* **EXPECTED ACTION(s):** • Control Room Notification	**CAS Controller:** **Ensure that X 2991 is used for Unit Supervisor.**
T~13 ~0743	**EVENT DESCRIPTION: Control Room Response** • The Control Room implements OS1290.03 (Response to a Security Event), Trips the Reactor, Implements E - 0 (Reactor Trip/Safety Injection). **EXPECTED ACTION(s):** The Control Room will: • WCS will perform OS1290.03 ATTACHMENT B, EMERGENCY PLAN ACTIVATION DURING CODE RED. • Stop RC-P-1D and 1B • Implement applicable emergency operating procedures (EOPs) • Notify Town of Seabrook Fire Dispatch that an attack is imminent or underway, and to be - ON STANDBY	

Timeline: *CFE 14- 05*

T~14 **~0744**	**EVENT DESCRIPTION:** • Using the explosion as a diversion, Adversary teams 1 and 2 initiate their assault on the Protected Area (PA). • Team 1 uses hand carried bulk charges to explosively breach PA Gate 2. • Team 2 initiates suppressive fire on the Defensive Positions in the S/SW corner of the PA while explosively breaching the SOCA & PA fence in the SW corner (Zones 801 & 16) near the Cooling Tower. *DRILL MSG* D.8*:* *(This is a Drill Message.)* Controller: *"You simultaneously receive Intrusion alarms on Zones 801, 16 and Gate 2". (This is a Drill Message.)* **EXPECTED ACTION(s):** • Security maintains a CODE RED condition. SAS operator provides SALE report (size, activity, location, equipment) informing the Control Room of attacks. • Control Room or Security notifies ICP of hostile action occurring at the SWPH.	**Message D.8**

Timeline: *CFE 14- 05*

T~15 **~0745**	• Team 2 reaches the SEPS Diesel Generators and plants explosive devices on the SEPS DG fuel tanks. • Team 1 proceeds to the Service Water Pump house (SWPH). While en route the adversaries target surrounding defensive positions utilizing rocket propelled grenade launchers (RPG). CAS Operator receives report of Security Force Member (SFMs) engagements from the SWPH prior to losing contact with the SFMs. Shortly after, the CAS Operator receives an Intrusion alarm on SW100. *DRILL MSG* D.9*: (This is a Drill Message.)* SFM to CAS: *"Multiple Adversaries in the area of Gate 2 and the Cooling Tower. I'm receiving suppressive fire on my East and West ports".* Followed shortly by "*RPGs impacting the roof*". *(This is a Drill Message.)* *DRILL MSG D.10: (This is a Drill Message.)* Controller to CAS/SAS: *"You receive Intrusion alarm on SW100.".* *(This is a Drill Message.)* **EXPECTED ACTION(s):** • Security maintains a CODE RED condition. SAS operator provides SALE report (size, activity, location, equipment) informing the Control Room of attacks and entry into SWPH. • Control Room or Security notifies ICP of hostile action occurring at the SWPH.	**Message D.9** **Message D.10**

Timeline: *CFE 14- 05*

DEP Opportunity **SAE** **CLASSIFICATION** **HS4** **T ~15** **~0745**	**EVENT DESCRIPTION: Declaration of General Emergency** • The Shift Manager may declare a SITE AREA EMERGENCY at this time, based on HS4, Notification of HOSTILE ACTION within the PROTECTED AREA as directed by OS1290.03 ATTACHMENT D, SITE AREA EMERGENCY ACTIONS DURING CODE RED. • The conditions are met for the ALERT and SAE ECLs at the same time, only the SAE should be declared. Time Recognized _____ Time Declared _____ **EXPECTED ACTION:** Site Area Emergency is Declared and actions of OS1290.03 ATTACHMENT D, SITE AREA EMERGENCY ACTIONS DURING CODE RED are implemented. **Objective: Demonstrate the ability to implement the emergency plan during a HAB event.** **Objective: Demonstrate the ability to classify an emergency during a hostile based drill or exercise** **Objective: Demonstrate the ability to recognize station conditions and parameter trends as emergency plan initiating conditions, and to develop potential solutions for placing the station in a safe, stable condition.**	

Timeline: *CFE 14- 05*

T~16 ~0746	**EVENT DESCRIPTION:** The WCS makes the following announcement over the PA System, and sounds the SPARE alarm: **"This is a Drill Message. *ATTENTION ALL PERSONNEL. A SECURITY EVENT IS IN PROGRESS. CLEAR ALL HALLWAYS AND STOP ALL MOVEMENT UNTIL ADVISED OTHERWISE. TURN OFF ALL RADIOS AND PLACE PAGERS TO VIBRATE MODE. TRESPASSERS MUST HALT IMMEDIATELY OR DEADLY FORCE MAY BE USED." This is a Drill Message*** (Announcement/alarm repeated.) **EXPECTED ACTION(s):** • The Control Room repeats the announcement over the public address system. • All personnel on site clear hallways and stop movement and remain there until directed otherwise by Operations or Security. **Objective:** ***Demonstrate the ability to mobilize the station emergency response organization and activate station emergency response facilities in a timely manner.***	**Unit Supervisor:** **Message D.11**
T~16 ~0746	**EVENT DESCRIPTION:** • The WCS activates the ERO per OS1290.03 ATTACHMENT B, EMERGENCY PLAN ACTIVATION DURING CODE RED. **Objective:** ***Demonstrate the ability to mobilize the station emergency response organization and activate station emergency response facilities in a timely manner.***	

Timeline: *CFE 14- 05*

T~17 ~0747	**EVENT DESCRIPTION:** • SFMs report explosions occurring at SEPS Diesel Generators, sending a large cloud of black smoke into the air. (SEPS-DG-2A is destroyed, SEPS-DG-2B remains undamaged) • Adversary Team 2 is neutralized by SFMs while attempting to make movement into the Waste Process Building. *DRILL MSG D.12: (This is a Drill Message.)* SFM: *"Multiple Adversaries in the area of the Cooling Tower neutralized crossing the 50 yard line. There was an explosion near the SEPS and I see black smoke & fire.". (This is a Drill Message.)* **EXPECTED ACTION(s):** Alarm Station Operator expected to report explosions in the area of the Cooling Tower before reporting adversary neutralization in the area of WPB..	**Message D.12**

Timeline: *CFE 14- 05*

T ~17 **~0747**	**EVENT DESCRIPTION:** • SFMs report a large explosion in SWPH with light smoke coming out of the building. • Adversary team 1 detonates a large satchel charge in the SWPH, damaging SW piping. *DRILL MSG* D.13*: (This is a Drill Message.)* SFM: *"We have explosions occurring inside the SWPH.". (This is a Drill Message.)* • Both Trains of SW swap to the cooling tower due to low service water pump discharge pressure. This results in the cooling tower being pumped to the service water pump house. This condition will result in rising PCCW temperatures and lowering cooling tower level. This will drive the Control Room to secure all service water pumps to maintain cooling tower inventory. • A Train SW piping is severely damaged and will require extensive repair. B Train SW piping has a large hole, that can be repaired. • The loss of service water will necessitate shutting down equipment as Service Water and PCCW Temperatures rise. **EXPECTED ACTION(s):** • SAS notifies Control Room of explosion. • Control Room Implements OS1216.01, Degraded Ultimate Heat Sink and OS1212.01, PCCW SYSTEM MALFUNCTION. • Drive actions to align alternate cooling to charging pump lube oil cooler per OS1002.02, OPERATION OF LETDOWN, CHARGING AND SEAL INJECTION. • Control Room will secure all Service Water and Cooling Tower Pumps resulting in loss of cooling to PCCW.	**Message** D.13

Timeline: *CFE 14- 05*

T~18 ~0748	**EVENT DESCRIPTION:** • SFMs monitor SWPH. *DRILL MSG D.14: (This is a Drill Message.)* SFM: *"We have observation of SW. No activity.". (This is a Drill Message.)* **EXPECTED ACTION(s):** • SFMs maintain observation of SWPH.	**Message D.14**
T~18 ~0748	**EVENT DESCRIPTION:** • The WCS performs an accelerated notification to the NRC Operations Center, per OS1290.03 ATTACHMENT B @ _____. **Objective:** ***Demonstrate the ability to communicate threat-related information to the NRC during a hostile action-based event.*** **Perf Crit.:** ***Perform accelerated notification to the NRC in accordance with appropriate procedures***	**Message** D.15
T~18 ~0748	**EVENT DESCRIPTION:** LLEA arriving on site reports arcing in the high yard on the Southern line. *DRILL MSG* D.16*: (This is a Drill Message.)* SFM to CAS: *" There is a large amount of arcing on the insulators in the high yard for the Southern line". (This is a Drill Message.)* **EXPECTED ACTION:** • Security reports to Control Room arcing on the northern 345 kv line.	**Message** D.16

Timeline: *CFE 14- 05*

DEP Opportunity GE CLASSIFICATION HG1 (HG2) T ~18 ~0748	**EVENT DESCRIPTION: Declaration of General Emergency** • The Shift Manager **may** declare a General Emergency at this time, based on HG1, Security Event Resulting In Loss of Physical Control as directed by OS1290.03 ATTACHMENT E, GENERAL EMERGENCY ACTIONS DURING CODE RED. • This classification is based upon loss of physical control of the facility, which may not be recongized at this time. • This classification may also be based on the Judgement of the STED/ SED. Time Recognized _____ Time Declared _____ **EXPECTED ACTION:** General Emergency is Declared and actions of OS1290.03 ATTACHMENT E, GENERAL EMERGENCY ACTIONS DURING CODE RED are implemented. **Objective: Demonstrate the ability to implement the emergency plan during a HAB event.** **Objective: Demonstrate the ability to classify an emergency during a hostile based drill or exercise** **Objective: Demonstrate the ability to recognize station conditions and parameter trends as emergency plan initiating conditions, and to develop potential solutions for placing the station in a safe, stable condition.**	
T ~28 ~0758	**CR Lead Controller:** If no emergency declaration has been made AND is not pending, the Shift Manager will be directed to declare a General Emergency based on HG1. Contingency time is based on 15 minutes from the notification of HOSTILE ACTION within the protected area.	**Message** D.17
	INITIAL SWEEP PHASE *(30-60 min)*	
T ~30 ~0800	**EVENT DESCRIPTION:** PAR Identification • Control Room identifies PARs for EPZ. **EXPECTED ACTION(s):** • Control Room correctly identifies PAR Group A, wind direction from 168 – 281.4.	

Timeline: *CFE 14- 05*

T ~30 **~0800**	**EVENT DESCRIPTION:** Recommendation to Implement KI plans for the general public (and emergency workers) **EXPECTED ACTION(s):** • Control Room correctly identifies the recommendation to Implement KI plans for the general public.	
T ~30 **~0800**	**EVENT DESCRIPTION:** • Security Officers surround SWPH. **EXPECTED ACTION(s):** • Security officers maintain perimeter on SWPH.	
	EVENT DESCRIPTION: Data Validation Verify Notification was made within 15 minutes ☐Yes ☐ No	
	Declaration Time:	
	Notification Time:	
T ~35 **~0805**	**EVENT DESCRIPTION:** Security reports that all known adversaries have been neutralized or contained in Service Water Pumphouse. *DRILL MSG* **D.18***: (This is a Drill Message.)* Controller: *" Seven total adversaries confirmed neutralized two are contained in the SWPH at this time. Status unknown. We have 2 wounded Security Force Member in need of immediate medical attention on the roof.". (This is a Drill Message.)* **EXPECTED ACTION:** • Security reports to Control Room and ICP that all known adversaries neutralized or contained in the SWPH. • SFMs maintain a 360° watch from their firing positions. • Security coordinates with Control Room and ICP to preserve the crime scene to the extent possible.	**Message D.18**

Timeline: *CFE 14- 05*

T~35 **~0805**	**EVENT DESCRIPTION:** A SBK resident makes report to Seabrook PD, noted that when he was leaving for fishing this morning a group of men were leaving from the Farm Lane Boat launch in two boats. They had guns and packs with them. *DRILL MSG **D.19**: (This is a Drill Message.)* Controller: *" Person called Seabrook Police, reported that when he was leaving for fishing this morning a group of men were leaving from the Farm Lane Boat launch in two boats. They had guns and packs with them. One of their vehicles is still there.". (This is a Drill Message.)* **EXPECTED ACTIONS:** • Incident Commander: o Incident Commander coordinates the necessary support to investigate this report.	**Message D.19**
T~36 **~0806**	**EVENT DESCRIPTION:** Security, with input from the Control Room, discusses the attack with ICP. Immediate needs and radiation protection requirements are reviewed with Incident Commander. **EXPECTED ACTIONS:** • Security: o Maintains onsite protective measures (cover). o Requests LLEA sweep of Owner Controlled Area. o Requests medical care for 3 wounded SFMs, 2 of which require immediate medical attention. o Coordinates perimeter control and site access restrictions with LLEA. o Requests Explosives and Ordinates Disposal (EOD) Team to mitigate undetonated explosives that may have been left behind in areas traversed by adversaries. • Control Room: o Requests EMS for injured personnel. o Requests Fire Response for SEPS DG o Requests Security support to enable safe limited movement for assessments of plant damage, and with associated Health Physics support.	

Timeline: *CFE 14- 05*

	○ May discuss possible establishment of fire service water cooling to charging pump lube oil cooler. • Incident Commander: ○ Incident Commander and Security coordinate the necessary support. **Objective:** ***Demonstrate the ability of on-shift Operations and Security personnel to coordinate response actions among themselves, and with the Incident Commander and local law enforcement agency (LLEA) personnel.*** **Objective:** ***Demonstrate the ability of on-shift Operations and Security personnel to coordinate with the Incident Commander for deployment of on-site and offsite first-responders in a post-attack environment***	
T~36	**EVENT DESCRIPTION: Security Support of NSO movement to PAB** • At this time Security can support movement of NSO to PAB to align cooling for CS-P-2B. **EXPECTED ACTION:** • SFM escort or safe travel path provided to NSO by Security.	
T~40 **~0810**	**EVENT DESCRIPTION:** Security reports arcing in the high yard on the Southern line. *DRILL MSG D.20: (This is a Drill Message.)* SFM to CAS: *" There is a large amount of arcing on the insulators in the high yard". (This is a Drill Message.)* **EXPECTED ACTION:** • Security reports to Control Room arcing on the northern 345 kv line.	**Message D.20**

Timeline: *CFE 14- 05*

T ~40 **~0810**	**EVENT DESCRIPTION:** ERDS will be activated as directed by OS1290.03. **EXPECTED ACTION:** The Control Room activates ERDS using a computer monitor in accordance with OS1290.03. Time ERDS is activated:_____ **Objective:** *Demonstrate the ability to perform timely and accurate NRC notification.*	
DEP Opportunity **GE / SAE** **NOTIFICATION** **HG1 / HS4** **T ~43** **~0805**	**EVENT DESCRIPTION:** State Notification **EXPECTED ACTION:** • The WCS develops notifies the states within 15 minutes of DECLARATION per OS1290.03. • This notification is based upon T=0 for the SAE. (Per ER 1.2, Notification should be made of the higher level ECL) (NEI) Record time of contact with first state: (NRC) Record time both states have been notified: **Objective: Demonstrate the ability to notify offsite response agencies during a hostile based drill or exercise.** **Objective: Demonstrate the ability to make a protective action recommendation offsite during a hostile based drill or exercise**	
T ~45 **~0815**	**EVENT DESCRIPTION:** NRC Notification. **EXPECTED ACTION:** NRC headquarters operations center is notified per OS1290.03. Time NRC is notified:_____ **Objective:** ***Demonstrate the ability to communicate threat-related information to the NRC during a hostile action-based event.***	

Timeline: *CFE 14- 05*

T~50 **~0820**	**EVENT DESCRIPTION:** Loss of Offsite Power • Due to debris from prior explosion damaging insulator in high yard, the Ward Hill line (394) trips on line faults. Resulting in loss of offsite power. • Both Diesel Generator Start and load Buses 5 & 6 • SEPS 2A is unavailable, SEPS DG-2B starts. **EXPECTED ACTION(s):** Control Room Implements actions in E.0 to restore power to emergency busses from an offsite source.	
T~51 **~0821**	**EVENT DESCRIPTION:** Control Room Considerations • Diesel Generators will be running without cooling water. This condition is not described by station procedures and will require Engineering input in order to plan Diesel Generator use. • High Temperature alarms will be actuated if running without full cooling. **EXPECTED ACTION(s):** • Control Room Requests guidance on use of Diesel Generators.	
When requested and support available.	**EVENT DESCRIPTION:** Align Alternate Cooling to Charging Pump 2B • Diesel Generators will be running without cooling water. This condition is not described by station procedures and will require Engineering input in order to plan Diesel Generator use. **EXPECTED ACTION(s):** • Control Room Requests guidance on use of Diesel Generators.	

Timeline: *CFE 14- 05*

T~55 ~0825	**EVENT DESCRIPTION:** Offsite first responders continue staging (at Staging Area), awaiting additional response direction from ICP. **EXPECTED ACTION:** • ICP continues discussion and decision-making necessary to support deployment of offsite response assets and ERO movement and mobilization. • LLEA continues initial sweep of Owner Controlled Area. • Security continues initial sweep of PA and OCA, and coordination of limited movement within PA.	
ERO MOBILIZATION PHASE *(30-60 min)*		
DEP Opportunity GE CLASSIFICATION SG1 T ~58 (when applicable) ~0828	**EVENT DESCRIPTION: Declaration of General Emergency** • **IF** diesel generators are secured with a loss of offsite power, the Shift Manager will declare a General Emergency, based on SG1, Prolonged loss of both AC emergency buses. • This classification will not be made if GE declared under HG1. Time Recognized _____ Time Declared _____ **EXPECTED ACTION:** General Emergency is Declared and actions of OS1290.03 ATTACHMENT E, GENERAL EMERGENCY ACTIONS DURING CODE RED are implemented. **Objective: Demonstrate the ability to implement the emergency plan during a HAB event.** **Objective: Demonstrate the ability to classify an emergency during a hostile based drill or exercise** **Objective: Demonstrate the ability to recognize station conditions and parameter trends as emergency plan initiating conditions, and to develop potential solutions for placing the station in a safe, stable condition.**	

Timeline: *CFE 14- 05*

DEP Opportunity **GE** **NOTIFICATION** **SG1 / HS4** **T ~ 15 min after declaration**	**EVENT DESCRIPTION:** State Notification **EXPECTED ACTION:** • The WCS develops notifies the states within 15 minutes of DECLARATION per OS1290.03. • This notification is based upon T=0 for the Loss of AC power. • Notification not required if GE not declared. (NEI) Record time of contact with first state: (NRC) Record time both states have been notified: **Objective: Demonstrate the ability to notify offsite response agencies during a hostile based drill or exercise.** **Objective: Demonstrate the ability to make a protective action recommendation offsite during a hostile based drill or exercise**	
T~60 **~0830**	**EVENT DESCRIPTION:** LLEA coordinates with Security on safe travel paths to/from the PA. LLEA Coordinates with Security on tacking back SWPH. **EXPECTED ACTION:** • Security maintains onsite protective measures (cover). • Security coordinates with LLEA Tactical Units on course of action to deal with barricaded adversaries (2) in SWPH. • LLEA investigative branch works on developing leads in reference to the SBK resident report of suspicious activities observed earlier in the day. • Security establishes safe and/or protected areas and routes to/from PA for necessary troubleshooting and repair activities. • Safe and/or protected routes of travel have been established out of the PA and OCA by Security and LLEA to enable PA evacuation and accountability. • Coordination of EMS for wounded SFMs, FBI/crime scene investigation, and EOD for undetonated explosives. **Objective: Demonstrate the ability of the Emergency Response Organization (ERO) to coordinate in-plant and on-site response actions with Security and the Incident Command Post (ICP).** **Objective: As appropriate to the scenario, coordinate deployment of fire and medical response resources between the ICP, on-site ERO facilities, and Security.**	

Timeline: *CFE 14- 05*

T~70 **~0840**	**EVENT DESCRIPTION:** The SED (ERO still forming at EOF), in concert with the STED, Security, and the ICP, will likely be coordinating with Operations and Maintenance personnel to conduct an initial investigation of damaged plant equipment and render opinions on its repair. But it is anticipated that the ERO will coordinate repair teams from the Alternative OSC for the major equipment repair operations. **EXPECTED ACTION:** Onsite Operations and Maintenance personnel should communicate the need for **REPAIR TEAMS** to Control Room, who relays the need to available ERO facilities and ICP.	

Timeline: *CFE 14- 05*

T~71 **~0841**	**EVENT DESCRIPTION:** The STED turns over to the SED, and the ATSC, AOSC, and EOF are fully staffed and activated, IAW ER 3.1, ER 3.2, ER and 3.3. *(NOTE: For purposes of this Exercise, designated personnel will respond. If this were an actual emergency, all available ERO personnel would respond, and ongoing 24-hour ERO coverage would be established along with current facility activation.)* Alternative TSC activated: _____ Alternative OSC activated: _____ EOF activated: _____ **EXPECTED ACTION:** • Communication established between EOF, TSC, ICP, and CR. • ERO members initiate applicable portions of applicable ER procedures: o The SED is in charge of overall emergency response. o SED contacts Control Room and receive report on plant and personnel conditions. o EOF assumes communications from Control Room as soon as possible. o TSC will designate a Site Emergency Director as the Operations Liaison to the SCC and the OSC will designate an available RP tech as the SCC Liaison. After being briefed, they will be dispatched to the ICP. **Objective: Demonstrate the ability of the Emergency Response Organization (ERO) to support operation of an Incident Command Post (ICP).** **Objective: Demonstrate the ability of the ERO to activate alternative facilities**	

Timeline: *CFE 14- 05*

T~71 **~0841**	**EVENT DESCRIPTION:** The JIC is staffed and activated at the EOF, IAW ER 3.5. JIC activated: _____ **EXPECTED ACTION:** • State, federal, and company PIOs arrive and integrate into JIC operations. • Press releases are accurate, and are vetted for sensitive and safeguards information prior issuance. • Media line updated appropriate to available information. • Joint Information Center will designate an SCC Liaison. After being briefed, they will be dispatched to the ICP. **Objective:** ***Demonstrate the ability of the ERO to coordinate the development and release of public information in a post-attack environment.***	
T~90 **~0900**	**EVENT DESCRIPTION:** Radiation Protection measures determined between ERO, HP, and ICP, with assistance of state agencies. • Dosimetry provided by the State of New Hampshire to ORO at staging area. • Dosimetry provided by Seabrook Station to ICP. **Objective:** ***Demonstrate the ability to coordinate implementation of on-site radiation protection measures for offsite first-responders with the ICP.***	
T~95 **~0905**	**EVENT DESCRIPTION:** Security completes PA accountability, and presents it to Control Room. **EXPECTED ACTION:** • Personnel Search and Rescue will be initiated when possible of any missing PA personnel. Scenario does not include any missing personnel. • Security is maintaining safe cordons for personnel to exit and travel within the PA. • LLEA is ensuring safe passage on the South Access Road and via traffic control points to the staging area. • Non-essentials will remain at the Offsite Holding Area until released by FBI/LLEA. **Objective:** ***Demonstrate the ability to account for on-site personnel in a post-attack environment.***	

Timeline: *CFE 14- 05*

T~95 **~0905**	**EVENT DESCRIPTION:** ICP executes plan to extract barricaded subjects in SWPH. **EXPECTED ACTION:** ICP will coordinate with LLEA to extract / neutralize adversaries in SWPH. The Control Room should impress upon the ICP the need to evaluate the status of Service Water in order to restore Service	
T~100 **~0910**	**EVENT DESCRIPTION:** First New Briefing During first News Briefing, ask questions in Message	**Message** D.22
T~100 **~0910**	**EVENT DESCRIPTION:** Requested offsite first responders (EMS, EOD, etc.) enter PA and commence operations under the direction of Security and the ICP.	
T~130 **~0940**	**EVENT DESCRIPTION: REPAIR TEAMS** are briefed at AOSC, and begin escorted/protected travel to plant. **Objective:** ***Demonstrate the ability to coordinate mobilization of the Emergency Response Organization (ERO) with Security and the ICP.***	
T~150 **~1000**	**EVENT DESCRIPTION:** EOD completes initial sweep of the PA near gate 2 through SWPH to detect explosive ordinance.	
T~160 **~1010**	**EVENT DESCRIPTION:** Crime scene team(s) continue to coordinate with EMS, Fire, and Security to gain access to the crime scene. Crime scene investigators conduct investigation in the PA. This consists of collecting evidence prior to allowing repair team activity at the SWPH.	
T~160 **~1010**	**EVENT DESCRIPTION:** Repair Teams arrive on site, where safe travel has been coordinated to SEPS and SWPH (if/when verified no hazard due to undetonated explosives). They make their assessments, and begin to formulate success paths to respective equipment restoration. **EXPECTED ACTION:** • Maintenance welding of eventual B Train Service Water piping repair will governed by work order.	
T~195 **~1035**	**EVENT DESCRIPTION:** Service Water Pump House Repair Team reports that repair to the A Train Service Water piping will take at least a week, and B-Service Water train can be restored with within 12 hrs.	

Timeline: *CFE 14- 05*

T~200 **~1040**	**EVENT DESCRIPTION:** Exercise is terminated when objectives are satisfied. **EXPECTED ACTION:** Termination message is sent to the State and counties.	**Message** D.23 **Message** D.24

Timeline: *CFE 14- 05*



Timeline: *CFE 14- 05*

Seabrook Station State Notification Fact Sheet

Time Notification Initiated: NH *0744 - 0813* **MA** *0744 - 0813*

Block 1: This is: *Name* (Name) *WCS* (Title) **at Seabrook Station.**

Block 2:

Time Declared:		OR	Time Terminated:
0743 - 0758	[ ] Unusual Event [ ] Alert [X] Site Area Emergency [ ] General Emergency		

Block 3: The emergency initiating condition is *HS4*.

DEP ER2.0B SAE

Block 4: We recommend the following protective actions:

[ ] None [X] As follows

New Hampshire

ERPA	Town	Shelter	Evacuate
A.	Seabrook	[ ]	[ ]
	Hampton Falls	[ ]	[ ]
C.	Kensington	[ ]	[ ]
	S. Hampton	[ ]	[ ]
D.	Hampton	[ ]	[ ]
	N. Hampton	[ ]	[ ]
F.	Brentwood	[ ]	[ ]
	E. Kingston	[ ]	[ ]
	Exeter	[ ]	[ ]
	Newfields	[ ]	[ ]
	Newton	[ ]	[ ]
	Kingston	[ ]	[ ]
G.	Greenland	[ ]	[ ]
	Stratham	[ ]	[ ]
	Rye	[ ]	[ ]
	New Castle	[ ]	[ ]
	Portsmouth	[ ]	[ ]

Massachusetts

ERPA	Town	Shelter	Evacuate
B.	Amesbury	[ ]	[ ]
	Salisbury	[ ]	[ ]
E.	Merrimac	[ ]	[ ]
	Newburyport	[ ]	[ ]
	Newbury	[ ]	[ ]
	West Newbury	[ ]	[ ]

Beaches
Evacuate
[ ] Seabrook Beach
[ ] Hampton Beach

Close
[ ] Parker River National Wildlife Refuge
[ ] Plum Island Beach
[ ] Salisbury Beach

Potassium Iodide (General Emergency only)
[ ] Implement KI plans for the general public

Block 5: A radiological release
[X] Has not occurred
[ ] Has occurred and is continuing
[ ] Occurred but has been terminated

Block 6: Authorized by: *Name* (STED / SED / RM) *11/5/14* (Date) *0743-0800* (Time)

Block 7: Acknowledge receipt of this message with your name.

New Hampshire: *New Hampshire* (Name of Dispatcher) **Massachusetts:** *Massachusetts* (Name of Dispatcher)

Time Notification Initiated: NH *0744 - 0758* **MA** *0744 - 0813*

Seabrook Station State Notification Fact Sheet

Block 1: This is: *Name* (Name) *WCS* (Title) **at Seabrook Station.**

Block 2:

Time Declared:		OR	Time Terminated:
0743 - 0758	[ ] Unusual Event [ ] Alert [ ] Site Area Emergency [X] General Emergency		

Block 3: The emergency initiating condition is *HG1 (HG2)*.

DEP ER2.0B GE

Block 4: We recommend the following protective actions:

[ ] None [X] As follows

New Hampshire

ERPA	Town	Shelter	Evacuate
A.	Seabrook	[ ]	[X]
	Hampton Falls	[ ]	[X
C.	Kensington	[X]	[ ]
	S. Hampton	[X]	[ ]
D.	Hampton	[ ]	[X]
	N. Hampton	[ ]	[X]
F.	Brentwood	[X]	[ ]
	E. Kingston	[X]	[ ]
	Exeter	[X]	[ ]
	Newfields	[X]	[ ]
	Newton	[X]	[ ]
	Kingston	[X]	[ ]
G.	Greenland	[X]	[ ]
	Stratham	[X]	[ ]
	Rye	[X]	[ ]
	New Castle	[X]	[ ]
	Portsmouth	[X]	[ ]

Massachusetts

ERPA	Town	Shelter	Evacuate
B.	Amesbury	[X]	[ ]
	Salisbury	[X]	[ ]
E.	Merrimac	[X]	[ ]
	Newburyport	[X]	[ ]
	Newbury	[X]	[ ]
	West Newbury	[X]	[ ]

Beaches
Evacuate
[X] Seabrook Beach
[X] Hampton Beach

Close
[X] Parker River National Wildlife Refuge
[X] Plum Island Beach
[X] Salisbury Beach

Potassium Iodide (General Emergency only)
[X] Implement KI plans for the general public

Block 5: A radiological release
[X] Has not occurred
[ ] Has occurred and is continuing
[ ] Occurred but has been terminated

Block 6: Authorized by: *Name* (STED / SED / RM) *11/5/14* (Date) *0743-0800* (Time)

Block 7: Acknowledge receipt of this message with your name.

New Hampshire: *New Hampshire* (Name of Dispatcher) **Massachusetts:** *Massachusetts* (Name of Dispatcher)

D. Messages

SEABROOK STATION
CONTROLLER MESSAGE

CFE 14- 05 November 5, 2014

TO: Control Room Personnel

MESSAGE NO.: D.1

FROM: Drill Manager

TIME: ~0730

LOCATION: Simulator Control Room

THIS IS A DRILL

The drill date is simulated as Saturday, November 5, 2014.

On-site personnel are limited to the normal weekday compliment. Current reactor power is 100%. Reactor core power history since the completion of OR-15 is Average Burnup = 10,000 MWD/MTU and Effective Full Power Days = 257. All plant parameters are normal except for those identified below.

THIS IS A DRILL
DO NOT INITIATE ACTIONS AFFECTING STATION OPERATION

SEABROOK STATION
CONTROLLER MESSAGE

CFE 14- 05 November 5, 2014

TO: Non-Control Room Personnel

MESSAGE NO.: D.2

FROM: Drill Manager

TIME: Upon Arrival

LOCATION: Emergency Response Facilities

THIS IS A DRILL

The drill date is simulated as Saturda, November 5, 2014.

On-site personnel are limited to the normal weekday compliment. Current reactor power is 100%. Reactor core power history since the completion of OR-15 is Average Burnup = 10,000 MWD/MTU and Effective Full Power Days = 257. All plant parameters are normal except for those identified below.

THIS IS A DRILL

DO NOT INITIATE ACTIONS AFFECTING STATION OPERATION

SEABROOK STATION
CONTROLLER MESSAGE

CFE 14- 05 November 5, 2014

TO: Plant Unit Supervisor (CR)

MESSAGE NO.: D.3

FROM: CR Lead Controller

TIME: 0730

LOCATION: CR

THIS IS A DRILL

MESSAGE:

Notify Site personnel as follows:

a. Ensure Gaitronics night muting is off.

b. Using the Gaitronics override, make the following announcement:

"ATTENTION ALL PERSONNEL. AN EMERGENCY RESPONSE ORGANIZATION DRILL HAS COMMENCED. NON-PARTICIPANT PERSONNEL DISREGARD ALL DRILL RELATED ALARMS AND ANNOUNCEMENTS."

c. Using the Gaitronics override, repeat the announcement.

THIS IS A DRILL
DO NOT INITIATE ACTIONS AFFECTING STATION OPERATION

SEABROOK STATION
CONTROLLER MESSAGE

CFE 14- 05 November 5, 2014

TO: CAS

MESSAGE NO.: D.4

FROM: Guard Island

TIME: ~0737

LOCATION: CAS

THIS IS A DRILL

MESSAGE:

We picked up a white van speeding down the North Access road before parking on the north side of the road, east of the checkpoint.

THIS IS A DRILL
DO NOT INITIATE ACTIONS AFFECTING STATION OPERATION

SEABROOK STATION
CONTROLLER MESSAGE

CFE 14- 05 November 5, 2014

TO: Central Alarm Station

MESSAGE NO.: D.5

FROM: OCA Patrol

TIME: ~0740

LOCATION: CAS

THIS IS A DRILL

MESSAGE:

CODE GRAY, the white van took off heading toward Alpha Lot. No license plates visible. Standby for further information.

THIS IS A DRILL
DO NOT INITIATE ACTIONS AFFECTING STATION OPERATION

SEABROOK STATION
CONTROLLER MESSAGE

CFE 14- 05 November 5, 2014

TO: Central Alarm Station

MESSAGE NO.: D.6

FROM: OCA Patrol

TIME: ~0740

LOCATION: CAS

THIS IS A DRILL

MESSAGE:

I have visual on white van. He's stopped by the VBS under the highlines.

[redacted]

THIS IS A DRILL

DO NOT INITIATE ACTIONS AFFECTING STATION OPERATION

SEABROOK STATION
CONTROLLER MESSAGE

CFE 14- 05 November 5, 2014

TO: CAS Operator

MESSAGE NO.: D.7

FROM: CAS Controller

TIME: ~0741

LOCATION: CAS

THIS IS A DRILL

MESSAGE:

You hear/see a large explosion. OCA patrol appears damaged on camera and is non-responsive on radio

THIS IS A DRILL
DO NOT INITIATE ACTIONS AFFECTING STATION OPERATION

SEABROOK STATION
CONTROLLER MESSAGE

CFE 14- 05 November 5, 2014

TO: CAS / SAS

MESSAGE NO.: D.8

FROM: CAS Controller

TIME: ~0744

LOCATION: Simulator

THIS IS A DRILL

MESSAGE:

You simultaneously receive Intrusion alarms on Zones 801, 16 and Gate 2.

THIS IS A DRILL

DO NOT INITIATE ACTIONS AFFECTING STATION OPERATION

SEABROOK STATION
CONTROLLER MESSAGE

CFE 14- 05 November 5, 2014

TO: CAS / SAS

MESSAGE NO.: D.9

FROM: SFM

TIME:~0745

LOCATION: CAS/SAS

THIS IS A DRILL

MESSAGE:

"Multiple Adversaries in the area of Gate 2 and the Cooling Tower. I'm receiving suppressive fire on my East and West ports."

after a few seconds report the following:

"RPGs impacting the roof."

THIS IS A DRILL
DO NOT INITIATE ACTIONS AFFECTING STATION OPERATION

SEABROOK STATION
CONTROLLER MESSAGE

CFE 14- 05 November 5, 2014

TO: CAS /SAS

MESSAGE NO.: D.10

FROM: CAS Controller

TIME: ~0745

LOCATION: CAS

THIS IS A DRILL

MESSAGE:

You receive Intrusion alarm on SW100.

THIS IS A DRILL
DO NOT INITIATE ACTIONS AFFECTING STATION OPERATION

SEABROOK STATION
CONTROLLER MESSAGE

CFE 14- 05 November 5, 2014

TO: Plant Unit Supervisor (CR)

MESSAGE NO.: D.11

FROM: Drill Manager

TIME:~0746

LOCATION: CR (Sim)

THIS IS A DRILL

Notify Site personnel as follows:

a. Ensure Gaitronics night muting is off.
b. Place telephone page lockout to ON
c. Sound the Plant Security Alarm by pressing the button for the **Spare Alarm**.
d. Using the Gaitronics override, make the following announcement:

   THIS IS A DRILL MESSAGE

   "ATTENTION ALL PERSONNEL. A SECURITY EVENT IS IN PROGRESS. CLEAR ALL HALLWAYS AND STOP ALL MOVEMENT UNTIL ADVISED OTHERWISE. TURN OFF ALL RADIOS AND PLACE PAGERS TO VIBRATE MODE. TRESPASSERS MUST HALT IMMEDIATELY OR DEADLY FORCE MAY BE USED."

   THIS IS A DRILL MESSAGE

e. Repeat the Plant Security Alarm.
f. Repeat the Gaitronics announcement.

THIS IS A DRILL
DO NOT INITIATE ACTIONS AFFECTING STATION OPERATION

SEABROOK STATION
CONTROLLER MESSAGE

CFE 14- 05 November 5, 2014

MESSAGE NO.: D.12

TO: CAS / SAS

FROM: SFM **TIME:** ~0747

LOCATION: CAS

THIS IS A DRILL

MESSAGE:

Multiple Adversaries in the area of the Cooling Tower neutralized crossing the 50 yard line. There was an explosion near the SEPS generators and I see black smoke & fire.

THIS IS A DRILL
DO NOT INITIATE ACTIONS AFFECTING STATION OPERATION

SEABROOK STATION
CONTROLLER MESSAGE

CFE 14- 05 November 5, 2014

TO: CAS /SAS

MESSAGE NO.: D.13

FROM: CAS Controller

TIME: ~0747

LOCATION: CAS

THIS IS A DRILL

"We have explosions occurring inside the SWPH."

THIS IS A DRILL

DO NOT INITIATE ACTIONS AFFECTING STATION OPERATION

SEABROOK STATION
CONTROLLER MESSAGE

CFE 14- 05 November 5, 2014

TO: CAS / SAS

FROM: SFM

LOCATION: CAS

MESSAGE NO.: D.14

TIME: ~0748

THIS IS A DRILL

MESSAGE:

We have observation of SW. No activity.

THIS IS A DRILL
DO NOT INITIATE ACTIONS AFFECTING STATION OPERATION

SEABROOK STATION
CONTROLLER MESSAGE

CFE 14- 05 November 5, 2014

TO: WCS

FROM: CR Controller

LOCATION: Simulator

MESSAGE NO: D.15

TIME: ~0748

THIS IS A DRILL

MESSAGE:

Perform accelerated NRC Notification using the FTS handset phone. IF this phone is not operable, THEN use a commercial line. The numbers below can be used for either phone
:
• 1-(301) 816-5100 (Primary)
- OR -
• 1-(301) 951-0550 (Back-Up)

1) When the NRC Headquarters Operations Officer (HOO) answers the phone, announce the following:

   • This is _____ (name) calling from Seabrook Station notifying the NRC of an onsite security threat.

   • The authentication code is _____ (daily code).

2) Upon NRC confirmation of the authentication code, provide the following information:

   • If determined, state the emergency classification,

   • Brief description of the nature of the threat,

   ☐ Type of threat/attack

   ☐ Threat/attack status (i.e., imminent, in progress, repelled)

THIS IS A DRILL
DO NOT INITIATE ACTIONS AFFECTING STATION OPERATION

SEABROOK STATION
CONTROLLER MESSAGE

CFE 14- 05 November 5, 2014

TO: CAS/SAS

FROM: LLEA

LOCATION: CAS/SAS

MESSAGE NO: D.16

TIME: ~0810

THIS IS A DRILL

MESSAGE:

There is a large amount of arcing on the insulators in the high yard for the Southern line.

THIS IS A DRILL
DO NOT INITIATE ACTIONS AFFECTING STATION OPERATION

SEABROOK STATION
CONTROLLER MESSAGE

CFE 14- 05 November 5, 2014

TO: Control Room and TSC

MESSAGE NO:D.17

FROM: CR Controller / TSC controller

TIME:~0758

LOCATION: Control Room / TSC

THIS IS A DRILL

Inform the Facility Lead Controller and Drill Manager if this message is passed.

Deliver the following message if a General Emergency has not been declared by this time.

T-0 time starts when explosions reported in SWPH.

MESSAGE:

Declare a General Emergency at this time in accordance with OS1290.03, Response To Security Event.

Initiating Condition is HG1, Security Event Resulting In Loss Of Physical Control Of The Facility.

THIS IS A DRILL

DO NOT INITIATE ACTIONS AFFECTING STATION OPERATION

SEABROOK STATION
CONTROLLER MESSAGE

CFE 14- 05 November 5, 2014

TO: Control Room / SCC

FROM: SCC Security Lead

LOCATION: SCC

MESSAGE NO: D.18

TIME: ~0805

THIS IS A DRILL

MESSAGE:

Seven total adversaries confirmed neutralized two are contained in the SWPH at this time. Status unknown. We have 2 wounded Security Force Member in need immediate medical attention on the roof.

THIS IS A DRILL
DO NOT INITIATE ACTIONS AFFECTING STATION OPERATION

SEABROOK STATION
CONTROLLER MESSAGE

CFE 14- 05 November 5, 2014

TO: Seabrook Police Rep at ICP

MESSAGE NO.: D.19

FROM: ICP Controller

TIME: ~0805

LOCATION: ICP

THIS IS A DRILL

MESSAGE:

Person called Seabrook Police, reported that when he was leaving for fishing this morning a group of men were leaving from the Farm Lane Boat launch in two boats. They had guns and packs with them. One of their vehicles is still there.

Figure D-1 - Farmers Lane Boat Launch

THIS IS A DRILL

DO NOT INITIATE ACTIONS AFFECTING STATION OPERATION

SEABROOK STATION
CONTROLLER MESSAGE

CFE 14- 05 November 5, 2014

THIS IS A DRILL

DO NOT INITIATE ACTIONS AFFECTING STATION OPERATION

SEABROOK STATION
CONTROLLER MESSAGE

CFE 14- 05 November 5, 2014

TO: CAS/SAS

MESSAGE NO: D.20

FROM: SFM

TIME: ~0810

LOCATION: CAS/SAS

THIS IS A DRILL

MESSAGE:

There is a large amount of arcing on the insulators in the high yard for the Southern line.

THIS IS A DRILL
DO NOT INITIATE ACTIONS AFFECTING STATION OPERATION

SEABROOK STATION
CONTROLLER MESSAGE

CFE 14- 05 November 5, 2014

TO: Shift Manager

MESSAGE NO: D.21

FROM: Control Room Lead Controller

TIME: ~0748

LOCATION: Simulator Control Room

THIS IS A DRILL

When notified that a General Emergency has been declared, notify the Unit Supervisor to deliver the following message.

MESSAGE:

Notify Site personnel as follows:

a. Ensure Gaitronics night muting is off.

b. Sound the plant emergency alarm.

c. Using the Gaitronics override, make the following announcement:

THIS IS A DRILL MESSAGE

"ATTENTION ALL PERSONNEL. A GENERAL EMERGENCY HAS BEEN DECLARED. ALL PERSONNEL WITH GENERAL EMERGENCY DUTIES REPORT TO YOUR ASSIGNED LOCATIONS. ALL NON-ASSIGNED PERSONNEL EVACUATE THE SITE TO YOUR HOME."

THIS IS A DRILL MESSAGE

d. Repeat the plant emergency alarm.

e. Using the Gaitronics override, repeat the announcement.

THIS IS A DRILL
DO NOT INITIATE ACTIONS AFFECTING STATION OPERATION

SEABROOK STATION
CONTROLLER MESSAGE

CFE 14- 05 November 5, 2014

TO: Shift Manager

MESSAGE NO: D.22

FROM: Control Room Lead Controller

TIME: ~0910

LOCATION: Simulator Control Room

THIS IS A DRILL

As News Media, ask the following questions during the briefing;

The black smoke that is blowing thoroughout the area, is that burning radioactive material?

What is FEMA's role in the response to these events?

If PARs have been issued by this time ask why it was recommended to issue KI?

THIS IS A DRILL
DO NOT INITIATE ACTIONS AFFECTING STATION OPERATION

SEABROOK STATION
CONTROLLER MESSAGE

CFE 14- 05 November 5, 2014

TO: All Drill Participants

FROM: Drill Controllers

LOCATION: All Facilities

MESSAGE NO: D.23

TIME: When Directed

THIS IS A DRILL

MESSAGE:

DRILL ACTIVITIES HAVE BEEN TERMINATED

A post-drill critique of facility performance will begin in approximately 20 minutes. This critique will be facilitated by the Facility Lead Controller. You should complete the following actions prior to the start of the critique.

1. Restore your work area to the original state of readiness.
2. Save ALL materials for review.
3. Conduct a self-critique with the other players in your functional/work area. Refer to the Drill/Exercise Critique Review Points handout for topics to consider.
4. Each functional area should designate a spokesperson to present the self-critique results during the facility critique.

[redacted]

5. Controllers will caucus in a separate area and summarize their observations. Keep this meeting brief and focus on the more significant issues.

As directed by the Lead Controller, the designated spokespersons will present the self-critique comments for each functional/work area. Other players may offer comments after the spokesperson is done.

Controllers will give their comments following the players.

Document drill comments on EP-AA-101-1000-F03, Typical Drill / Exercise Comment Form, and provide the completed form to a controller.

THIS IS A DRILL

DO NOT INITIATE ACTIONS AFFECTING STATION OPERATION

SEABROOK STATION
CONTROLLER MESSAGE

CFE 14- 05 November 5, 2014

TO: Plant Unit Supervisor (CR)

MESSAGE NO.: D.24

FROM: TSC Lead Controller

TIME: : ~ 1430

LOCATION: CR

THIS IS A DRILL

MESSAGE:

Notify Site personnel as follows:

a. Ensure Gaitronics night muting is off.
b. Using the Gaitronics override, make the following announcement:

"ATTENTION ALL PERSONNEL. THE EMERGENCY RESPONSE ORGANIZATION DRILL HAS BEEN TERMINATED. REGARD ALL FURTHER ALARMS AND ANNOUNCEMENTS."

c. Using the Gaitronics override, repeat the announcement.

THIS IS A DRILL
DO NOT INITIATE ACTIONS AFFECTING STATION OPERATION

E. Mini-Scenarios

SEABROOK STATION
MINI-SCENARIO

CFE 14- 05 November 5, 2014

MINI-SCENARIO E.1

CONTROL CELL INSTRUCTIONS FOR EXTERNAL ERO INTERFACE SIMULATIONS

I. General Instructions and Comments

A. The following information should be used as a basis for simulating responses.

B. Controllers may add to, delete from or otherwise modify any of the following information in response to player actions as deemed appropriate.

C. Controllers should thorough hly acquaint themselves with any referenced documents and forms prior to the drill.

II. NRC Emergency Notification System (ENS)

A. **Start Time:** Approximately 0830 -0900

B. **ERO Contact:** STED/WCS and Operations Technician/ENS Communicator

C. **Contact Location:** Control Room and TSC

D. **Form Used to Record Data:** ER 2.0D

E. **Topic(s) Discussed:**

1. Information/entries on Form ER 2.0D
2. Is there any change to the classification of the event? If so, what is the reason?
3. What is the ongoing/imminent damage to the facility, including affected equipment and safety features?
4. Have toxic or radiological releases occurred or been projected, including changes in the release rate? If so, what is the projected onsite and offsite releases, and what is the basis of assessment?
5. What are the health effect/consequences to onsite/offsite people? How many onsite/offsite people are/will be affected and to what extent?
6. Is the event under control? When was control established, or what is the planned action to bring the event under control? What is the mitigative action underway or planned?
7. What onsite protective measures have been taken or planned?
8. What offsite protective actions have been recommended to State/local officials?

SEABROOK STATION
MINI-SCENARIO

CFE 14- 05 November 5, 2014

MINI-SCENARIO E.1 **Page 2 of 4**

CONTROL CELL INSTRUCTIONS FOR EXTERNAL ERO INTERFACE SIMULATIONS

9. What is the status of State/local/other Federal agencies' responses, if known?
10. If applicable, what is the status of public information activities, such as alarm, broadcast, or press releases? Has a Joint Information Center been activated?

When asked, confirm that the NRC is receiving plant data from ERDS. Request a call back every 30 minutes with an update until the event is terminated. DO NOT provide any guidance, recommendations or directions.

E. **Information to Provide:**

1. When notified of the **Site Area Emergency declaration**, inform your ENS contact that an NRC Site Team has been dispatched to the EOF.

   a. Estimated arrival time at the EOF is 1400 today

   b. Team members:

   - Site Team Leader
   - Deputy Site Team Leader
   - Technical Assessment Branch Leader
   - Deputy Technical Assessment Branch Leader
   - Technical Assessment Communicator
   - Technical Assessment Specialist
   - Protective Measures Branch Leader
   - Deputy Protective Measures Branch Leader
   - Radiation Safety Coordinator
   - Dose Assessor
   - Protective Measures Specialist
   - Protective Measures Communicator
   - Safeguards/Security Branch Leader
   - Chronology/Documentation Branch Leader
   - Response Coordination Leader
   - Liaison Leader
   - State Emergency Operations Center Liaison
   - Public Information Leader
   - Public Information Technical Briefer(s)

SEABROOK STATION
MINI-SCENARIO

CFE 14- 05 November 5, 2014

MINI-SCENARIO E.1

CONTROL CELL INSTRUCTIONS FOR EXTERNAL ERO INTERFACE SIMULATIONS

c. Team will fly to Pease International Tradeport.

d. Ground transportation to the EOF has been arranged.

2. When notified of the **Site Area Emergency declaration**, inform your ENS contact that the NRC wants the Health Physics Line (HPN) line established by Seabrook Station as soon as possible. Provide your number as the HPN contact number and ask that the HPN Communicator be directed to contact you.

III. NRC Health Physics Network

B. **Start Time:** Sometime after Site Area Emergency declaration. If contact has not been initiated by 1045, call the HPN Communicator at 468-3950 and identify yourself as the NRC HPN Communicator.

C. **ERO Contact:** HPN Communicator

D. **Contact Location:** EOF

E. **Form Used to Record Data:** ER 2.0G

F. **Topic(s) Discussed:**

1. Information/entries on Form ER 2.0G
2. Is there any change to the classification of the event? If so, what is the reason?
3. Have toxic or radiological releases occurred or been projected (including changes in the release rate)? If so, what are the actual or currently projected on-site and off-site releases, and what is the basis for this assessment?
4. What are the health effects or consequences to on-site and off-site people? How many onsite or offsite people are being or will be affected and to what extent?
5. Is the event under control? When was control established, or what is the planned action to bring the event under control? What mitigative actions are currently underway or planned?
6. What on-site protective measures have been taken or are planned?
7. What off-site protective actions are being considered or have been recommended to state and local officials?
8. What are the current meteorological conditions?
9. What <u>are</u> the dose and dose rate readings on-site and off-site?

Request a call back every 30 minutes with an update until the event is terminated. DO NOT provide any guidance, recommendations or directions.

SEABROOK STATION
MINI-SCENARIO

CFE 14- 05 November 5, 2014

MINI-SCENARIO E.1

CONTROL CELL INSTRUCTIONS FOR EXTERNAL ERO INTERFACE SIMULATIONS

F. **Information to Provide:**

1. Telecopy number for HPN forms

V. Westinghouse

A. **Start Time:** As initiated by players
B. **ERO Contact:** Industry Liaison
C. **Contact Location:** EOF
D. **Topic(s) Discussed:**
   a. Availability of Westinghouse resources
      i. Accident and transient analysis
      ii. Fuel damage assessment
      iii. Replacement fuel and parts to support recovery operations
   b. DO NOT provide any response guidance or recommendations.
E. **Information to provide:**

1. If a Westinghouse response team is requested by the EOF, provide the following information.

   a. Estimated arrival time at the EOF: 5 hours after the request, but not earlier than 1500.

   b. Team composition as requested by EOF players

   c. Team will fly to Logan Airport

   d. Request assistance with ground transportation, lodging arrangements, directions to the EOF and required passes.

V. PSNH Load Dispatcher

A. **Start Time:** As initiated by players
B. **ERO Contact:** Various
C. **Contact Location:** Various
D. Topic(s) Discussed: Status of offsite power sources

1. The grid is stable. No problems are expected with offsite power sources.

SEABROOK STATION
MINI-SCENARIO

CFE 14- 05 November 5, 2014

MINI-SCENARIO E.2 **2 Pages**

Service Water Pump House Repair Team Investigation

Upon entry into the Service Water Pump House the water level in the lower level is approximately 3 feet and slowly lowering. (Figure E-1). This will necessitate the need to bring in a pump to rapidly initiate repairs.



Figure E-1

Train "A" Service Water Piping is completely split and will require 4 days to repair. (Figure E-2)

Train 'B" Service Water Piping has a reapairable hole (Figure E-3). Sufficent repairs can be made to make this train functional and restore cooling to PCCW/ Diesel Generator.



Figure E-3

Figure E-2

SEABROOK STATION
MINI-SCENARIO

CFE 14- 05 November 5, 2014

MINI-SCENARIO E.2 **2 Pages**

Service Water Pump House Repair Team Investigation

For the purposes of this drill the line numbers for the leak locations are:

A Train Pipe: SW-1801-32, 24" pipe in SWPH

B Train Pipe: SW-1802-38, 24" pipe in SWPH

Temporary Repairs will be made under a work order developed for this purpose.

SEABROOK STATION
MINI-SCENARIO

CFE 14- 05 November 5, 2014

MINI-SCENARIO E.3 **1 Page**

EOD Investigation

There are no unexploded devices except for the device attached to the 'B" SEPS Diesel Generator. (Figure E-4)



Figure E-4

F. Plant Parameter Data

CFE 14-05 Drill Data

No Drill Data

G. Radiological Data

CFE 14- 05 Drill Data
Radiological Data

Unless otherwise specified in Mini-Scenarios on-site and off-site radiological data will remain "as found" throughout the event. There are no events associated with this scenario that impact radiological conditions. There is no radiological release associated with this scenario.

Radiological data will be provided from the simulator.

H. Meteorological Data

CFE 14- 05Drill Data
Meteorological Data

Wind and Stability Class Info, for 11/5/14 ERO HAB Evaluated Exercise:

Wind speed, stability class, and wind direction will be relatively constant throughout the Exercise window. The following times indicate stability class, wind speed, and wind direction at discrete points:

Time	Wind Speed	Wind Direction Upper *(from)*	Wind Direction Lower *(from)*	Delta T Upper	Delta T Lower	Langley	Stability Class
Prior to 0800	8	225	222	1.20	1.00	1	E
0800							
0900	7	222	220	1.10	1.20	1	E
1000 To end of Exercise	7	225°	223	1.10	1.10	1	D

I. Chemistry Data

SEABROOK STATION
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS MESSAGE FORM

CH-L121
Seabrook Station
PRIMARY CHEMISTRY REPORT
Modes 1 and 2

Parameter(1)	AL 1	AL 2	AL 3	Reactor Coolant System	Sample Date / Time
Chloride (ppm) **(2)**	>0.050	≥0.150	>1.50	<0.001	11/4/2014 08:45
Fluoride (ppm) **(2)**	>0.050	>0.150	>1.50	<0.001	11/4/2014 08:45
Sulfate (ppm)	>0.025	>0.150	>1.50	<0.0002	11/4/2014 08:45
Dissolved O_2 (ppm) **(2)**	>0.005	≥0.100	>1.00	<0.0001	11/4/2014 08:45
Hydrogen cc/Kg (STP)	<25 **or** >50	<15	<5	34.75	11/4/2014 08:45
Boron (ppm)	Per COLR	N/A	N/A	1058	11/4/2014 08:45
Lithium (ppm)	N/A	N/A	N/A	2.14	11/4/2014 08:45
Dose Equivalent Iodine (µCi/gm) **(3)**			>1.0	3.26e-05	10/29/2014 08:45
Gross Activity (µCi/gm) (3) LIMIT - DATE : 77.5 01/14/2014 08:30			>100/E	1.18e-01	11/4/2014 08:45

Parameter	Pressurizer	Sample Date / Time
Boron (ppm)	1055	11/4/2014 08:51

Borated Water Source

Source	Boron (ppm)	Date/Time
BAST A (5)	7221	10/28/2014 12:22
BAST B (5)	7287	10/28/2014 00:22
RWST (4)	2528	10/28/2014 12:34
SFPP (4)	2489	10/17/2014 10:23

****

THIS IS A DRILL
DO NOT INITIATE ACTIONS AFFECTING STATION OPERATION

****

SEABROOK STATION
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS MESSAGE FORM

RM-6505 Correlation Values For S/G Tube Leak

1 gpd	25 cpm
30 gpd	760 cpm
75 gpd	1899 cpm

Note: Values used until 1st chemistry grab sample results.

(1) Circle all parameters exceeding action level specifications and refer to procedure CP3.1, Section 4.2.6.3 for recommended action.
(2) Refer to Technical Requirement 30-3.4.7.
(3) Refer to Technical Specification 3.4.8 and Table 4.4-3.
(4) Refer to COLR for Action Initiation Value.
(5) Refer to Technical Specification 29-3.1.2.6 and COLR

Cation Bed Runs - Normally performed at full flow Minutes:

Midshift (~2400):	0
Dayshift(~1200):	TBD
Cation Bed Preservice Rinse Required:	NO

Remarks: _____

Technician Signature: _____ 11/4/2014 14:45

****

THIS IS A DRILL
DO NOT INITIATE ACTIONS AFFECTING STATION OPERATION
****

SEABROOK STATION
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS MESSAGE FORM

CHL-088
SEABROOK STATION SECONDARY SAMPLE REPORT
Above 50% Power

PARAMETERS	ACTION LEVEL (1)	VALUE (1)	SAMPLE DATE/TIME		
CONDENSATE/FEEDWATER					
CPD, Oxygen ppb	>10	2.9	11/4/2014 08:40		
FW Hydrazine ppb (3)	< 8 x CPD O2 **or** <20	81	11/4/2014 08:41		
FW MPA ppb	< 8,000 **or** > 12,000	10332	11/4/201408:42		
FW Oxygen ppb	>5	0.71	11/4/201408:43		
STEAM GENERATORS					
	ACTION LEVEL (1)	A S/G	B S/G	C S/G	D S/G
		11/4/2014 00:45	11/4/2014 00:45	11/4/2014 00:45	11/4/2014 00:45
Sodium ppb	>5	0.37	0.32	0.28	0.29
Chloride ppb	>10	0.2	<0.2	0.22	<0.2
Sulfate ppb	>10	0.31	0.32	0.28	0.33
Total Cation Cond. µS/cm	>1.2	0.198	0.202	0.202	0.201
Secondary (DEI-131), µCi/g	(2)	08/05/2014 00:40		ND	

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION LEVELS

Technician: 11/4/14

NOTES: (1) Circled values have exceeded action levels (CPD Oxygen is an Action Initiation Value only)

(2) per CX0901.20, limits are 1.0E-3 µCi/g and 1.0E-01 µCi/g. Notify supervision if > 1.0E-6 µCi/g

(3) If the ratio of feedwater hoursr hydrazine to feedwater oxygen decreases to a value < 2 and is not restored to a value of ≥ 2 within 8 commence shutdo returned to fulwn as quickly as safe plant operation permits. If this ratio is restored to a value ≥ 2, the plant may be power.

Original: Chemistry Department file
Copies: Control Room (FAX #7087)

****

THIS IS A DRILL

DO NOT INITIATE ACTIONS AFFECTING STATION OPERATION

****

APPENDIX E: EOP

2014 - 2015 SEABROOK STATION EXERCISE CYCLE

HOSTILE ACTION BASED (HAB)

NEXTERA ENERGY

STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

EXTENT OF PLAY

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NEW HAMPSHIRE
EXTENT OF PLAY
SEABROOK STATION NUCLEAR POWER STATION
HOSTILE ACTION BASED EXERCISE
Evaluated Exercise – November 5, 2014

BACKGROUND:

This is the proposed 2014-2015 Extent of Play (EOP) Criteria for the New Hampshire (N.H.) Off-Site Response Organization (ORO) involved in the Hostile Action Based (HAB) Exercise Cycle for Seabrook Station. No changes have been made to any criterion except as noted in the document.

This EOP covers all components and activities of the exercise cycle starting with a one day workshop on June 18, 2014. Several Out-of-Sequence (OOS) activities have been or will be conducted prior to the Tabletop Exercise (TTX) scheduled for July 22, 2014. The Exercise Cycle will culminate with the "graded exercise" on November 5, 2014. Various "out-of-sequence" activities and exercises will be scheduled, but the criteria utilized will be incorporated within this EOP and noted throughout the document, as appropriate.

This document does NOT identify all exercise areas to be discussed/exercised by the State and other off-site response organizations/agencies. The scenarios developed for and utilized in the drills and exercises will incorporate sufficient injects to provide opportunities for all players to participate in response and recovery activities mindful of an all-hazard approach. Items identified in this EOP only will be subject to evaluation.

This is a **NEW HAMPSHIRE ONLY** document. The EOPs for Maine and Massachusetts will be combined with this document by FEMA to form a comprehensive EOP for this exercise cycle.

CALENDAR AND PLAYERS:

Wed. June 18, 2014 Registration: 8 a.m. Program 8:30-12:30 p.m.	DES Pease Tradeport Portsmouth, N.H.	Invited: N.H. and Mass. Local EPZ/Host EOC, ICP, personnel; SEOC Command & General Staff; ESF 1,2,3,6,7,8,10, 11,12,13; LL; JIC; RIMC; DPHS/Rad Health Unified Command; RHTA; AA; Lab; EOF Personnel (both DPHS/HSEM); FEMA Seabrook Station	Workshop Presentation Discussion-based Non-evaluated
Tues,July 22, 2014 Exercise 8:30 – 4 p.m.	DES Pease Tradeport Portsmouth, N.H	Invited: SEOC (N.H., Maine, Mass.); Command & General Staff ICP, ESF 1,2,3,4,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13; LL; JIC; RIMC; DPHS/Rad Health Unified Command; RHTA; AA; Lab; EOF Personnel (both DPHS/HSEM); FEMA Region I; I-MAT Team; RRCC; Seabrook Station Monitoring/Sampling Teams	TTX Discussion-based Non-evaluated
Wed., Aug.20, 2014	State EOCs Local EOCs EOF, JIC,ICP, Monitoring Team locations (appropriate other locations)	N.H. and Mass. Local/Host EPZ EOC personnel; ICP, SEOC Command & General Staff; ESF 1,2,3,6,7,8,10, 11,12,13; LL; JIC; RIMC; DPHS/Rad Health Unified Command; RHTA; AA; Lab; EOF Personnel (both DPHS/HSEM); FEMA Region I; Seabrook Station	CFE #1 Exercise Non-evaluated

Wed., Oct. 8, 2014	State EOCs Local EOCs EOF, JIC,ICP, Monitoring Team locations (appropriate other locations)	SEOC (N.H., Mass.) Command & General Staff; ESF 1,2,3,4,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13; LL; JIC; RIMC; ICP, Staging Area personnel (selected) DPHS/Rad Health Unified Command; RHTA; AA;; EOF Personnel (both DPHS/HSEM); FEMA Region I; FRMAC; Seabrook Station; Sampling Teams	CFE#2 Exercise Non-evaluated
Wed., Nov. 5, 2014	State EOC Local EOCs EOF, JIC,ICP Monitoring Team locations	N.H. and Mass. Local/Host EPZ EOC personnel; SEOC Command & General Staff; ICP, ESF 1,2,3,6,7,8,10, 11,12,13; LL; JIC; RIMC; DPHS/Rad Health Unified Command; RHTA; AA;; EOF Personnel (both DPHS/HSEM); Seabrook Station	[redacted]

FACILITIES:

The following organizations/locations will be involved in the Seabrook Station HAB Exercises Cycle in FY2014/2015:

In Sequence:

Local EPZ Community EOCs: Brentwood, E. Kingston, Exeter, Greenland, Hampton, Hampton Falls, Kensington, Kingston, New Castle, Newfields, Newton, North Hampton, Portsmouth, Rye, Seabrook, South Hampton, Stratham.

Local Host Communities: Dover, Manchester, Rochester (EOCs only - in sequence)

State Emergency Operations Center

N.H. Homeland Security & Emergency Management

*** State Local Liaisons may be located at the IFO Bldg. on Pease Tradeport for part or all of the Exercise Cycle

Emergency Operations Facility

New Hampshire Homeland Security & Emergency Management Agency (HSEM)
New Hampshire Department of Public Health/Radiological Health

Radiological Field Monitoring Teams

State Police Dispatch - State Warning Point

State Police Troop A

Rockingham County Dispatch

Rumor Control - E-911 PSAP

Joint Information Center

Incident Command Post-

General Statement: *Town of Seabrook Police, N.H. State Police and other members of the Incident Command Post will demonstrate the ability to provide command and coordination of the incident, as well as radiological protection of personnel. No tactical actions or manning of control points will be demonstrated. Only those assets or personnel necessary to demonstrate the command, communication, and radiological protection components will be deployed. The Incident Command Post may be placed at an alternate location to protect operational security.*

Field Monitoring Teams - Monitoring Teams (MT1 & MT2)

Equipment checklist - OOS day before

Dose Assessment Personnel - Will be located at the EOF on Pease Tradeport

Out of Sequence:

Risk Special Facilities: **Tuesday, May 27, 2014**

Kingston Children's Center
Building Block School (Kingston)
The Learning Tree (Exeter)
Hampton Falls Child Care Center
Fun After School (Hampton)
The Village Preschool (Hampton)
Langdon Place of Exeter

Wednesday, May 28, 2014

Sportsmouth Nature School (Greenland)
Place for Friends and Fun (Portsmouth)
Greenland Central School
Portsmouth High School
Mark Wentworth Home

Thursday, May 29, 2014

Kid Logic (E. Kingston)
Daniel J. Bakie Elementary School (Kingston)
Seabrook Middle School
Main St. School (Exeter)
Hampton Centre School

Reception Center(s): Manchester Memorial High School (CFEs Feb.19, March 3; **Graded: May 5, 2014**
Dover Middle School (CFEs - May 8, June 5, TBD; Graded :Sept. 18, 2014

MS-1 Hospital: Elliot Hospital, Manchester (Date TBD)

NH State Police: Troop A – Epping, N.H.

Tactical Staging Area- *Simulated*

Evaluation Criteria

Note: If during the exercise, a participant demonstrates sub-element 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 4.a.3, 4.b.1 or 5.b.1, 6.a.1 and 6.b.1 unsatisfactorily, the FEMA Evaluator will inform the participant and the Controller. After an "on the spot" re-training by the state or local organization, the FEMA Evaluator will provide the participant another opportunity to re-demonstrate the activity that same day.

Special Note: ALL facilities will be evaluated (1.b.1), except ICP.

Incident Command Post Evaluation Criteria

1.a.1
1.c.1
1.d.1
1.e.1
2.b.2
3.a.1

EVALUATION AREA 1: Emergency Operations Management

Sub-element 1.a – Mobilization

Intent

This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel, and activate and staff emergency facilities.

Criterion 1.a.1: OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, A.1.a, A.1.e, A.3, A.4; C.1, C.4, C.6; D.3, D.4; E.1, E.2; H.3, H.4)

Extent of Play

Responsible OROs must demonstrate the capability to receive notification of an incident from the licensee; verify the notification; and contact, alert, and mobilize key emergency personnel in a timely manner and demonstrate the ability to maintain and staff 24-hour operations. Twenty-four-hour operations can be demonstrated during the exercise via rosters or shift changes or otherwise in an actual activation. Local responders must demonstrate the ability to receive and/or initiate notification to the licensees or other respective emergency management organizations of an incident in a timely manner, when they receive information from the licensee or alternate sources. Responsible OROs must demonstrate the activation of facilities for immediate use by mobilized personnel upon their arrival.

Activation of facilities and staff, including those associated with the Incident Command System, must be completed in accordance with ORO plans/procedures. The location and contact information for facilities included in the incident command must be available to all appropriate responding agencies and the NPP after these facilities have been activated.

Pre-staging of emergency personnel is appropriate, in accordance with the Extent-of-Play Agreement, at those facilities located beyond a normal commuting distance from the individual's duty location or residence. This could include the staggered release of resources from an assembly area. Additionally, pre-staging of staff for out-of-sequence demonstrations may be used in accordance with the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

The REP program does not evaluate Incident Command Post tactical operations (e.g., Law Enforcement hostile action suppression techniques), only coordination among the incident command, the utility, and all appropriate OROs, pursuant to plans/procedures.

Initial law enforcement, fire service, HAZMAT, and emergency medical response to the NPP site may impact the ability to staff REP functions. The ability to identify and request additional resources or identify compensatory measures must be demonstrated. Exercises must also address the role of mutual aid in the incident, as appropriate. An integral part of the response to an HAB scenario at an NPP may also be within the auspices of the Federal Government (e.g., FBI, NRC, or DHS). Protocols for requesting Federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement support must be demonstrated, as appropriate. Any resources must be on the ORO's mobilization list so they can be contacted during an incident, if needed.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

New Hampshire Extent of Play

Sub-element 1.b – Facilities

Intent

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which provides that Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) have facilities to support the emergency response.

Criterion 1.b.1: Facilities are sufficient to support the emergency response. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, H.3; G.3.a; J.10.h; J.12; K.5.b)

Extent of Play

Responsible OROs must demonstrate, no less than once every eight years, the availability of facilities to support accomplishment of emergency operations (this includes all alternate and backup facilities). Evaluations are typically performed for EOCs and JICs, as well as other facilities such as reception/relocation centers. Some of the areas evaluated within the facilities are adequate space,

furnishings, lighting, restrooms, ventilation, backup power, and/or alternate facility, if required to support operations. Radio stations, laboratories, initial warning points and hospitals are not evaluated under 1.b.1.

In addition, facilities will be evaluated for this criterion during the first biennial exercise after any new or substantial changes in structure, equipment, or mission that affect key capabilities, as outlined in espective emergency plans/procedures. A substantial change is one that has a direct effect or impact on emergency response operations performed in those facilities. Examples of substantial changes include: modifying the size or configuration of an emergency operations center, adding more function to a center, or changing the equipment available for use in a center. All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

New Hampshire Extent of Play

[redacted]

Sub-element 1.c - Direction and Control

Intent

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which provides that Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) have the capability to control their overall response to an emergency.

Criterion 1.c.1: Key personnel with leadership roles for the ORO provide direction and control to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible. (NUREG-0654, A.1.d; A.2.a, b; A.3; C.4, 6)

Extent of Play

Leadership personnel must demonstrate the ability to carry out the essential management functions of the response effort (e.g., keeping staff informed through periodic briefings and/or other means, coordinating with other OROs, and ensuring completion of requirements and requests.) Leadership must demonstratethe ability to prioritize resource tasking and replace/supplement resources (e.g., through MOUs or otheragreements) when faced with competing demands for finite resources. Any resources identified through LOA/MOUs must be on the ORO's mobilization list so they may be contacted during an incident, if needed.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

New Hampshire Extent of Play

[redacted]

Sub-element 1.d – Communications Equipment

Intent

This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs establish and operate reliable primary and backup communication systems to ensure communications with key emergency personnel at locations such as contiguous governments within the EPZ, Federal emergency response organizations, the licensee and its facilities, EOCs, Incident Command Posts, and FMTs.

> ***Criterion 1.d.1: At least two communication systems are available, at least one operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations. Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, F.1, 2)***

Extent of Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion is accomplished initially in a baseline evaluation and subsequently in periodic testing and drills. System familiarity and use must be demonstrated as applicable in biennial or tabletop exercise, or if their use would be required, during an actual event

OROs must demonstrate that a primary system, and at least one backup system for fixed facilities, is fully functional at all times. Communications systems are maintained and tested on a recurring basis throughout the assessment period and system status is available to all operators. Periodic test results and corrective actions are maintained on a real time basis. If a communications system or systems are not functional, but exercise performance is not affected, no exercise issue will be assessed.

Communications equipment and procedures for facilities and field units are used as needed for transmission and receipt of exercise messages. All facilities, FMTs, and incident command must have the capability to access at least one communication system that is independent of the commercial telephone system. Responsible OROs must demonstrate the capability to manage the communication systems and ensure that all message traffic is handled without delays that might disrupt emergency operations. OROs must ensure that a coordinated communication link for fixed and mobile medical support facilities exists. Exercise scenarios may require the failure of a communication system and use of an alternate system, as negotiated in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

New Hampshire Extent of Play

[redacted]

Note: If during the exercise, a participant demonstrates this sub-element unsatisfactorily, the FEMA Evaluator will inform the participant and the Controller. After an "on the spot" re-training by the state or local organization, the FEMA Evaluator will provide the participant another opportunity to re-demonstrate the activity that same day.

Sub-element 1.e – Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations

Intent

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which provides that Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) have emergency equipment and supplies adequate to support the emergency response.

Criterion 1.e.1: Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, potassium iodide (KI), and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, H.7, 10; I.7, 8, 9; J.10.a, b, e; J.11, 12; K.3.a; K.5.b)

Extent of Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion is accomplished primarily through a baseline evaluation and subsequent periodic inspections.

A particular facility's equipment and supplies must be sufficient and consistent with that facility's assigned role in the ORO's emergency operations plans. Use of maps and other displays is encouraged. For non-facility-based operations, the equipment and supplies must be sufficient and consistent with the assigned operational role. At locations where traffic and access control personnel are deployed, appropriate equipment (e.g., vehicles, barriers, traffic cones, and signs) must be available, or their availability described.

Specific equipment and supplies that must be demonstrated under this criterion include KI inventories, dosimetry, and monitoring equipment, as follows:

KI: Responsible OROs must demonstrate the capability to maintain inventories of KI sufficient for use by: (1) emergency workers; (2) institutionalized individuals, as indicated in capacity lists for facilities; and (3) where stipulated by the plans / procedures, members of the general public (including transients) within the plume pathway EPZ. In addition, OROs must demonstrate provisions to make KI available to specialized response teams (e.g., civil support team, Special Weapons and Tactics Teams, urban search and rescue, bomb squads, HAZMAT, or other ancillary groups) as identified in plans / procedures). The plans / procedures must include the forms to be used for documenting emergency worker ingestion of KI, as well as a mechanism for identifying emergency workers that have declined KI in advance. Consider carefully the placement of emergency workers that have declined KI in advance.

ORO quantities of dosimetry and KI available and storage locations(s) will be confirmed by physical inspection at the storage location(s) or through documentation of current inventory submitted during the exercise, provided in the ALC submission, and/or verified during an SAV. Available supplies of KI must be within the expiration date indicated on KI bottles or blister packs. As an alternative, the ORO may produce a letter from a certified private or state laboratory indicating that the KI supply remains potent, in accordance with U.S. Pharmacopoeia standards.

Dosimetry: Sufficient quantities of appropriate direct-reading and permanent record dosimetry and dosimeter chargers must be available for issuance to all emergency workers who will be dispatched to perform an ORO mission. In addition, OROs must demonstrate provisions to make dosimetry available to specialized response teams (e.g., civil support team, Special Weapons and Tactics Teams, urban search and rescue, bomb squads, HAZMAT, or other ancillary groups) as identified in plans / procedures).

Appropriate direct-reading dosimetry must allow an individual(s) to read the administrative reporting limits and maximum exposure limits contained in the ORO's plans / procedures.

Direct-reading dosimeters must be zeroed or operationally checked prior to issuance. The dosimeters must be inspected for electrical leakage at least annually and replaced when necessary. Civil Defense Victoreen Model 138s (CD V-138s) (0-200 mR), due to their documented history of electrical leakage problems, must be inspected for electrical leakage at least quarterly and replaced when necessary. This leakage testing will be verified during the exercise, through documentation submitted in the ALC and/or through an SAV.

Operational checks and testing of electronic dosimeters must be in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions and be verified during the exercise, through documentation submitted in the ALC and/or through an SAV.

Monitoring Instruments: All instruments must be inspected, inventoried, and operationally checked before each use. Instruments must be calibrated in accordance with the manufacturer's recommendations. Unmodified CDV-700 series instruments and other instruments without a manufacturer's recommendation must be calibrated annually. Modified CDV-700 instruments must be calibrated in accordance with the recommendation of the modification manufacturer. A label indicating such calibration must be on each instrument or calibrated frequency can be verified by other means. In addition, instruments being used to measure activity must have a sticker-affixed to their sides indicating the effective range of the readings. The range of readings documentation specifies the acceptable range of readings that the meter should indicate when it is response-checked using a standard test source.

For FMTs, the instruments must be capable of measuring gamma exposure rates and detecting beta radiation. These instruments must be capable of measuring a range of activity and exposure, including radiological protection/exposure control of team members and detection of activity on air sample collection media, consistent with the intended use of the instrument and the ORO's plans / procedures. An appropriate radioactive check source must be used to verify proper operational response for each low-range radiation measurement instrument (less than 1R/hr) and for high-range instruments when available. If a source is not available for a high-range instrument, a procedure must exist to operationally test the instrument before entering an area where only a high-range instrument can make useful readings.

In areas where portal monitors are used, the OROs must set up and operationally check the monitor(s). The monitor(s) must conform to the standards set forth in the Contamination Monitoring Standard for a Portal Monitor Used for Emergency Response, FEMA-REP-21 (March 1995) or in accordance with the manufacturer's recommendations.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

New Hampshire Extent of Play

[redacted]

Note: If during the exercise, a participant demonstrates this sub-element unsatisfactorily, the FEMA Evaluator will inform the participant and the Controller. After an "on the spot" re-training by the state or local organization, the FEMA Evaluator will provide the participant another opportunity to re-demonstrate the activity that same day.

EVALUATION AREA 2: Protective Action Decision-Making

Sub-element 2.a - Emergency Worker Exposure Control

Intent

This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to assess and control the radiation exposure received by emergency workers and have a decision chain in place, as specified in the ORO's plans/procedures, to authorize emergency worker exposure limits to be exceeded for specific missions.

Radiation exposure limits for emergency workers are the recommended accumulated dose limits or exposure rates that emergency workers may be permitted to incur during an emergency. These limits include any pre-established administrative reporting limits (that take into consideration TEDE or organ- specific limits) identified in the ORO's plans/procedures.

> ***Criterion 2.a.1: OROs use a decision-making process, considering relevant factors and appropriate coordination, to ensure that an exposure control system, including the use of KI, is in place for emergency workers including provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or protective action guides. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, C.6; J.10. e, f; K.4)***

Extent of Play

OROs authorized to send emergency workers into the plume exposure pathway EPZ should demonstrate a capability to meet the criterion based on their emergency plans and procedures.

Responsible OROs should demonstrate the capability to make decisions concerning the authorization of exposure levels in excess of pre-authorized levels and to the number of emergency workers receiving radiation dose above pre-authorized levels. As appropriate, OROs should demonstrate the capability to make decisions on the distribution and administration of KI as a protective measure, based on the ORO's plan and/or procedures or projected thyroid dose compared with the established Protective Action Guides (PAGs) for KI administration. All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed, as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.

New Hampshire Extent of Play



Sub-element 2.b. - Radiological Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations and Decisions for the Plume Phase of the Emergency

Intent

This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to independently project integrated dose from projected or actual dose rates and compare these estimates to the PAGs.

OROs must have the capability to choose, among a range of protective actions, those most appropriate in a given emergency. OROs base these choices on PAGs from their plans/procedures or EPA's Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents and other criteria, such as plant conditions, licensee PARs, coordination of PADs with other political jurisdictions (e.g., other affected OROs and incident command), availability of in-place shelter, weather conditions, and situations, to include HAB incidents, the threat posed by the specific hostile action, the affiliated response, and the effect of an evacuation on the threat response effort, that create higher than normal risk from general population evacuation.

> ***Criterion 2.b.1: Appropriate protective action recommendations are based on available information on plant conditions, field monitoring data, and licensee and ORO dose projections, as well as knowledge of onsite and offsite environmental conditions.*** **(NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, I.10 and Supplement 3)**

Extent of Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion must be accomplished concurrently with a licensee exercise and may be demonstrated in a biennial or tabletop exercise.

During the initial stage of the emergency response, following notification of plant conditions that may warrant offsite protective actions, the ORO must demonstrate the capability to use appropriate means, described in the plans/procedures, to develop PARs for decision-makers based on available information and recommendations provided by the licensee as well as field monitoring data, if available. The ORO must also consider any release and meteorological data provided by the licensee.

The ORO must demonstrate a reliable capability to independently validate dose projections. The types of calculations to be demonstrated depend on the data available and the need for assessments to support the PARs must be appropriate to the scenario. In all cases, calculation of projected dose must be demonstrated. Projected doses must be related to quantities and units of the PAG to which they will be compared. PARs must be promptly transmitted to decision-makers in a pre-arranged format.

When the licensee and ORO projected doses differ by more than a factor of 10, the ORO and licensee must determine the source of the difference by discussing input data and assumptions, using different models, or exploring possible reasons. Resolution of these differences must be incorporated into the PARs if timely and appropriate. The ORO must demonstrate the capability to use any additional data to refine projected doses and exposure rates and revise the associated PARs.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

New Hampshire Extent of Play

[redacted]

Criterion 2.b.2: A decision-making process involving consideration of appropriate factors and necessary coordination is used to make protective action decisions (PAD) for the general public (including the recommendation for the use of KI, if ORO policy). (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, A.3; C.4, 6; D.4; J.9; J.10.f, m)

Extent of Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion must be accomplished concurrently with a licensee exercise and may be demonstrated in a biennial or tabletop exercise.

OROs must have the capability to make both initial and subsequent PADs. OROs must demonstrate the capability to make initial PADs in a timely manner appropriate to the incident, based on information from the licensee, assessment of plant status and potential or actual releases, other available information related to the incident, input from appropriate ORO authorities (e.g., incident command), and PARs from the utility and ORO staff. In addition, a subsequent or alternate PAD may be appropriate if various conditions (e.g., an HAB incident, weather, release timing and magnitude) pose undue risk to an evacuation, or if evacuation may disrupt the efforts to respond to a hostile action.

OROs must demonstrate the ability to obtain supplemental resources (e.g., mutual aid) necessary to implement a PAD if local law enforcement, fire service, HAZMAT, and emergency medical resources are utilized to augment response to the NPP site or other key infrastructure.

Dose assessment personnel may provide additional PARs based on the subsequent dose projections, field monitoring data, or information on plant conditions. In addition, incident command must provide input regarding considerations for subsequent PARs based on the magnitude of the ongoing threat, the response, and/or site conditions. The decision-makers must demonstrate the capability to change protective actions based on the combination of all these factors.

If the ORO has determined that KI will be used as a protective measure for the general public under offsite plans/procedures, then it must demonstrate the capability to make decisions on the distribution and administration of KI to supplement sheltering and evacuation. This decision must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures or projected thyroid dose compared with the established PAG for KI administration. The KI decision-making process must involve close coordination with appropriate assessment and decision- making staff.

If more than one ORO is involved in decision making, all appropriate OROs must communicate and coordinate PADs with each other. In addition, decisions must be coordinated/communicated with incident command. OROs must demonstrate the capability to communicate the results of decisions to all the affected locations.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

New Hampshire Extent of Play

[redacted]

Sub-element 2.c - Protective Action Decisions Consideration for the Protection of Persons with Disabilities and Access/Functional Needs

Intent

This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to determine PADs, including evacuation, sheltering, and use of KI, if applicable, for groups of persons with disabilities and access/functional needs (e.g., hospitals, nursing homes, correctional facilities, schools, licensed daycare centers, mobility-impaired individuals, and transportation-dependent individuals). The focus is on those groups of persons with disabilities and access/functional needs that are, or potentially will be, affected by a radiological release from an NPP.

> ***Criterion 2.c.1: Protective action decisions are made, as appropriate, for groups of persons with disabilities and access/functional needs. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1,D.4; J.9; J.10.d, e)***

Extent of Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion must be accomplished concurrently with a licensee exercise and may be demonstrated in a biennial or tabletop exercise that would include the use of plant conditions transmitted from the licensee.

Usually it is appropriate to implement evacuation in areas where doses are projected to exceed the lower end of the range of PAGs, except for incidents where there is a high-risk environmental condition or where high-risk groups (e.g., the immobile or infirm) are involved. In these cases, factors that must be considered include weather conditions, shelter availability, availability of transportation assets, risk of evacuation versus risk from the avoided dose, and precautionary school evacuations. In addition, decisions must be coordinated/communicated with the incident command. In situations where an institutionalized population cannot be evacuated, the ORO must consider use of KI.

Applicable OROs must demonstrate the capability to alert and notify all public school systems/districts of emergency conditions that are expected to or may necessitate protective actions for students. Demonstration requires that the OROs actually contact public school systems/districts during the exercise.

In accordance with plans/procedures, OROs and/or officials of public school systems/districts must demonstrate the capability to make prompt decisions on protective actions for students. The decision-making process, including any preplanned strategies for protective actions for that ECL, must consider the location of students at the time (e.g., whether the students are still at home, en route to school, or at school).

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

New Hampshire Extent of Play

[redacted]

Sub-element 2.d. –Radiological Assessment and Decision-Making for the Ingestion Exposure Pathway

Intent

This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the means to assess the radiological consequences for the ingestion exposure pathway, relate them to the appropriate PAGs, and make timely, appropriate PADs to mitigate exposure from the pathway.

During an incident at an NPP, a release of radioactive material may contaminate water supplies and agricultural products in the surrounding areas. Any such contamination would likely occur during the plume phase of the incident and, depending on the nature of the release, could impact the ingestion pathway for weeks or years.

> ***Criterion 2.d.1: Radiological consequences for the ingestion pathway are assessed and appropriate protective action decisions are made based on the ORO's planning criteria. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, A.3; C.1, 4; D.4; J.9, 11)***

Extent of Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion must be accomplished concurrently with a licensee exercise and may be demonstrated in a biennial or tabletop exercise that would include the use of plant conditions transmitted from the licensee.

OROs are expected to take precautionary actions to protect food and water supplies, or to minimize exposure to potentially contaminated water and food, in accordance with their respective plans/procedures. Often OROs initiate such actions based on criteria related to the facility's ECLs. Such actions may include recommendations to place milk animals on stored feed and use protected water supplies.

The ORO must use its procedures to assess the radiological consequences of a release on the food and water supplies, such as the development of a sampling plan. The ORO's assessment must include evaluation of the radiological analyses of representative samples of water, food, and other ingestible substances of local interest from potentially impacted areas; characterization of the releases from the facility; and the extent of areas potentially impacted by the release. During this assessment, OROs must consider use of agricultural and watershed data within the 50-mile EPZ. The radiological impacts on the food and water must then be compared to the appropriate ingestion PAGs contained in the ORO's plans/procedures. The plans/procedures contain PAGs based on specific dose commitment criteria or on criteria as recommended by current Food and Drug Administration (FDA) guidance. Timely and

appropriate recommendations must be provided to the ORO decision-makers group for implementation decisions. OROs may also include a comparison of taking or not taking a given action on the resultant ingestion pathway dose commitments.

The ORO must demonstrate timely decisions to minimize radiological impacts from the ingestion pathway, based on the given assessments and other information. Any such decisions must be communicated and, to the extent practical, coordinated with neighboring OROs.

OROs will use Federal resources, as identified in the Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex of the NRF and other resources (e.g., compacts or nuclear insurers), as necessary. Evaluation of this criterion will take into consideration the level of Federal and other participating resources.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

New Hampshire Extent of Play

[redacted]

Sub-element 2.e. – Radiological Assessment and Decision-Making Concerning Relocation, Re-entry, and Return

Intent

This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to make decisions on post-plume phase relocation, reentry, and return of the general public. These decisions are essential for protection of the public from direct long-term exposure to deposited radioactive materials from a severe incident at an NPP.

Criterion 2.e.1: Timely relocation, re-entry, and return decisions are made and coordinated as appropriate, based on assessments of the radiological conditions and criteria in the ORO's plan and/or procedures. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, I.10; J.9; K.3.a; M.1)

Extent of Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion must be accomplished concurrently with a licensee exercise and may be demonstrated in a full-scale, functional or tabletop exercise that would include the use of plant conditions transmitted from the licensee.

Relocation: OROs must demonstrate the capability to estimate integrated dose in contaminated areas and compare these estimates with PAGs; apply decision criteria for relocation of those individuals in the general public who have not been evacuated, but where actual or projected doses are in excess of relocation PAGs; and control access to evacuated and restricted areas.

OROs will make decisions for relocating members of the evacuated public who lived in areas that now have residual radiation levels in excess of the PAGs. Determination of areas to be restricted must be based on factors such as the mix of radionuclides in deposited materials, calculated exposure rates versus the PAGs, and analyses of vegetation and soil field samples.

Reentry: Decisions must be made on location of control points and policies regarding access and exposure control for emergency workers and members of the general public who need to temporarily enter the evacuated area to perform specific tasks or missions.

Examples of control procedures are the assignment of, or checking for, direct-reading and permanent record dosimetry for emergency workers; questions regarding an individual's objectives, locations expected to be visited, and associated timeframes; availability of maps and plots of radiation exposure rates; and advice on areas to avoid. Control procedures also include monitoring of individuals, vehicles, and equipment; the implementation of decision criteria regarding decontamination; and proper disposition of emergency worker dosimetry and maintenance of emergency worker radiation exposure records.

Responsible OROs must demonstrate the capability to develop a strategy for authorized reentry of individuals into the restricted zone(s), based on established decision criteria. OROs must demonstrate the capability to modify those policies for security purposes (e.g., police patrols), maintenance of essential services (e.g., fire protection and utilities), and other critical functions. They must demonstrate the capability to use decision-making criteria in allowing access to the restricted zone by the public for various reasons, such as to maintain property (e.g., to care for farm animals or secure machinery for storage) or retrieve important possessions. Coordinated policies for access and exposure control must be developed among all agencies with roles to perform in the restricted zone(s). OROs must demonstrate the capability to establish policies for provision of dosimetry to all individuals allowed to reenter the restricted zone(s). The extent to which OROs need to develop policies on reentry will be determined by scenario events.

Return: OROs must demonstrate the capability to implement policies concerning return of members of the public to areas that were evacuated during the plume phase (i.e., permitting populations that were previously evacuated to reoccupy their homes and businesses on an unrestricted basis). OROs must base decisions on environmental data and political boundaries or physical/ geological features, which allow identification of the boundaries of areas to which members of the general public may return. Return is permitted to the boundary of the restricted area(s) that is based on the relocation PAG.

Other factors that the ORO must consider in decision-making include conditions that permit cancellation of the ECL and relaxation of associated restrictive measures. OROs must base return recommendations on measurements of radiation from ground deposition. OROs must have the capability to identify services and facilities that require restoration within a few days and to identify the procedures and resources for their restoration. Examples of these services and facilities are medical and social services, utilities, roads, schools, and intermediate-term housing for relocated persons.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

New Hampshire Extent of Play

[redacted]

EVALUATION AREA 3: Protective Action Implementation

Sub-element 3.a – Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control

Intent

This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to provide for the following: distribution, use, collection, and processing of direct-reading dosimetry and permanent record dosimetry; reading of direct-reading dosimetry by emergency workers at appropriate frequencies; maintaining a radiation dose record for each emergency worker; establishing a decision chain or authorization procedure for emergency workers to incur radiation exposures in excess of the PAGs, and the capability to provide KI for emergency workers, always applying the as low as is reasonably achievable principle as appropriate.

> ***Criterion 3.a.1: The OROs issue appropriate dosimetry and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plans and procedures. Emergency workers periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, J.10.e; K.3.a, b; K.4)***

Extent of Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a full-scale, functional or tabletop exercise. Other means may include drills, seminars or training activities that would fully demonstrate technical proficiency.

OROs must demonstrate the capability to provide emergency workers (including supplemental resources) with the appropriate direct-reading and permanent record dosimetry, dosimeter chargers, KI, and instructions on the use of these items. For evaluation purposes, appropriate direct-reading dosimetry is defined as dosimetry that allows an individual(s) to read the administrative reporting limits that are pre-established at a level low enough to consider subsequent calculation of TEDE and maximum exposure limits, for those emergency workers involved in lifesaving activities, contained in the ORO's plans / procedures.

Each emergency worker must have basic knowledge of radiation exposure limits as specified in the ORO's plans / procedures. If supplemental resources are used, they must be provided with just-in-time training to ensure basic knowledge of radiation exposure control. Emergency workers must demonstrate procedures to monitor and record dosimeter readings and manage radiological exposure control.

During a plume phase exercise, emergency workers must demonstrate the procedures to be followed when administrative exposure limits and turn-back values are reached. The emergency worker must report accumulated exposures during the exercise as indicated in the plans / procedures. OROs must demonstrate the actions described in the plans / procedures by determining whether to replace the worker, authorize the worker to incur additional exposures, or take other actions. If exercise play does not require emergency workers to seek authorizations for additional exposure, evaluators must interview at least two workers to determine their knowledge of whom to contact in case authorization is needed, and at what exposure levels. Workers may use any available resources (e.g., written procedures and/or coworkers) in providing responses.

Although it is desirable for all emergency workers to each have a direct-reading dosimeter, there may be situations where team members will be in close proximity to each other during the entire mission. In

such cases, adequate control of exposure can be achieved for all team members using one direct-reading dosimeter worn by the team leader. Emergency workers assigned to low-exposure rate fixed facilities (e.g., EOCs and communications center within the EPZ, reception centers, and counting laboratories) may have individual direct-reading dosimeters or they may be monitored using group dosimetry (i.e., direct-reading dosimeters strategically placed in the work area). Each team member must still have his or her own permanent record dosimetry. Individuals authorized by the ORO to reenter an evacuated area during the plume (emergency) phase, must be limited to the lowest radiological exposure commensurate with completing their missions.

OROs may have administrative limits lower than EPA-400-R-92-001 dose limits for emergency workers performing various services (e.g., life-saving, protection of valuable property, all activities). OROs must ensure that the process used to seek authorization for exceeding dose limits does not negatively impact the capability to respond to an incident where life-saving and/or protection of valuable property may require an urgent response.

OROs must demonstrate the capability to accomplish distribution of KI to emergency workers consistent with decisions made. OROs must have the capability to develop and maintain lists of emergency workers who have ingested KI, including documentation of the date(s) and time(s) they did so. Ingestion of KI recommended by the designated ORO health official is voluntary. For evaluation purposes, the actual ingestion of KI shall not be performed. OROs must demonstrate the capability to formulate and disseminate instructions on using KI for those advised to take it. Emergency workers must demonstrate basic knowledge of procedures for using KI whether or not the scenario drives the implementation of KI use. This can be accomplished by an interview with the evaluator.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

New Hampshire Extent of Play

[redacted]

Note: If during the exercise, a participant demonstrates this sub-element unsatisfactorily, the FEMA Evaluator will inform the participant and the Controller. After an "on the spot" re-training by the state or local organization, the FEMA Evaluator will provide the participant another opportunity to re-demonstrate the activity that same day.

Sub-element 3.b – Implementation of KI Decision

Intent

This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to provide KI for institutionalized individuals, and, if in the plans / procedures, to the general public for whom immediate evacuation may not be feasible, very difficult, or significantly delayed. While it is necessary for OROs to have the capability to provide KI to

institutionalized individuals, providing KI to the general public is an ORO option and must be reflected as such in ORO plans / procedures. Provisions must include the availability of adequate quantities, storage, and means of distributing KI.

Criterion 3.b.1: KI and appropriate instructions are available should a decision to recommend use of KI be made. Appropriate record keeping of the administration of KI for emergency workers and institutionalized individuals is maintained. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, J.10.e, f)

Extent of Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a full-scale, functional or tabletop exercise. Other means may include drills, seminars or training activities that would fully demonstrate technical proficiency.

OROs must demonstrate the capability to make KI available to institutionalized individuals, and, where provided for in their plans / procedures, to members of the general public. OROs must demonstrate the capability to accomplish distribution of KI consistent with decisions made.

OROs must have the capability to develop and maintain lists of institutionalized individuals who have ingested KI, including documentation of the date(s) and time(s) they were instructed to ingest KI. Ingestion of KI recommended by the designated ORO health official is voluntary. For evaluation purposes, the actual ingestion of KI shall not be performed. OROs must demonstrate the capability to formulate and disseminate instructions on using KI for those advised to take it.

If a recommendation is made for the general public to take KI, appropriate information must be provided to the public by the means of notification specified in the ORO's plans / procedures.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

New Hampshire Extent of Play

[redacted]

Note: If during the exercise, a participant demonstrates this sub-element unsatisfactorily, the FEMA Evaluator will inform the participant and the Controller. After an "on the spot" re-training by the state or local organization, the FEMA Evaluator will provide the participant another opportunity to re-demonstrate the activity that same day.

Sub-element 3.c – Implementation of Protective Actions for Persons with Disabilities and Access/Functional Needs

Intent

This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to implement PADs, including evacuation and/or sheltering, for all persons with disabilities and access / functional needs. The focus is on those persons with disabilities and access/functional needs that are (or potentially will be) affected by a radiological release from an NPP.

> ***Criterion 3.c.1: Protective action decisions are implemented for persons with disabilities and access/functional needs other than schools within areas subject to protective actions. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, J.10.c, d, e, g)***

Extent of Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a full-scale or functional exercise, an actual event, or by means of drills conducted at any time.

Applicable OROs must demonstrate the capability to alert and notify (i.e., provide PARs and emergency information and instructions to) persons with disabilities and access/functional needs, including hospitals / medical facilities, nursing homes, correctional facilities, and mobility-impaired and transportation-dependent individuals. OROs must demonstrate the capability to provide for persons with disabilities and access / functional needs in accordance with plans / procedures.

Contact with persons with disabilities and access / functional needs and reception facilities may be actual or simulated, as agreed to in the extent of play. Some contacts with transportation providers must be actual, as negotiated in the extent of play. All actual and simulated contacts must be logged.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

New Hampshire Extent of Play

Criterion 3.c.2: OROs/School officials implement protective actions for schools. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, J.10.c, d, e, g)

Extent of Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a full-scale, functional, or tabletop exercise, an actual event, or by means of drills conducted at any time.

Public school systems / districts must demonstrate the ability to implement PADs for students. The demonstration must be made as follows: each school system / district within the 10 mile EPZ must demonstrate implementation of protective actions. At least one school per affected system / district must participate in the demonstration. Canceling the school day, dismissing early, or sheltering in place must be simulated by describing to evaluators the procedures that would be followed. If evacuation is the implemented protective action, all activities to coordinate and complete the evacuation of students to reception centers, congregate care centers, or host schools may actually be demonstrated or accomplished through an interview process.

If accomplished through an interview, appropriate school personnel including decision-making officials (e.g., schools' superintendent/principals and transportation director/bus dispatchers), and at least one bus driver (and the bus driver's escort, if applicable) must be available to demonstrate knowledge of their role(s) in the evacuation of school children. Communications capabilities between school officials and the buses, if required by the plans / procedures, must be verified.

Officials of the school system(s) must demonstrate the capability to develop and provide timely information to OROs for use in messages to parents, the general public, and the media on the status of protective actions for schools.

The provisions of this criterion also apply to any private schools, private kindergartens, and licensed daycare centers that participate in REP exercises pursuant to the ORO's plans / procedures as negotiated in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

New Hampshire Extent of Play

[redacted]

Sub-element 3.d. – Implementation of Traffic and Access Control

Intent

This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to implement protective action plans / procedures, including relocation and restriction of access to evacuated/sheltered areas. This Sub-element focuses on selecting, establishing, and staffing of traffic and access control points, and removal of impediments to the flow of evacuation traffic.

Criterion 3.d.1: Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, A.3; C.1, 4; J.10.g, j)

Extent of Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a full-scale or functional exercise, an actual event, or by means of drills conducted at any time.

OROs must demonstrate the capability to select, establish, and staff appropriate traffic and access control points consistent with current conditions and PADs (e.g., evacuating, sheltering, and relocation) in a timely manner. OROs must demonstrate the capability to provide instructions to traffic and access control staff on actions to take when modifications in protective action strategies necessitate changes in evacuation patterns or in the area(s) where access is controlled.

Traffic and access control staff must demonstrate accurate knowledge of their roles and responsibilities, including verifying emergency worker identification and access authorization to the affected areas, as per the Extent-of-Play Agreement. These capabilities may be demonstrated by actual deployment or by interview, in accordance with the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

In instances where OROs lack authority necessary to control access by certain types of traffic (e.g., rail, water, and air traffic), they must demonstrate the capability to contact the state or Federal agencies that have the needed authority, as agreed upon in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

New Hampshire Extent of Play



Note: If during the exercise, a participant demonstrates this sub-element unsatisfactorily, the FEMA Evaluator will inform the participant and the Controller. After an "on the spot" re-training by the state or local organization, the FEMA Evaluator will provide the participant another opportunity to re-demonstrate the activity that same day.

Criterion 3.d.2: Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, J.10.k)

Extent of Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a full-scale or functional exercise, an actual event, or by means of drills conducted at any time.

OROs must demonstrate the capability, as required by the scenario, to identify and take appropriate actions concerning impediments to evacuation. Actual dispatch of resources to deal with impediments, such as wreckers, need not be demonstrated; however, all contacts, actual or simulated, must be logged. The impediment must occur during the evacuation and be on an evacuation route such that re-routing of traffic is required, triggering decision-making and coordination with the JIC to communicate the alternate route to evacuees leaving the area.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

New Hampshire Extent of Play

[redacted]

Note: If during the exercise, a participant demonstrates this sub-element unsatisfactorily, the FEMA Evaluator will inform the participant and the Controller. After an "on the spot" re-training by the state or local organization, the FEMA Evaluator will provide the participant another opportunity to re-demonstrate the activity that same day.

Sub-element 3.e – Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Decisions

Intent

This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to implement protective actions, based on criteria recommended by current FDA guidance, for the ingestion exposure pathway 233 (i.e., the area within an approximate 50-mile radius of the NPP). This Sub-element focuses on those actions required for implementation of protective actions.

Criterion 3.e.1: The ORO demonstrates the availability and appropriate use of adequate information regarding water, food supplies, milk, and agricultural production within the ingestion exposure pathway emergency planning zone for implementation of protective actions. NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, A.3; C.1, 4; J.11)

Extent of Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a full-scale or functional exercise, an actual event, or by means of drills conducted at any time.

Applicable OROs must demonstrate the capability to secure and use current information on the locations of dairy farms, meat and poultry producers, fisheries, fruit growers, vegetable growers, grain producers, food processing plants, and water supply intake points to implement protective actions within the EPZ. OROs use Federal resources as identified in the NRF Nuclear / Radiological Incident Annex, and other resources (e.g., compacts, nuclear insurers), if available. Evaluation of this criterion will take into consideration the level of Federal and other resources participating in the exercise.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

New Hampshire Extent of Play

[redacted]

Criterion 3.e.2: Appropriate measures, strategies, and pre-printed instructional material are developed for implementing protective action decisions for contaminated water, food products, milk, and agricultural production. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, G.1, J.9, 11)

Extent of Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a full-scale or functional exercise, an actual event, or by means of drills conducted at any time.

OROs must demonstrate the development of measures and strategies for implementation of ingestion exposure pathway EPZ protective actions by formulating protective action information for the general public and food producers and processors. Demonstration of this criterion includes either pre-distributed public information material in the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ or the capability for rapid reproduction and distribution of appropriate reproduction-ready information and instructions to pre-determined individuals and businesses.

OROs must also demonstrate the capability to control, restrict, or prevent distribution of contaminated food by commercial sectors. Exercise play must include demonstration of communications and coordination among organizations to implement protective actions. Field play of implementation activities may be simulated. For example, communications and coordination with agencies responsible for enforcing food controls within the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ must be demonstrated, but actual communications with food producers and processors may be simulated.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

New Hampshire Extent of Play

[redacted]

Sub-element 3.f – Implementation of Relocation, Re-entry, and Return Decisions

Intent

This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to implement plans, procedures, and decisions for post-plume phase relocation, reentry, *and* return. *Implementation of these decisions is essential for protecting the public from direct long-term exposure to deposited radioactive materials from a severe incident at a commercial NPP.*

> ***Criterion 3.f.1: Decisions regarding controlled reentry of emergency workers and relocation and return of the public during the post-plume phase are coordinated with appropriate organizations and implemented. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, E.7; J.10.j; J.12; K.5.b; M.1, 3)***

Extent of Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a full-scale, functional, or tabletop exercise, an actual event, or by means of drills conducted at any time.

Relocation: OROs must demonstrate the capability to coordinate and implement decisions concerning relocation of individuals located in radiologically contaminated areas who were not previously evacuated. Such individuals must be relocated to an area(s) where radiological contamination will not expose the general public to doses that exceed the relocation PAGs. OROs must also demonstrate the capability to provide for short- or long-term relocation of evacuees who lived in an area(s) that has residual radiation levels above the (first-, second-, and 50-year) PAGs.

Areas of consideration must include the capability of OROs to communicate with other OROs regarding timing of actions, notification of the population of procedures for relocation, and notification of, and advice for, evacuated individuals who will be converted to relocation status in situations where they will not be able to return to their homes due to high levels of contamination. OROs must also demonstrate the capability to communicate instructions to the public regarding relocation decisions and intermediate-term housing for relocated persons.

Reentry: OROs must demonstrate the capability to control reentry and exit of individuals who are authorized by the ORO to temporarily reenter the restricted area during the post-plume (i.e., intermediate or late) phase to protect them from unnecessary radiation exposure. OROs must also demonstrate the capability to control exit of vehicles and other equipment to control the spread of contamination outside the restricted area(s). Individuals without specific radiological response missions, such as farmers for animal care, essential utility service personnel, or other members of the public who must reenter an evacuated area during the post-emergency phase must be limited to the lowest radiological exposure commensurate with completing their missions. Monitoring and decontamination facilities will be established as appropriate.

Examples of control procedures are: (1) assignment of, or checking for, direct-reading and permanent record dosimetry for emergency workers; (2) questions regarding the individuals' objective(s), location(s) expected to be visited, and associated timeframes; (3) maps and plots of radiation exposure rates; (4) advice on areas to avoid; (5) procedures for exit, including monitoring of individuals, vehicles, and equipment; (6) decision criteria regarding contamination; (7) proper disposition of emergency worker dosimetry, and (8) maintenance of emergency worker radiation exposure records.

Return: OROs must demonstrate the capability to implement policies concerning return of members of the public to areas that were evacuated during the plume phase. OROs must demonstrate the capability

to identify and prioritize services and facilities that require restoration within a few days, and to identify procedures and resources for their restoration. Examples of these services and facilities are medical and social services, utilities, roads, and schools.

Communication among OROs for relocation, reentry, and return may be simulated. All simulated or actual contacts must be documented. These discussions may be accomplished in a group setting.

OROs must use Federal resources as identified in the NRF Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex, and other resources (e.g., compacts or nuclear insurers), if available. Evaluation of this criterion will take into consideration the level of Federal and other resources participating in the exercise.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

New Hampshire Extent of Play

[redacted]

EVALUATION AREA 4: Field Measurement and Analysis

Sub-element 4.a – Plume Phase Field Measurements and Analyses

Intent

This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to deploy FMTs with the equipment, methods, and expertise necessary to determine the location of airborne radiation and particulate deposition on the ground from an airborne plume. In addition, NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1 indicates that OROs must have the capability to use FMTs within the plume exposure pathway EPZ to detect airborne radioiodine in the presence of noble gases and radioactive particulate material in the airborne plume. In an incident at an NPP, the possible release of radioactive material may pose a risk to the nearby population and environment. Although incident assessment methods are available to project the extent and magnitude of a release, these methods are subject to large uncertainties. During an incident, it is important to collect field radiological data to help characterize any radiological release. Adequate equipment and procedures are essential to such field measurement efforts.

Criterion 4.a.1: [RESERVED]

Criterion 4.a.2: Field teams (2 or more) are managed to obtain sufficient information to help characterize the release and to control radiation exposure. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, C.1; H.12; I.7, 8, 11; J.10.a)

Extent of Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a full-scale, functional, or tabletop exercise. Other means may include drills, seminars or training activities that would fully demonstrate technical proficiency.

Responsible OROs must demonstrate the capability to brief FMTs on predicted plume location and direction, plume travel speed, and exposure control procedures before deployment. During an HAB incident, the Field Team management must keep the incident command informed of field monitoring teams' activities and location. Coordination with FMTs and field monitoring may be demonstrated as out-of-sequence demonstrations, as negotiated in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

Field measurements are needed to help characterize the release and support the adequacy of implemented protective actions, or to be a factor in modifying protective actions. Teams must be directed to take measurements at such locations and times as necessary to provide sufficient information to characterize the plume and its impacts.

If the responsibility for obtaining peak measurements in the plume has been accepted by licensee field monitoring teams, with concurrence from OROs, there is no requirement for these measurements to be repeated by ORO monitoring teams. If the licensee FMTs do not obtain peak measurements in the plume, it is the ORO's decision as to whether peak measurements are necessary to sufficiently characterize the plume. The sharing and coordination of plume measurement information among all FMTs (licensee, Federal, and ORO) is essential. Coordination concerning transfer of samples, including a chain-of-custody form(s), to a radiological laboratory(ies) must be demonstrated.

OROs must use Federal resources as identified in the NRF Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex and other resources (e.g., compacts or the licensee). Evaluation of this criterion will take into consideration the level of Federal and other resources participating in the exercise.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

New Hampshire Extent of Play

[redacted]

Criterion 4.a.3: ***Ambient radiation measurements are made and recorded at appropriate locations, and radioiodine and particulate samples are collected. Teams will move to an appropriate low background location to determine whether any significant (as specified in the plan and/or procedures) amount of radioactivity has been collected on the sampling media. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, C.1; H.12: I.8, 9; J.10.a)***

Extent of Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a full-scale, functional, or tabletop exercise. Other means may include drills, seminars or training activities that would fully demonstrate technical proficiency.

Two or more FMTs must demonstrate the capability to make and report measurements of ambient radiation to the field team coordinator, dose assessment team, or other appropriate authority. FMTs must also demonstrate the capability to obtain an air sample for measurement of airborne radioiodine and particulates, and to provide the appropriate authority with field data pertaining to measurement. If samples have radioactivity significantly above background, the authority must consider the need for expedited laboratory analyses of these samples.
OROs must share data in a timely manner with all other appropriate OROs. All methodology, including contamination control, instrumentation, preparation of samples, and a chain-of-custody form(s) for transfer to a laboratory(ies), will be in accordance with the ORO's plans / procedures.

OROs must use Federal resources as identified in the NRF Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex and other resources (e.g., compacts or the licensee). Evaluation of this criterion will take into consideration the level of Federal and other resources participating in the exercise.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

New Hampshire Extent of Play

[redacted]

Note: If during the exercise, a participant demonstrates this sub-element unsatisfactorily, the FEMA Evaluator will inform the participant and the Controller. After an "on the spot" re-training by the state or local organization, the FEMA Evaluator will provide the participant another opportunity to re-demonstrate the activity that same day.

Sub-element 4.b – Post Plume Phase Field Measurements and Sampling

Intent

This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to assess the actual or potential magnitude and locations of radiological hazards to determine the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ and to support relocation, reentry, and return decisions. This Sub-element focuses on collecting environmental samples for laboratory analyses that are essential for decisions on protecting the public from contaminated food and water and direct radiation from deposited materials.

***Criterion 4.b.1: The field teams (2 or more) demonstrate the capability to make appropriate measurements and to collect appropriate samples (e.g., food crops, milk, water, vegetation, and soil) to support adequate assessments and protective action decision making.* (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, C.1; I.8; J.11)**

Extent of Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a full-scale, functional, or tabletop exercise. Other means may include drills, seminars or training activities that would fully demonstrate technical proficiency.

The ORO's FMTs must demonstrate the capability to take measurements and samples, at such times and locations as directed, to enable an adequate assessment of the ingestion pathway and to support reentry, relocation, and return decisions. When resources are available, use of aerial surveys and in-situ gamma measurement is appropriate. All methodology, including contamination control, instrumentation, preparation of samples, and chain-of-custody form(s) for transfer to a laboratory(ies), will be in accordance with the ORO's plans / procedures.

The FMTs and/or other sampling personnel must secure ingestion pathway samples from agricultural products and water. Samples in support of relocation and return must be secured from soil, vegetation, and other surfaces in areas that received radioactive ground deposition.

OROs must use Federal resources as identified in the NRF Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex and other resources (e.g., compacts, the licensee, or nuclear insurers). Evaluation of this criterion will take into consideration the level of Federal and other resources participating in the exercise.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

New Hampshire Extent of Play

[redacted]

Sub-element 4.c - Laboratory Operations

Intent

This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to perform laboratory analyses of radioactivity in air, liquid, and environmental samples to support protective action decision making.

Criterion 4.c.1: The laboratory is capable of performing required radiological analyses to support protective action decisions. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, C.1, 3; J.11)

Extent of Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a full-scale, functional, or tabletop exercise. Other means may include drills, seminars or training activities that would fully demonstrate technical proficiency.

The laboratory staff must demonstrate the capability to follow appropriate procedures for receiving samples, including logging information, preventing contamination of the laboratory(ies), preventing buildup of background radiation due to stored samples, preventing cross contamination of samples, preserving samples that may spoil (e.g., milk), and keeping track of sample identity. In addition, the laboratory staff must demonstrate the capability to prepare samples for conducting measurements.

The laboratory(ies) must be appropriately equipped to provide, upon request, timely analyses of media of sufficient quality and sensitivity to support assessments and decisions anticipated in the ORO's plans / procedures. The laboratory instrument calibrations must be traceable to standards provided by the National Institute of Standards and Technology. Laboratory methods used to analyze typical radionuclides released in a reactor incident must be as described in the plans / procedures. New or revised methods may be used to analyze atypical radionuclide releases (e.g., transuranics or as a result of a terrorist incident) or if warranted by incident circumstances. Analysis may require resources beyond those of the ORO.

The laboratory staff must be qualified in radio-analytical techniques and contamination control procedures.

OROs must use Federal resources as identified in the NRF Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex and other resources (e.g., compacts, the licensee, or nuclear insurers). Evaluation of this criterion will take into consideration the level of Federal and other resources participating in the exercise.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

New Hampshire Extent of Play

[redacted]

EVALUATION AREA 5: Emergency Notification and Public Information

Sub-element 5.a – Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System

Intent

This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to provide prompt instructions to the public within the plume exposure pathway EPZ. Specific provisions addressed in this Sub-element are derived from the Guide for the Evaluation of Alert and Notification Systems for Nuclear Power Plants, FEMA-REP-10 (November 1985).

> ***Criterion 5.a.1: Activities associated with primary alerting and notification of the public are completed in a timely manner following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. The initial instructional message to the public must include as a minimum the elements required by current REP guidance. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, E.5, 6, 7)***

Extent of Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a full-scale or functional exercise, drills, or operational testing of equipment that would fully demonstrate capability.

Responsible OROs must demonstrate the capability to sequentially provide an alert signal followed by an initial instructional message to populated areas (permanent resident and transient) throughout the 10-mile plume EPZ. Following the decision to activate the alert and notification system, OROs must complete system activation for primary alert / notification and disseminate the information / instructions in a timely manner. For exercise purposes, timely is defined as with a sense of urgency and without

undue delay. If message dissemination is identified as not having been accomplished in a timely manner, the evaluator(s) will document a specific delay or cause as to why a message was not considered timely.

Procedures to broadcast the message must be fully demonstrated as they would in an actual emergency up to the point of transmission. Broadcast of the message(s) or test message(s) is not required. The procedures must be demonstrated up to the point of actual activation. The alert signal activation should be simulated, not performed. Evaluations of EAS broadcast stations may also be accomplished through SAVs.

The capability of the primary notification system to broadcast an instructional message on a 24-hour basis must be verified during an interview with appropriate personnel from the primary notification system, including verification of provisions for backup power or an alternate station.

The initial message must include at a minimum the following elements:

- Identification of the ORO responsible and the official with authority for providing the alert signal and instructional message;
- Identification of the commercial NPP and a statement that an emergency exists there;
- Reference to REP-specific emergency information (e.g., brochures, calendars, and/or information in telephone books) for use by the general public during an emergency;
- A closing statement asking that the affected and potentially affected population stay tuned for additional information, or that the population tune to another station for additional information.

If route alerting is demonstrated as a primary method of alert and notification, it must be done in accordance with the ORO's plans / procedures and the Extent-of-Play Agreement. OROs must demonstrate the capability to accomplish the primary route alerting in a timely manner (not subject to specific time requirements). At least one route needs to be demonstrated and evaluated. The selected route(s) must vary from exercise to exercise. However, the most difficult route(s) must be demonstrated no less than once every 8 years. All alert and notification activities along the route(s) must be simulated (that is, the message that would actually be used is read for the evaluator, but not actually broadcast) as negotiated in the extent of play. Actual testing of the mobile public address system will be conducted at an agreed-upon location.

OROs may demonstrate any means of primary alert and notification included in their plans / procedures as negotiated in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

New Hampshire Extent of Play

Criterion 5.a.2: [RESERVED]

Criterion 5.a.3: Backup alert and notification of the public is completed within a reasonable time following the detection by the ORO of a failure of the primary alert and notification system. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, E.6, Appendix 3.B.2.c)

Extent of Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a full-scale or functional exercise, drills, or operational testing of equipment that would fully demonstrate capability.

If the exercise scenario calls for failure of any portion of the primary system(s) or if any portion of the primary system(s) actually fails to function during the exercise, OROs must demonstrate backup means of alert and notification. Backup means of alert and notification will differ from facility to facility.

Backup alert and notification procedures that would be implemented in multiple stages must be structured such that the population closest to the plant (e.g., within 2 miles) is alerted and notified first. The populations farther away and downwind of any potential radiological release would be covered sequentially (e.g., 2 to 5 miles, followed by downwind 5 to 10 miles, and finally the remaining population as directed by authorities). Topography, population density, existing ORO resources, and timing will be considered in judging the acceptability of backup means of alert and notification.

Although circumstances may not allow this for all situations, FEMA and the NRC recommend that OROs and operators attempt to establish backup means that will reach those in the plume exposure EPZ within a reasonable time of failure of the primary alert and notification system, with a recommended goal of 45 minutes. The backup alert message must, at a minimum, include (1) a statement that an emergency exists at the plant and (2) instructions regarding where to obtain additional information.

If backup route alerting is demonstrated, only one route needs to be selected and demonstrated. All alert and notification activities along the route(s) must be simulated (that is, the message that would actually be used is read for the evaluator, but not actually broadcast), as negotiated in the extent of play. Actual testing of the mobile public address system will be conducted at an agreed-upon location.

OROs may demonstrate any means of backup alert and notification included in their plans / procedures as negotiated in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

New Hampshire Extent of Play

[redacted]

Criterion 5.a.4: Activities associated with FEMA-approved exception areas (where applicable) are completed in a timely manner following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, E.6; Appendix 3.B.2.c)

Extent of Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a full-scale or functional exercise, drills, or operational testing of equipment that would fully demonstrate capability.

OROs with FEMA-approved exception areas (identified in the approved Alert and Notification System Design Report), 5 to 10 miles from the NPP, must demonstrate the capability to accomplish primary alerting and notification of the exception area(s). FEMA and the NRC recommend that OROs and operators establish means that will reach those in approved exception areas in a timely manner, with a recommended goal of 45 minutes, once the initial decision is made by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an incident. The exception area alert message must, at a minimum, include (1) a statement that an emergency exists at the plant and (2) instructions regarding where to obtain additional information.

For exception area alerting, at least one route must be demonstrated and evaluated. The selected route(s) must vary from exercise to exercise. However, the most difficult route(s) must be demonstrated no less than once every 8 years. All alert and notification activities along the route(s) must be simulated (that is, the message that would actually be used is read for the evaluator, but not actually broadcasted) as negotiated in the extent of play. Actual testing of the mobile public address system will be conducted at an agreed-upon location. For exception areas alerted by aircraft, actual flights will be negotiated in the extent of play, but must be demonstrated no less than once every 8 years.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

New Hampshire Extent of Play

[redacted]

Sub-element 5.b – Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media

Intent

This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to disseminate appropriate emergency information and instructions, including any recommended protective actions, to the public. In addition, NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1 requires OROs to ensure that the capability exists for providing information to the media. This includes the availability of a physical location for use by the media during an emergency. NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1 also provides that a system must be available for dealing with rumors. This system will hereafter be known as the "public inquiry hotline."

Criterion 5.b.1: OROs provide accurate subsequent emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, E.5, 7; G.3.a, G.4.a, c)

Extent of Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a full-scale or functional exercise, or drills.

The responsible ORO personnel / representatives must demonstrate actions to provide emergency information and instructions to the public and media in a timely manner following the initial alert and notification (not subject to specific time requirements). For exercise purposes, timely is defined as with a sense of urgency and without undue delay. If message dissemination is identified as not having been accomplished in a timely manner, the evaluator(s) will document a specific delay or cause as to why a message was not considered timely.

Message elements: The ORO must ensure that emergency information and instructions are consistent with PADs made by appropriate officials. The emergency information must contain all necessary and applicable instructions (e.g., evacuation instructions, evacuation routes, reception center locations, what to take when evacuating, shelter-in-place instructions, information concerning protective actions for schools and persons with disabilities and access / functional needs, and public inquiry hotline telephone number) to assist the public in carrying out the PADs provided. The ORO must also be prepared to disclose and explain the ECL of the incident. At a minimum, this information must be included in media briefings and/or media releases. OROs must demonstrate the capability to use language that is clear and understandable to the public within both the plume and ingestion exposure pathway EPZs. This includes demonstration of the capability to use familiar landmarks and boundaries to describe protective action areas.

The emergency information must be all-inclusive by including the four items specified under exercise Demonstration Criterion 5.a.1 and previously identified protective action areas that are still valid, as well as new areas. The OROs must demonstrate the capability to ensure that emergency information that is no longer valid is rescinded and not repeated by broadcast media.

In addition, the OROs must demonstrate the capability to ensure that current emergency information is repeated at pre-established intervals in accordance with the plans / procedures. OROs must demonstrate the capability to develop emergency information in a non-English language when required by the plans / procedures.

If ingestion pathway measures are exercised, OROs must demonstrate that a system exists for rapid dissemination of ingestion pathway information to pre-determined individuals and businesses in accordance with the ORO's plans / procedures.

Media information: OROs must demonstrate the capability to provide timely, accurate, concise, and coordinated information to the news media for subsequent dissemination to the public. This would include demonstration of the capability to conduct timely and pertinent media briefings and distribute media releases as the incident warrants. The OROs must demonstrate the capability to respond appropriately to inquiries from the news media. All information presented in media briefings and releases must be consistent with PADs and other emergency information provided to the public. Copies of pertinent emergency information (e.g., EAS messages and media releases) and media information kits must be available for dissemination to the media.

Public inquiry: OROs must demonstrate that an effective system is in place for dealing with calls received via the public inquiry hotline. Hotline staff must demonstrate the capability to provide or obtain accurate information for callers or refer them to appropriate information source. Information from the hotline staff, including information that corrects false or inaccurate information when trends are noted, must be included, as appropriate, in emergency information provided to the public, media briefings, and/or media releases.

HAB considerations: The dissemination of information dealing with specific aspects of NPP security capabilities, actual or perceived adversarial (terrorist) force or threat, and tactical law enforcement response must be coordinated / communicated with appropriate security authorities, e.g., law enforcement and NPP security agencies, in accordance with ORO plans / procedures.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

New Hampshire Extent of Play



Note: If during the exercise, a participant demonstrates this sub-element unsatisfactorily, the FEMA Evaluator will inform the participant and the Controller. After an "on the spot" re-training by the state or local organization, the FEMA Evaluator will provide the participant another opportunity to re-demonstrate the activity that same day.

EVALUATION AREA 6: Support Operation/Facilities

Sub-element 6.a – Monitoring, Decontamination, and Registration of Evacuees

Intent

This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to implement radiological monitoring and decontamination of evacuees, while minimizing contamination of the facility. OROs must also have the capability to identify and register evacuees at reception centers.

Criterion 6.a.1: The reception center facility has appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide monitoring, decontamination, and registration of evacuees. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, A.3; C.4; J.10.h; J.12)

Extent of Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a full-scale or functional exercise, drills, or SAV.

Radiological monitoring, decontamination, and registration facilities for evacuees must be set up and demonstrated as they would be in an actual emergency or as indicated in the Extent-of-Play Agreement. OROs conducting this demonstration must have one-third of the resources (e.g., monitoring teams / instrumentation / portal monitors) available at the facility(ies) as necessary to monitor 20 percent of the population within a 12-hour period. This would include adequate space for evacuees' vehicles. Availability of resources can be demonstrated with valid documentation (e.g., MOU/LOA, etc.) reflecting how necessary equipment would be procured for the location. Plans / procedures must indicate provisions for service animals.

Before using monitoring instrument(s), the monitor(s) must demonstrate the process of checking the instrument(s) for proper operation. Staff responsible for the radiological monitoring of evacuees must demonstrate the capability to attain and sustain, within about 12 hours, a monitoring productivity rate per hour needed to monitor the 20 percent EPZ population planning base. The monitoring productivity rate per hour is the number of evacuees that can be monitored, per hour, by the total complement of monitors using an appropriate procedure. For demonstration of monitoring, decontamination, and registration capabilities, a minimum of six evacuees must be monitored per station using equipment and procedures specified in the plans / procedures. The monitoring sequences for the first six simulated evacuees per monitoring team will be timed by the evaluators to determine whether the 12-hour requirement can be met.

OROs must demonstrate the capability to register evacuees upon completion of the monitoring and decontamination activities. The activities for recording radiological monitoring and, if necessary, decontamination must include establishing a registration record consisting of the evacuee's name, address, results of monitoring, and time of decontamination (if any), or as otherwise designated in the plan and/or procedures. Audio recorders, camcorders, or written records are all acceptable means for registration.

Monitoring activities shall not be simulated. Monitoring personnel must explain use of trigger / action levels for determining the need for decontamination. They must also explain the procedures for referring any evacuees who cannot be adequately decontaminated for assessment and follow-up in accordance with the ORO's plans / procedures. Contamination of the evacuee(s) will be determined by controller inject and not simulated with any low-level radiation source. All activities must be based on the plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

Decontamination of evacuees may be simulated and conducted by interview. Provisions for separate showering and same-sex monitoring must be demonstrated or explained. The staff must demonstrate provisions for limiting the spread of contamination. Provisions could include floor coverings, signs, and appropriate means (e.g., partitions, roped-off areas) to separate uncontaminated from potentially contaminated areas. Provisions must also exist to separate contaminated and uncontaminated evacuees, provide changes of clothing for those with contaminated clothing; and store contaminated clothing and personal belongings to prevent further contamination of evacuees or facilities. In addition, for any evacuee found to be contaminated, procedures must be discussed concerning handling of potential contamination of vehicles and personal belongings. Waste water from decontamination operations does not need to be collected.

Individuals who have completed monitoring (and decontamination, if needed) must have means (e.g., hand stamp, sticker, bracelet, form, etc) indicating that they, and their service animals and vehicles, where applicable, have been monitored, cleared, and found to have no contamination or contamination below the trigger / action level.

In accordance with plans / procedures, individuals found to be clean after monitoring do not need to have their vehicle monitored. These individuals do not require confirmation that their vehicle is free from contamination prior to entering the congregate care areas.

However, those individuals who are found to be contaminated and are then decontaminated will have their vehicles impounded or monitored and decontaminated (if applicable) and do require confirmation that their vehicle is impounded or free from contamination prior to entering the congregate care areas.

New Hampshire Extent of Play

[redacted]

Note: If during the exercise, a participant demonstrates this sub-element unsatisfactorily, the FEMA Evaluator will inform the participant and the Controller. After an "on the spot" re-training by the state or local organization, the FEMA Evaluator will provide the participant another opportunity to re-demonstrate the activity that same day.

Sub-element 6.b – Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Worker Equipment

Intent

This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to implement radiological monitoring and decontamination of emergency workers and their equipment, inclusive of vehicles.

> ***Criterion 6.b.1: The facility/ORO has adequate procedures and resources to accomplish monitoring and decontamination of emergency workers and their equipment and vehicles. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, K.5.a, b)***

Extent of Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a full-scale or functional exercise, drills, or SAV.

The monitoring staff must demonstrate the capability to monitor emergency worker personnel and their equipment and vehicles for contamination in accordance with the ORO's plans / procedures.

Specific attention must be given to equipment, including any vehicles that were in contact with contamination. The monitoring staff must demonstrate the capability to make decisions on the need for decontamination of personnel, equipment, and vehicles based on trigger/action levels and procedures

stated in the ORO plans / procedures. Monitoring of emergency workers does not have to meet the 12-hour requirement. However, appropriate monitoring procedures must be demonstrated for a minimum of two emergency workers and their equipment and vehicles. Before using monitoring instrument(s), the monitor(s) must demonstrate the process of checking the instrument(s) for proper operation.

The area to be used for monitoring and decontamination must be set up as it would be in an actual emergency, with all route markings, instrumentation, record keeping, and contamination control measures in place. Monitoring procedures must be demonstrated for a minimum of one vehicle. It is generally not necessary to monitor the entire surface of vehicles. However, the capability to monitor areas such as radiator grills, bumpers, wheel wells, tires, and door handles must be demonstrated. Interior surfaces of vehicles that were in contact with contaminated individuals must also be checked.

Decontamination of emergency workers may be simulated and conducted via interview. Provisions for separate showering and same-sex monitoring must be demonstrated or explained. The staff must demonstrate provisions for limiting the spread of contamination. Provisions could include floor coverings, signs, and appropriate means (e.g., partitions, roped-off areas) to separate uncontaminated from potentially contaminated areas. Provisions must also exist to separate contaminated and uncontaminated individuals where applicable; provide changes of clothing for those with contaminated clothing; and store contaminated clothing and personal belongings to prevent further contamination of emergency workers or facilities.

Monitoring activities shall not be simulated. Monitoring personnel must explain use of trigger/action levels for determining the need for decontamination. They must also explain the procedures for referring any emergency workers who cannot be adequately decontaminated for assessment and follow-up in accordance with the ORO's plans / procedures. Contamination of the individual(s) will be determined by controller inject and not simulated with any low-level radiation source.

Decontamination capabilities and provisions for vehicles and equipment that cannot be successfully decontaminated may be simulated and conducted by interview. Waste water from decontamination operations does not need to be collected.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

New Hampshire Extent of Play

[redacted]

Note: If during the exercise, a participant demonstrates this sub-element unsatisfactorily, the FEMA Evaluator will inform the participant and the Controller. After an "on the spot" re-training by the state or local organization, the FEMA Evaluator will provide the participant another opportunity to re-demonstrate the activity that same day.

Sub-element 6.c - Temporary Care of Evacuees

Intent

This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires OROs to have the capability to establish relocation centers in host / support jurisdictions. The American Red Cross normally provides congregate care in support of OROs under existing letters of agreement.

> ***Criterion 6.c.1: Managers of congregate care facilities demonstrate that the centers have resources to provide services and accommodations consistent with American Red Cross planning guidelines. Managers demonstrate the procedures to assure that evacuees have been monitored for contamination and have been decontaminated as appropriate prior to entering congregate care facilities. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, J.10.h, J.12)***

Extent of Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a full-scale or functional exercise, drills, or SAV.

The evaluator must conduct a walk-through of the center to determine, through observation and inquiries, that the services and accommodations are consistent with applicable guidance.

For planning purposes, OROs must plan for a sufficient number of congregate care centers in host / support jurisdictions to accommodate a minimum of 20 percent of the EPZ population. In this simulation, it is not necessary to set up operations as they would be in an actual emergency. Alternatively, capabilities may be demonstrated by setting up stations for various services and providing those services to simulated evacuees. Given the substantial differences between demonstration and simulation of this criterion, exercise demonstration expectations must be clearly specified in Extent-of-Play Agreements.

Congregate care staff must also demonstrate the capability to ensure that evacuees, service animals, and vehicles have been monitored for contamination, decontaminated as appropriate, and registered before entering the facility.

Individuals arriving at congregate care facilities must have means (e.g., hand stamp, sticker, bracelet, form, etc.) indicating that they, and their service animals and vehicles, where applicable, have been monitored, cleared, and found to have no contamination or contamination below the trigger / action level.

In accordance with plans / procedures, individuals found to be clean after monitoring do not need to have their vehicle monitored. These individuals do not need confirmation that their vehicle is free from contamination prior to entering the congregate care areas.

However, those individuals who are found to be contaminated and are then decontaminated will have their vehicles monitored and decontaminated (if applicable) and does need confirmation that their vehicle is free from contamination prior to entering the congregate care areas. This capability may be determined through an interview process.

If operations at the center are demonstrated, material that would be difficult or expensive to transport (e.g., cots, blankets, sundries, and large-scale food supplies) need not be physically available at the

facility(ies). However, availability of such items must be verified by providing the evaluator a list of sources with locations and estimates of quantities.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

New Hampshire Extent of Play

[redacted]

Sub-element 6.d - Transportation and Treatment of Contaminated Injured Individuals

Intent

This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to transport contaminated injured individuals to medical facilities with the capability to provide medical services.

> ***Criterion 6.d.1: The facility/ORO has the appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide transport, monitoring, decontamination, and medical services to contaminated injured individuals. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, F.2; H.10; K.5.a, b; L.1, 4)***

Extent of Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a full-scale or functional exercise, or drills.

Monitoring, decontamination, and contamination control efforts must not delay urgent medical care for the victim. OROs must demonstrate the capability to transport contaminated injured individuals to medical facilities.

An ambulance must be used for response to the victim. However, to avoid taking an ambulance out of service for an extended time, OROs may use any vehicle (e.g., car, truck, or van) to transport the victim to the medical facility. Normal communications between the ambulance/dispatcher and the receiving medical facility must be demonstrated. If a substitute vehicle is used for transport to the medical facility, this communication must occur before releasing the ambulance from the drill. This communication would include reporting radiation monitoring results, if available. In addition, the ambulance crew must demonstrate, by interview, knowledge of where the ambulance and crew would be monitored and decontaminated, if required, or whom to contact for such information.

Monitoring of the victim may be performed before transport or en route, or may be deferred to the medical facility. Before using monitoring instruments, the monitor(s) must demonstrate the process of checking the instrument(s) for proper operation. All monitoring activities must be completed as they would be in an actual emergency. Appropriate contamination control measures must be demonstrated before and during transport and at the receiving medical facility.
The medical facility must demonstrate the capability to activate and set up a radiological emergency area for treatment. Equipment and supplies must be available for treatment of contaminated injured individuals.

The medical facility must demonstrate the capability to make decisions on the need for decontamination of the individual, follow appropriate decontamination procedures, and maintain records of all survey

measurements and samples taken. All procedures for collection and analysis of samples and decontamination of the individual must be demonstrated or described to the evaluator. Waste water from decontamination operations must be handled according to facility plans / procedures.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

New Hampshire Extent of Play

[redacted]

MASSACHUSETTS
EVALUATION AREAS AND EXTENT OF PLAY
SEABROOK NUCLEAR POWER STATION HOSTILE ACTION BASED EXERCISE
November 5, 2014

Overview

The following organizations/locations will demonstrate in 2014:

State Emergency Operations Center
Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency
Massachusetts Department of Public Health
Massachusetts State Police
Massachusetts Department of Transportation
Massachusetts National Guard
Massachusetts Department of Mental Health
Mass 2-1-1 Call Center
American Red Cross
Federal Emergency Management Agency Region I
NextEra Energy Seabrook Station Liaison

Region I Emergency Operations Center
Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency – Region I
Massachusetts State Police – Troop A
MassDOT
Massachusetts Department of Mental Health
American Red Cross
Central Medical Emergency Direction (C-Med)
Region I EOC Volunteer Staff
RACES Volunteer Staff

Emergency Operations Facility
Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency
Massachusetts Department of Public Health/Radiation Control Program
NextEra Energy Seabrook Station

Radiological Field Monitoring and Sampling Teams
Massachusetts Department of Public Health/Radiation Control Program
NextEra Energy Seabrook Station

Joint Information Center
Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency
NextEra Energy Seabrook Station

EAS Radio Station
WBZ 1030 AM

Risk Jurisdictions
Amesbury EOC
Merrimac EOC
Newbury EOC
Newburyport EOC
Salisbury EOC
West Newbury EOC

Support Jurisdictions

The following demonstrations will be conducted out of sequence during TBD :

State Police Troop A, Danvers: TBD

The following organizations/locations will NOT demonstrate in 2014:

MassDOT, Scotland Rd, Newbury – demonstrated November 2008
State Transportation Staging Area – demonstrated June 2010
Local Transportation Staging Areas – demonstrated June 2010
Masconomet Reception Center – demonstrated June 2008

NOTE: There is standing FEMA umbrella approval for "On the Spot"

Note: If during the exercise, a participant demonstrates sub-element 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 4.a.3, 4.b.1 or 5.b.1, 6.a.1 and 6.b.1 unsatisfactorily, the FEMA Evaluator will inform the participant and the Controller. After an "on the spot" re-training by the state or local organization, the FEMA Evaluator will provide the participant another opportunity to re-demonstrate the activity that same day.

EVALUATION AREA 1: Emergency Operations Management

Sub-element 1.a – Mobilization

Intent

This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel, and activate and staff emergency facilities.

Criterion 1.a.1: OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, A.1.a, A.1.e, A.3, A.4; C.1, C.4, C.6; D.3, D.4; E.1, E.2; H.3, H.4)

Extent of Play

Responsible OROs must demonstrate the capability to receive notification of an incident from the licensee; verify the notification; and contact, alert, and mobilize key emergency personnel in a timely manner and demonstrate the ability to maintain and staff 24-hour operations. Twenty-four-hour operations can be demonstrated during the exercise via rosters or shift changes or otherwise in an actual activation. Local responders must demonstrate the ability to receive and/or initiate notification to the licensees or other respective emergency management organizations of an incident in a timely manner, when they receive information from the licensee or alternate sources. Responsible OROs must demonstrate the activation of facilities for immediate use by mobilized personnel upon their arrival. Activation of facilities and staff, including those associated with the Incident Command System, must be completed in accordance with ORO plans/procedures. The location and contact information for facilities included in the incident command must be available to all appropriate responding agencies and the NPP after these facilities have been activated.

Pre-staging of emergency personnel is appropriate, in accordance with the Extent-of-Play Agreement, at those facilities located beyond a normal commuting distance from the individual's duty location or residence. This could include the staggered release of resources from an assembly area. Additionally, pre-staging of staff for out-of-sequence demonstrations may be used in accordance with the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

The REP program does not evaluate Incident Command Post tactical operations (e.g., Law Enforcement hostile action suppression techniques), only coordination among the incident command, the utility, and all appropriate OROs, pursuant to plans/procedures.

Initial law enforcement, fire service, HAZMAT, and emergency medical response to the NPP site may impact the ability to staff REP functions. The ability to identify and request additional resources or identify compensatory measures must be demonstrated. Exercises must also address the role of mutual aid in the incident, as appropriate. An integral part of the response to an HAB scenario at an NPP may also be within the auspices of the Federal Government (e.g., FBI, NRC, or DHS). Protocols for requesting Federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement support must be demonstrated, as appropriate. Any resources must be on the ORO's mobilization list so they can be contacted during an incident, if needed.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

Massachusetts Extent of Play

The notification process for state and local responders will be completed, and call down rosters will be shown to the FEMA Evaluator.

State EOC: —Massachusetts Emergency Management (MEMA) SEOC emergency staff, including the Massachusetts Emergency Support Functions Team staff (Massachusetts Department of Public Health (MDPH), Massachusetts Department of Transportation (MassDOT), Massachusetts Department of Mental Health (MDMH), Massachusetts State Police (MSP), Massachusetts Army National Guard (MANG), and American Red Cross (ARC), the State Public Information Line staff, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and the Seabrook Nuclear Power Station Liaison.

The MASS 211 Call Center will be activated for an event at Seabrook Station.

Region I EOC—MEMA Region I EOC staff and emergency volunteer staff.

Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) – Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency (MEMA) and Massachusetts Department of Public Health (MDPH).

Joint Information Center (JIC) – The JIC may be pre-staged. Although it is possible that a "Virtual JIC" may be opened at MEMA's SEOC for a HAB incident.

NIAT Field Monitoring Team Personnel: Field Team personnel will be in the area awaiting notification. Once notified to report, they will use a compressed time: 10 minutes/hour of normal travel response time.

Community EOCs: Due to time constraints Municipalities may pre-stage their personnel for HAB exercises. Evaluator will conduct an interview of how the municipality would activate.

Transportation Providers – Calls will be made to five transportation providers to verify the contact information and resources (drivers and vehicles) under the LOA. A Controller message will provide the number of vehicles and drivers available for exercise play. No vehicles or personnel will be mobilized.

Sub-element 1.b – Facilities

Intent

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which provides that Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) have facilities to support the emergency response.

Criterion 1.b.1: Facilities are sufficient to support the emergency response. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, H.3; G.3.a; J.10.h; J.12; K.5.b)

Extent of Play

Responsible OROs must demonstrate, no less than once every eight years, the availability of facilities to support accomplishment of emergency operations (this includes all alternate and backup facilities). Evaluations are typically performed for EOCs and JICs, as well as other facilities such as

reception/relocation centers. Some of the areas evaluated within the facilities are adequate space, furnishings, lighting, restrooms, ventilation, access to backup power, and/or alternate facility, if required to support
operations. Radio stations, laboratories, initial warning points and hospitals are not evaluated under 1.b.1.

In addition, facilities will be evaluated for this criterion during the first biennial exercise after any new or substantial changes in structure, equipment, or mission that affect key capabilities, as outlined in respective emergency plans/procedures. A substantial change is one that has a direct effect or impact on emergency response operations performed in those facilities. Examples of substantial changes include: modifying the size or configuration of an emergency operations center, adding more function to a center, or changing the equipment available for use in a center.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

Massachusetts Extent of Play

Communities will demonstrate this criteria during federal evaluation (generally once per 8 year cycle) unless new or substantial improvements occur. All EPZ EOCs, as well as MEMA's Region I EOC will be evaluated during this exercise. MEMA's State EOC has been evaluated during the Pilgrim Exercise on April 30, 2014.

The Incident Command Post will not be evaluated with this criteria during this Hostile Action Based Exercise.

Sub-element 1.c - Direction and Control

Intent

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which provides that Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) have the capability to control their overall response to an emergency.

Criterion 1.c.1: Key personnel with leadership roles for the ORO provide direction and control to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible. (NUREG-0654, A.1.d; A.2.a, b; A.3; C.4, 6)

Extent of Play

Leadership personnel must demonstrate the ability to carry out the essential management functions of the response effort (e.g., keeping staff informed through periodic briefings and/or other means, coordinating with other OROs, and ensuring completion of requirements and requests.) Leadership must demonstrate the ability to prioritize resource tasking and replace/supplement resources (e.g., through MOUs or other agreements) when faced with competing demands for finite resources. Any resources identified through LOA/MOUs must be on the ORO's mobilization list so they may be contacted during an incident, if needed.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

Massachusetts Extent of Play

If a community is directed to evacuate, EOC personnel will demonstrate continuity of government through a discussion of logistics with the FEMA Evaluator. Closing of the local EOC and relocation will be simulated.

Sub-element 1.d – Communications Equipment

Intent

This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs establish and operate reliable primary and backup communication systems to ensure communications with key emergency personnel at locations such as contiguous governments within the EPZ, Federal emergency response organizations, the licensee and its facilities, EOCs, Incident Command Posts, and FMTs.

> ***Criterion 1.d.1: At least two communication systems are available, at least one operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations. Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, F.1, 2)***

Extent of Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion is accomplished initially in a baseline evaluation and subsequently in periodic testing and drills. System familiarity and use must be demonstrated as applicable in biennial or tabletop exercise, or if their use would be required, during an actual event

OROs must demonstrate that a primary system, and at least one backup system for fixed facilities, is fully functional at all times. Communications systems are maintained and tested on a recurring basis throughout the assessment period and system status is available to all operators. Periodic test results and corrective actions are maintained on a real time basis. If a communications system or systems are not functional, but exercise performance is not affected, no exercise issue will be assessed.

Communications equipment and procedures for facilities and field units are used as needed for transmission and receipt of exercise messages. All facilities, FMTs, and incident command must have the capability to access at least one communication system that is independent of the commercial telephone system. Responsible OROs must demonstrate the capability to manage the communication systems and ensure that all message traffic is handled without delays that might disrupt emergency operations. OROs must ensure that a coordinated communication link for fixed and mobile medical support facilities exists. *Exercise scenarios may require the failure of a communication system and use of an alternate system, as negotiated in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.*

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

Massachusetts Extent of Play

Contact with locations not playing will be simulated. See Extent of Play Overview for the listing of facilities that will be playing during the exercise (pages 1-3).

NOTE: "On the Spot" corrections approved for the fore mentioned sub-element. That portion of the evaluation element relating to both the proper functionality of communications systems

and the proper use of those systems. This portion of the criterion that deals with performance only.

Note: If during the exercise, a participant demonstrates this sub-element unsatisfactorily, the FEMA Evaluator will inform the participant and the Controller. After an "on the spot" re-training by the state or local organization, the FEMA Evaluator will provide the participant another opportunity to re-demonstrate the activity that same day.

Sub-element 1.e – Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations

Intent

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which provides that Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) have emergency equipment and supplies adequate to support the emergency response.

> ***Criterion 1.e.1: Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, potassium iodide (KI), and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, H.7, 10; I.7, 8, 9; J.10.a, b, e; J.11, 12; K.3.a; K.5.b)***

Extent of Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion is accomplished primarily through a baseline evaluation and subsequent periodic inspections.

A particular facility's equipment and supplies must be sufficient and consistent with that facility's assigned role in the ORO's emergency operations plans. Use of maps and other displays is encouraged. For non-facility-based operations, the equipment and supplies must be sufficient and consistent with the assigned operational role. At locations where traffic and access control personnel are deployed, appropriate equipment (e.g., vehicles, barriers, traffic cones, and signs) must be available, or their availability described.

Specific equipment and supplies that must be demonstrated under this criterion include KI inventories, dosimetry, and monitoring equipment, as follows:

KI: Responsible OROs must demonstrate the capability to maintain inventories of KI sufficient for use by: (1) emergency workers; (2) institutionalized individuals, as indicated in capacity lists for facilities; and (3) where stipulated by the plans / procedures, members of the general public (including transients) within the plume pathway EPZ. In addition, OROs must demonstrate provisions to make KI available to specialized response teams (e.g., civil support team, Special Weapons and Tactics Teams, urban search and rescue, bomb squads, HAZMAT, or other ancillary groups) as identified in plans / procedures). The plans / procedures must include the forms to be used for documenting emergency worker ingestion of KI, as well as a mechanism for identifying emergency workers that have declined KI in advance. Consider carefully the placement of emergency workers that have declined KI in advance.

ORO quantities of dosimetry and KI available and storage locations(s) will be confirmed by physical inspection at the storage location(s) or through documentation of current inventory submitted during the exercise, provided in the ALC submission, and/or verified during an SAV. Available supplies of KI must be within the expiration date indicated on KI bottles or blister packs. As an alternative, the ORO may produce a letter from a certified private or state laboratory indicating that the KI supply remains potent, in accordance with U.S. Pharmacopoeia standards.

Dosimetry: Sufficient quantities of appropriate direct-reading and permanent record dosimetry and dosimeter chargers must be available for issuance to all emergency workers who will be dispatched to perform an ORO mission. In addition, OROs must demonstrate provisions to make dosimetry available to specialized response teams (e.g., civil support team, Special Weapons and Tactics Teams, urban search and rescue, bomb squads, HAZMAT, or other ancillary groups) as identified in plans / procedures).

Appropriate direct-reading dosimetry must allow an individual(s) to read the administrative reporting limits and maximum exposure limits contained in the ORO's plans / procedures.

Direct-reading dosimeters must be zeroed or operationally checked prior to issuance. The dosimeters must be inspected for electrical leakage at least annually and replaced when necessary. Civil Defense Victoreen Model 138s (CD V-138s) (0-200 mR), due to their documented history of electrical leakage problems, must be inspected for electrical leakage at least quarterly and replaced when necessary. This leakage testing will be verified during the exercise, through documentation submitted in the ALC and/or through an SAV.

Operational checks and testing of electronic dosimeters must be in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions and be verified during the exercise, through documentation submitted in the ALC and/or through an SAV.

Monitoring Instruments: All instruments must be inspected, inventoried, and operationally checked before each use. Instruments must be calibrated in accordance with the manufacturer's recommendations. Unmodified CDV-700 series instruments and other instruments without a manufacturer's recommendation must be calibrated annually. Modified CDV-700 instruments must be calibrated in accordance with the recommendation of the modification manufacturer. A label indicating such calibration must be on each instrument or calibrated frequency can be verified by other means. In addition, instruments being used to measure activity must have a sticker-affixed to their sides indicating the effective range of the readings. The range of readings documentation specifies the acceptable range of readings that the meter should indicate when it is response-checked using a standard test source.

For FMTs, the instruments must be capable of measuring gamma exposure rates and detecting beta radiation. These instruments must be capable of measuring a range of activity and exposure, including radiological protection/exposure control of team members and detection of activity on air sample collection media, consistent with the intended use of the instrument and the ORO's plans / procedures. An appropriate radioactive check source must be used to verify proper operational response for each low-range radiation measurement instrument (less than 1R/hr) and for high-range instruments when available. If a source is not available for a high-range instrument, a procedure must exist to operationally test the instrument before entering an area where only a high-range instrument can make useful readings.

In areas where portal monitors are used, the OROs must set up and operationally check the monitor(s). The monitor(s) must conform to the standards set forth in the Contamination Monitoring Standard for a Portal Monitor Used for Emergency Response, FEMA-REP-21 (March 1995) or in accordance with the manufacturer's recommendations.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

Massachusetts Extent of Play

Participating facilities will demonstrate that equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, KI and other supplies are adequate and sufficient to support the emergency response.

Documentation of dosimetry inspection, dosimetry inventory and KI inventory will be available for review at the Region I office.

Note: FEMA will provide copies of the Annual Letter of Certification to evaluators, as appropriate.

NOTE: "On the Spot" corrections approved for the fore mentioned sub-element. That portion of the evaluation element where players are initially unable to show proper equipment, supplies or documentation. This portion of the criterion that deal with performance only.

Note: If during the exercise, a participant demonstrates this sub-element unsatisfactorily, the FEMA Evaluator will inform the participant and the Controller. After an "on the spot" re-training by the state or local organization, the FEMA Evaluator will provide the participant another opportunity to re-demonstrate the activity that same day.

EVALUATION AREA 2: Protective Action Decision-Making

Sub-element 2.a - Emergency Worker Exposure Control

Intent

This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to assess and control the radiation exposure received by emergency workers and have a decision chain in place, as specified in the ORO's plans/procedures, to authorize emergency worker exposure limits to be exceeded for specific missions.

Radiation exposure limits for emergency workers are the recommended accumulated dose limits or exposure rates that emergency workers may be permitted to incur during an emergency. These limits include any pre-established administrative reporting limits (that take into consideration TEDE or organ- specific limits) identified in the ORO's plans/procedures.

Criterion 2.a.1: OROs use a decision-making process, considering relevant factors and appropriate coordination, to ensure that an exposure control system, including the use of KI, is in place for emergency workers including provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or protective action guides. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, C.6; J.10. e, f; K.3.a;k.4)

Extent of Play

OROs authorized to send emergency workers into the plume exposure pathway EPZ should demonstrate a capability to meet the criterion based on their emergency plans and procedures.

Responsible OROs should demonstrate the capability to make decisions concerning the authorization of exposure levels in excess of pre-authorized levels and to the number of emergency workers receiving radiation dose above pre-authorized levels.

As appropriate, OROs should demonstrate the capability to make decisions on the distribution and administration of KI as a protective measure, based on the ORO's plan and/or procedures or projected thyroid dose compared with the established Protective Action Guides (PAGs) for KI administration.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed, as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.

Massachusetts Extent of Play

Protective action decisions are demonstrated at the Massachusetts State EOC by MEMA and MDPH, with input from Incident Commander (if HAB event) based upon information provided from the EOF and until the adversaries are confirmed to be neutralized from the Incident Command Post.

Radiation Control Program EOF staff will analyze utility, field team and meteorological data provided at the EOF to make a recommendation to the State EOC for their consideration in making protective action decisions.

Radiological briefings will be provided to address exposure limits, procedures to replace those personnel approaching exposure limits and how permission to exceed limits is obtained. Emergency workers will also be briefed on when to take KI. Distribution of KI to emergency workers will be simulated. MDPH will authorize use of KI when radiological conditions warrant its use. If the scenario has no potential for a radiological release, the decision on the distribution and administration of KI as a protective measure for emergency workers and the authorization process for emergency workers to exceed pre-authorized levels can be addressed through an interview.

Sub-element 2.b. - Radiological Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations and Decisions for the Plume Phase of the Emergency

Intent

This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to independently project integrated dose from projected or actual dose rates and compare these estimates to the PAGs.

OROs must have the capability to choose, among a range of protective actions, those most appropriate in a given emergency. OROs base these choices on PAGs from their plans/procedures or EPA's Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents and other criteria, such as plant conditions, licensee PARs, coordination of PADs with other political jurisdictions (e.g., other affected OROs and incident command), availability of in-place shelter, weather conditions, and situations, to include HAB incidents, the threat posed by the specific hostile action, the affiliated response, and the effect of an evacuation on the threat response effort, that create higher than normal risk from general population evacuation.

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Criterion 2.b.1: Appropriate protective action recommendations are based on available information on plant conditions, field monitoring data, and licensee and ORO dose

projections, as well as knowledge of onsite and offsite environmental conditions. **(NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, I.10 and Supplement 3)**

Extent of Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion must be accomplished concurrently with a licensee exercise and may be demonstrated in a biennial or tabletop exercise.

During the initial stage of the emergency response, following notification of plant conditions that may warrant offsite protective actions, the ORO must demonstrate the capability to use appropriate means, described in the plans/procedures, to develop PARs for decision-makers based on available information and recommendations provided by the licensee as well as field monitoring data, if available. The ORO must also consider any release and meteorological data provided by the licensee.

The ORO must demonstrate a reliable capability to independently validate dose projections. The types of calculations to be demonstrated depend on the data available and the need for assessments to support the PARs must be appropriate to the scenario. In all cases, calculation of projected dose must be demonstrated. Projected doses must be related to quantities and units of the PAG to which they will be compared. PARs must be promptly transmitted to decision-makers in a pre-arranged format.

When the licensee and ORO projected doses differ by more than a factor of 10, the ORO and licensee must determine the source of the difference by discussing input data and assumptions, using different models, or exploring possible reasons. Resolution of these differences must be incorporated into the PARs if timely and appropriate. The ORO must demonstrate the capability to use any additional data to refine projected doses and exposure rates and revise the associated PARs.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

Massachusetts Extent of Play

This evaluation area will be demonstrated in accordance with the NIAT Handbook in the context of the exercise scenario.

The State EOC decision making team will evaluate the protective action recommendations of the NIAT accident assessment team and develop appropriate protective action decisions.

Protective action decisions are demonstrated at the Massachusetts State EOC by MEMA and MDPH, in concert with the Incident Commander (if HAB event) based upon information provided from the EOF and until the adversaries are confirmed to be neutralized from the Incident Command Post.

Protective action recommendations will be made in accordance with the MARERP and NIAT Handbook. MDPH will validate plant dose projections and coordinate resolution.

Criterion 2.b.2: A decision-making process involving consideration of appropriate factors and necessary coordination is used to make protective action decisions (PAD) for the general public (including the recommendation for the use of KI, if ORO policy). **(NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, A.3; C.4; D.4; J.9; J.10.f, m)**

Extent of Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion must be accomplished concurrently with a licensee exercise and may be demonstrated in a biennial or tabletop exercise.

OROs must have the capability to make both initial and subsequent PADs. OROs must demonstrate the capability to make initial PADs in a timely manner appropriate to the incident, based on information from the licensee, assessment of plant status and potential or actual releases, other available information related to the incident, input from appropriate ORO authorities (e.g., incident command), and PARs from the utility and ORO staff. In addition, a subsequent or alternate PAD may be appropriate if various conditions (e.g., an HAB incident, weather, release timing and magnitude) pose undue risk to an evacuation, or if evacuation may disrupt the efforts to respond to a hostile action.

OROs must demonstrate the ability to obtain supplemental resources (e.g., mutual aid) necessary to implement a PAD if local law enforcement, fire service, HAZMAT, and emergency medical resources are used to augment response to the NPP site or other key infrastructure.

Dose assessment personnel may provide additional PARs based on the subsequent dose projections, field monitoring data, or information on plant conditions. In addition, incident command must provide input regarding considerations for subsequent PARs based on the magnitude of the ongoing threat, the response, and/or site conditions. The decision-makers must demonstrate the capability to change protective actions based on the combination of all these factors.

If the ORO has determined that KI will be used as a protective measure for the general public under offsite plans/procedures, then it must demonstrate the capability to make decisions on the distribution and administration of KI to supplement sheltering and evacuation. This decision must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures or projected thyroid dose compared with the established PAG for KI administration. The KI decision-making process must involve close coordination with appropriate assessment and decision- making staff.

If more than one ORO is involved in decision making, all appropriate OROs must communicate and coordinate PADs with each other. In addition, decisions must be coordinated/communicated with incident command. OROs must demonstrate the capability to communicate the results of decisions to all the affected locations.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

Massachusetts Extent of Play

Protective action decisions are demonstrated at the Massachusetts State EOC based upon information provided by the EOF. MEMA and MDPH Radiation Control Program staff will analyze utility, field team and meteorological data provided at the EOF to make a recommendation to the State EOC for their consideration in making protective action decisions. In a HAB exercise Incident Command will be consulted as part of the decision making process until the adversaries are confirmed to be neutralized.

Sub-element 2.c - Protective Action Decisions Consideration for the Protection of Persons with Disabilities and Access/Functional Needs

Intent

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This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to determine PADs, including evacuation, sheltering, and use of KI, if applicable, for groups

of persons with disabilities and access/functional needs (e.g., hospitals, nursing homes, correctional facilities, schools, licensed daycare centers, mobility-impaired individuals, and transportation-dependent individuals). The focus is on those groups of persons with disabilities and access/functional needs that are, or potentially will be, affected by a radiological release from an NPP.

Criterion 2.c.1: Protective action decisions are made, as appropriate, for groups of persons with disabilities and access/functional needs. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1,D.4; J.9; J.10.d, e)

Extent of Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion must be accomplished concurrently with a licensee exercise and may be demonstrated in a biennial or tabletop exercise that would include the use of plant conditions transmitted from the licensee.

Usually it is appropriate to implement evacuation in areas where doses are projected to exceed the lower end of the range of PAGs, except for incidents where there is a high-risk environmental condition or where high-risk groups (e.g., the immobile or infirm) are involved. In these cases, factors that must be considered include weather conditions, shelter availability, availability of transportation assets, risk of evacuation versus risk from the avoided dose, and precautionary school evacuations. In addition, decisions must be coordinated/communicated with the incident command. In situations where an institutionalized population cannot be evacuated, the ORO must consider use of KI.

Applicable OROs must demonstrate the capability to alert and notify all public school systems/districts of emergency conditions that are expected to or may necessitate protective actions for students. Demonstration requires that the OROs actually contact public school systems/districts during the exercise.

In accordance with plans/procedures, OROs and/or officials of public school systems/districts must demonstrate the capability to make prompt decisions on protective actions for students. The decision-making process, including any preplanned strategies for protective actions for that ECL, must consider the location of students at the time (e.g., whether the students are still at home, en route to school, or at school).

Since other agencies place requirements on hospitals to prepare for contaminated patients, the REP Program has no need to evaluate these facilities, nor does the ORO have the responsibility to provide training or dosimetry.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

Massachusetts Extent of Play

Protective action decisions, including those for individuals with disabilities and access/functional needs population groups, are demonstrated at the Massachusetts State EOC based upon information provided by MEMA and MDPH Radiation Control Program staff at the EOF. MEMA and MDPH Radiation Control Program staff will analyze utility, field team and meteorological data provided at the EOF to make a recommendation to the State EOC for their consideration in making protective action decisions.

In a HAB exercise Incident Command will be consulted as part of the decision making process until the adversaries are confirmed to be neutralized.

Sub-element 2.d. –Radiological Assessment and Decision-Making for the Ingestion Exposure Pathway

Intent

This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the means to assess the radiological consequences for the ingestion exposure pathway, relate them to the appropriate PAGs, and make timely, appropriate PADs to mitigate exposure from the pathway.

During an incident at an NPP, a release of radioactive material may contaminate water supplies and agricultural products in the surrounding areas. Any such contamination would likely occur during the plume phase of the incident and, depending on the nature of the release, could impact the ingestion pathway for weeks or years.

> ***Criterion 2.d.1: Radiological consequences for the ingestion pathway are assessed and appropriate protective action decisions are made based on the ORO's planning criteria. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, A.3; C.1, 4; D.4; J.9, 11)***

Extent of Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion must be accomplished concurrently with a licensee exercise and may be demonstrated in a biennial or tabletop exercise that would include the use of plant conditions transmitted from the licensee.

OROs are expected to take precautionary actions to protect food and water supplies, or to minimize exposure to potentially contaminated water and food, in accordance with their respective plans/procedures. Often OROs initiate such actions based on criteria related to the facility's ECLs. Such actions may include recommendations to place milk animals on stored feed and use protected water supplies.

The ORO must use its procedures to assess the radiological consequences of a release on the food and water supplies, such as the development of a sampling plan. The ORO's assessment must include evaluation of the radiological analyses of representative samples of water, food, and other ingestible substances of local interest from potentially impacted areas; characterization of the releases from the facility; and the extent of areas potentially impacted by the release. During this assessment, OROs must consider use of agricultural and watershed data within the 50-mile EPZ. The radiological impacts on the food and water must then be compared to the appropriate ingestion PAGs contained in the ORO's plans/procedures. The plans/procedures contain PAGs based on specific dose commitment criteria or on criteria as recommended by current Food and Drug Administration (FDA) guidance. Timely and appropriate recommendations must be provided to the ORO decision-makers group for implementation decisions. OROs may also include a comparison of taking or not taking a given action on the resultant ingestion pathway dose commitments.

The ORO must demonstrate timely decisions to minimize radiological impacts from the ingestion pathway, based on the given assessments and other information. Any such decisions must be communicated and, to the extent practical, coordinated with neighboring OROs. These decisions include tracking agricultural products entering and leaving the EPZ. Demonstration of plans and procedures which use traffic access control points to track agricultural products entering and leaving the EPZ may be conducted through interview.

OROs will use Federal resources, as identified in the Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex of the NRF and other resources (e.g., compacts or nuclear insurers), as necessary. Evaluation of this criterion will take into consideration the level of Federal and other participating resources.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

Massachusetts Extent of Play

This sub-element will not be evaluated during this exercise.

Sub-element 2.e. – Radiological Assessment and Decision-Making Concerning Relocation, Re-entry, and Return

Intent

This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to make decisions on post-plume phase relocation, reentry, and return of the general public. These decisions are essential for protection of the public from direct long-term exposure to deposited radioactive materials from a severe incident at an NPP.

> ***Criterion 2.e.1: Timely relocation, re-entry, and return decisions are made and coordinated as appropriate, based on assessments of the radiological conditions and criteria in the ORO's plan and/or procedures. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, I.10; J.9; K.3.a; M.1)***

Extent of Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion must be accomplished concurrently with a licensee exercise and may be demonstrated in a full-scale, functional or tabletop exercise that would include the use of plant conditions transmitted from the licensee.

Relocation: OROs must demonstrate the capability to estimate integrated dose in contaminated areas and compare these estimates with PAGs; apply decision criteria for relocation of those individuals in the general public who have not been evacuated, but where actual or projected doses are in excess of relocation PAGs; and control access to evacuated and restricted areas.

OROs will make decisions for relocating members of the evacuated public who lived in areas that now have residual radiation levels in excess of the PAGs. Determination of areas to be restricted must be based on factors such as the mix of radionuclides in deposited materials, calculated exposure rates versus the PAGs, and analyses of vegetation and soil field samples.

Reentry: Decisions must be made on location of control points and policies regarding access and exposure control for emergency workers and members of the general public who need to temporarily enter the evacuated area to perform specific tasks or missions.

Examples of control procedures are the assignment of, or checking for, direct-reading and permanent record dosimetry for emergency workers; questions regarding an individual's objectives, locations expected to be visited, and associated timeframes; availability of maps and plots of radiation exposure rates; and advice on areas to avoid. Control procedures also include monitoring of individuals, vehicles, and equipment; the implementation of decision criteria regarding decontamination; and proper disposition of emergency worker dosimetry and maintenance of emergency worker radiation exposure records.

Responsible OROs must demonstrate the capability to develop a strategy for authorized reentry of individuals into the restricted zone(s), based on established decision criteria. OROs must demonstrate the capability to modify those policies for security purposes (e.g., police patrols), maintenance of essential services (e.g., fire protection and utilities), and other critical functions. They must demonstrate the capability to use decision-making criteria in allowing access to the restricted zone by the public for various reasons, such as to maintain property (e.g., to care for farm animals or secure machinery for storage) or retrieve important possessions. Coordinated policies for access and exposure control must be developed among all agencies with roles to perform in the restricted zone(s). OROs must demonstrate the capability to establish policies for provision of dosimetry to all individuals allowed to reenter the restricted zone(s). The extent to which OROs need to develop policies on reentry will be determined by scenario events.

Return: OROs must demonstrate the capability to implement policies concerning return of members of the public to areas that were evacuated during the plume phase (i.e., permitting populations that were previously evacuated to reoccupy their homes and businesses on an unrestricted basis). OROs must base decisions on environmental data and political boundaries or physical/ geological features, which allow identification of the boundaries of areas to which members of the general public may return. Return is permitted to the boundary of the restricted area(s) that is based on the relocation PAG.

Other factors that the ORO must consider in decision-making include conditions that permit cancellation of the ECL and relaxation of associated restrictive measures. OROs must base return recommendations on measurements of radiation from ground deposition. OROs must have the capability to identify services and facilities that require restoration within a few days and to identify the procedures and resources for their restoration. Examples of these services and facilities are medical and social services, utilities, roads, schools, and intermediate-term housing for relocated persons.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

Massachusetts Extent of Play

This sub-element will not be evaluated during this exercise.

EVALUATION AREA 3: Protective Action Implementation

Sub-element 3.a – Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control

Intent

This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to provide for the following: distribution, use, collection, and processing of direct-reading dosimetry and permanent record dosimetry; reading of direct-reading dosimetry by emergency workers at appropriate frequencies; maintaining a radiation dose record for each emergency worker; establishing a decision chain or authorization procedure for emergency workers to incur radiation exposures in excess of the PAGs, and the capability to provide KI for emergency workers, always applying the as low as is reasonably achievable principle as appropriate.

Criterion 3.a.1: The OROs issue appropriate dosimetry and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plans and procedures. Emergency workers periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, J.10.e; K.3.a, b; K.4)

Extent of Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a full-scale, functional or tabletop exercise. Other means may include drills, seminars or training activities that would fully demonstrate technical proficiency.

OROs must demonstrate the capability to provide emergency workers (including supplemental resources) with the appropriate direct-reading and permanent record dosimetry, dosimeter chargers, KI, and instructions on the use of these items. For evaluation purposes, appropriate direct-reading dosimetry is defined as dosimetry that allows an individual(s) to read the administrative reporting limits that are pre-established at a level low enough to consider subsequent calculation of TEDE and maximum exposure limits, for those emergency workers involved in lifesaving activities, contained in the ORO's plans / procedures.

Each emergency worker must have basic knowledge of radiation exposure limits as specified in the ORO's plans / procedures. If supplemental resources are used, they must be provided with just-in-time training to ensure basic knowledge of radiation exposure control. Emergency workers must demonstrate procedures to monitor and record dosimeter readings and manage radiological exposure control.

During a plume phase exercise, emergency workers must demonstrate the procedures to be followed when administrative exposure limits and turn-back values are reached. The emergency worker must report accumulated exposures during the exercise as indicated in the plans / procedures. OROs must demonstrate the actions described in the plans / procedures by determining whether to replace the worker, authorize the worker to incur additional exposures, or take other actions. If exercise play does not require emergency workers to seek authorizations for additional exposure, evaluators must interview at least two workers to determine their knowledge of whom to contact in case authorization is needed, and at what exposure levels. Workers may use any available resources (e.g., written procedures and/or coworkers) in providing responses.

Although it is desirable for all emergency workers to each have a direct-reading dosimeter, there may be situations where team members will be in close proximity to each other during the entire mission. In such cases, adequate control of exposure can be achieved for all team members using one direct-reading dosimeter worn by the team leader. Emergency workers assigned to low-exposure rate fixed facilities (e.g., EOCs and communications center within the EPZ, reception centers, and counting laboratories) may have individual direct-reading dosimeters or they may be monitored using group dosimetry (i.e., direct-reading dosimeters strategically placed in the work area). Each team member must still have his or her own permanent record dosimetry. Individuals authorized by the ORO to reenter an evacuated area during the plume (emergency) phase, must be limited to the lowest radiological exposure commensurate with completing their missions.

OROs may have administrative limits lower than EPA-400-R-92-001 dose limits for emergency workers performing various services (e.g., life-saving, protection of valuable property, all activities). OROs must ensure that the process used to seek authorization for exceeding dose limits does not negatively impact the capability to respond to an incident where life-saving and/or protection of valuable property may require an urgent response.

OROs must demonstrate the capability to accomplish distribution of KI to emergency workers consistent with decisions made. OROs must have the capability to develop and maintain lists of emergency workers who have ingested KI, including documentation of the date(s) and time(s) they did so. Ingestion of KI recommended by the designated ORO health official is voluntary. For evaluation purposes, the actual ingestion of KI shall not be performed. OROs must demonstrate the capability to formulate and disseminate instructions on using KI for those advised to take it. Emergency workers must demonstrate basic knowledge of procedures for using KI whether or not the scenario drives the implementation of KI use. This can be accomplished by an interview with the evaluator.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

Massachusetts Extent of Play

EPZ/RC EOCs: Dosimetry packets will be issued to a minimum of two individuals who will be working inside each EPZ EOC. Actual distribution and ingestion of KI will not occur. Knowledge of the use of dosimetry and Massachusetts policies on dosimetry will be demonstrated through an interview with the FEMA Evaluator and only with individuals issued dosimetry.

NOTE: "On the Spot" corrections approved for the fore mentioned sub-element. That portion of the evaluation element dealing with issuing of dosimetry and briefings. Also to be included is the demonstration by emergency worker knowledge of radiation control.

Note: If during the exercise, a participant demonstrates this sub-element unsatisfactorily, the FEMA Evaluator will inform the participant and the Controller. After an "on the spot" re-training by the state or local organization, the FEMA Evaluator will provide the participant another opportunity to re-demonstrate the activity that same day.

Sub-element 3.b – Implementation of KI Decision

Intent

This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to provide KI for institutionalized individuals, and, if in the plans / procedures, to the general public for whom immediate evacuation may not be feasible, very difficult, or significantly delayed. While it is necessary for OROs to have the capability to provide KI to institutionalized individuals, providing KI to the general public is an ORO option and must be reflected as such in ORO plans / procedures. Provisions must include the availability of adequate quantities, storage, and means of distributing KI.

Criterion 3.b.1: KI and appropriate instructions are available should a decision to recommend use of KI be made. Appropriate record keeping of the administration of KI for emergency workers and institutionalized individuals is maintained. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, J.10.e, f)

Extent of Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a full-scale, functional or tabletop exercise. Other means may include drills, seminars or training activities that would fully demonstrate technical proficiency.

OROs must demonstrate the capability to make KI available to institutionalized individuals, and, where provided for in their plans / procedures, to members of the general public. OROs must demonstrate the capability to accomplish distribution of KI consistent with decisions made.

OROs must have the capability to develop and maintain lists of institutionalized individuals who have ingested KI, including documentation of the date(s) and time(s) they were instructed to ingest KI. Ingestion of KI recommended by the designated ORO health official is voluntary. For evaluation purposes, the actual ingestion of KI shall not be performed. OROs must demonstrate the capability to formulate and disseminate instructions on using KI for those advised to take it.

If a recommendation is made for the general public to take KI, appropriate information must be provided to the public by the means of notification specified in the ORO's plans / procedures.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

Massachusetts Extent of Play

Actual distribution and ingestion of KI will not occur. Empty KI tablet containers (small zip-lock bags) will be included in the dosimetry packets for emergency workers.

NOTE: "On the Spot" corrections approved for the fore mentioned sub-element.

Note: If during the exercise, a participant demonstrates this sub-element unsatisfactorily, the FEMA Evaluator will inform the participant and the Controller. After an "on the spot" re-training by the state or local organization, the FEMA Evaluator will provide the participant another opportunity to re-demonstrate the activity that same day.

Sub-element 3.c – Implementation of Protective Actions for Persons with Disabilities and Access/Functional Needs

Intent

This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to implement PADs, including evacuation and/or sheltering, for all persons with disabilities and access / functional needs. The focus is on those persons with disabilities and access/functional needs that are (or potentially will be) affected by a radiological release from an NPP.

Criterion 3.c.1: Protective action decisions are implemented for persons with disabilities and access/functional needs other than schools within areas subject to protective actions. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, J.10.c, d, e, g)

Extent of Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a full-scale or functional exercise, an actual event, or by means of drills conducted at any time.

Applicable OROs must demonstrate the capability to alert and notify (i.e., provide PARs and emergency information and instructions to) persons with disabilities and access/functional needs, including hospitals / medical facilities, nursing homes, correctional facilities, and mobility-impaired and transportation-dependent individuals. OROs must demonstrate the capability to provide for persons with disabilities and access / functional needs in accordance with plans / procedures.

Contact with persons with disabilities and access / functional needs and reception facilities may be actual or simulated, as agreed to in the extent of play. Some contacts with transportation providers must be actual, as negotiated in the extent of play. All actual and simulated contacts must be logged.

Since the other agencies place requirements on hospitals to prepare for contaminated patients, the REP Program has no need to evaluate these facilities, nor does the ORO have the responsibility to provide training or dosimetry.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

Massachusetts Extent of Play

All actual and simulated contacts must be logged.

Region I: Initial calls to Transportation Providers will be made to verify telephone number and contact person. Default numbers from the Resource Manual will be used to determine transportation requirements. No vehicles or personnel will be mobilized. A list of the Transportation Providers from the Resource Manual will be provided to the FEMA Evaluator.

Region I Special Needs Coordinator and staff will demonstrate all appropriate communications with EPZ community EOC staff and coordination of bed space assignment for evacuating nursing home patients and hospital patients, although actual evacuation of special facilities will not occur. Default numbers from the Resource Manual will be used.

EPZ EOCs: All special facilities will receive initial contact only to verify attendance (to be logged for comparison to default number). Default numbers will be used from the Resource Manual for exercise play. Follow-up calls will be **simulated** and logged. Participating special facilities will be interviewed **out of sequence** by a FEMA Evaluator.

Local Transportation Coordinators will report to Region I the number of additional beds needed to accommodate patients from each participating facility that may be directed to evacuate; however, no patients will actually be moved or be impacted in any way. Default numbers from the Resource Manual will be used to determine number of beds needed.

The list of access and functional needs individuals will be shown to the FEMA evaluator; however, the information is confidential and copies will not be provided to the evaluator. All calls will be **simulated** and logged. **There are no access and functional needs individuals requiring the use of TTY in the EPZ, therefore TTY will not be demonstrated.**

Criterion 3.c.2: OROs/School officials implement protective actions for schools. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, J.10.c, d, e, g)

Extent of Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a full-scale, functional, or tabletop exercise, an actual event, or by means of drills conducted at any time.

Public school systems / districts must demonstrate the ability to implement PADs for students. The demonstration must be made as follows: each school system / district within the 10 mile EPZ must demonstrate implementation of protective actions. At least one school per affected system / district must participate in the demonstration. Canceling the school day, dismissing early, or sheltering in place must be simulated by describing to evaluators the procedures that would be followed. If evacuation is the implemented protective action, all activities to coordinate and complete the evacuation of students to reception centers, congregate care centers, or host schools may actually be demonstrated or accomplished through an interview process.

If accomplished through an interview, appropriate school personnel including decision-making officials (e.g., schools' superintendent/principals and transportation director/bus dispatchers), and at least one bus driver (and the bus driver's escort, if applicable) must be available to demonstrate knowledge of their role(s) in the evacuation of school children. Communications capabilities between school officials and the buses, if required by the plans / procedures, must be verified.

Officials of the school system(s) must demonstrate the capability to develop and provide timely information to OROs for use in messages to parents, the general public, and the media on the status of protective actions for schools.

If a school facility has emergency plans as a condition of licensing, those plans may be submitted to FEMA review in place of demonstration or interview pursuant to the ORO's plans/procedures as negotiated in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

Since the other agencies place requirements on hospitals to prepare for contaminated patients, the REP Program has no need to evaluate these facilities, nor does the ORO have the responsibility to provide training or dosimetry.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

Massachusetts Extent of Play

Region I EOC: The MEMA Region I Special Needs Coordinator, in an interview with the FEMA Evaluator, will provide a list of schools located outside the EPZ with students who reside within the EPZ. Calls to schools outside the EPZ will be **simulated** and logged.

EPZ EOCs: Initial notification will be made to all school superintendents who will contact each school and day care per procedure to obtain attendance (information to be logged for comparison to default numbers). Default numbers for the Resource Manual will be used for exercise play. Follow-up calls will be **simulated** and logged.

School Superintendents:

Amesbury School Superintendent
Newburyport School Superintendent
Pentucket School Superintendent
Triton School Superintendent

Sub-element 3.d. – Implementation of Traffic and Access Control

Intent

This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to implement protective action plans / procedures, including relocation and restriction of access to evacuated/sheltered areas. This Sub-element focuses on selecting, establishing, and staffing of traffic and access control points, and removal of impediments to the flow of evacuation traffic.

Criterion 3.d.1: Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, A.3; C.1, 4; J.10.g, j)

Extent of Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a full-scale or functional exercise, an actual event, or by means of drills conducted at any time.

OROs must demonstrate the capability to select, establish, and staff appropriate traffic and access control points consistent with current conditions and PADs (e.g., evacuating, sheltering, and relocation) in a timely manner. OROs must demonstrate the capability to provide instructions to traffic and access control staff on actions to take when modifications in protective action strategies necessitate changes in evacuation patterns or in the area(s) where access is controlled.

Traffic and access control staff must demonstrate accurate knowledge of their roles and responsibilities, including verifying emergency worker identification and access authorization to the affected areas, as per the Extent-of-Play Agreement. These capabilities may be demonstrated by actual deployment or by interview, in accordance with the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

In instances where OROs lack authority necessary to control access by certain types of traffic (e.g., rail, water, and air traffic), they must demonstrate the capability to contact the state or Federal agencies that have the needed authority, as agreed upon in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

Massachusetts Extent of Play

EPZ EOCs and/or ICP: EPZ EOCs will demonstrate the ability to direct and monitor traffic control operations within their jurisdictions through discussions and communications with the evaluator. At the EOCs, local highway representative and the Local Police representative will participate in a discussion of procedures and resources available for traffic control. No personnel or equipment will be deployed to field locations.

NOTE: "On the Spot" corrections approved for the fore mentioned sub-element. Appropriate traffic and access control established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control point personnel.

Note: If during the exercise, a participant demonstrates this sub-element unsatisfactorily, the FEMA Evaluator will inform the participant and the Controller. After an "on the spot" re-training by the state or local organization, the FEMA Evaluator will provide the participant another opportunity to re-demonstrate the activity that same day.

Criterion 3.d.2: Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, J.10.k)

Extent of Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a full-scale or functional exercise, an actual event, or by means of drills conducted at any time.

OROs must demonstrate the capability, as required by the scenario, to identify and take appropriate actions concerning impediments to evacuation. Actual dispatch of resources to deal with impediments, such as wreckers, need not be demonstrated; however, all contacts, actual or simulated, must be logged. The impediment must remain in place during the evacuation, does not necessarily need to occur on an evacuation route, and should be such that re-routing of traffic is required. The impediment should result in, and must remain in place long enough, for demonstration of the decision-making and coordination with the JIC to communicate the alternate route to evacuees leaving the area.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

Massachusetts Extent of Play

Each EPZ Local EOC will demonstrate decision-making regarding rerouting of traffic following a traffic impediment by a controller inject or through an interview with the FEMA Evaluator. No personnel or equipment will be dispatched to the simulated accident scene.

If the scenario does not lead to evacuation the criteria shall be deemed complete if the ORO can describe to the evaluator the actions they would take to overcome a major traffic impediment during an evacuation and how such actions would be communicated to the public and affected OROs.

NOTE: "On the Spot" corrections approved for the fore mentioned sub-element. Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved.

Note: If during the exercise, a participant demonstrates this sub-element unsatisfactorily, the FEMA Evaluator will inform the participant and the Controller. After an "on the spot" re-training by the state or local organization, the FEMA Evaluator will provide the participant another opportunity to re-demonstrate the activity that same day.

Sub-element 3.e – Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Decisions

Intent

This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to implement protective actions, based on criteria recommended by current FDA guidance, for the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ (i.e., the area within an approximate 50-mile radius of the NPP). This Sub-element focuses on those actions required for implementation of protective actions.

Criterion 3.e.1: The ORO demonstrates the availability and appropriate use of adequate information regarding water, food supplies, milk, and agricultural production within the ingestion exposure pathway emergency planning zone for implementation of protective actions. NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, A.3; C.1, 4; J.11)

Extent of Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a full-scale or functional exercise, an actual event, or by means of drills conducted at any time.

Applicable OROs must demonstrate the capability to secure and use current information on the locations of dairy farms, meat and poultry producers, fisheries, fruit growers, vegetable growers, grain producers, food processing plants, and water supply intake points to implement protective actions within the EPZ. OROs use Federal resources as identified in the NRF Nuclear / Radiological Incident Annex, and other resources (e.g., compacts, nuclear insurers), if available. Evaluation of this criterion will take into consideration the level of Federal and other resources participating in the exercise.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

Massachusetts Extent of Play

This sub-element will not be evaluated during this exercise.

Criterion 3.e.2: Appropriate measures, strategies, and pre-printed instructional material are developed for implementing protective action decisions for contaminated

water, food products, milk, and agricultural production. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, G.1, J.9, 11)

Extent of Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a full-scale or functional exercise, an actual event, or by means of drills conducted at any time.

OROs must demonstrate the development of measures and strategies for implementation of ingestion exposure pathway EPZ protective actions by formulating protective action information for the general public and food producers and processors. Demonstration of this criterion includes either pre-distributed public information material in the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ or the capability for rapid reproduction and distribution of appropriate reproduction-ready information and instructions to pre-determined individuals and businesses.

OROs must also demonstrate the capability to control, restrict, or prevent distribution of contaminated food by commercial sectors. Exercise play must include demonstration of communications and coordination among organizations to implement protective actions. Field play of implementation activities may be simulated. For example, communications and coordination with agencies responsible for enforcing food controls within the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ must be demonstrated, but actual communications with food producers and processors may be simulated.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

Massachusetts Extent of Play

This sub-element will not be evaluated during this exercise.

Sub-element 3.f – Implementation of Relocation, Re-entry, and Return Decisions

Intent

This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to implement plans, procedures, and decisions for post-plume phase relocation, reentry, *and* return. *Implementation of these decisions is essential for protecting the public from direct long-term exposure to deposited radioactive materials from a severe incident at a commercial NPP.*

Criterion 3.f.1: Decisions regarding controlled reentry, relocation, and return of individuals during the post-plume phase are coordinated with appropriate organizations and implemented. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, E.7; J.10.j; J.12; K.5.b; M.1, 3)

Extent of Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a full-scale, functional, or tabletop exercise, an actual event, or by means of drills conducted at any time.

Relocation: OROs must demonstrate the capability to coordinate and implement decisions concerning relocation of individuals located in radiologically contaminated areas who were not previously evacuated. Such individuals must be relocated to an area(s) where radiological contamination will not expose the general public to doses that exceed the relocation PAGs. OROs must also demonstrate the capability to provide for short- or long-term relocation of evacuees who lived in an area(s) that has residual radiation levels above the (first-, second-, and 50-year) PAGs.

Areas of consideration must include the capability of OROs to communicate with other OROs regarding timing of actions, notification of the population of procedures for relocation, and notification of, and advice for, evacuated individuals who will be converted to relocation status in situations where they will not be able to return to their homes due to high levels of contamination. OROs must also demonstrate the capability to communicate instructions to the public regarding relocation decisions and intermediate-term housing for relocated persons.

Reentry: OROs must demonstrate the capability to control reentry and exit of individuals who are authorized by the ORO to temporarily reenter the restricted area during the post-plume (i.e., intermediate or late) phase to protect them from unnecessary radiation exposure. OROs must also demonstrate the capability to control exit of vehicles and other equipment to control the spread of contamination outside the restricted area(s). Individuals without specific radiological response missions, such as farmers for animal care, essential utility service personnel, or other members of the public who must reenter an evacuated area during the post-emergency phase must be limited to the lowest radiological exposure commensurate with completing their missions. Monitoring and decontamination facilities will be established as appropriate.

Examples of control procedures are: (1) assignment of, or checking for, direct-reading and permanent record dosimetry for emergency workers; (2) questions regarding the individuals' objective(s), location(s) expected to be visited, and associated timeframes; (3) maps and plots of radiation exposure rates; (4) advice on areas to avoid; (5) procedures for exit, including monitoring of individuals, vehicles, and equipment; (6) decision criteria regarding contamination; (7) proper disposition of emergency worker dosimetry, and (8) maintenance of emergency worker radiation exposure records.

Return: OROs must demonstrate the capability to implement policies concerning return of members of the public to areas that were evacuated during the plume phase. OROs must demonstrate the capability to identify and prioritize services and facilities that require restoration within a few days, and to identify procedures and resources for their restoration. Examples of these services and facilities are medical and social services, utilities, roads, and schools.

Communication among OROs for relocation, reentry, and return may be simulated. All simulated or actual contacts must be documented. These discussions may be accomplished in a group setting.

OROs must use Federal resources as identified in the NRF Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex, and other resources (e.g., compacts or nuclear insurers), if available. Evaluation of this criterion will take into consideration the level of Federal and other resources participating in the exercise.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

Massachusetts Extent of Play

This sub-element will not be evaluated during this exercise.

EVALUATION AREA 4: Field Measurement And Analysis

Sub-element 4.a – Plume Phase Field Measurements and Analyses

Intent

This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to deploy FMTs with the equipment, methods, and expertise necessary to determine the location of airborne radiation and particulate deposition on the ground from an airborne plume. In addition, NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1 indicates that OROs must have the capability to use FMTs within the plume exposure pathway EPZ to detect airborne radioiodine in the presence of noble gases and radioactive particulate material in the airborne plume. In an incident at an NPP, the possible release of radioactive material may pose a risk to the nearby population and environment. Although incident assessment methods are available to project the extent and magnitude of a release, these methods are subject to large uncertainties. During an incident, it is important to collect field radiological data to help characterize any radiological release. Adequate equipment and procedures are essential to such field measurement efforts.

Criterion 4.a.1: [RESERVED]

Criterion 4.a.2: Field teams (2 or more) are managed to obtain sufficient information to help characterize the release and to control radiation exposure. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, C.1; H.12; I.7, 8, 11; J.10.a)

Extent of Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a full-scale, functional, or tabletop exercise. Other means may include drills, seminars or training activities that would fully demonstrate technical proficiency.

Responsible OROs must demonstrate the capability to brief FMTs on predicted plume location and direction, plume travel speed, and exposure control procedures before deployment. During an HAB incident, the Field Team management must keep the incident command informed of field monitoring teams' activities and location. Coordination with FMTs and field monitoring may be demonstrated as out-of-sequence demonstrations, as negotiated in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

Field measurements are needed to help characterize the release and support the adequacy of implemented protective actions, or to be a factor in modifying protective actions. Teams must be directed to take measurements at such locations and times as necessary to provide sufficient information to characterize the plume and its impacts.

If the responsibility for obtaining peak measurements in the plume has been accepted by licensee field monitoring teams, with concurrence from OROs, there is no requirement for these

measurements to be repeated by ORO monitoring teams. If the licensee FMTs do not obtain peak measurements in the plume, it is the ORO's decision as to whether peak measurements are necessary to sufficiently characterize the plume. The sharing and coordination of plume measurement information among all FMTs (licensee, Federal, and ORO) is essential.

OROs must use Federal resources as identified in the NRF Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex and other resources (e.g., compacts or the licensee). Evaluation of this criterion will take into consideration the level of Federal and other resources participating in the exercise.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

Massachusetts Extent of Play

This criterion was demonstrated during the Pilgrim 2014 exercise, the team will deploy for **training purposes only**.

NIAT Field Teams are managed by the Field Team Coordinator who is located at the utility EOF. He will brief and dispatch two teams to sampling locations in accordance with the NIAT Handbook, Section D.4, as dictated by scenario play. The Field Teams will collect one complete sample.

NIAT Field Team personnel will prepare sample media, survey forms, and chain of custody documents as if they were being transferred to the lab for analysis. Actual transport of samples will be simulated.

For scenarios involving Hostile Action based incidents the Field Team Coordinator will coordinate activities with the Incident Command Post and / or operate beyond an established Security Perimeter.

Controller injects will be specifically prepared to allow Field Teams to be evaluated but these injects will not be part of the HAB scenario and therefore will be separate from the HAB scenario.

Criterion 4.a.3: Ambient radiation measurements are made and recorded at appropriate locations, and radioiodine and particulate samples are collected. Teams will move to an appropriate low background location to determine whether any significant (as specified in the plan and/or procedures) amount of radioactivity has been collected on the sampling media. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, C.1; H.12: I.8, 9; J.10.a)

Extent of Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a full-scale, functional, or tabletop exercise. Other means may include drills, seminars or training activities that would fully demonstrate technical proficiency.

Two or more FMTs must demonstrate the capability to make and report measurements of ambient radiation to the field team coordinator, dose assessment team, or other appropriate authority. FMTs must also demonstrate the capability to obtain an air sample for measurement

of airborne radioiodine and particulates, and to provide the appropriate authority with field data pertaining to measurement. If samples have radioactivity significantly above background, the authority must consider the need for expedited laboratory analyses of these samples. Coordination concerning transfer of samples, including a chain-of-custody form(s), to a radiological laboratory(ies) must be demonstrated.

OROs must share data in a timely manner with all other appropriate OROs. All methodology, including contamination control, instrumentation, preparation of samples, and a chain-of-custody form(s) for transfer to a laboratory(ies), will be in accordance with the ORO's plans / procedures.

OROs must use Federal resources as identified in the NRF Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex and other resources (e.g., compacts or the licensee). Evaluation of this criterion will take into consideration the level of Federal and other resources participating in the exercise.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

Massachusetts Extent of Play

This criterion was demonstrated during the Pilgrim 2014 exercise; the team will deploy for **training purposes only**.

Two MA NIAT Field Teams will be dispatched from the EOF in accordance with the NIAT Handbook. Once, dispatched, only disposable gloves will be used for actual exercise play. Charcoal cartridges will be used instead of silver zeolite.

The NIAT Field Teams will collect one complete sample (monitoring and air sample) as specified by the procedures in Section D.4 of the NIAT Handbook.

For scenarios involving Hostile Action based incidents the Field Team Control will coordinate activities with the Incident Command Post and / or operate beyond an established Security Perimeter.

NOTE: "On the Spot" corrections approved for the fore mentioned sub-element. That portion of the evaluation element that demonstrates one complete sample.

Note: If during the exercise, a participant demonstrates this sub-element unsatisfactorily, the FEMA Evaluator will inform the participant and the Controller. After an "on the spot" re-training by the state or local organization, the FEMA Evaluator will provide the participant another opportunity to re-demonstrate the activity that same day.

Sub-element 4.b – Post Plume Phase Field Measurements and Sampling

Intent

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This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to assess the actual or potential magnitude and locations of radiological hazards

to determine the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ and to support relocation, reentry, and return decisions. This Sub-element focuses on collecting environmental samples for laboratory analyses that are essential for decisions on protecting the public from contaminated food and water and direct radiation from deposited materials.

Criterion 4.b.1: The field teams (2 or more) demonstrate the capability to make appropriate measurements and to collect appropriate samples (e.g., food crops, milk, water, vegetation, and soil) to support adequate assessments and protective action decision making. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, C.1; I.8; J.11)

Extent of Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a full-scale, functional, or tabletop exercise. Other means may include drills, seminars or training activities that would fully demonstrate technical proficiency.

The ORO's FMTs must demonstrate the capability to take measurements and samples, at such times and locations as directed, to enable an adequate assessment of the ingestion pathway and to support reentry, relocation, and return decisions. When resources are available, use of aerial surveys and in-situ gamma measurement is appropriate. All methodology, including contamination control, instrumentation, preparation of samples, and chain-of-custody form(s) for transfer to a laboratory(ies), will be in accordance with the ORO's plans / procedures.

The FMTs and/or other sampling personnel must secure ingestion pathway samples from agricultural products and water. Samples in support of relocation and return must be secured from soil, vegetation, and other surfaces in areas that received radioactive ground deposition.

OROs must use Federal resources as identified in the NRF Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex and other resources (e.g., compacts, the licensee, or nuclear insurers). Evaluation of this criterion will take into consideration the level of Federal and other resources participating in the exercise.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

Massachusetts Extent of Play

This sub-element will be not demonstrated **during this exercise.**

Sub-element 4.c - Laboratory Operations

Intent

This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to perform laboratory analyses of radioactivity in air, liquid, and environmental samples to support protective action decision making.

Criterion 4.c.1: The laboratory is capable of performing required radiological analyses to support protective action decisions. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, C.1, 3; J.11)

Extent of Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a full-scale, functional, or tabletop exercise. Other means may include drills, seminars or training activities that would fully demonstrate technical proficiency.
The laboratory staff must demonstrate the capability to follow appropriate procedures for receiving samples, including logging information, preventing contamination of the laboratory(ies), preventing buildup of background radiation due to stored samples, preventing cross contamination of samples, preserving samples that may spoil (e.g., milk), and keeping track of sample identity. In addition, the laboratory staff must demonstrate the capability to prepare samples for conducting measurements.

The laboratory(ies) must be appropriately equipped to provide, upon request, timely analyses of media of sufficient quality and sensitivity to support assessments and decisions anticipated in the ORO's plans / procedures. The laboratory instrument calibrations must be traceable to standards provided by the National Institute of Standards and Technology. Laboratory methods used to analyze typical radionuclides released in a reactor incident must be as described in the plans / procedures. New or revised methods may be used to analyze atypical radionuclide releases (e.g., transuranics or as a result of a terrorist incident) or if warranted by incident circumstances. Analysis may require resources beyond those of the ORO.

The laboratory staff must be qualified in radio-analytical techniques and contamination control procedures.

OROs must use Federal resources as identified in the NRF Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex and other resources (e.g., compacts, the licensee, or nuclear insurers). Evaluation of this criterion will take into consideration the level of Federal and other resources participating in the exercise.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

Massachusetts Extent of Play

This sub-element will be not demonstrated during this exercise.

EVALUATION AREA 5: Emergency Notification and Public Information

Sub-element 5.a – Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System

Intent

This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to provide prompt instructions to the public within the plume exposure pathway EPZ. Specific provisions addressed in this Sub-element are derived from the Guide for the Evaluation of Alert and Notification Systems for Nuclear Power Plants, FEMA-REP-10 (November 1985).

Criterion 5.a.1: Activities associated with primary alerting and notification of the public are completed in a timely manner following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. The initial instructional message to the public must include as a minimum the elements required by current REP guidance. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, E.5, 6, 7)

Extent of Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a full-scale or functional exercise, drills, or operational testing of equipment that would fully demonstrate capability.

Responsible OROs must demonstrate the capability to sequentially provide an alert signal followed by an initial instructional message to populated areas (permanent resident and transient) throughout the 10-mile plume EPZ. Following the decision to activate the alert and notification system, OROs must complete system activation for primary alert / notification and disseminate the information / instructions in a timely manner. For exercise purposes, timely is defined as with a sense of urgency and without undue delay. If message dissemination is identified as not having been accomplished in a timely manner, the evaluator(s) will document a specific delay or cause as to why a message was not considered timely.

Procedures to broadcast the message must be fully demonstrated as they would in an actual emergency up to the point of transmission. Broadcast of the message(s) or test message(s) is not required. The procedures must be demonstrated up to the point of actual activation. The alert signal activation should be simulated, not performed. Evaluations of EAS broadcast stations may also be accomplished through SAVs.

The capability of the primary notification system to broadcast an instructional message on a 24-hour basis must be verified during an interview with appropriate personnel from the primary notification system, including verification of provisions for backup power or an alternate station.

The initial message must include at a minimum the following elements:

- Identification of the ORO responsible and the official with authority for providing the alert signal and instructional message;
- Identification of the commercial NPP and a statement that an emergency exists there;
- Reference to REP-specific emergency information (e.g., brochures, calendars, and/or information in telephone books) for use by the general public during an emergency;
- A closing statement asking that the affected and potentially affected population stay tuned for additional information, or that the population tune to another station for additional information.

If route alerting is demonstrated as a primary method of alert and notification, it must be done in accordance with the ORO's plans / procedures and the Extent-of-Play Agreement. OROs must demonstrate the capability to accomplish the primary route alerting in a timely manner (not subject to specific time requirements). At least one route needs to be demonstrated and evaluated. The selected route(s) must vary from exercise to exercise. However, the most difficult route(s) must be demonstrated no less than once every 8 years. All alert and notification activities along the route(s) must be simulated (that is, the message that would actually be used is

read for the evaluator, but not actually broadcast) as negotiated in the extent of play. Actual testing of the mobile public address system will be conducted at an agreed-upon location.

OROs may demonstrate any means of primary alert and notification included in their plans / procedures as negotiated in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

Massachusetts Extent of Play

MEMA SEOC: Actions to demonstrate performance of initial notification of the public will be performed up to the point of actual transmission of the Emergency Alert System (EAS) message. The EAS message will be prepared / encoded by MEMA. The State Primary EAS Station of WBZ will be contacted only once and notified that activations of the EAS System will be handled out of the SEOC. Actual activation of the Emergency Alert System will be simulated by SEOC staff.

The MA SEOC in coordination with New Hampshire will demonstrate the actions necessary to perform the siren activation up to the point of actually sounding the sirens. Siren sounding will be simulated.

Criterion 5.a.2: [RESERVED]

Criterion 5.a.3: Backup alert and notification of the public is completed within a reasonable time following the detection by the ORO of a failure of the primary alert and notification system. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, E.6, Appendix 3.B.2.c)

Extent of Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a full-scale or functional exercise, drills, or operational testing of equipment that would fully demonstrate capability.

If the exercise scenario calls for failure of any portion of the primary system(s) or if any portion of the primary system(s) actually fails to function during the exercise, OROs must demonstrate backup means of alert and notification. Backup means of alert and notification will differ from facility to facility.

Backup alert and notification procedures that would be implemented in multiple stages must be structured such that the population closest to the plant (e.g., within 2 miles) is alerted and notified first. The populations farther away and downwind of any potential radiological release would be covered sequentially (e.g., 2 to 5 miles, followed by downwind 5 to 10 miles, and finally the remaining population as directed by authorities). Topography, population density, existing ORO resources, and timing will be considered in judging the acceptability of backup means of alert and notification.

Although circumstances may not allow this for all situations, FEMA and the NRC recommend that OROs and operators attempt to establish backup means that will reach those in the plume

exposure EPZ within a reasonable time of failure of the primary alert and notification system, with a recommended goal of 45 minutes. The backup alert message must, at a minimum, include (1) a statement that an emergency exists at the plant and (2) instructions regarding where to obtain additional information.

If backup route alerting is demonstrated, only one route needs to be selected and demonstrated. All alert and notification activities along the route(s) must be simulated (that is, the message that would actually be used is read for the evaluator, but not actually broadcast), as negotiated in the extent of play. Actual testing of the mobile public address system will be conducted at an agreed-upon location.

OROs may demonstrate any means of backup alert and notification included in their plans / procedures as negotiated in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

Massachusetts Extent of Play

This sub-element will not be demonstrated in this exercise.

Criterion 5.a.4: Activities associated with FEMA-approved exception areas (where applicable) are completed in a timely manner following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, E.6; Appendix 3.B.2.c)

Extent of Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a full-scale or functional exercise, drills, or operational testing of equipment that would fully demonstrate capability.

OROs with FEMA-approved exception areas (identified in the approved Alert and Notification System Design Report), 5 to 10 miles from the NPP, must demonstrate the capability to accomplish primary alerting and notification of the exception area(s). FEMA and the NRC recommend that OROs and operators establish means that will reach those in approved exception areas in a timely manner, with a recommended goal of 45 minutes, once the initial decision is made by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an incident. The exception area alert message must, at a minimum, include (1) a statement that an emergency exists at the plant and (2) instructions regarding where to obtain additional information.

For exception area alerting, at least one route must be demonstrated and evaluated. The selected route(s) must vary from exercise to exercise. However, the most difficult route(s) must be demonstrated no less than once every 8 years. All alert and notification activities along the route(s) must be simulated (that is, the message that would actually be used is read for the evaluator, but not actually broadcasted) as negotiated in the extent of play. Actual testing of the mobile public address system will be conducted at an agreed-upon location. For exception areas alerted by aircraft, actual flights will be negotiated in the extent of play, but must be demonstrated no less than once every 8 years.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

Massachusetts Extent of Play

This sub-element will not be demonstrated in this exercise.

Sub-element 5.b – Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media

Intent

This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to disseminate appropriate emergency information and instructions, including any recommended protective actions, to the public. In addition, NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1 requires OROs to ensure that the capability exists for providing information to the media. This includes the availability of a physical location for use by the media during an emergency. NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1 also provides that a system must be available for dealing with rumors. This system will hereafter be known as the "public inquiry hotline."

Criterion 5.b.1: OROs provide accurate subsequent emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, E.5, 7; G.3.a, G.4.a, c)

Extent of Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a full-scale or functional exercise, or drills.

The responsible ORO personnel / representatives must demonstrate actions to provide emergency information and instructions to the public and media in a timely manner following the initial alert and notification (not subject to specific time requirements). For exercise purposes, timely is defined as with a sense of urgency and without undue delay. If message dissemination is identified as not having been accomplished in a timely manner, the evaluator(s) will document a specific delay or cause as to why a message was not considered timely.

Message elements: The ORO must ensure that emergency information and instructions are consistent with PADs made by appropriate officials. The emergency information must contain all necessary and applicable instructions (e.g., evacuation instructions, evacuation routes, reception center locations, what to take when evacuating, shelter-in-place instructions, information concerning protective actions for schools and persons with disabilities and access / functional needs, and public inquiry hotline telephone number) to assist the public in carrying out the PADs provided. The ORO must also be prepared to disclose and explain the ECL of the incident. At a minimum, this information must be included in media briefings and/or media releases. OROs must demonstrate the capability to use language that is clear and understandable to the public within both the plume and ingestion exposure pathway EPZs. This includes demonstration of the capability to use familiar landmarks and boundaries to describe protective action areas.

The emergency information must be all-inclusive by including the four items specified under exercise Demonstration Criterion 5.a.1 and previously identified protective action areas that are still valid, as well as new areas. The OROs must demonstrate the capability to ensure that emergency information that is no longer valid is rescinded and not repeated by broadcast media.

In addition, the OROs must demonstrate the capability to ensure that current emergency information is repeated at pre-established intervals in accordance with the plans / procedures. OROs must demonstrate the capability to develop emergency information in a non-English language when required by the plans / procedures.

If ingestion pathway measures are exercised, OROs must demonstrate that a system exists for rapid dissemination of ingestion pathway information to pre-determined individuals and businesses in accordance with the ORO's plans / procedures.

Media information: OROs must demonstrate the capability to provide timely, accurate, concise, and coordinated information to the news media for subsequent dissemination to the public. This would include demonstration of the capability to conduct timely and pertinent media briefings and distribute media releases as the incident warrants. The OROs must demonstrate the capability to respond appropriately to inquiries from the news media. All information presented in media briefings and releases must be consistent with PADs and other emergency information provided to the public. Copies of pertinent emergency information (e.g., EAS messages and media releases) and media information kits must be available for dissemination to the media.

Public inquiry: OROs must demonstrate that an effective system is in place for dealing with calls received via the public inquiry hotline. Hotline staff must demonstrate the capability to provide or obtain accurate information for callers or refer them to appropriate information source. Information from the hotline staff, including information that corrects false or inaccurate information when trends are noted, must be included, as appropriate, in emergency information provided to the public, media briefings, and/or media releases.

HAB considerations: The dissemination of information dealing with specific aspects of NPP security capabilities, actual or perceived adversarial (terrorist) force or threat, and tactical law enforcement response must be coordinated / communicated with appropriate security authorities, e.g., law enforcement and NPP security agencies, in accordance with ORO plans / procedures.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

Massachusetts Extent of Play

Subsequent emergency information and instructions should be provided to the public and the media in a timely manner.

Joint Information Center: Rumor trends generated as a result of public inquiry calls to the Mass-211 Public Information Line will be included in news briefings by the MEMA PIO. (In compliance with NIMS terminology, Rumor Control is now considered to be "Public Inquiry"). It is possible during a HAB incident, that a "virtual" JIC will be opened at MEMA's SEOC. This "virtual" JIC will be connected to and directly communicate with the NPP's JIC through electronic means.

State EOC: Simulation Cell personnel will make calls simulating members of the public to the Mass-211 Public Information Line. This process will commence after the initial siren activation. Information on rumor trends recognized at the Mass-211 Public Information Line will be forwarded to the Public Affairs Office at the SEOC.

Mass-211 Operations Center: Staff from Mass-211 will demonstrate the ability to handle inquiry calls. Handling at least two rumor trends will be demonstrated.

EPZ Towns: Simulation Cell personnel at the SEOC will make calls to the local EOCs simulating members of the public with inquiries. Each local EOC will demonstrate the ability to properly handle these inquiries.

HAB exercises will demonstrate that public information relating to security matters should receive approval of the Unified Command before release. Each ORO should only be reporting on their areas of operation and not on others such as the law enforcement aspects.

NOTE: "On the Spot" corrections approved for the fore mentioned sub-elements. That portion of the evaluation element dealing with "timely manner" and emergency information being all–inclusive. Players should have the opportunity to re-demonstrate this criterion in subsequent messages.

Note: If during the exercise, a participant demonstrates this sub-element unsatisfactorily, the FEMA Evaluator will inform the participant and the Controller. After an "on the spot" re-training by the state or local organization, the FEMA Evaluator will provide the participant another opportunity to re-demonstrate the activity that same day.

EVALUATION AREA 6: Support Operation/Facilities

Sub-element 6.a – Monitoring, Decontamination, and Registration of Evacuees

Intent

This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to implement radiological monitoring and decontamination of evacuees, while minimizing contamination of the facility. OROs must also have the capability to identify and register evacuees at reception centers.

Criterion 6.a.1: The reception center facility has appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide monitoring, decontamination, and registration of evacuees. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, A.3; C.4; J.10.h; J.12)

Extent of Play

Radiological monitoring, decontamination, and registration facilities for evacuees must be set up and demonstrated as they would be in an actual emergency or as indicated in the Extent-of-Play Agreement. OROs conducting this demonstration must have one-third of the resources (e.g., monitoring teams / instrumentation / portal monitors) available at the facility(ies) as necessary to monitor 20 percent of the population within a 12-hour period. This would include adequate space for evacuees' vehicles. Availability of resources can be demonstrated with valid documentation (e.g., MOU/LOA, etc.) reflecting how necessary equipment would be procured for the location. Plans / procedures must indicate provisions for service animals.

Before using monitoring instrument(s), the monitor(s) must demonstrate the process of checking the instrument(s) for proper operation. Staff responsible for the radiological monitoring of evacuees must demonstrate the capability to attain and sustain, within about 12 hours, a monitoring productivity rate per hour needed to monitor the 20 percent EPZ population planning base. The monitoring productivity rate per hour is the number of evacuees that can be monitored, per hour, by the total complement of monitors using an appropriate procedure. For demonstration of monitoring, decontamination, and registration capabilities, a minimum of six evacuees must be monitored per station using equipment and procedures specified in the plans / procedures. The monitoring sequences for the first six simulated evacuees per monitoring team will be timed by the evaluators to determine whether the 12-hour requirement can be met.

OROs must demonstrate the capability to register evacuees upon completion of the monitoring and decontamination activities. The activities for recording radiological monitoring and, if necessary, decontamination must include establishing a registration record consisting of the evacuee's name, address, results of monitoring, and time of decontamination (if any), or as otherwise designated in the plan and/or procedures. Audio recorders, camcorders, or written records are all acceptable means for registration.

Monitoring activities shall not be simulated. Monitoring personnel must explain use of trigger / action levels for determining the need for decontamination. They must also explain the procedures for referring any evacuees who cannot be adequately decontaminated for assessment and follow-up in accordance with the ORO's plans / procedures. All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

Decontamination of evacuees may be simulated and conducted by interview. Provisions for separate showering and same-sex monitoring must be demonstrated or explained. The staff must demonstrate provisions for limiting the spread of contamination. Provisions could include floor coverings, signs, and appropriate means (e.g., partitions, roped-off areas) to separate uncontaminated from potentially contaminated areas. Provisions must also exist to separate contaminated and uncontaminated evacuees, provide changes of clothing for those with contaminated clothing; and store contaminated clothing and personal belongings to prevent further contamination of evacuees or facilities. In addition, for any evacuee found to be contaminated, procedures must be discussed concerning handling of potential contamination of vehicles and personal belongings. Waste water from decontamination operations does not need to be collected.

Individuals who have completed monitoring (and decontamination, if needed) must have means (e.g., hand stamp, sticker, bracelet, form, etc) indicating that they, and their service animals and vehicles, where applicable, have been monitored, cleared, and found to have no contamination or



contamination below the trigger / action level. or have been placed in a secure area until they can be monitored and decontaminated, if necessary.

In accordance with plans / procedures, individuals found to be clean after monitoring do not need to have their vehicle monitored. These individuals do not require confirmation that their vehicle is free from contamination prior to entering the congregate care areas.

However, those individuals who are found to be contaminated and are then decontaminated will have their vehicles held in a secure area or monitored and decontaminated (if applicable) and do require confirmation that their vehicle is being held in a secure area or free from contamination prior to entering the congregate care areas.

Massachusetts Extent of Play

This sub-element will not be demonstrated during this exercise.

Sub-element 6.b – Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Worker Equipment

Intent

This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to implement radiological monitoring and decontamination of emergency workers and their equipment, inclusive of vehicles.

Criterion 6.b.1: The facility/ORO has adequate procedures and resources to accomplish monitoring and decontamination of emergency workers and their equipment and vehicles. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, K.5.a, b)

Extent of Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a full-scale or functional exercise, drills, or SAV.

The monitoring staff must demonstrate the capability to monitor emergency worker personnel and their equipment and vehicles for contamination in accordance with the ORO's plans / procedures.

Specific attention must be given to equipment, including any vehicles that were in contact with contamination. The monitoring staff must demonstrate the capability to make decisions on the need for decontamination of personnel, equipment, and vehicles based on trigger/action levels and procedures stated in the ORO plans / procedures. Monitoring of emergency workers does not have to meet the 12-hour requirement. However, appropriate monitoring procedures must be demonstrated for a minimum of two emergency workers and their equipment and vehicles. Before using monitoring instrument(s), the monitor(s) must demonstrate the process of checking the instrument(s) for proper operation.

The area to be used for monitoring and decontamination must be set up as it would be in an actual emergency, with all route markings, instrumentation, record keeping, and contamination control measures in place. Monitoring procedures must be demonstrated for a minimum of one vehicle. It is generally not necessary to monitor the entire surface of vehicles. However, the

capability to monitor areas such as radiator grills, bumpers, wheel wells, tires, and door handles must be demonstrated. Interior surfaces of vehicles that were in contact with contaminated individuals must also be checked.

Decontamination of emergency workers may be simulated and conducted via interview. Provisions for separate showering and same-sex monitoring must be demonstrated or explained. The staff must demonstrate provisions for limiting the spread of contamination. Provisions could include floor coverings, signs, and appropriate means (e.g., partitions, roped-off areas) to separate uncontaminated from potentially contaminated areas. Provisions must also exist to separate contaminated and uncontaminated individuals where applicable; provide changes of clothing for those with contaminated clothing; and store contaminated clothing and personal belongings to prevent further contamination of emergency workers or facilities.

Monitoring activities shall not be simulated. Monitoring personnel must explain use of trigger/action levels for determining the need for decontamination. They must also explain the procedures for referring any emergency workers who cannot be adequately decontaminated for assessment and follow-up in accordance with the ORO's plans / procedures.

Decontamination capabilities and provisions for vehicles and equipment that cannot be successfully decontaminated may be simulated and conducted by interview. Waste water from decontamination operations does not need to be collected.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

Massachusetts Extent of Play

This sub-element will not be demonstrated during this exercise

Sub-element 6.c - Temporary Care of Evacuees

Intent

This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires OROs to have the capability to establish relocation centers in host / support jurisdictions. The American Red Cross normally provides congregate care in support of OROs under existing letters of agreement.

> **Criterion 6.c.1: Managers of congregate care facilities demonstrate that the centers have resources to provide services and accommodations consistent with American Red Cross planning guidelines. Managers demonstrate the procedures to assure that evacuees have been monitored for contamination and have been decontaminated as appropriate prior to entering congregate care facilities. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, J.10.h, J.12)**

Extent of Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a full-scale or functional exercise, drills, or SAV.



The evaluator must conduct a walk-through of the center to determine, through observation and inquiries, that the services and accommodations are consistent with applicable guidance.

For planning purposes, OROs must plan for a sufficient number of congregate care centers in host/support jurisdictions based on their all-hazard sheltering experience and what is historically relevant for that particular area. In this simulation, it is not necessary to set up operations as they would be in an actual emergency. Alternatively, capabilities may be demonstrated by setting up stations for various services and providing those services to simulated evacuees. Given the substantial differences between demonstration and simulation of this criterion, exercise demonstration expectations must be clearly specified in Extentof-Play Agreements.

Congregate care staff must also demonstrate the capability to ensure that evacuees, service animals, and vehicles have been monitored for contamination, decontaminated as appropriate, and registered before entering the facility.

Individuals arriving at congregate care facilities must have means (e.g., hand stamp, sticker, bracelet, form, etc.) indicating that they, and their service animals and vehicles, where applicable, have been placed in a secured area or monitored, cleared, and found to have no contamination or contamination below the trigger/action level.

In accordance with plans / procedures, individuals found to be clean after monitoring do not need to have their vehicle monitored. These individuals do not need confirmation that their vehicle is free from contamination prior to entering the congregate care areas.

However, those individuals who are found to be contaminated and are then decontaminated will have their vehicles held in a secure area until they can be monitored and decontaminated (if applicable) and do need confirmation that their vehicle is being held in a secure area or free from contamination prior to entering the congregate care areas. This capability may be determined through an interview process.

If operations at the center are demonstrated, material that would be difficult or expensive to transport (e.g., cots, blankets, sundries, and large-scale food supplies) need not be physically available at the facility(ies). However, availability of such items must be verified by providing the evaluator a list of sources with locations and estimates of quantities.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

Massachusetts Extent of Play

This will not be demonstrated during this exercise.

Sub-element 6.d - Transportation and Treatment of Contaminated Injured Individuals

Intent

This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to transport contaminated injured individuals to medical facilities with the capability to provide medical services.

Criterion 6.d.1: The facility/ORO has the appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide transport, monitoring, decontamination, and medical services to contaminated injured individuals. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, F.2; H.10; K.5.a, b; L.1, 4)

Extent of Play

Assessment of this Demonstration Criterion may be accomplished during a biennial exercise, an actual event, or drills.

FEMA has determined that these capabilities have been enhanced and consistently demonstrated as adequate; therefore, offsite medical services drills need only be evaluated biennially. FEMA will, at the request of the involved ORO, continue to evaluate the drills on an annual basis. If more than two medical facilities and transportation providers are designated as primary or backup, they are also evaluated biennially.

Monitoring, decontamination, and contamination control efforts must not delay urgent medical care for the victim.

OROs must demonstrate the capability to transport contaminated injured individuals to medical facilities.

An ambulance must be used for response to the victim. However, to avoid taking an ambulance out of service for an extended time, OROs may use any vehicle (e.g., car, truck, or van) to transport the victim to the medical facility. It is allowable for an ambulance to demonstrate up to the point of departure for the medical facility and then have a non-specialized vehicle transport the "victim(s)" to the medical facility. This option is used in areas where removing an ambulance from service to drive a great distance (over an hour) for a drill would not be in the best interests of the community.

Normal communications between the ambulance/dispatcher and the receiving medical facility must be demonstrated. If a substitute vehicle is used for transport to the medical facility, this communication must occur before releasing the ambulance from the drill. This communication would include reporting radiation monitoring results, if available. In addition, the ambulance crew must demonstrate, by interview, knowledge of where the ambulance and crew would be monitored and decontaminated, if required, or whom to contact for such information.

Monitoring of the victim may be performed before transport or en route, or may be deferred to the medical facility. Contaminated injured individuals transported to medical facilities are monitored as soon as possible to assure that everyone (ambulance and medical facility) is aware of the medical and radiological status of the individual(s). However, if an ambulance defers monitoring to the medical facility, then the ambulance crew presumes that the patient(s) is contaminated and demonstrate appropriate contamination controls until the patient(s) is monitored. Before using monitoring instruments, the monitor(s) must demonstrate the process of checking the instrument(s) for proper operation. All monitoring activities must be completed as they would be in an actual emergency. Appropriate contamination control measures must be demonstrated before and during transport and at the receiving medical facility.
The medical facility must demonstrate the capability to activate and set up a radiological emergency area for treatment. Medical facilities are expected to have at least one trained physician and one trained nurse to perform and supervise treatment of contaminated injured

individuals. Equipment and supplies must be available for treatment of contaminated injured individuals.

The medical facility must demonstrate the capability to make decisions on the need for decontamination of the individual, follow appropriate decontamination procedures, and maintain records of all survey measurements and samples taken. All procedures for collection and analysis of samples and decontamination of the individual must be demonstrated or described to the evaluator. Waste water from decontamination operations must be handled according to facility plans / procedures.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans / procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

Massachusetts Extent of Play

This sub-element will not be demonstrated during this exercise.

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