



April R. Rice
Manager
New Nuclear Licensing

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NND-14-0630
10 CFR 52.99(c)(1)

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attn: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555-0001

Subject: Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station (VCSNS) Unit 2
Combined License No. NPF-93
Docket Number 52-027
ITAAC Closure Notification for ITAAC 2.4.02.03.iii

Attachments: References

The purpose of this letter is to notify the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) of the completion of Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station (VCSNS) Unit 2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC) Item 2.4.02.03.iii for verifying that a report exists and concludes that the two electrical overspeed protection systems have diverse hardware and software/firmware. The closure process for this ITAAC is based on the guidance described in NEI 08-01 (Reference 1), which was endorsed by the NRC in Regulatory Guide 1.215.

ITAAC Statement

Design Commitment:

3. The trip signals from the two turbine electrical overspeed protection trip systems are isolated from, and independent of, each other.

Inspections, Tests, Analyses:

iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the two turbine electrical overspeed protection systems have diverse hardware and software/firmware.

Acceptance Criteria:

iii) A report exists and concludes that the two electrical overspeed protection systems have diverse hardware and software/firmware.

ITAAC Determination Basis

Multiple ITAAC are performed to confirm that the trip signals from the two turbine electrical overspeed protection trip systems are isolated from, and independent of, each other. This ITAAC performed an inspection of the overspeed protection systems' design to verify the existence of diverse hardware and software/firmware.

The designs for the two turbine electrical overspeed protection systems have been reviewed and verified to have diverse hardware and software/firmware. The basis of diversity used for prevention of common mode failure is established by Method for Performing Diversity and Defense-in-Depth Analyses of Reactor Protection Systems, NUREG/CR-6303 (Reference 2). The two turbine electrical overspeed protection systems were assessed on the elements of diversity established with NUREG/CR-6303.

Using guidelines set forth within NUREG/CR-6303, the diversity that exists between the two turbine electrical overspeed protection systems is documented in the AP1000 Turbine Control & Protection System Overspeed Diversity Analysis (Reference 3). The elements of diversity implemented within the design of the two electrical overspeed protection systems are as follows:

- Equipment Diversity
 - Use of different hardware manufacturers
- Functional Diversity
 - Different response-time scale (different setpoints)
- Human Diversity
 - Use of different design organizations/companies
 - Different design/development teams (designers, engineers, programmers)
 - Different implementation/validation teams (testers, installers, or certification personnel)
- Signal Diversity
 - Different parameters sensed by different physical effects
 - Same parameter sensed by a different redundant set of similar sensors
- Software Diversity
 - Different algorithms, logic, and program architecture
 - Different timing or order of execution
 - Different operating systems

The AP1000 Turbine Control & Protection System Overspeed Diversity Analysis Report exists and concludes that the two electrical overspeed protection systems have diverse hardware and software/firmware.

ITAAC Finding Review

In accordance with plant procedures for ITAAC completion, SCE&G performed a review of all findings pertaining to the subject ITAAC and associated corrective actions. This review found that there are no relevant ITAAC findings associated with this ITAAC. The

review found that there are no relevant ITAAC findings associated with this ITAAC. The ITAAC completion review is documented in the ITAAC Completion Package for ITAAC 2.4.02.03.iii (Reference 4) and available for NRC inspection.

ITAAC Completion Statement

Based on the above information, SCE&G hereby notifies the NRC that ITAAC 2.4.02.03.iii was performed for VCSNS Unit 2 and that the prescribed acceptance criteria are met.

Systems, structures, and components verified as part of this ITAAC are being maintained in their as-designed, ITAAC compliant condition in accordance with approved plant programs and procedures.

We request NRC staff confirmation of this determination and publication of the required notice in the Federal Register per 10 CFR 52.99(e)(1).

If there are any questions, please contact Ryder Thompson at (803) 941-9812.

Sincerely,



for April R. Rice
Manager
Nuclear Licensing
New Nuclear Deployment

RCT/AR/jl

- c. Document Control Desk
Victor McCree – Region II Regional Administrator
Steven Vias - NRC
Thomas R. Fredette - NRC
Denise McGovern – NRC
James Reece - NRC
Marion Cherry – Santee Cooper
Stephen A. Byrne – SCE&G
Jeffrey B. Archie – SCE&G
Ronald A. Jones – SCE&G
Alan Torres – SCE&G
Ryder Thompson – SCE&G
April Rice -SCE&G
Justin Bouknight – SCE&G
Alvis J. Bynum – SCE&G
Margaret Felkel – SCE&G
Cynthia Lanier – SCE&G
Joel Hjelseth – Westinghouse
Daniel Churchman – Westinghouse
Christopher Levesque – Westinghouse
Brian McIntyre – Westinghouse
Brian J. Bedford – Westinghouse
Tom Geer – Westinghouse
Michael Frankle – Westinghouse
Kathryn M. Sutton – Morgan Lewis
Ken Hollenbach – CB&I Stone & Webster
Curtis Castell - CB&I Stone & Webster
Chuck Baucom - CB&I Stone & Webster
AJ Marciano - CB&I Stone & Webster
Sean Burk – CB&I Stone & Webster
VCSummer2&3ProjectMail@cbi.com
vcsummer2&3project@westinghouse.com
DCRM-EDMS@SCANA.COM

References (available for NRC inspection):

1. NEI 08-01, Industry Guideline for the ITAAC Closure Process Under 10 CFR Part 52.
2. NUREG/CR-6303, Method for Performing Diversity and Defense-in-Depth Analyses of Reactor Protection Systems
3. APP-PLS-J0R-009, AP1000 Turbine Control & Protection System Overspeed Diversity Analysis
4. V.C. Summer Unit 2 ITAAC 2.4.02.03.iii Completion Package