

RS-14-192

10 CFR 50.90

July 14, 2014

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555-0001

Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2
Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-72 and NPF-77
NRC Docket Nos. STN 50-456 and STN 50-457

Byron Station, Units 1 and 2
Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-37 and NPF-66
NRC Docket Nos. STN 50-454 and STN 50-455

Clinton Power Station, Unit 1
Facility Operating License No. NPF-62
NRC Docket No. 50-461

Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3
Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-19 and DPR-25
NRC Docket Nos. 50-237 and 50-249

LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2
Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-11 and NPF-18
NRC Docket Nos. 50-373 and 50-374

Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2
Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-29 and DPR-30
NRC Docket Nos. 50-254 and 50-265

Subject: Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-523, "Generic Letter 2008-01, Managing Gas Accumulation," Revision 2, Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process

References: 1. TSTF-523, "Generic Letter 2008-01, Managing Gas Accumulation," Revision 2, dated February 20, 2013

2. Notice of Availability of "TSTF-523, 'Generic Letter 2008-01, Managing Gas Accumulation,' Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process," dated January 15, 2014

3. Letter from K. R. Jury (Exelon Generation Company, LLC/AmerGen Energy Company, LLC) to U.S. NRC, "Nine-Month Response to Generic Letter 2008-01," dated October 14, 2008

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.90, "Application for amendment of license, construction permit, or early site permit," Exelon Generation Company, LLC (EGC), requests an amendment to Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-72 and NPF-77 for Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2, Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-37 and NPF-66 for Byron Station, Units 1 and 2, Facility Operating License No. NPF-62 for Clinton Power Station, Unit 1, Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-19 and DPR-25 for Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3, Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-11 and NPF-18 for LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2, and Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-29 and DPR-30 for Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2.

The proposed amendment would modify Technical Specifications (TS) requirements to address Reference 1. EGC committed in Reference 3 to evaluate the resolution of the TS issues with respect to the elements contained in the TSTF, and submit a license amendment request, if deemed necessary based on the evaluation, within 180 days following NRC approval of the TSTF (Reference 2). This submittal satisfies the commitments.

Attachment 1 provides a description and assessment of the proposed change. Attachment 2 provides the existing TS pages marked up to show the proposed change. Attachment 3 provides the existing TS Bases pages marked up to show the proposed change. Changes to the existing TS Bases, consistent with the technical and regulatory analyses, will be implemented under the Technical Specifications Bases Control Program. They are provided in Attachment 3 for information only.

The proposed change has been reviewed by the Plant Operations Review Committees at each station and approved by the Nuclear Safety Review Board in accordance with the requirements of the EGC Quality Assurance Program.

EGC requests approval of the proposed change by July 14, 2015. Once approved, the amendment shall be implemented within 120 days.

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.91, "Notice for public comment; State consultation," paragraph (b), EGC is notifying the State of Illinois of this application for license amendment by transmitting a copy of this letter and its attachments to the designated State Official.

There are no regulatory commitments contained in this letter. Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact Mr. Kenneth M. Nicely at (630) 657-2803.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on the 14th day of July 2014.

Respectfully,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Patrick R. Simpson". The signature is written in a cursive style with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

Patrick R. Simpson
Manager – Licensing

Attachments:

1. Description and Assessment
2. Proposed Technical Specifications Changes (Mark-Up)
3. Proposed Technical Specifications Bases Changes (Mark-Up) (For Information Only)

cc: NRC Regional Administrator, Region III
NRC Senior Resident Inspector – Braidwood Station
NRC Senior Resident Inspector – Byron Station
NRC Senior Resident Inspector – Clinton Power Station
NRC Senior Resident Inspector – Dresden Nuclear Power Station
NRC Senior Resident Inspector – LaSalle County Station
NRC Senior Resident Inspector – Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station
Illinois Emergency Management Agency – Division of Nuclear Safety

ATTACHMENT 1

Description and Assessment

1.0 DESCRIPTION

The proposed change revises or adds Surveillance Requirements to verify that the system locations susceptible to gas accumulation are sufficiently filled with water and to provide allowances which permit performance of the verification. The changes are being made to address the concerns discussed in Generic Letter 2008-01, "Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling, Decay Heat Removal, and Containment Spray Systems."

The proposed amendment is consistent with TSTF-523, Revision 2, "Generic Letter 2008-01, Managing Gas Accumulation."

2.0 ASSESSMENT

2.1 Applicability of Published Safety Evaluation

Exelon Generation Company, LLC (EGC) has reviewed the model safety evaluation dated December 23, 2013 (i.e., ADAMS Accession No. ML13255A169), as part of the Federal Register Notice of Availability. This review included a review of the NRC's evaluation, as well as the information provided in TSTF-523. As described in the subsequent paragraphs, EGC has concluded that the justifications presented in the TSTF-523 proposal and the model safety evaluation prepared by the NRC are applicable to Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2, Byron Station, Units 1 and 2, Clinton Power Station (CPS), Unit 1, Dresden Nuclear Power Station (DNPS), Units 2 and 3, LaSalle County Station (LSCS), Units 1 and 2, and Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station (QCNPS), Units 1 and 2, and justify this amendment for the incorporation of the changes to the TS of the referenced plants.

The model safety evaluation discusses the applicable regulatory requirements and guidance, including applicable 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, General Design Criteria (GDC). DNPS, Units 2 and 3, and QCNPS, Units 1 and 2, were not licensed to the 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC. The plants' Updated Final Safety Analysis Reports (UFSARs), Section 3.1, "Conformance with NRC General Design Criteria," provides an assessment against the draft GDC published in 1967; while there is not a direct correlation between the current and draft GDC published in 1967, a review has determined that the plant-specific requirements are sufficiently similar to the Appendix A GDC as related to the proposed change. Therefore, the proposed change is applicable to DNPS, Units 2 and 3, and QCNPS, Units 1 and 2.

2.2 Optional Changes and Variations

EGC is not proposing any significant variations or deviations from the Technical Specifications (TS) changes described in TSTF-523, Revision 2, or the applicable parts of the NRC's model safety evaluation dated December 23, 2013 (i.e., ADAMS Accession No. ML13255A169). EGC is noting the following minor variations from the TS changes described in TSTF-523, Revision 2.

ATTACHMENT 1

Description and Assessment

- TSTF-523 is based on the Standard Technical Specification (STS). Braidwood Station, Byron Station, CPS, DNPS, LSCS, and QCNPS have adopted the STS. In the cases listed below, the STS Section number corresponds to a different plant TS Section number.
 - BWR/4 STS Section 3.4.8, "RHR Shutdown Cooling System – Hot Shutdown," corresponds to DNPS TS Section 3.4.7, "SDC System – Hot Shutdown."
 - BWR/4 STS Section 3.4.9, "RHR Shutdown Cooling System – Cold Shutdown," corresponds to DNPS TS Section 3.4.8, "SDC System – Cold Shutdown."
 - BWR/4 STS Section 3.6.2.3, "RHR Suppression Pool Cooling," corresponds to DNPS TS Section 3.6.2.3, "Suppression Pool Cooling."
 - BWR/4 STS Section 3.6.2.4, "RHR Suppression Pool Spray," corresponds to DNPS TS Section 3.6.2.4, "Suppression Pool Spray."
 - BWR/4 STS Section 3.9.8, "RHR – High Water Level," corresponds to DNPS TS Section 3.9.8, "SDC – High Water Level."
 - BWR/4 STS Section 3.9.9, "RHR – Low Water Level," corresponds to DNPS TS Section 3.9.9, "SDC – Low Water Level."
 - BWR/4 STS Section 3.4.8, "RHR Shutdown Cooling System – Hot Shutdown," corresponds to QCNPS TS Section 3.4.7, "RHR Shutdown Cooling System – Hot Shutdown."
 - BWR/4 STS Section 3.4.9, "RHR Shutdown Cooling System – Cold Shutdown," corresponds to QCNPS TS Section 3.4.8, "RHR Shutdown Cooling System – Cold Shutdown."
- In some cases, the SR number for new SRs being added is different than the SR number identified in TSTF-523 and in the model application. This is due to EGC's desire to add the new SRs at the end of the existing SRs to minimize the impact on station documents due to SR renumbering.

EGC has reviewed these changes and determined that they are administrative and do not affect the applicability of TSTF-523 to the Braidwood Station, Byron Station, CPS, DNPS, LSCS, or QCNPS TS.

3.0 REGULATORY ANALYSIS

3.1 No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination

Exelon Generation Company, LLC (EGC) requests adoption of TSTF-523, Revision 2, "Generic Letter 2008-01, Managing Gas Accumulation," which is an approved change to the standard technical specifications (STS), into the Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2, Byron Station, Units 1 and 2, Clinton Power Station (CPS), Unit 1, Dresden Nuclear Power Station (DNPS), Units 2

ATTACHMENT 1
Description and Assessment

and 3, LaSalle County Station (LSCS), Units 1 and 2, and Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station (QCNPS), Units 1 and 2, Technical Specifications (TS). The proposed change revises or adds Surveillance Requirements to verify that the system locations susceptible to gas accumulation are sufficiently filled with water and to provide allowances which permit performance of the verification.

EGC has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards consideration is involved with the proposed amendments by focusing on the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, "Issuance of amendment," as discussed below:

1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

Response: No

The proposed change revises or adds Surveillance Requirements (SRs) that require verification that the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS), the Decay Heat Removal (DHR) / Residual Heat Removal (RHR) / Shutdown Cooling (SDC) System, the Containment Spray (CS) System, and the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System, as applicable, are not rendered inoperable due to accumulated gas and to provide allowances which permit performance of the revised verification. Gas accumulation in the subject systems is not an initiator of any accident previously evaluated. As a result, the probability of any accident previously evaluated is not significantly increased. The proposed SRs ensure that the subject systems continue to be capable to perform their assumed safety function and are not rendered inoperable due to gas accumulation. Thus, the consequences of any accident previously evaluated are not significantly increased.

Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

Response: No

The proposed change revises or adds SRs that require verification that the ECCS, the DHR/RHR/SDC System, the CS System, and the RCIC System, as applicable, are not rendered inoperable due to accumulated gas and to provide allowances which permit performance of the revised verification. The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of the plant (i.e., no new or different type of equipment will be installed) or a change in the methods governing normal plant operation. In addition, the proposed change does not impose any new or different requirements that could initiate an accident. The proposed change does not alter assumptions made in the safety analysis and is consistent with the safety analysis assumptions.

Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

ATTACHMENT 1
Description and Assessment

3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

Response: No

The proposed change revises or adds SRs that require verification that the ECCS, the DHR/RHR/SDC System, the CS System, and the RCIC System, as applicable, are not rendered inoperable due to accumulated gas and to provide allowances which permit performance of the revised verification. The proposed change adds new requirements to manage gas accumulation in order to ensure the subject systems are capable of performing their assumed safety functions. The proposed SRs are more comprehensive than the current SRs and will ensure that the assumptions of the safety analysis are protected. The proposed change does not adversely affect any current plant safety margins or the reliability of the equipment assumed in the safety analysis. Therefore, there are no changes being made to any safety analysis assumptions, safety limits or limiting safety system settings that would adversely affect plant safety as a result of the proposed change.

Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Based on the above, EGC concludes that the proposed change presents no significant hazards consideration under the standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c), and, accordingly, a finding of "no significant hazards consideration" is justified.

4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL EVALUATION

The proposed change would change a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area, as defined in 10 CFR 20, or would change an inspection or surveillance requirement. However, the proposed change does not involve (i) a significant hazards consideration, (ii) a significant change in the types or a significant increase in the amounts of any effluent that may be released offsite, or (iii) a significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. Accordingly, the proposed change meets the eligibility criterion for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the proposed change.

**ATTACHMENT 2
Proposed Technical Specifications Changes (Mark-Up)**

**Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2
Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-72 and NPF-77**

**Byron Station, Units 1 and 2
Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-37 and NPF-66**

**Clinton Power Station, Unit 1
Facility Operating License No. NPF-62**

**Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3
Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-19 and DPR-25**

**LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2
Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-11 and NPF-18**

**Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2
Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-29 and DPR-30**

REVISED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS PAGES

*Braidwood Station,
Units 1 and 2*

*Byron Station,
Units 1 and 2*

*Clinton Power Station,
Unit 1*

3.4.6-3	3.4.6-3	3.4-24
3.4.7-3	3.4.7-3	3.4-26
3.4.8-2	3.4.8-2	3.5-4
3.5.2-3	3.5.2-3	3.5-8
3.6.6-2	3.6.6-2	3.5-11
3.6.6-3	3.6.6-3	3.6-25
3.9.5-2	3.9.5-2	3.6-33
3.9.6-2	3.9.6-2	3.9-12
		3.9-15

*Dresden Nuclear Power Station,
Units 2 and 3*

*LaSalle County Station,
Units 1 and 2*

*Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station,
Units 1 and 2*

3.4.7-3	3.4.9-3	3.4.7-3
3.4.8-2	3.4.10-2	3.4.8-2
3.5.1-4	3.5.1-4	3.5.1-4
3.5.2-3	3.5.2-3	3.5.2-3
3.6.2.3-2	3.5.3-2	3.5.3-2
3.6.2.4-2	3.6.2.3-2	3.6.2.3-2
3.9.8-3	3.6.2.4-2	3.6.2.4-2
3.9.9-3	3.9.8-3	3.9.8-3
	3.9.9-3	3.9.9-3

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
SR 3.4.6.3 Verify correct breaker alignment and indicated power are available to each required pump that is not in operation.	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program

SR 3.4.6.4 -----NOTE----- Not required to be performed until 12 hours after entering MODE 4. ----- Verify required RHR loop locations susceptible to gas accumulation are sufficiently filled with water.	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program
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ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
D. Two required RHR loops inoperable. <u>OR</u> Required RHR loop inoperable and one or both required SG secondary side water level(s) not within limits.	D.1 Suspend all operations involving a reduction of RCS boron concentration.	Immediately
	<u>AND</u>	
	D.2.1 Initiate action to restore one RHR loop to OPERABLE status. <u>OR</u> D.2.2 Initiate action to restore required SG secondary side water level(s) to within limits.	Immediately Immediately

SR 3.4.7.4 Verify required RHR loop locations susceptible to gas accumulation are sufficiently filled with water.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
SR 3.4.7.1 Verify required RHR loop is in operation.	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program
SR 3.4.7.2 Verify SG secondary side narrow range water level is $\geq 18\%$ in required SGs.	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program
SR 3.4.7.3 Verify correct breaker alignment and indicated power are available to each required RHR pump that is not in operation.	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program

ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
B. One required RHR loop inoperable.	B.1 Initiate action to restore RHR loop to OPERABLE status.	Immediately
C. Two required RHR loops inoperable.	C.1 Suspend all operations involving reduction in RCS boron concentration.	Immediately
	<u>AND</u> C.2 Initiate action to restore one RHR loop to OPERABLE status.	Immediately

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
SR 3.4.8.1 Verify required RHR loop is in operation.	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program
SR 3.4.8.2 Verify correct breaker alignment and indicated power are available to each required RHR pump that is not in operation.	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program

SR 3.4.8.3 Verify RHR loop locations susceptible to gas accumulation are sufficiently filled with water.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE		FREQUENCY																											
SR 3.5.2.1	<p>Verify the following valves are in the listed position with power to the valve operator removed:</p> <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>Number</th> <th>Position</th> <th>Function</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>MOV SI8806</td> <td>Open</td> <td>Suction to SI Pumps</td> </tr> <tr> <td>MOV SI8835</td> <td>Open</td> <td>SI Pump Discharge to Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Cold Legs</td> </tr> <tr> <td>MOV SI8813</td> <td>Open</td> <td>SI Pump Recirculation to the Refueling Water Storage Tank</td> </tr> <tr> <td>MOV SI8809A</td> <td>Open</td> <td>RHR Pump Discharge to RCS Cold Legs</td> </tr> <tr> <td>MOV SI8809B</td> <td>Open</td> <td>RHR Pump Discharge to RCS Cold Legs</td> </tr> <tr> <td>MOV SI8840</td> <td>Closed</td> <td>RHR Pump Discharge to RCS Hot Legs</td> </tr> <tr> <td>MOV SI8802A</td> <td>Closed</td> <td>SI Pump Discharge to RCS Hot Legs</td> </tr> <tr> <td>MOV SI8802B</td> <td>Closed</td> <td>SI Pump Discharge to RCS Hot Legs</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	Number	Position	Function	MOV SI8806	Open	Suction to SI Pumps	MOV SI8835	Open	SI Pump Discharge to Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Cold Legs	MOV SI8813	Open	SI Pump Recirculation to the Refueling Water Storage Tank	MOV SI8809A	Open	RHR Pump Discharge to RCS Cold Legs	MOV SI8809B	Open	RHR Pump Discharge to RCS Cold Legs	MOV SI8840	Closed	RHR Pump Discharge to RCS Hot Legs	MOV SI8802A	Closed	SI Pump Discharge to RCS Hot Legs	MOV SI8802B	Closed	SI Pump Discharge to RCS Hot Legs	<p>In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program</p> <div style="border: 1px solid red; padding: 5px; margin-top: 10px;"> <p>-----NOTE----- Not required to be met for system vent flow paths opened under administrative control. -----</p> </div>
Number	Position	Function																											
MOV SI8806	Open	Suction to SI Pumps																											
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MOV SI8802B	Closed	SI Pump Discharge to RCS Hot Legs																											
SR 3.5.2.2	<p>Verify each ECCS manual, power operated, and automatic valve in the flow path, that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in the correct position.</p>	<p>In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program</p>																											
SR 3.5.2.3	<p>Verify ECCS piping is full of water.</p> <div style="border: 1px solid red; padding: 5px; margin-top: 10px;"> <p>Verify ECCS locations susceptible to gas accumulation are sufficiently filled with water.</p> </div>	<p>In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program</p>																											

(continued)

ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
D. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition C not met.	D.1 Be in MODE 3.	6 hours
	<u>AND</u> D.2 Be in MODE 5.	36 hours
E. Two containment spray trains inoperable. <u>OR</u> Any combination of three or more trains inoperable.	E.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3.	Immediately

-----NOTE-----
Not required to be met for system vent flow paths opened under administrative control.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE		FREQUENCY
SR 3.6.6.1	Verify each containment spray manual, power operated, and automatic valve in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position is in the correct position.	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program
SR 3.6.6.2	Operate each containment cooling train fan unit for ≥ 15 minutes.	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program
SR 3.6.6.3	Verify each containment cooling train cooling water flow rate is ≥ 2660 gpm to each cooler.	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program

(continued)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
SR 3.6.6.4 Verify each containment spray pump's developed head at the flow test point is greater than or equal to the required developed head.	In accordance with the Inservice Testing Program
SR 3.6.6.5 Verify each automatic containment spray valve in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, actuates to the correct position on an actual or simulated actuation signal.	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program
SR 3.6.6.6 Verify each containment spray pump starts automatically on an actual or simulated actuation signal.	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program
SR 3.6.6.7 Verify each containment cooling train starts automatically on an actual or simulated actuation signal.	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program
SR 3.6.6.8 Verify each spray nozzle is unobstructed.	Following maintenance that could result in nozzle blockage <u>OR</u> Following fluid flow through the nozzles

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SR 3.6.6.9 Verify containment spray locations susceptible to gas accumulation are sufficiently filled with water.

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In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program

ACTIONS

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
A. (continued)	A.4 Close all containment penetrations providing direct access from containment atmosphere to outside atmosphere.	4 hours

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
SR 3.9.5.1 Verify one RHR loop is in operation and circulating reactor coolant at a flow rate of ≥ 1000 gpm.	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program

SR 3.9.5.2 Verify required RHR loop locations susceptible to gas accumulation are sufficiently filled with water.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program

ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
B. No RHR loop in operation.	B.1 Suspend operations involving a reduction in reactor coolant boron concentration.	Immediately
	<u>AND</u>	
	B.2 Initiate action to restore one RHR loop to operation.	Immediately
	<u>AND</u>	
	B.3 Close all containment penetrations providing direct access from containment atmosphere to outside atmosphere.	4 hours

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
SR 3.9.6.1 Verify one RHR loop is in operation and circulating reactor coolant at a flow rate of ≥ 1000 gpm.	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program
SR 3.9.6.2 Verify correct breaker alignment and indicated power available to the required RHR pump that is not in operation.	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program

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SR 3.9.6.3 Verify RHR loop locations susceptible to gas accumulation are sufficiently filled with water.

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In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
SR 3.4.6.3 Verify correct breaker alignment and indicated power are available to each required pump that is not in operation.	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program

SR 3.4.6.4 -----NOTE----- Not required to be performed until 12 hours after entering MODE 4. ----- Verify required RHR loop locations susceptible to gas accumulation are sufficiently filled with water.	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program
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ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
D. Two required RHR loops inoperable. <u>OR</u> Required RHR loop inoperable and one or both required SG secondary side water level(s) not within limits.	D.1 Suspend all operations involving a reduction of RCS boron concentration.	Immediately
	<u>AND</u>	
	D.2.1 Initiate action to restore one RHR loop to OPERABLE status. <u>OR</u> D.2.2 Initiate action to restore required SG secondary side water level(s) to within limits.	Immediately Immediately

SR 3.4.7.4 Verify required RHR loop locations susceptible to gas accumulation are sufficiently filled with water.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

	SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
SR 3.4.7.1	Verify required RHR loop is in operation.	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program
SR 3.4.7.2	Verify SG secondary side narrow range water level is $\geq 18\%$ in required SGs.	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program
SR 3.4.7.3	Verify correct breaker alignment and indicated power are available to each required RHR pump that is not in operation.	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program

ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
B. One required RHR loop inoperable.	B.1 Initiate action to restore RHR loop to OPERABLE status.	Immediately
C. Two required RHR loops inoperable.	C.1 Suspend all operations involving reduction in RCS boron concentration.	Immediately
	<u>AND</u> C.2 Initiate action to restore one RHR loop to OPERABLE status.	Immediately

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
SR 3.4.8.1 Verify required RHR loop is in operation.	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program
SR 3.4.8.2 Verify correct breaker alignment and indicated power are available to each required RHR pump that is not in operation.	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program

SR 3.4.8.3 Verify RHR loop locations susceptible to gas accumulation are sufficiently filled with water.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE		FREQUENCY																											
SR 3.5.2.1	<p>Verify the following valves are in the listed position with power to the valve operator removed:</p> <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>Number</th> <th>Position</th> <th>Function</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>MOV SI8806</td> <td>Open</td> <td>Suction to SI Pumps</td> </tr> <tr> <td>MOV SI8835</td> <td>Open</td> <td>SI Pump Discharge to Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Cold Legs</td> </tr> <tr> <td>MOV SI8813</td> <td>Open</td> <td>SI Pump Recirculation to the Refueling Water Storage Tank</td> </tr> <tr> <td>MOV SI8809A</td> <td>Open</td> <td>RHR Pump Discharge to RCS Cold Legs</td> </tr> <tr> <td>MOV SI8809B</td> <td>Open</td> <td>RHR Pump Discharge to RCS Cold Legs</td> </tr> <tr> <td>MOV SI8840</td> <td>Closed</td> <td>RHR Pump Discharge to RCS Hot Legs</td> </tr> <tr> <td>MOV SI8802A</td> <td>Closed</td> <td>SI Pump Discharge to RCS Hot Legs</td> </tr> <tr> <td>MOV SI8802B</td> <td>Closed</td> <td>SI Pump Discharge to RCS Hot Legs</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	Number	Position	Function	MOV SI8806	Open	Suction to SI Pumps	MOV SI8835	Open	SI Pump Discharge to Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Cold Legs	MOV SI8813	Open	SI Pump Recirculation to the Refueling Water Storage Tank	MOV SI8809A	Open	RHR Pump Discharge to RCS Cold Legs	MOV SI8809B	Open	RHR Pump Discharge to RCS Cold Legs	MOV SI8840	Closed	RHR Pump Discharge to RCS Hot Legs	MOV SI8802A	Closed	SI Pump Discharge to RCS Hot Legs	MOV SI8802B	Closed	SI Pump Discharge to RCS Hot Legs	<p>In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program</p> <div style="border: 1px solid red; padding: 5px; margin-top: 20px;"> <p>-----NOTE----- Not required to be met for system vent flow paths opened under administrative control. -----</p> </div>
Number	Position	Function																											
MOV SI8806	Open	Suction to SI Pumps																											
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MOV SI8802B	Closed	SI Pump Discharge to RCS Hot Legs																											
SR 3.5.2.2	<p>Verify each ECCS manual, power operated, and automatic valve in the flow path, that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in the correct position.</p>	<p>In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program</p>																											
SR 3.5.2.3	<p>Verify ECCS piping is full of water.</p> <div style="border: 1px solid red; padding: 5px; margin-top: 10px;"> <p>Verify ECCS locations susceptible to gas accumulation are sufficiently filled with water.</p> </div>	<p>In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program</p>																											

(continued)

ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
D. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition C not met.	D.1 Be in MODE 3.	6 hours
	<u>AND</u> D.2 Be in MODE 5.	36 hours
E. Two containment spray trains inoperable. <u>OR</u> Any combination of three or more trains inoperable.	E.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3.	Immediately

-----NOTE-----
Not required to be met for system vent flow paths opened under administrative control.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
SR 3.6.6.1 Verify each containment spray manual, power operated, and automatic valve in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position is in the correct position.	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program
SR 3.6.6.2 Operate each containment cooling train fan unit for ≥ 15 minutes.	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program
SR 3.6.6.3 Verify each containment cooling train cooling water flow rate is ≥ 2660 gpm to each cooler.	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program

(continued)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
SR 3.6.6.4 Verify each containment spray pump's developed head at the flow test point is greater than or equal to the required developed head.	In accordance with the Inservice Testing Program
SR 3.6.6.5 Verify each automatic containment spray valve in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, actuates to the correct position on an actual or simulated actuation signal.	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program
SR 3.6.6.6 Verify each containment spray pump starts automatically on an actual or simulated actuation signal.	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program
SR 3.6.6.7 Verify each containment cooling train starts automatically on an actual or simulated actuation signal.	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program
SR 3.6.6.8 Verify each spray nozzle is unobstructed.	Following maintenance that could result in nozzle blockage <u>OR</u> Following fluid flow through the nozzles

SR 3.6.6.9 Verify containment spray locations susceptible to gas accumulation are sufficiently filled with water.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program

ACTIONS

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
A. (continued)	A.4 Close all containment penetrations providing direct access from containment atmosphere to outside atmosphere.	4 hours

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
SR 3.9.5.1 Verify one RHR loop is in operation and circulating reactor coolant at a flow rate of ≥ 1000 gpm.	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program

SR 3.9.5.2 Verify required RHR loop locations susceptible to gas accumulation are sufficiently filled with water.	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program
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ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
<p>B. No RHR shutdown cooling subsystem in operation.</p> <p><u>AND</u></p> <p>No recirculation pump in operation.</p>	<p>B.1 Initiate action to restore one RHR shutdown cooling subsystem or one recirculation pump to operation.</p> <p><u>AND</u></p> <p>B.2 Verify reactor coolant circulation by an alternate method.</p> <p><u>AND</u></p> <p>B.3 Monitor reactor coolant temperature and pressure.</p>	<p>Immediately</p> <p>1 hour from discovery of no reactor coolant circulation</p> <p><u>AND</u></p> <p>Once per 12 hours thereafter</p> <p>Once per hour</p>

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
<p>SR 3.4.9.1 -----NOTE----- Not required to be met until 2 hours after reactor steam dome pressure is less than the RHR cut in permissive pressure. -----</p> <p>Verify one RHR shutdown cooling subsystem or recirculation pump is operating.</p>	<p>In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control program</p>

↑
Insert 1

Insert 1

SR 3.4.9.2	<p>-----NOTE----- Not required to be performed until 12 hours after reactor steam dome pressure is less than the RHR cut in permissive pressure. -----</p> <p>Verify RHR shutdown cooling subsystem locations susceptible to gas accumulation are sufficiently filled with water.</p>	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program
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ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
B. No RHR shutdown cooling subsystem in operation. <u>AND</u> No recirculation pump in operation.	B.1 Verify reactor coolant circulating by an alternate method.	1 hour from discovery of no reactor coolant circulation <u>AND</u> Once per 12 hours thereafter
	<u>AND</u> B.2 Monitor reactor coolant temperature and pressure.	Once per hour

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
SR 3.4.10.1 Verify one RHR shutdown cooling subsystem or recirculation pump is operating.	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program

SR 3.4.10.2 Verify RHR shutdown cooling subsystem locations susceptible to gas accumulation are sufficiently filled with water.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE		FREQUENCY												
SR 3.5.1.1	Verify, for each ECCS injection/spray subsystem, the piping is filled with water from the pump discharge valve to the injection valve.	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program												
	<div data-bbox="87 453 690 527" style="border: 1px solid red; padding: 2px;"> locations susceptible to gas accumulation are sufficiently filled with water. </div>													
SR 3.5.1.2	<p>-----NOTE-----</p> <p>1. Low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) subsystems may be considered OPERABLE during alignment and operation for decay heat removal with reactor steam dome pressure less than the residual heat removal cut in permissive pressure in MODE 3, if capable of being manually realigned and not otherwise inoperable.</p> <p>2. Not required to be met for system vent flow paths opened under administrative control.</p> <p>Verify each ECCS injection/spray subsystem manual, power operated, and automatic valve in the flow path, that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in the correct position.</p>	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program												
SR 3.5.1.3	Verify ADS accumulator supply pressure is ≥ 140 psig.	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program												
SR 3.5.1.4	<p>Verify each ECCS pump develops the specified flow rate with the specified pump differential pressure.</p> <table border="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"> <thead> <tr> <th><u>SYSTEM</u></th> <th><u>FLOW RATE</u></th> <th><u>PUMP DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE</u></th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>LPCS</td> <td>≥ 5010 gpm</td> <td>≥ 290 psid</td> </tr> <tr> <td>LPCI</td> <td>≥ 5050 gpm</td> <td>≥ 113 psid</td> </tr> <tr> <td>HPCS</td> <td>≥ 5010 gpm</td> <td>≥ 363 psid</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	<u>SYSTEM</u>	<u>FLOW RATE</u>	<u>PUMP DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE</u>	LPCS	≥ 5010 gpm	≥ 290 psid	LPCI	≥ 5050 gpm	≥ 113 psid	HPCS	≥ 5010 gpm	≥ 363 psid	In accordance with the Inservice Testing Program
<u>SYSTEM</u>	<u>FLOW RATE</u>	<u>PUMP DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE</u>												
LPCS	≥ 5010 gpm	≥ 290 psid												
LPCI	≥ 5050 gpm	≥ 113 psid												
HPCS	≥ 5010 gpm	≥ 363 psid												

(continued)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE		FREQUENCY
SR 3.5.2.1	Verify, for each required low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem, the suppression pool water level is \geq 12 ft 8 inches.	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program
SR 3.5.2.2	Verify, for the required High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) System, the: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Suppression pool water level is \geq 12 ft 8 inches; or b. RCIC storage tank available water volume is \geq 125,000 gal. 	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program
SR 3.5.2.3	Verify, for each required ECCS injection/spray subsystem, the piping is filled with water from the pump discharge valve to the injection valve.	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program
SR 3.5.2.4	<p>-----NOTE-----</p> <p>1. One low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) subsystem may be considered OPERABLE during alignment and operation for decay heat removal, if capable of being manually realigned and not otherwise inoperable.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>2. Verify each required ECCS injection/spray subsystem manual, power operated, and automatic valve in the flow path, that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in the correct position.</p>	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program

locations susceptible to gas accumulation are sufficiently filled with water.

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1.

2. Not required to be met for system vent flow paths opened under administrative control.

(continued)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
<p>SR 3.5.3.1 Verify the RCIC System pipng is filled with water from the pump discharge valve to the injection valve.</p>	<p>In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program</p>
<p>SR 3.5.3.2 Verify each RCIC System manual, power operated, and automatic valve in the flow path, that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in the correct position.</p>	<p>In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program</p>
<p>SR 3.5.3.3 -----NOTE----- Not required to be performed until 12 hours after reactor steam pressure and flow are adequate to perform the test. ----- Verify, with RCIC steam supply pressure ≤ 1045 psig and ≥ 920 psig, the RCIC pump can develop a flow rate ≥ 600 gpm against a system head corresponding to reactor pressure.</p>	<p>In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program</p>
<p>SR 3.5.3.4 -----NOTE----- Not required to be performed until 12 hours after reactor steam pressure and flow are adequate to perform the test. ----- Verify, with RCIC steam supply pressure ≤ 150 psig and ≥ 135 psig, the RCIC pump can develop a flow rate ≥ 600 gpm against a system head corresponding to reactor pressure.</p>	<p>In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program</p>

(continued)

locations susceptible to gas accumulation are sufficiently filled with water.

-----NOTE-----
Not required to be met for system vent flow paths opened under administrative control.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE		FREQUENCY
SR 3.6.1.7.1	<p style="text-align: center;">-----NOTE-----</p> <p>RHR containment spray subsystems may be considered OPERABLE during alignment and operation for decay heat removal when below the RHR cut in permissive pressure in MODE 3 if capable of being manually realigned and not otherwise inoperable.</p> <p>Verify each RHR containment spray subsystem manual, power operated, and automatic valve in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position is in the correct position.</p>	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program
SR 3.6.1.7.2	Verify each RHR pump develops a flow rate of ≥ 3800 gpm on recirculation flow through the associated heat exchanger to the suppression pool.	In accordance with the Inservice Testing Program
SR 3.6.1.7.3	Verify each RHR containment spray subsystem automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on an actual or simulated automatic initiation signal.	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program
SR 3.6.1.7.4	Verify each spray nozzle is unobstructed.	Following activities that could result in nozzle blockage

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2. Not required to be met for system vent flow paths opened under administrative control.

SR 3.6.1.7.5 Verify RHR containment spray subsystem locations susceptible to gas accumulation are sufficiently filled with water.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE		FREQUENCY
SR 3.6.2.3.1	Verify each RHR suppression pool cooling subsystem manual, power operated, and automatic valve in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position is in the correct position or can be aligned to the correct position.	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program
SR 3.6.2.3.2	Verify each RHR pump develops a flow rate ≥ 4550 gpm through the associated heat exchanger to the suppression pool.	In accordance with the Inservice Testing Program

SR 3.6.2.3.3 Verify RHR suppression pool cooling subsystem locations susceptible to gas accumulation are sufficiently filled with water.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program

ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
C. No RHR shutdown cooling subsystem in operation.	C.1 Verify reactor coolant circulation by an alternate method.	1 hour from discovery of no reactor coolant circulation
	<u>AND</u> C.2 Monitor reactor coolant temperature.	<u>AND</u> Once per 12 hours thereafter Once per hour

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
SR 3.9.8.1 Verify one RHR shutdown cooling subsystem is operating.	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program

SR 3.9.8.2 Verify required RHR shutdown cooling subsystem locations susceptible to gas accumulation are sufficiently filled with water.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program

ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
C. No RHR shutdown cooling subsystem in operation.	C.1 Verify reactor coolant circulation by an alternate method.	1 hour from discovery of no reactor coolant circulation
	<u>AND</u> C.2 Monitor reactor coolant temperature.	<u>AND</u> Once per 12 hours thereafter Once per hour

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
SR 3.9.9.1 Verify one RHR shutdown cooling subsystem is operating.	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program

SR 3.9.9.2 Verify RHR shutdown cooling subsystem locations susceptible to gas accumulation are sufficiently filled with water.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
<p>SR 3.4.7.1 -----NOTE----- Not required to be met until 2 hours after reactor vessel coolant temperature is less than the SDC cut-in permissive temperature. ----- Verify one SDC subsystem or recirculation pump is operating.</p>	<p>In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program</p>



SR 3.4.7.2 -----NOTE-----
 Not required to be performed until 12 hours after reactor vessel coolant temperature is less than the SDC cut-in permissive temperature.

 Verify SDC subsystem locations susceptible to gas accumulation are sufficiently filled with water.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program

ACTIONS

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
B. No required SDC subsystem in operation. <u>AND</u> No recirculation pump in operation.	B.1 Verify reactor coolant circulating by an alternate method.	1 hour from discovery of no reactor coolant circulation <u>AND</u> Once per 12 hours thereafter
	<u>AND</u> B.2 Monitor reactor coolant temperature and pressure.	Once per hour



SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
SR 3.4.8.1 Verify one SDC subsystem or recirculation pump is operating.	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program

SR 3.4.8.2 Verify SDC subsystem locations susceptible to gas accumulation are sufficiently filled with water.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE		FREQUENCY																
SR 3.5.1.1	Verify, for each ECCS injection/spray subsystem, the piping is filled with water from the pump discharge valve to the injection valve. 	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program																
locations susceptible to gas accumulation are sufficiently filled with water.																		
SR 3.5.1.2	Verify each ECCS injection/spray subsystem manual, power operated, and automatic valve in the flow path, that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in the correct position. 	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program																
SR 3.5.1.3	Verify correct breaker alignment to the LPCI swing bus.	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program																
SR 3.5.1.4	Verify each recirculation pump discharge valve cycles through one complete cycle of full travel or is de-energized in the closed position.	In accordance with the Inservice Testing Program																
SR 3.5.1.5	Verify the following ECCS pumps develop the specified flow rate against a test line pressure corresponding to the specified reactor pressure.	In accordance with the Inservice Testing Program																
	<table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <thead> <tr> <th style="text-align: left;"><u>SYSTEM</u></th> <th style="text-align: left;"><u>FLOW RATE</u></th> <th style="text-align: center;"><u>NO. OF PUMPS</u></th> <th style="text-align: center;"><u>TEST LINE PRESSURE CORRESPONDING TO A REACTOR PRESSURE OF</u></th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>Core</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>Spray</td> <td>≥ 4500 gpm</td> <td style="text-align: center;">1</td> <td>≥ 90 psig</td> </tr> <tr> <td>LPCI</td> <td>≥ 9000 gpm</td> <td style="text-align: center;">2</td> <td>≥ 20 psig</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	<u>SYSTEM</u>	<u>FLOW RATE</u>	<u>NO. OF PUMPS</u>	<u>TEST LINE PRESSURE CORRESPONDING TO A REACTOR PRESSURE OF</u>	Core				Spray	≥ 4500 gpm	1	≥ 90 psig	LPCI	≥ 9000 gpm	2	≥ 20 psig	
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(continued)

-----NOTE-----

Not required to be met for system vent flow paths opened under administrative control.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE		FREQUENCY
SR 3.5.2.1	<p>Verify, for each required ECCS injection/spray subsystem, the:</p> <p>a. Suppression pool water level is ≥ 10 ft 4 inches; or</p> <p>b. -----NOTE----- Only one required ECCS injection/spray subsystem may take credit for this option during OPDRVs. -----</p> <p>Contaminated condensate storage tanks water volume is $\geq 140,000$ available gallons.</p>	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program
SR 3.5.2.2	<p>Verify, for each required ECCS injection/spray subsystem, the piping is filled with water from the pump discharge valve to the injection valve.</p>	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program
SR 3.5.2.3	<p>Verify each required ECCS injection/spray subsystem manual, power operated, and automatic valve in the flow path, that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in the correct position.</p>	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program

(continued)

locations susceptible to gas accumulation are sufficiently filled with water.

-----NOTE-----
Not required to be met for system vent flow paths opened under administrative control.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE		FREQUENCY
SR 3.6.2.3.1	Verify each suppression pool cooling subsystem manual and power operated valve in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in the correct position or can be aligned to the correct position.	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program
SR 3.6.2.3.2	Verify each required LPCI pump develops a flow rate ≥ 5000 gpm through the associated heat exchanger while operating in the suppression pool cooling mode.	In accordance with the Inservice Testing Program

SR 3.6.2.3.3 Verify suppression pool cooling subsystem locations susceptible to gas accumulation are sufficiently filled with water.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE		FREQUENCY
SR 3.6.2.4.1	Verify each suppression pool spray subsystem manual and power operated valve in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in the correct position or can be aligned to the correct position.	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program
SR 3.6.2.4.2	Verify each suppression pool spray nozzle is unobstructed.	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program

SR 3.6.2.4.3 Verify suppression pool spray subsystem locations susceptible to gas accumulation are sufficiently filled with water.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
SR 3.9.8.1 Verify one SDC subsystem is operating.	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program

SR 3.9.8.2 Verify required SDC subsystem locations susceptible to gas accumulation are sufficiently filled with water.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
SR 3.9.9.1 Verify one SDC subsystem is operating.	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program

SR 3.9.9.2 Verify SDC subsystem locations susceptible to gas accumulation are sufficiently filled with water.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
<p>SR 3.4.9.1 -----NOTE----- Not required to be met until 2 hours after reactor vessel pressure is less than the RHR cut-in permissive pressure. ----- Verify one RHR shutdown cooling subsystem or recirculation pump is operating.</p>	<p>In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program</p>

↑
Insert 1

Insert 1

SR 3.4.9.2	<p>-----NOTE----- Not required to be performed until 12 hours after reactor steam dome pressure is less than the RHR cut in permissive pressure. -----</p> <p>Verify RHR shutdown cooling subsystem locations susceptible to gas accumulation are sufficiently filled with water.</p>	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program
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ACTIONS

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
B. No RHR shutdown cooling subsystem in operation. <u>AND</u> No recirculation pump in operation.	B.1 Verify reactor coolant circulating by an alternate method.	1 hour from discovery of no reactor coolant circulation <u>AND</u> Once per 12 hours thereafter
	<u>AND</u> B.2 Monitor reactor coolant temperature and pressure.	Once per hour

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
SR 3.4.10.1 Verify one RHR shutdown cooling subsystem or recirculation pump is operating.	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program

SR 3.4.10.2 Verify RHR shutdown cooling subsystem locations susceptible to gas accumulation are sufficiently filled with water.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE		FREQUENCY															
SR 3.5.1.1	Verify, for each ECCS injection/spray subsystem, the piping is filled with water from the pump discharge valve to the injection valve.	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program															
SR 3.5.1.2	Verify each ECCS injection/spray subsystem manual, power operated, and automatic valve in the flow path, that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in the correct position.	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program															
SR 3.5.1.3	Verify ADS accumulator supply header pressure is ≥ 150 psig.	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program															
SR 3.5.1.4	Verify ADS accumulator backup compressed gas system bottle pressure is ≥ 500 psig. <u>OR</u> Verify ADS accumulator reserve bottle pressure is ≥ 1100 psig.	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program															
SR 3.5.1.5	Verify each ECCS pump develops the specified flow rate against the specified test line pressure. <table border="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"> <thead> <tr> <th><u>SYSTEM</u></th> <th><u>FLOW RATE</u></th> <th><u>TEST LINE PRESSURE</u></th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>LPCS</td> <td>≥ 6350 gpm</td> <td>≥ 290 psig</td> </tr> <tr> <td>LPCI</td> <td>≥ 7200 gpm</td> <td>≥ 130 psig</td> </tr> <tr> <td>HPCS (Unit 1)</td> <td>≥ 6250 gpm</td> <td>≥ 370 psig</td> </tr> <tr> <td>HPCS (Unit 2)</td> <td>≥ 6200 gpm</td> <td>≥ 330 psig</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	<u>SYSTEM</u>	<u>FLOW RATE</u>	<u>TEST LINE PRESSURE</u>	LPCS	≥ 6350 gpm	≥ 290 psig	LPCI	≥ 7200 gpm	≥ 130 psig	HPCS (Unit 1)	≥ 6250 gpm	≥ 370 psig	HPCS (Unit 2)	≥ 6200 gpm	≥ 330 psig	In accordance with the Inservice Testing Program
<u>SYSTEM</u>	<u>FLOW RATE</u>	<u>TEST LINE PRESSURE</u>															
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locations susceptible to gas accumulation are sufficiently filled with water.

-----NOTE-----
Not required to be met for system vent flow paths opened under administrative control.

(continued)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE		FREQUENCY															
SR 3.5.2.1	Verify, for each required low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem, the suppression pool water level is ≥ -12 ft 7 in.	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program															
SR 3.5.2.2	Verify, for the required High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) System, the suppression pool water level is ≥ -12 ft 7 in.	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program															
SR 3.5.2.3	Verify, for each required ECCS injection/spray subsystem, the piping is filled with water from the pump discharge valve to the injection valve.	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program															
SR 3.5.2.4	Verify each required ECCS injection/spray subsystem manual, power operated, and automatic valve in the flow path, that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in the correct position.	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program															
SR 3.5.2.5	Verify each required ECCS pump develops the specified flow rate against the specified test line pressure.	In accordance with the Inservice Testing Program															
	<table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>SYSTEM</th> <th>FLOW RATE</th> <th>TEST LINE PRESSURE</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>LPCS</td> <td>≥ 6350 gpm</td> <td>≥ 290 psig</td> </tr> <tr> <td>LPCI</td> <td>≥ 7200 gpm</td> <td>≥ 130 psig</td> </tr> <tr> <td>HPCS (Unit 1)</td> <td>≥ 6250 gpm</td> <td>≥ 370 psig</td> </tr> <tr> <td>HPCS (Unit 2)</td> <td>≥ 6200 gpm</td> <td>≥ 330 psig</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	SYSTEM	FLOW RATE	TEST LINE PRESSURE	LPCS	≥ 6350 gpm	≥ 290 psig	LPCI	≥ 7200 gpm	≥ 130 psig	HPCS (Unit 1)	≥ 6250 gpm	≥ 370 psig	HPCS (Unit 2)	≥ 6200 gpm	≥ 330 psig	
SYSTEM	FLOW RATE	TEST LINE PRESSURE															
LPCS	≥ 6350 gpm	≥ 290 psig															
LPCI	≥ 7200 gpm	≥ 130 psig															
HPCS (Unit 1)	≥ 6250 gpm	≥ 370 psig															
HPCS (Unit 2)	≥ 6200 gpm	≥ 330 psig															

locations susceptible to gas accumulation are sufficiently filled with water.

~~the piping is filled with water from the pump discharge valve to the injection valve.~~

-----NOTE-----
Not required to be met for system vent flow paths opened under administrative control.

(continued)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE		FREQUENCY
SR 3.5.3.1	<p>Verify the RCIC System piping is filled with water from the pump discharge valve to the injection valve.</p>	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program
SR 3.5.3.2	<p>Verify each RCIC System manual, power operated, and automatic valve in the flow path, that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in the correct position.</p>	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program
SR 3.5.3.3	<p>-----NOTE----- Not required to be performed until 12 hours after reactor steam pressure and flow are adequate to perform the test. -----</p> <p>Verify, with reactor pressure ≤ 1020 psig and ≥ 920 psig, the RCIC pump can develop a flow rate ≥ 600 gpm against a system head corresponding to reactor pressure.</p>	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program
SR 3.5.3.4	<p>-----NOTE----- Not required to be performed until 12 hours after reactor steam pressure and flow are adequate to perform the test. -----</p> <p>Verify, with reactor pressure ≤ 165 psig, the RCIC pump can develop a flow rate ≥ 600 gpm against a system head corresponding to reactor pressure.</p>	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program

(continued)

locations susceptible to gas accumulation are sufficiently filled with water.

-----NOTE-----
Not required to be met for system vent flow paths opened under administrative control.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE		FREQUENCY
SR 3.6.2.3.1	Verify each RHR suppression pool cooling subsystem manual and power operated valve in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in the correct position or can be aligned to the correct position.	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program
SR 3.6.2.3.2	Verify each required RHR pump develops a flow rate ≥ 7200 gpm through the associated heat exchanger while operating in the suppression pool cooling mode.	In accordance with the Inservice Testing Program

SR 3.6.2.3.3 Verify RHR suppression pool cooling subsystem locations susceptible to gas accumulation are sufficiently filled with water.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE		FREQUENCY
SR 3.6.2.4.1	Verify each RHR suppression pool spray subsystem manual and power operated valve in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in the correct position or can be aligned to the correct position.	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program
SR 3.6.2.4.2	Verify each required RHR pump develops a flow rate ≥ 450 gpm through the spray sparger while operating in the suppression pool spray mode.	In accordance with the Inservice Testing Program

SR 3.6.2.4.3 Verify RHR suppression pool spray subsystem locations susceptible to gas accumulation are sufficiently filled with water.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
SR 3.9.8.1 Verify one RHR shutdown cooling subsystem is operating.	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program



SR 3.9.8.2 Verify required RHR shutdown cooling subsystem locations susceptible to gas accumulation are sufficiently filled with water.



In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
SR 3.9.9.1 Verify one RHR shutdown cooling subsystem is operating.	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program

SR 3.9.9.2 Verify RHR shutdown cooling subsystem locations susceptible to gas accumulation are sufficiently filled with water.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
<p>SR 3.4.7.1 -----NOTE----- Not required to be met until 2 hours after reactor steam dome pressure is less than the RHR cut-in permissive pressure. -----</p> <p>Verify each RHR shutdown cooling subsystem manual and power operated valve in the flow path, that is not locked, sealed or otherwise secured in position, is in the correct position or can be aligned to the correct position.</p>	<p>In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program</p>



SR 3.4.7.2 -----NOTE-----
 Not required to be performed until 12 hours after reactor steam dome pressure is less than the RHR cut in permissive pressure.

Verify RHR shutdown cooling subsystem locations susceptible to gas accumulation are sufficiently filled with water.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program

ACTIONS

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
A. (continued)	<p>A.2 -----NOTE----- Only applicable if both RHR shutdown cooling subsystems are inoperable. -----</p> <p>Verify reactor coolant circulating by an alternate method.</p> <p><u>AND</u></p> <p>A.3 -----NOTE----- Only applicable if both RHR shutdown cooling subsystems are inoperable. -----</p> <p>Monitor reactor coolant temperature and pressure.</p>	<p>1 hour</p> <p><u>AND</u></p> <p>Once per 12 hours thereafter</p> <p>Once per hour</p>

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
<p>SR 3.4.8.1 Verify each RHR shutdown cooling subsystem manual and power operated valve in the flow path, that is not locked, sealed or otherwise secured in position, is in the correct position or can be aligned to the correct position.</p>	<p>In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program</p>

SR 3.4.8.2 Verify RHR shutdown cooling subsystem locations susceptible to gas accumulation are sufficiently filled with water.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE		FREQUENCY
SR 3.5.1.1	<p>Verify, for each ECCS injection/spray subsystem, the piping is filled with water from the pump discharge valve to the injection valve.</p> <p>locations susceptible to gas accumulation are sufficiently filled with water.</p>	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program
SR 3.5.1.2	<p>-----NOTE-----</p> <p>1. Low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) subsystems may be considered OPERABLE during alignment and operation for decay heat removal with reactor steam dome pressure less than the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) cut-in permissive pressure in MODE 3, if capable of being manually realigned and not otherwise inoperable.</p> <p>2. Not required to be met for system vent flow paths opened under administrative control.</p> <p>Verify each ECCS injection/spray subsystem manual, power operated, and automatic valve in the flow path, that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in the correct position.</p>	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program
SR 3.5.1.3	Verify correct breaker alignment to the LPCI swing bus.	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program
SR 3.5.1.4	Verify each recirculation pump discharge valve cycles through one complete cycle of full travel or is de-energized in the closed position.	In accordance with the Inservice Testing Program

(continued)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE		FREQUENCY
SR 3.5.2.1	<p>Verify, for each required ECCS injection/spray subsystem, the:</p> <p>a. Suppression pool water level is ≥ 8.5 ft; or</p> <p>b. -----NOTE----- Only one required ECCS injection/spray subsystem may take credit for this option during OPDRVs. -----</p> <p>Contaminated condensate storage tank(s) water volume is $\geq 140,000$ available gallons.</p>	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program
SR 3.5.2.2	<p>Verify, for each required ECCS injection/spray subsystem, the piping is filled with water from the pump discharge valve to the injection valve.</p>	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program
SR 3.5.2.3	<p>-----NOTE-----</p> <p>1. One LPCI subsystem may be considered OPERABLE during alignment and operation for decay heat removal if capable of being manually realigned and not otherwise inoperable.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>Verify each required ECCS injection/spray subsystem manual, power operated, and automatic valve in the flow path, that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in the correct position.</p>	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program

locations susceptible to gas accumulation are sufficiently filled with water.

2. Not required to be met for system vent flow paths opened under administrative control.

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(continued)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE		FREQUENCY
SR 3.5.3.1	Verify the RCIC System pipng is filled with water from the pump discharge valve to the injection valve.	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program
SR 3.5.3.2	Verify each RCIC System manual, power operated, and automatic valve in the flow path, that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in the correct position.	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program
SR 3.5.3.3	<p>-----NOTE----- Not required to be performed until 12 hours after reactor steam pressure and flow are adequate to perform the test. -----</p> <p>Verify, with reactor pressure ≤ 1005 psig and ≥ 920 psig, the RCIC pump can develop a flow rate ≥ 400 gpm against a system head corresponding to reactor pressure.</p>	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program
SR 3.5.3.4	<p>-----NOTE----- Not required to be performed until 12 hours after reactor steam pressure and flow are adequate to perform the test. -----</p> <p>Verify, with reactor pressure ≤ 180 psig, the RCIC pump can develop a flow rate ≥ 400 gpm against a system head corresponding to reactor pressure.</p>	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program

(continued)

locations susceptible to gas accumulation are sufficiently filled with water.

-----NOTE-----
Not required to be met for system vent flow paths opened under administrative control.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE		FREQUENCY
SR 3.6.2.3.1	Verify each RHR suppression pool cooling subsystem manual and power operated valve in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in the correct position or can be aligned to the correct position.	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program
SR 3.6.2.3.2	Verify each required RHR pump develops a flow rate ≥ 5000 gpm through the associated heat exchanger while operating in the suppression pool cooling mode.	In accordance with the Inservice Testing Program

SR 3.6.2.3.3 Verify RHR suppression pool cooling subsystem locations susceptible to gas accumulation are sufficiently filled with water.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE		FREQUENCY
SR 3.6.2.4.1	Verify each RHR suppression pool spray subsystem manual and power operated valve in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in the correct position or can be aligned to the correct position.	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program
SR 3.6.2.4.2	Verify each suppression pool spray nozzle is unobstructed.	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program

SR 3.6.2.4.3 Verify RHR suppression pool spray subsystem locations susceptible to gas accumulation are sufficiently filled with water.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
SR 3.9.8.1 Monitor reactor coolant temperature.	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program
SR 3.9.8.2 Verify each required RHR shutdown cooling subsystem manual and power operated valve in the flow path, that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in the correct position or can be aligned to the correct position.	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program

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SR 3.9.8.3 Verify required RHR shutdown cooling subsystem locations susceptible to gas accumulation are sufficiently filled with water.

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In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENCY
SR 3.9.9.1 Monitor reactor coolant temperature.	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program
SR 3.9.9.2 Verify each required RHR shutdown cooling subsystem manual and power operated valve in the flow path, that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in the correct position or can be aligned to the correct position.	In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program

SR 3.9.9.3 Verify RHR shutdown cooling subsystem locations susceptible to gas accumulation are sufficiently filled with water.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program

ATTACHMENT 3
Proposed Technical Specifications Bases Changes (Mark-Up)
(For Information Only)

Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2
Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-72 and NPF-77

Byron Station, Units 1 and 2
Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-37 and NPF-66

Clinton Power Station, Unit 1
Facility Operating License No. NPF-62

Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3
Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-19 and DPR-25

LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2
Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-11 and NPF-18

Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2
Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-29 and DPR-30

REVISED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES PAGES

*Braidwood Station,
Units 1 and 2*

*Byron Station,
Units 1 and 2*

*Clinton Power Station,
Unit 1*

B 3.4.6-3	B 3.4.6-3	B 3.4-44
B 3.4.6-5	B 3.4.6-5	B 3.4-47
B 3.4.7-3	B 3.4.7-3	B 3.4-49
B 3.4.7-6	B 3.4.7-6	B 3.4-52
B 3.4.8-2	B 3.4.8-2	B 3.5-5
B 3.4.8-4	B 3.4.8-4	B 3.5-10
B 3.5.2-6	B 3.5.2-6	B 3.5-15
B 3.5.2-9	B 3.5.2-9	B 3.5-20a
B 3.5.2-10	B 3.5.2-10	B 3.5-22
B 3.5.3-2	B 3.5.3-2	B 3.5-24
B 3.6.6-6	B 3.6.6-6	B 3.6-40
B 3.6.6-9	B 3.6.6-9	B 3.6-42
B 3.6.6-11	B 3.6.6-11	B 3.6-43
B 3.9.5-2	B 3.9.5-2	B 3.6-57
B 3.9.5-4	B 3.9.5-4	B 3.6-58b
B 3.9.6-2	B 3.9.6-2	B 3.9-26
B 3.9.6-4	B 3.9.6-4	B 3.9-28
		B 3.9-29
		B 3.9-32

ATTACHMENT 3
Proposed Technical Specifications Bases Changes (Mark-Up)
(For Information Only)

REVISED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES PAGES (continued)

*Dresden Nuclear Power Station,
Units 2 and 3*

*LaSalle County Station,
Units 1 and 2*

*Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station,
Units 1 and 2*

B 3.4.7-2	B 3.4.9-2	B 3.4.7-2
B 3.4.7-5	B 3.4.9-5	B 3.4.7-5
B 3.4.8-2	B 3.4.10-2	B 3.4.8-2
B 3.4.8-5	B 3.4.10-5	B 3.4.8-5
B 3.5.1-5	B 3.5.1-5	B 3.5.1-5
B 3.5.1-11	B 3.5.1-10	B 3.5.1-12
B 3.5.1-12	B 3.5.2-1	B 3.5.1-13
B 3.5.2-1	B 3.5.2-5	B 3.5.2-1
B 3.5.2-5	B 3.5.3-2	B 3.5.2-6
B 3.6.2.3-2	B 3.5.3-4	B 3.5.3-2
B 3.6.2.3-5	B 3.5.3-5	B 3.5.3-4
B 3.6.2.4-2	B 3.6.2.3-2	B 3.5.3-5
B 3.6.2.4-4	B 3.6.2.3-4	B 3.6.2.3-2
B 3.9.8-2	B 3.6.2.4-2	B 3.6.2.3-5
B 3.9.8-4	B 3.6.2.4-4	B 3.6.2.4-2
B 3.9.9-1	B 3.9.8-2	B 3.6.2.4-4
B 3.9.9-4	B 3.9.8-4	B 3.9.8-2
	B 3.9.9-1	B 3.9.8-5
	B 3.9.9-4	B 3.9.9-1
		B 3.9.9-5

BASES

LCO (continued)

Note 2 requires that the secondary side water temperature of each SG be < 50°F above each of the RCS cold leg temperatures before the start of an RCP with any RCS cold leg temperature ≤ 350°F. This restraint is to prevent a low temperature overpressure event due to a thermal transient when an RCP is started.

An OPERABLE RCS loop comprises an OPERABLE RCP and an OPERABLE SG which has the minimum water level specified in SR 3.4.6.2.

Similarly for the RHR System, an OPERABLE RHR loop is comprised of an OPERABLE RHR pump capable of providing forced flow to an OPERABLE RHR heat exchanger. RCPs and RHR pumps are OPERABLE if they are capable of being powered and are able to provide forced flow if required.

APPLICABILITY

In MODE 4, this LCO ensures forced circulation of the reactor coolant to remove decay heat from the core and to provide proper boron mixing. One loop of either RCS or RHR provides sufficient circulation for these purposes. However, two loops consisting of any combination of RCS and RHR loops are required to be OPERABLE to provide adequate redundancy for decay heat removal.

Operation in other MODES is covered by:

- LCO 3.4.4, "RCS Loops-MODES 1 and 2";
- LCO 3.4.5, "RCS Loops-MODE 3";
- LCO 3.4.7, "RCS Loops-MODE 5, Loops Filled";
- LCO 3.4.8, "RCS Loops-MODE 5, Loops Not Filled";
- LCO 3.9.5, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and Coolant Circulation-High Water Level" (MODE 6); and
- LCO 3.9.6, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and Coolant Circulation-Low Water Level" (MODE 6).

Management of gas voids is important to RHR System OPERABILITY.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.4.6.1

This SR requires verification that the required operating RCS or RHR loop is in operation. Verification may include flow rate, temperature, or pump status monitoring, which helps ensure that forced flow is providing heat removal. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

SR 3.4.6.2

SR 3.4.6.2 requires verification of required SG OPERABILITY. SG OPERABILITY is verified by ensuring that the secondary side narrow range water level is $\geq 18\%$ for each required RCS loop. If the SG secondary side narrow range water level is $< 18\%$, the tubes may become uncovered and the associated loop may not be capable of providing the heat sink necessary for removal of decay heat. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

SR 3.4.6.3

Verification that the required pump is OPERABLE ensures that an additional RCS or RHR pump can be placed in operation, if needed, to maintain decay heat removal and reactor coolant circulation. Verification is performed by verifying proper breaker alignment and power available to the required pump. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

REFERENCES

None.

↑
Insert 1

Insert 1

SR 3.4.6.4

RHR System piping and components have the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained gases. Preventing and managing gas intrusion and accumulation is necessary for proper operation of the required RHR loop(s) and may also prevent water hammer, pump cavitation, and pumping of noncondensable gas into the reactor vessel.

Selection of RHR System locations susceptible to gas accumulation is based on a review of system design information, including piping and instrumentation drawings, isometric drawings, plan and elevation drawings, and calculations. The design review is supplemented by system walk downs to validate the system high points and to confirm the location and orientation of important components that can become sources of gas or could otherwise cause gas to be trapped or difficult to remove during system maintenance or restoration. Susceptible locations depend on plant and system configuration, such as stand-by versus operating conditions.

The RHR System is OPERABLE when it is sufficiently filled with water. Acceptance criteria are established for the volume of accumulated gas at susceptible locations. If accumulated gas is discovered that exceeds the acceptance criteria for the susceptible location (or the volume of accumulated gas at one or more susceptible locations exceeds an acceptance criteria for gas volume at the suction or discharge of a pump), the Surveillance is not met. If it is determined by subsequent evaluation that the RHR System is not rendered inoperable by the accumulated gas (i.e., the system is sufficiently filled with water), the Surveillance may be declared met. Accumulated gas should be eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits.

RHR System locations susceptible to gas accumulation are monitored and, if gas is found, the gas volume is compared to the acceptance criteria for the location. Susceptible locations in the same system flow path which are subject to the same gas intrusion mechanisms may be verified by monitoring a representative sub-set of susceptible locations. Monitoring may not be practical for locations that are inaccessible due to radiological or environmental conditions, the plant configuration, or personnel safety. For these locations alternative methods (e.g., operating parameters, remote monitoring) may be used to monitor the susceptible location. Monitoring is not required for susceptible locations where the maximum potential accumulated gas void volume has been evaluated and determined to not challenge system OPERABILITY. The accuracy of the method used for monitoring the susceptible locations and trending of the results should be sufficient to assure system OPERABILITY during the Surveillance interval.

This SR is modified by a Note that states the SR is not required to be performed until 12 hours after entering MODE 4. In a rapid shutdown, there may be insufficient time to verify all susceptible locations prior to entering MODE 4.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. The Surveillance Frequency may vary by location susceptible to gas accumulation.

BASES

LCO (continued)

Utilization of Note 1 is permitted provided the following conditions are met, along with any other conditions imposed by procedures:

- a. No operations are permitted that would dilute the RCS boron concentration, therefore maintaining the margin to criticality. Boron reduction is prohibited because a uniform concentration distribution throughout the RCS cannot be ensured when in natural circulation; and
- b. Core outlet temperature is maintained at least 10°F below saturation temperature, so that no vapor bubble may form and possibly cause a natural circulation flow obstruction.

Note 2 allows one RHR loop to be inoperable for a period of ≤ 2 hours, provided that the other RHR loop is OPERABLE and in operation. This permits periodic surveillance tests to be performed on the inoperable loop when such testing is safe and possible.

Note 3 requires that the secondary side water temperature of each SG be $< 50^\circ\text{F}$ above each of the RCS cold leg temperatures before the start of a Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) with an RCS cold leg temperature $\leq 350^\circ\text{F}$. This restriction is to prevent a low temperature overpressure event due to a thermal transient when an RCP is started.

Note 4 provides for an orderly transition from MODE 5 to MODE 4 during a planned startup by permitting removal of RHR loops from operation when at least one RCS loop is in operation. This Note provides for the transition to MODE 4 where an RCS loop is permitted to be in operation and replaces the RCS circulation function provided by the RHR loops.

An OPERABLE RHR loop is comprised of an OPERABLE RHR pump capable of providing forced flow to an OPERABLE RHR heat exchanger. RHR pumps are OPERABLE if they are capable of being powered and are able to provide flow if required. An OPERABLE SG via natural circulation has greater than or equal to the minimum water level specified in SR 3.4.7.2 and is otherwise capable of providing the necessary heat sink via natural circulation.

Management of gas voids is important to RHR System OPERABILITY.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SR 3.4.7.3

Verification that a second RHR pump is OPERABLE, when required, ensures that an additional pump can be placed in operation, if needed, to maintain decay heat removal and reactor coolant circulation. Verification is performed by verifying proper breaker alignment and power available to the RHR pump. If secondary side water level is $\geq 18\%$ in at least two SGs, this surveillance is not needed. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

REFERENCES

1. NRC Information Notice 95-35, "Degraded Ability of Steam Generators to Remove Decay Heat by Natural Circulation," August 28, 1995.

↑
Insert 2

Insert 2

SR 3.4.7.4

RHR System piping and components have the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained gases. Preventing and managing gas intrusion and accumulation is necessary for proper operation of the required RHR loop(s) and may also prevent water hammer, pump cavitation, and pumping of noncondensable gas into the reactor vessel.

Selection of RHR System locations susceptible to gas accumulation is based on a review of system design information, including piping and instrumentation drawings, isometric drawings, plan and elevation drawings, and calculations. The design review is supplemented by system walk downs to validate the system high points and to confirm the location and orientation of important components that can become sources of gas or could otherwise cause gas to be trapped or difficult to remove during system maintenance or restoration. Susceptible locations depend on plant and system configuration, such as stand-by versus operating conditions.

The RHR System is OPERABLE when it is sufficiently filled with water. Acceptance criteria are established for the volume of accumulated gas at susceptible locations. If accumulated gas is discovered that exceeds the acceptance criteria for the susceptible location (or the volume of accumulated gas at one or more susceptible locations exceeds an acceptance criteria for gas volume at the suction or discharge of a pump), the Surveillance is not met. If it is determined by subsequent evaluation that the RHR System is not rendered inoperable by the accumulated gas (i.e., the system is sufficiently filled with water), the Surveillance may be declared met. Accumulated gas should be eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits.

RHR System locations susceptible to gas accumulation are monitored and, if gas is found, the gas volume is compared to the acceptance criteria for the location. Susceptible locations in the same system flow path which are subject to the same gas intrusion mechanisms may be verified by monitoring a representative sub-set of susceptible locations. Monitoring may not be practical for locations that are inaccessible due to radiological or environmental conditions, the plant configuration, or personnel safety. For these locations alternative methods (e.g., operating parameters, remote monitoring) may be used to monitor the susceptible location. Monitoring is not required for susceptible locations where the maximum potential accumulated gas void volume has been evaluated and determined to not challenge system OPERABILITY. The accuracy of the method used for monitoring the susceptible locations and trending of the results should be sufficient to assure system OPERABILITY during the Surveillance interval.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. The Surveillance Frequency may vary by location susceptible to gas accumulation.

BASES

LCO


The purpose of this LCO is to require that at least two RHR loops be OPERABLE and one of these loops be in operation. An OPERABLE loop is one that has the capability of transferring heat from the reactor coolant at a controlled rate. Heat cannot be removed via the RHR System unless forced flow is used. A minimum of one running RHR pump meets the LCO requirement for one loop in operation. An additional RHR loop is required to be OPERABLE to meet single failure considerations.

Note 1 permits all RHR pumps to be removed from operation for ≤ 1 hour. Utilization of Note 1 is permitted provided the following conditions are met, along with any other conditions imposed by procedures:

- a. No operations are permitted that would dilute the RCS boron concentration, therefore maintaining the margin to criticality. Boron reduction is prohibited because a uniform concentration distribution throughout the RCS cannot be ensured when in natural circulation;
- b. Core outlet temperature is maintained at least 10°F below saturation temperature, so that no vapor bubble may form and possibly cause a natural circulation flow obstruction; and
- c. No draining operations are permitted that would further reduce the RCS water volume.

Note 2 allows one RHR loop to be inoperable for a period of ≤ 2 hours, provided that the other loop is OPERABLE and in operation. This permits periodic surveillance tests to be performed on the inoperable loop when these tests are safe and possible.

An OPERABLE RHR loop is comprised of an OPERABLE RHR pump capable of providing forced flow to an OPERABLE RHR heat exchanger. RHR pumps are OPERABLE if they are capable of being powered and are able to provide flow if required.



Management of gas voids is important to RHR System OPERABILITY.

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

C.1 and C.2

If no required RHR loops are OPERABLE, all operations involving a reduction of RCS boron concentration must be suspended and action must be initiated immediately to restore an RHR loop to OPERABLE status. Boron dilution requires forced circulation to provide proper mixing and preserve the margin to criticality. The immediate Completion Times reflect the importance of maintaining the capability for heat removal.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.4.8.1

This SR requires verification that the required operating RHR loop is in operation. Verification may include flow rate, temperature, or pump status monitoring, which helps ensure that forced flow is providing heat removal. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

SR 3.4.8.2

Verification that a second RHR pump is OPERABLE ensures that an additional pump can be placed in operation, if needed, to maintain decay heat removal and reactor coolant circulation. Verification is performed by verifying proper breaker alignment and power available to the required pumps. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

REFERENCES

None.

↑
Insert 3

Insert 3

SR 3.4.8.3

RHR System piping and components have the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained gases. Preventing and managing gas intrusion and accumulation is necessary for proper operation of the RHR loops and may also prevent water hammer, pump cavitation, and pumping of noncondensable gas into the reactor vessel.

Selection of RHR System locations susceptible to gas accumulation is based on a review of system design information, including piping and instrumentation drawings, isometric drawings, plan and elevation drawings, and calculations. The design review is supplemented by system walk downs to validate the system high points and to confirm the location and orientation of important components that can become sources of gas or could otherwise cause gas to be trapped or difficult to remove during system maintenance or restoration. Susceptible locations depend on plant and system configuration, such as stand-by versus operating conditions.

The RHR System is OPERABLE when it is sufficiently filled with water. Acceptance criteria are established for the volume of accumulated gas at susceptible locations. If accumulated gas is discovered that exceeds the acceptance criteria for the susceptible location (or the volume of accumulated gas at one or more susceptible locations exceeds an acceptance criteria for gas volume at the suction or discharge of a pump), the Surveillance is not met. If it is determined by subsequent evaluation that the RHR System is not rendered inoperable by the accumulated gas (i.e., the system is sufficiently filled with water), the Surveillance may be declared met. Accumulated gas should be eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits.

RHR System locations susceptible to gas accumulation are monitored and, if gas is found, the gas volume is compared to the acceptance criteria for the location. Susceptible locations in the same system flow path which are subject to the same gas intrusion mechanisms may be verified by monitoring a representative sub-set of susceptible locations. Monitoring may not be practical for locations that are inaccessible due to radiological or environmental conditions, the plant configuration, or personnel safety. For these locations alternative methods (e.g., operating parameters, remote monitoring) may be used to monitor the susceptible location. Monitoring is not required for susceptible locations where the maximum potential accumulated gas void volume has been evaluated and determined to not challenge system OPERABILITY. The accuracy of the method used for monitoring the susceptible locations and trending of the results should be sufficient to assure system OPERABILITY during the Surveillance interval.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. The Surveillance Frequency may vary by location susceptible to gas accumulation.

BASES

LCO (continued)

During an event requiring ECCS actuation, a flow path is required to provide an abundant supply of water from the RWST to the RCS via the ECCS pumps and their respective supply headers to each of the four cold leg injection nozzles. In the long term, this flow path may be switched to take its supply from the containment sump and to supply its flow to the RCS hot and cold legs.

Management of gas voids is important to ECCS OPERABILITY.

The flow path for each train must maintain its designed independence to ensure that no single failure can disable both ECCS trains.

The LCO is modified by two Notes that allow isolation of both SI pump flow paths and a portion of both RHR flow paths for up to 2 hours to perform pressure isolation valve testing per SR 3.4.14.1 during MODE 3. Isolation of the discharge flow paths of both SI pumps may be accomplished by closing valve SI8835. Isolation of a portion of the discharge flow paths of both RHR pumps may be accomplished by closing either valve SI8809A or SI8809B. With a portion of both RHR flow paths isolated, an alternate means of cold leg injection must be available for each isolated flow path. An alternate means may include: 1) OPERABLE accumulators with their isolation valves either closed, but energized, or open; 2) cold leg injection via the Safety Injection pumps, and the SI8821A/B and the SI8835 valves; or 3) cold leg injection via the Centrifugal Charging pumps and the SI8801A/B valves.

APPLICABILITY

In MODES 1, 2, and 3, the ECCS OPERABILITY requirements for the limiting Design Basis Accident, a large break LOCA, are based on full power operation. Although reduced power would not require the same level of performance, the accident analysis does not provide for reduced cooling requirements in the lower MODES. The centrifugal charging pump performance is based on a small break LOCA, which establishes the pump performance curve and has less dependence on power. The SI pump performance requirements are based on a small break LOCA. MODE 2 and MODE 3 requirements are bounded by the MODE 1 analysis.


BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTSSR 3.5.2.1

Verification of proper motor operated valve position ensures that the injection flow path from the ECCS pumps to the RCS is maintained. Misalignment of these valves could render both ECCS trains inoperable. Securing these valves in position by removal of power ensures that they cannot change position as a result of an active failure or be inadvertently misaligned. These valves are of the type, described in Reference 8, that can disable the function of both ECCS trains and invalidate the accident analyses. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

SR 3.5.2.2

Verifying the correct alignment for manual, power operated, and automatic valves in the ECCS flow paths provides assurance that the proper flow paths will exist for ECCS operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position (e.g., the valves listed in SR 3.5.2.1 and SR 3.5.2.7), since these were verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. A valve that receives an actuation signal is allowed to be in a nonaccident position provided the valve will automatically reposition within the proper stroke time. This Surveillance does not require any testing or valve manipulation. Rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.



The Surveillance is modified by a Note which exempts system vent flow paths opened under administrative control. The administrative control should be proceduralized and include stationing a dedicated individual at the system vent flow path who is in continuous communication with the operators in the control room. This individual will have a method to rapidly close the system vent flow path if directed.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SR 3.5.2.3

~~With the exception of the operating centrifugal charging pump, the ECCS pumps are normally in a standby, nonoperating mode. As such, flow path piping has the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained gases. The system will perform properly, injecting its full capacity into the RCS upon demand, by maintaining the piping from the ECCS pumps to the RCS full of water. This will also prevent water hammer, pump cavitation, and pumping of noncondensable gas (e.g., air, nitrogen, or hydrogen) into the reactor vessel following an SI signal or during shutdown cooling. As described in Reference 9, voided lines are prevented by proper vent location and filling and venting procedures. Therefore, verification that the ECCS piping is maintained full of water is accomplished by venting certain portions of the ECCS and by performing ultrasonic examinations of other portions of the ECCS lacking vents. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.~~

~~The ECCS piping is maintained full of water by venting the non operating ECCS pump casings and the discharge piping high points (applicable to idle RH and SI systems only) outside containment. This venting surveillance does not apply to subsystems in communication with operating systems because the flows in these systems are sufficient to provide confidence that water hammer which could occur from voiding would not result in unacceptable dynamic loads. During shutdown cooling operation, the exclusion would apply to the operating RH pump, in addition to the ECCS piping in communication with the operating pump.~~

~~For selected portions of piping (i.e., portions involving the idle CV pump discharge piping up to the first check valve on the pump discharge and miniflow lines, the stagnant portion of the piping upstream of the SI8801A/B adjacent to the vent valve SI045, and the piping at the 1CV207 or 2CV206 valve if the B CV pump is idle) the verification that the piping is filled with water will be performed by ultrasonic examination. This examination will provide added assurance that the piping is maintained water solid. These methods are consistent with Reference 10.~~



Insert 4

SR 3.5.2.3

ECCS piping and components have the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained gases. Preventing and managing gas intrusion and accumulation is necessary for proper operation of the ECCS and may also prevent water hammer, pump cavitation, and pumping of noncondensable gas into the reactor vessel.

Selection of ECCS locations susceptible to gas accumulation is based on a review of system design information, including piping and instrumentation drawings, isometric drawings, plan and elevation drawings, and calculations. The design review is supplemented by system walk downs to validate the system high points and to confirm the location and orientation of important components that can become sources of gas or could otherwise cause gas to be trapped or difficult to remove during system maintenance or restoration. Susceptible locations depend on plant and system configuration, such as stand-by versus operating conditions.

The ECCS is OPERABLE when it is sufficiently filled with water. Acceptance criteria are established for the volume of accumulated gas at susceptible locations. If accumulated gas is discovered that exceeds the acceptance criteria for the susceptible location (or the volume of accumulated gas at one or more susceptible locations exceeds an acceptance criteria for gas volume at the suction or discharge of a pump), the Surveillance is not met. If it is determined by subsequent evaluation that the ECCS is not rendered inoperable by the accumulated gas (i.e., the system is sufficiently filled with water), the Surveillance may be declared met. Accumulated gas should be eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits.

ECCS locations susceptible to gas accumulation are monitored and, if gas is found, the gas volume is compared to the acceptance criteria for the location. Susceptible locations in the same system flow path which are subject to the same gas intrusion mechanisms may be verified by monitoring a representative sub-set of susceptible locations. Monitoring may not be practical for locations that are inaccessible due to radiological or environmental conditions, the plant configuration, or personnel safety. For these locations alternative methods (e.g., operating parameters, remote monitoring) may be used to monitor the susceptible location. Monitoring is not required for susceptible locations where the maximum potential accumulated gas void volume has been evaluated and determined to not challenge system OPERABILITY. The accuracy of the method used for monitoring the susceptible locations and trending of the results should be sufficient to assure system OPERABILITY during the Surveillance interval.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. The Surveillance Frequency may vary by location susceptible to gas accumulation.

BASES

LCO

In MODE 4, one of the two independent (and redundant) ECCS trains is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that sufficient ECCS flow is available to the core following a DBA.

In MODE 4, an ECCS train consists of a centrifugal charging subsystem and an RHR subsystem. Each train includes the piping, instruments, and controls to ensure an OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the RWST and transferring suction to the containment sump.

During an event requiring ECCS actuation, a flow path is required to provide an abundant supply of water from the RWST to the RCS via the ECCS pumps and their respective supply headers to each of the four cold leg injection nozzles. In the long term, this flow path may be switched to take its supply from the containment sump and to deliver its flow to the RCS hot and cold legs.

The LCO is modified by a Note that allows an RHR train to be considered OPERABLE during alignment and operation for decay heat removal, if capable of being manually realigned (remote or local) to the ECCS mode of operation and not otherwise inoperable. This allows operation in the RHR mode during MODE 4. However, due to the potential for steam binding of the RHR pump suction piping to occur when the RCS hot leg temperature is greater than 260°F and the RHR train is realigned to the RWST, one RHR train must remain aligned for the ECCS mode of operation to satisfy LCO 3.5.3 when RCS hot leg temperature is greater than 260°F.

APPLICABILITY

In MODES 1, 2, and 3, the OPERABILITY requirements for ECCS are covered by LCO 3.5.2.

In MODE 4 with RCS temperature below 350°F, one OPERABLE ECCS train is acceptable without single failure consideration, on the basis of the stable reactivity of the reactor and the limited core cooling requirements.

In MODES 5 and 6, unit conditions are such that the probability of an event requiring ECCS injection is extremely low. Core cooling requirements in MODE 5 are addressed by LCO 3.4.7, "RCS Loops-MODE 5, Loops Filled," and LCO 3.4.8, "RCS Loops-MODE 5, Loops Not Filled." MODE 6 core cooling requirements are addressed by LCO 3.9.5, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and Coolant Circulation-High Water Level," and LCO 3.9.6, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and Coolant Circulation-Low Water Level."

Management of gas voids is important to ECCS OPERABILITY.

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)

Containment cooling train performance for post accident conditions is given in Reference 6. The result of the analysis is that each train can provide 100% of the required peak cooling capacity during the post accident condition. The train post accident cooling capacity under varying containment ambient conditions, required to perform the accident analyses, is also shown in Reference 7.

The modeled Containment Cooling System actuation from the containment analysis is based upon a response time associated with exceeding the containment High-3 pressure setpoint to achieving full Containment Cooling System air and safety grade cooling water flow. The Containment Cooling System total response time of 65 seconds, includes signal delay, DG startup (for loss of offsite power), and service water pump startup times (Ref. 5).

The Containment Spray System and the Containment Cooling System satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

During a DBA, a minimum of one containment cooling train and one containment spray train are required to maintain the containment peak pressure and temperature below the design limits (Ref. 7). Additionally, one containment spray train is also required to remove iodine from the containment atmosphere and maintain concentrations below those assumed in the safety analysis. To ensure that these requirements are met, two containment spray trains and two containment cooling trains must be OPERABLE. The chemical aspects of iodine removal capability are addressed in LCO 3.6.7. Therefore, in the event of an accident, at least one train in each system operates, assuming the worst case single active failure occurs.

Each Containment Spray System includes a spray pump, spray headers, nozzles, valves, piping, instruments, and controls to ensure an OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the RWST upon an ESF actuation signal and manually transferring suction to the containment sump.

Management of gas voids is important to Containment Spray System OPERABILITY.



BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

D.1 and D.2

If the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition C of this LCO are not met, the unit must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours and to MODE 5 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

E.1

With two containment spray trains or any combination of three or more containment spray and cooling trains inoperable, the unit is in a condition outside the accident analysis. Therefore, LCO 3.0.3 must be entered immediately.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.6.1

Verifying the correct alignment for manual, power operated, and automatic valves in the containment spray flow path provides assurance that the proper flow paths will exist for Containment Spray System operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, since these were verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation. Rather, it involves verification, through a system walkdown, that those valves outside containment (only check valves are inside containment) and capable of potentially being mispositioned are in the correct position.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

The Surveillance is modified by a Note which exempts system vent flow paths opened under administrative control. The administrative control should be proceduralized and include stationing a dedicated individual at the system vent flow path who is in continuous communication with the operators in the control room. This individual will have a method to rapidly close the system vent flow path if directed.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SR 3.6.6.5 and SR 3.6.6.6

These SRs require verification that each automatic containment spray valve actuates to its correct position and that each containment spray pump starts upon receipt of an actual or simulated actuation of a containment High-3 pressure signal. This Surveillance is not required for valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the required position under administrative controls. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.


The surveillance of containment sump isolation valves is also required by SR 3.5.2.5. A single surveillance may be used to satisfy both requirements.

SR 3.6.6.7

This SR requires verification that each containment cooling train actuates upon receipt of an actual or simulated safety injection signal. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

SR 3.6.6.8

With the containment spray inlet valves closed and the spray header drained of any solution, low pressure air or smoke can be blown through test connections. This SR ensures that each spray nozzle is unobstructed and provides assurance that spray coverage of the containment during an accident is not degraded. Due to the passive design of the nozzle, a test following maintenance that could result in nozzle blockage or following fluid flow through the nozzles is considered adequate to detect obstruction of the nozzles.



Insert 5

SR 3.6.6.9

Containment Spray System piping and components have the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained gases. Preventing and managing gas intrusion and accumulation is necessary for proper operation of the containment spray trains and may also prevent water hammer and pump cavitation.

Selection of Containment Spray System locations susceptible to gas accumulation is based on a review of system design information, including piping and instrumentation drawings, isometric drawings, plan and elevation drawings, and calculations. The design review is supplemented by system walk downs to validate the system high points and to confirm the location and orientation of important components that can become sources of gas or could otherwise cause gas to be trapped or difficult to remove during system maintenance or restoration. Susceptible locations depend on plant and system configuration, such as stand-by versus operating conditions.

The Containment Spray System is OPERABLE when it is sufficiently filled with water. Acceptance criteria are established for the volume of accumulated gas at susceptible locations. If accumulated gas is discovered that exceeds the acceptance criteria for the susceptible location (or the volume of accumulated gas at one or more susceptible locations exceeds an acceptance criteria for gas volume at the suction or discharge of a pump), the Surveillance is not met. If it is determined by subsequent evaluation that the Containment Spray System is not rendered inoperable by the accumulated gas (i.e., the system is sufficiently filled with water), the Surveillance may be declared met. Accumulated gas should be eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits.

Containment Spray System locations susceptible to gas accumulation are monitored and, if gas is found, the gas volume is compared to the acceptance criteria for the location. Susceptible locations in the same system flow path which are subject to the same gas intrusion mechanisms may be verified by monitoring a representative sub-set of susceptible locations. Monitoring may not be practical for locations that are inaccessible due to radiological or environmental conditions, the plant configuration, or personnel safety. For these locations alternative methods (e.g., operating parameters, remote monitoring) may be used to monitor the susceptible location. Monitoring is not required for susceptible locations where the maximum potential accumulated gas void volume has been evaluated and determined to not challenge system OPERABILITY. The accuracy of the method used for monitoring the susceptible locations and trending of the results should be sufficient to assure system OPERABILITY during the Surveillance interval.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. The Surveillance Frequency may vary by location susceptible to gas accumulation.

BASES

LCO

Only one RHR loop is required for decay heat removal in MODE 6, with the water level ≥ 23 ft above the top of the reactor vessel flange because the volume of water above the reactor vessel flange provides backup decay heat removal capability. One RHR loop is required to be in operation and OPERABLE to provide:

- a. Removal of decay heat;
- b. Mixing of borated coolant to minimize the possibility of criticality; and
- c. Indication of reactor coolant temperature.

An OPERABLE RHR loop includes an RHR pump, a heat exchanger, valves, piping, instruments, and controls to ensure an OPERABLE flow path. The flow path starts in one of the RCS hot legs and is returned to the RCS cold legs.

The LCO is modified by a Note that allows the required operating RHR loop to be removed from service for up to 1 hour per 8 hour period, provided no operations are permitted that would cause a reduction of the RCS boron concentration. Boron concentration reduction is prohibited because uniform concentration distribution cannot be ensured without forced circulation. This permits operations such as core mapping or alterations in the vicinity of the reactor vessel hot leg nozzles and RCS to RHR isolation valve testing. During this 1 hour period, decay heat is removed by natural convection to the large mass of water in the refueling cavity.

Management of gas voids is important to RHR System OPERABILITY.

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

With the RHR loop requirements not met, the potential exists for the coolant to boil and release radioactive gas to the containment atmosphere. Therefore, all containment penetrations providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere must be closed within 4 hours. Closing containment penetrations that are open to the outside atmosphere ensures dose limits are not exceeded.

The Completion Time of 4 hours is reasonable, based on the low probability of the coolant boiling in that time.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.9.5.1

This Surveillance demonstrates that the RHR loop is in operation and circulating reactor coolant. The flow rate is determined by the flow rate necessary to provide sufficient decay heat removal capability and to provide mixing of the borated coolant to prevent thermal and boron stratification in the core. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 5.4.7.

 Insert 6

Insert 6

SR 3.9.5.2

RHR System piping and components have the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained gases. Preventing and managing gas intrusion and accumulation is necessary for proper operation of the RHR loops and may also prevent water hammer, pump cavitation, and pumping of noncondensable gas into the reactor vessel.

Selection of RHR System locations susceptible to gas accumulation is based on a review of system design information, including piping and instrumentation drawings, isometric drawings, plan and elevation drawings, and calculations. The design review is supplemented by system walk downs to validate the system high points and to confirm the location and orientation of important components that can become sources of gas or could otherwise cause gas to be trapped or difficult to remove during system maintenance or restoration. Susceptible locations depend on plant and system configuration, such as stand-by versus operating conditions.

The RHR System is OPERABLE when it is sufficiently filled with water. Acceptance criteria are established for the volume of accumulated gas at susceptible locations. If accumulated gas is discovered that exceeds the acceptance criteria for the susceptible location (or the volume of accumulated gas at one or more susceptible locations exceeds an acceptance criteria for gas volume at the suction or discharge of a pump), the Surveillance is not met. If it is determined by subsequent evaluation that the RHR System is not rendered inoperable by the accumulated gas (i.e., the system is sufficiently filled with water), the Surveillance may be declared met. Accumulated gas should be eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits.

RHR System locations susceptible to gas accumulation are monitored and, if gas is found, the gas volume is compared to the acceptance criteria for the location. Susceptible locations in the same system flow path which are subject to the same gas intrusion mechanisms may be verified by monitoring a representative sub-set of susceptible locations. Monitoring may not be practical for locations that are inaccessible due to radiological or environmental conditions, the plant configuration, or personnel safety. For these locations alternative methods (e.g., operating parameters, remote monitoring) may be used to monitor the susceptible location. Monitoring is not required for susceptible locations where the maximum potential accumulated gas void volume has been evaluated and determined to not challenge system OPERABILITY. The accuracy of the method used for monitoring the susceptible locations and trending of the results should be sufficient to assure system OPERABILITY during the Surveillance interval.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. The Surveillance Frequency may vary by location susceptible to gas accumulation.

BASES

LCO Both RHR loops must be OPERABLE in MODE 6, with the water level < 23 ft above the top of the reactor vessel flange. In addition, one RHR loop must be in operation in order to provide:

- a. Removal of decay heat;
- b. Mixing of borated coolant to minimize the possibility of criticality; and
- c. Indication of reactor coolant temperature.

An OPERABLE RHR loop consists of an RHR pump, a heat exchanger, valves, piping, instruments and controls to ensure an OPERABLE flow path. The flow path starts in one of the RCS hot legs and is returned to the RCS cold legs. However, the LCO is modified by a Note that permits the required RHR loop to be removed from operation and considered OPERABLE when aligned to, or during transitioning to or from, the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) to support filling or draining the refueling cavity, or to support required testing, if capable of being realigned to the RCS.

APPLICABILITY Two RHR loops are required to be OPERABLE, and one RHR loop must be in operation in MODE 6, with the water level < 23 ft above the top of the reactor vessel flange, to provide decay heat removal and mixing of the borated coolant. Requirements for the RHR System in MODES 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 are covered by LCO 3.4.6, "RCS Loops-MODE 4," LCO 3.4.7, "RCS Loops-MODE 5, Loops Filled," LCO 3.4.8, "RCS Loops-MODE 5, Loops Not Filled," LCO 3.5.2, "ECCS-Operating," and LCO 3.5.3, "ECCS-Shutdown." RHR loop requirements in MODE 6 with the water level \geq 23 ft are located in LCO 3.9.5, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and Coolant Circulation-High Water Level."

Management of gas voids is important to RHR System OPERABILITY.

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

With no RHR loop in operation, the potential exists for the coolant to boil and release radioactive gas to the containment atmosphere. Therefore, all containment penetrations providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere must be closed within 4 hours. Closing containment penetrations that are open to the outside atmosphere ensures that dose limits are not exceeded.

The Completion Time of 4 hours is reasonable, based on the low probability of the coolant boiling in that time.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.9.6.1

This Surveillance demonstrates that one RHR loop is in operation and circulating reactor coolant. The flow rate is determined by the flow rate necessary to provide sufficient decay heat removal capability and to provide mixing of the borated coolant to prevent thermal and boron stratification in the core. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

SR 3.9.6.2

Verification that the required pump is OPERABLE ensures a RHR pump can be placed in operation, if needed, to maintain decay heat removal and borated coolant circulation. Verification is performed by verifying proper breaker alignment and power available to the pump. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 5.4.7.

 Insert 7

Insert 7

SR 3.9.6.3

RHR System piping and components have the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained gases. Preventing and managing gas intrusion and accumulation is necessary for proper operation of the RHR loops and may also prevent water hammer, pump cavitation, and pumping of noncondensable gas into the reactor vessel.

Selection of RHR System locations susceptible to gas accumulation is based on a review of system design information, including piping and instrumentation drawings, isometric drawings, plan and elevation drawings, and calculations. The design review is supplemented by system walk downs to validate the system high points and to confirm the location and orientation of important components that can become sources of gas or could otherwise cause gas to be trapped or difficult to remove during system maintenance or restoration. Susceptible locations depend on plant and system configuration, such as stand-by versus operating conditions.

The RHR System is OPERABLE when it is sufficiently filled with water. Acceptance criteria are established for the volume of accumulated gas at susceptible locations. If accumulated gas is discovered that exceeds the acceptance criteria for the susceptible location (or the volume of accumulated gas at one or more susceptible locations exceeds an acceptance criteria for gas volume at the suction or discharge of a pump), the Surveillance is not met. If it is determined by subsequent evaluation that the RHR System is not rendered inoperable by the accumulated gas (i.e., the system is sufficiently filled with water), the Surveillance may be declared met. Accumulated gas should be eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits.

RHR System locations susceptible to gas accumulation are monitored and, if gas is found, the gas volume is compared to the acceptance criteria for the location. Susceptible locations in the same system flow path which are subject to the same gas intrusion mechanisms may be verified by monitoring a representative sub-set of susceptible locations. Monitoring may not be practical for locations that are inaccessible due to radiological or environmental conditions, the plant configuration, or personnel safety. For these locations alternative methods (e.g., operating parameters, remote monitoring) may be used to monitor the susceptible location. Monitoring is not required for susceptible locations where the maximum potential accumulated gas void volume has been evaluated and determined to not challenge system OPERABILITY. The accuracy of the method used for monitoring the susceptible locations and trending of the results should be sufficient to assure system OPERABILITY during the Surveillance interval.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. The Surveillance Frequency may vary by location susceptible to gas accumulation.

BASES

LCO (continued)

Note 2 requires that the secondary side water temperature of each SG be $< 50^{\circ}\text{F}$ above each of the RCS cold leg temperatures before the start of an RCP with any RCS cold leg temperature $\leq 350^{\circ}\text{F}$. This restraint is to prevent a low temperature overpressure event due to a thermal transient when an RCP is started.

An OPERABLE RCS loop comprises an OPERABLE RCP and an OPERABLE SG which has the minimum water level specified in SR 3.4.6.2.

Similarly for the RHR System, an OPERABLE RHR loop is comprised of an OPERABLE RHR pump capable of providing forced flow to an OPERABLE RHR heat exchanger. RCPs and RHR pumps are OPERABLE if they are capable of being powered and are able to provide forced flow if required.

APPLICABILITY

In MODE 4, this LCO ensures forced circulation of the reactor coolant to remove decay heat from the core and to provide proper boron mixing. One loop of either RCS or RHR provides sufficient circulation for these purposes. However, two loops consisting of any combination of RCS and RHR loops are required to be OPERABLE to provide adequate redundancy for decay heat removal.

Operation in other MODES is covered by:

- LCO 3.4.4, "RCS Loops-MODES 1 and 2";
- LCO 3.4.5, "RCS Loops-MODE 3";
- LCO 3.4.7, "RCS Loops-MODE 5, Loops Filled";
- LCO 3.4.8, "RCS Loops-MODE 5, Loops Not Filled";
- LCO 3.9.5, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and Coolant Circulation-High Water Level" (MODE 6); and
- LCO 3.9.6, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and Coolant Circulation-Low Water Level" (MODE 6).

Management of gas voids is important to RHR System OPERABILITY.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.4.6.1

This SR requires verification that the required operating RCS or RHR loop is in operation. Verification may include flow rate, temperature, or pump status monitoring, which helps ensure that forced flow is providing heat removal. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

SR 3.4.6.2

SR 3.4.6.2 requires verification of required SG OPERABILITY. SG OPERABILITY is verified by ensuring that the secondary side narrow range water level is $\geq 18\%$ for each required RCS loop. If the SG secondary side narrow range water level is $< 18\%$, the tubes may become uncovered and the associated loop may not be capable of providing the heat sink necessary for removal of decay heat. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

SR 3.4.6.3

Verification that the required pump is OPERABLE ensures that an additional RCS or RHR pump can be placed in operation, if needed, to maintain decay heat removal and reactor coolant circulation. Verification is performed by verifying proper breaker alignment and power available to the required pump. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

REFERENCES

None.

Insert 1



Insert 1

SR 3.4.6.4

RHR System piping and components have the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained gases. Preventing and managing gas intrusion and accumulation is necessary for proper operation of the required RHR loop(s) and may also prevent water hammer, pump cavitation, and pumping of noncondensable gas into the reactor vessel.

Selection of RHR System locations susceptible to gas accumulation is based on a review of system design information, including piping and instrumentation drawings, isometric drawings, plan and elevation drawings, and calculations. The design review is supplemented by system walk downs to validate the system high points and to confirm the location and orientation of important components that can become sources of gas or could otherwise cause gas to be trapped or difficult to remove during system maintenance or restoration. Susceptible locations depend on plant and system configuration, such as stand-by versus operating conditions.

The RHR System is OPERABLE when it is sufficiently filled with water. Acceptance criteria are established for the volume of accumulated gas at susceptible locations. If accumulated gas is discovered that exceeds the acceptance criteria for the susceptible location (or the volume of accumulated gas at one or more susceptible locations exceeds an acceptance criteria for gas volume at the suction or discharge of a pump), the Surveillance is not met. If it is determined by subsequent evaluation that the RHR System is not rendered inoperable by the accumulated gas (i.e., the system is sufficiently filled with water), the Surveillance may be declared met. Accumulated gas should be eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits.

RHR System locations susceptible to gas accumulation are monitored and, if gas is found, the gas volume is compared to the acceptance criteria for the location. Susceptible locations in the same system flow path which are subject to the same gas intrusion mechanisms may be verified by monitoring a representative sub-set of susceptible locations. Monitoring may not be practical for locations that are inaccessible due to radiological or environmental conditions, the plant configuration, or personnel safety. For these locations alternative methods (e.g., operating parameters, remote monitoring) may be used to monitor the susceptible location. Monitoring is not required for susceptible locations where the maximum potential accumulated gas void volume has been evaluated and determined to not challenge system OPERABILITY. The accuracy of the method used for monitoring the susceptible locations and trending of the results should be sufficient to assure system OPERABILITY during the Surveillance interval.

This SR is modified by a Note that states the SR is not required to be performed until 12 hours after entering MODE 4. In a rapid shutdown, there may be insufficient time to verify all susceptible locations prior to entering MODE 4.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. The Surveillance Frequency may vary by location susceptible to gas accumulation.

BASES

LCO (continued)

Utilization of Note 1 is permitted provided the following conditions are met, along with any other conditions imposed by procedures:

- a. No operations are permitted that would dilute the RCS boron concentration, therefore maintaining the margin to criticality. Boron reduction is prohibited because a uniform concentration distribution throughout the RCS cannot be ensured when in natural circulation; and
- b. Core outlet temperature is maintained at least 10°F below saturation temperature, so that no vapor bubble may form and possibly cause a natural circulation flow obstruction.

Note 2 allows one RHR loop to be inoperable for a period of ≤ 2 hours, provided that the other RHR loop is OPERABLE and in operation. This permits periodic surveillance tests to be performed on the inoperable loop when such testing is safe and possible.

Note 3 requires that the secondary side water temperature of each SG be $< 50^\circ\text{F}$ above each of the RCS cold leg temperatures before the start of a Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) with an RCS cold leg temperature $\leq 350^\circ\text{F}$. This restriction is to prevent a low temperature overpressure event due to a thermal transient when an RCP is started.

Note 4 provides for an orderly transition from MODE 5 to MODE 4 during a planned startup by permitting removal of RHR loops from operation when at least one RCS loop is in operation. This Note provides for the transition to MODE 4 where an RCS loop is permitted to be in operation and replaces the RCS circulation function provided by the RHR loops.

An OPERABLE RHR loop is comprised of an OPERABLE RHR pump capable of providing forced flow to an OPERABLE RHR heat exchanger. RHR pumps are OPERABLE if they are capable of being powered and are able to provide flow if required. An OPERABLE SG via natural circulation has greater than or equal to the minimum water level specified in SR 3.4.7.2 and is otherwise capable of providing the necessary heat sink via natural circulation.

Management of gas voids is important to RHR System OPERABILITY.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SR 3.4.7.3

Verification that a second RHR pump is OPERABLE, when required, ensures that an additional pump can be placed in operation, if needed, to maintain decay heat removal and reactor coolant circulation. Verification is performed by verifying proper breaker alignment and power available to the RHR pump. If secondary side water level is $\geq 18\%$ in at least two SGs, this surveillance is not needed. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

REFERENCES

1. NRC Information Notice 95-35, "Degraded Ability of Steam Generators to Remove Decay Heat by Natural Circulation," August 28, 1995.

Insert 2



Insert 2

SR 3.4.7.4

RHR System piping and components have the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained gases. Preventing and managing gas intrusion and accumulation is necessary for proper operation of the required RHR loop(s) and may also prevent water hammer, pump cavitation, and pumping of noncondensable gas into the reactor vessel.

Selection of RHR System locations susceptible to gas accumulation is based on a review of system design information, including piping and instrumentation drawings, isometric drawings, plan and elevation drawings, and calculations. The design review is supplemented by system walk downs to validate the system high points and to confirm the location and orientation of important components that can become sources of gas or could otherwise cause gas to be trapped or difficult to remove during system maintenance or restoration. Susceptible locations depend on plant and system configuration, such as stand-by versus operating conditions.

The RHR System is OPERABLE when it is sufficiently filled with water. Acceptance criteria are established for the volume of accumulated gas at susceptible locations. If accumulated gas is discovered that exceeds the acceptance criteria for the susceptible location (or the volume of accumulated gas at one or more susceptible locations exceeds an acceptance criteria for gas volume at the suction or discharge of a pump), the Surveillance is not met. If it is determined by subsequent evaluation that the RHR System is not rendered inoperable by the accumulated gas (i.e., the system is sufficiently filled with water), the Surveillance may be declared met. Accumulated gas should be eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits.

RHR System locations susceptible to gas accumulation are monitored and, if gas is found, the gas volume is compared to the acceptance criteria for the location. Susceptible locations in the same system flow path which are subject to the same gas intrusion mechanisms may be verified by monitoring a representative sub-set of susceptible locations. Monitoring may not be practical for locations that are inaccessible due to radiological or environmental conditions, the plant configuration, or personnel safety. For these locations alternative methods (e.g., operating parameters, remote monitoring) may be used to monitor the susceptible location. Monitoring is not required for susceptible locations where the maximum potential accumulated gas void volume has been evaluated and determined to not challenge system OPERABILITY. The accuracy of the method used for monitoring the susceptible locations and trending of the results should be sufficient to assure system OPERABILITY during the Surveillance interval.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. The Surveillance Frequency may vary by location susceptible to gas accumulation.

BASES

LCO

The purpose of this LCO is to require that at least two RHR loops be OPERABLE and one of these loops be in operation. An OPERABLE loop is one that has the capability of transferring heat from the reactor coolant at a controlled rate. Heat cannot be removed via the RHR System unless forced flow is used. A minimum of one running RHR pump meets the LCO requirement for one loop in operation. An additional RHR loop is required to be OPERABLE to meet single failure considerations.

Note 1 permits all RHR pumps to be removed from operation for ≤ 1 hour. Utilization of Note 1 is permitted provided the following conditions are met, along with any other conditions imposed by procedures:

- a. No operations are permitted that would dilute the RCS boron concentration, therefore maintaining the margin to criticality. Boron reduction is prohibited because a uniform concentration distribution throughout the RCS cannot be ensured when in natural circulation;
- b. Core outlet temperature is maintained at least 10°F below saturation temperature, so that no vapor bubble may form and possibly cause a natural circulation flow obstruction; and
- c. No draining operations are permitted that would further reduce the RCS water volume.

Note 2 allows one RHR loop to be inoperable for a period of ≤ 2 hours, provided that the other loop is OPERABLE and in operation. This permits periodic surveillance tests to be performed on the inoperable loop when these tests are safe and possible.

An OPERABLE RHR loop is comprised of an OPERABLE RHR pump capable of providing forced flow to an OPERABLE RHR heat exchanger. RHR pumps are OPERABLE if they are capable of being powered and are able to provide flow if required.

↑
Management of gas voids is important to RHR System OPERABILITY.

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

C.1 and C.2

If no required RHR loops are OPERABLE, all operations involving a reduction of RCS boron concentration must be suspended and action must be initiated immediately to restore an RHR loop to OPERABLE status. Boron dilution requires forced circulation to provide proper mixing and preserve the margin to criticality. The immediate Completion Times reflect the importance of maintaining the capability for heat removal.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.4.8.1

This SR requires verification that the required operating RHR loop is in operation. Verification may include flow rate, temperature, or pump status monitoring, which helps ensure that forced flow is providing heat removal. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

SR 3.4.8.2

Verification that a second RHR pump is OPERABLE ensures that an additional pump can be placed in operation, if needed, to maintain decay heat removal and reactor coolant circulation. Verification is performed by verifying proper breaker alignment and power available to the required pumps. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

REFERENCES

None.



Insert 3

SR 3.4.8.3

RHR System piping and components have the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained gases. Preventing and managing gas intrusion and accumulation is necessary for proper operation of the RHR loops and may also prevent water hammer, pump cavitation, and pumping of noncondensable gas into the reactor vessel.

Selection of RHR System locations susceptible to gas accumulation is based on a review of system design information, including piping and instrumentation drawings, isometric drawings, plan and elevation drawings, and calculations. The design review is supplemented by system walk downs to validate the system high points and to confirm the location and orientation of important components that can become sources of gas or could otherwise cause gas to be trapped or difficult to remove during system maintenance or restoration. Susceptible locations depend on plant and system configuration, such as stand-by versus operating conditions.

The RHR System is OPERABLE when it is sufficiently filled with water. Acceptance criteria are established for the volume of accumulated gas at susceptible locations. If accumulated gas is discovered that exceeds the acceptance criteria for the susceptible location (or the volume of accumulated gas at one or more susceptible locations exceeds an acceptance criteria for gas volume at the suction or discharge of a pump), the Surveillance is not met. If it is determined by subsequent evaluation that the RHR System is not rendered inoperable by the accumulated gas (i.e., the system is sufficiently filled with water), the Surveillance may be declared met. Accumulated gas should be eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits.

RHR System locations susceptible to gas accumulation are monitored and, if gas is found, the gas volume is compared to the acceptance criteria for the location. Susceptible locations in the same system flow path which are subject to the same gas intrusion mechanisms may be verified by monitoring a representative sub-set of susceptible locations. Monitoring may not be practical for locations that are inaccessible due to radiological or environmental conditions, the plant configuration, or personnel safety. For these locations alternative methods (e.g., operating parameters, remote monitoring) may be used to monitor the susceptible location. Monitoring is not required for susceptible locations where the maximum potential accumulated gas void volume has been evaluated and determined to not challenge system OPERABILITY. The accuracy of the method used for monitoring the susceptible locations and trending of the results should be sufficient to assure system OPERABILITY during the Surveillance interval.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. The Surveillance Frequency may vary by location susceptible to gas accumulation.

BASES

LCO (continued)

During an event requiring ECCS actuation, a flow path is required to provide an abundant supply of water from the RWST to the RCS via the ECCS pumps and their respective supply headers to each of the four cold leg injection nozzles. In the long term, this flow path may be switched to take its supply from the containment sump and to supply its flow to the RCS hot and cold legs.

Management of gas voids is important to ECCS OPERABILITY.

The flow path for each train must maintain its designed independence to ensure that no single failure can disable both ECCS trains.

The LCO is modified by two Notes that allow isolation of both SI pump flow paths and a portion of both RHR flow paths for up to 2 hours to perform pressure isolation valve testing per SR 3.4.14.1 during MODE 3. Isolation of the discharge flow paths of both SI pumps may be accomplished by closing valve SI8835. Isolation of a portion of the discharge flow paths of both RHR pumps may be accomplished by closing either valve SI8809A or SI8809B. With a portion of both RHR flow paths isolated, an alternate means of cold leg injection must be available for each isolated flow path. An alternate means may include: 1) OPERABLE accumulators with their isolation valves either closed, but energized, or open; 2) cold leg injection via the Safety Injection pumps, and the SI8821A/B and the SI8835 valves; or 3) cold leg injection via the Centrifugal Charging pumps and the SI8801A/B valves.

APPLICABILITY

In MODES 1, 2, and 3, the ECCS OPERABILITY requirements for the limiting Design Basis Accident, a large break LOCA, are based on full power operation. Although reduced power would not require the same level of performance, the accident analysis does not provide for reduced cooling requirements in the lower MODES. The centrifugal charging pump performance is based on a small break LOCA, which establishes the pump performance curve and has less dependence on power. The SI pump performance requirements are based on a small break LOCA. MODE 2 and MODE 3 requirements are bounded by the MODE 1 analysis.


BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTSSR 3.5.2.1

Verification of proper motor operated valve position ensures that the injection flow path from the ECCS pumps to the RCS is maintained. Misalignment of these valves could render both ECCS trains inoperable. Securing these valves in position by removal of power ensures that they cannot change position as a result of an active failure or be inadvertently misaligned. These valves are of the type, described in Reference 8, that can disable the function of both ECCS trains and invalidate the accident analyses. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

SR 3.5.2.2

Verifying the correct alignment for manual, power operated, and automatic valves in the ECCS flow paths provides assurance that the proper flow paths will exist for ECCS operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position (e.g., the valves listed in SR 3.5.2.1 and SR 3.5.2.7), since these were verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. A valve that receives an actuation signal is allowed to be in a nonaccident position provided the valve will automatically reposition within the proper stroke time. This Surveillance does not require any testing or valve manipulation. Rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.



The Surveillance is modified by a Note which exempts system vent flow paths opened under administrative control. The administrative control should be proceduralized and include stationing a dedicated individual at the system vent flow path who is in continuous communication with the operators in the control room. This individual will have a method to rapidly close the system vent flow path if directed.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SR 3.5.2.3

~~With the exception of the operating centrifugal charging pump, the ECCS pumps are normally in a standby, nonoperating mode. As such, flow path piping has the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained gases. The system will perform properly, injecting its full capacity into the RCS upon demand, by maintaining the piping from the ECCS pumps to the RCS full of water. This will also prevent water hammer, pump cavitation, and pumping of noncondensable gas (e.g., air, nitrogen, or hydrogen) into the reactor vessel following an SI signal or during shutdown cooling. As described in Reference 9, voided lines are prevented by proper vent location and filling and venting procedures. Therefore, verification that the ECCS piping is maintained full of water is accomplished by venting certain portions of the ECCS and by performing ultrasonic examinations of other portions of the ECCS lacking vents. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.~~

~~The ECCS piping is maintained full of water by venting the non operating ECCS pump casings and the discharge piping high points (applicable to idle RH and SI systems only) outside containment. This venting surveillance does not apply to subsystems in communication with operating systems because the flows in these systems are sufficient to provide confidence that water hammer which could occur from voiding would not result in unacceptable dynamic loads. During shutdown cooling operation, the exclusion would apply to the operating RH pump, in addition to the ECCS piping in communication with the operating pump.~~

~~For selected portions of piping (i.e., portions involving the idle CV pump discharge piping up to the first check valve on the pump discharge and miniflow lines, the stagnant portion of the piping upstream of the SI8801A/B adjacent to the vent valve SI045, and the piping at the CV206 valve if the B CV pump is idle) the verification that the piping is filled with water will be performed by ultrasonic examination. This examination will provide added assurance that the piping is maintained water solid. These methods are consistent with Reference 10.~~



Insert 4

SR 3.5.2.3

ECCS piping and components have the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained gases. Preventing and managing gas intrusion and accumulation is necessary for proper operation of the ECCS and may also prevent water hammer, pump cavitation, and pumping of noncondensable gas into the reactor vessel.

Selection of ECCS locations susceptible to gas accumulation is based on a review of system design information, including piping and instrumentation drawings, isometric drawings, plan and elevation drawings, and calculations. The design review is supplemented by system walk downs to validate the system high points and to confirm the location and orientation of important components that can become sources of gas or could otherwise cause gas to be trapped or difficult to remove during system maintenance or restoration. Susceptible locations depend on plant and system configuration, such as stand-by versus operating conditions.

The ECCS is OPERABLE when it is sufficiently filled with water. Acceptance criteria are established for the volume of accumulated gas at susceptible locations. If accumulated gas is discovered that exceeds the acceptance criteria for the susceptible location (or the volume of accumulated gas at one or more susceptible locations exceeds an acceptance criteria for gas volume at the suction or discharge of a pump), the Surveillance is not met. If it is determined by subsequent evaluation that the ECCS is not rendered inoperable by the accumulated gas (i.e., the system is sufficiently filled with water), the Surveillance may be declared met. Accumulated gas should be eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits.

ECCS locations susceptible to gas accumulation are monitored and, if gas is found, the gas volume is compared to the acceptance criteria for the location. Susceptible locations in the same system flow path which are subject to the same gas intrusion mechanisms may be verified by monitoring a representative sub-set of susceptible locations. Monitoring may not be practical for locations that are inaccessible due to radiological or environmental conditions, the plant configuration, or personnel safety. For these locations alternative methods (e.g., operating parameters, remote monitoring) may be used to monitor the susceptible location. Monitoring is not required for susceptible locations where the maximum potential accumulated gas void volume has been evaluated and determined to not challenge system OPERABILITY. The accuracy of the method used for monitoring the susceptible locations and trending of the results should be sufficient to assure system OPERABILITY during the Surveillance interval.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. The Surveillance Frequency may vary by location susceptible to gas accumulation.

BASES

LCO

In MODE 4, one of the two independent (and redundant) ECCS trains is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that sufficient ECCS flow is available to the core following a DBA.

In MODE 4, an ECCS train consists of a centrifugal charging subsystem and an RHR subsystem. Each train includes the piping, instruments, and controls to ensure an OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the RWST and transferring suction to the containment sump.

During an event requiring ECCS actuation, a flow path is required to provide an abundant supply of water from the RWST to the RCS via the ECCS pumps and their respective supply headers to each of the four cold leg injection nozzles. In the long term, this flow path may be switched to take its supply from the containment sump and to deliver its flow to the RCS hot and cold legs.

The LCO is modified by a Note that allows an RHR train to be considered OPERABLE during alignment and operation for decay heat removal, if capable of being manually realigned (remote or local) to the ECCS mode of operation and not otherwise inoperable. This allows operation in the RHR mode during MODE 4. However, due to the potential for steam binding of the RHR pump suction piping to occur when the RCS hot leg temperature is greater than 260°F and the RHR train is realigned to the RWST, one RHR train must remain aligned for the ECCS mode of operation to satisfy LCO 3.5.3 when RCS hot leg temperature is greater than 260°F.

APPLICABILITY

In MODES 1, 2, and 3, the OPERABILITY requirements for ECCS are covered by LCO 3.5.2.

In MODE 4 with RCS temperature below 350°F, one OPERABLE ECCS train is acceptable without single failure consideration, on the basis of the stable reactivity of the reactor and the limited core cooling requirements.

In MODES 5 and 6, unit conditions are such that the probability of an event requiring ECCS injection is extremely low. Core cooling requirements in MODE 5 are addressed by LCO 3.4.7, "RCS Loops-MODE 5, Loops Filled," and LCO 3.4.8, "RCS Loops-MODE 5, Loops Not Filled." MODE 6 core cooling requirements are addressed by LCO 3.9.5, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and Coolant Circulation-High Water Level," and LCO 3.9.6, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and Coolant Circulation-Low Water Level."

Management of gas voids is important to ECCS OPERABILITY.

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)

Containment cooling train performance for post accident conditions is given in Reference 6. The result of the analysis is that each train can provide 100% of the required peak cooling capacity during the post accident condition. The train post accident cooling capacity under varying containment ambient conditions, required to perform the accident analyses, is also shown in Reference 7.

The modeled Containment Cooling System actuation from the containment analysis is based upon a response time associated with exceeding the containment High-3 pressure setpoint to achieving full Containment Cooling System air and safety grade cooling water flow. The Containment Cooling System total response time of 65 seconds, includes signal delay, DG startup (for loss of offsite power), and service water pump startup times (Ref. 5).

The Containment Spray System and the Containment Cooling System satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

During a DBA, a minimum of one containment cooling train and one containment spray train are required to maintain the containment peak pressure and temperature below the design limits (Ref. 7). Additionally, one containment spray train is also required to remove iodine from the containment atmosphere and maintain concentrations below those assumed in the safety analysis. To ensure that these requirements are met, two containment spray trains and two containment cooling trains must be OPERABLE. The chemical aspects of iodine removal capability are addressed in LCO 3.6.7. Therefore, in the event of an accident, at least one train in each system operates, assuming the worst case single active failure occurs.

Each Containment Spray System includes a spray pump, spray headers, nozzles, valves, piping, instruments, and controls to ensure an OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the RWST upon an ESF actuation signal and manually transferring suction to the containment sump.

Management of gas voids is important to Containment Spray System OPERABILITY.



BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

D.1 and D.2

If the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition C of this LCO are not met, the unit must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours and to MODE 5 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

E.1

With two containment spray trains or any combination of three or more containment spray and cooling trains inoperable, the unit is in a condition outside the accident analysis. Therefore, LCO 3.0.3 must be entered immediately.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.6.1

Verifying the correct alignment for manual, power operated, and automatic valves in the containment spray flow path provides assurance that the proper flow paths will exist for Containment Spray System operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, since these were verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation. Rather, it involves verification, through a system walkdown, that those valves outside containment (only check valves are inside containment) and capable of potentially being mispositioned are in the correct position.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.



The Surveillance is modified by a Note which exempts system vent flow paths opened under administrative control. The administrative control should be proceduralized and include stationing a dedicated individual at the system vent flow path who is in continuous communication with the operators in the control room. This individual will have a method to rapidly close the system vent flow path if directed.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SR 3.6.6.5 and SR 3.6.6.6

These SRs require verification that each automatic containment spray valve actuates to its correct position and that each containment spray pump starts upon receipt of an actual or simulated actuation of a containment High-3 pressure signal. This Surveillance is not required for valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the required position under administrative controls. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

The surveillance of containment sump isolation valves is also required by SR 3.5.2.5. A single surveillance may be used to satisfy both requirements.

SR 3.6.6.7

This SR requires verification that each containment cooling train actuates upon receipt of an actual or simulated safety injection signal. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

SR 3.6.6.8

With the containment spray inlet valves closed and the spray header drained of any solution, low pressure air or smoke can be blown through test connections. This SR ensures that each spray nozzle is unobstructed and provides assurance that spray coverage of the containment during an accident is not degraded. Due to the passive design of the nozzle, a test following maintenance that could result in nozzle blockage or following fluid flow through the nozzles is considered adequate to detect obstruction of the nozzles.



Insert 5

SR 3.6.6.9

Containment Spray System piping and components have the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained gases. Preventing and managing gas intrusion and accumulation is necessary for proper operation of the containment spray trains and may also prevent water hammer and pump cavitation.

Selection of Containment Spray System locations susceptible to gas accumulation is based on a review of system design information, including piping and instrumentation drawings, isometric drawings, plan and elevation drawings, and calculations. The design review is supplemented by system walk downs to validate the system high points and to confirm the location and orientation of important components that can become sources of gas or could otherwise cause gas to be trapped or difficult to remove during system maintenance or restoration. Susceptible locations depend on plant and system configuration, such as stand-by versus operating conditions.

The Containment Spray System is OPERABLE when it is sufficiently filled with water. Acceptance criteria are established for the volume of accumulated gas at susceptible locations. If accumulated gas is discovered that exceeds the acceptance criteria for the susceptible location (or the volume of accumulated gas at one or more susceptible locations exceeds an acceptance criteria for gas volume at the suction or discharge of a pump), the Surveillance is not met. If it is determined by subsequent evaluation that the Containment Spray System is not rendered inoperable by the accumulated gas (i.e., the system is sufficiently filled with water), the Surveillance may be declared met. Accumulated gas should be eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits.

Containment Spray System locations susceptible to gas accumulation are monitored and, if gas is found, the gas volume is compared to the acceptance criteria for the location. Susceptible locations in the same system flow path which are subject to the same gas intrusion mechanisms may be verified by monitoring a representative sub-set of susceptible locations. Monitoring may not be practical for locations that are inaccessible due to radiological or environmental conditions, the plant configuration, or personnel safety. For these locations alternative methods (e.g., operating parameters, remote monitoring) may be used to monitor the susceptible location. Monitoring is not required for susceptible locations where the maximum potential accumulated gas void volume has been evaluated and determined to not challenge system OPERABILITY. The accuracy of the method used for monitoring the susceptible locations and trending of the results should be sufficient to assure system OPERABILITY during the Surveillance interval.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. The Surveillance Frequency may vary by location susceptible to gas accumulation.

BASES

LCO

Only one RHR loop is required for decay heat removal in MODE 6, with the water level ≥ 23 ft above the top of the reactor vessel flange because the volume of water above the reactor vessel flange provides backup decay heat removal capability. One RHR loop is required to be in operation and OPERABLE to provide:

- a. Removal of decay heat;
- b. Mixing of borated coolant to minimize the possibility of criticality; and
- c. Indication of reactor coolant temperature.

An OPERABLE RHR loop includes an RHR pump, a heat exchanger, valves, piping, instruments, and controls to ensure an OPERABLE flow path. The flow path starts in one of the RCS hot legs and is returned to the RCS cold legs.

The LCO is modified by a Note that allows the required operating RHR loop to be removed from service for up to 1 hour per 8 hour period, provided no operations are permitted that would cause a reduction of the RCS boron concentration. Boron concentration reduction is prohibited because uniform concentration distribution cannot be ensured without forced circulation. This permits operations such as core mapping or alterations in the vicinity of the reactor vessel hot leg nozzles and RCS to RHR isolation valve testing. During this 1 hour period, decay heat is removed by natural convection to the large mass of water in the refueling cavity.

Management of gas voids is important to RHR System OPERABILITY.

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

With the RHR loop requirements not met, the potential exists for the coolant to boil and release radioactive gas to the containment atmosphere. Therefore, all containment penetrations providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere must be closed within 4 hours. Closing containment penetrations that are open to the outside atmosphere ensures dose limits are not exceeded.

The Completion Time of 4 hours is reasonable, based on the low probability of the coolant boiling in that time.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.9.5.1

This Surveillance demonstrates that the RHR loop is in operation and circulating reactor coolant. The flow rate is determined by the flow rate necessary to provide sufficient decay heat removal capability and to provide mixing of the borated coolant to prevent thermal and boron stratification in the core. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 5.4.7.

 Insert 6

Insert 6

SR 3.9.5.2

RHR System piping and components have the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained gases. Preventing and managing gas intrusion and accumulation is necessary for proper operation of the RHR loops and may also prevent water hammer, pump cavitation, and pumping of noncondensable gas into the reactor vessel.

Selection of RHR System locations susceptible to gas accumulation is based on a review of system design information, including piping and instrumentation drawings, isometric drawings, plan and elevation drawings, and calculations. The design review is supplemented by system walk downs to validate the system high points and to confirm the location and orientation of important components that can become sources of gas or could otherwise cause gas to be trapped or difficult to remove during system maintenance or restoration. Susceptible locations depend on plant and system configuration, such as stand-by versus operating conditions.

The RHR System is OPERABLE when it is sufficiently filled with water. Acceptance criteria are established for the volume of accumulated gas at susceptible locations. If accumulated gas is discovered that exceeds the acceptance criteria for the susceptible location (or the volume of accumulated gas at one or more susceptible locations exceeds an acceptance criteria for gas volume at the suction or discharge of a pump), the Surveillance is not met. If it is determined by subsequent evaluation that the RHR System is not rendered inoperable by the accumulated gas (i.e., the system is sufficiently filled with water), the Surveillance may be declared met. Accumulated gas should be eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits.

RHR System locations susceptible to gas accumulation are monitored and, if gas is found, the gas volume is compared to the acceptance criteria for the location. Susceptible locations in the same system flow path which are subject to the same gas intrusion mechanisms may be verified by monitoring a representative sub-set of susceptible locations. Monitoring may not be practical for locations that are inaccessible due to radiological or environmental conditions, the plant configuration, or personnel safety. For these locations alternative methods (e.g., operating parameters, remote monitoring) may be used to monitor the susceptible location. Monitoring is not required for susceptible locations where the maximum potential accumulated gas void volume has been evaluated and determined to not challenge system OPERABILITY. The accuracy of the method used for monitoring the susceptible locations and trending of the results should be sufficient to assure system OPERABILITY during the Surveillance interval.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. The Surveillance Frequency may vary by location susceptible to gas accumulation.

BASES

LCO Both RHR loops must be OPERABLE in MODE 6, with the water level < 23 ft above the top of the reactor vessel flange. In addition, one RHR loop must be in operation in order to provide:

- a. Removal of decay heat;
- b. Mixing of borated coolant to minimize the possibility of criticality; and
- c. Indication of reactor coolant temperature.

An OPERABLE RHR loop consists of an RHR pump, a heat exchanger, valves, piping, instruments and controls to ensure an OPERABLE flow path. The flow path starts in one of the RCS hot legs and is returned to the RCS cold legs. However, the LCO is modified by a Note that permits the required RHR loop to be removed from operation and considered OPERABLE when aligned to, or during transitioning to or from, the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) to support filling or draining the refueling cavity, or to support required testing, if capable of being realigned to the RCS.

APPLICABILITY Two RHR loops are required to be OPERABLE, and one RHR loop must be in operation in MODE 6, with the water level < 23 ft above the top of the reactor vessel flange, to provide decay heat removal and mixing of the borated coolant. Requirements for the RHR System in MODES 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 are covered by LCO 3.4.6, "RCS Loops-MODE 4," LCO 3.4.7, "RCS Loops-MODE 5, Loops Filled," LCO 3.4.8, "RCS Loops-MODE 5, Loops Not Filled," LCO 3.5.2, "ECCS-Operating," and LCO 3.5.3, "ECCS-Shutdown." RHR loop requirements in MODE 6 with the water level \geq 23 ft are located in LCO 3.9.5, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and Coolant Circulation-High Water Level."

Management of gas voids is important to RHR System OPERABILITY.

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

With no RHR loop in operation, the potential exists for the coolant to boil and release radioactive gas to the containment atmosphere. Therefore, all containment penetrations providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere must be closed within 4 hours. Closing containment penetrations that are open to the outside atmosphere ensures that dose limits are not exceeded.

The Completion Time of 4 hours is reasonable, based on the low probability of the coolant boiling in that time.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.9.6.1

This Surveillance demonstrates that one RHR loop is in operation and circulating reactor coolant. The flow rate is determined by the flow rate necessary to provide sufficient decay heat removal capability and to provide mixing of the borated coolant to prevent thermal and boron stratification in the core. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

SR 3.9.6.2

Verification that the required pump is OPERABLE ensures a RHR pump can be placed in operation, if needed, to maintain decay heat removal and borated coolant circulation. Verification is performed by verifying proper breaker alignment and power available to the pump. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 5.4.7.

 Insert 7

Insert 7

SR 3.9.6.3

RHR System piping and components have the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained gases. Preventing and managing gas intrusion and accumulation is necessary for proper operation of the RHR loops and may also prevent water hammer, pump cavitation, and pumping of noncondensable gas into the reactor vessel.

Selection of RHR System locations susceptible to gas accumulation is based on a review of system design information, including piping and instrumentation drawings, isometric drawings, plan and elevation drawings, and calculations. The design review is supplemented by system walk downs to validate the system high points and to confirm the location and orientation of important components that can become sources of gas or could otherwise cause gas to be trapped or difficult to remove during system maintenance or restoration. Susceptible locations depend on plant and system configuration, such as stand-by versus operating conditions.

The RHR System is OPERABLE when it is sufficiently filled with water. Acceptance criteria are established for the volume of accumulated gas at susceptible locations. If accumulated gas is discovered that exceeds the acceptance criteria for the susceptible location (or the volume of accumulated gas at one or more susceptible locations exceeds an acceptance criteria for gas volume at the suction or discharge of a pump), the Surveillance is not met. If it is determined by subsequent evaluation that the RHR System is not rendered inoperable by the accumulated gas (i.e., the system is sufficiently filled with water), the Surveillance may be declared met. Accumulated gas should be eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits.

RHR System locations susceptible to gas accumulation are monitored and, if gas is found, the gas volume is compared to the acceptance criteria for the location. Susceptible locations in the same system flow path which are subject to the same gas intrusion mechanisms may be verified by monitoring a representative sub-set of susceptible locations. Monitoring may not be practical for locations that are inaccessible due to radiological or environmental conditions, the plant configuration, or personnel safety. For these locations alternative methods (e.g., operating parameters, remote monitoring) may be used to monitor the susceptible location. Monitoring is not required for susceptible locations where the maximum potential accumulated gas void volume has been evaluated and determined to not challenge system OPERABILITY. The accuracy of the method used for monitoring the susceptible locations and trending of the results should be sufficient to assure system OPERABILITY during the Surveillance interval.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. The Surveillance Frequency may vary by location susceptible to gas accumulation.

BASES

LCO
(continued)

or local) in the shutdown cooling mode for removal of decay heat. In MODE 3, one RHR shutdown cooling subsystem can provide the required cooling, but two subsystems are required to be OPERABLE to provide redundancy. Operation of one subsystem can maintain or reduce the reactor coolant temperature as required. However, to ensure adequate core flow to allow for accurate average reactor coolant temperature monitoring, nearly continuous operation is required.

Management of gas voids is important to RHR Shutdown Cooling System OPERABILITY.

Note 1 permits both RHR shutdown cooling subsystems and recirculation pumps to be shut down for a period of 2 hours in an 8 hour period. Note 2 allows one RHR shutdown cooling subsystem to be inoperable for up to 2 hours for performance of surveillance tests. These tests may be on the affected RHR System or on some other plant system or component that necessitates placing the RHR System in an inoperable status during the performance. This is permitted because the core heat generation can be low enough and the heatup rate slow enough to allow some changes to the RHR subsystems or other operations requiring RHR flow interruption and loss of redundancy.

APPLICABILITY

In MODES 1 and 2, and in MODE 3 with reactor steam dome pressure greater than or equal to the RHR cut in permissive pressure, this LCO is not applicable. Operation of the RHR System in the shutdown cooling mode is not allowed above this pressure because the RCS pressure may exceed the design pressure of the shutdown cooling piping. Decay heat removal at reactor pressures greater than or equal to the RHR cut in permissive pressure is typically accomplished by condensing the steam in the main condenser. Additionally, in MODE 2 below this pressure, the OPERABILITY requirements for the Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) (LCO 3.5.1, "ECCS—Operating") do not allow placing the RHR shutdown cooling subsystem into operation.

In MODE 3 with reactor steam dome pressure below the RHR cut in permissive pressure (i.e., the actual pressure at which the interlock resets) the RHR System may be operated in the shutdown cooling mode to remove decay heat to reduce or maintain coolant temperature. Otherwise, a recirculation pump is required to be in operation.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS B.1, B.2, and B.3 (continued)

During the period when the reactor coolant is being circulated by an alternate method (other than by the required RHR shutdown cooling subsystem or recirculation pump), the reactor coolant temperature and pressure must be periodically monitored to ensure proper function of the alternate method. The once per hour Completion Time is deemed appropriate.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS SR 3.4.9.1

This Surveillance verifies that one RHR shutdown cooling subsystem or recirculation pump is in operation and circulating reactor coolant. The required flow rate is determined by the flow rate necessary to provide sufficient decay heat removal capability. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

This Surveillance is modified by a Note allowing sufficient time to align the RHR System for shutdown cooling operation after clearing the pressure interlock that isolates the system, or for placing a recirculation pump in operation. The Note takes exception to the requirements of the Surveillance being met (i.e., forced coolant circulation is not required for this initial 2 hour period), which also allows entry into the Applicability of this Specification in accordance with SR 3.0.4 since the Surveillance will not be "not met" at the time of entry into the Applicability.

Insert 1



REFERENCES 1. USAR, Section 5.4.7.

Insert 1

SR 3.4.9.2

RHR Shutdown Cooling System piping and components have the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained gases. Preventing and managing gas intrusion and accumulation is necessary for proper operation of the RHR shutdown cooling subsystems and may also prevent water hammer, pump cavitation, and pumping of noncondensable gas into the reactor vessel.

Selection of RHR Shutdown Cooling System locations susceptible to gas accumulation is based on a review of system design information, including piping and instrumentation drawings, isometric drawings, plan and elevation drawings, and calculations. The design review is supplemented by system walk downs to validate the system high points and to confirm the location and orientation of important components that can become sources of gas or could otherwise cause gas to be trapped or difficult to remove during system maintenance or restoration. Susceptible locations depend on plant and system configuration, such as stand-by versus operating conditions.

The RHR Shutdown Cooling System is OPERABLE when it is sufficiently filled with water. Acceptance criteria are established for the volume of accumulated gas at susceptible locations. If accumulated gas is discovered that exceeds the acceptance criteria for the susceptible location (or the volume of accumulated gas at one or more susceptible locations exceeds an acceptance criteria for gas volume at the suction or discharge of a pump), the Surveillance is not met. If it is determined by subsequent evaluation that the RHR Shutdown Cooling System is not rendered inoperable by the accumulated gas (i.e., the system is sufficiently filled with water), the Surveillance may be declared met. Accumulated gas should be eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits.

RHR Shutdown Cooling System locations susceptible to gas accumulation are monitored and, if gas is found, the gas volume is compared to the acceptance criteria for the location. Susceptible locations in the same system flow path which are subject to the same gas intrusion mechanisms may be verified by monitoring a representative subset of susceptible locations. Monitoring may not be practical for locations that are inaccessible due to radiological or environmental conditions, the plant configuration, or personnel safety. For these locations alternative methods (e.g., operating parameters, remote monitoring) may be used to monitor the susceptible location. Monitoring is not required for susceptible locations where the maximum potential accumulated gas void volume has been evaluated and determined to not challenge system OPERABILITY. The accuracy of the method used for monitoring the susceptible locations and trending of the results should be sufficient to assure system OPERABILITY during the Surveillance interval.

This SR is modified by a Note that states the SR is not required to be performed until 12 hours after reactor steam dome pressure is less than the RHR cut in permissive pressure. In a rapid shutdown, there may be insufficient time to verify all susceptible locations prior to entering the Applicability.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. The Surveillance Frequency may vary by location susceptible to gas accumulation.

BASES

LCO
(continued)

local) in the shutdown cooling mode for removal of decay heat. In MODE 4, one RHR shutdown cooling subsystem can provide the required cooling, but two subsystems are required to be OPERABLE to provide redundancy. Operation of one subsystem can maintain and reduce the reactor coolant temperature as required. However, to ensure adequate core flow to allow for accurate average reactor coolant temperature monitoring, nearly continuous operation is required.

Management of gas voids is important to RHR Shutdown Cooling System OPERABILITY.

Note 1 permits both RHR shutdown cooling subsystems and recirculation pumps to be shut down for a period of 2 hours in an 8 hour period. Note 2 allows one RHR shutdown cooling subsystem to be inoperable for up to 2 hours for performance of surveillance tests. These tests may be on the affected RHR System or on some other plant system or component that necessitates placing the RHR System in an inoperable status during the performance. This is permitted because the core heat generation can be low enough and the heatup rate slow enough to allow some changes to the RHR subsystems or other operations requiring RHR flow interruption and loss of redundancy. Note 3 permits both RHR shutdown cooling subsystems and recirculation pumps to be shut down during performance of inservice leak testing and during hydrostatic testing. This is permitted because RCS pressures and temperatures are being closely monitored during this testing as required by LCO 3.4.11, "RCS Pressure and Temperature (P/T) Limits."

APPLICABILITY

In MODES 1 and 2, and in MODE 3 with reactor steam dome pressure greater than or equal to the RHR cut in permissive pressure, this LCO is not applicable. Operation of the RHR System in the shutdown cooling mode is not allowed above this pressure because the RCS pressure may exceed the design pressure of the shutdown cooling piping. Decay heat removal at reactor pressures greater than or equal to the RHR cut in permissive pressure is typically accomplished by condensing the steam in the main condenser. Additionally, in MODE 2 below this pressure, the OPERABILITY requirements for the Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) (LCO 3.5.1, "ECCS—Operating") do not allow placing the RHR shutdown cooling subsystem into operation.

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.4.10.1 (continued)

decay heat removal capability. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

Insert 2 

REFERENCES

1. USAR, Section 5.4.7.
-

Insert 2

SR 3.4.10.2

RHR Shutdown Cooling System piping and components have the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained gases. Preventing and managing gas intrusion and accumulation is necessary for proper operation of the RHR shutdown cooling subsystems and may also prevent water hammer, pump cavitation, and pumping of noncondensable gas into the reactor vessel.

Selection of RHR Shutdown Cooling System locations susceptible to gas accumulation is based on a review of system design information, including piping and instrumentation drawings, isometric drawings, plan and elevation drawings, and calculations. The design review is supplemented by system walk downs to validate the system high points and to confirm the location and orientation of important components that can become sources of gas or could otherwise cause gas to be trapped or difficult to remove during system maintenance or restoration. Susceptible locations depend on plant and system configuration, such as stand-by versus operating conditions.

The RHR Shutdown Cooling System is OPERABLE when it is sufficiently filled with water. Acceptance criteria are established for the volume of accumulated gas at susceptible locations. If accumulated gas is discovered that exceeds the acceptance criteria for the susceptible location (or the volume of accumulated gas at one or more susceptible locations exceeds an acceptance criteria for gas volume at the suction or discharge of a pump), the Surveillance is not met. If it is determined by subsequent evaluation that the RHR Shutdown Cooling System is not rendered inoperable by the accumulated gas (i.e., the system is sufficiently filled with water), the Surveillance may be declared met. Accumulated gas should be eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits.

RHR Shutdown Cooling System locations susceptible to gas accumulation are monitored and, if gas is found, the gas volume is compared to the acceptance criteria for the location. Susceptible locations in the same system flow path which are subject to the same gas intrusion mechanisms may be verified by monitoring a representative subset of susceptible locations. Monitoring may not be practical for locations that are inaccessible due to radiological or environmental conditions, the plant configuration, or personnel safety. For these locations alternative methods (e.g., operating parameters, remote monitoring) may be used to monitor the susceptible location. Monitoring is not required for susceptible locations where the maximum potential accumulated gas void volume has been evaluated and determined to not challenge system OPERABILITY. The accuracy of the method used for monitoring the susceptible locations and trending of the results should be sufficient to assure system OPERABILITY during the Surveillance interval.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. The Surveillance Frequency may vary by location susceptible to gas accumulation.

BASES (continued)

LCO Each ECCS injection/spray subsystem and seven ADS valves are required to be OPERABLE. The ECCS injection/spray subsystems are the three LPCI subsystems, the LPCS System, and the HPCS System. The ECCS injection/spray subsystems are further subdivided into the following groups:

- a) The low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystems are the LPCS System and the three LPCI subsystems;
- b) The ECCS injection subsystems are the three LPCI subsystems; and
- c) The ECCS spray subsystems are the HPCS System and the LPCS System.

Management of gas voids is important to ECCS injection/spray subsystem OPERABILITY.



With less than the required number of ECCS subsystems OPERABLE during a limiting design basis LOCA concurrent with the worst case single failure, the limits specified in 10 CFR 50.46 (Ref. 10) could potentially be exceeded. All ECCS subsystems must therefore be OPERABLE to satisfy the single failure criterion required by 10 CFR 50.46 (Ref. 10).

LPCI subsystems may be considered OPERABLE during alignment and operation for decay heat removal when below the actual RHR cut in permissive pressure in MODE 3, if capable of being manually realigned (remote or local) to the LPCI mode and not otherwise inoperable. At these low pressures and decay heat levels, a reduced complement of ECCS subsystems should provide the required core cooling, thereby allowing operation of RHR shutdown cooling when necessary.

APPLICABILITY All ECCS subsystems are required to be OPERABLE during MODES 1, 2, and 3 when there is considerable energy in the reactor core and core cooling would be required to prevent fuel damage in the event of a break in the primary system piping. In MODES 2 and 3, the ADS function is not required when pressure is ≤ 150 psig because the low pressure ECCS subsystems (LPCS and LPCI) are capable of providing flow into the RPV below this pressure. ECCS requirements for MODES 4 and 5 are specified in LCO 3.5.2, "ECCS—Shutdown."

(continued)

BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.5.1.1

~~The flow path piping has the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained air. Maintaining the pump discharge lines of the HPCS System, LPCS System, and LPCT subsystems full of water ensures that the systems will perform properly, injecting their full capacity into the RCS upon demand. This will also prevent a water hammer following an ECCS initiation signal. One acceptable method of ensuring the lines are full is to vent at the high points. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.~~

Insert 3

SR 3.5.1.2

Verifying the correct alignment for manual, power operated, and automatic valves in the ECCS flow paths provides assurance that the proper flow paths will exist for ECCS operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position since these valves were verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. A valve that receives an initiation signal is allowed to be in a nonaccident position provided the valve will automatically reposition in the proper stroke time. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those valves potentially capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position. This SR does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

two Notes. Note 1

This SR is modified by a ~~Note~~ that allows LPCI subsystems to be considered OPERABLE during alignment and operation for decay heat removal with reactor steam dome pressure less than the RHR cut in permissive pressure in MODE 3, if capable of being manually realigned (remote or local) to the LPCI mode and not otherwise inoperable. This allows operation in the RHR shutdown cooling mode during MODE 3 if necessary.

(continued)

Note 2 exempts system vent flow paths opened under administrative control. The administrative control should be proceduralized and include stationing a dedicated individual at the system vent flow path who is in continuous communication with the operators in the control room. This individual will have a method to rapidly close the system vent flow path if directed.

Insert 3

SR 3.5.1.1

The ECCS injection/spray subsystem flow path piping and components have the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained gases. Preventing and managing gas intrusion and accumulation is necessary for proper operation of the ECCS injection/spray subsystems and may also prevent a water hammer, pump cavitation, and pumping of noncondensable gas into the reactor vessel.

Selection of ECCS injection/spray subsystem locations susceptible to gas accumulation is based on a review of system design information, including piping and instrumentation drawings, isometric drawings, plan and elevation drawings, and calculations. The design review is supplemented by system walk downs to validate the system high points and to confirm the location and orientation of important components that can become sources of gas or could otherwise cause gas to be trapped or difficult to remove during system maintenance or restoration. Susceptible locations depend on plant and system configuration, such as stand-by versus operating conditions.

The ECCS injection/spray subsystem is OPERABLE when it is sufficiently filled with water. Acceptance criteria are established for the volume of accumulated gas at susceptible locations. If accumulated gas is discovered that exceeds the acceptance criteria for the susceptible location (or the volume of accumulated gas at one or more susceptible locations exceeds an acceptance criteria for gas volume at the suction or discharge of a pump), the Surveillance is not met. If it is determined by subsequent evaluation that the ECCS injection/spray subsystems are not rendered inoperable by the accumulated gas (i.e., the system is sufficiently filled with water), the Surveillance may be declared met. Accumulated gas should be eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits.

ECCS injection/spray subsystem locations susceptible to gas accumulation are monitored and, if gas is found, the gas volume is compared to the acceptance criteria for the location. Susceptible locations in the same system flow path which are subject to the same gas intrusion mechanisms may be verified by monitoring a representative subset of susceptible locations. Monitoring may not be practical for locations that are inaccessible due to radiological or environmental conditions, the plant configuration, or personnel safety. For these locations alternative methods (e.g., operating parameters, remote monitoring) may be used to monitor the susceptible location. Monitoring is not required for susceptible locations where the maximum potential accumulated gas void volume has been evaluated and determined to not challenge system OPERABILITY. The accuracy of the method used for monitoring the susceptible locations and trending of the results should be sufficient to assure system OPERABILITY during the Surveillance interval.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. The Surveillance Frequency may vary by location susceptible to gas accumulation.

B 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION
COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM

B 3.5.2 ECCS—Shutdown

BASES

BACKGROUND A description of the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) System, Low Pressure Core Spray (LPCS) System, and low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) mode of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.5.1, "ECCS—Operating."

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES ECCS performance is evaluated for the entire spectrum of break sizes for a postulated loss of coolant accident (LOCA). The long term cooling analysis following a design basis LOCA (Ref. 1) demonstrates that only one ECCS injection/spray subsystem is required, post LOCA, to maintain the peak cladding temperature below the allowable limit. It is reasonable to assume, based on engineering judgement, that while in MODES 4 and 5, one ECCS injection/spray subsystem can maintain adequate reactor vessel water level. To provide redundancy, a minimum of two ECCS subsystems are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5.

The ECCS satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

LCO Two ECCS injection/spray subsystems are required to be OPERABLE. The ECCS injection/spray subsystems are defined as the three LPCI subsystems, the LPCS System, and the HPCS System. The LPCS System and each LPCI subsystem consist of one motor driven pump, piping, and valves to transfer water from the suppression pool to the reactor pressure vessel (RPV). The HPCS System consists of one motor driven pump, piping, and valves to transfer water from the suppression pool or RCIC storage tank to the RPV.

Management of gas voids is important to ECCS injection/spray subsystem OPERABILITY.

One LPCI subsystem (A or B) may be aligned for decay heat removal in MODE 4 or 5 and considered OPERABLE for the ECCS function, if it can be manually realigned (remote or local) to the LPCI mode and is not otherwise inoperable. Because of low pressure and low temperature conditions in MODES 4

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.5.2.4 (continued)

in the correct position. This SR does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

In MODES 4 and 5, the RHR System may operate in the shutdown cooling mode to remove decay heat and sensible heat from the reactor. Therefore, RHR valves that are required for LPCI subsystem operation may be aligned for decay heat removal. This SR is modified by a Note that allows one LPCI subsystem of the RHR System to be considered OPERABLE for the ECCS function if all the required valves in the LPCI flow path can be manually realigned (remote or local) to allow injection into the RPV and the system is not otherwise inoperable. This will ensure adequate core cooling if an inadvertent vessel draindown should occur.

two Notes. Note 1

REFERENCES

1. USAR, Section 6.3.3.
2. Calculation IP-0-0049.
3. Calculations 01HP09/10/11 and IP-C-0042.
4. Calculations 01LP08/11/14 and IP-C-0043.
5. Calculations 01RH19/20/22/26 and IP-C-0041.

Note 2 exempts system vent flow paths opened under administrative control. The administrative control should be proceduralized and include stationing a dedicated individual at the system vent flow path who is in continuous communication with the operators in the control room. This individual will have a method to rapidly close the system vent flow path if directed.

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)	The RCIC pump is provided with a minimum flow bypass line, which discharges to the suppression pool. The valve in this line automatically opens to prevent pump damage due to overheating when other discharge line valves are closed. To ensure rapid delivery of water to the RPV and to minimize water hammer effects, the RCIC System discharge line "keep fill" system is designed to maintain the pump discharge line filled with water.
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APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES	The function of the RCIC System is to respond to transient events by providing makeup coolant to the reactor. The RCIC System is not an Engineered Safety Feature and no credit is taken in the safety analysis for RCIC System operation. The RCIC System satisfies Criterion 4 of the NRC Policy Statement.
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LCO	The OPERABILITY of the RCIC System provides adequate core cooling such that actuation of any of the ECCS subsystems is not required in the event of RPV isolation accompanied by a loss of feedwater flow. The RCIC System has sufficient capacity to maintain RPV inventory during an isolation event.
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Management of gas voids is important to RCIC System OPERABILITY.



APPLICABILITY	The RCIC System is required to be OPERABLE in MODE 1, and MODES 2 and 3 with reactor steam dome pressure > 150 psig since RCIC is the primary non-ECCS water source for core cooling when the reactor is isolated and pressurized. In MODES 2 and 3 with reactor steam dome pressure ≤ 150 psig, and in MODES 4 and 5, RCIC is not required to be OPERABLE since the ECCS injection/spray subsystems can provide sufficient flow to the vessel.
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ACTIONS	A Note prohibits the application of LCO 3.0.4.b to an inoperable RCIC system. There is an increased risk associated with entering a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability with an inoperable RCIC system and the provisions of LCO 3.0.4.b, which allow entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability with the LCO not met after performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, should not be applied in this circumstance.
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(continued)

BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.5.3.1

~~The flow path piping has the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained air. Maintaining the pump discharge line of the RCIC System full of water ensures that the system will perform properly, injecting its full capacity into the Reactor Coolant System upon demand. This will also prevent a water hammer following an initiation signal. One acceptable method of ensuring the line is full is to vent at the high points. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.~~

Insert 4

SR 3.5.3.2

Verifying the correct alignment for manual, power operated, and automatic valves in the RCIC flow path provides assurance that the proper flow path will exist for RCIC operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position since these were verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. A valve that receives an initiation signal is allowed to be in a nonaccident position provided the valve will automatically reposition in the proper stroke time. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of potentially being mispositioned are in the correct position. This SR does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves. For the RCIC System, this SR also includes the steam flow path for the turbine and the flow controller position.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

(continued)

The Surveillance is modified by a Note which exempts system vent flow paths opened under administrative control. The administrative control should be proceduralized and include stationing a dedicated individual at the system vent flow path who is in continuous communication with the operators in the control room. This individual will have a method to rapidly close the system vent flow path if directed.

Insert 4

SR 3.5.3.1

The RCIC System flow path piping and components have the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained gases. Preventing and managing gas intrusion and accumulation is necessary for proper operation of the RCIC System and may also prevent a water hammer, pump cavitation, and pumping of noncondensable gas.

Selection of RCIC System locations susceptible to gas accumulation is based on a self-assessment of the piping configuration to identify where gases may accumulate and remain even after the system is filled and vented, and to identify vulnerable potential degassing flow paths. The review is supplemented by verification that installed high-point vents are actually at the system high points, including field verification to ensure pipe shapes and construction tolerances have not inadvertently created additional high points. Susceptible locations depend on plant and system configuration, such as stand-by versus operating conditions.

The RCIC System is OPERABLE when it is sufficiently filled with water. Acceptance criteria are established for the volume of accumulated gas at susceptible locations. If accumulated gas is discovered that exceeds the acceptance criteria for the susceptible location (or the volume of accumulated gas at one or more susceptible locations exceeds an acceptance criteria for gas volume at the suction or discharge of a pump), the Surveillance is not met. If it is determined by subsequent evaluation that the RCIC Systems are not rendered inoperable by the accumulated gas (i.e., the system is sufficiently filled with water), the Surveillance may be declared met. Accumulated gas should be eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits.

RCIC System locations susceptible to gas accumulation are monitored and, if gas is found, the gas volume is compared to the acceptance criteria for the location. Susceptible locations in the same system flow path which are subject to the same gas intrusion mechanisms may be verified by monitoring a representative sub-set of susceptible locations. Monitoring may not be practical for locations that are inaccessible due to radiological or environmental conditions, the plant configuration, or personnel safety. For these locations alternative methods (e.g., operating parameters, remote monitoring) may be used to monitor the susceptible location. Monitoring is not required for susceptible locations where the maximum potential accumulated gas void volume has been evaluated and determined to not challenge system OPERABILITY. The accuracy of the method used for monitoring the susceptible locations and trending of the results should be sufficient to assure system OPERABILITY during the Surveillance interval.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. The Surveillance Frequency may vary by location susceptible to gas accumulation.

BASES

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES
(continued)


The analysis demonstrates that with containment spray operation the containment pressure remains within design limits.

The RHR Containment Spray System satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

LCO

In the event of a Design Basis Accident (DBA), a minimum of one RHR containment spray subsystem is required to mitigate potential bypass leakage paths and maintain the primary containment peak pressure below design limits. To ensure that these requirements are met, two RHR containment spray subsystems must be OPERABLE. Therefore, in the event of an accident, at least one subsystem is OPERABLE assuming the worst case single active failure. An RHR containment spray subsystem is OPERABLE when the pump, the heat exchanger, and associated piping, valves, instrumentation, and controls are OPERABLE.

Management of gas voids is important to RHR Containment Spray System OPERABILITY.



APPLICABILITY

In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a DBA could cause pressurization of primary containment. In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining RHR containment spray subsystems OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 or 5.

ACTIONS

A.1

With one RHR containment spray subsystem inoperable, the inoperable subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE RHR containment spray subsystem is adequate to perform the primary containment cooling function. However, the overall reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE subsystem could result in reduced primary containment cooling capability. The 7 day Completion Time was chosen in light of the redundant RHR containment capabilities afforded by the OPERABLE subsystem and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.1.7.1

Verifying the correct alignment for manual, power operated, and automatic valves in the RHR containment spray mode flow path provides assurance that the proper flow paths will exist for system operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, since these were verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position. This SR does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

. The first Note

Two Notes have

A Note has been added to this SR that allows RHR containment spray subsystems to be considered OPERABLE during alignment to and operation in the RHR shutdown cooling mode when below the RHR cut in permissive pressure in MODE 3, if capable of being manually realigned and not otherwise inoperable. At these low pressures and decay heat levels (the reactor is shut down in MODE 3), a reduced complement of subsystems should provide the required containment pressure mitigation function thereby allowing operation of an RHR shutdown cooling loop when necessary.

SR 3.6.1.7.2

Verifying each RHR pump develops a flow rate ≥ 3800 gpm while operating in the suppression pool cooling mode with flow through the associated heat exchanger ensures that pump performance has not degraded below the required flow rate during the cycle. It is tested in the pool cooling mode to demonstrate pump OPERABILITY without spraying down equipment in primary containment. Although this SR is satisfied by running the pump in the suppression pool cooling mode, the test procedures that satisfy this SR include appropriate acceptance criteria to account for the higher pressure requirements resulting from aligning the RHR System in the containment spray mode. The Frequency of this SR is in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program.

(continued)

The second Note exempts system vent flow paths opened under administrative control. The administrative control should be proceduralized and include stationing a dedicated individual at the system vent flow path who is in continuous communication with the operators in the control room. This individual will have a method to rapidly close the system vent flow path if directed.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS
(continued)

SR 3.6.1.7.3

This SR verifies that each RHR containment spray subsystem automatic valve actuates to its correct position upon receipt of an actual or simulated automatic actuation signal. Actual spray initiation is not required to meet this SR. The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST in SR 3.3.6.3.5 overlaps this SR to provide complete testing of the safety function. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

SR 3.6.1.7.4

This Surveillance is performed following activities that could result in nozzle blockage to verify that the spray nozzles are not obstructed and that flow will be provided when required. Such activities may include a loss of foreign material control (of if it cannot be assured), following a major configuration change, or following an inadvertent actuation of containment spray. This Surveillance is normally performed by an air or smoke flow test. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

Insert 5 

REFERENCES

1. USAR, Section 6.2.1.1.5.
 2. NEDC-32988-A, Revision 2, Technical Justification to Support Risk-Informed Modification to Selected Required End States for BWR Plants, December 2002.
 3. ASME Code for Operation and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants.
 4. USAR, Section 5.4.7
-

Insert 5

SR 3.6.1.7.5

RHR Containment Spray System piping and components have the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained gases. Preventing and managing gas intrusion and accumulation is necessary for proper operation of the RHR suppression pool spray subsystems and may also prevent water hammer and pump cavitation.

Selection of RHR Containment Spray System locations susceptible to gas accumulation is based on a review of system design information, including piping and instrumentation drawings, isometric drawings, plan and elevation drawings, and calculations. The design review is supplemented by system walk downs to validate the system high points and to confirm the location and orientation of important components that can become sources of gas or could otherwise cause gas to be trapped or difficult to remove during system maintenance or restoration. Susceptible locations depend on plant and system configuration, such as stand-by versus operating conditions.

The RHR Containment Spray System is OPERABLE when it is sufficiently filled with water. Acceptance criteria are established for the volume of accumulated gas at susceptible locations. If accumulated gas is discovered that exceeds the acceptance criteria for the susceptible location (or the volume of accumulated gas at one or more susceptible locations exceeds an acceptance criteria for gas volume at the suction or discharge of a pump), the Surveillance is not met. If it is determined by subsequent evaluation that the RHR Containment Spray System is not rendered inoperable by the accumulated gas (i.e., the system is sufficiently filled with water), the Surveillance may be declared met. Accumulated gas should be eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits.

RHR Containment Spray System locations susceptible to gas accumulation are monitored and, if gas is found, the gas volume is compared to the acceptance criteria for the location. Susceptible locations in the same system flow path which are subject to the same gas intrusion mechanisms may be verified by monitoring a representative subset of susceptible locations. Monitoring may not be practical for locations that are inaccessible due to radiological or environmental conditions, the plant configuration, or personnel safety. For these locations alternative methods (e.g., operating parameters, remote monitoring) may be used to monitor the susceptible location. Monitoring is not required for susceptible locations where the maximum potential accumulated gas void volume has been evaluated and determined to not challenge system OPERABILITY. The accuracy of the method used for monitoring the susceptible locations and trending of the results should be sufficient to assure system OPERABILITY during the Surveillance interval.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. The Surveillance Frequency may vary by location susceptible to gas accumulation.

BASES


APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES
(continued)

The RHR Suppression Pool Cooling System satisfies
Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

LCO

During a DBA, a minimum of one RHR suppression pool cooling subsystem is required to maintain the primary containment peak pressure and temperature below the design limits (Ref. 1). To ensure that these requirements are met, two RHR suppression pool cooling subsystems must be OPERABLE. Therefore, in the event of an accident, at least one subsystem is OPERABLE, assuming the worst case single active failure. An RHR suppression pool cooling subsystem is OPERABLE when the pump, heat exchanger, and associated piping, valves, instrumentation, and controls are OPERABLE.

Management of gas voids is important to RHR Suppression Pool Cooling System OPERABILITY.



APPLICABILITY

In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a DBA could cause a release of radioactive material to primary containment and cause a heatup and pressurization of primary containment. In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, the RHR Suppression Pool Cooling System is not required to be OPERABLE in MODE 4 or 5.

ACTIONS

A.1

With one RHR suppression pool cooling subsystem inoperable, the inoperable subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. In this Condition, the remaining RHR suppression pool cooling subsystem is adequate to perform the primary containment cooling function. However, the overall reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE subsystem could result in reduced primary containment cooling capability. The 7 day Completion Time is acceptable in light of the redundant RHR suppression pool cooling capabilities afforded by the OPERABLE subsystem and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.2.3.2

(continued)

Verifying each RHR pump develops a flow rate ≥ 4550 gpm, with flow through the associated heat exchanger to the suppression pool, ensures that pump performance has not degraded during the cycle. Flow is a normal test of centrifugal pump performance required by ASME (Ref. 3). This test confirms one point on the pump design curve, and the results are indicative of overall performance. Such inservice inspections confirm component OPERABILITY, trend performance, and detect incipient failures by indicating abnormal performance. The Frequency of this SR is in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program.

With regard to RHR pump flow rate values obtained pursuant to this SR, as read from plant indication instrumentation, the specified limit is considered to be a nominal value with respect to instrument uncertainties. This requires additional margin to be added to the limit to compensate for instrument uncertainties for implementation in the associated plant procedures. (Ref. 5).

Insert 6



REFERENCES

1. USAR, Section 6.2.
 2. NEDC-32988-A, Revision 2, Technical Justification to Support Risk-Informed Modification to Selected Required End States for BWR Plants, December 2002.
 3. ASME Code for Operation and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants.
 4. USAR, Section 5.4.7.
 5. Calculations 01RH20/22/25 and IP-C-0041.
-
-

Insert 6

SR 3.6.2.3.3

RHR Suppression Pool Cooling System piping and components have the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained gases. Preventing and managing gas intrusion and accumulation is necessary for proper operation of the RHR suppression pool cooling subsystems and may also prevent water hammer and pump cavitation.

Selection of RHR Suppression Pool Cooling System locations susceptible to gas accumulation is based on a review of system design information, including piping and instrumentation drawings, isometric drawings, plan and elevation drawings, and calculations. The design review is supplemented by system walk downs to validate the system high points and to confirm the location and orientation of important components that can become sources of gas or could otherwise cause gas to be trapped or difficult to remove during system maintenance or restoration. Susceptible locations depend on plant and system configuration, such as stand-by versus operating conditions.

The RHR Suppression Pool Cooling System is OPERABLE when it is sufficiently filled with water. Acceptance criteria are established for the volume of accumulated gas at susceptible locations. If accumulated gas is discovered that exceeds the acceptance criteria for the susceptible location (or the volume of accumulated gas at one or more susceptible locations exceeds an acceptance criteria for gas volume at the suction or discharge of a pump), the Surveillance is not met. If it is determined by subsequent evaluation that the RHR Suppression Pool Cooling System is not rendered inoperable by the accumulated gas (i.e., the system is sufficiently filled with water), the Surveillance may be declared met. Accumulated gas should be eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits.

RHR Suppression Pool Cooling System locations susceptible to gas accumulation are monitored and, if gas is found, the gas volume is compared to the acceptance criteria for the location. Susceptible locations in the same system flow path which are subject to the same gas intrusion mechanisms may be verified by monitoring a representative subset of susceptible locations. Monitoring may not be practical for locations that are inaccessible due to radiological or environmental conditions, the plant configuration, or personnel safety. For these locations alternative methods (e.g., operating parameters, remote monitoring) may be used to monitor the susceptible location. Monitoring is not required for susceptible locations where the maximum potential accumulated gas void volume has been evaluated and determined to not challenge system OPERABILITY. The accuracy of the method used for monitoring the susceptible locations and trending of the results should be sufficient to assure system OPERABILITY during the Surveillance interval.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. The Surveillance Frequency may vary by location susceptible to gas accumulation.

BASES

LCO
(continued)

Management of gas voids is important to RHR Shutdown Cooling System OPERABILITY.

An OPERABLE RHR shutdown cooling subsystem consists of an RHR pump, a heat exchanger, valves, piping, instruments, and controls to ensure an OPERABLE flow path.

Additionally, each RHR shutdown cooling subsystem is considered OPERABLE if it can be manually aligned (remote or local) in the shutdown cooling mode for removal of decay heat. Operation (either continuous or intermittent) of one subsystem can maintain and reduce the reactor coolant temperature as required. However, to ensure adequate core flow to allow for accurate average reactor coolant temperature monitoring, nearly continuous operation is required. A Note is provided to allow a 2 hour exception to shut down the operating subsystem every 8 hours.

APPLICABILITY

One RHR shutdown cooling subsystem must be OPERABLE in MODE 5, with irradiated fuel in the RPV and the water level \geq 22 ft 8 inches above the top of the RPV flange, to provide decay heat removal. RHR System requirements in other MODES are covered by LCOs in Section 3.4, Reactor Coolant System (RCS); Section 3.5, Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System; and Section 3.6, Containment Systems. RHR Shutdown Cooling System requirements in MODE 5, with the water level $<$ 22 ft 8 inches above the RPV flange, are given in LCO 3.9.9, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR)—Low Water Level."

ACTIONS

A.1

With no RHR shutdown cooling subsystem OPERABLE, an alternate method of decay heat removal must be established within 1 hour. In this condition, the volume of water above the RPV flange provides adequate capability to remove decay heat from the reactor core. However, the overall reliability is reduced because loss of water level could result in reduced decay heat removal capability. The 1 hour Completion Time is based on the decay heat removal function and the probability of a loss of the available decay heat removal capabilities. Furthermore, verification of the functional availability of these alternate method(s) must be reconfirmed every 24 hours thereafter. This will ensure continued heat removal capability.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

B.1, B.2, B.3, B.4, and B.5 (continued)

would not be expected to result in the immediate release of appreciable fission products to the containment atmosphere. Actions must continue until all requirements of this Condition are satisfied.

C.1 and C.2

If no RHR shutdown cooling subsystem is in operation, an alternate method of coolant circulation is required to be established within 1 hour. The Completion Time is modified such that 1 hour is applicable separately for each occurrence involving a loss of coolant circulation.

During the period when the reactor coolant is being circulated by an alternate method (other than by the required RHR shutdown cooling subsystem), the reactor coolant temperature must be periodically monitored to ensure proper functioning of the alternate method. The once per hour Completion Time is deemed appropriate.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.9.8.1

This Surveillance demonstrates that the RHR shutdown cooling subsystem is in operation and circulating reactor coolant. The required flow rate is determined by the flow rate necessary to provide sufficient decay heat removal capability. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

Insert 7 

REFERENCES

1. USAR, Section 5.4.7.

Insert 7

SR 3.9.8.2

RHR Shutdown Cooling System piping and components have the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained gases. Preventing and managing gas intrusion and accumulation is necessary for proper operation of the required RHR shutdown cooling subsystem(s) and may also prevent water hammer, pump cavitation, and pumping of noncondensable gas into the reactor vessel.

Selection of RHR Shutdown Cooling System locations susceptible to gas accumulation is based on a review of system design information, including piping and instrumentation drawings, isometric drawings, plan and elevation drawings, and calculations. The design review is supplemented by system walk downs to validate the system high points and to confirm the location and orientation of important components that can become sources of gas or could otherwise cause gas to be trapped or difficult to remove during system maintenance or restoration. Susceptible locations depend on plant and system configuration, such as stand-by versus operating conditions.

The RHR Shutdown Cooling System is OPERABLE when it is sufficiently filled with water. Acceptance criteria are established for the volume of accumulated gas at susceptible locations. If accumulated gas is discovered that exceeds the acceptance criteria for the susceptible location (or the volume of accumulated gas at one or more susceptible locations exceeds an acceptance criteria for gas volume at the suction or discharge of a pump), the Surveillance is not met. If it is determined by subsequent evaluation that the RHR Shutdown Cooling System is not rendered inoperable by the accumulated gas (i.e., the system is sufficiently filled with water), the Surveillance may be declared met. Accumulated gas should be eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits.

RHR Shutdown Cooling System locations susceptible to gas accumulation are monitored and, if gas is found, the gas volume is compared to the acceptance criteria for the location. Susceptible locations in the same system flow path which are subject to the same gas intrusion mechanisms may be verified by monitoring a representative subset of susceptible locations. Monitoring may not be practical for locations that are inaccessible due to radiological or environmental conditions, the plant configuration, or personnel safety. For these locations alternative methods (e.g., operating parameters, remote monitoring) may be used to monitor the susceptible location. Monitoring is not required for susceptible locations where the maximum potential accumulated gas void volume has been evaluated and determined to not challenge system OPERABILITY. The accuracy of the method used for monitoring the susceptible locations and trending of the results should be sufficient to assure system OPERABILITY during the Surveillance interval.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. The Surveillance Frequency may vary by location susceptible to gas accumulation.

B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

B 3.9.9 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) —Low Water Level

BASES

BACKGROUND

The purpose of the RHR System in MODE 5 is to remove decay heat and sensible heat from the reactor coolant, as required by GDC 34. Each of the two shutdown cooling loops of the RHR System can provide the required decay heat removal. However, the shutdown cooling loops are single failure proof per GDC 34 only with Alternate Shutdown Cooling. Each loop consists of one motor driven pump, a heat exchanger, and associated piping and valves. Both loops have a common suction from the same recirculation loop. Each pump discharges the reactor coolant, after it has been cooled by circulation through the respective heat exchanger, to the reactor via separate feedwater lines, to the upper containment pool via a common single flow distribution sparger, or to the reactor via the low pressure coolant injection path. The RHR heat exchangers transfer heat to the Shutdown Service Water System. The RHR shutdown cooling mode is manually controlled.

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES

With the unit in MODE 5, the RHR shutdown cooling subsystem is not required to mitigate any events or accidents evaluated in the safety analyses. The RHR System is required for removing decay heat to maintain the temperature of the reactor coolant.


Although the RHR shutdown cooling subsystem does not meet a specific criterion of the NRC Policy Statement, it was identified in the NRC Policy Statement as an important contributor to risk reduction. Therefore, the RHR shutdown cooling subsystem, with its common suction from reactor recirculation, is retained as a Specification.

LCO

In MODE 5 with irradiated fuel in the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) and with the water level < 22 ft 8 inches above the RPV flange both RHR shutdown cooling subsystems must be OPERABLE.

An OPERABLE RHR shutdown cooling subsystem consists of an RHR pump, a heat exchanger, valves, piping, instruments, and controls to ensure an OPERABLE flow path.

(continued)



Management of gas voids is important to RHR Shutdown Cooling System OPERABILITY.

BASES

ACTIONS

B.1, B.2, B.3, and B.4 (continued)

required component is inoperable, then it must be restored to OPERABLE status. In this case, the Surveillances may need to be performed to restore the component to OPERABLE status. In addition, at least one door in the upper containment personnel air lock must be closed. The closed air lock door completes the boundary for control of potential radioactive releases. With the appropriate administrative controls however, the closed door can be opened intermittently for entry and exit. This allowance is acceptable due to the need for containment access and due to the slow progression of events which may result from inadequate decay heat removal. Loss of decay heat removal would not be expected to result in the immediate release of appreciable fission products to the containment atmosphere. Actions must continue until all requirements of this Condition are satisfied.

C.1 and C.2

If no RHR shutdown cooling subsystem is in operation, an alternate method of coolant circulation is required to be established within 1 hour. The Completion Time is modified such that the 1 hour is applicable separately for each occurrence involving a loss of coolant circulation.

During the period when the reactor coolant is being circulated by an alternate method (other than by the required RHR Shutdown Cooling System), the reactor coolant temperature must be periodically monitored to ensure proper function of the alternate method. The once per hour Completion Time is deemed appropriate.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.9.9.1

This Surveillance demonstrates that one RHR shutdown cooling subsystem is in operation and circulating reactor coolant. The required flow rate is determined by the flow rate necessary to provide sufficient decay heat removal capability. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

Insert 8



REFERENCES

1. USAR, Section 5.4.7.

Insert 8

SR 3.9.9.2

RHR Shutdown Cooling System piping and components have the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained gases. Preventing and managing gas intrusion and accumulation is necessary for proper operation of the RHR shutdown cooling subsystems and may also prevent water hammer, pump cavitation, and pumping of noncondensable gas into the reactor vessel.

Selection of RHR Shutdown Cooling System locations susceptible to gas accumulation is based on a review of system design information, including piping and instrumentation drawings, isometric drawings, plan and elevation drawings, and calculations. The design review is supplemented by system walk downs to validate the system high points and to confirm the location and orientation of important components that can become sources of gas or could otherwise cause gas to be trapped or difficult to remove during system maintenance or restoration. Susceptible locations depend on plant and system configuration, such as stand-by versus operating conditions.

The RHR Shutdown Cooling System is OPERABLE when it is sufficiently filled with water. Acceptance criteria are established for the volume of accumulated gas at susceptible locations. If accumulated gas is discovered that exceeds the acceptance criteria for the susceptible location (or the volume of accumulated gas at one or more susceptible locations exceeds an acceptance criteria for gas volume at the suction or discharge of a pump), the Surveillance is not met. If it is determined by subsequent evaluation that the RHR Shutdown Cooling System is not rendered inoperable by the accumulated gas (i.e., the system is sufficiently filled with water), the Surveillance may be declared met. Accumulated gas should be eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits.

RHR Shutdown Cooling System locations susceptible to gas accumulation are monitored and, if gas is found, the gas volume is compared to the acceptance criteria for the location. Susceptible locations in the same system flow path which are subject to the same gas intrusion mechanisms may be verified by monitoring a representative subset of susceptible locations. Monitoring may not be practical for locations that are inaccessible due to radiological or environmental conditions, the plant configuration, or personnel safety. For these locations alternative methods (e.g., operating parameters, remote monitoring) may be used to monitor the susceptible location. Monitoring is not required for susceptible locations where the maximum potential accumulated gas void volume has been evaluated and determined to not challenge system OPERABILITY. The accuracy of the method used for monitoring the susceptible locations and trending of the results should be sufficient to assure system OPERABILITY during the Surveillance interval.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. The Surveillance Frequency may vary by location susceptible to gas accumulation.

BASES

LCO
(continued)

common to both subsystems. Each shutdown cooling subsystem is considered OPERABLE if it can be manually aligned (remote or local) in the shutdown cooling mode for removal of decay heat. In MODE 3, one SDC subsystem can provide the required cooling, but two subsystems are required to be OPERABLE to provide redundancy. Operation of one subsystem can maintain or reduce the reactor coolant temperature as required. To ensure adequate core flow to allow for accurate average reactor coolant temperature monitoring, nearly continuous operation is required.

Management of gas voids is important to SDC System OPERABILITY.

Note 1 permits both required SDC subsystems and recirculation pumps to not be in operation for a period of 2 hours in an 8 hour period. Note 2 allows one required SDC subsystem to be inoperable for up to 2 hours for the performance of Surveillance tests. These tests may be on the affected SDC System or on some other plant system or component that necessitates placing the SDC System in an inoperable status during the performance. This is permitted because the core heat generation can be low enough and the heatup rate slow enough to allow some changes to the SDC subsystems or other operations requiring SDC flow interruption and loss of redundancy.

APPLICABILITY

In MODE 3 with reactor vessel coolant temperature below the SDC cut-in permissive temperature (i.e., the actual temperature at which the interlock resets) the SDC System may be operated in the shutdown cooling mode to remove decay heat to reduce or maintain coolant temperature. Otherwise, a recirculation pump is required to be in operation.

In MODES 1 and 2, and in MODE 3 with reactor vessel coolant temperature greater than or equal to the SDC cut-in permissive temperature, this LCO is not applicable. Operation of the SDC System in the shutdown cooling mode is not allowed above this temperature because the RCS temperature may exceed the design temperature of the shutdown cooling piping. Decay heat removal at reactor temperatures greater than or equal to the SDC cut-in permissive temperature is typically accomplished by condensing the steam in the main condenser.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

B.1, B.2, and B.3 (continued)

During the period when the reactor coolant is being circulated by an alternate method (other than by the required SDC subsystem or recirculation pump), the reactor coolant temperature and pressure must be periodically monitored to ensure proper function of the alternate method. The once per hour Completion Time is deemed appropriate.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.4.7.1

This Surveillance verifies that one SDC subsystem or recirculation pump is in operation and circulating reactor coolant. The required flow rate is determined by the flow rate necessary to provide sufficient decay heat removal capability. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

This Surveillance is modified by a Note allowing sufficient time to align the SDC System for shutdown cooling operation after clearing the pressure interlock that isolates the system, or for placing a recirculation pump in operation. The Note takes exception to the requirements of the Surveillance being met (i.e., forced coolant circulation is not required for this initial 2 hour period), which also allows entry into the Applicability of this Specification in accordance with SR 3.0.4 since the Surveillance will not be "not met" at the time of entry into the Applicability.

Insert 1



REFERENCES

None.

Insert 1

SR 3.4.7.2

SDC System piping and components have the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained gases. Preventing and managing gas intrusion and accumulation is necessary for proper operation of the SDC subsystems and may also prevent water hammer, pump cavitation, and pumping of noncondensable gas into the reactor vessel.

Selection of SDC System locations susceptible to gas accumulation is based on a review of system design information, including piping and instrumentation drawings, isometric drawings, plan and elevation drawings, and calculations. The design review is supplemented by system walk downs to validate the system high points and to confirm the location and orientation of important components that can become sources of gas or could otherwise cause gas to be trapped or difficult to remove during system maintenance or restoration. Susceptible locations depend on plant and system configuration, such as stand-by versus operating conditions.

The SDC System is OPERABLE when it is sufficiently filled with water. Acceptance criteria are established for the volume of accumulated gas at susceptible locations. If accumulated gas is discovered that exceeds the acceptance criteria for the susceptible location (or the volume of accumulated gas at one or more susceptible locations exceeds an acceptance criteria for gas volume at the suction or discharge of a pump), the Surveillance is not met. If it is determined by subsequent evaluation that the SDC System is not rendered inoperable by the accumulated gas (i.e., the system is sufficiently filled with water), the Surveillance may be declared met. Accumulated gas should be eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits.

SDC System locations susceptible to gas accumulation are monitored and, if gas is found, the gas volume is compared to the acceptance criteria for the location. Susceptible locations in the same system flow path which are subject to the same gas intrusion mechanisms may be verified by monitoring a representative subset of susceptible locations. Monitoring may not be practical for locations that are inaccessible due to radiological or environmental conditions, the plant configuration, or personnel safety. For these locations alternative methods (e.g., operating parameters, remote monitoring) may be used to monitor the susceptible location. Monitoring is not required for susceptible locations where the maximum potential accumulated gas void volume has been evaluated and determined to not challenge system OPERABILITY. The accuracy of the method used for monitoring the susceptible locations and trending of the results should be sufficient to assure system OPERABILITY during the Surveillance interval.

This SR is modified by a Note that states the SR is not required to be performed until 12 hours after reactor vessel coolant temperature is less than the SDC cut in permissive temperature. In a rapid shutdown, there may be insufficient time to verify all susceptible locations prior to entering the Applicability.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. The Surveillance Frequency may vary by location susceptible to gas accumulation.

BASES

LCO
(continued)

component that is assumed not to fail, it is allowed to be common to both subsystems. Additionally, each shutdown cooling subsystem is considered OPERABLE if it can be manually aligned (remote or local) in the shutdown cooling mode for removal of decay heat. In MODE 4, one SDC subsystem can provide the required cooling, but two subsystems are required to be OPERABLE to provide redundancy. Operation of one subsystem can maintain or reduce the reactor coolant temperature as required. To ensure adequate core flow to allow for accurate average reactor coolant temperature monitoring, nearly continuous operation is required.

Management of gas voids is important to SDC System OPERABILITY.

Note 1 allows both required SDC subsystems to not be in operation during hydrostatic testing. This allowance is acceptable because adequate reactor coolant circulation will be maintained by operation of a reactor recirculation pump to ensure adequate core flow and since systems are available to control reactor coolant temperature. Note 2 permits both SDC subsystems and recirculation pumps to not be in operation for a period of 2 hours in an 8 hour period. Note 3 allows one required SDC subsystem to be inoperable for up to 2 hours for the performance of Surveillance tests. These tests may be on the affected SDC System or on some other plant system or component that necessitates placing the SDC System in an inoperable status during the performance. This is permitted because the core heat generation can be low enough and the heatup rate slow enough to allow some changes to the SDC subsystems or other operations requiring SDC flow interruption and loss of redundancy.

APPLICABILITY

In MODE 4, the SDC System must be OPERABLE and one SDC subsystem shall be operated in the shutdown cooling mode to remove decay heat to maintain coolant temperature below 212°F. Otherwise, a recirculation pump is required to be in operation.

In MODES 1 and 2, and in MODE 3 with reactor vessel coolant temperature greater than or equal to the SDC cut-in permissive temperature, this LCO is not applicable. Operation of the SDC System in the shutdown cooling mode is not allowed above this temperature because the RCS temperature may exceed the design temperature of the

(continued)

BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.4.8.1

This Surveillance verifies that one SDC subsystem or recirculation pump is in operation and circulating reactor coolant. The required flow rate is determined by the flow rate necessary to provide sufficient decay heat removal capability. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

Insert 2



REFERENCES

None.

Insert 2

SR 3.4.8.2

SDC System piping and components have the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained gases. Preventing and managing gas intrusion and accumulation is necessary for proper operation of the SDC subsystems and may also prevent water hammer, pump cavitation, and pumping of noncondensable gas into the reactor vessel.

Selection of SDC System locations susceptible to gas accumulation is based on a review of system design information, including piping and instrumentation drawings, isometric drawings, plan and elevation drawings, and calculations. The design review is supplemented by system walk downs to validate the system high points and to confirm the location and orientation of important components that can become sources of gas or could otherwise cause gas to be trapped or difficult to remove during system maintenance or restoration. Susceptible locations depend on plant and system configuration, such as stand-by versus operating conditions.

The SDC System is OPERABLE when it is sufficiently filled with water. Acceptance criteria are established for the volume of accumulated gas at susceptible locations. If accumulated gas is discovered that exceeds the acceptance criteria for the susceptible location (or the volume of accumulated gas at one or more susceptible locations exceeds an acceptance criteria for gas volume at the suction or discharge of a pump), the Surveillance is not met. If it is determined by subsequent evaluation that the SDC System is not rendered inoperable by the accumulated gas (i.e., the system is sufficiently filled with water), the Surveillance may be declared met. Accumulated gas should be eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits.

SDC System locations susceptible to gas accumulation are monitored and, if gas is found, the gas volume is compared to the acceptance criteria for the location. Susceptible locations in the same system flow path which are subject to the same gas intrusion mechanisms may be verified by monitoring a representative subset of susceptible locations. Monitoring may not be practical for locations that are inaccessible due to radiological or environmental conditions, the plant configuration, or personnel safety. For these locations alternative methods (e.g., operating parameters, remote monitoring) may be used to monitor the susceptible location. Monitoring is not required for susceptible locations where the maximum potential accumulated gas void volume has been evaluated and determined to not challenge system OPERABILITY. The accuracy of the method used for monitoring the susceptible locations and trending of the results should be sufficient to assure system OPERABILITY during the Surveillance interval.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. The Surveillance Frequency may vary by location susceptible to gas accumulation.

BASES

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES
(continued)

- b. Maximum cladding oxidation is ≤ 0.17 times the total cladding thickness before oxidation;
- c. Maximum hydrogen generation from a zirconium water reaction is ≤ 0.01 times the hypothetical amount that would be generated if all of the metal in the cladding surrounding the fuel, excluding the cladding surrounding the plenum volume, were to react;
- d. The core is maintained in a coolable geometry; and
- e. Adequate long term cooling capability is maintained.

The limiting single failures are discussed in Reference 8. |

The ECCS satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

Each ECCS injection/spray subsystem and five ADS valves are required to be OPERABLE. The ECCS injection/spray subsystems are defined as the two CS subsystems, the two LPCI subsystems, and one HPCI System. The low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystems are defined as the two CS subsystems and the two LPCI subsystems.

Management of gas voids is important to ECCS injection/spray subsystem OPERABILITY.

With less than the required number of ECCS subsystems OPERABLE, the potential exists that during a limiting design basis LOCA concurrent with the worst case single failure, the limits specified in Reference 9 could be exceeded. All ECCS subsystems must therefore be OPERABLE to satisfy the single failure criterion required by Reference 9.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

J.1 and J.2 (continued)

steam dome pressure reduced to ≤ 150 psig within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

K.1

When multiple ECCS subsystems are inoperable, as stated in Condition K, the plant is in a condition outside of the accident analyses. Therefore, LCO 3.0.3 must be entered immediately.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.5.1.1

~~The flow path piping has the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained air. Maintaining the pump discharge lines of the HPCI System, CS System, and LPCI subsystems full of water ensures that the ECCS will perform properly, injecting its full capacity into the RCS upon demand. This will also prevent a water hammer following an ECCS initiation signal. One acceptable method of ensuring that the lines are full is to vent at the high points. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.~~

Insert 3



SR 3.5.1.2

Verifying the correct alignment for manual, power operated, and automatic valves in the ECCS flow paths provides assurance that the proper flow paths will exist for ECCS operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position since these were verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. A valve that receives an initiation signal is allowed to be in a nonaccident position provided the valve will automatically reposition in the proper stroke time. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that

(continued)

Insert 3

SR 3.5.1.1

The ECCS injection/spray subsystem flow path piping and components have the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained gases. Preventing and managing gas intrusion and accumulation is necessary for proper operation of the ECCS injection/spray subsystems and may also prevent a water hammer, pump cavitation, and pumping of noncondensable gas into the reactor vessel.

Selection of ECCS injection/spray subsystem locations susceptible to gas accumulation is based on a review of system design information, including piping and instrumentation drawings, isometric drawings, plan and elevation drawings, and calculations. The design review is supplemented by system walk downs to validate the system high points and to confirm the location and orientation of important components that can become sources of gas or could otherwise cause gas to be trapped or difficult to remove during system maintenance or restoration. Susceptible locations depend on plant and system configuration, such as stand-by versus operating conditions.

The ECCS injection/spray subsystem is OPERABLE when it is sufficiently filled with water. Acceptance criteria are established for the volume of accumulated gas at susceptible locations. If accumulated gas is discovered that exceeds the acceptance criteria for the susceptible location (or the volume of accumulated gas at one or more susceptible locations exceeds an acceptance criteria for gas volume at the suction or discharge of a pump), the Surveillance is not met. If it is determined by subsequent evaluation that the ECCS injection/spray subsystems are not rendered inoperable by the accumulated gas (i.e., the system is sufficiently filled with water), the Surveillance may be declared met. Accumulated gas should be eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits.

ECCS injection/spray subsystem locations susceptible to gas accumulation are monitored and, if gas is found, the gas volume is compared to the acceptance criteria for the location. Susceptible locations in the same system flow path which are subject to the same gas intrusion mechanisms may be verified by monitoring a representative subset of susceptible locations. Monitoring may not be practical for locations that are inaccessible due to radiological or environmental conditions, the plant configuration, or personnel safety. For these locations alternative methods (e.g., operating parameters, remote monitoring) may be used to monitor the susceptible location. Monitoring is not required for susceptible locations where the maximum potential accumulated gas void volume has been evaluated and determined to not challenge system OPERABILITY. The accuracy of the method used for monitoring the susceptible locations and trending of the results should be sufficient to assure system OPERABILITY during the Surveillance interval.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. The Surveillance Frequency may vary by location susceptible to gas accumulation.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.5.1.2 (continued)

those valves capable of potentially being mispositioned are in the correct position. This SR does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves. For the HPCI System, this SR also includes the steam flow path for the turbine and the flow controller position.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

SR 3.5.1.3

Verification of the correct breaker alignment to the LPCI swing bus demonstrates that the AC electrical power is available to ensure proper operation of the associated LPCI injection valves and the recirculation pump discharge valves. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

SR 3.5.1.4

Cycling the recirculation pump discharge valves through one complete cycle of full travel demonstrates that the valves are mechanically OPERABLE and will close when required.

Upon initiation of an automatic LPCI subsystem injection signal, these valves are required to be closed to ensure full LPCI subsystem flow injection in the reactor via the recirculation jet pumps. De-energizing the valve in the closed position will also ensure the proper flow path for the LPCI subsystem. Acceptable methods of de-energizing the valve include de-energizing breaker control power, racking out the breaker or removing the breaker.

(continued)

The Surveillance is modified by a Note which exempts system vent flow paths opened under administrative control. The administrative control should be proceduralized and include stationing a dedicated individual at the system vent flow path who is in continuous communication with the operators in the control room. This individual will have a method to rapidly close the system vent flow path if directed.

B 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) AND ISOLATION CONDENSER (IC) SYSTEM

B 3.5.2 ECCS—Shutdown

BASES

BACKGROUND A description of the Core Spray (CS) System and the Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) System is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.5.1, "ECCS—Operating."

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES The ECCS performance is evaluated for the entire spectrum of break sizes for a postulated loss of coolant accident (LOCA). The long term cooling analysis following a design basis LOCA (Ref. 1) demonstrates that only one low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem is required, post LOCA, to maintain adequate reactor vessel water level in the event of an inadvertent vessel draindown. It is reasonable to assume, based on engineering judgement, that while in MODES 4 and 5, one low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem can maintain adequate reactor vessel water level. To provide redundancy, a minimum of two low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystems are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5.

The low pressure ECCS subsystems satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO Two low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystems are required to be OPERABLE. The low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystems consist of two CS subsystems and two LPCI subsystems. Each CS subsystem consists of one motor driven pump, piping, and valves to transfer water from the suppression pool or contaminated condensate storage tanks (CCSTs) to the reactor pressure vessel (RPV). Each LPCI subsystem consists of one motor driven pump, piping, and valves to transfer water from the suppression pool or the CCSTs to the RPV. A single LPCI pump is required per subsystem because of the similar injection capacity in relation to a CS subsystem. In addition, in MODES 4 and 5, the LPCI System cross-tie valves are not required to be open.

(continued)

Management of gas voids is important to ECCS injection/spray subsystem OPERABILITY.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.5.2.1 (continued)

completely drained. Therefore, only one low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem is allowed to use the CCSTs. This ensures the other required ECCS subsystem has adequate makeup volume.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

SR 3.5.2.2, SR 3.5.2.4, and SR 3.5.2.5

The Bases provided for SR 3.5.1.1, SR 3.5.1.5, and SR 3.5.1.8 are applicable to SR 3.5.2.2, SR 3.5.2.4, and SR 3.5.2.5, respectively.

SR 3.5.2.3

Verifying the correct alignment for manual, power operated, and automatic valves in the ECCS flow paths provides assurance that the proper flow paths will exist for ECCS operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, since these valves were verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. A valve that receives an initiation signal is allowed to be in a nonaccident position provided the valve will automatically reposition in the proper stroke time. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of potentially being mispositioned are in the correct position. This SR does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 6.3.3.4.1.

The Surveillance is modified by a Note which exempts system vent flow paths opened under administrative control. The administrative control should be proceduralized and include stationing a dedicated individual at the system vent flow path who is in continuous communication with the operators in the control room. This individual will have a method to rapidly close the system vent flow path if directed.

BASES

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES
(continued)


primary containment conditions within design limits. The suppression pool temperature is calculated to remain below the design limit.

The Suppression Pool Cooling System satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

During a DBA, a minimum of one suppression pool cooling subsystem is required to maintain the primary containment peak pressure and temperature below design limits (Ref. 1). To ensure that these requirements are met, two suppression pool cooling subsystems must be OPERABLE with power from two safety related independent power supplies. Therefore, in the event of an accident, at least one subsystem is OPERABLE assuming the worst case single active failure. A suppression pool cooling subsystem is OPERABLE when one of the pumps, the heat exchanger, and associated piping, valves, instrumentation, and controls are OPERABLE.

Management of gas voids is important to Suppression Pool Cooling System OPERABILITY.



APPLICABILITY

In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a DBA could cause both a release of radioactive material to primary containment and a heatup and pressurization of primary containment. In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, the Suppression Pool Cooling System is not required to be OPERABLE in MODE 4 or 5.

ACTIONS

A.1

With one suppression pool cooling subsystem inoperable, the inoperable subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. In this condition, the remaining OPERABLE suppression pool cooling subsystem is adequate to perform the primary containment cooling function. However, the overall reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE subsystem could result in reduced primary containment cooling capability. The 7 day Completion Time is acceptable in light of the redundant suppression pool cooling capabilities afforded by the OPERABLE subsystem and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.2.3.2

Verifying that each required LPCI pump develops a flow rate ≥ 5000 gpm while operating in the suppression pool cooling mode with flow through the associated heat exchanger ensures that the primary containment peak pressure and temperature can be maintained below the design limits during a DBA (Ref. 1). The flow is a normal test of centrifugal pump performance required by ASME Code (Ref. 3). This test confirms one point on the pump design curve, and the results are indicative of overall performance. Such inservice tests confirm component OPERABILITY, and detect incipient failures by indicating abnormal performance. The Frequency of this SR is in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program.

Insert 4



REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 6.2.
 2. ASME Code for Operation and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants.
-
-

Insert 4

SR 3.6.2.3.3

Suppression Pool Cooling System piping and components have the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained gases. Preventing and managing gas intrusion and accumulation is necessary for proper operation of the suppression pool cooling subsystems and may also prevent water hammer and pump cavitation.

Selection of Suppression Pool Cooling System locations susceptible to gas accumulation is based on a review of system design information, including piping and instrumentation drawings, isometric drawings, plan and elevation drawings, and calculations. The design review is supplemented by system walk downs to validate the system high points and to confirm the location and orientation of important components that can become sources of gas or could otherwise cause gas to be trapped or difficult to remove during system maintenance or restoration. Susceptible locations depend on plant and system configuration, such as stand-by versus operating conditions.

The Suppression Pool Cooling System is OPERABLE when it is sufficiently filled with water. Acceptance criteria are established for the volume of accumulated gas at susceptible locations. If accumulated gas is discovered that exceeds the acceptance criteria for the susceptible location (or the volume of accumulated gas at one or more susceptible locations exceeds an acceptance criteria for gas volume at the suction or discharge of a pump), the Surveillance is not met. If it is determined by subsequent evaluation that the Suppression Pool Cooling System is not rendered inoperable by the accumulated gas (i.e., the system is sufficiently filled with water), the Surveillance may be declared met. Accumulated gas should be eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits.

Suppression Pool Cooling System locations susceptible to gas accumulation are monitored and, if gas is found, the gas volume is compared to the acceptance criteria for the location. Susceptible locations in the same system flow path which are subject to the same gas intrusion mechanisms may be verified by monitoring a representative subset of susceptible locations. Monitoring may not be practical for locations that are inaccessible due to radiological or environmental conditions, the plant configuration, or personnel safety. For these locations alternative methods (e.g., operating parameters, remote monitoring) may be used to monitor the susceptible location. Monitoring is not required for susceptible locations where the maximum potential accumulated gas void volume has been evaluated and determined to not challenge system OPERABILITY. The accuracy of the method used for monitoring the susceptible locations and trending of the results should be sufficient to assure system OPERABILITY during the Surveillance interval.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. The Surveillance Frequency may vary by location susceptible to gas accumulation.

BASES (continued)

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES


Reference 1 contains the results of analyses used to predict primary containment pressure and temperature following large and small break loss of coolant accidents. The intent of the analyses is to demonstrate that the pressure reduction capacity of the Suppression Pool Spray System is adequate to maintain the primary containment conditions within design limits. The time history for primary containment pressure is calculated to demonstrate that the maximum pressure remains below the design limit.

The Suppression Pool Spray System satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

In the event of a DBA, a minimum of one suppression pool spray subsystem is required to mitigate potential bypass leakage paths and maintain the primary containment peak pressure below the design limits (Ref. 1). To ensure that these requirements are met, two suppression pool spray subsystems must be OPERABLE with power from two safety related independent power supplies. Therefore, in the event of an accident, at least one subsystem is OPERABLE assuming the worst case single active failure. A suppression pool spray subsystem is OPERABLE when one of the pumps, the heat exchanger, and associated piping, valves, instrumentation, and controls are OPERABLE.

Management of gas voids is important to Suppression Pool Spray System OPERABILITY.



APPLICABILITY

In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a DBA could cause pressurization of primary containment. In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining suppression pool spray subsystems OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 or 5.

ACTIONS

A.1

With one suppression pool spray subsystem inoperable, the inoperable subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. In this condition, the remaining OPERABLE suppression pool spray subsystem is adequate to perform the primary containment bypass leakage mitigation function.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

C.1 (continued)

of this risk assessment is required to determine the acceptability of entering MODE 3 from MODE 4 when this LCO is not met. The allowed Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.2.4.1

Verifying the correct alignment for manual and power operated valves in the suppression pool spray mode flow path provides assurance that the proper flow path exists for system operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position since these valves were verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. A valve is also allowed to be in the nonaccident position provided it can be aligned to the accident position within the time assumed in the accident analysis. This is acceptable since the suppression pool spray mode is manually initiated. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position. This SR does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

SR 3.6.2.4.2

This Surveillance is performed to verify that the spray nozzles are not obstructed and that spray flow will be provided when required. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

Insert 5 

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 6.2.
 2. NEDC-32988-A, Revision 2, Technical Justification to Support Risk-Informed Modification to Selected Required End States for BWR Plants, December 2002.
-

Insert 5

SR 3.6.2.4.3

Suppression Pool Spray System piping and components have the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained gases. Preventing and managing gas intrusion and accumulation is necessary for proper operation of the suppression pool spray subsystems and may also prevent water hammer and pump cavitation.

Selection of Suppression Pool Spray System locations susceptible to gas accumulation is based on a review of system design information, including piping and instrumentation drawings, isometric drawings, plan and elevation drawings, and calculations. The design review is supplemented by system walk downs to validate the system high points and to confirm the location and orientation of important components that can become sources of gas or could otherwise cause gas to be trapped or difficult to remove during system maintenance or restoration. Susceptible locations depend on plant and system configuration, such as stand-by versus operating conditions.

The Suppression Pool Spray System is OPERABLE when it is sufficiently filled with water. Acceptance criteria are established for the volume of accumulated gas at susceptible locations. If accumulated gas is discovered that exceeds the acceptance criteria for the susceptible location (or the volume of accumulated gas at one or more susceptible locations exceeds an acceptance criteria for gas volume at the suction or discharge of a pump), the Surveillance is not met. If it is determined by subsequent evaluation that the Suppression Pool Spray System is not rendered inoperable by the accumulated gas (i.e., the system is sufficiently filled with water), the Surveillance may be declared met. Accumulated gas should be eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits.

Suppression Pool Spray System locations susceptible to gas accumulation are monitored and, if gas is found, the gas volume is compared to the acceptance criteria for the location. Susceptible locations in the same system flow path which are subject to the same gas intrusion mechanisms may be verified by monitoring a representative subset of susceptible locations. Monitoring may not be practical for locations that are inaccessible due to radiological or environmental conditions, the plant configuration, or personnel safety. For these locations alternative methods (e.g., operating parameters, remote monitoring) may be used to monitor the susceptible location. Monitoring is not required for susceptible locations where the maximum potential accumulated gas void volume has been evaluated and determined to not challenge system OPERABILITY. The accuracy of the method used for monitoring the susceptible locations and trending of the results should be sufficient to assure system OPERABILITY during the Surveillance interval.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. The Surveillance Frequency may vary by location susceptible to gas accumulation.

BASES

LCO
(continued)

An OPERABLE SDC subsystem consists of a SDC pump, a heat exchanger, valves, piping, instruments, and controls to ensure an OPERABLE flow path. In addition, the necessary portions of the RBCCW System must be capable of providing cooling water to the SDC heat exchanger, the SDC pump seal cooler.

Management of gas voids is important to SDC System OPERABILITY.

Additionally, the SDC subsystem is considered OPERABLE if it can be manually aligned (remote or local) in the shutdown cooling mode for removal of decay heat. Operation (either continuous or intermittent) of one subsystem can maintain and reduce the reactor coolant temperature as required. However, to ensure adequate core flow to allow for accurate average reactor coolant temperature monitoring, nearly continuous operation is required. A Note is provided to allow a 2 hour exception for the operating subsystem to not be in operation every 8 hours. This is permitted because the core heat generation can be low enough and the heatup rate slow enough to allow some changes to the SDC subsystem or other operations requiring SDC flow interruption.

APPLICABILITY

One SDC subsystem must be OPERABLE and in operation in MODE 5, with irradiated fuel in the RPV and with the water level ≥ 23 feet above the top of the RPV flange, to provide decay heat removal. SDC subsystem requirements in other MODES are covered by LCOs in Section 3.4, Reactor Coolant System (RCS). SDC subsystem requirements in MODE 5 with irradiated fuel in the RPV and with the water level < 23 ft above the RPV flange are given in LCO 3.9.9, "Shutdown Cooling (SDC)—Low Water Level."

ACTIONS

A.1

With no SDC subsystem OPERABLE, an alternate method of decay heat removal must be provided within 1 hour. In this condition, the volume of water above the RPV flange provides adequate capability to remove decay heat from the reactor core. However, the overall reliability is reduced because loss of water level could result in reduced decay heat removal capability. The 1 hour Completion Time is based on decay heat removal function and the probability of a loss of the available decay heat removal capabilities. Furthermore,

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

B.1, B.2, B.3, and B.4 (continued)

examining logs or other information to determine whether the components are out of service for maintenance or other reasons. It is not necessary to perform the Surveillances needed to demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the components. If, however, any required component is inoperable, then it must be restored to OPERABLE status. In this case, a surveillance may need to be performed to restore the component to OPERABLE status. Actions must continue until all required components are OPERABLE.

C.1 and C.2

If no SDC subsystem is in operation, an alternate method of coolant circulation is required to be established within 1 hour. The Completion Time is modified such that the 1 hour is applicable separately for each occurrence involving a loss of coolant circulation.

During the period when the reactor coolant is being circulated by an alternate method (other than by the required SDC subsystem), the reactor coolant temperature must be periodically monitored to ensure proper functioning of the alternate method. The once per hour Completion Time is deemed appropriate.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.9.8.1

This Surveillance demonstrates that the required SDC subsystem is in operation and circulating reactor coolant. The required flow rate is determined by the flow rate necessary to provide sufficient decay heat removal capability. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

Insert 6 

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 5.4.7.

Insert 6

SR 3.9.8.2

SDC System piping and components have the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained gases. Preventing and managing gas intrusion and accumulation is necessary for proper operation of the required SDC subsystem(s) and may also prevent water hammer, pump cavitation, and pumping of noncondensable gas into the reactor vessel.

Selection of SDC System locations susceptible to gas accumulation is based on a review of system design information, including piping and instrumentation drawings, isometric drawings, plan and elevation drawings, and calculations. The design review is supplemented by system walk downs to validate the system high points and to confirm the location and orientation of important components that can become sources of gas or could otherwise cause gas to be trapped or difficult to remove during system maintenance or restoration. Susceptible locations depend on plant and system configuration, such as stand-by versus operating conditions.

The SDC System is OPERABLE when it is sufficiently filled with water. Acceptance criteria are established for the volume of accumulated gas at susceptible locations. If accumulated gas is discovered that exceeds the acceptance criteria for the susceptible location (or the volume of accumulated gas at one or more susceptible locations exceeds an acceptance criteria for gas volume at the suction or discharge of a pump), the Surveillance is not met. If it is determined by subsequent evaluation that the SDC System is not rendered inoperable by the accumulated gas (i.e., the system is sufficiently filled with water), the Surveillance may be declared met. Accumulated gas should be eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits.

SDC System locations susceptible to gas accumulation are monitored and, if gas is found, the gas volume is compared to the acceptance criteria for the location. Susceptible locations in the same system flow path which are subject to the same gas intrusion mechanisms may be verified by monitoring a representative subset of susceptible locations. Monitoring may not be practical for locations that are inaccessible due to radiological or environmental conditions, the plant configuration, or personnel safety. For these locations alternative methods (e.g., operating parameters, remote monitoring) may be used to monitor the susceptible location. Monitoring is not required for susceptible locations where the maximum potential accumulated gas void volume has been evaluated and determined to not challenge system OPERABILITY. The accuracy of the method used for monitoring the susceptible locations and trending of the results should be sufficient to assure system OPERABILITY during the Surveillance interval.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. The Surveillance Frequency may vary by location susceptible to gas accumulation.

B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

B 3.9.9 Shutdown Cooling (SDC)—Low Water Level

BASES

BACKGROUND The purpose of the SDC System in MODE 5 is to remove decay heat and sensible heat from the reactor coolant, as described by UFSAR, Section 5.4.7 (Ref. 1). Two of the three shutdown cooling loops of the SDC System can provide the required decay heat removal. Each loop consists of a motor driven pump, a heat exchanger, and associated piping and valves. The loops can take suction from either recirculation loop. Each pump discharges the reactor coolant, after it has been cooled by circulation through the respective heat exchanger, to the reactor via either low pressure coolant injection path and the associated recirculation loop. The SDC heat exchangers transfer heat to the Service Water System via the Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water (RBCCW) System. The SDC mode is manually controlled.


APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES With the unit in MODE 5, the SDC System is not required to mitigate any events or accidents evaluated in the safety analyses. The SDC System is required for removing decay heat to maintain the temperature of the reactor coolant.

The SDC System satisfies Criterion 4 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO In MODE 5 with irradiated fuel in the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) and the water level < 23 ft above the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) flange two SDC subsystems must be OPERABLE and one SDC subsystem must be in operation.

An OPERABLE SDC subsystem consists of a SDC pump, a heat exchanger, valves, piping, instruments, and controls to ensure an OPERABLE flow path. To meet the LCO, one pump in each of the two required loops must be OPERABLE. In addition the necessary portions of the RBCCW System must be capable of providing cooling water to the SDC heat exchanger and the SDC pump seal cooler.

Management of gas voids is important to SDC System OPERABILITY.



(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS B.1, B.2, and B.3 (continued)

need for secondary containment isolation is indicated). This may be performed as an administrative check, by examining logs or other information to determine whether the components are out of service for maintenance or other reasons. It is not necessary to perform the Surveillances needed to demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the components. If, however, any required component is inoperable, then it must be restored to OPERABLE status. In this case, the surveillance may need to be performed to restore the component to OPERABLE status. Actions must continue until all required components are OPERABLE.

C.1 and C.2

If no SDC subsystem is in operation, an alternate method of coolant circulation is required to be established within 1 hour. The Completion Time is modified such that the 1 hour is applicable separately for each occurrence involving a loss of coolant circulation.

During the period when the reactor coolant is being circulated by an alternate method (other than by the required SDC subsystem), the reactor coolant temperature must be periodically monitored to ensure proper functioning of the alternate method. The once per hour Completion Time is deemed appropriate.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.9.9.1

This Surveillance demonstrates that one SDC subsystem is in operation and circulating reactor coolant. The required flow rate is determined by the flow rate necessary to provide sufficient decay heat removal capability. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

Insert 7 

REFERENCES 1. UFSAR, Section 5.4.7.

Insert 7

SR 3.9.9.2

SDC System piping and components have the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained gases. Preventing and managing gas intrusion and accumulation is necessary for proper operation of the SDC subsystems and may also prevent water hammer, pump cavitation, and pumping of noncondensable gas into the reactor vessel.

Selection of SDC System locations susceptible to gas accumulation is based on a review of system design information, including piping and instrumentation drawings, isometric drawings, plan and elevation drawings, and calculations. The design review is supplemented by system walk downs to validate the system high points and to confirm the location and orientation of important components that can become sources of gas or could otherwise cause gas to be trapped or difficult to remove during system maintenance or restoration. Susceptible locations depend on plant and system configuration, such as stand-by versus operating conditions.

The SDC System is OPERABLE when it is sufficiently filled with water. Acceptance criteria are established for the volume of accumulated gas at susceptible locations. If accumulated gas is discovered that exceeds the acceptance criteria for the susceptible location (or the volume of accumulated gas at one or more susceptible locations exceeds an acceptance criteria for gas volume at the suction or discharge of a pump), the Surveillance is not met. If it is determined by subsequent evaluation that the SDC System is not rendered inoperable by the accumulated gas (i.e., the system is sufficiently filled with water), the Surveillance may be declared met. Accumulated gas should be eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits.

SDC System locations susceptible to gas accumulation are monitored and, if gas is found, the gas volume is compared to the acceptance criteria for the location. Susceptible locations in the same system flow path which are subject to the same gas intrusion mechanisms may be verified by monitoring a representative subset of susceptible locations. Monitoring may not be practical for locations that are inaccessible due to radiological or environmental conditions, the plant configuration, or personnel safety. For these locations alternative methods (e.g., operating parameters, remote monitoring) may be used to monitor the susceptible location. Monitoring is not required for susceptible locations where the maximum potential accumulated gas void volume has been evaluated and determined to not challenge system OPERABILITY. The accuracy of the method used for monitoring the susceptible locations and trending of the results should be sufficient to assure system OPERABILITY during the Surveillance interval.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. The Surveillance Frequency may vary by location susceptible to gas accumulation.

BASES

LCO
(continued)

local) in the shutdown cooling mode for removal of decay heat. In MODE 3, one RHR shutdown cooling subsystem can provide the required cooling, but two subsystems are required to be OPERABLE to provide redundancy. Operation of one subsystem can maintain or reduce the reactor coolant temperature as required. To ensure adequate core flow to allow for accurate average reactor coolant temperature monitoring, nearly continuous operation is required.

Management of gas voids is important to RHR Shutdown Cooling System OPERABILITY.

Note 1 permits both RHR shutdown cooling subsystems and recirculation pumps to not be in operation for a period of 2 hours in an 8 hour period. Note 2 allows one RHR shutdown cooling subsystem to be inoperable for up to 2 hours for performance of surveillance tests. These tests may be on the affected RHR System or on some other plant system or component that necessitates placing the RHR System in an inoperable status during the performance. This is permitted because the core heat generation can be low enough and the heatup rate slow enough to allow some changes to the RHR subsystems or other operations requiring RHR flow interruption and loss of redundancy.

APPLICABILITY

In MODE 3 with reactor vessel pressure below the RHR cut in permissive pressure (i.e., the actual pressure at which the interlock resets) the RHR Shutdown Cooling System must be OPERABLE and one RHR shutdown cooling subsystem shall be operated in the shutdown cooling mode to remove decay heat to reduce or maintain coolant temperature. With an RHR shutdown cooling subsystem not in operation, a recirculation pump is required to be in operation.

In MODES 1 and 2, and in MODE 3 with reactor vessel pressure greater than or equal to the RHR cut-in permissive pressure, this LCO is not applicable. Operation of the RHR System in the shutdown cooling mode is not allowed above this pressure because the RCS pressure may exceed the design pressure of the shutdown cooling piping. Decay heat removal at reactor pressures greater than or equal to the RHR cut-in permissive pressure is typically accomplished by condensing the steam in the main condenser. Additionally, in MODE 2, the OPERABILITY requirements for the Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) (LCO 3.5.1, "ECCS—Operating") do not allow placing the RHR shutdown cooling subsystem into operation.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

B.1, B.2, and B.3 (continued)

separately for each occurrence involving a loss of coolant circulation. Furthermore, verification of the functioning of the alternate method must be reconfirmed every 12 hours thereafter. This will provide assurance of continued temperature monitoring capability.

During the period when the reactor coolant is being circulated by an alternate method (other than by the required RHR shutdown cooling subsystem or recirculation pump), the reactor coolant temperature and pressure must be periodically monitored to ensure proper function of the alternate method. The once per hour Completion Time is deemed appropriate.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.4.9.1

This Surveillance verifies that one RHR shutdown cooling subsystem or recirculation pump is in operation and circulating reactor coolant. The required flow rate is determined by the flow rate necessary to provide sufficient decay heat removal capability. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

This Surveillance is modified by a Note allowing sufficient time to align the RHR System for shutdown cooling operation after clearing the pressure interlock that isolates the system, or for placing a recirculation pump in operation. The Note takes exception to the requirements of the Surveillance being met (i.e., forced coolant circulation is not required for this initial 2 hour period), which also allows entry into the Applicability of this Specification in accordance with SR 3.0.4 since the Surveillance will not be "not met" at the time of entry into the Applicability.

Insert 1 →

REFERENCES

None.

Insert 1

SR 3.4.9.2

RHR Shutdown Cooling System piping and components have the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained gases. Preventing and managing gas intrusion and accumulation is necessary for proper operation of the RHR shutdown cooling subsystems and may also prevent water hammer, pump cavitation, and pumping of noncondensable gas into the reactor vessel.

Selection of RHR Shutdown Cooling System locations susceptible to gas accumulation is based on a review of system design information, including piping and instrumentation drawings, isometric drawings, plan and elevation drawings, and calculations. The design review is supplemented by system walk downs to validate the system high points and to confirm the location and orientation of important components that can become sources of gas or could otherwise cause gas to be trapped or difficult to remove during system maintenance or restoration. Susceptible locations depend on plant and system configuration, such as stand-by versus operating conditions.

The RHR Shutdown Cooling System is OPERABLE when it is sufficiently filled with water. Acceptance criteria are established for the volume of accumulated gas at susceptible locations. If accumulated gas is discovered that exceeds the acceptance criteria for the susceptible location (or the volume of accumulated gas at one or more susceptible locations exceeds an acceptance criteria for gas volume at the suction or discharge of a pump), the Surveillance is not met. If it is determined by subsequent evaluation that the RHR Shutdown Cooling System is not rendered inoperable by the accumulated gas (i.e., the system is sufficiently filled with water), the Surveillance may be declared met. Accumulated gas should be eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits.

RHR Shutdown Cooling System locations susceptible to gas accumulation are monitored and, if gas is found, the gas volume is compared to the acceptance criteria for the location. Susceptible locations in the same system flow path which are subject to the same gas intrusion mechanisms may be verified by monitoring a representative subset of susceptible locations. Monitoring may not be practical for locations that are inaccessible due to radiological or environmental conditions, the plant configuration, or personnel safety. For these locations alternative methods (e.g., operating parameters, remote monitoring) may be used to monitor the susceptible location. Monitoring is not required for susceptible locations where the maximum potential accumulated gas void volume has been evaluated and determined to not challenge system OPERABILITY. The accuracy of the method used for monitoring the susceptible locations and trending of the results should be sufficient to assure system OPERABILITY during the Surveillance interval.

This SR is modified by a Note that states the SR is not required to be performed until 12 hours after reactor steam dome pressure is less than the RHR cut in permissive pressure. In a rapid shutdown, there may be insufficient time to verify all susceptible locations prior to entering the Applicability.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. The Surveillance Frequency may vary by location susceptible to gas accumulation.

BASES

LCO
(continued)

subsystem is considered OPERABLE if it can be manually aligned (remote or local) in the shutdown cooling mode for removal of decay heat. In MODE 4, one RHR shutdown cooling subsystem can provide the required cooling, but two subsystems are required to be OPERABLE to provide redundancy. Operation of one subsystem can maintain and reduce the reactor coolant temperature as required. To ensure adequate core flow to allow for accurate average reactor coolant temperature monitoring, nearly continuous operation is required.

Management of gas voids is important to RHR Shutdown Cooling System OPERABILITY.

Note 1 allows both RHR shutdown cooling subsystems to be inoperable during hydrostatic testing. This is allowed since the RHR Shutdown Cooling System is not designed to operate at the Reactor Coolant System pressures achieved during hydrostatic testing. This is acceptable since adequate reactor coolant circulation will be achieved by operation of a reactor recirculation pump and since systems are available to control reactor coolant temperature. Note 2 permits both RHR shutdown cooling subsystems and recirculation pumps to not be in operation for a period of 2 hours in an 8 hour period. Note 3 allows one RHR shutdown cooling subsystem to be inoperable for up to 2 hours for performance of surveillance tests. These tests may be on the affected RHR System or on some other plant system or component that necessitates placing the RHR System in an inoperable status during the performance. This is permitted because the core heat generation can be low enough and the heatup rate slow enough to allow some changes to the RHR subsystems or other operations requiring RHR flow interruption and loss of redundancy.

APPLICABILITY

In MODE 4, the RHR Shutdown Cooling System must be OPERABLE and one RHR shutdown cooling subsystem shall be operated in the shutdown cooling mode to remove decay heat to maintain coolant temperature below 200°F. With an RHR shutdown cooling subsystem not in operation, a recirculation pump is required to be in operation.

In MODES 1 and 2, and in MODE 3 with reactor vessel pressure greater than or equal to the RHR cut-in permissive pressure, this LCO is not applicable. Operation of the RHR System in the shutdown cooling mode is not allowed above this

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

B.1 and B.2 (continued)

During the period when the reactor coolant is being circulated by an alternate method (other than by the required RHR shutdown cooling subsystem or recirculation pump), the reactor coolant temperature and pressure must be periodically monitored to ensure proper function of the alternate method. The once per hour Completion Time is deemed appropriate.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.4.10.1

This Surveillance verifies that one RHR shutdown cooling subsystem or recirculation pump is in operation and circulating reactor coolant. The required flow rate is determined by the flow rate necessary to provide sufficient decay heat removal capability. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

Insert 2



REFERENCES

None.

Insert 2

SR 3.4.10.2

RHR Shutdown Cooling System piping and components have the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained gases. Preventing and managing gas intrusion and accumulation is necessary for proper operation of the RHR shutdown cooling subsystems and may also prevent water hammer, pump cavitation, and pumping of noncondensable gas into the reactor vessel.

Selection of RHR Shutdown Cooling System locations susceptible to gas accumulation is based on a review of system design information, including piping and instrumentation drawings, isometric drawings, plan and elevation drawings, and calculations. The design review is supplemented by system walk downs to validate the system high points and to confirm the location and orientation of important components that can become sources of gas or could otherwise cause gas to be trapped or difficult to remove during system maintenance or restoration. Susceptible locations depend on plant and system configuration, such as stand-by versus operating conditions.

The RHR Shutdown Cooling System is OPERABLE when it is sufficiently filled with water. Acceptance criteria are established for the volume of accumulated gas at susceptible locations. If accumulated gas is discovered that exceeds the acceptance criteria for the susceptible location (or the volume of accumulated gas at one or more susceptible locations exceeds an acceptance criteria for gas volume at the suction or discharge of a pump), the Surveillance is not met. If it is determined by subsequent evaluation that the RHR Shutdown Cooling System is not rendered inoperable by the accumulated gas (i.e., the system is sufficiently filled with water), the Surveillance may be declared met. Accumulated gas should be eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits.

RHR Shutdown Cooling System locations susceptible to gas accumulation are monitored and, if gas is found, the gas volume is compared to the acceptance criteria for the location. Susceptible locations in the same system flow path which are subject to the same gas intrusion mechanisms may be verified by monitoring a representative subset of susceptible locations. Monitoring may not be practical for locations that are inaccessible due to radiological or environmental conditions, the plant configuration, or personnel safety. For these locations alternative methods (e.g., operating parameters, remote monitoring) may be used to monitor the susceptible location. Monitoring is not required for susceptible locations where the maximum potential accumulated gas void volume has been evaluated and determined to not challenge system OPERABILITY. The accuracy of the method used for monitoring the susceptible locations and trending of the results should be sufficient to assure system OPERABILITY during the Surveillance interval.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. The Surveillance Frequency may vary by location susceptible to gas accumulation.

BASES

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES
(continued)

the most severe failure. The remaining OPERABLE ECCS subsystems, which include one spray subsystem, provide the capability to adequately cool the core, under near-term and long-term conditions, and prevent excessive fuel damage. For all LOCA analyses, only six ADS valves are assumed to function. An additional analysis has been performed which assumes five ADS valves function, however in this analysis all low pressure and high pressure ECCS subsystems are also assumed to be available.

The ECCS satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

Each ECCS injection/spray subsystem and six ADS valves are required to be OPERABLE. The ECCS injection/spray subsystems are defined as the three LPCI subsystems, the LPCS System, and the HPCS System. The low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystems are defined as the LPCS System and the three LPCI subsystems.

Management of gas voids is important to ECCS injection/spray subsystem OPERABILITY.

With less than the required number of ECCS subsystems OPERABLE during a limiting design basis LOCA concurrent with the worst case single failure, the limits specified in 10 CFR 50.46 (Ref. 10) could potentially be exceeded. All ECCS subsystems must therefore be OPERABLE to satisfy the single failure criterion required by 10 CFR 50.46 (Ref. 10).

As noted, LPCI subsystems may be considered OPERABLE during alignment and operation for decay heat removal when below the actual RHR cut in permissive pressure in MODE 3, if capable of being manually realigned (remote or local) to the LPCI mode and not otherwise inoperable. Alignment and operation for decay heat removal includes: a) when the system is realigned to or from the RHR shutdown cooling mode and; b) when the system is in the RHR shutdown cooling mode, whether or not the RHR pump is operating. This allowance is necessary since the RHR System may be required to operate in the shutdown cooling mode to remove decay heat and sensible heat from the reactor. At these low pressures and decay heat levels, a reduced complement of ECCS subsystems should provide the required core cooling, thereby allowing operation of RHR shutdown cooling when necessary.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

~~SR 3.5.1.1~~

~~The flow path piping has the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained air. Maintaining the pump discharge lines of the HPCS System, LPCS System, and LPCI subsystems full of water ensures that the systems will perform properly, injecting their full capacity into the RCS upon demand. This will also prevent a water hammer following an ECCS initiation signal. One acceptable method of ensuring the lines are full is to vent at the high points. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.~~

Insert 3

SR 3.5.1.2

Verifying the correct alignment for manual, power operated, and automatic valves in the ECCS flow paths provides assurance that the proper flow paths will exist for ECCS operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position since these valves were verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. A valve that receives an initiation signal is allowed to be in a nonaccident position provided the valve will automatically reposition in the proper stroke time. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those valves potentially capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position. This SR does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

SR 3.5.1.3

Verification that ADS accumulator supply header pressure is ≥ 150 psig assures adequate pneumatic pressure for reliable ADS operation. The accumulator on each ADS valve provides pneumatic pressure for valve actuation. The ADS valve accumulators are sized to provide two cycles of the ADS valves upon loss of the nitrogen supply (Ref. 13). The ECCS safety analysis assumes only one actuation to achieve the depressurization required for operation of the low pressure

(continued)

The Surveillance is modified by a Note which exempts system vent flow paths opened under administrative control. The administrative control should be proceduralized and include stationing a dedicated individual at the system vent flow path who is in continuous communication with the operators in the control room. This individual will have a method to rapidly close the system vent flow path if directed.

Insert 3

SR 3.5.1.1

The ECCS injection/spray subsystem flow path piping and components have the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained gases. Preventing and managing gas intrusion and accumulation is necessary for proper operation of the ECCS injection/spray subsystems and may also prevent a water hammer, pump cavitation, and pumping of noncondensable gas into the reactor vessel.

Selection of ECCS injection/spray subsystem locations susceptible to gas accumulation is based on a review of system design information, including piping and instrumentation drawings, isometric drawings, plan and elevation drawings, and calculations. The design review is supplemented by system walk downs to validate the system high points and to confirm the location and orientation of important components that can become sources of gas or could otherwise cause gas to be trapped or difficult to remove during system maintenance or restoration. Susceptible locations depend on plant and system configuration, such as stand-by versus operating conditions.

The ECCS injection/spray subsystem is OPERABLE when it is sufficiently filled with water. Acceptance criteria are established for the volume of accumulated gas at susceptible locations. If accumulated gas is discovered that exceeds the acceptance criteria for the susceptible location (or the volume of accumulated gas at one or more susceptible locations exceeds an acceptance criteria for gas volume at the suction or discharge of a pump), the Surveillance is not met. If it is determined by subsequent evaluation that the ECCS injection/spray subsystems are not rendered inoperable by the accumulated gas (i.e., the system is sufficiently filled with water), the Surveillance may be declared met. Accumulated gas should be eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits.

ECCS injection/spray subsystem locations susceptible to gas accumulation are monitored and, if gas is found, the gas volume is compared to the acceptance criteria for the location. Susceptible locations in the same system flow path which are subject to the same gas intrusion mechanisms may be verified by monitoring a representative subset of susceptible locations. Monitoring may not be practical for locations that are inaccessible due to radiological or environmental conditions, the plant configuration, or personnel safety. For these locations alternative methods (e.g., operating parameters, remote monitoring) may be used to monitor the susceptible location. Monitoring is not required for susceptible locations where the maximum potential accumulated gas void volume has been evaluated and determined to not challenge system OPERABILITY. The accuracy of the method used for monitoring the susceptible locations and trending of the results should be sufficient to assure system OPERABILITY during the Surveillance interval.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. The Surveillance Frequency may vary by location susceptible to gas accumulation.

B 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION
COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM

B 3.5.2 ECCS—Shutdown

BASES

BACKGROUND A description of the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) System, Low Pressure Core Spray (LPCS) System, and low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) mode of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.5.1, "ECCS-Operating."

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES The ECCS performance is evaluated for the entire spectrum of break sizes for a postulated loss of coolant accident (LOCA). The long term cooling analysis following a design basis LOCA (Ref. 1) demonstrates that only one ECCS injection/spray subsystem is required, post LOCA, to maintain adequate reactor vessel water level in the event of an inadvertent vessel draindown. It is reasonable to assume, based on engineering judgment, that while in MODES 4 and 5, one ECCS injection/spray subsystem can maintain adequate reactor vessel water level. To provide redundancy, a minimum of two ECCS injection/spray subsystems are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5.

The ECCS satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO Two ECCS injection/spray subsystems are required to be OPERABLE. The ECCS injection/spray subsystems are defined as the three LPCI subsystems, the LPCS System, and the HPCS System. The LPCS System and each LPCI subsystem consist of one motor driven pump, piping, and valves to transfer water from the suppression pool to the RPV. The HPCS System consists of one motor driven pump, piping, and valves to transfer water from the suppression pool to the RPV. The necessary portions of the Diesel Generator Cooling Water System are also required to provide appropriate cooling to each required ECCS injection/spray subsystem.

Management of gas voids is important to ECCS injection/spray subsystem OPERABILITY.

As noted, one LPCI subsystem (A or B) may be considered OPERABLE during alignment and operation for decay heat removal, if capable of being manually realigned (remote or

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS
(continued)

SR 3.5.2.3, SR 3.5.2.5, and SR 3.5.2.6

The Bases provided for SR 3.5.1.1, SR 3.5.1.5, and SR 3.5.1.6 are applicable to SR 3.5.2.3, SR 3.5.2.5, and SR 3.5.2.6, respectively.

SR 3.5.2.4

Verifying the correct alignment for manual, power operated, and automatic valves in the ECCS flow paths provides assurance that the proper flow paths will exist for ECCS operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position since these valves were verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. A valve that receives an initiation signal is allowed to be in a nonaccident position provided the valve will automatically reposition in the proper stroke time. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of potentially being mispositioned are in the correct position. This SR does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 6.3.3.2.
-
-

The Surveillance is modified by a Note which exempts system vent flow paths opened under administrative control. The administrative control should be proceduralized and include stationing a dedicated individual at the system vent flow path who is in continuous communication with the operators in the control room. This individual will have a method to rapidly close the system vent flow path if directed.

BASES

BACKGROUND
(continued)

flow test line is provided to route water to the CST or the suppression pool to allow testing of the RCIC System during normal operation without injecting water into the RPV.

The RCIC pump is provided with a minimum flow bypass line, which discharges to the suppression pool. The valve in this line automatically opens to prevent pump damage due to overheating when other discharge line valves are closed. To ensure rapid delivery of water to the RPV and to minimize water hammer effects, the RCIC System discharge line "keep fill" system is designed to maintain the pump discharge line filled with water.

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES

The function of the RCIC System is to respond to transient events by providing makeup coolant to the reactor. The RCIC System is not an Engineered Safety Feature System and no credit is taken in the safety analyses for RCIC System operation. Based on its contribution to the reduction of overall plant risk, the system satisfies Criterion 4 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

The OPERABILITY of the RCIC System provides adequate core cooling such that actuation of any of the ECCS subsystems is not required in the event of RPV isolation accompanied by a loss of feedwater flow. The RCIC System has sufficient capacity to maintain RPV inventory during an isolation event.

Management of gas voids is important to RCIC System OPERABILITY.



APPLICABILITY

The RCIC System is required to be OPERABLE in MODE 1, and MODES 2 and 3 with reactor steam dome pressure > 150 psig since RCIC is the primary non-ECCS water source for core cooling when the reactor is isolated and pressurized. In MODES 2 and 3 with reactor steam dome pressure ≤ 150 psig, and in MODES 4 and 5, RCIC is not required to be OPERABLE since the ECCS injection/spray subsystems can provide sufficient flow to the vessel.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS
(continued) B.1 and B.2

If the RCIC System cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, or if the HPCS System is simultaneously inoperable, the plant must be brought to a condition in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and reactor steam dome pressure reduced to ≤ 150 psig within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS SR 3.5.3.1

Insert 4 

~~The flow path piping has the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained air. Maintaining the pump discharge line of the RCIC System full of water ensures that the system will perform properly, injecting its full capacity into the Reactor Coolant System upon demand. This will also prevent a water hammer following an initiation signal. One acceptable method of ensuring the line is full is to vent at the high points. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.~~

SR 3.5.3.2

Verifying the correct alignment for manual, power operated, and automatic valves (including the RCIC pump flow controller) in the RCIC flow path provides assurance that the proper flow path will exist for RCIC operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position since these were verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. A valve that receives an initiation signal is allowed to be in a nonaccident position provided the valve will automatically reposition in the proper stroke time. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of potentially being mispositioned are in the correct position. This SR does not apply to valves that cannot be

(continued)

Insert 4

SR 3.5.3.1

The RCIC System flow path piping and components have the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained gases. Preventing and managing gas intrusion and accumulation is necessary for proper operation of the RCIC System and may also prevent a water hammer, pump cavitation, and pumping of noncondensable gas.

Selection of RCIC System locations susceptible to gas accumulation is based on a self-assessment of the piping configuration to identify where gases may accumulate and remain even after the system is filled and vented, and to identify vulnerable potential degassing flow paths. The review is supplemented by verification that installed high-point vents are actually at the system high points, including field verification to ensure pipe shapes and construction tolerances have not inadvertently created additional high points. Susceptible locations depend on plant and system configuration, such as stand-by versus operating conditions.

The RCIC System is OPERABLE when it is sufficiently filled with water. Acceptance criteria are established for the volume of accumulated gas at susceptible locations. If accumulated gas is discovered that exceeds the acceptance criteria for the susceptible location (or the volume of accumulated gas at one or more susceptible locations exceeds an acceptance criteria for gas volume at the suction or discharge of a pump), the Surveillance is not met. If it is determined by subsequent evaluation that the RCIC Systems are not rendered inoperable by the accumulated gas (i.e., the system is sufficiently filled with water), the Surveillance may be declared met. Accumulated gas should be eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits.

RCIC System locations susceptible to gas accumulation are monitored and, if gas is found, the gas volume is compared to the acceptance criteria for the location. Susceptible locations in the same system flow path which are subject to the same gas intrusion mechanisms may be verified by monitoring a representative sub-set of susceptible locations. Monitoring may not be practical for locations that are inaccessible due to radiological or environmental conditions, the plant configuration, or personnel safety. For these locations alternative methods (e.g., operating parameters, remote monitoring) may be used to monitor the susceptible location. Monitoring is not required for susceptible locations where the maximum potential accumulated gas void volume has been evaluated and determined to not challenge system OPERABILITY. The accuracy of the method used for monitoring the susceptible locations and trending of the results should be sufficient to assure system OPERABILITY during the Surveillance interval.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. The Surveillance Frequency may vary by location susceptible to gas accumulation.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.5.3.2 (continued)

inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves. For the RCIC System, this SR also includes the steam flow path for the turbine and the flow controller position.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

SR 3.5.3.3 and SR 3.5.3.4

The Surveillance is modified by a Note which exempts system vent flow paths opened under administrative control. The administrative control should be proceduralized and include stationing a dedicated individual at the system vent flow path who is in continuous communication with the operators in the control room. This individual will have a method to rapidly close the system vent flow path if directed.

The RCIC pump flow rates ensure that the system can maintain reactor coolant inventory during pressurized conditions with the RPV isolated. The flow tests for the RCIC System are performed at two different pressure ranges such that system capability to provide rated flow against a test line pressure corresponding to reactor pressure is tested both at the higher and lower operating ranges of the system. The required system head should overcome the RPV pressure and associated discharge line losses. Adequate reactor steam pressure must be available to perform these tests. Additionally, adequate steam flow must be passing through the main turbine or turbine bypass valves to continue to control reactor pressure when the RCIC System diverts steam flow. Therefore, sufficient time is allowed after adequate pressure and flow are achieved to perform these SRs. Reactor steam pressure must be ≥ 920 psig to perform SR 3.5.3.3 and ≥ 135 psig to perform SR 3.5.3.4. Adequate steam flow is represented by at least one turbine bypass valve opened 50%. Reactor startup is allowed prior to performing the low pressure Surveillance because the reactor pressure is low and the time to satisfactorily perform the Surveillance is short. The reactor pressure is allowed to be increased to normal operating pressure since it is assumed that the low pressure test has been satisfactorily completed and there is no indication or reason to believe that RCIC is inoperable. Therefore, these SRs are modified by Notes that state the Surveillances are not required to be performed until 12 hours after the reactor steam pressure and flow are adequate to perform the test. The 12 hours allowed for the flow tests after the required pressure and flow are reached are sufficient to achieve stable conditions

(continued)

BASES

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES
(continued)


suppression pool temperature is calculated to remain below the design limit.

The RHR Suppression Pool Cooling System satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

During a DBA, a minimum of one RHR suppression pool cooling subsystem is required to maintain the primary containment peak pressure and temperature below the design limits (Ref. 1). To ensure that these requirements are met, two RHR suppression pool cooling subsystems must be OPERABLE. Therefore, in the event of an accident, at least one subsystem is OPERABLE, assuming the worst case single active failure. An RHR suppression pool cooling subsystem is OPERABLE when the pump, a heat exchanger, and associated piping, valves, instrumentation, and controls are OPERABLE.

Management of gas voids is important to RHR Suppression Pool Cooling System OPERABILITY.



APPLICABILITY

In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a DBA could cause both a release of radioactive material to primary containment and a heatup and pressurization of primary containment. In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, the RHR Suppression Pool Cooling System is not required to be OPERABLE in MODE 4 or 5.

ACTIONS

A.1

With one RHR suppression pool cooling subsystem inoperable, the inoperable subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. In this condition, the remaining RHR suppression pool cooling subsystem is adequate to perform the primary containment cooling function. However, the overall reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE subsystem could result in reduced primary containment cooling capability. The 7 day Completion Time is acceptable in light of the redundant RHR suppression pool cooling capabilities afforded by the OPERABLE subsystem and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

B.1

If one RHR suppression pool cooling subsystem is inoperable and is not restored to OPERABLE status within the required

(continued)

BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.2.3.1

Verifying the correct alignment for manual and power operated valves in the RHR suppression pool cooling mode flow path provides assurance that the proper flow path exists for system operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position since these valves were verified to be in the correct position prior to being locked, sealed, or secured. A valve is also allowed to be in the nonaccident position, provided it can be aligned to the accident position within the time assumed in the accident analysis. This is acceptable, since the RHR suppression pool cooling mode is manually initiated. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position. This SR does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

SR 3.6.2.3.2

Verifying each required RHR pump develops a flow rate ≥ 7200 gpm, while operating in the suppression pool cooling mode with flow through the associated heat exchanger, ensures that peak suppression pool temperature can be maintained below the design limits during a DBA (Ref. 1). The flow verification is also a normal test of centrifugal pump performance required by ASME OM Code (Ref. 2). This test confirms one point on the pump design curve, and the results are indicative of overall performance. Such inservice tests confirm component OPERABILITY and detect incipient failures by indicating abnormal performance. The Frequency of this SR is in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program.

Insert 5 

(continued)

Insert 5

SR 3.6.2.3.3

RHR Suppression Pool Cooling System piping and components have the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained gases. Preventing and managing gas intrusion and accumulation is necessary for proper operation of the RHR suppression pool cooling subsystems and may also prevent water hammer and pump cavitation.

Selection of RHR Suppression Pool Cooling System locations susceptible to gas accumulation is based on a review of system design information, including piping and instrumentation drawings, isometric drawings, plan and elevation drawings, and calculations. The design review is supplemented by system walk downs to validate the system high points and to confirm the location and orientation of important components that can become sources of gas or could otherwise cause gas to be trapped or difficult to remove during system maintenance or restoration. Susceptible locations depend on plant and system configuration, such as stand-by versus operating conditions.

The RHR Suppression Pool Cooling System is OPERABLE when it is sufficiently filled with water. Acceptance criteria are established for the volume of accumulated gas at susceptible locations. If accumulated gas is discovered that exceeds the acceptance criteria for the susceptible location (or the volume of accumulated gas at one or more susceptible locations exceeds an acceptance criteria for gas volume at the suction or discharge of a pump), the Surveillance is not met. If it is determined by subsequent evaluation that the RHR Suppression Pool Cooling System is not rendered inoperable by the accumulated gas (i.e., the system is sufficiently filled with water), the Surveillance may be declared met. Accumulated gas should be eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits.

RHR Suppression Pool Cooling System locations susceptible to gas accumulation are monitored and, if gas is found, the gas volume is compared to the acceptance criteria for the location. Susceptible locations in the same system flow path which are subject to the same gas intrusion mechanisms may be verified by monitoring a representative subset of susceptible locations. Monitoring may not be practical for locations that are inaccessible due to radiological or environmental conditions, the plant configuration, or personnel safety. For these locations alternative methods (e.g., operating parameters, remote monitoring) may be used to monitor the susceptible location. Monitoring is not required for susceptible locations where the maximum potential accumulated gas void volume has been evaluated and determined to not challenge system OPERABILITY. The accuracy of the method used for monitoring the susceptible locations and trending of the results should be sufficient to assure system OPERABILITY during the Surveillance interval.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. The Surveillance Frequency may vary by location susceptible to gas accumulation.

BASES

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES
(continued)

capacity of the RHR Suppression Pool Spray System is adequate to maintain the primary containment conditions within design limits. The time history for primary containment pressure is calculated to demonstrate that the maximum pressure remains below the design limit.

The RHR Suppression Pool Spray System satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

In the event of a DBA, a minimum of one RHR suppression pool spray subsystem is required to mitigate potential bypass leakage paths and maintain the primary containment peak pressure below the design limits (Ref. 1). To ensure that these requirements are met, two RHR suppression pool spray subsystems must be OPERABLE. Therefore, in the event of an accident, at least one subsystem is OPERABLE assuming the worst case single active failure. An RHR suppression pool spray subsystem is OPERABLE when one of the pumps and associated piping, valves, instrumentation, and controls are OPERABLE.

Management of gas voids is important to RHR Suppression Pool Spray System OPERABILITY.

APPLICABILITY

In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a DBA could cause pressurization of primary containment. In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining RHR suppression pool spray subsystems OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 or 5.

ACTIONS

A.1

With one RHR suppression pool spray subsystem inoperable, the inoperable subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. In this condition, the remaining OPERABLE RHR suppression pool spray subsystem is adequate to perform the primary containment bypass leakage mitigation function.

However, the overall reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE subsystem could result in reduced primary containment bypass mitigation capability. The 7 day Completion Time was chosen in light of the redundant RHR suppression pool spray capabilities afforded by the OPERABLE subsystem and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.2.4.1 (continued)

correct position. This SR does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

SR 3.6.2.4.2

Verifying each required RHR pump develops a flow rate ≥ 450 gpm through the spray sparger while operating in the suppression pool spray mode helps ensure that the primary containment pressure can be maintained below the design limits during a DBA (Ref. 1). The normal test of centrifugal pump performance required by the ASME OM Code (Ref. 2) is covered by the requirements of LCO 3.6.2.3, "RHR Suppression Pool Cooling." The Frequency of this SR is in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program.

Insert 6



REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 6.2.1.1.3.
 2. ASME Code for Operation and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants (OM Code).
 3. NEDC-32998-A, Revision 2, "Technical Justification to Support Risk-Informed Modification to Selected Required End States for BWR Plants," December 2002.
-
-

Insert 6

SR 3.6.2.4.3

RHR Suppression Pool Spray System piping and components have the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained gases. Preventing and managing gas intrusion and accumulation is necessary for proper operation of the RHR suppression pool spray subsystems and may also prevent water hammer and pump cavitation.

Selection of RHR Suppression Pool Spray System locations susceptible to gas accumulation is based on a review of system design information, including piping and instrumentation drawings, isometric drawings, plan and elevation drawings, and calculations. The design review is supplemented by system walk downs to validate the system high points and to confirm the location and orientation of important components that can become sources of gas or could otherwise cause gas to be trapped or difficult to remove during system maintenance or restoration. Susceptible locations depend on plant and system configuration, such as stand-by versus operating conditions.

The RHR Suppression Pool Spray System is OPERABLE when it is sufficiently filled with water. Acceptance criteria are established for the volume of accumulated gas at susceptible locations. If accumulated gas is discovered that exceeds the acceptance criteria for the susceptible location (or the volume of accumulated gas at one or more susceptible locations exceeds an acceptance criteria for gas volume at the suction or discharge of a pump), the Surveillance is not met. If it is determined by subsequent evaluation that the RHR Suppression Pool Spray System is not rendered inoperable by the accumulated gas (i.e., the system is sufficiently filled with water), the Surveillance may be declared met. Accumulated gas should be eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits.

RHR Suppression Pool Spray System locations susceptible to gas accumulation are monitored and, if gas is found, the gas volume is compared to the acceptance criteria for the location. Susceptible locations in the same system flow path which are subject to the same gas intrusion mechanisms may be verified by monitoring a representative subset of susceptible locations. Monitoring may not be practical for locations that are inaccessible due to radiological or environmental conditions, the plant configuration, or personnel safety. For these locations alternative methods (e.g., operating parameters, remote monitoring) may be used to monitor the susceptible location. Monitoring is not required for susceptible locations where the maximum potential accumulated gas void volume has been evaluated and determined to not challenge system OPERABILITY. The accuracy of the method used for monitoring the susceptible locations and trending of the results should be sufficient to assure system OPERABILITY during the Surveillance interval.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. The Surveillance Frequency may vary by location susceptible to gas accumulation.

BASES

LCO
(continued) cooling to the RHR heat exchanger, valves, piping, instruments, and controls to ensure an OPERABLE flow path.

Management of gas voids is important to RHR Shutdown Cooling System OPERABILITY.

Additionally, each RHR shutdown cooling subsystem is considered OPERABLE if it can be manually aligned (remote or local) in the shutdown cooling mode for removal of decay heat. Operation (either continuous or intermittent) of one subsystem can maintain and reduce the reactor coolant temperature as required. However, to ensure adequate core flow to allow for accurate average reactor coolant temperature monitoring, nearly continuous operation is required. A Note is provided to allow a 2 hour exception for the operating subsystem to not be in operation every 8 hours. This is permitted because the core heat generation can be low enough and the heatup rate slow enough to allow some changes to the RHR subsystem or other operations requiring RHR flow interruption.

APPLICABILITY One RHR shutdown cooling subsystem must be OPERABLE and in operation in MODE 5, with irradiated fuel in the RPV and with the water level ≥ 22 ft above the top of the RPV flange, to provide decay heat removal. RHR shutdown cooling subsystem requirements in other MODES are covered by LCOs in Section 3.4, Reactor Coolant System (RCS). RHR shutdown cooling subsystem requirements in MODE 5, with irradiated fuel in the RPV and with the water level < 22 ft above the RPV flange, are given in LCO 3.9.9, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR)—Low Water Level."

ACTIONS A.1

With no RHR shutdown cooling subsystem OPERABLE, an alternate method of decay heat removal must be provided within 1 hour. In this condition, the volume of water above the RPV flange provides adequate capability to remove decay heat from the reactor core. However, the overall reliability is reduced because loss of water level could result in reduced decay heat removal capability. The 1 hour Completion Time is based on the decay heat removal function and the probability of a loss of the available decay heat removal capabilities. Furthermore, verification of the

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

B.1, B.2, B.3, and B.4 (continued)

This may be performed as an administrative check, by examining logs or other information to determine whether the components are out of service for maintenance or other reasons. It is not necessary to perform the Surveillances needed to demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the components. If, however, any required component is inoperable, then it must be restored to OPERABLE status. In this case, a surveillance may need to be performed to restore the component to OPERABLE status. Actions must continue until all required components are OPERABLE.

C.1 and C.2

If no RHR shutdown cooling subsystem is in operation, an alternate method of coolant circulation is required to be established within 1 hour. The Completion Time is modified such that 1 hour is applicable separately for each occurrence involving a loss of coolant circulation.

During the period when the reactor coolant is being circulated by an alternate method (other than by the required RHR shutdown cooling subsystem), the reactor coolant temperature must be periodically monitored to ensure proper functioning of the alternate method. The once per hour Completion Time is deemed appropriate.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.9.8.1

This Surveillance demonstrates that the required RHR shutdown cooling subsystem is in operation and circulating reactor coolant in accordance with normal procedural requirements. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

Insert 7 

REFERENCES

1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 34.
-

Insert 7

SR 3.9.8.2

RHR Shutdown Cooling System piping and components have the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained gases. Preventing and managing gas intrusion and accumulation is necessary for proper operation of the required RHR shutdown cooling subsystem(s) and may also prevent water hammer, pump cavitation, and pumping of noncondensable gas into the reactor vessel.

Selection of RHR Shutdown Cooling System locations susceptible to gas accumulation is based on a review of system design information, including piping and instrumentation drawings, isometric drawings, plan and elevation drawings, and calculations. The design review is supplemented by system walk downs to validate the system high points and to confirm the location and orientation of important components that can become sources of gas or could otherwise cause gas to be trapped or difficult to remove during system maintenance or restoration. Susceptible locations depend on plant and system configuration, such as stand-by versus operating conditions.

The RHR Shutdown Cooling System is OPERABLE when it is sufficiently filled with water. Acceptance criteria are established for the volume of accumulated gas at susceptible locations. If accumulated gas is discovered that exceeds the acceptance criteria for the susceptible location (or the volume of accumulated gas at one or more susceptible locations exceeds an acceptance criteria for gas volume at the suction or discharge of a pump), the Surveillance is not met. If it is determined by subsequent evaluation that the RHR Shutdown Cooling System is not rendered inoperable by the accumulated gas (i.e., the system is sufficiently filled with water), the Surveillance may be declared met. Accumulated gas should be eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits.

RHR Shutdown Cooling System locations susceptible to gas accumulation are monitored and, if gas is found, the gas volume is compared to the acceptance criteria for the location. Susceptible locations in the same system flow path which are subject to the same gas intrusion mechanisms may be verified by monitoring a representative subset of susceptible locations. Monitoring may not be practical for locations that are inaccessible due to radiological or environmental conditions, the plant configuration, or personnel safety. For these locations alternative methods (e.g., operating parameters, remote monitoring) may be used to monitor the susceptible location. Monitoring is not required for susceptible locations where the maximum potential accumulated gas void volume has been evaluated and determined to not challenge system OPERABILITY. The accuracy of the method used for monitoring the susceptible locations and trending of the results should be sufficient to assure system OPERABILITY during the Surveillance interval.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. The Surveillance Frequency may vary by location susceptible to gas accumulation.

B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

B 3.9.9 Residual Heat Removal (RHR)—Low Water Level

BASES

BACKGROUND The purpose of the RHR System in MODE 5 is to remove decay heat and sensible heat from the reactor coolant, as required by GDC 34 (Ref. 1). Each of the two shutdown cooling loops of the RHR System can provide the required decay heat removal. Each loop consists of one motor driven pump, a heat exchanger, and associated piping and valves. Both loops have a common suction from the same recirculation loop. Each pump discharges the reactor coolant, after it has been cooled by circulation through the respective heat exchangers, to the reactor via the associated recirculation loop. The RHR heat exchangers transfer heat to the RHR Service Water (RHRSW) System. The RHR shutdown cooling mode is manually controlled.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES With the unit in MODE 5, the RHR shutdown cooling subsystems are not required to mitigate any events or accidents evaluated in the safety analyses. The RHR shutdown cooling subsystems are required for removing decay heat to maintain the temperature of the reactor coolant.

The RHR System satisfies Criterion 4 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO In MODE 5 with irradiated fuel in the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) and with the water level < 22 ft above the RPV flange both RHR shutdown cooling subsystems must be OPERABLE and one RHR shutdown cooling subsystem must be in operation.

Management of gas voids is important to RHR Shutdown Cooling System OPERABILITY.



An OPERABLE RHR shutdown cooling subsystem consists of an RHR pump, a heat exchanger, the necessary portions of the RHRSW System and Ultimate Heat Sink capable of providing cooling to the RHR heat exchanger, valves, piping, instruments, and controls to ensure an OPERABLE flow path.

Additionally, each RHR shutdown cooling subsystem is considered OPERABLE if it can be manually aligned (remote or local) in the shutdown cooling mode for removal of decay

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS B.1, B.2, and B.3 (continued)

In this way, the penetration can be rapidly isolated when a need for secondary containment isolation is indicated). This may be performed as an administrative check, by examining logs or other information to determine whether the components are out of service for maintenance or other reasons. It is not necessary to perform the Surveillances needed to demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the components. If, however, any required component is inoperable, then it must be restored to OPERABLE status. In this case, a surveillance may need to be performed to restore the component to OPERABLE status. Actions must continue until all required components are OPERABLE.

C.1 and C.2

If no RHR shutdown cooling subsystem is in operation, an alternate method of coolant circulation is required to be established within 1 hour. The Completion Time is modified such that the 1 hour is applicable separately for each occurrence involving a loss of coolant circulation.

During the period when the reactor coolant is being circulated by an alternate method (other than by the required RHR shutdown cooling subsystem), the reactor coolant temperature must be periodically monitored to ensure proper function of the alternate method. The once per hour Completion Time is deemed appropriate.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.9.9.1

This Surveillance demonstrates that one RHR shutdown cooling subsystem is in operation and circulating reactor coolant in accordance with normal procedural requirements. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

Insert 8 

REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 34.

Insert 8

SR 3.9.9.2

RHR Shutdown Cooling System piping and components have the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained gases. Preventing and managing gas intrusion and accumulation is necessary for proper operation of the RHR shutdown cooling subsystems and may also prevent water hammer, pump cavitation, and pumping of noncondensable gas into the reactor vessel.

Selection of RHR Shutdown Cooling System locations susceptible to gas accumulation is based on a review of system design information, including piping and instrumentation drawings, isometric drawings, plan and elevation drawings, and calculations. The design review is supplemented by system walk downs to validate the system high points and to confirm the location and orientation of important components that can become sources of gas or could otherwise cause gas to be trapped or difficult to remove during system maintenance or restoration. Susceptible locations depend on plant and system configuration, such as stand-by versus operating conditions.

The RHR Shutdown Cooling System is OPERABLE when it is sufficiently filled with water. Acceptance criteria are established for the volume of accumulated gas at susceptible locations. If accumulated gas is discovered that exceeds the acceptance criteria for the susceptible location (or the volume of accumulated gas at one or more susceptible locations exceeds an acceptance criteria for gas volume at the suction or discharge of a pump), the Surveillance is not met. If it is determined by subsequent evaluation that the RHR Shutdown Cooling System is not rendered inoperable by the accumulated gas (i.e., the system is sufficiently filled with water), the Surveillance may be declared met. Accumulated gas should be eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits.

RHR Shutdown Cooling System locations susceptible to gas accumulation are monitored and, if gas is found, the gas volume is compared to the acceptance criteria for the location. Susceptible locations in the same system flow path which are subject to the same gas intrusion mechanisms may be verified by monitoring a representative subset of susceptible locations. Monitoring may not be practical for locations that are inaccessible due to radiological or environmental conditions, the plant configuration, or personnel safety. For these locations alternative methods (e.g., operating parameters, remote monitoring) may be used to monitor the susceptible location. Monitoring is not required for susceptible locations where the maximum potential accumulated gas void volume has been evaluated and determined to not challenge system OPERABILITY. The accuracy of the method used for monitoring the susceptible locations and trending of the results should be sufficient to assure system OPERABILITY during the Surveillance interval.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. The Surveillance Frequency may vary by location susceptible to gas accumulation.

BASES

LCO
(continued)

loop or one RHR pump (and one RHR service water pump) in each of the two loops must be OPERABLE. Since the piping and heat exchangers are passive components that are assumed not to fail, they are allowed to be common to both subsystems. Each shutdown cooling subsystem is considered OPERABLE if it can be manually aligned (remote or local) in the shutdown cooling mode for removal of decay heat. In MODE 3, one RHR shutdown cooling subsystem can provide the required cooling, but two subsystems are required to be OPERABLE to provide redundancy.

Management of gas voids is important to RHR Shutdown Cooling System OPERABILITY.

A Note allows one RHR shutdown cooling subsystem to be inoperable for up to 2 hours for the performance of Surveillance tests. These tests may be on the affected RHR shutdown cooling subsystem or on some other plant system or component that necessitates placing the RHR System in an inoperable status during the performance. This is permitted because the core heat generation can be low enough and the heatup rate slow enough to allow some changes to the RHR shutdown cooling subsystems or other operations requiring RHR flow interruption and loss of redundancy.

APPLICABILITY

In MODE 3 with reactor steam dome pressure below the RHR cut-in permissive pressure (i.e., the actual pressure at which the interlock resets) the RHR Shutdown Cooling System must be OPERABLE to ensure it can be operated in the shutdown cooling mode to remove decay heat to reduce or maintain coolant temperature.

In MODES 1 and 2, and in MODE 3 with reactor steam dome pressure greater than or equal to the RHR cut-in permissive pressure, this LCO is not applicable. Operation of the RHR System in the shutdown cooling mode is not allowed above this pressure because the RCS pressure may exceed the design pressure of the shutdown cooling piping. Decay heat removal at reactor pressures greater than or equal to the RHR cut-in permissive pressure is typically accomplished by condensing the steam in the main condenser. Additionally, in MODE 2 below this pressure, the OPERABILITY requirements for the Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) (LCO 3.5.1, "ECCS—Operating") do not allow placing the RHR shutdown cooling subsystem into operation.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.4.7.1

Verifying the correct alignment for manual and power operated valves in the two RHR shutdown cooling subsystems' flow paths provides assurance that the proper flow paths will exist for RHR operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position since these were verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. A valve that can be manually (from the control room or locally) aligned is allowed to be in a non-RHR shutdown cooling position provided the valve can be repositioned. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of potentially being mispositioned are in the correct position. This SR does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

This Surveillance is modified by a Note allowing sufficient time to align the RHR System for shutdown cooling operation after clearing the pressure interlock that isolates the system, or for placing a recirculation pump in operation. The Note takes exception to the requirements of the Surveillance being met (i.e., verification that valves are aligned or can be aligned is not required for this initial 2 hour period), which also allows entry into the Applicability of this Specification in accordance with SR 3.0.4 since the Surveillance will not be "not met" at the time of entry into the Applicability.

Insert 1 

REFERENCES

None.

Insert 1

SR 3.4.7.2

RHR Shutdown Cooling System piping and components have the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained gases. Preventing and managing gas intrusion and accumulation is necessary for proper operation of the RHR shutdown cooling subsystems and may also prevent water hammer, pump cavitation, and pumping of noncondensable gas into the reactor vessel.

Selection of RHR Shutdown Cooling System locations susceptible to gas accumulation is based on a review of system design information, including piping and instrumentation drawings, isometric drawings, plan and elevation drawings, and calculations. The design review is supplemented by system walk downs to validate the system high points and to confirm the location and orientation of important components that can become sources of gas or could otherwise cause gas to be trapped or difficult to remove during system maintenance or restoration. Susceptible locations depend on plant and system configuration, such as stand-by versus operating conditions.

The RHR Shutdown Cooling System is OPERABLE when it is sufficiently filled with water. Acceptance criteria are established for the volume of accumulated gas at susceptible locations. If accumulated gas is discovered that exceeds the acceptance criteria for the susceptible location (or the volume of accumulated gas at one or more susceptible locations exceeds an acceptance criteria for gas volume at the suction or discharge of a pump), the Surveillance is not met. If it is determined by subsequent evaluation that the RHR Shutdown Cooling System is not rendered inoperable by the accumulated gas (i.e., the system is sufficiently filled with water), the Surveillance may be declared met. Accumulated gas should be eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits.

RHR Shutdown Cooling System locations susceptible to gas accumulation are monitored and, if gas is found, the gas volume is compared to the acceptance criteria for the location. Susceptible locations in the same system flow path which are subject to the same gas intrusion mechanisms may be verified by monitoring a representative subset of susceptible locations. Monitoring may not be practical for locations that are inaccessible due to radiological or environmental conditions, the plant configuration, or personnel safety. For these locations alternative methods (e.g., operating parameters, remote monitoring) may be used to monitor the susceptible location. Monitoring is not required for susceptible locations where the maximum potential accumulated gas void volume has been evaluated and determined to not challenge system OPERABILITY. The accuracy of the method used for monitoring the susceptible locations and trending of the results should be sufficient to assure system OPERABILITY during the Surveillance interval.

This SR is modified by a Note that states the SR is not required to be performed until 12 hours after reactor steam dome pressure is less than the RHR cut in permissive pressure. In a rapid shutdown, there may be insufficient time to verify all susceptible locations prior to entering the Applicability.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. The Surveillance Frequency may vary by location susceptible to gas accumulation.

BASES

LCO
(continued)

each of the two loops must be OPERABLE. Since the piping and heat exchangers are passive components that are assumed not to fail, they are allowed to be common to both subsystems. Each shutdown cooling subsystem is considered OPERABLE if it can be manually aligned (remote or local) in the shutdown cooling mode for removal of decay heat. In MODE 4, one RHR shutdown cooling subsystem can provide the required cooling, but two subsystems are required to be OPERABLE to provide redundancy.

Management of gas voids is important to RHR Shutdown Cooling System OPERABILITY.

Note 1 allows both RHR shutdown cooling subsystems to be inoperable during hydrostatic testing. This is necessary since the RHR Shutdown Cooling System is not designed to operate at the Reactor Coolant System pressures achieved during hydrostatic testing. This is acceptable since adequate reactor coolant circulation will be achieved by operation of a reactor recirculation pump and since systems are available to control reactor coolant temperature. Note 2 allows one RHR shutdown cooling subsystem to be inoperable for up to 2 hours for the performance of Surveillance tests. These tests may be on the affected RHR System or on some other plant system or component that necessitates placing the RHR shutdown cooling subsystem in an inoperable status during the performance. This is permitted because the core heat generation can be low enough and the heatup rate slow enough to allow some changes to the RHR shutdown cooling subsystems or other operations requiring RHR flow interruption and loss of redundancy.

APPLICABILITY

In MODE 4, the RHR Shutdown Cooling System must be OPERABLE to ensure it can be operated in the shutdown cooling mode to remove decay heat to maintain coolant temperature below 212°F.

In MODES 1 and 2, and in MODE 3 with reactor steam dome pressure greater than or equal to the RHR cut-in permissive pressure, this LCO is not applicable. Operation of the RHR System in the shutdown cooling mode is not allowed above this pressure because the RCS pressure may exceed the design pressure of the shutdown cooling piping. Decay heat removal at reactor pressures greater than or equal to the RHR cut-in permissive pressure is typically accomplished by condensing the steam in the main condenser. Additionally, in MODE 2

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

A.2 and A.3 (continued)

Required Actions A.2 and A.3 are modified by Notes that clarify that these Required Actions are only applicable when both RHR shutdown cooling subsystems are inoperable since Condition A is applicable when one or two RHR shutdown cooling subsystems are inoperable.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.4.8.1

Verifying the correct alignment for manual and power operated valves in the two RHR shutdown cooling subsystems' flow paths provides assurance that the proper flow paths will exist for RHR operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position since these were verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. A valve that can be manually (remote or local) aligned is allowed to be in a non-RHR shutdown cooling position provided the valve can be repositioned. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of potentially being mispositioned are in the correct position. This SR does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

Insert 2 

REFERENCES

None.

Insert 2

SR 3.4.8.2

RHR Shutdown Cooling System piping and components have the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained gases. Preventing and managing gas intrusion and accumulation is necessary for proper operation of the RHR shutdown cooling subsystems and may also prevent water hammer, pump cavitation, and pumping of noncondensable gas into the reactor vessel.

Selection of RHR Shutdown Cooling System locations susceptible to gas accumulation is based on a review of system design information, including piping and instrumentation drawings, isometric drawings, plan and elevation drawings, and calculations. The design review is supplemented by system walk downs to validate the system high points and to confirm the location and orientation of important components that can become sources of gas or could otherwise cause gas to be trapped or difficult to remove during system maintenance or restoration. Susceptible locations depend on plant and system configuration, such as stand-by versus operating conditions.

The RHR Shutdown Cooling System is OPERABLE when it is sufficiently filled with water. Acceptance criteria are established for the volume of accumulated gas at susceptible locations. If accumulated gas is discovered that exceeds the acceptance criteria for the susceptible location (or the volume of accumulated gas at one or more susceptible locations exceeds an acceptance criteria for gas volume at the suction or discharge of a pump), the Surveillance is not met. If it is determined by subsequent evaluation that the RHR Shutdown Cooling System is not rendered inoperable by the accumulated gas (i.e., the system is sufficiently filled with water), the Surveillance may be declared met. Accumulated gas should be eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits.

RHR Shutdown Cooling System locations susceptible to gas accumulation are monitored and, if gas is found, the gas volume is compared to the acceptance criteria for the location. Susceptible locations in the same system flow path which are subject to the same gas intrusion mechanisms may be verified by monitoring a representative subset of susceptible locations. Monitoring may not be practical for locations that are inaccessible due to radiological or environmental conditions, the plant configuration, or personnel safety. For these locations alternative methods (e.g., operating parameters, remote monitoring) may be used to monitor the susceptible location. Monitoring is not required for susceptible locations where the maximum potential accumulated gas void volume has been evaluated and determined to not challenge system OPERABILITY. The accuracy of the method used for monitoring the susceptible locations and trending of the results should be sufficient to assure system OPERABILITY during the Surveillance interval.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. The Surveillance Frequency may vary by location susceptible to gas accumulation.

BASES

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES
(continued)

- b. Maximum cladding oxidation is ≤ 0.17 times the total cladding thickness before oxidation;
- c. Maximum hydrogen generation from a zirconium water reaction is ≤ 0.01 times the hypothetical amount that would be generated if all of the metal in the cladding surrounding the fuel, excluding the cladding surrounding the plenum volume, were to react;
- d. The core is maintained in a coolable geometry; and
- e. Adequate long term cooling capability is maintained.

The limiting single failures are discussed in Reference 8. |
The ECCS satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

Each ECCS injection/spray subsystem and five ADS valves are required to be OPERABLE. The ECCS injection/spray subsystems are defined as the two CS subsystems, the two LPCI subsystems, and one HPCI System. The low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystems are defined as the two CS subsystems and the two LPCI subsystems.

Management of gas voids is important to ECCS injection/spray subsystem OPERABILITY.

With less than the required number of ECCS subsystems OPERABLE, the potential exists that during a limiting design basis LOCA concurrent with the worst case single failure,

(continued)

BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

~~SR 3.5.1.1~~

Insert 3

~~The flow path piping has the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained air. Maintaining the pump discharge lines of the HPCI System, CS System, and LPCI subsystems full of water ensures that the ECCS will perform properly, injecting its full capacity into the RCS upon demand. This will also prevent a water hammer following an ECCS initiation signal. One acceptable method of ensuring that the lines are full is to vent at the high points. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.~~

SR 3.5.1.2

Verifying the correct alignment for manual, power operated, and automatic valves in the ECCS flow paths provides assurance that the proper flow paths will exist for ECCS operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position since these were verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. A valve that receives an initiation signal is allowed to be in a nonaccident position provided the valve will automatically reposition in the proper stroke time. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of potentially being mispositioned are in the correct position. This SR does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves. For the HPCI System, this SR also includes the steam flow path for the turbine and the flow controller position.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

In MODE 3 with reactor steam dome pressure less than the actual RHR cut-in permissive pressure, the RHR System may be required to operate in the shutdown cooling mode to remove

(continued)

Insert 3

SR 3.5.1.1

The ECCS injection/spray subsystem flow path piping and components have the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained gases. Preventing and managing gas intrusion and accumulation is necessary for proper operation of the ECCS injection/spray subsystems and may also prevent a water hammer, pump cavitation, and pumping of noncondensable gas into the reactor vessel.

Selection of ECCS injection/spray subsystem locations susceptible to gas accumulation is based on a review of system design information, including piping and instrumentation drawings, isometric drawings, plan and elevation drawings, and calculations. The design review is supplemented by system walk downs to validate the system high points and to confirm the location and orientation of important components that can become sources of gas or could otherwise cause gas to be trapped or difficult to remove during system maintenance or restoration. Susceptible locations depend on plant and system configuration, such as stand-by versus operating conditions.

The ECCS injection/spray subsystem is OPERABLE when it is sufficiently filled with water. Acceptance criteria are established for the volume of accumulated gas at susceptible locations. If accumulated gas is discovered that exceeds the acceptance criteria for the susceptible location (or the volume of accumulated gas at one or more susceptible locations exceeds an acceptance criteria for gas volume at the suction or discharge of a pump), the Surveillance is not met. If it is determined by subsequent evaluation that the ECCS injection/spray subsystems are not rendered inoperable by the accumulated gas (i.e., the system is sufficiently filled with water), the Surveillance may be declared met. Accumulated gas should be eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits.

ECCS injection/spray subsystem locations susceptible to gas accumulation are monitored and, if gas is found, the gas volume is compared to the acceptance criteria for the location. Susceptible locations in the same system flow path which are subject to the same gas intrusion mechanisms may be verified by monitoring a representative subset of susceptible locations. Monitoring may not be practical for locations that are inaccessible due to radiological or environmental conditions, the plant configuration, or personnel safety. For these locations alternative methods (e.g., operating parameters, remote monitoring) may be used to monitor the susceptible location. Monitoring is not required for susceptible locations where the maximum potential accumulated gas void volume has been evaluated and determined to not challenge system OPERABILITY. The accuracy of the method used for monitoring the susceptible locations and trending of the results should be sufficient to assure system OPERABILITY during the Surveillance interval.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. The Surveillance Frequency may vary by location susceptible to gas accumulation.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.5.1.2 (continued)

Note 1

decay heat and sensible heat from the reactor. Therefore, this SR is modified by a Note that allows LPCI subsystems to be considered OPERABLE during alignment and operation for decay heat removal, if capable of being manually realigned (remote or local) to the LPCI mode and not otherwise inoperable. Alignment and operation for decay heat removal includes: a) when the system is being realigned to or from the RHR shutdown cooling mode and; b) when the system is in the RHR shutdown cooling mode, whether or not the RHR pump is operating. At the low pressures and decay heat loads associated with operation in MODE 3 with reactor steam dome pressure less than the RHR cut-in permissive pressure, a reduced complement of low pressure ECCS subsystems should provide the required core cooling, thereby allowing operation of RHR shutdown cooling, when necessary.

Note 2 exempts system vent flow paths opened under administrative control. The administrative control should be proceduralized and include stationing a dedicated individual at the system vent flow path who is in continuous communication with the operators in the control room. This individual will have a method to rapidly close the system vent flow path if directed.

SR 3.5.1.3

Verification of the correct breaker alignment to the LPCI swing bus demonstrates that the AC electrical power is available to ensure proper operation of the associated LPCI injection valves and the recirculation pump discharge valves. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

SR 3.5.1.4

Cycling the recirculation pump discharge valves through one complete cycle of full travel demonstrates that the valves are mechanically OPERABLE and will close when required. Upon initiation of an automatic LPCI subsystem injection signal, these valves are required to be closed to ensure full LPCI subsystem flow injection in the reactor via the recirculation jet pumps. De-energizing the valve in the closed position will also ensure the proper flow path for the LPCI subsystem. Acceptable methods of de-energizing the valve include de-energizing breaker control power, racking out the breaker or removing the breaker.

(continued)

B 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION
COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM

B 3.5.2 ECCS—Shutdown

BASES

BACKGROUND A description of the Core Spray (CS) System and the low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) mode of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.5.1, "ECCS—Operating."

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES The ECCS performance is evaluated for the entire spectrum of break sizes for a postulated loss of coolant accident (LOCA). The long term cooling analysis following a design basis LOCA (Ref. 1) demonstrates that only one low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem is required, post LOCA, to maintain adequate reactor vessel water level in the event of an inadvertent vessel draindown. It is reasonable to assume, based on engineering judgement, that while in MODES 4 and 5, one low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem can maintain adequate reactor vessel water level. To provide redundancy, a minimum of two low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystems are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5.

The low pressure ECCS subsystems satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO Two low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystems are required to be OPERABLE. The low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystems consist of two CS subsystems and two LPCI subsystems. Each CS subsystem consists of one motor driven pump, piping, and valves to transfer water from the suppression pool or contaminated condensate storage tank(s) (CCST) to the reactor pressure vessel (RPV). Each LPCI subsystem consists of one motor driven pump, piping, and valves to transfer water from the suppression pool or the CCST(s) to the RPV. A single LPCI pump is required per subsystem because of similar injection capacity in relation to a CS subsystem. In addition, In MODES 4 and 5, the RHR System cross-tie valves are not required to be open.

Management of gas voids is important to ECCS injection/spray subsystem OPERABILITY.

One LPCI subsystem may be considered OPERABLE during alignment and operation for decay heat removal, if capable

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.5.2.3 (continued)

involves verification that those valves capable of potentially being mispositioned are in the correct position. This SR does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

Note 1

In MODES 4 and 5, the RHR System may be required to operate in the shutdown cooling mode to remove decay heat and sensible heat from the reactor. Therefore, this SR is modified by a Note that allows one LPCI subsystem to be considered OPERABLE during alignment and operation for decay heat removal, if capable of being manually realigned (remote or local) to the LPCI mode and not otherwise inoperable. Alignment and operation for decay heat removal includes: a) when the system is being realigned to or from the RHR shutdown cooling mode and; b) when the system is in the RHR shutdown cooling mode, whether or not the RHR pump is operating. Because of the low pressure and low temperature conditions in MODES 4 and 5, sufficient time will be available to manually align and initiate LPCI subsystem operation to provide core cooling prior to postulated fuel uncover. This will ensure adequate core cooling if an inadvertent RPV draindown should occur.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 6.3.3.1.2.1.
-
-

Note 2 exempts system vent flow paths opened under administrative control. The administrative control should be proceduralized and include stationing a dedicated individual at the system vent flow path who is in continuous communication with the operators in the control room. This individual will have a method to rapidly close the system vent flow path if directed.

BASES

BACKGROUND
(continued)

The RCIC pump is provided with a minimum flow bypass line, which discharges to the suppression pool. The valve in this line automatically opens on an initiation signal combined with low flow to prevent pump damage due to overheating when other discharge line valves are closed. To ensure rapid delivery of water to the RPV and to minimize water hammer effects, the RCIC System discharge piping is kept full of water. The RCIC System is normally aligned to the CCST. The height of water (≥ 12 ft) in the CCST is sufficient to maintain the piping full of water up to the first isolation valve in the discharge piping. The relative height of the feedwater line connection for RCIC is such that the water in the feedwater lines keeps the remaining portion of the RCIC discharge line full of water. Therefore, RCIC does not require a "keep fill" system.


APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES

The function of the RCIC System is to respond to transient events by providing makeup coolant to the reactor. The RCIC System is not an Engineered Safety Feature System and no credit is taken in the safety analyses for RCIC System operation. Based on its contribution to the reduction of overall plant risk, the system satisfies Criterion 4 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

The OPERABILITY of the RCIC System provides makeup water such that actuation of any of the low pressure ECCS subsystems is not required in the event of RPV isolation accompanied by a loss of feedwater flow. The RCIC System has sufficient capacity for maintaining RPV inventory during an isolation event.

Management of gas voids is important to RCIC System OPERABILITY.



APPLICABILITY

The RCIC System is required to be OPERABLE during MODE 1, and MODES 2 and 3 with reactor steam dome pressure > 150 psig, since RCIC is the primary non-ECCS water source for core cooling when the reactor is isolated and pressurized. In MODES 2 and 3 with reactor steam dome pressure ≤ 150 psig, and in MODES 4 and 5, RCIC is not required to be OPERABLE since the low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystems can provide sufficient flow to the RPV.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS
(continued)

B.1

If the RCIC System cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, or if the HPCI System is simultaneously inoperable, the plant must be brought to a condition in which the overall plant risk is minimized. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours. Remaining in the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 3 is similar to or lower than the risk in MODE 4 (Ref. 3) and because the time spent in MODE 3 to perform the necessary repairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status will be short. However, voluntary entry into MODE 4 may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state.

Required Action B.1 is modified by a Note that prohibits the application of LCO 3.0.4.a. This Note clarifies the intent of the Required Action by indicating that it is not permissible under LCO 3.0.4.a to enter MODE 3 from MODE 4 with the LCO not met. While remaining in MODE 3 presents an acceptable level of risk, it is not the intent of the Required Action to allow entry into, and continue operation in, MODE 3 from MODE 4 in accordance with LCO 3.0.4.a. However, where allowed, a risk assessment may be performed in accordance with LCO 3.0.4.b. Consideration of the results of this risk assessment is required to determine the acceptability of entering MODE 3 from MODE 4 when this LCO is not met. The allowed Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.5.3.1

Insert 4

~~The flow path piping has the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained air. Maintaining the pump discharge line of the RCIC System full of water ensures that the system will perform properly, injecting its full capacity into the Reactor Coolant System upon demand. This will also prevent a water hammer following an initiation signal. One acceptable method of ensuring the line is full is to vent at the high points. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.~~

(continued)

Insert 4

SR 3.5.3.1

The RCIC System flow path piping and components have the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained gases. Preventing and managing gas intrusion and accumulation is necessary for proper operation of the RCIC System and may also prevent a water hammer, pump cavitation, and pumping of noncondensable gas into the reactor vessel.

Selection of RCIC System locations susceptible to gas accumulation is based on a self-assessment of the piping configuration to identify where gases may accumulate and remain even after the system is filled and vented, and to identify vulnerable potential degassing flow paths. The review is supplemented by verification that installed high-point vents are actually at the system high points, including field verification to ensure pipe shapes and construction tolerances have not inadvertently created additional high points. Susceptible locations depend on plant and system configuration, such as stand-by versus operating conditions.

The RCIC System is OPERABLE when it is sufficiently filled with water. Acceptance criteria are established for the volume of accumulated gas at susceptible locations. If accumulated gas is discovered that exceeds the acceptance criteria for the susceptible location (or the volume of accumulated gas at one or more susceptible locations exceeds an acceptance criteria for gas volume at the suction or discharge of a pump), the Surveillance is not met. If it is determined by subsequent evaluation that the RCIC Systems are not rendered inoperable by the accumulated gas (i.e., the system is sufficiently filled with water), the Surveillance may be declared met. Accumulated gas should be eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits.

RCIC System locations susceptible to gas accumulation are monitored and, if gas is found, the gas volume is compared to the acceptance criteria for the location. Susceptible locations in the same system flow path which are subject to the same gas intrusion mechanisms may be verified by monitoring a representative sub-set of susceptible locations. Monitoring may not be practical for locations that are inaccessible due to radiological or environmental conditions, the plant configuration, or personnel safety. For these locations alternative methods (e.g., operating parameters, remote monitoring) may be used to monitor the susceptible location. Monitoring is not required for susceptible locations where the maximum potential accumulated gas void volume has been evaluated and determined to not challenge system OPERABILITY. The accuracy of the method used for monitoring the susceptible locations and trending of the results should be sufficient to assure system OPERABILITY during the Surveillance interval.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. The Surveillance Frequency may vary by location susceptible to gas accumulation.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS
(continued)

SR 3.5.3.2

Verifying the correct alignment for manual, power operated, and automatic valves (including the RCIC pump flow controller) in the RCIC flow path provides assurance that the proper flow path will exist for RCIC operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position since these valves were verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. A valve that receives an initiation signal is allowed to be in a nonaccident position provided the valve will automatically reposition in the proper stroke time. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of potentially being mispositioned are in the correct position. This SR does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves. For the RCIC System, this SR also includes the steam flow path for the turbine and the flow controller position. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

The Surveillance is modified by a Note which exempts system vent flow paths opened under administrative control. The administrative control should be proceduralized and include stationing a dedicated individual at the system vent flow path who is in continuous communication with the operators in the control room. This individual will have a method to rapidly close the system vent flow path if directed.

SR 3.5.3.3 and SR 3.5.3.4

The RCIC pump flow rates ensure that the system can maintain reactor coolant inventory during pressurized conditions with the RPV isolated. The flow tests for the RCIC System are performed at two different pressure ranges such that system capability to provide rated flow against a system head corresponding to reactor pressure is tested both at the higher and lower operating ranges of the system. The required system head should overcome the RPV pressure and associated discharge line losses. Adequate reactor steam pressure must be available to perform these tests. Additionally, adequate steam flow must be passing through the main turbine or turbine bypass valves to continue to control reactor pressure when the RCIC System diverts steam flow. Therefore, sufficient time is allowed after adequate

(continued)

BASES

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES
(continued)


primary containment conditions within design limits. The suppression pool temperature is calculated to remain below the design limit.

The RHR Suppression Pool Cooling System satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

During a DBA, a minimum of one RHR suppression pool cooling subsystem is required to maintain the primary containment peak pressure and temperature below design limits (Ref. 1). To ensure that these requirements are met, two RHR suppression pool cooling subsystems must be OPERABLE with power from two safety related independent power supplies. Therefore, in the event of an accident, at least one subsystem is OPERABLE assuming the worst case single active failure. An RHR suppression pool cooling subsystem is OPERABLE when one of the pumps, the heat exchanger, and associated piping, valves, instrumentation, and controls are OPERABLE.

Management of gas voids is important to RHR Suppression Pool Cooling System OPERABILITY.



APPLICABILITY

In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a DBA could cause both a release of radioactive material to primary containment and a heatup and pressurization of primary containment. In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, the RHR Suppression Pool Cooling System is not required to be OPERABLE in MODE 4 or 5.

ACTIONS

A.1

With one RHR suppression pool cooling subsystem inoperable, the inoperable subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. In this condition, the remaining OPERABLE RHR suppression pool cooling subsystem is adequate to perform the primary containment cooling function. However, the overall reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE subsystem could result in reduced primary containment cooling capability. The 7 day Completion Time is acceptable in light of the redundant RHR suppression pool cooling capabilities afforded by the OPERABLE subsystem and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.2.3.2 (continued)

that the primary containment peak pressure and temperature can be maintained below the design limits during a DBA (Ref. 1). The flow is a normal test of centrifugal pump performance required by ASME Code (Ref. 3). This test confirms one point on the pump design curve, and the results are indicative of overall performance. Such inservice tests confirm component OPERABILITY, and detect incipient failures by indicating abnormal performance. The Frequency of this SR is in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program.

Insert 5



REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 6.2.
 2. NEDC-32988-A, Revision 2, Technical Justification to Support Risk-Informed Modification to Selected Required End States for BWR Plants, December 2002.
 3. ASME Code for Operation and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants.
-
-

Insert 5

SR 3.6.2.3.3

RHR Suppression Pool Cooling System piping and components have the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained gases. Preventing and managing gas intrusion and accumulation is necessary for proper operation of the RHR suppression pool cooling subsystems and may also prevent water hammer and pump cavitation.

Selection of RHR Suppression Pool Cooling System locations susceptible to gas accumulation is based on a review of system design information, including piping and instrumentation drawings, isometric drawings, plan and elevation drawings, and calculations. The design review is supplemented by system walk downs to validate the system high points and to confirm the location and orientation of important components that can become sources of gas or could otherwise cause gas to be trapped or difficult to remove during system maintenance or restoration. Susceptible locations depend on plant and system configuration, such as stand-by versus operating conditions.

The RHR Suppression Pool Cooling System is OPERABLE when it is sufficiently filled with water. Acceptance criteria are established for the volume of accumulated gas at susceptible locations. If accumulated gas is discovered that exceeds the acceptance criteria for the susceptible location (or the volume of accumulated gas at one or more susceptible locations exceeds an acceptance criteria for gas volume at the suction or discharge of a pump), the Surveillance is not met. If it is determined by subsequent evaluation that the RHR Suppression Pool Cooling System is not rendered inoperable by the accumulated gas (i.e., the system is sufficiently filled with water), the Surveillance may be declared met. Accumulated gas should be eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits.

RHR Suppression Pool Cooling System locations susceptible to gas accumulation are monitored and, if gas is found, the gas volume is compared to the acceptance criteria for the location. Susceptible locations in the same system flow path which are subject to the same gas intrusion mechanisms may be verified by monitoring a representative subset of susceptible locations. Monitoring may not be practical for locations that are inaccessible due to radiological or environmental conditions, the plant configuration, or personnel safety. For these locations alternative methods (e.g., operating parameters, remote monitoring) may be used to monitor the susceptible location. Monitoring is not required for susceptible locations where the maximum potential accumulated gas void volume has been evaluated and determined to not challenge system OPERABILITY. The accuracy of the method used for monitoring the susceptible locations and trending of the results should be sufficient to assure system OPERABILITY during the Surveillance interval.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. The Surveillance Frequency may vary by location susceptible to gas accumulation.

BASES (continued)

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES

Reference 1 contains the results of analyses used to predict primary containment pressure and temperature following large and small break loss of coolant accidents. The intent of the analyses is to demonstrate that the pressure reduction capacity of the RHR Suppression Pool Spray System is adequate to maintain the primary containment conditions within design limits. The time history for primary containment pressure is calculated to demonstrate that the maximum pressure remains below the design limit.

The RHR Suppression Pool Spray System satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

In the event of a DBA, a minimum of one RHR suppression pool spray subsystem is required to mitigate potential bypass leakage paths and maintain the primary containment peak pressure below the design limits (Ref. 1). To ensure that these requirements are met, two RHR suppression pool spray subsystems must be OPERABLE with power from two safety related independent power supplies. Therefore, in the event of an accident, at least one subsystem is OPERABLE assuming the worst case single active failure. An RHR suppression pool spray subsystem is OPERABLE when one of the pumps, the heat exchanger, and associated piping, valves, instrumentation, and controls are OPERABLE.

Management of gas voids is important to RHR Suppression Pool Spray System OPERABILITY.

APPLICABILITY

In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a DBA could cause pressurization of primary containment. In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining RHR suppression pool spray subsystems OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 or 5.

ACTIONS

A.1

With one RHR suppression pool spray subsystem inoperable, the inoperable subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. In this condition, the remaining OPERABLE RHR suppression pool spray subsystem is adequate to perform the primary containment bypass leakage mitigation function.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

C.1 (continued)

in accordance with LCO 3.0.4.b. Consideration of the results of this risk assessment is required to determine the acceptability of entering MODE 3 from MODE 4 when this LCO is not met. The allowed Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.2.4.1

Verifying the correct alignment for manual and power operated valves in the RHR suppression pool spray mode flow path provides assurance that the proper flow path exists for system operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position since these valves were verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. A valve is also allowed to be in the nonaccident position provided it can be aligned to the accident position within the time assumed in the accident analysis. This is acceptable since the RHR suppression pool spray mode is manually initiated. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position. This SR does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

SR 3.6.2.4.2

This surveillance is performed to verify that the spray nozzles are not obstructed and that spray flow will be provided when required. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

Insert 6



(continued)

Insert 6

SR 3.6.2.4.3

RHR Suppression Pool Spray System piping and components have the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained gases. Preventing and managing gas intrusion and accumulation is necessary for proper operation of the RHR suppression pool spray subsystems and may also prevent water hammer and pump cavitation.

Selection of RHR Suppression Pool Spray System locations susceptible to gas accumulation is based on a review of system design information, including piping and instrumentation drawings, isometric drawings, plan and elevation drawings, and calculations. The design review is supplemented by system walk downs to validate the system high points and to confirm the location and orientation of important components that can become sources of gas or could otherwise cause gas to be trapped or difficult to remove during system maintenance or restoration. Susceptible locations depend on plant and system configuration, such as stand-by versus operating conditions.

The RHR Suppression Pool Spray System is OPERABLE when it is sufficiently filled with water. Acceptance criteria are established for the volume of accumulated gas at susceptible locations. If accumulated gas is discovered that exceeds the acceptance criteria for the susceptible location (or the volume of accumulated gas at one or more susceptible locations exceeds an acceptance criteria for gas volume at the suction or discharge of a pump), the Surveillance is not met. If it is determined by subsequent evaluation that the RHR Suppression Pool Spray System is not rendered inoperable by the accumulated gas (i.e., the system is sufficiently filled with water), the Surveillance may be declared met. Accumulated gas should be eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits.

RHR Suppression Pool Spray System locations susceptible to gas accumulation are monitored and, if gas is found, the gas volume is compared to the acceptance criteria for the location. Susceptible locations in the same system flow path which are subject to the same gas intrusion mechanisms may be verified by monitoring a representative subset of susceptible locations. Monitoring may not be practical for locations that are inaccessible due to radiological or environmental conditions, the plant configuration, or personnel safety. For these locations alternative methods (e.g., operating parameters, remote monitoring) may be used to monitor the susceptible location. Monitoring is not required for susceptible locations where the maximum potential accumulated gas void volume has been evaluated and determined to not challenge system OPERABILITY. The accuracy of the method used for monitoring the susceptible locations and trending of the results should be sufficient to assure system OPERABILITY during the Surveillance interval.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. The Surveillance Frequency may vary by location susceptible to gas accumulation.

BASES

LCO
(continued)

Management of gas voids is important to RHR Shutdown Cooling System OPERABILITY.

necessary portions of the RHR Service Water System must be capable of providing cooling water to the RHR heat exchanger.

Additionally, the RHR shutdown cooling subsystem is considered OPERABLE if it can be manually aligned (remote or local) in the shutdown cooling mode for removal of decay heat. Operation (either continuous or intermittent) of one subsystem can maintain and reduce the reactor coolant temperature as required.

APPLICABILITY

One RHR shutdown cooling subsystem must be OPERABLE in MODE 5, with irradiated fuel in the RPV and with the water level \geq 23 feet above the top of the RPV flange, to provide decay heat removal. RHR shutdown cooling subsystem requirements in other MODES are covered by LCOs in Section 3.4, Reactor Coolant System (RCS). RHR shutdown cooling subsystem requirements in MODE 5 with irradiated fuel in the RPV and with the water level $<$ 23 ft above the RPV flange are given in LCO 3.9.9, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR)—Low Water Level."

ACTIONS

A.1, A.2, and A.3

With no RHR shutdown cooling subsystem OPERABLE, an alternate method of decay heat removal must be provided within 1 hour. In this condition, the volume of water above the RPV flange provides adequate capability to remove decay heat from the reactor core. However, the overall reliability is reduced because loss of water level could result in reduced decay heat removal capability. The 1 hour Completion Time is based on decay heat removal function and the probability of a loss of the available decay heat removal capabilities. Furthermore, verification of the functional availability of the alternate method must be reconfirmed every 24 hours thereafter. This will ensure continued heat removal capability.

Alternate decay heat removal methods are available to the operators for review and preplanning in the unit operating procedures. The required cooling capacity of the alternate method should be ensured by verifying (by calculation or

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.9.8.2 (continued)

or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of potentially being mispositioned are in the correct position. This SR does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves.

Insert 7

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 5.4.7.
-
-

Insert 7

SR 3.9.8.3

RHR Shutdown Cooling System piping and components have the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained gases. Preventing and managing gas intrusion and accumulation is necessary for proper operation of the required RHR shutdown cooling subsystem(s) and may also prevent water hammer, pump cavitation, and pumping of noncondensable gas into the reactor vessel.

Selection of RHR Shutdown Cooling System locations susceptible to gas accumulation is based on a review of system design information, including piping and instrumentation drawings, isometric drawings, plan and elevation drawings, and calculations. The design review is supplemented by system walk downs to validate the system high points and to confirm the location and orientation of important components that can become sources of gas or could otherwise cause gas to be trapped or difficult to remove during system maintenance or restoration. Susceptible locations depend on plant and system configuration, such as stand-by versus operating conditions.

The RHR Shutdown Cooling System is OPERABLE when it is sufficiently filled with water. Acceptance criteria are established for the volume of accumulated gas at susceptible locations. If accumulated gas is discovered that exceeds the acceptance criteria for the susceptible location (or the volume of accumulated gas at one or more susceptible locations exceeds an acceptance criteria for gas volume at the suction or discharge of a pump), the Surveillance is not met. If it is determined by subsequent evaluation that the RHR Shutdown Cooling System is not rendered inoperable by the accumulated gas (i.e., the system is sufficiently filled with water), the Surveillance may be declared met. Accumulated gas should be eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits.

RHR Shutdown Cooling System locations susceptible to gas accumulation are monitored and, if gas is found, the gas volume is compared to the acceptance criteria for the location. Susceptible locations in the same system flow path which are subject to the same gas intrusion mechanisms may be verified by monitoring a representative subset of susceptible locations. Monitoring may not be practical for locations that are inaccessible due to radiological or environmental conditions, the plant configuration, or personnel safety. For these locations alternative methods (e.g., operating parameters, remote monitoring) may be used to monitor the susceptible location. Monitoring is not required for susceptible locations where the maximum potential accumulated gas void volume has been evaluated and determined to not challenge system OPERABILITY. The accuracy of the method used for monitoring the susceptible locations and trending of the results should be sufficient to assure system OPERABILITY during the Surveillance interval.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. The Surveillance Frequency may vary by location susceptible to gas accumulation.

B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

B 3.9.9 Residual Heat Removal (RHR)—Low Water Level

BASES

BACKGROUND The purpose of the RHR System in MODE 5 is to remove decay heat and sensible heat from the reactor coolant, as described by UFSAR, Section 5.4.7 (Ref. 1). Each of the two shutdown cooling loops of the RHR System can provide the required decay heat removal. Each loop consists of two motor driven pumps, a heat exchanger, and associated piping and valves. Both loops have a common suction from the same recirculation loop. Each pump discharges the reactor coolant, after it has been cooled by circulation through the respective heat exchangers, to the reactor via the associated recirculation loop. The RHR heat exchangers transfer heat to the RHR Service Water System. The RHR shutdown cooling mode is manually controlled.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES With the unit in MODE 5, the RHR Shutdown Cooling System is not required to mitigate any events or accidents evaluated in the safety analyses. The RHR Shutdown Cooling System is required for removing decay heat to maintain the temperature of the reactor coolant.

The RHR Shutdown Cooling System satisfies Criterion 4 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO In MODE 5 with irradiated fuel in the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) and the water level < 23 ft above the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) flange both RHR shutdown cooling subsystems must be OPERABLE.

An OPERABLE RHR shutdown cooling subsystem consists of an RHR pump, a heat exchanger, valves, piping, instruments, and controls to ensure an OPERABLE flow path. To meet the LCO, both pumps in one loop or one pump in each of the two loops must be OPERABLE. In addition the necessary portions of the RHR Service Water System must be capable of providing cooling water to the RHR heat exchanger.

Management of gas voids is important to RHR Shutdown Cooling System OPERABILITY.



(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS
(continued)

SR 3.9.9.2

Verifying the correct alignment for manual and power operated valves in the required RHR shutdown cooling flow paths provides assurance that the proper flow paths will exist for RHR operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position since these were verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. A valve that can be manually (from the control room or locally) aligned is allowed to be in a non-RHR shutdown cooling position provided the valve can be repositioned. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of potentially being mispositioned are in the correct position. This SR does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves.

Insert 8

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 5.4.7.
-
-

Insert 8

SR 3.9.9.3

RHR Shutdown Cooling System piping and components have the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained gases. Preventing and managing gas intrusion and accumulation is necessary for proper operation of the RHR shutdown cooling subsystems and may also prevent water hammer, pump cavitation, and pumping of noncondensable gas into the reactor vessel.

Selection of RHR Shutdown Cooling System locations susceptible to gas accumulation is based on a review of system design information, including piping and instrumentation drawings, isometric drawings, plan and elevation drawings, and calculations. The design review is supplemented by system walk downs to validate the system high points and to confirm the location and orientation of important components that can become sources of gas or could otherwise cause gas to be trapped or difficult to remove during system maintenance or restoration. Susceptible locations depend on plant and system configuration, such as stand-by versus operating conditions.

The RHR Shutdown Cooling System is OPERABLE when it is sufficiently filled with water. Acceptance criteria are established for the volume of accumulated gas at susceptible locations. If accumulated gas is discovered that exceeds the acceptance criteria for the susceptible location (or the volume of accumulated gas at one or more susceptible locations exceeds an acceptance criteria for gas volume at the suction or discharge of a pump), the Surveillance is not met. If it is determined by subsequent evaluation that the RHR Shutdown Cooling System is not rendered inoperable by the accumulated gas (i.e., the system is sufficiently filled with water), the Surveillance may be declared met. Accumulated gas should be eliminated or brought within the acceptance criteria limits.

RHR Shutdown Cooling System locations susceptible to gas accumulation are monitored and, if gas is found, the gas volume is compared to the acceptance criteria for the location. Susceptible locations in the same system flow path which are subject to the same gas intrusion mechanisms may be verified by monitoring a representative subset of susceptible locations. Monitoring may not be practical for locations that are inaccessible due to radiological or environmental conditions, the plant configuration, or personnel safety. For these locations alternative methods (e.g., operating parameters, remote monitoring) may be used to monitor the susceptible location. Monitoring is not required for susceptible locations where the maximum potential accumulated gas void volume has been evaluated and determined to not challenge system OPERABILITY. The accuracy of the method used for monitoring the susceptible locations and trending of the results should be sufficient to assure system OPERABILITY during the Surveillance interval.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. The Surveillance Frequency may vary by location susceptible to gas accumulation.