



**UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION**
REGION III
2443 WARRENVILLE ROAD, SUITE 210
LISLE, IL 60532-4352

December 6, 2013

Mr. Larry Meyer
Site Vice President
NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC
6610 Nuclear Road
Two Rivers, WI 54241

**SUBJECT: POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2,
TRIENNIAL FIRE PROTECTION INSPECTION REPORT
05000266/2013010; 05000301/2013010**

Dear Mr. Meyer:

On November 25, 2013, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a Triennial Fire Protection Inspection at your Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on November 8, 2013, with Mr. E. McCartney, and on November 25, 2013, with Mr. B. Woyak and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

No NRC-identified or self-revealing findings were identified during this inspection.

However, inspectors documented a licensee-identified violation which was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) in Section 4OA7 of this report. The NRC is treating this violation as a Non-Cited Violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the subject or severity of any Non-Cited Violation you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001; with a copy to the Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Region III, 2443 Warrenville Road, Suite 210, Lisle, IL 60532-4352; the Director, Office of Enforcement, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector office at the Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2.

L. Meyer

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In accordance with Title 10, *Code of Federal Regulations* (CFR), Section 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and your response (if any), will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records System (PARS) component of NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html> (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Robert C. Daley, Chief
Engineering Branch 3
Division of Reactor Safety

Docket Nos. 50-266; 50-301
License Nos. DPR-24; DPR-27

Enclosure: Inspection Report 05000266/2013010; 05000301/2013010
w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Docket Nos: 50-266; 50-301
License Nos: DPR-24; DPR-27

Report No: 05000266/2013010; 05000301/2013010

Licensee: NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC

Facility: Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2

Location: Two Rivers, WI

Dates: October 21 through November 25, 2013

Inspectors: D. Szwarc, Senior Reactor Inspector, Lead
M. Munir, Reactor Inspector
D. Oliver, Reactor Inspector
R. Winter, Reactor Inspector

Approved by: Robert C. Daley, Chief
Engineering Branch 3
Division of Reactor Safety

Enclosure

SUMMARY

IR 05000266/2013010, 05000301/2013010; 10/21/2013 – 11/25/2013; Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2; Routine Triennial Fire Protection Baseline Inspection.

This report covers an announced Triennial Fire Protection Baseline Inspection. The inspection was conducted by Region III inspectors. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (i.e., greater than Green, or Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, "Significance Determination Process" (SDP). All violations of NRC requirements are dispositioned in accordance with the NRC's Enforcement Policy dated June 7, 2012. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 4, dated December 2006.

A. NRC-Identified and Self-Revealed Findings

No findings were identified.

B. Licensee-Identified Violations

A violation of very low safety significance that was identified by the licensee has been reviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee have been entered into the licensee's Corrective Action Program. This violation and corrective action tracking numbers are listed in Section 4OA7 of this report.

REPORT DETAILS

1. REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events and Mitigating Systems

1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05T)

The licensee was in transition to National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 805, "Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants, 2001 Edition," as incorporated by 10 CFR 50.48(c). The NFPA 805 standard establishes a comprehensive set of requirements for Fire Protection Programs at nuclear power plants. The standard incorporates both deterministic and risk-informed, performance-based concepts. The deterministic aspects of the standard are comparable to traditional requirements. However, the transition to a risk-informed, performance-based Fire Protection Program requires an in-depth nuclear safety circuit analysis for equipment identified for nuclear safety functions such as safe shutdown. Because the conversion and licensing process to NFPA 805 was expected to identify and address a variety of issues that were normally the subject of the Triennial Fire Protection Baseline Inspection, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) modified the Enforcement Policy for licensees in transition to NFPA 805. As part of the transition to NFPA 805, certain findings not associated with findings of high-safety significance that meet the four criteria established by Section A of the NRC's Interim Enforcement Policy Regarding Enforcement Discretion for Certain Fire Protection Issues (10 CFR 50.48) receive enforcement discretion in accordance with the NRC's Enforcement Policy.

The purpose of the fire protection triennial baseline inspection was to conduct a design-based, plant specific, risk-informed, onsite inspection of the licensee's Fire Protection Program's defense-in-depth elements used to mitigate the consequences of a fire. The Fire Protection Program shall extend the concept of defense-in-depth to fire protection in plant areas important to safety by:

- preventing fires from starting;
- rapidly detecting, controlling and extinguishing fires that do occur;
- providing protection for structures, systems, and components important to safety so that a fire that is not promptly extinguished by fire suppression activities will not prevent the safe shutdown of the reactor plant; and
- taking reasonable actions to mitigate postulated events that could potentially cause loss of large areas of power reactor facilities due to explosions or fires.

The inspectors' evaluation focused on the design, operational status, and material condition of the reactor plant's Fire Protection Program, post-fire safe shutdown systems, and B.5.b mitigating strategies. The objectives of the inspection were to assess whether the licensee had implemented a Fire Protection Program that: (1) provided adequate controls for combustibles and ignition sources inside the plant; (2) provided adequate fire detection and suppression capability; (3) maintained passive fire protection features in good material condition; (4) established adequate compensatory measures for out-of-service, degraded or inoperable fire protection equipment, systems or features; (5) ensured that procedures, equipment, fire barriers

and systems exist so that the post-fire capability to safely shut down the plant was ensured; (6) included feasible and reliable operator manual actions when appropriate to achieve safe shutdown; and (7) identified fire protection issues at an appropriate threshold and ensured these issues were entered into the licensee's problem identification and resolution program.

In addition, the inspectors' review and assessment focused on the licensee's post-fire safe shutdown systems for selected risk significant fire areas. Inspector emphasis was placed on determining that the post-fire safe shutdown capability and the fire protection features were maintained free of fire damage to ensure that at least one post-fire safe shutdown success path was available. The inspectors' review and assessment also focused on the licensee's B.5.b related license conditions and the requirements of Title 10, *Code of Federal Regulations* (10 CFR) Part 50.54 (hh)(2). Inspector emphasis was to ensure that the licensee could maintain or restore core cooling, containment, and spent fuel pool cooling capabilities utilizing the B.5.b mitigating strategies following a loss of large areas of power reactor facilities due to explosions or fires. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

The fire areas and fire zones and B.5.b mitigating strategies selected for review during this inspection are listed below and in Section 1R05.13. The fire areas and fire zones selected constituted four inspection samples and the B.5.b mitigating strategies selected constituted two inspection samples, respectively, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.05T.

Fire Area	Fire Zone	Description
A23N	304N	Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room North
A30	318	Cable Spreading Room
A33	337	Control Building Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning (HVAC) Room
A71	308	Diesel Generator Room

.2 Protection of Safe Shutdown Capabilities

a. Inspection Scope

For each of the selected fire areas, the inspectors reviewed the fire hazards analysis, safe shutdown analysis, and supporting drawings and documentation to verify that safe shutdown capabilities were properly protected.

The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's design control procedures to ensure that the process included appropriate reviews and controls to assess plant changes for any potential adverse impact on the Fire Protection Program and/or post-fire safe shutdown analysis and procedures.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.3 Passive Fire Protection

a. Inspection Scope

For the selected fire areas, the inspectors evaluated the adequacy of fire area barriers, penetration seals, fire doors, electrical raceway fire barriers, and fire rated electrical cables. The inspectors observed the material condition and configuration of the installed barriers, seals, doors, and cables. The inspectors reviewed approved construction details and supporting fire tests. In addition, the inspectors reviewed license documentation, such as NRC safety evaluation reports, and deviations from NRC regulations and the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) standards to verify that fire protection features met license commitments.

The inspectors walked down accessible portions of the selected fire areas to observe material condition and the adequacy of design of fire area boundaries (including walls, fire doors, and fire dampers) to ensure they were appropriate for the fire hazards in the area.

The inspectors reviewed the installation, repair, and qualification records for a sample of penetration seals to ensure the fill material was of the appropriate fire rating and that the installation met the engineering design.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.4 Active Fire Protection

a. Inspection Scope

For the selected fire areas, the inspectors evaluated the adequacy of fire suppression and detection systems. The inspectors observed the material condition and configuration of the installed fire detection and suppression systems. The inspectors reviewed design documents and supporting calculations. In addition, the inspectors reviewed license basis documentation, such as, NRC safety evaluation reports, deviations from NRC regulations, and NFPA standards to verify that fire suppression and detection systems met license commitments.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.5 Protection from Damage from Fire Suppression Activities

a. Inspection Scope

For the selected fire areas, the inspectors verified that redundant trains of systems required for hot shutdown would not be subject to damage from fire suppression activities or from the rupture or inadvertent operation of fire suppression systems including the effects of flooding. The inspectors conducted walkdowns of each of the selected fire areas to assess conditions such as the adequacy and condition of floor drains, equipment elevations, and spray protection.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.6 Alternative Shutdown Capability

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's systems required to achieve alternative safe shutdown to determine if the licensee had properly identified the components and systems necessary to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions. The inspectors also focused on the adequacy of the systems to perform reactor pressure control, reactivity control, reactor coolant makeup, decay heat removal, process monitoring, and support system functions.

The inspectors conducted selected area walkdowns to determine if operators could reasonably be expected to perform the alternate safe shutdown procedure actions and that equipment labeling was consistent with the alternate safe shutdown procedure. The review also looked at operator training as well as consistency between the operations shutdown procedures and any associated administrative controls.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified

.7 Circuit Analyses

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors did not review the licensee's post-fire safe shutdown (SSD) analysis because the licensee was in transition to NFPA 805.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.8 Communications

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed, on a sample basis, the adequacy of the communication system to support plant personnel in the performance of alternative safe shutdown functions and fire brigade duties. The inspectors verified that plant telephones, page systems, sound powered phones, and radios were available for use and maintained in working order. The inspectors reviewed the electrical power supplies and cable routing for these systems to verify that either the telephones or the radios would remain functional following a fire.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.9 Emergency Lighting

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a plant walkdown of selected areas in which a sample of operator actions would be performed in the performance of alternative safe shutdown functions. As part of the walkdowns, the inspectors focused on the existence of sufficient emergency lighting for access and egress to areas and for performing necessary equipment operations. The locations and positioning of the emergency lights were observed during the walkdown and during review of manual actions implemented for the selected fire areas.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.10 Cold Shutdown Repairs

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's procedures to determine whether repairs were required to achieve cold shutdown and to verify that dedicated repair procedures, equipment, and material to accomplish those repairs were available onsite. The inspectors also evaluated whether cold shutdown could be achieved within the required time using the licensee's procedures and repair methods. The inspectors also verified that equipment necessary to perform cold shutdown repairs was available onsite and properly staged.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.11 Compensatory Measures

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted a review to verify that compensatory measures were in place for out-of-service, degraded or inoperable fire protection and post-fire safe shutdown equipment, systems, or features (e.g., detection and suppression systems, and equipment, passive fire barriers, pumps, valves or electrical devices providing safe shutdown functions or capabilities). The inspectors also conducted a review of the adequacy of short term compensatory measures to compensate for a degraded function or feature until appropriate corrective actions were taken.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.12 Review and Documentation of Fire Protection Program Changes

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed changes to the approved Fire Protection Program to verify that the changes did not constitute an adverse effect on the ability to safely shutdown. The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's design control procedures to ensure that the process included appropriate reviews and controls to assess plant changes for any potential adverse impact on the Fire Protection Program and/or post-fire safe shutdown analysis and procedures.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.13 Control of Transient Combustibles and Ignition Sources

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's procedures and programs for the control of ignition sources and transient combustibles to assess their effectiveness in preventing fires and in controlling combustible loading within limits established in the fire hazards analysis. A sample of hot work and transient combustible control permits were also reviewed. The inspectors performed plant walkdowns to verify that transient combustibles and ignition sources were being implemented in accordance with the administrative controls.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.14 B.5.b Inspection Activities

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's preparedness to handle large fires or explosions by reviewing selected mitigating strategies. This review ensured that the licensee continued to meet the requirements of their B.5.b related license conditions and 10 CFR 50.54(hh)(2) by determining that:

- Procedures were being maintained and adequate;
- Equipment was properly staged, maintained, and tested;
- Station personnel were knowledgeable and could implement the procedures; and
- Additionally, inspectors reviewed the storage, maintenance, and testing of B.5.b related equipment.

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's B.5.b related license conditions and evaluated selected mitigating strategies to ensure they remain feasible in light of operator training, maintenance/testing of necessary equipment and any plant modifications. In addition, the inspectors reviewed previous inspection reports for commitments made by the

licensee to correct deficiencies identified during performance of Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/171 or subsequent performances of these inspections.

The B.5.b mitigating strategies selected for review during this inspection are listed below. The offsite and onsite communications, notifications/emergency response organization activation, initial operational response actions and damage assessment activities identified in Table A.3 1 of Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 06-12, "B.5.b Phase II and III Submittal Guidance," Revision 2 are evaluated each time due to the mitigation strategies' scenario selected.

NEI 06-12, Revision 2, Section	Licensee Strategy (Table)	Selected for Review
3.2.2	Off-site and On-site Communications (Table A.3-1)	Evaluated
3.2.3	Notification/Emergency Response Organization Activation (Table A.3-1)	Evaluated
3.2.4	Initial Operation Response Actions (Table A.3-1)	Evaluated
3.2.5	Initial Damage Assessment (Table A.3-1)	Evaluated
3.3.3	Manual Operation of Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (Table A.4-3)	Selected
3.3.6	Containment Flooding with Portable Pump (Table A.4-6)	Selected

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES

4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's corrective action program procedures and samples of corrective action documents to verify that the licensee was identifying issues related to the Fire Protection Program at an appropriate threshold and entering them in the Corrective Action Program. The inspectors reviewed selected samples of condition reports, design packages, and fire protection system non-conformance documents.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA6 Management Meetings

.1 Exit Meeting Summary

On November 25, 2013, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. R. Seizer, and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues

presented. The inspectors verified that no proprietary information was retained by the inspectors or documented in this report.

.2 Interim Exit Meetings

On November 8, 2013, the inspectors presented the preliminary inspection results to Mr. E. McCartney, and other members of the licensee staff.

40A7 Licensee-Identified Violations

The following violation of very low safety significance (Green) was identified by the licensee and is a violation of NRC requirements which meets the criteria of the NRC Enforcement Policy for being dispositioned as an NCV.

- The licensee identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) and associated NCV of Technical Specification 5.4.1.h for the failure to control transient combustible material in accordance with the Fire Protection Program requirements. Technical Specification Section 5.4.1.h for Units 1 and 2 required that written procedures be established, implemented, and maintained, covering activities related to Fire Protection Program implementation. Nuclear Procedure (NP) 1.9.9, "Transient Combustible Control," Revision 23, Section 2.10 stated, in part, that no transient combustible material be allowed in combustible exclusion zones without specific evaluation and the approval of the fire protection engineer. Contrary to the above, on September 17, 2013, the licensee failed to implement the guidelines specified in Procedure NP 1.9.9 and identified two instances where transient combustibles were located in combustion exclusion zones. The licensee entered this issue into their Corrective Action Program as Action Request (AR) AR01904510 and removed the transient combustible materials.

The finding was associated with the Initiating Events cornerstone attribute of Protection Against External Factors (Fire) and affected the cornerstone objective of limiting the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during plant operations. The inspectors evaluated the finding using the Significance Determination Process (SDP) in accordance with IMC 0609, "Significance Determination Process," Attachment 0609.04, "Initial Characterization of Findings," dated June 19, 2012, and Appendix F, "Fire Protection Significance Determination Worksheet," dated September 20, 2013. This finding screened to a Phase II analysis in accordance with SDP Phase I based on review of the "Fire Prevention and Administrative Controls" Section of IMC 0609. Using IMC 0609 Appendix F, Attachment 2, "Degradation Rating Guidance Specific to Various Fire Protection Program Elements," dated February 28, 2005, the inspectors determined that the finding resulted in a low degradation from the combustible controls program and screened the finding as having very low safety significance (Green).

ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee

E. McCartney, Site Director
R. Wright, Plant General Manager
J. Fischer, Fire Protection Engineer
K. Locke, Licensing Engineering Analyst
R. Mrozinsky, Appendix R Engineer
V. Rubano, Fleet NFPA 805 Project Manager
E. Schmidt, Engineering Supervisor
T. Schneider, License Engineering
R. Seizert, Licensing Supervisor
B. Woyak, Engineering Manager

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

D. Betancourt, Acting Senior Resident Inspector
B. Bartlett, Acting Senior Resident Inspector
K. Barclay, Resident Inspector

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED

Opened, Closed, and Discussed

None.

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

The following is a list of documents reviewed during the inspection. Inclusion on this list does not imply that the NRC inspectors reviewed the documents in their entirety, but rather, that selected sections of portions of the documents were evaluated as part of the overall inspection effort. Inclusion of a document on this list does not imply NRC acceptance of the document or any part of it, unless this is stated in the body of the inspection report.

CALCULATIONS

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
2004-004	MAAP4 Analysis for Appendix R Timing of Restoration of AFW and Charging Flow	January 20, 2005
2005-0054	Control Building Gothic Temperature Calculation	4
95-0094	Acceptance Criteria for TS-74, Annual Underground Fire Main Flow Test	June 26, 1995
FPTE 015	Technical Evaluation of Acceptance Testing For The Cable Spreading Room, Vital Switchgear Room And Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room Halon System	1

COMPLETED SURVEILLANCES

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
RMP 9384-1	Appendix R Emergency Lighting Testing and Maintenance	August 15, 2013
352007	Discharge Test Concentration Log - Cable Spreading, Vital Electric Switchgear, and Auxiliary Feedwater Rooms	September 20, 1984
0-PT-FP-004	Annual Fire Pump Capacity Test	July 26, 2013
TS-78	Semiannual Halon 1301 Fire Suppression Surveillance Test	March 15, 2013
TS-78	Semiannual Halon 1301 Fire Suppression Surveillance Test	September 24, 2013
RMP 9057	Fire Barrier Penetration Fire Seal Surveillance	August 11, 2011
RMP 9057	Fire Barrier Penetration Fire Seal Surveillance	February 27, 2013

CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM DOCUMENTS ISSUED DURING INSPECTION

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
1914362	FEP 4.16 – Control Room/Cable Spreading Room/Computer Room	October 22, 2013
1914696	Drawing PBC-219 Sheet 27 Shows Inaccurate W12 Switch Location	October 23, 2013

CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM DOCUMENTS ISSUED DURING INSPECTION

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
1914764	NRC Triennial – B.5.b Flowchart Concerns	October 23, 2013
1914872	EDMG-2 – Loss of Large Areas of the Plant Due to Fire or Explosions	October 24, 2013
1915145	NRC Triennial-Unsecured Items in Non Vital Switchgear Room	October 24, 2013
1915268	NRC Triennial – Timeliness of Corrective Actions	October 25, 2013
1917802	EDMG-2 Att. F TD AFW Pump Local Operation Procedure Flowpath	November 5, 2013
1917813	NRC Triennial – AOP 10A Operation of TDAFP	November 5, 2013
1918130	NRC Triennial – Transient Combustibles Identified Near ADVs	November 5, 2013
1918133	Triennial Fire Protection – Missing Appendix R Label	November 5, 2013
1918141	NRC Triennial – Cable Identification for Appendix R Equipment	November 5, 2013
1918487	NRC Triennial – Discussion of NFPA 805 Comp Measures	November 6, 2013
1918804	NRC Triennial – AOP 10A Guidance Improvement	November 7, 2013
1919120	RMP 9057 – Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Surveillance	November 8, 2013
1919180	Triennial Fire Protection – Unresolved Item	November 8, 2013
1921659	NRC Triennial – Error Identified in NFPA 805 Report	November 19, 2013

CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
1232138	Comments on 125 V DC Vendor Calc.'s After Owner's Review	August 12, 2003
1263584	Radios May Not Function Properly for Appendix R Fire	November 5, 2004
1290079	Treatment of Safe Shutdown Manual Actions During NFPA 805 Transition	March 14, 2006
1323111	NFPA 13 Issues with G-01 and G-02 Room Sprinklers	July 12, 2007
1339552	Calculation 2001-0049 Identified Issues with Fire Pump Power Supply	March 21, 2008
1345411	Appendix R Common Enclosure Concern	June 16, 2013
1356884	B.5.b Fire Drills	December 17, 2008
1400837	Changes to OM 3.27 Rev 40 for EC 13407	November 30, 2010
1621315	OM 3.27 – EC 259831 & 259835 EPU Procedure Revisions per EC 259831 and	February 18, 2011

CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
1623991	EC 259835. Degraded Fire Seal Between PAB and AFP Room	February 25, 2011
1636540	IER1 11-1 Vulnerability: Inadequate B.5.b Pump	April 1, 2011
1638260	OI-40 – Fire Detection System Reset Instruction for Alarms	April 6, 2011
1669330	Japan Earthquake EDMG-2 B.5.b Pump Prolonged Use with No AC	July 14, 2011
1669678	NRC URI – Loss of Diesel-Driven Fire Pump Suction During Test	July 15, 2011
1672387	Less Than Timely Training Review Committee Actions	July 26, 2011
1678233	Appendix R Concern Identified During Review of CDBI Question	August 16, 2011
1713472	Computer RM Smoke Detectors Not Installed Per NFPA Standards	December 7, 2011
1713509	Fire Detection Procedures Do Not Meet NFPA Standards	December 7, 2011
1713517	Control Room Smoke Detector Coverage May Not Meet NFPA	December 7, 2011
1725575	Fire Detection Modification is Still Not Fully Implemented	January 18, 2012
1787922	AFW Modification Has Not Finished Fire Protection Program Document Revisions	July 26, 2012
1805552	There Seems To Be a Lack of Respect for Fire Detection at PB	September 21, 2012
1844088	WO to Repair Fire Detection Panel Pushed Out Another Year	January 31, 2013
1848619	WO to Repair D-405 Pushed Out 6 Months	February 15, 2013
1854599	D-416 Delay In Alarm Function	March 7, 2013
1858707	NRC IN 2013-02 Issues Potentially Affecting Fire Safety	March 21, 2013
1875052	NFPA-805 Electrical Review “Short Time Pick-up” Concerns	May 16, 2013
1879465	Cable Running Through Combustible Exclusion Zone	June 5, 2013
1904510	Inadequate Control of Transient Combustibles	September 17, 2013

DRAWINGS

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
6118 E-1	Single Line Diagram Station Connections	28
6118 E-6 Sh. 1	Single Line Diagram 125V DC Distribution	60

DRAWINGS

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
	System	
6118 E-6 Sh. 2	Single Line Diagram 125V DC Distribution System	19
6118 E-6 Sh. 3	Single Line Diagram 125V DC Distribution System	4
6118 E-98 Sh. 50D	Panel Schedule 125V DC Panel D-28 (D-40)	12
PBC-218, Sh. 2	Fire Protection for Turbine Building Aux Building and Containment Elev. 8'-0"	23
MFPL 00001010	Fire emergency Procedure 4.12 Turbine & Aux Building Elev 8'0"	10
MFPL 000015111	Fire Barrier Locations Turbine Building, Aux Building and Containment Elev 8'0"	11
MFPL 000015225	Fire Protection Turbine Building, Aux Building and Containment Elev 8'0	23
MFPL 000015312	Fire Protection Turbine Building, Aux Building and Containment Elev 26'0"	11
MFPL 000015410	Fire Protection Turbine Building, Aux Building and Containment Elev 44'0"	10
MFPL 000015606	Fire Protection Turbine Building and Containment Elev 66'0"	6
MFPK 00000123	P&ID Fire Protection Water Unit 2	23
MFPK 00000502	P&ID Halon Fire Protection System	2
MFPK 00000736	P&ID Fire Protec./Sprinkler Sys Unit 1	36
EFPL 00001103	Electrical Layout Fire Detection Control Bldg EL 60'0"	3
EFPL 00001405	Electrical Layout Fire Detection Control Bldg EL 26'0"	5
E147 01800103	Electrical Layout Fire Detection Control Bldg EL 8'0"	3

MISCELLANEOUS DOCUMENTS

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
MR 00-063	Install New 900 MHZ Radio System	May 22, 2002
IWP 00-63	Work Order Plan Point to Point Testing for Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis	June 26, 2001
PC 6 Part 1	Monthly Operations Inventory Report	October 24, 2013

PROCEDURES

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
0-PT-FP-013	Quarterly Operations B.5.b Fire Equipment Inventory Report	7
AOP-10A	Safe Shutdown – Local Control	63

PROCEDURES

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
AOP-30	Temporary Ventilation for Vital Areas	8
CS-13	ERO Notification	4
EDMG-2	Loss of Large Areas of the Plant Due to Fire or Explosion	7
EPIP 2.1	Notifications – ERO, State and Counties, and NRC	47
FEP-4.0	Fire Emergency Plan	5
FEP-4.12	Auxiliary Feedwater Pump And Vital Switchgear Area	9
FEP-4.13	Emergency Diesel Generator (G01/G02) And Compressor Rooms	10
FEP-4.16	Control Room/Cable Spreading Room/Computer Room	9
FOP 1.2	Potential Fire Affected Safe Shutdown Components	21
FPTE 007	Technical Evaluation of PBNP Point-to-Point Portable Radio Communications for an Appendix R Fire	2
MA-AA-100-1008	Station Housekeeping And Material Control	5
NP 1.9.13	Ignition Control Procedure	19
NP 1.9.9	Transient Combustible Control	23
OI-40	Fire Detection System Reset Instructions for Alarms and Detectors	10
OI-62B	Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater System (P-29)	27
OM 3.27	Control of Fire Protection & Appendix R Safe Shutdown Equipment	50
RMP 262	Emergency Replacement of Power Supply Cables to RHR and CCW Pump Motors	2
RMP 9006-4	Component Cooling Water Pump Motor Emergency Replacement	11
RMP 9376-12	Emergency Power for Containment MOVs	2

WORK ORDERS

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
40100443 01	EL-LTG11, 2 Year Test of Emergency Light Batteries Group II	February 10, 2012
40141461 01	EL-LTGIV, 2 Year Test of Emergency Light Batteries	May 12, 2013
40160612 01	EL-LTG III, 2 Year Test of Emergency Light Batteries	February 6, 2013
40067174 01	P-011A/B-M SPR, Inspect Spare CCW Motor (Warehouse No. 3)	February 8, 2011

LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

AC	Alternating Current
ADAMS	Agencywide Document Access Management System
ADV	Atmospheric Dump Valve
AFP	Auxiliary Feedwater Pump
AFW	Auxiliary Feedwater
AOP	Abnormal Operating Procedure
AR	Action Request
CCW	Component Cooling Water
CDBI	Component Design Basis Inspection
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
DC	Direct Current
EC	Engineering Change
EDMG	Extensive Damage Mitigation Guideline
EPIP	Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures
EPU	Extended Power Uprate
ERO	Emergency Response Organization
IMC	Inspection Manual Chapter
IN	Information Notice
IR	Inspection Report
MHz	Megahertz
MOV	Motor-Operated Valve
NCV	Non-Cited Violation
NFPA	National Fire Protection Association
NRC	U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
OM	Operations Manual
P&ID	Piping and Instrumentation Drawing
PAB	Primary Auxiliary Building
PARS	Publicly Available Records
PBNP	Point Beach Nuclear Plant
RHR	Residual Heat Removal
SSD	Safe Shutdown
TCCF	Transient Combustible Control Form
TDAFW	Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump
WO	Work Order

L. Meyer

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Sincerely,

/RA/

Robert C. Daley, Chief
Engineering Branch 3
Division of Reactor Safety

Docket Nos. 50-266; 50-301
License Nos. DPR-24; DPR-27

Enclosure: Inspection Report 05000266/2013010; and 05000301/2013010
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