

October 3, 2013

NRC 2013-0025 10 CFR 50.54(f)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001

Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 Docket 50-266 and 50-301 Renewed License Nos. DPR-24 and DPR-27

<u>Update to NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC Response to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Request for Information Regarding Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3, Seismic</u>

References: (1)

- (1) NRC letter to All Power Reactor Licensees and Holders of Construction Permits in Active or Deferred Status, dated March 12, 2012, Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Accident (ML12053A340)
- (2) NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC letter to NRC, dated November 26, 2012, NextEra Energy Point Beach LLD Response to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Request for Information Regarding Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3, Seismic (ML12332A070)

On November 26, 2012, NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC (NextEra) responded to the NRC staff's request for information pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) (Reference 1). Enclosure 3 of Reference (1) contains specific Requested Actions and Requested Information associated with Recommendation 2.3 for Seismic. Requested Information Item 2 of Reference (1), Enclosure 4, requested addressees conduct a seismic walkdown and submit a final report which addressed various requirements detailed in the item. Reference (1), Enclosure 3 required addressees submit a final seismic walkdown report within 180 days of the NRC's endorsement of the seismic walkdown process.

Via Reference (2), NextEra submitted the required reports for Units 1 and 2 regarding seismic walkdowns. Subsequent to submitting this report, NextEra determined that there were errors in these reports. The errors are administrative in nature and have no impact on the contents of this report. Additionally, NextEra determined that some information in the reports could be better presented.

Enclosure 1 contains the updated information for the Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 seismic walkdown report. Enclosure 2 contains the updated information for the Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 2 seismic walkdown report. A table is provided in the beginning of each enclosure describing the updates. Walkdowns that have been completed after the report will be submitted to the NRC when all of the remaining walkdowns are complete.

This letter contains no new Regulatory Commitments and no revision to existing Regulatory Commitments.

If you have any questions please contact Mr. Michael Millen, Licensing Manager, at 920/755-7845.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on October 3, 2013.

Very truly yours,

NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC

Larry Meyer

Site Vice President

Enclosures

CC:

Administrator, Region III, USNRC

Project Manager, Point Beach Nuclear Plant, USNRC Resident Inspector, Point Beach Nuclear Plant, USNRC Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, USNRC

ENCLOSURE 1

NEXTERA ENERGY POINT BEACH, LLC POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2

UPDATE TO NEXTERA ENERGY POINT BEACH, LLC
RESPONSE TO 10 CFR 50.54(F)
REQUEST FOR INFORMATION REGARDING NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE
RECOMMENDATION 2.3, SEISMIC

SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 1 12Q0114-R-001 REVISION 0

Updates to Seismic Walkdown Report Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 12Q0114-R-001 Revision 0

Executive Summary	No Changes
Section 1	No Changes
Section 2	No Changes
Section 3	No Changes
Section 4	No Changes
Section 5	An additional item was added to Table 5.2 (D-63). An additional item was added to Table 5.3 (AWB 24, Abandoned Pipe Support).
Section 6	No Changes
Section 7	No Changes
Section 8	No Changes
Section 9	No Changes
Appendix A	No Changes
Appendix B	Table 3, IPEEE and A-46 Outlier Resolution, is updated to only include the equipment for Unit 1. Resolution dates were also added. Attachment C was added to provide the selected equipment list. The enclosed pages, B-14 through B-51, replace pages B-14 through B-38 of the original report.
Appendix C	Administrative changes made on pages C-49, C-56, and C-179.
Appendix D	Administrative change made on pages D-35 and D-40.
Appendix E	Table E-1 has been updated
Appendix F	Administrative changes made on pages F-3 and F-4.

	Table 5-2: Table of Actions Resulting from Seismic Walkdown Inspection								
Equipment ID	Potentially Adverse Seismic Condition	Degraded	Non- conforming	Unanalyzed	Action Taken to Address the Condition	Current Status			
1MS-02090	A section of tubing is supporting the solenoid and attached flexible conduit fitting. The solenoid and the fitting are relatively heavy compared to the capacity of the tubing supporting them.			x	NextEra Engineer determined from P&ID drawings that a loss of air to the valve results in the valve going to a safe position. Initiated CR.	Being tracked in the CAP.			
1-83/DY-03 and DY-0C	The south side of panel DY-0C is in contact with an electrical fitting attached to panel 1-83/DY-03. It is uncertain what components are in each panel.		Х		NextEra performed an evaluation of contents of the panels and determined that the interaction would not affect the operability of the components. Initiated CR.	Closed			
1B-04	Cracks identified in concrete along centerline of anchors.			x	The condition was evaluated and determined to be acceptable. A review of the modification and calculation determined that there is sufficient margin to accommodate the crack. Initiated CR.	Being tracked in the CAP.			
1P-002A	Light supported off incorrectly oriented beam clamp.		Х		Informed maintenance and operations to repair. Initiated CR.	Closed. Identified issue repaired.			
D-63	Overhead 3" Service Water line (return) has condensation on it. Part of the line is above 1SMS-02020.		×		The walkdown team determined that this is not a seismic concern	Work Request initiated to repair.			

Table 5-2: Table of Actions Resulting from Seismic Walkdown Inspection								
Equipment ID	Potentially Adverse Seismic Condition	Degraded	Non- conforming	Unanalyzed	Action Taken to Address the Condition	Current Status		
1P-014A	An overhead light fixture was raised by overlapping the light fixture chain and securing it with ty-wraps.	×			The walkdown team determined that the light fixture would not fall and interact with seismically qualified equipment since the chain would support the light fixture if the ty-wraps were to break. Initiated CR.	Work Request initiated to repair.		
1B-03	Rear bottom panel is missing a mounting bolt.	x			The walkdown team determined that the missing bolt does not adversely affect the seismic capability of the equipment. The bolt is one of many that attach the rear panel to the frame. Initiated CR.	Work Request initiated to repair.		
P-012A	Chain for valve SF-1 can interact with the oiler on the pump.	x			The chain was secured behind conduit and judged not to pose a current concern. Initiated CR.	Closed. Chain is tied off to a support with seal type lock.		

Table 5-2: Table of Actions Resulting from Seismic Walkdown Inspection								
Equipment ID	Potentially Adverse Seismic Condition	Degraded	Non- conforming	Unanalyzed	Action Taken to Address the Condition	Current Status		
HX-013A	East bolt spacing is not per drawing EC-36A-3, Job 12703, Rev. 3. Bolts are spaced at 8", 9" and 8" in the north south direction. The drawing shows the bolts spaced at 9", 9" and 9".		×		Per calculation 91C2696-C-021 a spacing of 9", 9", 9" is used. There is a safety factor of 42.5 on these anchors. Therefore, they are concluded to be capable of carrying the load with the slightly reduced spacing. Initiated CR.	Being tracked in the CAP.		
HX-013B	East bolt spacing is not per drawing EC-36A-3, Job 12703, Rev. 3. Bolts are spaced at 7 3/4"", 9 1/4"" and 7 3/4"" in the north south direction. The drawing shows the bolts spaced at 9", 9" and 9".		x		Per calculation 91C2696-C-021 a spacing of 9", 9", 9" is used. There is a safety factor of 42.5 on these anchors. Therefore, they are concluded to be capable of carrying the load with the slightly reduced spacing. Initiated CR.	Being tracked in the CAP.		
P-32A	Overhead trolley control pendant wedged between pump junction box and pump casing.			Х	NextEra Engineer determined junction box and pump casing are rugged and will not be damaged by the pendant. Initiated CR.	Work request initiated to repair.		

	Table 5-3: Table of Actions Resulting from Area Walk-by Inspections								
Area	Potentially Adverse Seismic Condition	Degraded	Non- conforming	Unanalyzed	Action Taken to Address the Condition	Current Status			
AWB 3	The instrument pipe behind valve 1RH-716B has a long horizontal cantilever. The first support clamp is loose.	X			The seismic walkdown team assessed the potential interaction during the walkdown and determined not to be a concern. The pipe will not move enough to interact and damage seismically qualified equipment. Initiated CR.	Work request initiated to repair.			
AWB 5	Masonry wall located behind 2CV-351. Could not determine if wall was seismically evaluated.			x	NextEra Engineer determined that the masonry wall was not in vicinity of safety related equipment. Initiated CR.	Closed			
AWB 8	The nuts for the south post for 1T-006A are not fully tightened.		X		Initiated CR. NextEra Engineering performed a preliminary calculation to show that there is sufficient capacity in the remaining bolts to prevent the tank from overturning and becoming an interaction concern.	Work request initiated to repair.			

	Table 5-3: Table of Actions Resulti	Table 5-3: Table of Actions Resulting from Area Walk-by Inspections								
Area	Potentially Adverse Seismic Condition	Degraded	Non- conforming	Unanalyzed	Action Taken to Address the Condition	Current Status				
AWB 9	An S-Hook supporting a light fixture was observed to be opened.	х			In the judgment of the walkdown team, the light fixture would not fall and interact with any seismically qualified equipment. Initiated CR.	Work request initiated to repair.				
AWB 15	The public address speaker is close to an instrument line and could interact with it.	×			The seismic walkdown team determined that the tubing was sufficiently rugged that it would not be damaged by the speaker in a seismic event. Initiated CR.	Work request initiated to repair.				
AWB 19	A 3/8" tube for valve 1SI-881A has a long span (~10') and is very flexible.	X			The walkdown team judged that the tube was not an interaction hazard and would deflect but not break in a seismic event. A preliminary calculation of the tubing spans showed that the tubing will not overstress. Initiated CR.	Work request initiated to repair.				

	Table 5-3: Table of Actions Resulting from Area Walk-by Inspections								
Area	Potentially Adverse Seismic Condition	Degraded	Non- conforming	Unanalyzed	Action Taken to Address the Condition	Current Status			
AWB 19	On the west wall there is a flexible pipe from SI-917A that appears to bearing on some conduit clamps. The hose could dislodge from the clamps and interact with items below.	X			The walkdown team determined that the condition was not a seismic concern. There were no soft targets immediately below. Initiated CR.	Work request initiated to repair.			
AWB 19	A conduit for valve 2SI-825C is attached to the flange of a vertical hanger with clamps oriented such that they are resisting dead load with friction. Clamps should be re-orientated.	Х			The conduit is attached to nearby cable tray JG08 and will not fall. Initiated CR.	Work request initiated to repair.			
AWB 19	A copper instrument air pipe is attached to a vertical hanger with clamps oriented such that they are resisting dead load with friction. The clamps should be reoriented.	Х			The bottom support of the pipe is oriented correctly. There is a support in the horizontal run at the top of the riser. Based on this the pipe is judged not to fall. Initiated CR.	Work request initiated to repair.			
AWB 19	There are two lights in the area that are attached to structural steel with magnets. It is suggested that the magnets be backed up with lanyards to assure they will not fall.	Х			The lights were tug tested and determined to be adequately supported. Initiated CR.	Closed			

Table 5-3: Table of Actions Resulting from Area Walk-by Inspections									
Area	Potentially Adverse Seismic Condition	Degraded	Non- conforming	Unanalyzed	Action Taken to Address the Condition	Current Statu			
AWB 20	A pipe support in the north west corner of the room was observed to have potential deficiencies. The support is a structural member (W shape) with the weak axis resisting dead load welded to a four bolt anchor plate at each end. One of the anchors on the south plate is missing. The west flange of the support and about ½ of the web are notched in three places. There is a shackle on the south west anchor on the north plate.	Х			The walkdown team judged it to be acceptable since the support is lightly loaded. CR initiated.	Being tracked the CAP.			
AWB 24	Various housekeeping items identified at Elevation 66, above the SFP Hx area	Х			The walkdown team judged the items acceptable due to no soft targets in the area. Initiated CR.	Work reques initiated to repa			
AWB 24	The anchors for T-161A appear to be in oversized holes and some had minor corrosion.		x		The walkdown team judged the anchors to be adequate to support the tank. Initiated CR.	Work reques initiated to repa			
AWB 24	The piping from T-161C to the header is not clamped to the supports. Hence it is not laterally supported.	Х			The walkdown team judged the piping to not be a falling hazard since there are no soft targets below. Initiated CR.	Work reques initiated to repa			
AWB 24	There is an abandoned pipe support in the SW corner of the SFP HX area.	X			The walkdown team judged the connection of the pipe support is robust, and therefore does not pose an interaction hazard.	Work reques initiated to remo			

	Table 5-3: Table of Actions Resulting from Area Walk-by Inspections									
Area	Potentially Adverse Seismic Condition	Degraded	Non- conforming	Unanalyzed	Action Taken to Address the Condition	Current Status				
AWB 27	There is a missing anchor bolt on the pipe support west of P-31A	Х			Previously identified and evaluated in CR.	Work Request initiated to repair.				
AWB 27	There is a missing anchor bolt on the base plate north west of P-31A for a chlorination line.	Х			Previously identified and evaluated in CR.	Work Request initiated to repair.				
AWB 27	There is corrosion on P-31A and P-31B base plates.	X			Corrosion evaluated by NextEra Engineering and determined to minor surface corrosion and not a concern. CR initiated.	Closed. Will be tracked through structures monitoring program.				
AWB 42	The G-01 diesel room contains threaded fire protection piping that is supported from threaded rod hangers. The fire protections system is only laterally supported at a connection to a fire protection header which comes into the room through a wall. The lines are supported off various lengths threaded rods that are typically attached to a shell type anchor in the concrete ceiling. On the west end, the fire protection line and a sprinkler head are relatively close to the room fans. The Seismic Walkdown Team was unable to conclude that the fire protection pipe and sprinkler head would not move and interaction with the fans. In addition, the team could not conclude that the fire protection line would not deflect in a manner that would cause the threaded fittings to leak.			X	NextEra Engineering performed a walkdown and determined that much of the area is not susceptible to issues do to spray. A preliminary evaluation was performed for the piping at the west end of the room and it was determined that the piping is within code allowable stresses and will not leak. This preliminary evaluation was considered a bounding case and thus the remaining piping will not leak. Initiated CR.	Being tracked in the CAP.				

Table 5-3: Table of Actions Resulting from Area Walk-by Inspections							
Area	Potentially Adverse Seismic Condition	Degraded	Non- conforming	Unanalyzed	Action Taken to Address the Condition	Current Status	
AWB 48	The cable tray overhead spanning from C-180 to C-181 is sagging and several of the rungs are bent.	Х			The walkdown team determined that the cable tray is sufficiently supported that it would not fall. CR initiated.	Closed	

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<u>Table 3 IPEEE and A-46 Outlier Resolution – Unit 1</u>

Outlier No.	Program	Equip Class	System	Equip ID	Noun Name	Status at Time of SRT Walkdown in 1993	Outlier Description	Interim Resolution Documented in the USI A-46 Seismic Evaluation Report to NRC	Status / Final Resolution	Required Close Out	Date Completed
3	A,1	2	480V	1B- 03	480v Safeguards Load Center	O - ANCHORAGE INSUFFICIENT, Weld spacing is to large. Every 3rd cabinet in some cases. TROLLEY HOIST needs to be clamped in place. T. Dykstra to submit separate EWRs for weld and trolley hoist.	The anchorage weld spacing is too large, every 3rd cabinet in some cases. The trolley hoist that rides along the top of the switchgear poses an interaction hazard.	There is sufficient anchorage capacity in the existing welds to carry the seismic anchorage loads. However, the switchgear was declared an outlier because it is not good engineering practice to transfer the seismic loading through the switchgear structure. The switchgear is considered seismically operable. Modification MR 95-005 is initiated to install new anchorage. The trolley hoist will be evaluated.	MR 95-005 installed new anchorage (WO 9700600). EWR 96-042 evaluated breaker handling trolley. EWR closed. MR 98-094 installed trolley stops.	SQ-001544, SQ-001531 completed	7/6/99
5	A,I	2	480V	1B- 04	480v Safeguards Load Center	O - ANCHORAGE INSUFFICIENT, Weld spacing is to large. Every 3rd cabinet in some cases. TROLLEY HOIST needs to be clamped in place. T. Dykstra to submit separate EWRs for weld and trolley hoist.	The anchorage weld spacing is too large, every 3rd cabinet in some cases. The trolley hoist that rides along the top of the switchgear poses an interaction hazard.	There is sufficient anchorage capacity in the existing welds to carry the seismic anchorage loads. However, the switchgear was declared an outlier because it is not good engineering practice to transfer the seismic loading through the switchgear structure. The switchgear is considered seismically operable. Modification MR 95-005 is initiated to install new anchorage. The trolley hoist will be evaluated.	MR 95-005 installed new anchorage. EWR 96-042 assigned to evaluated breaker handling trolley. EWR closed. MR 98-094 installed trolley stops.	SQ-001545, SQ-001535 complete	7/6/99
8	A,I	4	4.16KV	1X- 13	B-03 Station Service Transformer	O - ANCHORED WITH FRICTION CLIPS. MR in process. MR 94-012	The transformer anchorage uses friction clips which are not covered by the GIP.	The friction clips provide adequate capacity to withstand the PBNP SSE, because the friction coefficient exceeds the seismic demand level. The anchorage will be upgrade under modification MR 94-012.	MR 94-012 installed new anchorage - accepted 4/16/96.	SQ-001703 completed	8/1/97
10	A,I	4	4.16KV	1X- 14	B-04 Station Service Transformer	O - ANCHORED WITH FRICTION CLIPS. MR in process. MR 94-012	The transformer anchorage uses friction clips which are not covered by the GIP.	The friction clips provide adequate capacity to withstand the PBNP SSE, because the friction coefficient exceeds the seismic demand level. The anchorage will be upgrade under modification MR 94-012.	MR 94-012 installed new anchorage - accepted 4/16/96.	SQ-001799 completed	8/1/97

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Outlier No.	Program	Equip Class	System	Equip ID	Noun Name	Status at Time of SRT Walkdown in 1993	Outlier Description	Interim Resolution Documented in the USI A-46 Seismic Evaluation Report to NRC	Status / Final Resolution	Required Close Out	Date Completed
12	A,I	5	RH	1P- 10A	Residual Heat Removal Pump	O - Anchorage failed	The pump anchorage has less than GIP minimum required edge distance, resulting in anchorage failure when evaluated in accordance with the GIP.	The pump anchorage was analyzed in accordance with ACI 349-80 Appendix B and shown to have sufficient capacity.	S&A Calc 91C2696-C-008 uses guidelines from ACI-349-80 to show pump anchorage adequate	SQ-1842 completed.	11/5/02
13	A,I	5	RH	1P- 10B	Residual Heat Removal Pump	O - Anchorage failed	The pump anchorage has less than GIP minimum required edge distance, resulting in anchorage failure when evaluated in accordance with the GIP.	The pump anchorage was analyzed in accordance with ACI 349-80 Appendix B and shown to have sufficient capacity.	S&A Calc 91C2696-C-008 uses guidelines from ACI-349-80 to show pump anchorage adequate	SQ-1802 completed.	11/5/02
14	A,I,C	5	CC	1P- 11A	Component Cooling Water Pump	O - ANCHOR	The anchor J-bolts have an embedment < 16D as required by the GIP.	A calculation per ACI 318-63 and ACI 349-80 Appendix B shows that the pump anchorage has sufficient capacity.	S&A Calc 91C2696-C-009 uses the guidelines from ACI 348-63 and ACI 349-80 Appendix B to show that the pump anchorage has sufficient capacity.	SQ-1804 completed.	11/5/02
15	A,I,C	5	CC	1P- 11B	Component Cooling Water Pump	O - ANCHOR	The anchor J-bolts have an embedment < 16D as required by the GIP.	A calculation per ACI 318-63 and ACI 349-80 Appendix B shows that the pump anchorage has sufficient capacity.	S&A Calc 91C2696-C-009 uses the guidelines from ACI 318-63 and ACI 349-80 Appendix B to show that the pump anchorage has sufficient capacity.	SQ-1803 completed.	11/5/02
16	A,I	5	SI	1P- 14A	Containment Spray Pump	O - Failed Anchorage Calc PIPE LOAD ON SUCTION NOZZLES	The anchor J-bolts have an embedment < 16D as required by the GIP.	A calculation per ACI 318-63 and ACI 349-80 Appendix B shows that the pump anchorage has sufficient capacity.	S&A Calc 91C2696-C-019 uses the guidelines from ACI 318-63 and ACI 349-80 Appendix B to show that the pump anchorage has sufficient capacity.	SQ-1805 completed.	11/12/02

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Outlier No.	Program	Equip Class	System	Equip ID	Noun Name	Status at Time of SRT Walkdown in 1993	Outlier Description	Interim Resolution Documented in the USI A-46 Seismic Evaluation Report to NRC	Status / Final Resolution	Required Close Out	Date Completed
18	A,1	5	SI	1P- 14B	Containment Spray Pump	O - Failed Anchorage Calc PIPE LOAD ON SUCTION NOZZLES	The anchor J-bolts have an embedment < 16D as required by the GIP.	A calculation per ACI 318-63 and ACI 349-80 Appendix B shows that the pump anchorage has sufficient capacity.	S&A Calc 91C2696-C-019 uses the guidelines from ACI 318-63 and ACI 349-80 Appendix B to show that the pump anchorage has sufficient capacity.	SQ-1806 completed.	11/12/02
20	A,I	6	SW	P- 32A	Service Water Pump	O - Anchorage/capacity check on bolts & studs, restraint of overhead trolley,	The pump extending casing is 34' long > the 20' allowable. The overhead crane poses an interaction hazard.	The pump is considered operable based on original design calculations. S&A calculation 91C2696-C-012 shows that the pump shaft stress is within allowable limits.	S&A Calc 91C2696-C-012 shows pump shaft stresses within limits. EWR 96- 041 evaluated the overhead hoist. Concluded that the existing configuration does not present an interaction hazard to the SW pumps- completed 12/5/96.	SQ-1808 completed.	6/15/99
21	A,I	6	SW	P- 32B	Service Water Pump	O - Anchorage/capacity check on bolts & studs, restraint of overhead trolley,	The pump extending casing is 34' long > the 20' allowable. The overhead crane poses an interaction hazard.	The pump is considered operable based on original design calculations. S&A calculation 91C2696-C-012 shows that the pump shaft stress is within allowable limits.	S&A Calc 91C2696-C-012 shows pump shaft stresses within limits. EWR 96- 041 evaluated the overhead hoist. Concluded that the existing configuration does not present an interaction hazard to the SW pumps - completed 12/5/96.	SQ-1809 completed.	6/15/99

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Outlier No.	Program	Equip Class	System	Equip ID	Noun Name	Status at Time of SRT Walkdown in 1993	Outlier Description	Interim Resolution Documented in the USI A-46 Seismic Evaluation Report to NRC	Status / Final Resolution	Required Close Out	Date Completed
22	A,I	6	SW	P- 32C	Service Water Pump	O - Anchorage/capacity check on bolts & studs, restraint of overhead trolley,	The pump extending casing is 34' long > the 20' allowable. The overhead crane poses an interaction hazard.	The pump is considered operable based on original design calculations. S&A calculation 91C2696-C-012 shows that the pump shaft stress is within allowable limits.	S&A Calc 91C2696-C-012 shows pump shaft stresses within limits. EWR 96- 041 evaluated the overhead hoist. Concluded that the existing configuration does not present an interaction hazard to the SW pumps - completed 12/5/96.	SQ-1810 completed.	6/15/99
23	A,I	6	SW	P- 32D	Service Water Pump	O - Anchorage/capacity check on bolts & studs, restraint of overhead trolley,	The pump extending casing is 34' long > the 20' allowable. The overhead crane poses an interaction hazard.	The pump is considered operable based on original design calculations. S&A calculation 91C2696-C-012 shows that the pump shaft stress is within allowable limits.	S&A Calc 91C2696-C-012 shows pump shaft stresses within limits. EWR 96- 041 evaluated the overhead hoist. Concluded that the existing configuration does not present an interaction hazard to the SW pumps - completed 12/5/96.	SQ-1811 completed.	6/15/99
24	A,1	6	SW	P- 32E	Service Water Pump	O - Anchorage/capacity check on bolts & studs, restraint of overhead trolley,	The pump extending casing is 34' long > the 20' allowable. The overhead crane poses an interaction hazard.	The pump is considered operable based on original design calculations. S&A calculation 91C2696-C-012 shows that the pump shaft stress is within allowable limits.	S&A Calc 91C2696-C-012 shows pump shaft stresses within limits. EWR 96- 041 evaluated the overhead hoist. Concluded that the existing configuration does not present an interaction hazard to the SW pumps - completed 12/5/96.	SQ-1812 completed.	6/15/99

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Outlier No.	Program	Equip Class	System	Equip ID	Noun Name	Status at Time of SRT Walkdown in 1993	Outlier Description	Interim Resolution Documented in the USI A-46 Seismic	Status / Final Resolution	Required Close Out	Date Completed
25	A,I	6	SW	P- 32F	Service Water Pump	O - Anchorage/capacity check on bolts & studs, restraint of overhead trolley,	The pump extending casing is 34' long > the 20' allowable. The overhead crane poses an interaction hazard.	Evaluation Report to NRC The pump is considered operable based on original design calculations. S&A calculation 91C2696-C-012 shows that the pump shaft stress is within allowable limits.	S&A Calc 91C2696-C-012 shows pump shaft stresses within limits. EWR 96- 041 evaluated the overhead hoist. Concluded that the existing configuration does not present an interaction hazard to the SW pumps - completed 12/5/96.	SQ-1813 completed.	6/15/99
26	A,Î,V	7	cs	1CS- 466	Hx-1a Sg Feedwater Regulator Control	O - Block Wall interaction	The valves are adjacent to a large unanalyzed block wall. The block wall poses an interaction hazard for the valve and it subcomponents.	The function of the valve is to close to isolate feed to the S/Gs. The valve is not required to shut during the 30 second period of strong motion. However, it is desired to have it shut during the 72 hour recovery period. As a backup to the valve failing to close, the operators can turn off the feed pumps and condensate pumps.	EWR - Functional Evaluation. 6/20/96 - EWR 96- 043 assigned to document evaluation. Evaluation concluded that this valve is not required to be on the SSEL.	No walkdown required SQ-001814 update complete.	8/30/00
28	A,I,V	7	CS	1CS- 476	Hx-1b Sg Feedwater Regulator Control	O - Block Wall interaction	The valves are adjacent to a large unanalyzed block wall. The block wall poses an interaction hazard for the valve and it subcomponents.	The function of the valve is to close to isolate feed to the S/Gs. The valve is not required to shut during the 30 second period of strong motion. However, it is desired to have it shut during the 72 hour recovery period. As a backup to the valve failing to close, the operators can turn off the feed pumps and condensate pumps.	EWR - Functional Evaluation. 6/20/96 - EWR 96- 043 assigned to document evaluation. Evaluation concluded that this valve is not required to be on the SSEL.	No walkdown required SQ-001816 update complete.	8/30/00

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Outlier No.	Program	Equip Class	System	Equip ID	Noun Name	Status at Time of SRT Walkdown in 1993	Outlier Description	Interim Resolution Documented in the USI A-46 Seismic Evaluation Report to NRC	Status / Final Resolution	Required Close Out	Date Completed
30	A,I,V	7	CS	1CS- 480	Hx-1a Sg Regulator Control Bypass	O - Block Wall interaction	The valves are adjacent to a large unanalyzed block wall. The block wall poses an interaction hazard for the valve and it subcomponents.	The valve is normally close and must remain closed to isolate feed to the S/Gs. Therefore, during the 30 second period of strong motion, the valve is not required to change state. It is not likely, that the block wall interaction would cause the valve to open. As a backup to the valve inadvertently opening, the operators can turn off the feed pumps and condensate pumps.	EWR - Functional Evaluation. 6/20/96 - EWR 96- 043 assigned to document evaluation. Evaluation concluded that this valve is not required to be on the SSEL.	No walkdown required SQ-001818 update complete.	8/30/00
32	A,I,V	7	CS	1CS- 481	Hx-1b Sg Regulator Control Bypass	O - Block Wall interaction	The valves are adjacent to a large unanalyzed block wall. The block wall poses an interaction hazard for the valve and it subcomponents.	The valve is normally close and must remain closed to isolate feed to the S/Gs. Therefore, during the 30 second period of strong motion, the valve is not required to change state. It is not likely, that the block wall interaction would cause the valve to open. As a backup to the valve inadvertently opening, the operators can turn off the feed pumps and condensate pumps.	EWR - Functional Evaluation. 6/20/96 - EWR 96- 043 assigned to document evaluation. Evaluation concluded that this valve is not required to be on the SSEL.	No walkdown required SQ-001820 update complete.	8/30/00
34	I,V,RG	7	RM	1RM- 3200 A	Re-211/Re- 212 Monitor Return	O - Based on visual inspection, the building the RMs are located in is not anchored. Need to check any drawings. 1 OF 4 ANCHOR BOLTS MISSING. Need to determine which ISRS would be applicable	The valve is located in a climate control hut that has no visible base anchorage.	The item has been walked down for the IPEEE only. Subsequent to the walkdown, it has been screened out using the Seismic PSA screening criteria.	12/28/98 - EWR 96-044 complete. ID'd the anchorage. S&L completed calc. Calculation resolves outlier.	SQ-001985 resolves this outlier	3/10/98

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Outlier No.	Program	Equip Class	System	Equip ID	Noun Name	Status at Time of SRT Walkdown in 1993	Outlier Description	Interim Resolution Documented in the USI A-46 Seismic Evaluation Report to NRC	Status / Final Resolution	Required Close Out	Date Completed
36	I,V,RG	7	RM	1RM- 3200 B	Re-211/Re- 212 Monitor Supply	O - Based on visual inspection, the building the RMs are located in is not anchored. Need to check any drawings. 1 OF 4 ANCHOR BOLTS MISSING. Need to determine which ISRS would be applicable	The valve is located in a climate control hut that has no visible base anchorage.	The item has been walked down for the IPEEE only. Subsequent to the walkdown, it has been screened out using the Seismic PSA screening criteria.	12/28/98 - EWR 96-044 complete. ID'd the anchorage. S&L completed calc. Calculation resolves outlier.	SQ-001987 resolves this outlier	3/10/98
38	A,I	7	SC	1SC- 959	Rhr Loop Sample Isolation	O - Valve is only restrained by 2 U-bolts in friction. The valve is on a 3/8" sample line. Should have operator support or analysis on load bearing capacity of U-bolts	The AOV body is mounted to a support shelf by 2 U-bolts in friction. The valve is mounted on a 3/8" line. If the U-bolts slip, the potential exists for the line to be overstress.	This valve is normally closed and is required to stay closed in the event of an SSE. The U-bolt support will be analyzed and if required a valve operator support will be installed.	EWR - 6/20/96 - EWR Submitted, MR 96-035 assigned to install operator support. (DNC) WO 9817131. Installation complete.	SQ-001771 resolves this outlier	1/14/00
39	A,I,V	7	SI	1SI- 839A	T-34a Si Accum Outlet To Si Test Line Isolation	O - The Shot in concrete nails used for anchorage of the valve support frame are not covered in the GIP. They are considered to be seismically operable by inspection. Anchorage evaluation will be done. 7/25/94 - Support frame modified during U1R21. MR 93-047	The Shot in concrete nails used for anchorage of the valve support frame are not covered in the GIP. They are considered to be seismically operable by inspection.	The support frame anchorage was modified during the same U1R21refueling outage under MR 93-047	Fixed, MR 93-047. Accepted 4/29/94	SQ-001641 resolves outlier, completed	9/29/95
41	A,I,V	7	SI	1SI- 839B	Si A Cold Leg To Si Test Line Isolation	O - The Shot in concrete nails used for anchorage of the valve support frame are not covered in the GIP. They are considered to be seismically operable by inspection. Anchorage evaluation will be done. 7/25/94 - Support frame modified during U1R21. MR 93-047	The Shot in concrete nails used for anchorage of the valve support frame are not covered in the GIP. They are considered to be seismically operable by inspection.	The support frame anchorage was modified during the same U1R21refueling outage under MR 93-047	Fixed, MR 93-047. Accepted 4/29/94	SQ-001642 resolves outlier.	9/29/95

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Outlier No.	Program	Equip Class	System	Equip ID	Noun Name	Status at Time of SRT Walkdown in 1993	Outlier Description	Interim Resolution Documented in the USI A-46 Seismic Evaluation Report to NRC	Status / Final Resolution	Required Close Out	Date Completed
43	A,I,V	7	SI	1SI- 839C	T-34b Si Accum Outlet To Si Test Line Isolation	O - The Shot in concrete nails used for anchorage of the valve support frame are not covered in the GIP. They are considered to be seismically operable by inspection. Anchorage evaluation will be done. 7/25/94 - Support frame modified during U1R21. MR 93-047	The Shot in concrete nails used for anchorage of the valve support frame are not covered in the GIP. They are considered to be seismically operable by inspection.	The support frame anchorage was modified during the same U1R21refueling outage under MR 93-047	Fixed, MR 93-047. Accepted 4/29/94	SQ-001643 resolves outlier. Completed	9/29/95
45	A,I,V	7	SI	1SI- 839D	Si B Cold Leg To Si Test Line Isolation	O - The Shot in concrete nails used for anchorage of the valve support frame are not covered in the GIP. They are considered to be seismically operable by inspection. Anchorage evaluation will be done. 7/25/94 - Support frame modified during U1R21. MR 93-047	The Shot in concrete nails used for anchorage of the valve support frame are not covered in the GIP. They are considered to be seismically operable by inspection.	The support frame anchorage was modified during the same U1R21refueling outage under MR 93-047	Fixed, MR 93-047. Accepted 4/29/94	SQ-001644 resolves outlier. Completed	9/29/95
47	I,V	7	SI	1SI- 844A	T-34a Si Accumulator Drain To T-16 Rcdt	O - Within 1/2" of concrete wall. Valve on 1" line. Recommend brace on yoke. 7/25/94 - Added operator support during U1R21 MR 94-031	The valve is within 1/2" of concrete wall. Valve on 1" line.	An operator support was installed during the same U1R21 refueling outage under modification MR 94-031.	Fixed, MR 94-031 - Accepted 4/25/94	SQ-001645 resolves outlier. Completed	11/18/94
48	I,V	7	SI	1SI- 844B	T-34b Si Accumulator Drain To T-16 Rcdt	O - Valve operator support is not anchored to the floor. 7/25/94 - Modified operator support during U1R21 MR 94-031	The valve operator support is not anchored to the floor.	The valve support was mounted during the same U1R21 under MR 94-031	Fixed, MR 94-031 - Accepted 4/25/94	SQ-001646 resolves outlier. Completed	11/18/94

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Outlier No.	Program	Equip Class	System	Equip ID	Noun Name	Status at Time of SRT Walkdown in 1993	Outlier Description	Interim Resolution Documented in the USI A-46 Seismic Evaluation Report to NRC	Status / Final Resolution	Required Close Out	Date Completed
49	I,V,RG	7	Si di	1SI- 846	T-34a/B Si Accum Nitrogen Inlet Control	O - 36" offset on 1.25" line. Because of pipe support configuration, potential for pipe overstress.	The AOV offset of 36" < 45" allowable offset for a 1" line. However, because of the pipe support configuration, there is a potential for pipe overstress.	The item has been walked down for the IPEEE only. Subsequent to the walkdown, it has been screened out using the Seismic PSA screening criteria. Modification request MR 94-066*B is initiated to upgrade the support of the 1" line.	(MR 94-066*B is incorrect) MR 95-059 installed a check valve, relief valve and regulator in the line during U1R23. S&L analysis WE-100165. Stresses are above allowable but below operability. CR 98-2401 created. 2/8/99: CR action (MAW) to do an analysis. MR 00-009 removed existing support and added two new supports.	SQ-001951 completed	4/30/96
52	I,RG	7	WG	1WG -1786	T-16 Rcdt Vent	O - Even though 24" offset < 45" GIP allowable for a 1" there is a potential for pipe overstress in line 1"-WD- 151R-1 because of how the 1" line is supported.	Even though 24" offset < 45" GIP allowable for a 1" there is a potential for pipe overstress in line 1"-WD-151R-1 because of how the 1" line is supported.	The item has been walked down for the IPEEE only. Subsequent to the walkdown, it has been screened out using the Seismic PSA screening criteria.	EWR 96-049 assigned - valves have been as-built, 9/3/98. Need to draft sketch for valve supports. 4/1/99 - MR 96-035 will install operator support. WO 9904473. Installation complete.	SQ-001775 resolves this outlier	1/14/00
54	I,RG	7	WG	1WG -1787	T-16 Rcdt Vent	O - Even though 24" offset < 45" GIP allowable for a 1" there is a potential for pipe overstress in line 1"-WD-151R-1 because of how the 1" line is supported.	Even though 24" offset < 45" GIP allowable for a 1" there is a potential for pipe overstress in line 1"-WD-151R-1 because of how the 1" line is supported.	The item has been walked down for the IPEEE only. Subsequent to the walkdown, it has been screened out using the Seismic PSA screening criteria.	EWR 96-049 assigned - valves have been as-built, 9/3/98. Need to draft sketch for valve supports. 4/1/99 - MR 96-035 will install operator support. WO 9904473. Installation complete.	SQ-001776 resolves this outlier	1/14/00

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Outlier No.	Program	Equip Class	System	Equip ID	Noun Name	Status at Time of SRT Walkdown in 1993	Outlier Description	Interim Resolution Documented in the USI A-46 Seismic Evaluation Report to NRC	Status / Final Resolution	Required Close Out	Date Completed
56	A,I	8	SI	1SI- 878A	P-15b Si Pump R-1 Reactor Vessel Injection	O - SRT review of pipe analysis Evaluated - Stress report Accession # - WE-100104	The valve was supported by the valve operator but not the valve body. In addition, the gap between the valve body and the gravity support stanchion is not properly shimmed	The pipe analysis, Accession # - WE-100104, shows that the valve will not be overstressed.	EWR 96-045 assigned to document resolution. NRC RAI asked for piping analysis. Resolved.	SQ-001647 resolves outlier.	3/27/97
58	A,I	8	SI	1SI- 878B	P-15a Si Pump Loop B Injection	O - SRT review of pipe analysis Evaluated - Stress report Accession # - WE-100104	The valve was supported by the valve operator but not the valve body. In addition, the gap between the valve body and the gravity support stanchion is not properly shimmed	The pipe analysis, Accession # - WE-100104, shows that the valve will not be overstressed.	EWR 96-045 assigned to document resolution. NRC RAI asked for piping analysis. Resolved.	SQ-001648 resolves outlier.	3/27/97
60	A,I	8	SI	1SI- 878C	P-15b Si Pump R-1 Reactor Vessel Injection	O - SRT review of pipe analysis Evaluated - Stress report Accession # - WE-100104	The valve was supported by the valve operator but not the valve body. In addition, the gap between the valve body and the gravity support stanchion is not properly shimmed	The pipe analysis, Accession # - WE-100104, shows that the valve will not be overstressed.	EWR 96-045 assigned to document resolution. NRC RAI asked for piping analysis. Resolved.	SQ-001649 resolves outlier.	3/27/97
62	A,ī	8	SI	1Si- 878D	P-15a Si Pump Loop A Injection	O - SRT review of pipe analysis Evaluated - Stress report Accession # - WE-100104	The valve was supported by the valve operator but not the valve body. In addition, the gap between the valve body and the gravity support stanction is not properly shimmed	The pipe analysis, Accession # - WE-100104, shows that the valve will not be overstressed.	EWR 96-045 assigned to document resolution. NRC RAI asked for piping analysis. Resolved.	SQ-001650 resolves outlier.	3/27/97

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Outlier No.	Program	Equip Class	System	Equip ID	Noun Name	Status at Time of SRT Walkdown in 1993	Outlier Description	Interim Resolution Documented in the USI A-46 Seismic Evaluation Report to NRC	Status / Final Resolution	Required Close Out	Date Completed
64	A,I	10	VNAFW	HX- 66	Auxiliary Feed Pump Area Cooler	O - Rubber isolators fail. They do not have sufficient shear and tension capacity to transfer the anchor loads to the concrete expansion anchors.	The air handling unit is mounted on rubber vibration isolators. The anchorage calculation concluded that the rubber isolators had insufficient capacity to transfer the anchorage loads to the concrete expansion anchors.	HX-66 is on the SSEL to maintain SW system integrity. The air handling and air cooling function is not required. The SW system engineer judged that a break in the attached 2" SW line would not significantly impact service water to other essential loads. The function of the air handling unit will be evaluated to determine if an anchorage upgrade is required.	EWR 96-046 assigned. MR 97- 104 installed replacement vibration isolators. Accepted 2/28/98.	SQ-001672. Outlier is resolved.	5/15/99
65	A,I	10	VNAFW	HX- 66A	Auxiliary Feed Pump Area Cooler	O - The Spring isolator base plate yields.	The air handling unit is mounted on spring vibration isolators. The anchorage calculation determined that the spring isolator base plate will yield.	HX-66A is on the SSEL to maintain SW system integrity. The air handling and air cooling function is not required. The SW system engineer judged that a break in the attached 2" SW line would not significantly impact service water to other essential loads. The function of the air handling unit will be evaluated to determine if an anchorage upgrade is required.	EWR 96-047 assigned. MR 98- 127 initiated. (RE: DNC) 2/11/99 - Need WO. WO 9808637 is replacing HX-66A cooling coils. Work complete.	SQ-001888 Outlier is resolved.	12/14/00
66	A,I	10	SW	HX- 98	Residual Heat Removal Pump Area Cooling Coil	O - Mounted on Neoprene pads. Pads need further eval per GIP Section 4.4. Evaluation by S&A? 5/22/95 - During the bolt tightness check on 2/20/95, the concrete expansion anchors for the left rear rubber vibration isolator were found to be never installed	The air handling unit is mounted on rubber vibration isolators. The anchorage calculation concluded that the rubber isolators had insufficient capacity to transfer the anchorage loads to the concrete expansion anchors.	HX-98 is on the SSEL to maintain SW system integrity. The air handling and air cooling function is not required. The SW system engineer judged that a break in the attached 2 1/2" SW line would not significantly impact service water to other essential loads. The function of the air handling unit will be evaluated to determine if an anchorage upgrade is required.	EWR 96-048 assigned. MR 97- 105 installed. WO 9807185 replaced HX-98 cooling coils.	SQ-001841. Outlier is resolved.	9/19/00
67	A,I	10	VNRC	1W- 4A	Containment Cavity Cooling Fan	O - No anchorage Anchored during U1R21 by TCM and ARB. MR 94-032.	The air handling unit was found unanchored.O- No anchorage Anchored during U1R21 by TCM and ARB. MR 94-032.	The unit was anchored during that same U1R21 outage under modification MR 94-032.	Fixed, MR 94-032 installed new anchorage - 4/25/94.	SQ-001651 resolves outlier.	9/29/94

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Outlier No.	Program	Equip Class	System	Equip ID	Noun Name	Status at Time of SRT Walkdown in 1993	Outlier Description	Interim Resolution Documented in the USI A-46 Seismic Evaluation Report to NRC	Status / Final Resolution	Required Close Out	Date Completed
68	A,I	10	VNRC	1W- 4B	Containment Cavity Cooling Fan	O - No anchorage Anchored during U1R21 by TCM and ARB. MR 94-032.	The air handling unit was found unanchored.O- No anchorage Anchored during U1R21 by TCM and ARB. MR 94-032.	The unit was anchored during that same U1R21 outage under modification MR 94-032.	Fixed, MR 94-032 installed new anchorage - 4/25/94.	SQ-001652 resolves outlier.	9/29/94
69	A,I,H	11	VNCSR	HX- 38A1 ,A2,A 3	Cable Spreading Room Air Conditioning Unit	O - No Anchorage, Motor on steel isolation springs. ISRS exceeds RS. New component 7/13/94. It is the parent component of HX-38A1, HX-38A2 and HX-38A3. Equipment class changed from 21 to 11	The chiller unit is not anchored, the compressor motors are on springs, and the seismic demand exceeds 1.5 x BS at the low frequency peak.	The chiller is on the SSEL to maintain SW integrity. A leak in the SW pipe would not significantly affect SW flow to other essential loads. The HVAC room is designed to handle that flooding from a SW break. The chill water cooling function of the unit is not required. The function of the chiller unit will be evaluated to determine if an anchorage upgrade is required.	EWR 96-052 assigned. Chiller HX-038A replaced. MR 97-049*B installed new heat exchangers.	SQ-001957 Outlier is resolved.	5/19/02
70	A,I,H	11	VNCR	HX- 38B1 ,B2,B 3,B4	Control Room Air Conditioning Unit	O - No Anchorage, Motor on steel isolation springs. ISRS exceeds RS. New component 7/13/94. It is the parent component of HX-38B1, HX-38B2, HX-38B3 and HX-38B4. Equipment class changed from 21 to 11	The chiller unit is not anchored, the compressor motors are on springs, and the seismic demand exceeds 1.5 x BS at the low frequency peak.	The chiller is on the SSEL to maintain SW integrity. A leak in the SW pipe would not significantly affect SW flow to other essential loads. The HVAC room is designed to handle that flooding from a SW break. The chill water cooling function of the unit is not required. The function of the chiller unit will be evaluated to determine if an anchorage upgrade is required.	EWR 96-051 assigned. Chiller HX-038B replaced. MR 97-049*C installed new heat exchangers.	SQ-001962 Outlier is resolved.	8/15/02
71	A,1	12	DA	K-4B	G-02 Edg Starting Air Compressor Motor Or Diesel	O - Loose hand crank resting against it which may pose an interaction hazard. 4/21/95 - a hand crank mount has been installed on the wall adjacent to the compressor	A loose hand crank was resting against the air compressor posing an interaction hazard.	Hand crank installed on a bracket on the wall adjacent to the air compressor	Hand crank installed on a bracket on the wall adjacent to the air compressor	SQ-001822 Outlier is resolved.	4/21/95

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Outlier No.	Program	Equip Class	System	Equip ID	Noun Name	Status at Time of SRT Walkdown in 1993	Outlier Description	Interim Resolution Documented in the USI A-46 Seismic Evaluation Report to NRC	Status / Final Resolution	Required Close Out	Date Completed
72	A,I	16	125V	D-07	Station Battery Charger	O - Interaction, CABINET IS NOT TIED TO ADJACENT CABINET, ALSO BLOCK WALL MAY GOVERN HCLPF. EWR submitted 2/4/94 for CSE to bolt battery charger to adjacent switchgear. MR 94-048	The battery charger is not attached to the adjacent switchgear.	The battery charger does not contain essential relays, and there are 3 switchgear cubicles between the battery charger and switchgear cubicle that contains the essential relays. Therefore, the battery charger and the switchgear are considered seismically operable. Modification Request MR 94-048 has be initiated to bolt these together.	MR 94-048 bolted D-07 to the old 2A- 05. WO 9904504.	SQ-001938 Outlier is resolved.	12/13/00
73	A,I	16	125V	D-08	Station Battery Charger	O - Interaction, CABINET IS NOT TIED TO ADJACENT CABINET, ALSO BLOCK WALL MAY GOVERN HCLPF. EWR submitted 2/4/94 for CSE to bolt battery charger to adjacent switchgear. MR 94- 048	The battery charger is not attached to the adjacent switchgear.	The battery charger does not contain essential relays, and there are 3 switchgear cubicles between the battery charger and switchgear cubicle that contains the essential relays. Therefore, the battery charger and the switchgear are considered seismically operable. Modification Request MR 94-048 has be initiated to bolt these together.	MR 94-048 bolted D-08 to 1A-05. WO 9504505.	SQ-001939 Outlier is resolved.	12/18/00
74	A,I	16	Y	DY- 0A	Red 125v Dc/120v Ac Alternate Inverter	O - Interaction; Mounted directly adjacent to 1C-167. The cabinets are not fastened together. P- REPORT	The outlier is an interaction. DY-0A is mounted directly adjacent to 1C-167. The cabinets are not fastened together.	The inverter does not contain any essential relays. It is IEEE 344-1975 qualified. It is considered seismically operable based on there being no instances of inverter failure due to impact in the earthquake experience database. The inverter will be fastened to the adjacent cabinet.	MR 96-037 assigned to move inverter to create a gap between inverter and relay cabinet. WO 9805184. Installation complete.	SQ-001867 Outlier is resolved.	5/25/00
75	A,I	16	Y	DY- 0B	Blue 125v Dc/120v Ac Alternate Inverter	O - Interaction; Mounted directly adjacent to 2C-156. The cabinets are not fastened together. P- REPORT	The outlier is an interaction. DY-0B is mounted directly adjacent to 2C-157. The cabinets are not fastened together.	The inverter does not contain any essential relays. It is IEEE 344-1975 qualified. It is considered seismically operable based on there being no instances of inverter failure due to impact in the earthquake experience database. The inverter will be fastened to the adjacent cabinet.	MR 96-037*A assigned to move inverter to create a gap between inverter and relay cabinet. WO 9805185. Installation complete	SQ-001868 Outlier is resolved.	5/25/00

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Outlier Program Equip System Equip Noun Name Status at Time of SRT Outlier Description Interim Resolution Documented Status / Final Required Date No. Class וח Walkdown in 1993 in the USI A-46 Seismic Resolution Close Out Completed Evaluation Report to NRC RH 19 1TE-Hx-11a Rhr O - Interaction, Pinned 78 The outlier concern The piping analysis shows that MR 96-036 SQ-001823 7/21/97 622 Hx Outlet against pipe support. is interaction. The the maximum expected pipe assigned. MR 96-Outlier is Support has a 2" gap so Temperature TE is pinned against displacement at the TE is .13". 036 was cancelled. resolved. Rtd pipe could move and a pipe support. The Therefore only slight bending of WO 9607885 shear or bend element. support has a 2" gap the TE is expected and it is repositioned the TE Needs EWR. so pipe could move considered seismically and conduit and and shear or bend operable. The temperature secured w/ Loctite. element. element will be rotated to (RE: Andy Hoy) removed the interaction Completed 7/21/97 concern. The item has been walked down for the IPEEE only. Subsequent to the walkdown, it has been screened out using the Seismic PSA screening criteria. A.I.RG 20 MMS C-01-Main Control O - Interaction, adjacent An adjacent supply The supply cabinet was 79 Fixed, MR 94-021 SQ-001824 8/24/94 1(2)C Boards supply cabinets not cabinet posed a attached to the back of 2C-03 bolted supply Outlier is secured. EWR -04 spatial interaction under modification MR 94-021. cabinets to the resolved. submitted, 7/25/94 hazard. back of 1C-03 and Supply cabinets 2C-03. secured. 1/18/95 - MR 94-021 installed 6/9/94 resolves interaction concern. Item identified during MCB walkdown 12/90 - Overhead lights and duct above control room restrained by chains or light metal straps that are sometimes hooked with open ended hooks. SRT not concerned that duct or lights pose a structural hazard. however, they may pose an operator (human injury) hazard.

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Outlier No.	Program	Equip Class	System	Equip. ID	Noun Name	Status at Time of SRT Walkdown in 1993	Outlier Description	Interim Resolution Documented in the USI A-46 Seismic Evaluation Report to NRC	Status / Final Resolution	Required Close Out	Date Completed
80	A,I	20	IOPS	1C- 75	Turbine lops Main Trip Panel	O - Doors are not positively latched. T. Dykstra to submit MWR after inspection. 6/19/95 - Need to discuss with Steve Bowe to see if he would rather install different handles or have I&C start using the key lock to latch the door. 9/23/96 - WO 9607849	O - Doors are not positively latched.	The cabinet does not contain any essential relays, and the doors are fairly light weight therefore, significant damage is not expected to occur. I & C will be contacted to determine if the existing door latch can be used or whether a new handle would be preferred.	WO 9607849 installed new handle - completed 1/20/97	SQ-001825 Outlier is resolved.	1/20/97
82	A,I	20	MMS	1C- 105- 114	Plant Process I&C Cabinets	O - 1C-105 door binding, not secured. Interaction - Supply cabinet interference EWR submitted. 1/18/95 - MR 94-021 installed 6/9/94 resolves interaction concern.	The door on 1C-105 was identified as binding and not being secured, allowing it to impact the cabinet.door binding, A adjacent supply cabinet poses and interaction concern.	The cabinet was bolted to the back of 1C-03 under MR 94-021. The door binding was checked by an I&C technician. The door does bind, but the binding does not prevent the door from closing. Technicians must use an extra effort to ensure the door is shut.	Fixed, MR 94-021 bolted supply cabinet to the back of 1C-03. Checked door binding with I&C technician. The door does bind, but the binding does not prevent the door from closing. Technicians must use an extra effort to ensure the door is shut.	SQ-001827 completed.	8/24/94
84	A,I	20	RP	1C- 115- 133	Plant Process I&C Cabinets	O - Interaction - Table in SE corner should be secured or moved. EWR submitted. 1/18/95 - MR 94-021 installed 6/9/94 resolves interaction concern.	An adjacent supply cabinet posed a spatial interaction hazard.	The supply cabinet was attached to the back of 1C-03 under modification MR 94-021.	Fixed, MR 94-021 bolted supply cabinet to the back of 1C-03. Accepted 7/28/94	SQ-001831 completed.	8/24/94
85	A,I	20	RP	1C- 151- 155	Rp Train A Relay Cabinets	O - ANCHOR DETAIL Unknown. No specific information on the grout pad to concrete floor anchorage. Needs EWR	The anchor detail for the grout pad and the perimeter channel is unknown.	Since the cabinet has anchorage as originally designed, it is considered seismically operable. Modification request MR 95-007 will upgrade the anchorage.	MR 95-007 upgraded the anchorage - accepted 4/15/96	SQ-001832 Outlier is resolved.	12/2/97
87	A,I	20	ESF	1C- 156- 157	Safeguards Train A Relay Cabinets	O - ANCHOR DETAIL Unknown. No specific information on the grout pad to concrete floor anchorage.	The anchor detail for the grout pad and the perimeter channel is unknown.	Since the cabinet has anchorage as originally designed, it is considered seismically operable. Modification request MR 95-011 will upgrade the anchorage.	MR 95-011 cancelled, work combined with MR 95-007. MR 95- 007 upgraded the anchorage - accepted 4/15/96	SQ-001524 completed.	12/2/97

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Outlier No.	Program	Equip Class	System	Equip ID	Noun Name	Status at Time of SRT Walkdown in 1993	Outlier Description	Interim Resolution Documented in the USI A-46 Seismic Evaluation Report to NRC	Status / Final Resolution	Required Close Out	Date Completed
89	A,I	20	ESF	1C- 158/1 66/16 7	Safeguards Train B And Misc Relay Cabinets	O - Interaction; Mounted directly adjacent to inverter DY- OA. The cabinets are not fastened together. P-REPORT Provide Mod Package	The outlier is an Interaction. The cabinets are mounted directly adjacent to inverter DY-OA. The cabinets are not fastened together.	No "bad actor" relays are located in the cabinets. The relays in the cabinets have a seismic capacity of at least 4 g's. Therefore, they are considered seismically operable. The cabinet will be fastened to the adjacent inverter.	MR 96-037 assigned to move inverter to create a gap between inverter and relay cabinet. WO 9805185. Installation complete	SQ-001869 Outlier is resolved.	5/25/00
90	A,1	20	RP	1C- 161- 165	Rp Train B Relay Logic Cabinet (Red)	O - ANCHOR DETAIL Unknown. No specific information on the grout pad to concrete floor anchorage. Needs EWR	The anchor detail for the grout pad and the perimeter channel is unknown.	Since the cabinet has anchorage as originally designed, it is considered seismically operable. Modification request MR 95-009 will upgrade the anchorage.	MR 95-009 cancelled, work combined with MR 95-007. MR 95-007 upgraded the anchorage - accepted 4/15/96	SQ-001843 Outlier is resolved.	12/2/97
93	A,I	20	COMP	C- 178- 179	Computer Input Mux	O - Line Printer adjacent to cabinet	Line Printer, LP-300, is kept on the floor adjacent to the cabinet.	C-178-179 are computer cabinets contain primarily solid state and circuit board components. There are no essential relays in the cabinets. The cabinets are considered seismically operable. I&C will store the printer in a different location and have it adjacent to the cabinets only when being used.	12/30/98 - Have inspected the Computer Room on numerous occasions since the USI A-46 walkdown. The printer has been relocated. No interaction hazards were identified.	SQ-001834 Outlier is resolved.	12/30/98
95	A,I,C	21	СС.	1T- 12	Component Cooling Surge Tank	O - Oversized anchor bolt holes (2.25" x 1.18") identified from WEST 685J114. Anchor bolts are 1" diameter. Too much clearance to say seismic load is transferred to enough anchor bolts.	The saddle anchorage on both ends of the tank has oversized anchor bolt holes (2.25" x 1.18") identified from WEST 685J114. The anchor bolts are 1" diameter. Therefore, there is too much clearance to say seismic load is transferred evenly to enough anchor bolts	There are large washers between the anchorage nut and the oval holes. Therefore, some load will be transferred to all of the anchor bolts. In addition, the attached piping will help in restraining the tank. Therefore, the tanks are considered seismically operable. The anchorage will be upgraded with a structural member between the tank base and the anchor bolt.	MR 94-091*C installed 1/2" steel plate under each of the nuts on the south side of the tank. The plate is welded to the saddle. The installation was checked 12/3/97	SQ-001836 Outlier is resolved.	8/5/96

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Outlier No.	Program	Equip Class	System	Equip ID	Noun Name	Status at Time of SRT Walkdown in 1993	Outlier Description	Interim Resolution Documented in the USI A-46 Seismic Evaluation Report to NRC	Status / Final Resolution	Required Close Out	Date Completed
97	A,I	21	Ø	1T- 13	Refueling Water Storage Tank W/6 Immersion Htrs	O - ANALYSIS/REINFORC EMENT 7/25/94 - Received DRAFT analysis from S& A showing RWST has sufficient capacity.	The tank does not pass the screening criteria of Section 7 of the GIP.	The tank has been analyzed using a finite element analysis [23].	In WE NRC RAI response NPL 97-0450, page 5 of 22, WE stated that the design margin from the A-46 analysis is not sufficient. EWR 97-169 assigned. MR 99-040 upgraded the RWST.	SQ-001999 resolves this outlier	6/6/02
99	A,I	21	DA	T- 61F	G-02 Edg Starting Air Receiver	O - Anchor - cracked grout	The grout under the foot of one of the air receiver tank legs is cracked.	An inspection subsequent to the seismic verification walkdown found a steel spacer plate under the leg of the tank. Therefore the grout is not structural and the tank is considered seismically operable. The leg will be re-grouted.	WO- 9501221 completed 5/23/97 - installed new grout	SQ-001838 resolves the outlier	5/23/97
100	A,I	22		AUX 8FTA REA	Pab 8' Cable & Conduit Raceways		LAR 9 is an OUTLIER because it does not meet the requirements of Section 8.0 of the GIP. See S&A's LAR - Cable Tray and Conduit Supports Report, 91C2696-C-018.		Work completed under MR 96-022. Post installation walkdown complete. WO 9808941	SQ-001714 resolves the outlier	8/1/00
101	A,I	22		SPR EADI NGR M	Csr Cable & Conduit Raceways		LAR 3 & LAR 4 are OUTLIER(s) because it does not meet the requirements of Section 8.0 of the GIP. See S&A's LAR - Cable Tray and Conduit Supports Report, 91C2696-C-018.		MR 96-080 created to upgrade cable tray supports in the CSR (RE: DNC). Installation complete	SQ-001881 Outlier is resolved.	9/25/00

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Outlier No.	Program	Equip Class	System	Equip ID	Noun Name	Status at Time of SRT Walkdown in 1993	Outlier Description	Interim Resolution Documented in the USI A-46 Seismic Evaluation Report to NRC	Status / Final Resolution	Required Close Out	Date Completed
102	A,I	22		U1C2 1FTA REA	U1c 21' Cable & Conduit Raceways	O - Loose base clip angle	One outlier was noted on the floor-to-ceiling hanger east of the access hatch near location 8 (as marked on liner wall). The base clip angle on one side is loose and should be tightened.		DNC & TJD1 inspected & tightened the base clip angle 6/4/98. The CEA turned in < 1/4 turn and satisfied the requirements of a tightness check.	SQ-001388 resolves outlier	6/4/98
103	A,I	22		U1C4 6FTA REA	U1c 46' Cable & Conduit Raceways	O - Cables not tied to tray	(1) Vertical trays 1VR01 and 1VQ01 had larges cable bundles (aka "pigtails") from wall penetrations that were not tied to vertical tray and are free to swing, see figure 12.		Resolved during U1R24. Verified during walkdown. WO 9808624	SQ-001549 resolves outlier	6/4/98
104	A,I	22		U1C4 6FTA REA	U1c 46' Cable & Conduit Raceways	O - Cables not tied to tray	(2) Horizontal tray 1VA04 at penetration has cable pigtail hanging out of tray and not restrained to or within the tray. There appears to be other tray bundles with similar problems behind it, see figure 13.		Resolved during U1R24. Verified during walkdown. WO 9808624	SQ-001549 resolves outlier	6/4/98

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Outlier No.	Program	Equip Class	System	Equip ID	Noun Name	Status at Time of SRT Walkdown in 1993	Outlier Description	Interim Resolution Documented in the USI A-46 Seismic Evaluation Report to NRC	Status / Final Resolution	Required Close Out	Date Completed
106	A,I	1	480V	1B- 32	480v Motor Control Center Pab Safeguards	SAT - O- End cabinet on right hand side, base channel CEA fastening nuts are loose. Need to be tightened. T. Dykstra to develop CEA torque tightness procedure, Al Bayer to review. Then submit WO to do torque tightness check. WO 9411729. Maintenance			4/20/95 - Attempt to turn the nut during the bolt tightness test was unsuccessful. Application of torque >installation torque was not desirable due to possibility of breaking the bolt. Since the bolt is loaded in shear only, this is considered acceptable	NOT AN OUTLIER - Resolved in the anchorage analysis on the original SEWS	4/20/95
107	A,I,RG	3	4.16KV	1A- 05	4.16 Kv Bus Switchgear (Safeguards)	SAT - O-WELD QUALITY IN QUESTION, Recommend thorough weld inspection. T. Dykstra to check with QA about weld inspections			Weld inspection completed, used results to adjust anchorage capacity in the anchorage calculation 91C2696-C-016.	NOT AN OUTLIER - resolved w/ weld inspection and anchorage calc.	7/3/02
109	A,I,RG	3	4.16KV	1A- 06 (old)	4.16 Kv Bus Switchgear (Safeguards)	PO - Not fastened to adjacent D-08 battery charger. WELD QUALITY IN QUESTION, Recommend thorough weld inspection. T. Dykstra to check with QA about weld inspections. 11/7/94 - Renamed to 1A-06 (old). The old 1A-05 and old 1A-06 will be hard tied together			MR 94-048 connected cabinets together. WO 9904505.	SQ-001939 Outlier is resolved.	12/18/00

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Outlier No.	Program	Equip Class	System	Equip ID	Noun Name	Status at Time of SRT Walkdown in 1993	Outlier Description	Interim Resolution Documented in the USI A-46 Seismic Evaluation Report to NRC	Status / Final Resolution	Required Close Out	Date Completed
111	I,RG	7	SC	1SC- 966A	Pzr Steam Sample Containment Isolation	PO - Valve on 3/8" tubing. Valve body clamped to support shelf by 2 U-bolts. May not be able to resist moment. Need material 11/11/94 Update - Material info provided to S&A. Valve status changed to Outlier based on walkdown 7/26/94. SRT recommends operator support	The AOV body is mounted to a support shelf by 2 Ubolts in friction. The valve is mounted on a 3/8" line. If the Ubolts slip, the potential exists for the line to be overstress.	This valve was not declared an outlier. This valve is normally closed and is required to stay closed in the event of an SSE. Rather than analyzing the U-bolt support's capacity, the SRT recommended installing an operator support as a prudent fix. The U	MR 96-035 installed operator supports.	SQ-001772 resolves this issue	1/14/00
112	I,RG	7	SC	1SC- 966B	Pzr Liquid Sample Containment Isolation	PO - Valve on 3/8" tubing. Valve body clamped to support shelf by 2 U-bolts. May not be able to resist moment. Need material 11/11/94 Update - Material info provided to S&A. Valve status changed to Outlier based on walkdown 7/26/94. SRT recommends operator support	The AOV body is mounted to a support shelf by 2 U-bolts in friction. The valve is mounted on a 3/8" line. If the U-bolts slip, the potential exists for the line to be overstress.	This valve was not declared an outlier. This valve is normally closed and is required to stay closed in the event of an SSE. Rather than analyzing the U-bolt support's capacity, the SRT recommended installing an operator support as a prudent fix. The U	MR 96-035 installed operator supports.	SQ-001773 resolves this issue	1/14/00
113	A,I,RG	7	SC	1SC- 966C	Rc Hot Leg Sample	PO - Valve on 3/8" tubing. Valve body clamped to support shelf by 2 U-bolts. May not be able to resist moment. Need material 11/11/94 Update - Material info provided to S&A. Valve status changed to Outlier based on walkdown 7/26/94. SRT recommends operator support	The AOV body is mounted to a support shelf by 2 U-bolts in friction. The valve is mounted on a 3/8" line. If the U-bolts slip, the potential exists for the line to be overstress.	This valve was not declared an outlier. This valve is normally open and is required to close in the event of an SSE. Rather than analyzing the U-bolt support's capacity, the SRT recommended installing an operator support as a prudent fix. The U1 configuration	MR 96-035 installed operator supports.	SQ-001774 resolves this issue	1/14/00

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Outlier No.	Program	Equip Class	System	Equip ID	Noun Name	Status at Time of SRT Walkdown in 1993	Outlier Description	Interim Resolution Documented in the USI A-46 Seismic Evaluation Report to NRC	Status / Final Resolution	Required Close Out	Date Completed
115	A,I,C	8	C	1CC- 815	T-12 Cc Surge Tank Emergency Makeup Water Inlet	PO - pipe has insufficient supports - 11/11/94 update - STATUS changed to outlier. Valves also identified as having insufficient pipe support adjacent to valve during the CCW Upgrade piping walkdowns. PO - 3g required to qualify valve yoke. Trapeze supports may allow valve yoke to swing resulting in possible pipe failure			NOT AN OUTLIER - CCW Upgrade identified these valves as having insufficient support MR 94-091 installed valve support. Verified installation 12/3/97	NOT AN OUTLIER - Resolved on original SEWS	3/30/01
117	A,I	8	SW	SW- 2832 A-S	K-3a Sa Compressor Inlet Solenoid	SAT - O-Attached conduit is very flexible and should be restrained. Check with Frank Mueller about SW piping replacement. Rewalked 10/26/94 by SR St Amour and W Djordjevic. Determined flexibility was not a problem.			Resolved	NOT AN OUTLIER - Resolved on original SEWS	10/26/94
118	A,1	15	125V	D-05	125v Dc Station Battery	SAT - O-SPACER, Need battery cell type information. EWR submitted 2/4/94 for ESE to install styrofoam bead spacers. 7/25/94 - EWR cancelled. T. Dykstra to submit MWR to install spacers. 1/18/95 - Qual report shows batteries shake table tested in same			Resolved	NOT AN OUTLIER - Resolved on original SEWS	1/18/95

Outlier	Program	Equip	System	Equip	Noun Name	Status at Time of SRT	Outlier Description	Interim Resolution Documented	Status / Final	Required	Date
No.	i rogram	Class		ID -	140dii 14aiile	Walkdown in 1993	Oddier Description	in the USI A-46 Seismic Evaluation Report to NRC_	Resolution	Close Out	Completed
119	A,I	15	125V	D-06	125v Dc Station Battery	SAT - O-SPACER. EWR submitted 2/4/94 for ESE to install styrofoam bead spacers. 7/25/94 - EWR cancelled. T. Dykstra to submit MWR to install spacers. 1/18/95 - Qual report shows batteries shake table tested in same configuration at PBNP. No addition			Resolved	NOT AN OUTLIER - Resolved on original SEWS	1/18/95
120	A,I	15	125V	D- 305	Swing Station Battery	SAT - O-SPACER. EWR submitted 2/4/94 for ESE to install styrofoam bead spacers. 7/25/94 - EWR cancelled. T. Dykstra to submit MWR to install spacers. 1/18/95 - Qual report shows batteries shake table tested in same configuration at PBNP. No addition			Resolved	NOT AN OUTLIER - Resolved on original SEWS	1/18/95
121	A,I,C	18	CC	FI- 643	K-1a Waste Gas Comp Cc Return Flow Indicator	SAT - O-Anchor Bolted to Block Wall - no thru bolts T. Dykstra to check scope of block wall program. Tug tested by B.O. Sasman & W. Djordjevic 7/94 OK.		-	Resolved	NOT AN OUTLIER - Resolved on original SEWS	7/94
122	A,I,C	18	CC	FI- 645	K-1b Waste Gas Comp Cc Return Flow Indicator	SAT - O-Anchor Bolted to Block Wali - no thru bolts T. Dykstra to check scope of block wall program. Tug tested by B.O. Sasman & W. Djordjevic 7/94 OK.			Resolved	NOT AN OUTLIER - Resolved on original SEWS	7/94

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Outlier No.	Program	Equip Class	System	Equip ID	Noun Name	Status at Time of SRT Walkdown in 1993	Outlier Description	Interim Resolution Documented in the USI A-46 Seismic Evaluation Report to NRC	Status / Final Resolution	Required Close Out	Date Completed
123	I,RG	18	AF	LT- 4039	T-24b Cst Level Transmitter	O - Interaction, POTENTIAL FOR BLOCK WALL TO FALL ON COMPONENT. T. Dykstra to evaluate function of LT. 1/18/95 - LTs removed from A- 46 list. Still IPEEE and RG 1.97.	D		Deleted from SSEL	Deleted from SSEL	1/18/95
124	I,RG	18	AF	LT- 4040	T-24a Cst Level Transmitter	O - Interaction, POTENTIAL FOR BLOCK WALL TO FALL ON COMPONENT. T. Dykstra to evaluate function of LT. 1/18/95 - LTs removed from A- 46 list. Still IPEEE and RG 1.97.			Deleted from SSEL	Deleted from SSEL	1/18/95
125	I,RG	18	AF	LT- 4041	T-24b Cst Level Transmitter	O - Interaction, POTENTIAL FOR BLOCK WALL TO FALL ON COMPONENT. T. Dykstra to evaluate function of LT. 1/18/95 - LTs removed from A- 46 list. Still IPEEE and RG 1.97.			Deleted from SSEL	Deleted from SSEL	1/18/95
126	I,RG	18	AF	LT- 4038	T-24a Cst Level Transmitter	O - Interaction, POTENTIAL FOR BLOCK WALL TO FALL ON COMPONENT. T. Dykstra to evaluate function of LT. 1/18/95 - LTs removed from A-46 list. Still IPEEE and RG 1.97.			Deleted from SSEL	Deleted from SSEL	1/18/95
129	I,RG	18	SI	1PT- 936	T-34b Si Accumulator Pressure Transmitter	SAT - resolved using Unistrut deflection calc. O - Cable tray support within 3/4" of PT			Resolved on SEWS using a Unistrut deflection calc.	NOT AN OUTLIER - Resolved on original SEWS	6/28/95

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Outlier No.	Program	Equip Class	System	Equip ID	Noun Name	Status at Time of SRT Walkdown in 1993	Outlier Description	Interim Resolution Documented in the USI A-46 Seismic Evaluation Report to NRC	Status / Final Resolution	Required Close Out	Date Completed
130	A,I,Ĉ	18	SC	1RK- 20	Primary Plant Sample Room Rack	SAT - O - Interim outlier until anchorage is checked. Interaction - adjacent sample sink has no visible anchorage			4/25/95 - phone conversation with Wally Djordjevic - determined that since the only function of the rack was to support flow indicator and that the sample tubing is isolated upstream of rack and there is no requirement to operate the valves on the rack.	NOT AN OUTLIER - Resolved on original SEWS	4/25/95

ATTACHMENT A Seismic Walkdown Equipment List Unit 1 & SFP (SWEL)

SWEL	RISK	N E S	UNIT	SYS CODE	EQUIP CLASS	WALK BY AREA	EQUIP#	EQUIP NAME	1	2	3	4	5	TRN	IPEEE Equip. Enhanced	LOCATION DESC
SWEL1-1	Υ		1	AF	5	1	1P-029	AUX FEEDWATER TURBINE-DRIVEN PUMP	Х	Х		X		A	·	8/CB/AFP RM 1P-29 CUB
SWEL1-1			0	AF	5	1	P-038A	AUX FEEDWATER MOTOR-DRIVEN PUMP	X	Х		Х		Α		8/CB/AFP RM P-38A CUB
SWEL1-1	Y		1	AF	7	1	1AF-04002	1P-29 AFP MINI RECIRC CONTROL	X	X		X		Α		8/CB/AFP RM 1P-29 CUB
SWEL1-1			0	AF	7	1	AF-04007	P-38A SSGP MINI RECIRC CONTROL	X	Х		Х		Α		8/CB/AFP RM P-38A CUB
SWEL1-1			0	AF	7	1	AF-04012	P-38A SSGP DISCHARGE CONTROL	X	X		Х		Α		8/CB/AFP RM P-38A CUB
SWEL1-1		Υ	0	125V	14	1	D-63	125V DC DISTRIBUTION PANEL	X		Х	Х	Х	А		8/CB/AFP RM 1P-29 CUB 1RK-89
SWEL1-1			0	ĀF	18	1	RK-25A	P-38A SSGP INSTRUMENTATION RACK	X	Х		X		Α		8/CB/AFP RM P-38A CUB
SWEL1-1		Υ	1	AF	21a	1	1T-212	1P-29 AFP MINI RECIRC IA 1AF-4002 BACKUP ACCUMULATOR	X	Х		X		Α		8/CB/AFP RM
SWEL1-1			1	AF	8a	1	1AF-04000	1P-29 AFP DISCHARGE 1HX-1B SG INLET ISOLATION MOV		Х		Х		Α		8/CB/AFP RM 1P-29 CUB
SWEL1-1			1	AF	8a	1	1AF-04001	1P-29 AFP DISCHARGE 1HX-1A SG INLET ISOLATION MOV		Х		X		Α	-	8/CB/AFP RM 1P-29 CUB
SWEL1-1			1	AF	8a	1	1AF-04006	1P-29 AFP SUCTION FROM SERVICE WATER	Χ	Х		X		Α		8/CB/AFP RM 1P-29 CUB
SWEL1-1			0	AF	8a	1	AF-04009	P-38A SSGP SUCTION FROM SERVICE WATER	X	Х		X		Α		8/CB/AFP RM P-38A CUB
SWEL1-1		Ý	0	AF	8a	1	AF-04023	P-38A SSGP DISCHARGE TO 1HX-1A STEAM GENERATOR	Х	Х		Х		Α		8/CB/AFP RM P-38A CUB
SWEL1-1			1	MS	8b	1	1MS-02090	1P-29 AFP BEARING COOLING INLET	X	Х		X	Г	Α		8/CB/AFP RM
SWEL1-1	Y		1	480V	2	9	1B-03	480V SAFEGUARDS LOAD CENTER	X	Х	Х	Х	X	Α	Х	26/CB/CSR
SWEL1-1	Y		1	480V	2	9	1B-04	480V SAFEGUARDS LOAD CENTER	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	В	Х	26/CB/CSR
SWEL1-1	Y		1	480V	4	9	1X-13	1B-03 STATION SERVICE TRANSFORMER	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	Α	Х	26/CB/CSR
SWEL1-1	Y		1	480V	4	9	1X-14	1B-04 STATION SERVICE TRANSFORMER	Х	Х	Х	X	Х	В	Х	26/CB/CSR
SWEL1-1			1	Y	14	9	1Y-203	WHITE 120V INVERTER DISTRIBUTION PANEL	X	X	X	X	X	Α		26/CB/CSR WEST WALL
SWEL1-1		Υ	0	125V	14	9	D-12	125V DC DISTRIBUTION PANEL	X	Х	Х	Х	Х	Α		26/CB/CSR EAST
SWEL1-1	Y	Υ	0	125V	14	9	D-14	125V DC DISTRIBUTION PANEL	X	Х	Х	X	Х	В		26/CB/CSR EAST
SWEL1-1			1	Y	16	9	1DY-01	RED 125V DC/120V AC INVERTER	X	X	X	X	Х	Α		26/CB/CSR
SWEL1-1			0	Y	16	9	DY-0B	BLUE 125V DC/120V AC ALTERNATE INVERTER	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	В	Х	26/CB/CSR
SWEL1-1	Y		1	SW	7	8	SW-00012A	HX-12A CC HX OUTLET TEMPERATURE CONTROL				X		0		46/PAB/CC HX AREA

SWEL	RISK	N E S	UNIT	SYS CODE	EQUIP CLASS	WALK BY AREA	EQUIP#	EQUIP NAME	1	2	3	4	5	TRN	IPEEE Equip. Enhanced	LOCATION DESC
SWEL1-1	Y		0	SW	7	8	SW-00012B	HX-12B CC HX OUTLET TEMPERATURE CONTROL				Х		0		46/PAB/CC HX AREA
SWEL1-1	Y	Υ	0	SW	7	8	SW- 00012C	HX-12C CC HX OUTLET TEMPERATURE CONTROL				X		0		46/PAB/CC HX AREA
SWEL1-1			1	CC	19	8	1TE-00621	HX-12A/B CC HX OUTLET HEADER TEMPERATURE RTD	X	Х		X		0		46/PAB/CC HX AREA
SWEL1-1	Y _		1	CC	21a	8	1T-012	COMPONENT COOLING SURGE TANK	X	X		X	П	0		46/PAB/CC HX AREA
SWEL1-1		Υ	1	CC	21b	8	1HX-012A	COMPONENT COOLING WATER HEAT EXCHANGER	X	Х		X		0		46/PAB/CC HX AREA
SWEL1-1			1	MS	8a	8	1MS-02019	HX-1B SG HEADER P-29 AFP STEAM SUPPLY MOV	Х	Х		X	X	А		46/PAB/BAST AREA S
SWEL1-1			1	MS	8a	8	1MS-02020	HX-1A SG HEADER P-29 AFP STEAM SUPPLY MOV	X	Х		X	X	A		46/PAB/BAST AREA S
SWEL1-1			1	Y	14	10	1-43/Y-01	1Y-01 RED 120V AC VITAL INST PNL PWR SUP TRANSFER SW	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	А		44/CB/CR WEST
SWEL1-1			1	Y	14	10	1-43/Y-02	1Y-02 BLUE 120V AC VITAL INST PNL PWR SUP TRANSFER SW	X	X	Х	X	Х	В		44/CB/CR WEST
SWEL1-1		Υ	0	125V	14	10	D-16	125V DC DISTRIBUTION PANEL	X	X	X	X	X	В		44/CB/CR SOUTH
SWEL1-1	Ý	Υ	0	125V	14	10	D-17	125V DC DISTRIBUTION PANEL	X	X	X	X	X	Α		44/CB/CR SOUTH
SWEL1-1		Υ	0	125V	14	10	D-18	125V DC DISTRIBUTION PANEL	X	X	X	X	Х	В		44/CB/CR NORTH
SWEL1-1			1	MMS	20	10	1C-105	SECONDARY SYSTEM POWER SUPPLIES PANEL	X	X		X		0		44/CB/CR
SWEL1-1		Υ	0	FÖ	5	26	P-206A	G-01 EDG FUEL OIL TRANSFER PUMP	X	X	Х	X	X	Α		28/DGB/G-01/2 FOTP RM
SWEL1-1		Υ	0	DG	9	33	W-181A1	G-03 EDG HX-265A RADIATOR FAN	X	X	X	X	X	В		50/DGB/G-03 RADTR RM
SWEL1-1		Υ	0	DG	9	33	W-181A2	G-03 EDG HX-265A RADIATOR FAN	X	Х	Х	X	Х	В		50/DGB/G-03 RADTR RM
SWEL1-1	Y	Υ	0	VNDG	9	34	W-183B	G-03 EDG RM SMALL CAPACITY EXHAUST FAN	X	X	X	X	X	В		50/DGB/G-03 FAN RM
SWEL1-1	Y	Υ	0	VNDG	9	34	W-183C	G-03 EDG RM LARGE CAPACITY EXHAUST FAN	X	X	Х	X	X	В		50/DGB/G-03 FAN RM
SWEL1-1		Υ	0	125V	14	37	D-28	G-03 EDG DC DISTRIBUTION PANEL	X	Х	Х	X	X	В		28/DGB/G-03 SWGR RM
SWEL1-1	Y	Υ	0	DG	17	38	G-03	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR	X	X	X	X	X	В		28/DGB/G-03 RM
SWEL1-1		Υ	0	DG	20	37	C-081	G-03 EDG CONTROL PANEL	X	X	X	X	X	В		28/DGB/G-03 SWGR RM
SWEL1-1		Y	0	DA	21a	38	T-170A	G-03 EDG STARTING AIR RECEIVER	X	X	X	X	X	В		28/DGB/G-03 RM
SWEL1-1	Y		0	DG	17	42	G-01	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR	X	X	X	X	Х	Α		8/CB/G-01 RM
SWEL1-1			0	VNDG	20	42	C-032	G-01 EDG EXHAUST FAN CONTROL PANEL	X	Х	Х	X	Х	Α		8/CB/G-01 RM S WALL
SWEL1-1			0	DG	20	42	C-034	G-01 EDG ALARM AND ELECTRICAL PANEL	X	X	Х	X	X	Ā	<u> </u>	8/CB/G-01 RM W WALL
SWEL1-1			0	DG	20	42	C-034A	G-01 EDG LOCAL TRANSFER PANEL	X	X	Х	X	X	Α		8/CB/G-01 RM W WALL

SWEL	RISK	N E W	UNIT	SYS CODE	EQUIP CLASS	WALK BY AREA	EQUIP#	EQUIP NAME	1	2	3	4	5	TRN	IPEEE Equip. Enhanced	LOCATION DESC
SWEL1-1			0	DG	20	42	C-078	G-01 EDG DC POWER TRANSFER CONTROL PANEL	Х	Х	Х	X	Х	Α		8/CB/G-01 RM W WALL
SWEL1-1			0	FO	21a	42	T-031A	G-01 DIESEL GENERATOR DAY TANK	Х	Х	Х	X	Х	Α		8/CB/G-01 RM
SWEL1-1			0	DA	21a	42	T-060B	G-01 EDG STARTING AIR RECEIVER (RIGHT BANK)	X	Х	Х	X	Х	Α		8/CB/G-01 RM
SWEL1-1			0	DA	21a	42	T-060C	G-01 EDG STARTING AIR RECEIVER (RIGHT BANK)	X	Х	Х	X	X	Α		8/CB/G-01 RM
SWEL1-1			0	DA	21a	42	T-060E	G-01 EDG STARTING AIR RECEIVER (LEFT BANK)	X	Х	Х	X	X	Α		8/CB/G-01 RM
SWEL1-1			0	DA	21a	42	T-060F	G-01 EDG STARTING AIR RECEIVER (LEFT BANK)	X	Х	Х	X	Х	A		8/CB/G-01 RM
SWEL1-1			0	FO	8a	42	FO-03930	T-31A G-01 EDG DAY TANK INLET SECOND OFF ISOLATION	X	Х	Х	X	Х	Α		8/CB/G-01 RM
SWEL1-1		Υ	2	480V	1	47	2B42- 4212B	2B4212B-B811M (D-109) CHGR NRM/ALT XFR SWITCH CONTACTOR	X	Х	Х	X	Х	В		26/PAB/INVERT RM WEST
SWEL1-1			0	VNBI	10	4	W-085	PAB BATTERY AND INVERTER ROOM VENT FAN	X	Х	Х	X	X	Α		35/PAB/D-106 ROOF
SWEL1-1			1	Y	14	7	1-83/DY-03	1DY-03 WHITE INVERTER STATIC TRANSFER SWITCH	X	Х			Х	Α		26/PAB/INVERT RM WEST
SWEL1-1			0	125V	14	7	D-03	125V DC DISTRIBUTION PANEL	X	Х	Х	X	X	Α		26/PAB/INVERT RM WEST
SWEL1-1	Y		1	4.16K V	3	21	1A-05	4.16 KV BUS SWITCHGEAR (SAFEGUARDS)	X	Х	Х	X	X	Α		8/CB/VSG RM
SWEL1-1		Υ	0	125V	15	6	D-105	125V DC STATION BATTERY	X	Х	Х	X	Х	Α		35/PAB/D-105 BATT RM
SWEL1-1			1	Υ	16	7	1DY-03	WHITE 125V DC/120V AC INVERTER	X	X	Х	X	X	Α		26/PAB/INVERT RM WEST
SWEL1-1			0	125V	16	7	D-107	D-105 DC STATION BATTERY CHARGER	X	Х	Х	X	X	Α		26/PAB/INVERT RM WEST
SWEL1-1			0	Υ	16	7	DY-0C	WHITE 125V DC/120V AC INVERTER	X	Х	Х	X	X	А		26/PAB/INVERT RM WEST
SWEL1-1			0	VNBI	20	5	C-022	BATTERY ROOM HVAC CONTROL PANEL	X	Х	Х	X	X	Α		26/PAB/NORTH
SWEL1-1		Y	1	480V	1	14	1B312A- B855B	1P-10A RHR PUMP NORMAL/ALT TRANSFER SWITCH	X	Х	Х	X	X	Α		8/PAB/COL P-11
SWEL1-1	Y		1	CC	5	20	1P-011A	COMPONENT COOLING WATER PUMP	X	Х		X		Α		8/PAB/CC PUMP AREA
SWEL1-1			1	SI	5	19	1P-014A	CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP	Г				X	Α	- "	8/PAB/SPRAY PUMP AREA
SWEL1-1			1	SI	5	19	1P-014B	CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP	Γ				X	В		8/PAB/SPRAY PUMP AREA
SWEL1-1	Y		1	SI	5	19	1P-015A	SAFETY INJECTION PUMP	X	Х	X	X	Х	Α		8/PAB/SI PUMP AREA
SWEL1-1	Y	Υ	1	AF	5	41	1P-053	UNIT 1 AUX FEEDWATER MOTOR-DRIVEN PUMP	X	Х		X		В		8/PAB/1P-53 AFP RM
SWEL1-1		Υ	1	AF	21a	41	T-224B	1AF-4073B/1AF-4074B AFP RECIRC ISOLATION IA ACCUMULATOR		Х		X		В		8/PAB/1P-53 AFP RM
SWEL1-1		Υ	1	AF	8a	41	1AF-04067	1P-53 AFP SERVICE WATER SUPPLY ISOLATION	X	Х		X		В		8/PAB/1P-53 AFP RM

SWEL	RISK	N E W	UNIT	SYS CODE	EQUIP CLASS	WALK BY AREA	EQUIP#	EQUIP NAME	1	2	3	4	5	TRN	IPEEE Equip. Enhanced	LOCATION DESC
SWEL1-1			1	SI	8a	19	1SI-00825A	T-13 RWST OUTLET TO P-15A/B SI PUMP	X	Х	Х	X	X	Α		8/PAB/SPRAY PUMP AREA
SWEL1-1			1	SI	8a	19	1SI-00825B	T-13 RWST OUTLET TO P-15A/B SI PUMP	X	Х	Х	X	Х	В		8/PAB/SPRAY PUMP AREA
SWEL1-1	Ŷ		1	SI	8a	19	1SI-00857A	HX-11A RHR HX OUTLET TO P-15A SI PUMP SUCTION	X	Х	Х	Х	Х	Α		8/PAB/SI PUMP AREA
SWEL1-1	Y		1	Si	8a	19	1SI-00896A	P-15A SI PUMP SUCTION	X	Х	Х	X	X	Α		8/PAB/SI PUMP AREA
SWEL1-1		Υ	1	AF	8b	41	AF-04073B	1P-53 AFP RECIRCULATION ISOLATION	X	X		Х		В		8/PAB/1P-53 AFP RM
SWEL1-1	Y		1	CV	5	17	1P-002A	CHARGING PUMP (Pump Only as Pressure Boundary)	Х	Х	Х			А		8/PAB/U1 CHG PUMP RM
SWEL1-1			1	CV	7	13	1CV-00142	CHARGING LINE FLOW CONTROL	X	X		Х		0		8/PAB/PIPEWAY #1
SWEL1-1	Y		1	CV	8a	18	1CV- 00112B	1P-2A-C CHARGING PUMP REFUELING WATER SUCTION	X	Х		X		Α		8/PAB/U1 CHG PUMP AREA
SWEL1-1	Y		1	SI	8a	13	1SI-00866A	COLD LEG INJECTION LINE ISOLATION	X	X	Х	X	X	Α		8/PAB/PIPEWAY #1
SWEL1-1	Y		1	SI	8a	13	1SI-00866B	CORE DELUGE INJECTION LINE ISOLATION	X	X	Х	Х	X	В		8/PAB/PIPEWAY #1
SWEL1-1	Y		1	RH	5	2	1P-010A	RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL PUMP	X	Х	X	X	X	Α	Х	-19/PAB
SWEL1-1	Y		1	RH	5	43	1P-010B	RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL PUMP	X	Х	Х	Х	X	В	Х	-19/PAB
SWEL1-1			1	RH	7	3	1RH-00624	HX-11A RHR HX OUTLET CONTROL	X	Х	Х	X	Х	Α		-5/PAB/EAST WALL OVHD
SWEL1-1			1	RH	7	3	1RH-00625	HX-11B RHR HX OUTLET CONTROL	X	Х	Х	X	X	В		-5/PAB/EAST WALL OVHD
SWEL1-1			1	VNCC	9	53	W-001A1	CONTAINMENT ACCIDENT RECIRCATION FAN					Х	Α		66/U1C/NORTH
SWEL1-1			1	PACV	19	54	TE-03292	EL 66' U1C TEMPERATURE ELEMENT					X	0		66/U1C/NE QTR
SWEL1-1			1	SI	21a	55,56	T-034A	SAFETY INJECTION ACCUMULATOR	X	Х	Х			Α		21/U1C/SW QTR
SWEL1-1			1	CV	21b	57	HX-004	EXCESS LETDOWN HEAT EXCHANGER					Х	0		21/U1C
SWEL1-1	Y		0	SW	6	27	P-032A	SERVICE WATER PUMP	X			X		Α	Х	8/CWPH/SW BLDG
SWEL1-1			1	SI	8a	58	SI-00852A	LOW HEAD SI CORE DELUGE ISOLATION					X	Α		46/U1C/SEAL TABLE
SWEL2			0	SF	5	24	P-012B	SPENT FUEL COOLING PUMP						В		46/PAB/SFP HX AREA
SWEL2			0	SF	5	24	P-012A	SPENT FUEL COOLING PUMP						Α		46/PAB/SFP HX AREA
SWEL2			0	SF	. 21b	24	HX-013B	SPENT FUEL POOL HEAT EXCHANGER						В		46/PAB/SFP HX AREA
SWEL2			0	SF	21b	24	HX-013A	SPENT FUEL POOL HEAT EXCHANGER						Α		46/PAB/SFP HX AREA
SWEL2			0	SW	8a	24	SW-02930B	HX-13B SFP HX OUTLET						В		46/PAB/SFP HX AREA
SWEL2			0	SW	8a	24	SW-02930A	HX-13A SFP HX OUTLET						Α		46/PAB/SFP HX AREA
SWEL2			0	SW	8a	24	SW-02927B	HX-13B SFP HX INLET						В		46/PAB/SFP HX AREA
SWEL2			0	SW	8a	24	SW-02927A	HX-13A SFP HX INLET						Α		46/PAB/SFP HX AREA

SWEL	RISK	Z Ш S	UNIT	SYS CODE	EQUIP CLASS	WALK BY AREA	EQUIP#	EQUIP NAME	1	2	3	4	5	TRN	IPEEE Equip. Enhanced	LOCATION DESC
SWEL2			0	SW	0	14	SF-00785B	P-9 HUT RECIRC PUMP SUCTION FROM TRANSFER CANAL						В		8/PAB/P-9 HUT AREA WEST

ATTACHMENT B Classes of Equipment Unit 1 and SFP

	Classes of Equipment	SWEL1 Unit 1	SWEL2
0	Other	0	1
1	MCCs and wall-mounted contactors	2	0
2	Low voltage switchgear and break panels	2	0
3	Medium voltage, metal-clad switchgear	1	0
_4	Transformers	2	0
_ 5	Horizontal pumps	11	2
6	Vertical pumps	1	0
7	Fluid-operated valves	9	0
8a	MOVs	17	4
_8b	SOVs	2	0
9	Fans	5	0
10	Air handlers	1	0
11	Chiller	0	0
_12	Air Compressors	0	0
_13	Motor Generators	0	0
14	Distribution panels and Auto Transfer Switches	12	0
_15	Batteries and Racks	1	0
_16	Battery chargers and inverters	5	0
17	Engine Generators	2	0
18	Instrument Racks	1	0
_19	Temperature sensors	2	00
_20	Instrumentation and Control panels	7	0
21a	Tanks	10	0
21b	Heat exchangers	2	2
L	TOTAL	95	99

Note: There are no Chillers, Air Compressors and Motor Generators at Point Beach Unit 1 which are Seismic Category I. Therefore, none of these classes of equipment were included in the SWEL.

Attachment C Selected Equipment List Unit 1 and SFP

SWEL	RISK	NEW	UNIT	SYS CODE	EQUIP CLASS	EQUIP NUMBER	EQUIPMENT NAME	1	2	3	4	5	LOCATION DESC	SEISMIC CAT
SWEL1-1			0	125V	14	D-03	125V DC DISTRIBUTION PANEL	Х	Х	Х	х	X	26/PAB/INVERT RM WEST	I
SWEL1-1		Υ	0	125V	15	D-105	125V DC STATION BATTERY	Х	Х	Х	Х	X	35/PAB/D-105 BATT RM	1
SWEL1-1			0	125V _	16	D-107	D-105 DC STATION BATTERY CHARGER	Х	X	X	Х	X	26/PAB/INVERT RM WEST	1
SWEL1-1		Υ	0	125V	14	D-12	125V DC DISTRIBUTION PANEL	Χ_	Х	Х	Х	Χ	26/CB/CSR EAST	
SWEL1-1	Υ	Υ	0	125V	14	D-14	125V DC DISTRIBUTION PANEL	Х	Х	X	Х	Χ	26/CB/CSR EAST	1
SWEL1-1		Υ	0	125V	14	D-16	125V DC DISTRIBUTION PANEL	X	Х	Х	Х	Х	44/CB/CR SOUTH	I
SWEL1-1	Υ	Υ	0	125V	14	D-17	125V DC DISTRIBUTION PANEL	Х	Х	X	X	Χ	44/CB/CR SOUTH	1
SWEL1-1		Υ	0	125V	14	D-18	125V DC DISTRIBUTION PANEL	X	Х	X	Х	Χ	44/CB/CR NORTH	l
SWEL1-1		Υ	0	125V	14	D-28	G-03 EDG DC DISTRIBUTION PANEL	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	28/DGB/G-03 SWGR RM	1
SWEL1-1		Υ	0	125V	14	D-63	125V DC DISTRIBUTION PANEL	x	X	х	Х	х	8/CB/AFP RM 1P-29 CUB 1RK-89	1
SWEL1-1	Υ		1	4.16KV	3	1A-05	4.16 KV BUS SWITCHGEAR (SAFEGUARDS)	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	8/CB/VSG RM	I
SWEL1-1	Υ		1	480V	2	1B-03	480V SAFEGUARDS LOAD CENTER	Х	Х	Х	X	Х	26/CB/CSR	I
SWEL1-1	Y		1	480V	2	1B-04	480V SAFEGUARDS LOAD CENTER	Х	Х	Х	X	X	26/CB/CSR	i
SWEL1-1	Υ		1	480V	4	1X-13	1B-03 STATION SERVICE TRANSFORMER	Х	X	Х	X	Х	26/CB/CSR	Ī
SWEL1-1	Y		1	480V	4	1X-14	1B-04 STATION SERVICE TRANSFORMER	Х	X	Х	Х	Х	26/CB/CSR	I
SWEL1-1		Υ	1	480V	1	B312A- B855B	P-10A RHR PUMP NORMAL/ALT TRANSFER SWITCH	Х	х	х	Х	х	8/PAB/COL P-11	1
SWEL1-1		Υ	2	480V	1	B42- 4212B	2B4212B-B811M (D-109) CHGR NRM/ALT XFR SWITCH CONTACTOR	Х	X	Х	Х	Х	26/PAB/C-59 AREA 2B-42	l
SWEL1-1			1	AF	8a	1AF- 04000	1P-29 AFP DISCHARGE 1HX-1B SG INLET ISOLATION MOV	X	Х		X		8/CB/AFP RM 1P-29 CUB	1
SWEL1-1			1	AF	8a	1AF- 04001	1P-29 AFP DISCHARGE 1HX-1A SG INLET ISOLATION MOV	x	x		X		8/CB/AFP RM 1P-29 CUB	I
SWEL1-1	Υ		1	AF	7	1AF- 04002	1P-29 AFP MINI RECIRC CONTROL	Х	X		Х		8/CB/AFP RM 1P-29 CUB	Ī
SWEL1-1			1	AF	8a	1AF- 04006	1P-29 AFP SUCTION FROM SERVICE WATER	X	X		X		8/CB/AFP RM 1P-29 CUB	ı
SWEL1-1	Υ		1	AF	5	1P-029	AUX FEEDWATER TURBINE-DRIVEN PUMP	X	Х		X		8/CB/AFP RM 1P-29 CUB	ı
SWEL1-1	Υ	Υ	1	AF	5	1P-053	UNIT 1 AUX FEEDWATER MOTOR-DRIVEN PUMP	Х	X		х		8/PAB/1P-53 AFP RM	1

			VISION										B-45	
SWEL	RISK	NEW	UNIT	SYS CODE	EQUIP CLASS	EQUIP NUMBER	EQUIPMENT NAME	1	2	3	4	5	LOCATION DESC	SEISMIC CAT
						1T-212	1P-29 AFP MINI RECIRC IA 1AF-4002							ī
SWEL1-1]	Υ	1	AF	21a		BACKUP ACCUMULATOR	Х	X] .	х	,	8/CB/AFP RM	, '
0.7127		·····	· ·			AF-04007	Ditation /todamastrati	 ^ 	-^`			_	8/CB/AFP RM P-38A	T T
SWEL1-1			0	AF	7	711 04007	P-38A SSGP MINI RECIRC CONTROL	x	X		Х		CUB	, ,
01122.1		_		7.4	· ·	AF-04009	P-38A SSGP SUCTION FROM SERVICE		 ^ `				8/CB/AFP RM P-38A	
SWEL1-1			0	AF	8a	Yi -04009	WATER	Х	x		Х		CUB	'
OWLLINI			<u>-</u>	74		AF-04012	VV/TLIC	 ^ 	 ^-				8/CB/AFP RM P-38A	1
SWEL1-1)		0	AF	7	AI -040 IZ	P-38A SSGP DISCHARGE CONTROL	Х	x		Х		CUB	, '
OVVELI-1				ΑΙ	 '	AF-04023	P-38A SSGP DISCHARGE TO 1HX-1A		 ^- -				8/CB/AFP RM P-38A	
SWEL1-1		Υ	0	AF	8a	AF*04023	STEAM GENERATOR	x	X		Х		CUB	'
SVVLL I-1			<u> </u>	AF	oa	AF-04067	1P-53 AFP SERVICE WATER SUPPLY	-	+^-				ГСОВ.	
SWEL1-1		Y	1	AF	8a	AF-04067	ISOLATION	×	X		х		8/PAB/1P-53 AFP RM	!
SWELT-1		- <u>Y</u>	<u> </u>	AF AF	<u>oa</u>	AF-	ISOLATION		-		^	-	8/PAB/1P-53 AFP RIVI	 -
0.000)		,	۸	01-		AD 50 AED DECIDOUIL ATION IOOL ATION	\ \ \	1				0/040/40 50 450 014	1
SWEL1-1		Y	11	AF	8b	04073B	1P-53 AFP RECIRCULATION ISOLATION	X	X		X		8/PAB/1P-53 AFP RM	ļ
					_	P-038A		١.,	.,				8/CB/AFP RM P-38A	Į I
SWEL1-1			0	AF	5		AUX FEEDWATER MOTOR-DRIVEN PUMP	X_	Х		Х	<u> </u>	CUB	
						RK-25A						ŀ	8/CB/AFP RM P-38A	!
SWEL1-1			0	AF	18		P-38A SSGP INSTRUMENTATION RACK	X	X	ļ	Х	<u> </u>	CUB	
]			T-224B	1AF-4073B/1AF-4074B AFP RECIRC	ļ	}	ļ]	•		1
SWEL1-1		Y	1	AF	21a		ISOLATION IA ACCUMULATOR	X_	X		X		8/PAB/1P-53 AFP RM	
						1HX-012A	COMPONENT COOLING WATER HEAT							1
SWEL1-1	Υ	Υ	1	CC	21b		EXCHANGER	X	Х		X		46/PAB/CC HX AREA	
						1P-011A							8/PAB/CC PUMP	
SWEL1-1	Υ		1	CC	5	_	COMPONENT COOLING WATER PUMP	X	X		Х		AREA	
SWEL1-1	Υ		1	CC	21a	1T-012	COMPONENT COOLING SURGE TANK	Х	X		Х		46/PAB/CC HX AREA	1
<u> </u>						TE-00621	HX-12A/B CC HX OUTLET HEADER	1	 ``	-	<u> </u>	 	1977 7 1979 1 1977 11 123 1	1
SWEL1-1			1 1	cc	19	12 00021	TEMPERATURE RTD	X	X	ŀ	х		46/PAB/CC HX AREA	,
	1					HX-004		<u> </u>	+~-		<u> </u>	X		· · · · · ·
SWEL1-1	<u> </u>		11	CV	21b_		EXCESS LETDOWN HEAT EXCHANGER	ļ	┼ —	<u> </u>		<u> </u>	21/U1C	<u> </u>
					_	1CV-	1P-2A-C CHARGING PUMP REFUELING			ļ	.,		8/PAB/U1 CHG PUMP	1
SWEL1-1	Y		1	CV	<u>8a</u>	00112B	WATER SUCTION	X	X	ļ	X	 	AREA	ļ
			i .		_	1CV-		١	١		١			ļ I
SWEL1-1	L		1	CV	7	00142	CHARGING LINE FLOW CONTROL	Х	X	ļ	X		8/PAB/PIPEWAY #1	
						1P-002A	CHARGING PUMP (Pump Only as Pressure	İ	1				8/PAB/U1 CHG PUMP	I
SWEL1-1	Y		1	CV	5		Boundary)	X	X	X			RM	
						T-060B	G-01 EDG STARTING AIR RECEIVER							I
SWEL1-1			0	DA_	21a_		(RIGHT BANK)	X	↓X	X	_X_	X	8/CB/G-01 RM	
						T-060C	G-01 EDG STARTING AIR RECEIVER			1				1
SWEL1-1		L	0	DA	21a		(RIGHT BANK)	X	X	X	X	X	8/CB/G-01 RM	
						T-060E	G-01 EDG STARTING AIR RECEIVER (LEFT							I
SWEL1-1		ļ	0	DA	21a		BANK)	X	X	X	X	X	8/CB/G-01 RM	

		K-001, RE						,					B-46	
SWEL	RISK	NEW	UNIT	SYS CODE	EQUIP CLASS	EQUIP NUMBER	EQUIPMENT NAME	1	2	3	4	5	LOCATION DESC	SEISMIC CAT
		-				T-060F	G-01 EDG STARTING AIR RECEIVER (LEFT			- "				
SWEL1-1			0	DA	21a	. 555.	BANK)	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	8/CB/G-01 RM	
SWEL1-1		Υ	0	DA	21a	T-170A	G-03 EDG STARTING AIR RECEIVER	Х	Х	Х	X	Χ	28/DGB/G-03 RM	1
						C-034	O OO ESO OTATIONAL TREETABLE						8/CB/G-01 RM W	
SWEL1-1			0	DG	20		G-01 EDG ALARM AND ELECTRICAL PANEL	x	Х	Х	X	Х	WALL	
						C-034A							8/CB/G-01 RM W	1
SWEL1-1			0	DG	20	,	G-01 EDG LOCAL TRANSFER PANEL	Х	X	Х	Х	Х	WALL	
						C-078	G-01 EDG DC POWER TRANSFER					_	8/CB/G-01 RM W	I
SWEL1-1			0	DG	_20		CONTROL PANEL	X	X	Х	Х	X	WALL	
						C-081							28/DGB/G-03 SWGR	I
SWEL1-1		Υ	0	DG	20		G-03 EDG CONTROL PANEL	X	X	X	Х	X	RM	
SWEL1-1	Υ		0	DG	17	G-01	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR	Х	Х	Х	Х	Χ	8/CB/G-01 RM	Ī
SWEL1-1	Y	Υ	0	DG	17	G-03	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR	Х	Х	X	Х	Х	28/DGB/G-03 RM	i I
0,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,	<u> </u>	· · · · · ·				W-181A1			 `	<u> </u>			50/DGB/G-03 RADTR	i
SWEL1-1		Y	0	DG	9		G-03 EDG HX-265A RADIATOR FAN	Х	X	Х	X	Х	RM	
		-				W-181A2							50/DGB/G-03 RADTR	1
SWEL1-1		Y	0	DG	9		G-03 EDG HX-265A RADIATOR FAN	X_	X	X	X_	Х	RM	
						FO-03930	T-31A G-01 EDG DAY TANK INLET SECOND							I
SWEL1-1		_	0	FO	8a	_	OFF ISOLATION	X	X	X	X	X	8/CB/G-01 RM	
						P-206A	G-01 EDG FUEL OIL TRANSFER PUMP						28/DGB/G-01/2 FOTP	I
SWEL1-1		Υ	0	FO_	5			X_	X		X	Х	RM	
SWEL1-1			0	FO	21a	T-031A	G-01 DIESEL GENERATOR DAY TANK	Х	X	Х	Х	X	8/CB/G-01 RM	1
-						1C-105	SECONDARY SYSTEM POWER SUPPLIES							1
SWEL1-1		1	1	MMS	20	<u> </u>	PANEL	Χ	_X		Х		44/CB/CR	
						1MS-	HX-1B SG HEADER P-29 AFP STEAM							1
SWEL1-1			1	MS	8a	02019	SUPPLY MOV	X	X		Х	X	46/PAB/BAST AREA S	
						1MS-	HX-1A SG HEADER P-29 AFP STEAM		İ	l				1
SWEL1-1			11	MS	8a	02020	SUPPLY MOV	Χ_	X		X	Х	46/PAB/BAST AREA S	<u> </u>
						1MS-		l	1	1	, ,			I
SWEL1-1	_		1_1_	MS	8b	02090	P-29 AFP BEARING COOLING INLET	X	X		X		8/CB/AFP RM	
SWEL1-1			1	PACV	19	TE-03292	EL 66' U1C TEMPERATURE ELEMENT			<u></u>		X	66/U1C/NE QTR	<u> </u>
SWEL1-1	Υ		1	RH	5	1P-010A	RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL PUMP	X	X	X	X	Х	-19/PAB	_ I
SWEL1-1	Υ		1	RH	5	1P-010B	RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL PUMP	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	-19/PAB	l
OWELL	 - ' - 		 	1 (1)	 	1RH-	TAZORO (TAZORO TAZORO)	 ^` _	 ^`	<u> </u>	1	<u> </u>	-5/PAB/EAST WALL	1
SWEL1-1			1	RH	7	00624	HX-11A RHR HX OUTLET CONTROL	X	X	X	X	X	OVHD	,
		<u> </u>	†	 	 	1RH-		1	1				-5/PAB/EAST WALL	T
SWEL1-1			1	RH	7	00625	HX-11B RHR HX OUTLET CONTROL	X	X	X	X	X	OVHD	
SWEL1-1			1	SI	8a	SI-00852A	LOW HEAD SI CORE DELUGE ISOLATION					X	46/U1C/SEAL TABLE	I
SWEL1-1			1	SI	21a	T-034A	SAFETY INJECTION ACCUMULATOR	x	x	X		- `	21/U1C/SW QTR	1
OMETI-1	1	ل	<u> </u>	<u></u>	Z1a	1 . 00	SAFETT INJECTION ACCOMULATOR		┸~	12.	<u> </u>	Ь	L TO TO SAN WILL	

		K-001, KE											B-47	
SWEL	RISK	NEW	UNIT	SYS CODE	EQUIP CLASS	EQUIP NUMBER	EQUIPMENT NAME	1	2	3	4	5	LOCATION DESC	SEISMIC CAT
SWEL1-1			1	SI	5	1P-014A	CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP					х	8/PAB/SPRAY PUMP AREA	ı
SWEL1-1			1	SI	5	1P-014B	CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP					х	8/PAB/SPRAY PUMP AREA	Ĭ
SWEL1-1	Υ		1	l si	5	1P-015A	SAFETY INJECTION PUMP	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	8/PAB/SI PUMP AREA	Ī
SWEL1-1			1	SI	8a	1SI- 00825A	T-13 RWST OUTLET TO P-15A/B SI PUMP	х	Х	х	х	х	8/PAB/SPRAY PUMP AREA	I
SWEL1-1			1	SI	8a	1SI- 00825B	T-13 RWST OUTLET TO P-15A/B SI PUMP	х	Х	X	Х	X	8/PAB/SPRAY PUMP AREA	I
SWEL1-1	Υ		1	SI	8a	1SI- 00857A	HX-11A RHR HX OUTLET TO P-15A SI PUMP SUCTION	х	х	х	Х	Х	8/PAB/SI PUMP AREA	I
SWEL1-1	Υ		1	SI	8a	1SI- 00866A	COLD LEG INJECTION LINE ISOLATION	х	Х	х	х	X	8/PAB/PIPEWAY #1	Ī
SWEL1-1	Υ		1	SI	8a	1SI- 00866B	CORE DELUGE INJECTION LINE ISOLATION	х	Х	х	х	Х	8/PAB/PIPEWAY #1	
SWEL1-1	Y		1	SI	8a	1SI- 00896A	P-15A SI PUMP SUCTION	x	x	x	x_	х	8/PAB/SI PUMP AREA	I
SWEL1-1	Υ		1	SW	7	1SW- 00012A	HX-12A CC HX OUTLET TEMPERATURE CONTROL				Х		46/PAB/CC HX AREA	Ī
SWEL1-1	Υ		0	sw	6	P-032A	SERVICE WATER PUMP	Х			Х		8/CWPH/SW BLDG	I
SWEL1-1	Υ		0	SW	7	SW- 00012B	HX-12B CC HX OUTLET TEMPERATURE CONTROL				Х		46/PAB/CC HX AREA	ı
SWEL1-1	Υ	Υ	0	sw	7	SW- 00012C	HX-12C CC HX OUTLET TEMPERATURE CONTROL				х		46/PAB/CC HX AREA	l
SWEL1-1			0	VNBI	20	C-022	BATTERY ROOM HVAC CONTROL PANEL	X	Х	Х	Х	Х	26/PAB/NORTH	I
SWEL1-1			0	VNBI	10	W-085	PAB BATTERY AND INVERTER ROOM VENT FAN	х	х	х	x	х	35/PAB/D-106 ROOF	I
SWEL1-1			1	VNCC	9	W-001B1	CONTAINMENT ACCIDENT RECIRCULATION FAN	х	х	x	х	х		1
SWEL1-1			0	VNDG	20	C-032	G-01 EDG EXHAUST FAN CONTROL PANEL	х	х	х	х	х	8/CB/G-01 RM S WALL	I
SWEL1-1	Υ	Υ	0	VNDG	9	W-183B	G-03 EDG RM SMALL CAPACITY EXHAUST FAN	x	х	х	х	х	50/DGB/G-03 FAN RM	I
SWEL1-1	Y	Υ	0	VNDG	9	W-183C	G-03 EDG RM LARGE CAPACITY EXHAUST FAN	х	х	х	x	x	50/DGB/G-03 FAN RM	I
SWEL1-1			11	Υ	16	1DY-01	RED 125V DC/120V AC INVERTER	Х	Х	Х	Χ	Х	26/CB/CSR	<u> </u>
SWEL1-1			1	Y	16	1DY-03	WHITE 125V DC/120V AC INVERTER	x	х	х	х	х	26/PAB/INVERT RM WEST	I
SWEL1-1			1	Υ	14	1Y-203	WHITE 120V INVERTER DISTRIBUTION PANEL	x	х	X	X	х	26/CB/CSR WEST WALL	1

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SWEL	RISK	NEW	UNIT	SYS CODE	EQUIP CLASS	EQUIP NUMBER	EQUIPMENT NAME	1	2	3	4	5	LOCATION DESC	SEISMIC CAT
SWEL1-1			11	Υ	14	43/Y-01	1Y-01 RED 120V AC VITAL INST PNL PWR SUP TRANSFER SW	Х	х	Х	х	Х	44/CB/CR WEST	I
SWEL1-1			11	Y	14	43/Y-02	1Y-02 BLUE 120V AC VITAL INST PNL PWR SUP TRANSFER SW	Х	x	х	х	Х		l
SWEL1-1			1	Υ	14	83/DY-03	1DY-03 WHITE INVERTER STATIC TRANSFER SWITCH	Х	x	х	Х	Х	26/PAB/INVERT RM WEST	I
SWEL1-1			0	Y	16	DY-0B	BLUE 125V DC/120V AC ALTERNATE INVERTER	Х	X	X	X	Х		1
SWEL1-1			0	Υ	16	DY-0C	WHITE 125V DC/120V AC INVERTER	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	26/PAB/INVERT RM WEST	1
РВ			1	125V_	2	1SAF- 04000	1P-29 AFP DISCH 1HX-1B SG INLET ISOL MOV STARTER	X	Х		Х		8/CB/VSG EQUIP RM	I
РВ			1	125V	2	1SAF- 04001	1P-29 AFP DISCH 1HX-1A SG INLET ISOL MOV STARTER	Х	х		Х		8/CB/VSG EQUIP RM	1
РВ			1	125V	2	1SMS- 02019	HX-1B SG HDR P-29 AFP STEAM SUPPLY MOV STARTER	Х	х		Х		8/CB/VSG EQUIP RM	I
РВ			1	125V	2	1SMS- 02020_	HX-1A SG HDR P-29 AFP STEAM SUPPLY MOV STARTER	Х	х		Х		8/CB/VSG EQUIP RM	l
PB			1	125V	2	1SMS- 02082	P-29 AFP OVERSPEED TRIP STARTER	Х	X		X		8/CB/AFP RM 1P-29 CUB	1
PB			0	125V	14	D-01	125V DC DISTRIBUTION PANEL	Х	X	Х	Х	X	8/CB/VSG RM	l l
PB			0	125V	15	D-05	125V DC STATION BATTERY	Х	x	Х	X_	Х	8/CB/D-05 BATT RM	l l
РВ		Υ	0	125V	16	D-09	SWING STATION BATTERY CHARGER	Χ	X	Х	Х	Х	8/CB/VSG RM	I
РВ		Y	0	125V	14	D-19	125V DC DISTRIBUTION PANEL	X	X	X	X	Χ	44/CB/CR NORTH	l l
РВ	Υ	Υ	0	125V	14	D-21	125V DC DISTRIBUTION PANEL	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	44/CB/CR SOUTH	l
PB		Υ	0	125V	14	D-302	SWING BATTERY DISTRIBUTION PANEL	х	х	Х	x	Х	26/PAB/INVERT RM WEST	
PB			1	480V	1	1B-32	480V MOTOR CONTROL CENTER PAB SAFEGUARDS	X	Х	Х	х	Х	8/PAB/U1 CHG PUMP AREA	l
РВ			1	480V	1	1B-39	480V MOTOR CONTROL CENTER TRAIN A BATTERY CHARGER SUPPLY	Х	X	х	х	Х	8/CB/VSG RM	l l
PB			11	480V	1	1B-49	480V MOTOR CONTROL CENTER TRAIN B BATTERY CHARGER SUPPLY	Х	Х	Х	х	Х	8/CB/VSG RM	1
РВ			1	480V	1	B311C- B854D	P-32B SERVICE WATER PUMP NORMAL/ALT TRANSFER SW	Χ_			x_		8/CB/G-01 RM	I
РВ			2	480V	1	B334B- B854D	P-32F SERVICE WATER PUMP NORMAL/ALT TRANSFER SW	х			х		8/CB/G-01 RM	Ī
PB			1_1	480V	11	B421A- B855B	P-10B RHR PUMP NORMAL/ALT TRANSFER SWITCH	х	x	х	x	x	8/PAB/COL P-12	

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SWEL	RISK	NEW	UNIT	SYS CODE	EQUIP CLASS	EQUIP NUMBER	EQUIPMENT NAME	1			5	LOCATION DESC	SEISMIC CAT	
PB			1	480V	1	B42- 3212H	1B42-3212H D-109 SWING STN BATT CHGR TRAIN A CONTACTOR	Х	х	Х	Х	Х	8/PAB/U1 CHG PUMP AREA 1B-32	1
PB			1	480V	1	B42-391	D-07 STATION BATTERY CHARGER TRAIN A CONTACTOR	Х	Х	х	х	Х	8/CB/VSG RM 1B-39	I
PB			1	480V	1	B42-491	D-09 SWING STN BATTERY CHARGER TRAIN B CONTACTOR	Х	х	Х	Х	Х	8/CB/VSG RM 1B-49	I
РВ			1	480V	1	B42-494	D-108 STATION BATTERY CHARGER TRAIN B CONTACTOR	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	26/PAB/INVERT RM EAST	I
РВ			1	AF	18	1RK-35	1P-29 AUX FEEDWATER PUMP INSTRUMENTATION RACK	Х	Х		Х		8/CB/AFP RM 1P-29 CUB	I
РВ			0	AF	8b	AF- 04007A-S	P-38A SSGP COOLING WATER SOLENOID	Х	Х		х		8/CB/AFP RM P-38A CUB	I
PB			0	AF	8a	AF-04022	P-38A SSGP DISCHARGE TO 2HX-1A STEAM GENERATOR	х	Х		Х		8/CB/AFP RM P-38A CUB	I
РВ			1	СС	8a	1CC- 00719	CONT EQUIP CC SUPPLY HEADER OUTBOARD ISOLATION	X	Х		Х		8/PAB/PIPEWAY #2	Ī
РВ			1	СС	8a	1CC- 00738A	1HX-11A RHR HX SHELL SIDE INLET	х	X		Х		8/PAB/PIPEWAY #2	Ī
РВ			1_	СС	_8a	1CC- 00738B	1HX-11B RHR HX SHELL SIDE INLET_	X	X		Х		8/PAB/PIPEWAY #2	1
РВ			1	СС	8a	1CC- 00754A	1P-1A RCP CC INLET MOV	x	X		Х		8/PAB/PIPEWAY #2	
PB			1	СС	8a	1CC- 00754B	1P-1B RCP CC INLET MOV	X	Х		Х		8/PAB/PIPEWAY #2	ļ
PB			1	СС	8a	1CC- 00759A	1P-1A RCP CC OUTLET MOV	x	X		х		8/PAB/PIPEWAY #2	İ
PB			1	СС	8a	1CC- 00759B	1P-1B RCP CC OUTLET MOV	X	X		Х		8/PAB/PIPEWAY #2	Ī
РВ			1	СС	5	1P-011B	COMPONENT COOLING WATER PUMP	х	x		Х		8/PAB/CC PUMP AREA	Ι
РВ			2	CC	8a	2CC- 00719	CONT EQUIP CC SUPPLY HEADER OUTBOARD ISOLATION	х	X		Х		8/PAB/PIPEWAY #3	Ī
РВ			2	СС	8a	2CC- 00754A	2P-1A RCP CC INLET MOV	X	x		Х		8/PAB/PIPEWAY #3	Ι
PB			2_	СС	8a	2CC- 00754B	2P-1B RCP CC INLET MOV	Х	X		X		8/PAB/PIPEWAY #3	Ī
РВ			2	СС	8a	2CC- 00759B	2P-1B RCP CC OUTLET MOV	Х	X		Х		8/PAB/PIPEWAY #3	I
PB	Υ		_1	CV	5	1P-002B	CHARGING PUMP (Pump Only as Pressure Boundary)	Х	Х	Х			8/PAB/U1 CHG PUMP RM	1
РВ			1	ΙA	7	1IA-03047	U1C IA HEADER INLET CONTROL					X	26/PAB/PIPEWAY #2	I

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SWEL	RISK	NEW	UNIT	SYS	EQUIP CLASS	EQUIP NUMBER	EQUIPMENT NAME 1		2	3	4	5	LOCATION DESC	SEISMIC CAT
PB			1	IA	7	11A-03048	U1C IA HEADER INLET CONTROL					Х	26/PAB/PIPEWAY #2	ı
						1MS-	HX-1B SG HDR ATMOSPHERIC STEAM							I
PB			1	MS	7	02015	DUMP CONTROL	X	X		Х		85/U1F	<u> </u>
55					_	1MS-	HX-1A SG HDR ATMOSPHERIC STEAM		ĺ.,					l
PB		_	1_	MS	7	02016 1HX-011A	DUMP CONTROL RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL HEAT	Х	X		Х		85/U1F	
PB			1	RH	21b	IHX-UTTA	EXCHANGER	Х	x	X	X	х	-5/PAB/RHR HX CUB	1
			 '- -	IXII	210	1HX-011B	RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL HEAT	^	+^	 ^- -	 ^-	<u> </u>	-SIFABIRAN AX COD	
PB			1	RH	21b	11.000112	EXCHANGER	Х	x	X	x	Х	-5/PAB/RHR HX CUB	'
PB		_	1	SI	5	1P-015B	SAFETY INJECTION PUMP	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	8/PAB/SI PUMP AREA	
					_ <u> </u>	1SI-	P-10B RHR PUMP SUMP B SUCTION		 ^	 ^`	<u> </u>		OH PROPERTY ONLY PRINCEY	
PB			1	Si	8a	00850B-M	MOTOR/PUMP	X	X	X	X	X	8/PAB/PIPEWAY #2	
						1SI-	P-10A RHR PUMP SUCTION FROM						-5/PAB/RHR	I
PB			11	SI	8a	00851A	CONTAINMENT SUMP B	X	X	<u> </u>	X	X	PIPEWAY	
				٥.	_	1SI-	P-10B RHR PUMP SUCTION FROM	١.,	١.,	, ,		, ,	-5/PAB/RHR	1
PB	<u> </u>		1	SI	8a	00851B	CONTAINMENT SUMP B	X	X	X	X	X	PIPEWAY	ļ
PB			1	SI	8a	1SI- 00856A	T-13 RWST OUTLET TO P-10A RHR PUMP SUCTION HEADER	X	x	X	x	\ \	8/PAB/PIPEWAY #2	1
			 ! -	31	oa	1SI-	T-13 RWST OUTLET TO P-10B RHR PUMP	 ^ -	 ^-	 ^-	 ^-	 ^- -	O/FAB/FIFEVAT#2	
PB			1	SI	8a	00856B	SUCTION HEADER	x	Х	X	X	X	8/PAB/PIPEWAY #2	l I
						1SI-	HX-11B RHR HX OUTLET TO P-15B SI		 			_		
PB			_1_	SI	8a	0085 <u>7</u> B	PUMP SUCTION	X	LX	Х	X	Х	8/PAB/SI PUMP AREA	
						1SI-								1
PB			11	SI_	8a	00896B	P-15B SI PUMP SUCTION	X	X	X	X	X	8/PAB/SI PUMP AREA	<u> </u>
	Ì		ļ .		1	1T-013	REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK W/6		١.,	١		l		į l
PB			1	SI	21a	2SI-	IMMERSION HTRS	X_	 X	X	X	X	U1F	
PB			2	SI	8a	00856A	T-13 RWST OUTLET TO P-10A RHR PUMP SUCTION HEADER	x	X	X	\ \ \	x	8/PAB/PIPEWAY #3	1
1 0	 		 	01	Ua Ua	2SI-	T-13 RWST OUTLET TO P-10B RHR PUMP	 ^-	+^	 ^	+^	 ^- -	O/FAD/FII LVVAT#3	
PB			2	SI	8a	00856B	SUCTION HEADER	x	X	X	X	Х	8/PAB/PIPEWAY #3	'
PB			1	Y	16	1DY-02	BLUE 125V DC/120V AC INVERTER	X	X	X	X	X	26/CB/CSR	<u> </u>
	1		 		 	1DY-04	BLOC 120V BON 120V NO INVERVIEN		 ^	 ^	 	<u> </u>	26/PAB/INVERT RM	1
PB			11	Y	16		YELLOW 125V DC/120V AC INVERTER	Х	Lx	X	X	X	EAST	
PB			1	Y	14	1Y-01	RED 120V VITAL INSTRUMENT PANEL	Х	X	X	X	Х	44/CB/CR WEST	1
PB			1	Y	14	1Y-02	BLUE 120V VITAL INSTRUMENT PANEL	Х	X	Х	Х	X	44/CB/CR WEST	ī
PB			1	Y	14	1Y-104	YELLOW 120V VITAL INSTRUMENT PANEL	X	X	Х	X	X	60/CB/COMP RM	T
			<u> </u>			1Y-204	YELLOW 120V INVERTER DISTRIBUTION		Ť	 	1		26/CB/CSR WEST	
PB			1	Υ	14		PANEL	Х	X	X	X	Х	WALL	
PB			0	Υ	14	83/DY-0C	DY-0C WHITE INVERTER STATIC	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	26/PAB/NORTH	I

SWEL RISK NEW UNIT SYS **EQUIP** EQUIP **EQUIPMENT NAME** 3 4 LOCATION DESC SEISMIC CODE CLASS NUMBER CAT TRANSFER SWITCH DY-0D 26/PAB/INVERT RM Х 0 Х Х Х Х PB Υ 16 YELLOW 125V DC/120V AC INVERTER EAST AF-8/CB/AFP RM P-38B ΑF Χ Χ Χ PB 0 8b 04014A-S P-38B SSGP COOLING WATER SOLENOID CUB AF-04021 P-38B SSGP DISCHARGE TO 1HX-1B 8/CB/AFP RM P-38B Х Х Χ PB 0 ΑF 8a STEAM GENERATOR CUB 1P-002C CHARGING PUMP (Pump Only as Pressure 8/PAB/U1 CHG PUMP Χ Х Х PB CV Boundary) RM 1 5 1SI-P-10A RHR PUMP SUMP B SUCTION PB Υ 00850A-M MOTOR/PUMP Χ Х $\mathbf{x} \mid \mathbf{x}$ Х 8/PAB/PIPEWAY #2 1 SI 8a HX-013A SWEL2 0 SF 21h SPENT FUEL POOL HEAT EXCHANGER 46/PAB/SFP HX AREA HX-013B SWEL2 0 SF 21b SPENT FUEL POOL HEAT EXCHANGER 46/PAB/SFP HX AREA P-012A SWEL2 0 SF SPENT FUEL COOLING PUMP 46/PAB/SFP HX AREA 5 P-012B SWEL2 SF SPENT FUEL COOLING PUMP 46/PAB/SFP HX AREA 0 5 SF-P-9 HUT RECIRC PUMP SUCTION FROM 8/PAB/P-9 HUT AREA SWEL2 0 SF 00785B TRANSFER CANAL WEST SW-46/PAB/SFP HX AREA SWEL2 0 SW 02927A HX-13A SFP HX INLET 8a SW-SWEL2 0 SW 02927B 46/PAB/SFP HX AREA 8a HX-13B SFP HX INLET SW-46/PAB/SFP HX AREA SWEL2 0 SW 8a 02930A HX-13A SFP HX OUTLET SW-SWEL2 0 02930B HX-13B SFP HX OUTLET 46/PAB/SFP HX AREA SW 8a SFP SF SPENT FUEL POOL 46/PAB/SFP HX AREA PB 0 21a Y-204 YELLOW 120V INVERTER DISTRIBUTION 26/CB/CSR WEST $X \mid X \mid X \mid X$ Х Υ WALL PΒ 0 14 PANEL

Status: Selsmic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)	<u>N</u> υ
Equipment ID No.: 1P-010A	
Equipment Class: (5) Horizontal Pumps	
Equipment Description: RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL PUMP	
Project: Point Beach 1 SWEL 1	
Location (Bldg, Elev, Room/Area): PAB, -19.00 ft, ALL	
Manufacturer/Model:	
Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Selsmic Walkdown of an item of equipment or SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgment findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.	
Anchorage	
 Is anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)? 	Yes
2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?	Yes
3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?	Yes
4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?	Yes
5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? (Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.) Anchorage verified per drawlings C-250,Rev.8, C-243, Rev. 5 and	Yes
C-240 Rev. 6. 6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?	Yes
Interaction Effects 7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?	Yes

Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)	Status: Y N U
Equipment ID No.: 1P-014A	
Equipment Class: (5) Horizontal Pumps	
Equipment Description: CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP Interaction Effects	
7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?	Yes
Tube in contact with CC pipe and Judged to be acceptable.	
8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, celling tiles and lighting, and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment? Overhead HVAC, conduits, and pipes are judged to be acceptable.	Yes
Light above has chain the wrapped to lift up. Chain is continuous. The wraps should be removed. This issue has been entered into the corrective action process. 9. Do attached lines have adequate tlexibility to avoid damage?	s. Yes
Attached conduit is flexible.	
10. Based on the above selsmic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse selsmic interaction effects?	Yes
Other Adverse Conditions	
11. Have you looked for and found no adverse seismic conditions that could adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?	Yes
Comments Seismic Walkdown Team: M. Nielsen & D. Carter - 9/18/2012	
Detailed signed records of the checklists are available at the site. Date:	

Sta Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)	atus: YN U
Equipment ID No.: T-031A	
Equipment Class: (21) Tanks and Heat Exchangers	
Equipment Description: G-01 DIESEL GENERATOR DAY TANK	
Project: Point Beach 1 SWEL 1	
Location (Bldg, Elev, Room/Area): CB, 8.00 ft, G-01 RM	•
Manufacturer/Model:	
Instructions for Completing Checklist	
This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equip SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of jud findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other commen	dgments and
<u>Anchorage</u>	
 Is anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)? 	Yes
of over to the roughly out of the same and t	
2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?	Yes
3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?	Yes
4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?	Yes
5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? (Note: This question only applies if the Item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.) Tank is mounted to steel frame with 5/8" diameter bolts and the frame is mounted with 1" thru bolts and one anchorage welded to tan embed plate. Calculation N-90-043, Rev. 0 Attachment 2 shows analysis for 5/8" mounting bolts for tank and 1" thru bolts for the attachment of the frame to the wall. Therefore, the plant documentation is confirmed.	Yes
Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?	Yes

Status: Y N U Area Walk-By Checklist (AWC) Location (Bidg, Elev, Room/Area): Area Walk-by 19 PAB EL 8' BY SI & CS PUMPS 5. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic interactions Yes that could cause flooding or spray in the area? Fire protection lines in area are threaded and well supported. Judged to be acceptable. 6. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic interactions Yes that could cause a fire in the area? No sources. 7. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic interactions Yes associated with housekeeping practices, storage of portable equipment, and temporary installations (e.g., scaffolding, lead shielding)? Scaffold above 2P-14B looks to be well built and tied off. 8. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could Yes adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment in the area? Two lights in corridor area are attached to steel with magnets. Appear to be strongly attached. This issue has been entered into the station corrective action process. **Comments** Selsmic Walkdown Team: M. Nielsen & D. Carter - 9/20/2012 Detailed signed records of the checklists are available at Evaluated by: Date: the site.

Status: Y N U

Area Walk-By Checklist (AWC)

Location (Bldg, Elev, Room/Area): Area Walk-by 24: PAB EL. 46' SFP HX AREA Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Area Walk-By near one or more SWEL items. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments. 1. Does anchorage of equipment in the area appear to be free of potentially Yes adverse seismic conditions (if visible without necessarily opening cabinets)? Does anchorage of equipment in the area appear to be free of significant Yes degraded conditions? Anchorage on tank support for T-161A are small. East anchors are in oversized holes. Northwest anchors seem to have more surface rust, Appears to be OK now, but should be cleaned and evaluated. This issue has been entered into the station corrective action process. 3. Based on a visual inspection from the floor, do the cable/conduit raceways and Yes HVAC ducting appear to be free of potentially adverse seismic conditions (e.g., condition of supports is adequate and fill conditions of cable trays appear to be inside acceptable limits)? Drain tube attached to cable with clamps and oriented incorrectly. No seismic interaction concerns since there is no soft targets in the vicinity. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic spatial Yes interactions with other equipment in the area (e.g., ceiling tiles and lighting)? Abandoned support in SW corner of room. Will not cause damage to adjacent pipe and is judged to be acceptable. This issue has been entered into the corrective action program. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic interactions Yes that could cause flooding or spray in the area? Welded pipe supports. No concerns. Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic interactions Yes that could cause a fire in the area? Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic interactions Yes associated with housekeeping practices, storage of portable equipment, and temporary installations (e.g., scaffolding, lead shielding)? Scaffold at west end screw jacked to steel above and close to several pipes. Sufficiently braced with no interaction concerns. Scaffold fence is tied off at HX-13B base and tied to pipe support base and is judged to be acceptable.



Plan for Future Seismic Walkdown of Inaccessible Equipment

Completion of the walkdowns for nine (9) items must be deferred due to accessibility. Four items require opening energized equipment and five items require a refueling outage. Table E-1 summarizes the reasons each item is inaccessible during normal plant operation. PBNP CRs have been written to identify these deferred components and to provide a schedule the future Seismic Walkdowns for these items.

Table E -1. Summary of Inaccessible Equipment

Component ID	Location	Description	Reason for Inaccessibility	Scheduled Completion	
W-001A1	Unit 1 Containment	Containment Accident Recirculation Fan	Access to containment is restricted during plant operation.	Complete	
TE-03292	Unit 1 Containment	EL 66' U1C Temperature Element	Access to containment is restricted during plant operation.	Complete	
T-034A	Unit 1 Containment	Safety Injection Accumulator	Access to containment is restricted during plant operation.	Complete	
HX-004	Unit 1 Containment	Excess Letdown Heat Exchanger	Access to containment is restricted during plant operation.	Complete	
SI-00852A	Unit 1 Containment	Low Head Si Core Deluge Isolation	Access to containment is restricted during plant operation.	Complete	
C-022	26/PAB/North	Battery Room Hvac Control Panel	Equipment energized	Complete	
1B312A-B855B	8/PAB/Col P-11	P-10A RHR Pump Normal/ALT Transfer Switch	Equipment energized	Complete	
C-081	28/DGB/G-03 SWGR Rm	G-03 EDG Control PANEL	Equipment energized	4 th Qtr. 2013	
C-032	8/CB/G-01 Rm South Wall	G-01 EDG Exhaust Fan Control Panel	Equipment energized	1 st Qtr. 2014	

3. PEER REVIEW TEAM & PROCESS

The Point Beach (PBN) Peer Review Team consisted of individuals from PBN operations, civil engineering, licensing, and PRA as well as structural/selsmic engineers from Stevenson & Associates. These individuals participated in phases of preparation, performance, and peer review of the seismic walkdowns. This section documents the peer review process and how the Peer Review Team interacted with the Seismic Walkdown Engineering Teams.

3.1 Peer Review Team

The affiliation, role, and qualifications for each Peer Review Team member are summarized in the following table.

Name	Group	Role *	Qualifications **
Rick Merkes	PBN Operations	SWEL co-preparer	(e)(f)
Douglas P. Brown	PBN Civil Engineering	Peer Review Team Leader SWE SWEL co-preparer	(b) (c) (g)
David N. Carter	Stevenson &Assoc. (consultant eng.)	SWE Team #1 Leader SWE PR	(b) (c) (g)
Nabil Juraydini	Stevenson & Assoc. (consultant eng.)	SWE Team #2 Leader SWE PR	(b) (c) (g)
Stanley E. Guokas	PBN PRA Group	PR Team PBN – SWEL Preparer	(d)
Russ Severson	DAEC PRA Group	SWEL PR	(d)
T. K. Ram	Stevenson &Assoc. (consultant eng.)	SWEL PR	(d) (e)
Jeffery Buboltz	PBN Civil Engineering	SWE Team Member SWE PR	(b) (c) (g)
Scott Kahl		SWE Team Member SWE PR	(b) (c) (g)
Richard L. LaPlante	-	SWE Team Member SWE PR	(b) (c) (g)
Coreen A. McDonald	- }	SWE Team Member SWE PR	(b) (c) (g)
Mark C. Nielsen		SWE Team Member SWE PR License Basis PR	(b) (c) (g)
Dave J. Nuttall		SWE Team Member SWE PR License Basis PR	(b) (c) (g)

Notes:

- (a) Completed EPRI NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Training
- (b) Seismic engineering experience
- (c) Degree in mechanical engineering or civil/structural engineering
- (d) Seismic PRA / IPEEE experience

Role: PR (peer review), SWEL (seismic walkdown equipment list), SWE (seismic walkdown engineer)

^{**} Qualifications:

- (e) Knowledge of plant operations, documentation
- (f) Plant Operations member
- (g) Completed SQUG Walkdown Screening and Seismic Evaluation Training Course

3.2 Peer Review Process

PR Team Lead

Doug Brown served as the Peer Review Team Lead. In that role, he was responsible for coordinating the peer review and assembling this report. As described below, he also performed some additional roles as part of the walkdown team and checklist PR. He also participated in the SWEL preparation, so he was not part of that PR process. That is, even though he was a SWEL copreparer, the SWEL was independently reviewed and he did not partake in any of the SWEL PR. Therefore, performing as the lead peer review is considered acceptable.

SWEL Preparation

The SWEL was prepared by S. Guokas, who is a PBN PRA engineer, with familiarity with the PBN IPEEE Report and the PBN PRA model. Additional input into the SWEL was provided by a plant staff structural/selsmic engineer (D. P. Brown), and a Plant Operations representative (R. Merkes).

The SWEL was Peer Reviewed by a team that included a PRA engineer (R. Severson) and a Seismic PRA/IPEEE engineer (T.K. Ram).

Seismic Walkdown

The primary seismic walkdown was conducted with two teams, each with two qualified structural/seismic engineers. A contractor engineer severed as Team Leader of each team. The second team member was an available PBN SWE or the two contract engineers worked together as one team.

The Peer Review of the walkdowns consisted of a Peer Review Team Lead with Operations and PRA knowledge, and structural/seismic engineers. The structural/seismic engineers made up the SWE teams, but also served to peer review each other's work. The Peer Review Team Lead also participated in a few of the walkdowns for logistical support. The ultimate judgments regarding licensing basis were made by qualified Point Beach structural engineers.

- Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWE):
 - SWE Team #1 D. N. Carter (team lead),
 - SWE Team #2 N. Juraydini (team lead),
 - SWE Team member D. P. Brown
 - SWE Team member J. Buboltz

ENCLOSURE 2

NEXTERA ENERGY POINT BEACH, LLC POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2

UPDATE TO NEXTERA ENERGY POINT BEACH, LLC
RESPONSE TO 10 CFR 50.54(F)
REQUEST FOR INFORMATION REGARDING NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE
RECOMMENDATION 2.3, SEISMIC

SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 2 12Q0114-R-002 REVISION 0

Updates to Seismic Walkdown Report Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 2 12Q0114-R-002 Revision 0

Executive Summary	No Changes
Section 1	No Changes
Section 2	No Changes
Section 3	No Changes
Section 4	No Changes
Section 5	Additional items were added to Table 5.2 (P-032F, 2P-015B). A correction was made to
	Table 5.3 (AWB 28, W-002A should have been W-002B).
Section 6	No Changes
Section 7	No Changes
Section 8	No Changes
Section 9	No Changes
Appendix A	No Changes
Appendix B	Table 3, IPEEE and A-46 Outlier Resolution, is updated to only include the equipment for Unit 2. Resolution dates were also added. Attachment A was updated to include the equipment from the spent fuel pool (SFP). This information had been included on only the Unit 1 report. Attachment B was updated to include the equipment from the SFP. This information had been included on only the Unit 1 report. Attachment C was added to provide the selected equipment list. The enclosed pages, B-12 through B-48, replace pages B-12 through B-36 of the original report.
Appendix C	Administrative changes made on pages C-66, C-86, C-116, C-146, C-162, and C-172.
Appendix D	Administrative change made on page D-30.
Appendix E	Table E-1 has been updated
Appendix F	Administrative changes made on pages F-3 and F-4.

	Table 5-2: Table of Actions Resulting f	rom Se	ismic Wa	alkdow	n Inspection	
Equipment ID	Potentially Adverse Seismic Condition	Degraded	Non- conforming	Unanalyzed	Action Taken to Address the Condition	Current Status
P-032D	Corrosion observed on the base plate.	х			NextEra Engineering evaluated the corrosion and determined minor and would not affect the design function of the pump. CR initiated.	Closed. Will be tracked through structures monitoring program.
P-032E	Corrosion observed on the base plate.	x			NextEra Engineering evaluated the corrosion and determined minor and would not affect the design function of the pump. CR initiated	Closed. Will be tracked through structures monitoring program.
P-032F	Corrosion observed on the baseplate.	X			NextEra Engineering evaluated the corrosion and determined minor and would not affect the design function of the pump. CR initiated.	Closed. Will be tracked through structures monitoring program.
2MS-02090	A section of tubing is supporting the solenoid and attached flexible conduit fitting. The solenoid and the fitting are relatively heavy compared to the capacity of the tubing supporting them.			Х	NextEra Engineering determined from P&ID drawings that a loss of air to the valve results in the valve going to a safe position. Initiated CR.	Being tracked in the CAP.

	Table 5-2: Table of Actions Resulting for	om Se	ismic W	alkdow	n Inspection	
Equipment ID	Potentially Adverse Seismic Condition	Degraded	Non- conforming	Unanalyzed	Action Taken to Address the Condition	Current Status
2P-002C	The pump is anchored with eight 1" cast in place bolts. The Drawing C-240 shows the anchors as 1" Wejit type expansion anchor. The SQUG SEWS prepared for the USI A-46 program also indicates that the anchors are 1" Wejit type.		х		Cast in place anchors have greater capacity than Wejit expansion anchors. Based on this, the as installed condition is not a seismic concern. CR initiated.	Being tracked in the CAP.
2B-03	Rear bottom panel is missing a mounting bolt.	x			The walkdown team determined that the missing bolt does not adversely affect the seismic capability of the equipment. The bolt is one of many that attach the rear panel to the frame. Initiated CR.	Work request initiated to install the bolt.
D26	Two crank handles in vicinity are loosely hung from bolts in the concrete wall.			X	NextEra Engineering determined that the panel contains no sensitive items.	Closed
2P-015B	The anchor bolt type shown on drawing C-242 conflicts with the as-installed anchor bolt type. Drawing C-242 states the anchor bolt type is cast-in-place. The installed anchor bolts are Wej-its.		X		The as-installed Wej-it type anchors were evaluated on SQ-000077. Since the condition was previously evaluated, this is a documentation discrepancy issue.	Being tracked in CAP.

	Table 5-3: Table of Actions Resulting from Area Walk-by Inspections										
Area	Potentially Adverse Seismic Condition	Degraded	Non- conforming	Unanalyzed	Action Taken to Address the Condition	Current Status					
AWB 9	An S-Hook supporting a light fixture was observed to be opened.	x			In the judgment of the walkdown team, the light fixture would not fall and interact with any seismically qualified equipment. Initiated CR.	Work request initiated to repair.					
AWB 11	The G-02 diesel room contains threaded fire protection piping that is supported from threaded rod hangers. The fire protections system is only laterally supported at a connection to a fire protection header which comes into the room through a wall. The lines are supported off various lengths threaded rods that are typically attached to a shell type anchor in the concrete ceiling. On the west end, the fire protection line and a sprinkler head are relatively close to the room fans. The Seismic Walkdown Team was unable to conclude that the fire protection pipe and sprinkler head would not move and interaction with the fans. In addition, the team could not conclude that the fire protection line would not deflect in a manner that would cause the threaded fittings to leak.			X	NextEra Engineering performed a walkdown and determined that much of the area is not susceptible to issues do to spray. A preliminary evaluation was performed for the piping at the west end of the room and it was determined that the piping is within code allowable stresses and will not leak. This preliminary evaluation was considered a bounding case and thus the remaining piping will not leak. Initiated CR.	Being tracked in the CAP.					

	Table 5-3: Table of Actions Result	ing from	Area V	/alk-by	Inspections	
Area	Potentially Adverse Seismic Condition	Degraded	Non- conforming	Unanalyzed	Action Taken to Address the Condition	Current Status
AWB 19	A 3/8" tube for valve 1SI-881A has a long span (~10') and is very flexible.	X			The walkdown team judged that the tube was not an interaction hazard and would deflect but not break in a seismic event. A preliminary calculation of the tubing spans showed that the tubing will not overstress. Initiated CR.	Work request initiated to repair.
AWB 19	On the west wall there is a flexible pipe from SI-917A that appears to bearing on some conduit clamps. The hose could dislodge from the clamps and interact with items below.	Х			The walkdown team determined that the condition was not a seismic concern. There were no soft targets immediately below. Initiated CR.	Work request initiated to repair.
AWB 19	A conduit for valve 2SI-825C is attached to the flange of a vertical hanger with clamps oriented such that they are resisting dead load with friction. Clamps should be re-orientated.	Х			The conduit is attached to nearby cable tray JG08 and will not fall. Initiated CR.	Work request initiated to repair.
AWB 19	A copper instrument air pipe is attached to a vertical hanger with clamps oriented such that they are resisting dead load with friction. The clamps should be reoriented.	×			The bottom support of the pipe is oriented correctly. There is a support in the horizontal run at the top of the riser. Based on this the pipe is judged not to fall. Initiated CR.	Work Request initiated to repair.

	Table 5-3: Table of Actions Resulting from Area Walk-by Inspections											
Area	Potentially Adverse Seismic Condition	Degraded	Non- conforming	Unanalyzed	Action Taken to Address the Condition	Current Status						
AWB 19	There are two lights in the area that are attached to structural steel with magnets. It is suggested that the magnets be backed up with lanyards to assure they will not fall.	X			The lights were tug tested and determined to be adequately supported. Initiated CR.	Closed						
AWB 20	A pipe support in the north west corner of the room was observed to have potential deficiencies. The support is a structural member (W shape) with the weak axis resisting dead load welded to a four bolt anchor plate at each end. One of the anchors on the south plate is missing. The west flange of the support and about ½ of the web are notched in three places. There is a shackle on the south west anchor on the north plate.	X			The walkdown team judged it to be acceptable since the support is lightly loaded. CR initiated.	Being tracked in the CAP.						
AWB 27	There is a missing anchor bolt on the pipe support west of P-31A	Х			Previously identified and evaluated in CR.	Work Request initiated to repair.						
AWB 27	There is a missing anchor bolt on the base plate north west of P-31A for a chlorination line.	X			Previously identified and evaluated in CR.	Work Request initiated to repair.						
AWB 27	There is corrosion on P-31A and P-31B base plates.	X			Corrosion evaluated by NextEra Engineering and determined to minor surface corrosion and not a concern. CR initiated.	Closed. Will be tracked through structures monitoring program.						
AWB 28	There is a missing anchor bolt on the base plate northwest of P-35A.	х			Determined not to be a seismic concern due to ruggedness of the overall assembly. CR initiated.	Work Request initiated to repair.						

	Table 5-3: Table of Actions Result	ing from	Area V	Valk-by	<u>Inspections</u>	
Area	Potentially Adverse Seismic Condition	Degraded	Non- conforming	Unanalyzed	Action Taken to Address the Condition	Current Status
AWB 28	The bottom anchor bolt for W-002B is not fully engaged.	×			NextEra Engineering evaluated the condition and determined that the fan is not required to be seismically qualified. The remaining anchorage was determined to be sufficient anchorage to prevent seismic interaction with seismically qualified equipment. CR initiated.	Work Request initiated to repair.
AWB 28	There is loose grout at the northeast corner below SW-13.	x			Determined to have no adverse affect on the design function of the support since it is not in the bearing area of the base plate. CR initiated.	Work Request initiated to repair.
AWB 29	A conduit support on the southwest corner of K-3B has one missing bolt and one loose nut.	Х			Due to the light load on the support and the remaining anchorage it was determined to be acceptable. CR initiated.	Work Request initiated to repair.

	Table 5-3: Table of Actions Resulting from Area Walk-by Inspections											
Area	Potentially Adverse Seismic Condition	Degraded	Non- conforming	Unanalyzed	Action Taken to Address the Condition	Current Status						
AWB 29	There are is a 1" gap in the grout pad on T-33A.	Х			It was determined that there is sufficient grout for the bases to perform their design function. CR initiated.	Closed						
AWB 29	The west nut on T-033A does not have full thread engagement.	x			The top of the bolt is about 2 to 3 three threads below the top of the nut. The seismic walkdown team judged that this is sufficient to carry the required loads.	Closed						
AWB 39	The platform just east of the Main Steam Safety Valve is not anchored to the slab. In some cases there are anchor with no nuts, in other cases there are no anchors at all.	x			The permanent platform just south of the elevator shaft will prevent the platform from overturning during a seismic event. Other components in the area will prevent the platform from moving. CR initiated.	Work Request initiated to repair.						
AWB 44	One of the four anchor bolts on a support for the valve stem extender is missing. Three of the four bolts are installed.	x			Due to the location of the valve stem extender and the presences of the three remain bolts, it is not a seismic interaction concern. CR initiated.	Work Request initiated to repair.						

Table 3 IPEEE and A-46 Outlier Resolution - Unit 2

Outlier No.	Program	Equip Class	System	Equip ID	Noun Name	Status at Time of SRT Walkdown in 1993	Outlier Description	Interim Resolution Documented in the USI A-46 Seismic Evaluation Report to NRC	Status / Final Resolution	Required Close Out	Date Completed
1	_	0	CV	2F- 39A	Rcp Seal Water Injection Filter	O - Anchor nuts are not seated. Not an operability concern. EWR, 6/20/96 - EWR 96-040 assigned	The nuts for the caste in place anchors are not fully seated.	This is not an operability concern because the attached pipe has sufficient flexibility to accommodate the displacement of the filter. The nuts will be seated or washers installed to close up the gaps. The item has been walked down for the IPEEE only. Subsequent to the walkdown, it has been screened out using the Seismic PSA screening criteria.	WO 9815435 completed 11/6/98. Removed existing nuts, added washers and torqued down new nuts on all 4 anchors.	SQ-001530 completed	11/6/98
2	A,1	1	480V	2B-42	480v Motor Control Center Pab Safeguards	O - The connecting bolt that connects the double P1000 to the strut that is anchored to the wall has either loose or missing fastening nuts. T. Dykstra to submit MWR to check tightness, tighten & replace hardware. WO 9411729. Maintenance to assist with bolt tightness checks 2/20/95. WO submitted to replace missing hardware.	The connecting bolt that connects the double P1000 to the strut that is anchored to the wall has either loose or missing fastening nuts.	The MCC is considered seismically operable because the other top supports are sufficient to resist overturning. The bolts will be check tight and any missing hardware replaced.	WO 9606365, completed 11/13/96 checked the connecting bolts tight and replaced any missing hardware.	SQ-001250 resolves the outlier.	11/13/96

Outlier No.	Program	Equip Class	System	Equip ID	Noun Name	Status at Time of SRT Walkdown in 1993	Outlier Description	Interim Resolution Documented in the USI A-46 Seismic Evaluation Report to NRC	Status / Final Resolution	Required Close Out	Date Completed
4	A,I	2	480V	2B-03	480v Safeguards Load Center	O - ANCHORAGE INSUFFICIENT, Weld spacing is to large. Every 3rd cabinet in some cases. TROLLEY HOIST needs to be clamped in place. T. Dykstra to submit separate EWRs for weld and trolley hoist.	The anchorage weld spacing is to large, every 3rd cabinet in some cases. The trolley hoist that rides along the top of the switchgear poses an interaction hazard.	There is sufficient anchorage capacity in the existing welds to carry the seismic anchorage loads. However, the switchgear was declared an outlier because it is not good engineering practice to transfer the seismic loading through the switchgear structure. The switchgear is considered seismically operable. Modification MR 95-005 is initiated to install new anchorage. The trolley hoist will be evaluated.	MR 95-006 installed new anchorage (WO 9705903). EWR 96-042 evaluated breaker handling trolley. EWR closed. MR 98-095 installed trolley stops.	SQ-001588, SQ-001532 completed	7/6/99
6	A,i	2	480V	2B-04	480v Safeguards Load Center	O - ANCHORAGE INSUFFICIENT, Weld spacing is to large. Every 3rd cabinet in some cases. TROLLEY HOIST needs to be clamped in place, Cub 2B-00-32B-2B-04 has loose material, should remove it. T. Dykstra to submit separate EWRs for weld and trolley hoist.	The anchorage weld spacing is to large, every 3rd cabinet in some cases. The trolley hoist that rides along the top of the switchgear poses an interaction hazard.	There is sufficient anchorage capacity in the existing welds to carry the seismic anchorage loads. However, the switchgear was declared an outlier because it is not good engineering practice to transfer the seismic loading through the switchgear structure. The switchgear is considered seismically operable. Modification MR 95-005 is initiated to install new anchorage. The trolley hoist will be evaluated.	MR 95-006 installed new anchorage. EWR 96-042 assigned to evaluated breaker handling trolley. EWR closed. MR 98-095 installed trolley stops.	SQ-001589, SQ-001536 completed	7/6/99
7	A,I	3	RP	2C-41	Rod Ctl Mg/Reactor Trip Bkr Switchgear Ctl Panel	O - NOT ANCHORED. MR in process. MR 94-045. Candice Curtis	The cabinet is not anchored.	The relay review showed that there were no essential Reactor Protection System relays located in the cabinet. Any failure of 2C-41 is expected to cause the reactor trip breakers to open, therefore in the safe direction. Modification request MR 94-045 will install new anchorage.	MR 94-045 installed new anchorage. Accepted 11/7/95.	SQ-001537 completed	8/23/96
9	A,I	4	4.16KV	2X-13	B-03 Station Service Transformer	O - ANCHORED WITH FRICTION CLIPS. MR in process MR 94-013	The transformer anchorage uses friction clips which is not covered by the GIP.	The friction clips provide adequate capacity to withstand the PBNP SSE, because the friction coefficient exceeds the seismic demand level. The anchorage will be upgrade under modification MR 94-012.	MR 94-013 installed new anchorage - accepted 11/3/95.	SQ-001800 completed	8/1/97

Outlier No.	Program	Equip Class	System	Equip ID	Noun Name	Status at Time of SRT Walkdown in 1993	Outlier Description	Interim Resolution Documented in the USI A-46 Seismic Evaluation Report to NRC	Status / Final Resolution	Required Close Out	Date Completed
11	A,I	4	4.16KV	2X-14	B-04 Station Service Transformer	O - ANCHORED WITH FRICTION CLIPS. MR in process. MR 94-013	The transformer anchorage uses friction clips which is not covered by the GIP.	The friction clips provide adequate capacity to withstand the PBNP SSE, because the friction coefficient exceeds the seismic demand level. The anchorage will be upgrade under modification MR 94-012.	MR 94-013 installed new anchorage - accepted 11/3/95.	SQ-001801 completed	8/1/97
17	A,I	5	SI	2P- 14A	Containment Spray Pump	O - Failed Anchorage Calc PIPE LOAD ON SUCTION NOZZLES	The anchor J-bolts have an embedment < 16D as required by the GIP.	A calculation per ACI 318-63 and ACI 349-80 Appendix B shows that the pump anchorage has sufficient capacity.	S&A Calc 91C2696- C-019 uses the guidelines from ACI 318-63 and ACI 349- 80 Appendix B to show that the pump anchorage has sufficient capacity.	SQ-1807 completed.	11/12/02
19	A,I	5	SI	2P- 14B	Containment Spray Pump	O - Failed Anchorage Calc PIPE LOAD ON SUCTION NOZZLES	The anchor J-bolts have an embedment < 16D as required by the GIP.	A calculation per ACI 318-63 and ACI 349-80 Appendix B shows that the pump anchorage has sufficient capacity.	S&A Calc 91C2696- C-019 uses the guidelines from ACI 318-63 and ACI 349- 80 Appendix B to show that the pump anchorage has sufficient capacity.	SQ-1828 completed.	11/12/02
20	A,I	6	SW	P-32A	Service Water Pump	O - Anchorage/capacity check on bolts & studs, restraint of overhead trolley,	The pump extending casing is 34' long > the 20' allowable. The overhead crane poses an interaction hazard.	The pump is considered operable based on original design calculations. S&A calculation 91C2696-C-012 shows that the pump shaft stress is within allowable limits.	S&A Calc 91C2696- C-012 shows pump shaft stresses within limits. EWR 96-041 evaluated the overhead hoist. Concluded that the existing configuration does not present an interaction hazard to the SW pumps - completed 12/5/96.	SQ-1808 completed.	6/15/99

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21	A,I	6	SW	P-32B	Service Water Pump	O - Anchorage/capacity check on bolts & studs, restraint of overhead trolley,	The pump extending casing is 34' long > the 20' allowable. The overhead crane poses an interaction hazard.	The pump is considered operable based on original design calculations. S&A calculation 91C2696-C-012 shows that the pump shaft stress is within allowable limits.	S&A Calc 91C2696-C-012 shows pump shaft stresses within limits. EWR 96-041 evaluated the overhead hoist. Concluded that the existing configuration does not present an interaction hazard to the SW pumps - completed 12/5/96.	SQ-1809 completed.	6/15/99
22	A,I	6	SW	P-32C	Service Water Pump	O - Anchorage/capacity check on bolts & studs, restraint of overhead trolley,	The pump extending casing is 34' long > the 20' allowable. The overhead crane poses an interaction hazard.	The pump is considered operable based on original design calculations. S&A calculation 91C2696-C-012 shows that the pump shaft stress is within allowable limits.	S&A Calc 91C2696-C-012 shows pump shaft stresses within limits. EWR 96-041 evaluated the overhead hoist. Concluded that the existing configuration does not present an interaction hazard to the SW pumps - completed 12/5/96.	SQ-1810 completed.	6/15/99
23	A,I	6	SW	P-32D	Service Water Pump	O - Anchorage/capacity check on bolts & studs, restraint of overhead trolley,	The pump extending casing is 34' long > the 20' allowable. The overhead crane poses an interaction hazard.	The pump is considered operable based on original design calculations. S&A calculation 91C2696-C-012 shows that the pump shaft stress is within allowable limits.	S&A Calc 91C2696- C-012 shows pump shaft stresses within limits. EWR 96-041 evaluated the overhead hoist. Concluded that the existing configuration does not present an interaction hazard to the SW pumps - completed 12/5/96.	SQ-1811 completed.	6/15/99

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24	A,1	6	SW	P-32E	Service Water Pump	O - Anchorage/capacity check on bolts & studs, restraint of overhead trolley,	The pump extending casing is 34' long > the 20' allowable. The overhead crane poses an interaction hazard.	The pump is considered operable based on original design calculations. S&A calculation 91C2696-C-012 shows that the pump shaft stress is within allowable limits.	S&A Calc 91C2696-C-012 shows pump shaft stresses within limits. EWR 96-041 evaluated the overhead hoist. Concluded that the existing configuration does not present an interaction hazard to the SW pumps -completed 12/5/96.	SQ-1812 completed.	6/15/99
25	A,I	6	SW	P-32F	Service Water Pump	O - Anchorage/capacity check on bolts & studs, restraint of overhead trolley,	The pump extending casing is 34' long > the 20' allowable. The overhead crane poses an interaction hazard.	The pump is considered operable based on original design calculations. S&A calculation 91C2696-C-012 shows that the pump shaft stress is within allowable limits.	S&A Calc 91C2696- C-012 shows pump shaft stresses within limits. EWR 96-041 evaluated the overhead hoist. Concluded that the existing configuration does not present an interaction hazard to the SW pumps - completed 12/5/96.	SQ-1813 completed.	6/15/99
27	A,I,V	7	CS	2CS- 466	Hx-1a Sg Feedwater Regulator Control	O - Block Wall interaction	The valves are adjacent to a large unanalyzed block wall. The block wall poses an interaction hazard for the valve and it subcomponents.	The function of the valve is to close to isolate feed to the S/Gs. The valve is not required to shut during the 30 second period of strong motion. However, it is desired to have it shut during the 72 hour recovery period. As a back up to the valve failing to close, the operators can turn off the feed pumps and condensate pumps.	EWR - Functional Evaluation. 6/20/96 - EWR 96-043 assigned to document evaluation. Evaluation concluded that this valve is not required to be on the SSEL.	No walkdown required, SQ-001815 update complete.	8/30/00

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29	A,I,V	7	CS	2CS- 476	Hx-1b Sg Feedwater Regulator Control	O - Block Wall interaction	The valves are adjacent to a large unanalyzed block wall. The block wall poses an interaction hazard for the valve and it subcomponents.	The function of the valve is to close to isolate feed to the S/Gs. The valve is not required to shut during the 30 second period of strong motion. However, it is desired to have it shut during the 72 hour recovery period. As a back up to the valve failing to close, the operators can turn off the feed pumps and condensate pumps.	EWR - Functional Evaluation. 6/20/96 - EWR 96-043 assigned to document evaluation. Evaluation concluded that this valve is not required to be on the SSEL.	No walkdown required, SQ-001817 update complete.	8/30/00
31	A,I,V	7	CS	2CS- 480	Hx-1a Sg Regulator Control Bypass	O - Block Wall interaction	The valves are adjacent to a large unanalyzed block wall. The block wall poses an interaction hazard for the valve and it subcomponents.	The valve is normally close and must remain closed to isolate feed to the S/Gs. Therefore, during the 30 second period of strong motion, the valve is not required to change state. It is not likely, that the block wall interaction would cause the valve to open. As a back up to the valve inadvertently opening, the operators can turn off the feed pumps and condensate pumps.	EWR - Functional Evaluation. 6/20/96 - EWR 96-043 assigned to document evaluation. Evaluation concluded that this valve is not required to be on the SSEL.	No walkdown required, SQ-001819 update complete.	8/30/00
33	A,1,V	7	CS	2CS- 481	Hx-1b Sg Regulator Control Bypass	O - Block Wall interaction	The valves are adjacent to a large unanalyzed block wall. The block wall poses an interaction hazard for the valve and it subcomponents.	The valve is normally close and must remain closed to isolate feed to the S/Gs. Therefore, during the 30 second period of strong motion, the valve is not required to change state. It is not likely, that the block wall interaction would cause the valve to open. As a back up to the valve inadvertently opening, the operators can turn off the feed pumps and condensate pumps.	EWR - Functional Evaluation. 6/20/96 - EWR 96-043 assigned to document evaluation. Evaluation concluded that this valve is not required to be on the SSEL.	No walkdown required, SQ-001821 update complete.	8/30/00

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35	i,v,RG	7	RM	2RM- 3200A	Re-211/Re- 212 Monitor Return	O - Based on visual inspection, the building the RMs are located in is not anchored. Need to check any drawings.	The valve is located in a climate control hut that has no visible base anchorage.	The item has been walked down for the IPEEE only. Subsequent to the walkdown, it has been screened out using the Seismic PSA screening criteria.	12/28/98 - EWR 96- 044 complete. ID'd the anchorage. S&L completed calc. Calculation resolves outlier.	SQ-001986 resolves this outlier	3/10/98
37	I,V,RG	7	RM	2RM- 3200B	Re-211/Re- 212 Monitor Supply	O - Based on visual inspection, the building the RMs are located in is not anchored. Need to check any drawings.	The valve is located in a climate control hut that has no visible base anchorage.	The item has been walked down for the IPEEE only. Subsequent to the walkdown, it has been screened out using the Seismic PSA screening criteria.	12/28/98 - EWR 96- 044 complete. ID'd the anchorage. S&L completed calc. Calculation resolves outlier.	SQ-001988 resolves this outlier	3/10/98
40	A,I,V	7	SI	2SI- 839A	T-34a Si Accum Outlet To Si Test Line Isolation	O - UNSUPPORTED OPERATOR - MODIFIED U2R19 - Supported operators MWR 935398	The AOV was mounted on a 3/4" line with the valve operator unsupported	The valve was determined to be seismically inoperable. The operator was supported that same refueling out under MWR 935398	Fixed, MWR 935398 - completed 10/22/93	SQ-001631 resolves outlier, completed	10/22/93
42	A,I,V	7	SI	2SI- 839B	Si A Cold Leg To Si Test Line Isolation	O - UNSUPPORTED OPERATOR - MODIFIED U2R19 - Supported operators MWR 935398	The AOV was mounted on a 3/4" line with the valve operator unsupported	The valve was determined to be seismically inoperable. The operator was supported that same refueling out under MWR 935398	Fixed, MWR 935398 - completed 10/22/93	SQ-001632 resolves outlier. Completed	10/22/93
44	A,I,V	7	SI	2SI- 839C	T-34b Si Accum Outlet To Si Test Line Isolation	O - UNSUPPORTED OPERATOR - MODIFIED U2R19 - Supported operators MWR 935398	The AOV was mounted on a 3/4" line with the valve operator unsupported	The valve was determined to be seismically inoperable. The operator was supported that same refueling out under MWR 935398	Fixed, MWR 935398 - completed 10/22/93	SQ-001633 resolves outlier. completed	10/22/93
46	A,I,V	7	SI	2SI- 839D	Si B Cold Leg To Si Test Line Isolation	O - UNSUPPORTED OPERATOR - MODIFIED U2R19 - Supported operators MWR 935398	The AOV was mounted on a 3/4" line with the valve operator unsupported	The valve was determined to be seismically inoperable. The operator was supported that same refueling out under MWR 935398	Fixed, MWR 935398 - completed 10/22/93	SQ-001634 resolves outlier. Completed	10/22/93

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50	I,V,RG	7	Si .	2SI- 846	T-34a/B Si Accum Nitrogen Inlet Control	O - 36" offset on 1.25" line. Because of pipe support configuration, potential for pipe overstress. Valve is considered operable - attached conduit will stabilize valve.	The AOV offset of 36" < 45" allowable offset for a 1" line. However, because of the pipe support configuration, there is a potential for pipe overstress.	The item has been walked down for the IPEEE only. Subsequent to the walkdown, it has been screened out using the Seismic PSA screening criteria. Modification request MR 94-066*B is initiated to upgrade the support of the 1" line.	MR 94-066 was installed during U2R21. The pipe was moved to eliminated rubbing on adjacent pipe. New supports were installed on the valve operator and on each side of the valve. S&L analysis WE-200118, Rev. 0	SQ-001829 completed	2/6/96
51	I,V	7	SI	2SI- 957	T-34a/B Si Accum Nitrogen Header Vent Control	O - Yoke U-bolt missing, MWR submitted 7/25/94 - U- bolt to be installed U2R20 10/18/94 - U- Bolt installed 10/7/94 WO 935298	The valve operator yoke U-bolt was missing.	The valve was considered seismically operable based on a calculation that showed the pipe stress was < 2Sy. The valve operator U-bolt was installed during the next refueling outage under Word Order 935298	Fixed, WO 935298 installed a new U- bolt. Completed 10/10/94	SQ-001635 resolves outlier. Completed	10/10/94
53	I,RG	7	WG	2WG- 1786	T-16 Rcdt Vent	O - Even though 15" offset < 45" GIP allowable for a 1" there is a potential for pipe overstress in line 1"- WD-151R-1 because of how the 1" line is supported. Check offset, 1WG-1786 offset measured at 24" EWR	The AOV offset of 15" < 45" allowable offset for a 1" line. However, because of the pipe support configuration, there is a potential for pipe overstress.	The item has been walked down for the IPEEE only. Subsequent to the walkdown, it has been screened out using the Seismic PSA screening criteria.	EWR 96-050 assigned - valves have been as-built, 9/3/98. Need to draft sketch for valve supports. 4/1/99 - MR 96-035 will install operator support. WO 9904476. Installation complete.	SQ-001777 resolves this outlier	1/14/00
55	I,RG	7	WG	2WG- 1787	T-16 Rcdt Vent	O - Even though 15" offset < 45" GIP allowable for a 1" there is a potential for pipe overstress in line 1"- WD-151R-1 because of how the 1" line is supported. Check offset, 1WG-1787 offset measured at 24" EWR	The AOV offset of 15" < 45" allowable offset for a 1" line. However, because of the pipe support configuration, there is a potential for pipe overstress.	The item has been walked down for the IPEEE only. Subsequent to the walkdown, it has been screened out using the Seismic PSA screening criteria.	EWR 96-050 assigned - valves have been as-built, 9/3/98. Need to draft sketch for valve supports. 4/1/99 - MR 96-035 will install operator support. WO 9904476. Installation complete.	SQ-001778 resolves this outlier	1/14/00

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57	A,I	8	Ø	2SI- 878A	P-15b Si Pump R-1 Reactor Vessel Injection	O - Valve body not shimmed. MSA evaluated. Considered acceptable. Accession # - WE-200084	The valve was supported by the valve operator but not the valve body. In addition, the gap between the valve body and the gravity support stanchion is not properly shimmed	The piping analysis, Accession # - WE-200084, shows that the valve will not be overstressed.	EWR 96-045 assigned to document resolution. NRC RAI asked for piping analysis. Resolved.	SQ-001636 resolves outlier.	3/27/97
59	A,1	8	SI	2SI- 878B	P-15a Si Pump Loop B Injection	O - Valve body not shimmed. MSA evaluated. Considered acceptable. Accession # - WE-200084	The valve was supported by the valve operator but not the valve body. In addition, the gap between the valve body and the gravity support stanchion is not properly shimmed	The piping analysis, Accession # - WE-200084, shows that the valve will not be overstressed.	EWR 96-045 assigned to document resolution. NRC RAI asked for piping analysis. Resolved.	SQ-001637 resolves outlier.	3/27/97
61	A,1	8	SI	2SI- 878C	P-15b Si Pump R-1 Reactor Vessel Injection	O - Valve body not shimmed. MSA evaluated. Considered acceptable. Accession # - WE-200084	The valve was supported by the valve operator but not the valve body. In addition, the gap between the valve body and the gravity support stanchion is not properly shimmed	The piping analysis, Accession # - WE-200084, shows that the valve will not be overstressed.	EWR 96-045 assigned to document resolution. NRC RAI asked for piping analysis. Resolved.	SQ-001638 resolves outlier.	3/27/97
63	A,I	8	SI	2SI- 878D	P-15a Si Pump Loop A Injection	O - Valve body not shimmed. MSA evaluated. Considered acceptable. Accession # - WE-200084	The valve was supported by the valve operator but not the valve body. In addition, the gap between the valve body and the gravity support stanchion is not properly shimmed	The piping analysis, Accession # - WE-200084, shows that the valve will not be overstressed.	EWR 96-045 assigned to document resolution. NRC RAI asked for piping analysis. Resolved.	SQ-001639 resolves outlier.	3/27/97

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64	A,I	10	VNAFW	HX-66	Auxiliary Feed Pump Area Cooler	O - Rubber isolators fail. They do not have sufficient shear and tension capacity to transfer the anchor loads to the concrete expansion anchors.	The air handling unit is mounted on rubber vibration isolators. The anchorage calculation concluded that the rubber isolators had insufficient capacity to transfer the anchorage loads to the concrete expansion anchors.	HX-66 is on the SSEL to maintain SW system integrity. The air handling and air cooling function is not required. The SW system engineer judged that a break in the attached 2" SW line would not significantly impact service water to other essential loads. The function of the air handling unit will be evaluated to determine if an anchorage upgrade is required.	EWR 96-046 assigned. MR 97- 104 installed replacement vibration isolators. Accepted 2/28/98.	SQ-001672. Outlier is resolved.	6/18/99
65	A,I	10	VNAFW	HX- 66A	Auxiliary Feed Pump Area Cooler	O - The Spring isolator base plate yields.	The air handling unit is mounted on spring vibration isolators. The anchorage calculation determined that the spring isolator base plate will yield.	HX-66A is on the SSEL to maintain SW system integrity. The air handling and air cooling function is not required. The SW system engineer judged that a break in the attached 2" SW line would not significantly impact service water to other essential loads. The function of the air handling unit will be evaluated to determine if an anchorage upgrade is required.	EWR 96-047 assigned. MR 98- 127 initiated. (RE: DNC) 2/11/99 - Need WO. WO 9808637 is replacing HX-66A cooling coils. Work complete.	SQ-001888 Outlier is resolved.	12/14/00
66	A,I	10	SW	HX-98	Residual Heat Removal Pump Area Cooling Coil	O - Mounted on Neoprene pads. Pads need further eval per GIP Section 4.4. Evaluation by S&A? 5/22/95 - During the bolt tightness check on 2/20/95, the concrete expansion anchors for the left rear rubber vibration isolator were found to be never installed	The air handling unit is mounted on rubber vibration isolators. The anchorage calculation concluded that the rubber isolators had insufficient capacity to transfer the anchorage loads to the concrete expansion anchors.	HX-98 is on the SSEL to maintain SW system integrity. The air handling and air cooling function is not required. The SW system engineer judged that a break in the attached 2 1/2" SW line would not significantly impact service water to other essential loads. The function of the air handling unit will be evaluated to determine if an anchorage upgrade is required.	EWR 96-048 assigned. MR 97- 105 installed. WO 9807185 replaced HX-98 cooling coils.	SQ-001841. Outlier is resolved.	9/19/00

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69	A,I,H	11	VNCSR	HX- 38A1, A2,A3	Cable Spreading Room Air Conditioning Unit	O - No Anchorage, Motor on steel isolation springs. ISRS exceeds RS. New component 7/13/94. It is the parent component of HX-38A1, HX-38A2 and HX-38A3. Equipment class changed from 21 to 11	The chiller unit is not anchored, the compressor motors are on springs, and the seismic demand exceeds 1.5 x BS at the low frequency peak.	The chiller is on the SSEL to maintain SW integrity. A leak in the SW pipe would not significantly affect SW flow to other essential loads. The HVAC room is designed to handle that flooding from a SW break. The chill water cooling function of the unit is not required. The function of the chiller unit will be evaluated to determine if an anchorage upgrade is required.	EWR 96-052 assigned. Chiller HX-038A replaced. MR 97-049*B installed new heat exchangers.	SQ-001957 Outlier is resolved.	5/19/02
70	A,I,H	11	VNCR	HX- 38B1, B2,B3, B4	Control Room Air Conditioning Unit	O - No Anchorage, Motor on steel isolation springs. ISRS exceeds RS. New component 7/13/94. It is the parent component of HX-38B1, HX-38B2, HX-38B3 and HX- 38B4. Equipment class changed from 21 to 11	The chiller unit is not anchored, the compressor motors are on springs, and the seismic demand exceeds 1.5 x BS at the low frequency peak.	The chiller is on the SSEL to maintain SW integrity. A leak in the SW pipe would not significantly affect SW flow to other essential loads. The HVAC room is designed to handle that flooding from a SW break. The chill water cooling function of the unit is not required. The function of the chiller unit will be evaluated to determine if an anchorage upgrade is required.	EWR 96-051 assigned. Chiller HX-038B replaced. MR 97-049*C installed new heat exchangers.	SQ-001962 Outlier is resolved.	8/15/02
71	A,I	12	DA	K-4B	G-02 EDG Starting Air Compressor Motor Or Diesel	O - Loose hand crank resting against it which may pose an interaction hazard. 4/21/95 - a hand crank mount has been installed on the wall adjacent to the compressor	A loose hand crank was resting against the air compressor posing an interaction hazard.	Hand crank installed on a bracket on the wall adjacent to the air compressor	Hand crank installed on a bracket on the wall adjacent to the air compressor	SQ-001822 Outlier is resolved.	4/21/95

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72	A,I	16	125V	D-07	Station Battery Charger	O - Interaction, CABINET IS NOT TIED TO ADJACENT CABINET, ALSO BLOCK WALL MAY GOVERN HCLPF. EWR submitted 2/4/94 for CSE to bolt battery charger to adjacent switchgear. MR 94- 048	The battery charger is not attached to the adjacent switchgear.	The battery charger does not contain essential relays, and there are 3 switchgear cubicles between the battery charger and switchgear cubicle that contains the essential relays. Therefore, the battery charger and the switchgear are considered seismically operable. Modification Request MR 94-048 has be initiated to bolt these together.	MR 94-048 bolted D- 07 to the old 2A-05. WO 9904504.	SQ-001938 Outlier is resolved.	12/13/00
73	Ā,I	16	125V	D-08	Station Battery Charger	O - Interaction, CABINET IS NOT TIED TO ADJACENT CABINET, ALSO BLOCK WALL MAY GOVERN HCLPF. EWR submitted 2/4/94 for CSE to bolt battery charger to adjacent switchgear. MR 94- 048	The battery charger is not attached to the adjacent switchgear.	The battery charger does not contain essential relays, and there are 3 switchgear cubicles between the battery charger and switchgear cubicle that contains the essential relays. Therefore, the battery charger and the switchgear are considered seismically operable. Modification Request MR 94-048 has be initiated to bolt these together.	MR 94-048 bolted D- 08 to 1A-05. WO 9504505.	SQ-001939 Outlier is resolved.	12/13/00
74	Α,Ι	16	Y	DY-0A	Red 125v Dc/120v Ac Alternate Inverter	O - Interaction; Mounted directly adjacent to 1C-167. The cabinets are not fastened together. P- REPORT	The outlier is an interaction. DY-0A is mounted directly adjacent to 1C-167. The cabinets are not fastened together.	The inverter does not contain any essential relays. It is IEEE 344-1975 qualified. It is considered seismically operable based on there being no instances of inverter failure due to impact in the earthquake experience database. The inverter will be fastened to the adjacent cabinet.	MR 96-037 assigned to move inverter to create a gap between inverter and relay cabinet. WO 9805184. Installation complete.	SQ-001867 Outlier is resolved.	5/25/00
75	A,I	16	Y	DY-0B	Blue 125v Dc/120v Ac Alternate Inverter	O - Interaction; Mounted directly adjacent to 2C-156. The cabinets are not fastened together. P- REPORT	The outlier is an interaction. DY-0B is mounted directly adjacent to 2C-157. The cabinets are not fastened together.	The inverter does not contain any essential relays. It is IEEE 344-1975 qualified. It is considered seismically operable based on there being no instances of inverter failure due to impact in the earthquake experience database. The inverter will be fastened to the adjacent cabinet.	MR 96-037*A assigned to move inverter to create a gap between inverter and relay cabinet. WO 9805185. Installation complete	SQ-001868 Outlier is resolved.	5/25/00

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76	A,I,RG	19	RC .	2TE- 450B	Rc Loop A Hot Leg Temperature Rtd	O - Impinging on insulation. Does thermal expansion while hot accommodate seismic displacements? EWR submitted for MSA inspection/evaluation EWR 94-056. EWR determined that interaction was a problem, Calc N-94-168. MR 95-021 initiated to replace TE.	The temperature element is impinging on insulation. It must be determined if thermal expansion while hot accommodate seismic displacements.	An engineering evaluation showed that thermal expansion did not accommodate the expected seismic displacements. Modification request MR 95-021 is initiated to replace TE with a shorter one.	MR 95-021 initiated to replace TE with a bent unit. Scheduled for U2R23 (RE: PHB) Replacement TE installed U2R23	SQ-001570 Outlier is resolved.	2/24/99
77	A,I,RG	19	RC	2TE- 450D	Rc Loop A Hot Leg Temperature Rtd	O - Impinging on insulation. Does thermal expansion while hot accommodate seismic displacements? EWR submitted for MSA inspection/evaluation. EWR 94-056 EWR determined that interaction was a problem, Calc N-94-168. MR 95-021 initiated to replace TE.	The temperature element is impinging on insulation. It must be determined if thermal expansion while hot accommodate seismic displacements.	An engineering evaluation showed that thermal expansion did not accommodate the expected seismic displacements. Modification request MR 95-021 is initiated to replace TE with a shorter one.	MR 95-021 initiated to replace TE with a bent unit. Scheduled for U2R23 (RE: PHB) Replacement TE installed U2R23	SQ-001571 Outlier is resolved.	2/24/99

Outlier No.	Program	Equip Class	System	Equip ID	Noun Name	Status at Time of SRT Walkdown in 1993	Outlier Description	Interim Resolution Documented in the USI A-46 Seismic Evaluation Report to NRC	Status / Final Resolution	Required Close Out	Date Completed
79	A,I,RG	20	MMS	C-01- 1(2)C- 04	Main Control Boards	O - Interaction, adjacent supply cabinets not secured. EWR submitted. 7/25/94 - Supply cabinets secured. 1/18/95 - MR 94-021 installed 6/9/94 resolves interaction concern. Item identified during MCB walkdown 12/90 - Overhead lights and duct above control room restrained by chains or light metal straps that are sometimes hooked with open ended hooks. SRT not concerned that duct or lights pose a structural hazard, however, they may pose an operator (human injury) hazard.	An adjacent supply cabinet posed a spatial interaction hazard.	The supply cabinet was attached to the back of 2C-03 under modification MR 94-021.	Fixed, MR 94-021 bolted supply cabinets to the back of 1C-03 and 2C-03.	SQ-001824 Outlier is resolved.	8/24/94
81	A,I	20	IOPS	2C-75	Turbine lops Main Trip Panel	O - Doors are not positively latched. T. Dykstra to submit MWR after inspection. 6/19/95 - Need to discuss with Steve Bowe to see if he would rather install different handles or have I&C start using the key lock to latch the door. 9/23/96 - WO 9607849	The doors are not positively latched.	The cabinet does not contain any essential relays, and the doors are fairly light weight therefore, significant damage is not expected to occur. I & C will be contacted to determine if the existing door latch can be used or whether a new handle would be preferred.	WO 9607850 installed new handle - completed 12/7/96	SQ-001826 Outlier is resolved.	12/796
83	. A ,I	20	MMS	2C- 105- 114	Plant Process I&C Cabinets	O - Interaction - Supply cabinet interference EWR submitted. 1/18/95 - MR 94-021 installed 6/9/94 resolves interaction concern.	An adjacent supply cabinet posed a spatial interaction hazard.	The supply cabinet was attached to the back of 2C-03 under modification MR 94-021.	Fixed, MR 94-021 bolted supply cabinet to the back of 2C-03. Accepted 7/28/94	SQ-001830 completed.	8/24/94

Outlier No.	Program	Equip Class	System	Equip ID	Noun Name	Status at Time of SRT Walkdown in 1993	Outlier Description	Interim Resolution Documented in the USI A-46 Seismic Evaluation Report to NRC	Status / Final Resolution	Required Close Out	Date Completed
86	A,I	20	RP	2C- 151- 155	Rp Train A Relay Cabinets	O - ANCHOR DETAIL Unknown. No specific information on the grout pad to concrete floor anchorage. Needs EWR	The anchor detail for the grout pad and the perimeter channel is unknown.	Since the cabinet has anchorage as originally designed, it is considered seismically operable. Modification request MR 95-008 will upgrade the anchorage.	MR 95-008 upgraded the anchorage. Outlier Resolved	SQ-001604 Outlier is resolved.	12/2/97
88	A,1	20	ESF	2C- 156- 158	Safeguards Train A Relay Cabinets	O - Interaction; Mounted directly adjacent to inverter DY-OB. The cabinets are not fastened together. P-REPORT Provide Mod Package	The outlier is an Interaction. The cabinets are mounted directly adjacent to inverter DY-OB. The cabinets are not fastened together.	No "bad actor" relays are located in the cabinets. The relays in the cabinets have a seismic capacity of at least 4 g's. Therefore, they are considered seismically operable. The cabinet will be fastened to the adjacent inverter.	MR 96-037*A assigned to move inverter to create a gap between inverter and relay cabinet. WO 9805184. Installation complete.	SQ-001870 Outlier is resolved.	5/25/00
91	Ā,I	20	RP	2C- 161- 165	Rp Train B Relay Cabinets	O - ANCHOR DETAIL Unknown. No specific information on the grout pad to concrete floor anchorage. Needs EWR	The anchor detail for the grout pad and the perimeter channel is unknown.	Since the cabinet has anchorage as originally designed, it is considered seismically operable. Modification request MR 95-010 will upgrade the anchorage.	MR 95-010 cancelled, work combined with MR 95-008. MR 95-008 upgraded the anchorage. Outlier Resolved.	SQ-001605 Outlier is resolved.	12/2/97
92	Α,Ι	20	ESF	2C- 166- 167	Safeguards Train B And Misc Relay Cabinets	O - ANCHOR DETAIL Unknown. No specific information on the grout pad to concrete floor anchorage. Overhead light S-clamp needs to be clamped down. Needs EWR	The anchor detail for the grout pad and the perimeter channel is unknown.	Since the cabinet has anchorage as originally designed, it is considered seismically operable. Modification request MR 95-012 will upgrade the anchorage.	MR 95-012 cancelled - work transferred to MR 95-008. MR 95-008 upgrade the anchorage, accepted 10/25/95. WO 96- 0001(completed 5/3/96) inspected for open S-hooks on lighting in the CSR. 5 open S-hooks found and all were closed.	SQ-001833 Outlier is resolved.	12/2/97

Outlier No.	Program	Equip Class	System	Equip ID	Noun Name	Status at Time of SRT Walkdown in 1993	Outlier Description	Interim Resolution Documented in the USI A-46 Seismic Evaluation Report to NRC	Status / Final Resolution	Required Close Out	Date Completed
93	A,I	20	COMP	C-178- 179	Computer Input Mux	O - Line Printer adjacent to cabinet	Line Printer, LP-300, is kept on the floor adjacent to the cabinet.	C-178-179 are computer cabinets contain primarily solid state and circuit board components. There are no essential relays in the cabinets. The cabinets are considered seismically operable. I&C will store the printer in a different location and have it adjacent to the cabinets only when being used.	12/30/98 - Have inspected the Computer Room on numerous occasions since the USI A-46 walkdown. The printer has been relocated. No interaction hazards were identified.	SQ-001834 Outlier is resolved.	12/30/98
94	A,I,C	21	RH	2HX- 11A	Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger	O - Base bolt nuts not seated. 1/4" to 3/8" gaps. Not an operability concern since HX is top supported in both lateral directions.	The caste in place anchor bolt nuts are not fully seated. There are 1/4" to 3/8" gaps between the nut and the HX foot.	Not an operability concern since HX is top supported in both lateral directions.	EWR 96-053 assigned. WO 9815436 initiated to inspect / replace anchor bolt nuts. WO complete	SQ-001835 Outlier is resolved.	6/18/99
96	A,I,C	21	CC	2T-12	Component Cooling Surge Tank	O - Oversized anchor bolt holes (2.25" x 1.18") identified from WEST 685J114. Anchor bolts are 1" diameter. Too much clearance to say seismic load is transferred to enough anchor bolts.	The saddle anchorage on both ends of the tank has oversized anchor bolt holes (2.25" x 1.18") identified from WEST 685J114. The anchor bolts are 1" diameter. Therefore, there is too much clearance to say seismic load is transferred evenly to enough anchor bolts	There are large washers between the anchorage nut and the oval holes. Therefore, some load will be transferred to all of the anchor bolts. In addition, the attached piping will help in restraining the tank. Therefore, the tanks are considered seismically operable. The anchorage will be upgraded with a structural member between the tank base and the anchor bolt.	MR 94-091*C installed 1/2" steel plate under each of the nuts on the south side of the tank. The plate is welded to the saddle. The installation was checked 12/3/97	SQ-001837 Outlier is resolved.	8/5/96

Outlier No.	Program	Equip Class	System	Equip ID	Noun Name	Status at Time of SRT Walkdown in 1993	Outlier Description	Interim Resolution Documented in the USI A-46 Seismic Evaluation Report to NRC	Status / Final Resolution	Required Close Out	Date Completed
98	A ,1	21	$\overline{\omega}$	2T-13	Refueling Water Storage Tank W/6 Immersion Htrs	O - ANALYSIS/REINFORC EMENT 7/25/94 - Received DRAFT analysis from S& A showing RWST has sufficient capacity.	The tank does not pass the screening criteria of Section 7 of the GIP.	The tank has been analyzed using a finite element analysis [23].	In WE NRC RAI response NPL 97-0450, page 5 of 22, WE stated that the design margin from the A-46 analysis is not sufficient. EWR 97-169 assigned. MR 99-041 upgraded RWST. MR 00-0052 replaced tank vent FME screen with a new screen.	SQ-001909 Outlier is resolved.	4/18/01
99	A,I	21	DA	T-61F	G-02 Edg Starting Air Receiver	O - Anchor - cracked grout	The grout under the foot of one of the air receiver tank legs is cracked.	An inspection subsequent to the seismic verification walkdown found a steel spacer plate under the leg of the tank. Therefore the grout is not structural and the tank is considered seismically operable. The leg will be re-grouted.	WO- 9501221 completed 5/23/97 - installed new grout	SQ-001838 resolves the outlier	5/23/97
100	A,I	22		AUX8 FTAR EA	Pab 8' Cable & Conduit Raceways		LAR 9 is an OUTLIER because it does not meet the requirements of Section 8.0 of the GIP. See S&A's LAR - Cable Tray and Conduit Supports Report, 91C2696-C-018.		Work completed under MR 96-022. Post installation walkdown complete. WO 9808941	SQ-001714 resolves the outlier	8/1/00
101	A,I	22		SPRE ADIN GRM	Csr Cable & Conduit Raceways		LAR 3 & LAR 4 are OUTLIER(s) because it does not meet the requirements of Section 8.0 of the GIP. See S&A's LAR - Cable Tray and Conduit Supports Report, 91C2696-C-018.		MR 96-080 created to upgrade cable tray supports in the CSR (RE: DNC). Installation complete	SQ-001881 Outlier is resolved.	9/25/00

Outlier No.	Program	Equip Class	System	Equip ID	Noun Name	Status at Time of SRT Walkdown in 1993	Outlier Description	Interim Resolution Documented in the USI A-46 Seismic Evaluation Report to NRC	Status / Final Resolution	Required Close Out	Date Completed
105	A,I	22		U2C46 FTAR EA	U2c 46' Cable & Conduit Raceways	O - Cables not tied to tray	There is an isolated vertical cable tray which has no plastic ties and the cables appear to be hanging out of it, hence it is an outlier, see figure 18.		Resolved during U2R23. WO 9713098. Verified during walkdown.	SQ-001640 resolves outlier	1/8/99
108	A,I,RG	3	4.16KV	2A-05	4.16 Kv Bus Switchgear (Safeguards)	SAT - O-WELD QUALITY IN QUESTION, Recommend thorough weld inspection. T. Dykstra to check with QA about weld inspections			Weld inspection completed, used results to adjust anchorage capacity in the anchorage calculation.	NOT AN OUTLIER - resolved w/ weld inspection and anchorage calc.	12/13/00
110	A,I,RG	3	4.16KV	2A-06 (old)	4.16 Kv Bus Switchgear (Safeguards)	PO - Not fastened to adjacent D-07 battery charger. WELD QUALITY IN QUESTION, Recommend thorough weld inspection. T. Dykstra to check with QA about weld inspections. 11/7/94 - Renamed to 1A-06 (old). The old 1A-05 and old 1A-06 will be hard tied together			MR 94-048 connected cabinets together. WO 9904504.	SQ-001938 Outlier is resolved.	12/13/00
114	A,i,v	7	SI	2SI- 897B	Si Test Line Return Second Off Isolation	SAT - O - Attached copper lines too stiff. T. Dykstra to evaluate failure if copper line breaks. Valve currently gagged open during normal operation. P-MAT 11/11/94 Update - Valve walked down again 9/26/94. SRT confirmed that copper line was too st			Resolved	NOT AN OUTLIER - Resolved on original SEWS	11/11/94

Outlier No.	Program	Equip Class	System	Equip ID	Noun Name	Status at Time of SRT Walkdown in 1993	Outlier Description	Interim Resolution Documented in the USI A-46 Seismic Evaluation Report to NRC	Status / Final Resolution	Required Close Out	Date Completed
116	A,I,C	8	CC	2CC- 815	T-12 Cc Surge Tank Emergency Makeup Water Inlet	PO - pipe has insufficient supports - 11/11/94 update - STATUS changed to outlier. Valves also identified as having insufficient pipe support adjacent to valve during the CCW Upgrade piping walkdowns. PO - 3g required to qualify valve yoke. Trapeze supports may allow valve yoke to swing resulting in possible pipe failure			NOT AN OUTLIER - CCW Upgrade identified these valves as having insufficient support MR 94-091 installed valve support. Verified installation 12/3/97	NOT AN OUTLIER - Resolved on original SEWS	3/30/01
117	A,I	8	SW	SW- 2832A -S	K-3a Sa Compressor Inlet Solenoid	SAT - O-Attached conduit is very flexible and should be restrained. Check with Frank Mueller about SW piping replacement. Rewalked 10/26/94 by SR St Amour and W Djordjevic. Determined flexibility was not a problem.			Resolved	NOT AN OUTLIER - Resolved on original SEWS	10/26/94
118	A,1	15	125V	D-05	125v Dc Station Battery	SAT - O-SPACER, Need battery cell type information. EWR submitted 2/4/94 for ESE to install styrofoam bead spacers. 7/25/94 - EWR cancelled. T. Dykstra to submit MWR to install spacers. 1/18/95 - Qual report shows batteries shake table tested in same			Resolved	NOT AN OUTLIER - Resolved on original SEWS	1/18/95

Outlier No.	Program	Equip Class	System	Equip ID	Noun Name	Status at Time of SRT Walkdown in 1993	Outlier Description	Interim Resolution Documented in the USI A-46 Seismic Evaluation Report to NRC	Status / Final Resolution	Required Close Out	Date Completed
119	A,I	15	125V	D-06	125v Dc Station Battery	SAT - O-SPACER. EWR submitted 2/4/94 for ESE to install styrofoam bead spacers. 7/25/94 - EWR cancelled. T. Dykstra to submit MWR to install spacers. 1/18/95 - Qual report shows batteries shake table tested in same configuration at PBNP. No addition			Resolved	NOT AN OUTLIER - Resolved on original SEWS	1/18/95
120	A,1	15	125V	D-305	Swing Station Battery	SAT - O-SPACER. EWR submitted 2/4/94 for ESE to install styrofoam bead spacers. 7/25/94 - EWR cancelled. T. Dykstra to submit MWR to install spacers. 1/18/95 - Qual report shows batteries shake table tested in same configuration at PBNP. No addition	·		Resolved	NOT AN OUTLIER - Resolved on original SEWS	1/18/95
121	A,I,C	18	CC	FI-643	K-1a Waste Gas Comp Cc Return Flow Indicator	SAT - O-Anchor Bolted to Block Wall - no thru bolts T. Dykstra to check scope of block wall program. Tug tested by B.O. Sasman & W. Djordjevic 7/94 OK.			Resolved	NOT AN OUTLIER - Resolved on original SEWS	7/94
122	A,I,C	18	CC	FI-645	K-1b Waste Gas Comp Cc Return Flow Indicator	SAT - O-Anchor Bolted to Block Wall - no thru bolts T. Dykstra to check scope of block wall program. Tug tested by B.O. Sasman & W. Djordjevic 7/94 OK.			Resolved	NOT AN OUTLIER - Resolved on original SEWS	7/94

Outlier No.	Program	Equip Class	System	Equip ID	Noun Name	Status at Time of SRT Walkdown in 1993	Outlier Description	Interim Resolution Documented in the USI A-46 Seismic Evaluation Report to NRC	Status / Final Resolution	Required Close Out	Date Completed
123	I,RG	18	AF	LT- 4039	T-24b Cst Level Transmitter	O - Interaction, POTENTIAL FOR BLOCK WALL TO FALL ON COMPONENT. T. Dykstra to evaluate function of LT. 1/18/95 - LTs removed from A-46 list. Still IPEEE and RG 1.97.			Deleted from SSEL	Deleted from SSEL	1/18/95
124	I,RG	18	AF	LT- 4040	T-24a Cst Level Transmitter	O - Interaction, POTENTIAL FOR BLOCK WALL TO FALL ON COMPONENT. T. Dykstra to evaluate function of LT. 1/18/95 - LTs removed from A-46 list. Still IPEEE and RG 1.97.			Deleted from SSEL	Deleted from SSEL	1/18/95
125	i,RG	18	AF	LT- 4041	T-24b Cst Level Transmitter	O - Interaction, POTENTIAL FOR BLOCK WALL TO FALL ON COMPONENT. T. Dykstra to evaluate function of LT. 1/18/95 - LTs removed from A-46 list. Still IPEEE and RG 1.97.			Deleted from SSEL	Deleted from SSEL	1/18/95
126	I,RG	18	AF	LT- 4038	T-24a Cst Level Transmitter	O - Interaction, POTENTIAL FOR BLOCK WALL TO FALL ON COMPONENT. T. Dykstra to evaluate function of LT. 1/18/95 - LTs removed from A- 46 list. Still IPEEE and RG 1.97.			Deleted from SSEL	Deleted from SSEL	1/18/95

Outlier No.	Program	Equip Class	System	Equip ID	Noun Name	Status at Time of SRT Walkdown in 1993	Outlier Description	Interim Resolution Documented in the USI A-46 Seismic	Status / Final Resolution	Required Close Out	Date Completed
127	Α,Ι	18	RP	2PT- 469	Hx-1a Sg Pressure Transmitter	SAT - O-Interaction - Insufficient slack on inlet tube. T. Dykstra to submit MWR 11/11/94 Update - 926/94 walkdown by SRT did tug test on all 6 PTs in PAB 46' elevation east of SFP. Concluded that robust stanchions were rigid enough to prevent difference		Evaluation Report to NRC	Resolved	NOT AN OUTLIER - Resolved on original SEWS	11/11/94
128	A,I	18	RP	2PT- 482	Hx-1a Sg Steam Pressure Transmitter	SAT - O-Interaction - Insufficient slack on inlet tube. T. Dykstra to submit MWR 11/11/94 Update - 926/94 walkdown by SRT did tug test on all 6 PTs in PAB 46' elevation east of SFP. Concluded that robust stanchions were rigid enough to prevent difference			Resolved	NOT AN OUTLIER - Resolved on original SEWS	11/11/94
131	A,İ,C	18	SC	2RK- 20	Primary Plant Sample Room Rack	SAT - O - Interim outlier until anchorage is checked. Interaction - adjacent sample sink has no visible anchorage			4/25/95 - phone conversation with Wally Djordjevic - determined that since the only function of the rack was to support flow indicator and that the sample tubing is isolated upstream of rack and there is no requirement to operate the valves on the rack.	NOT AN OUTLIER - Resolved on original SEWS	4/25/95

Outlier No.	Program	Equip Class	System	Equip ID	Noun Name	Status at Time of SRT Walkdown in 1993	Outlier Description	Interim Resolution Documented in the USI A-46 Seismic Evaluation Report to NRC	Status / Final Resolution	Required Close Out	Date Completed
132	A,I	20	RP	2C- 115- 133	Plant Process I&C Cabinets	PO - Interaction - Supply cabinet interference. EWR submitted. 1/18/95 - MR 94-021 installed 6/9/94 resolves interaction concern. 6/28/96 - WO 9503622 replaced missing CEA bolt in 2C-130.			Fixed, MR 94-021 bolted supply cabinet to the back of 2C-03.	SQ-001839 completed.	8/24/94

ATTACHMENT A Seismic Walkdown Equipment List Unit 2 and SFP (SWEL)

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SWEL	RISK	N E W	UNIT	CODE	EQUIP CLASS	WALK BY AREA	EQUIP#	EQUIP NAME	I	2	3	4	5	TRN	IPEEE Equip. Enhanced	LOCATION DESC
SWEL1-2	Y		2	AF	5	30	2P-029	AUX FEEDWATER TURBINE-DRIVEN PUMP	Х	Х	T	Х	-	В	_	8/CB/AFP RM 2P-29 CUB
SWEL1-2			0	AF	5	30	P-038B	STANDBY STEAM GENERATOR PUMP	X	Х		X		В		8/CB/AFP RM P-38B CUB
SWEL1-2	Y	Y	2	AF	7	30	2AF-04002	2P-29 AFP MINI RECIRC CONTROL	Х	Х		X		В		8/CB/AFP RM 2P-29 CUB
SWEL1-2		Y	0	AF	7	30	AF-04014	P-38B SSGP MINI RECIRC CONTROL	Χ	Х		Х		В		8/CB/AFP RM P-38B CUB
SWEL1-2			0	AF	7	30	AF-04019	P-38B SSGP DISCHARGE CONTROL	Х	Х		Х		В		8/CB/AFP RM P-38B CUB
SWEL1-2		Y	0	125V	14	30	D - 64	125V DC DISTRIBUTION PANEL	X	Х	Х	X	Х	В		8/CB/AFP RM 2P-29 CUB
SWEL1-2			2	AF	18	30	2RK-35	2P-29 AUX FEEDWATER PUMP INSTRUMENTATION RACK	X	Х		X		В		8/CB/AFP RM 2P-29 CUB
SWEL1-2			2	MS	20	30	2C-197	2P-29 AFP SUCTION PRESSURE CONTROL PANEL	Х	Х		Х		В		8/CB/AFP RM 2P-29 CUB
SWEL1-2			2	AF	21a	30	2T-212	2P-29 AFP MINI RECIRC IA 2AF-4002 BACKUP ACCUMULATOR	X	Х		X		В		8/CB/AFP RM
SWEL1-2			2	AF	8a	30	2AF-04000	2P-29 AFP DISCHARGE 2HX-1B SG INLET ISOLATION MOV	Х	Х		Х		В		8/CB/AFP RM 2P-29 CUB
SWEL1-2			2	AF	8a	30	2AF-04001	2P-29 AFP DISCHARGE 2HX-1 A SG INLET ISOLATION MOV	X	Х		Х		В		8/CB/AFP RM 2P-29 CUB
SWEL1-2			2	AF	8a	30	2AF-04006	2P-29 AFP SUCTION FROM SERVICE WATER	X	X		Х		В		8/CB/AFP RM 2P-29 CUB
SWEL1-2			0	AF	8a	30	AF-04016	P-38B SSGP SUCTION FROM SERVICE WATER	X	Х		X		В		8/CB/AFP RM P-38B CUB
SWEL1-2			0	AF	8a	30	AF-04020	P-38B SSGP DISCHARGE TO 2HX-1B STEAM GENERATOR	Х	Х		Х		В		8/CB/AFP RM P-38B CUB
SWEL1-2			2	MS	8b	30	2MS-02090	2P-29 AFP BEARING COOLING INLET	Х	Х		Х		В		8/CB/AFP RM
SWEL1-2	Y		2	480V	2	9	2B-03	480V SAFEGUARDS LOAD CENTER	X	Х	X	X	X	Α	X	26/CB/CSR
SWEL1-2	Y		2	480V	2	9	2B-04	480V SAFEGUARDS LOAD CENTER	X	Х	X	X	Х	В	Х	26/CB/CSR
SWEL1-2	Y		2	480V	4	9	2X-13	2B-03 STATION SERVICE TRANSFORMER	X	Х	X	X	Х	A	X	26/CB/CSR
SWEL1-2	Y		2	480V	4	9	2X-14	2B-04 STATION SERVICE TRANSFORMER	Х	Х	X	X	X	В	X	26/CB/CSR
SWEL1-2		Y	0	125V	14	9	D-11	125V DC DISTRIBUTION PANEL	X	Х	X	X	Х	A		26/CB/CSR EAST
SWEL1-2	Y	Y	0	125V	14	9	D-13	125V DC DISTRIBUTION PANEL	X	Х	X	X	Х	В		26/CB/CSR EAST
SWEL1-2		Y	0	125V	14	9	D-26	125V DC DISTRIBUTION PANEL	X	X	X	X	X	A		26/CB/CSR
SWEL1-2		Y	0	125V	14	9	D-27	125V DC DISTRIBUTION PANEL			X	<u></u>		В		26/CB/CSR EAST
SWEL1-2			0	Y	14	9	Y-203	WHITE 120V INVERTER DISTRIBUTION PANEL	X	X	X	X	X	A		26/CB/CSR WEST WALL

SWEL	RISK	N E W	UNIT	SYS CODE	EQUIP CLASS	WALK BY AREA	EQUIP#	EQUIP NAME	1	2	3	4	5	TRN	IPEEE Equip. Enhanced	LOCATION DESC
SWEL1-2			2	Y	16	9	2DY-01	RED 125V DC/120V AC INVERTER	Х	X	X	Х	X	Α		26/CB/CSR
SWEL1-2	İ		2	Y	16	9	2DY-02	BLUE 125V DC/120V AC INVERTER	Х	X	Х	Х	X	В		26/CB/CSR
SWEL1-2			0	Y	16	9	DY-0A	RED 125V DC/120V AC ALTERNATE INVERTER	Х	X	Х	X	X	A	X	26/CB/CSR
SWEL1-2	Y		0	SW	6	27	P-032B	SERVICE WATER PUMP	X			Х		Α	X	8/CWPH/SW BLDG
SWEL1-2	Y		0	SW	6	27	P-032C	SERVICE WATER PUMP	X			Х		В	X	8/CWPH/SW BLDG
SWEL1-2	Y		0	SW	6	28	P-032D	SERVICE WATER PUMP	Х			Х		В	X	8/CWPH/SW BLDG
SWEL1-2	Y		0	SW	6	28	P-032E	SERVICE WATER PUMP	X	Г		Х		В	X	8/CWPH/SW BLDG
SWEL1-2	Y		0	SW	6	28	P-032F	SERVICE WATER PUMP	Х			X		Α	Х	8/CWPH/SW BLDG
SWEL1-2			0	SW	8a	27	SW-02890	NORTH HEADER TO SOUTH SUPPLY HEADER CROSSCONNECT	Х			X		В		8/CWPH/SW BLDG
SWEL1-2			0	SW	8a	28	SW-02891	SOUTH TO NORTH SUPPLY HEADER CROSSCONNECT	X			X		A		8/CWPH/SW BLDG
SWEL1-2		Y	2	480V	1	35	2B-40	480V MOTOR CONTROL CENTER DGB	X	X	X	X	X	В		28/DGB/G-04 SWGR RM
SWEL1-2		Y	0	DG	9	31	W-181B1	G-04 EDG HX-265B RADIATOR FAN	X	Х	Х	Х	Х	В		50/DGB/G-04 RADTR RM
SWEL1-2		Y	0	DG	9	31	W-181B2	G-04 EDG HX-265B RADIATOR FAN	Х	Х	Х	Х	X	В		50/DGB/G-04 RADTR RM
SWEL1-2		Y	0	DG	9	31	W-181B3	G-04 EDG HX-265B RADIATOR FAN	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	В		50/DGB/G-04 RADTR RM
SWEL1-2	Y	Y	0	VNDG	9	32	W-184B	G-04 EDG RM LARGE CAPACITY EXHAUST FAN	Х	X	X	X	Х	В		50/DGB/G-04 FAN RM
SWEL1-2	Y	Y	0	VNDG	9	32	W-184C	G-04 EDG RM SMALL CAPACITY EXHAUST FAN		Х		Х		В		50/DGB/G-04 FAN RM
SWEL1-2	Y		0	125V	14	35	D-40	G-04 EDG DC DISTRIBUTION PANEL	X	Х	Х	Х	X	В		28/DGB/G-04 SWGR RM
SWEL1-2	Y	Y	0	DG	17	36	G-04	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR	X	X	X	X	X	В		28/DGB/G-04 RM
SWEL1-2		Y	0	DG	20	35	C-082	G-04 EDG CONTROL PANEL	X	X	Х	Х	X	В		28/DGB/G-04 SWGR RM
SWEL1-2		Y	0	DA	21a	36	T-171A	G-04 EDG STARTING AIR RECEIVER	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	В		28/DGB/G-04 RM
SWEL1-2		Y	0	DA	21a	36	T-171B	G-04 EDG STARTING AIR RECEIVER	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	В		28/DGB/G-04 RM
SWEL1-2		Y	1	480V	1	11	1B420C- B957D	P-32C SERVICE WATER PUMP NORMAL/ALT TRANSFER SW	Х			Х		В		8/CB/G-02 RM
SWEL1-2		Y	2	480V	1	11	2B427C- B957D	P-32E SERVICE WATER PUMP NORMAL/ALT TRANSFER SW	Х			Х		В		8/CB/G-02 RM
SWEL1-2	Y		0	DG	17	11	G-02	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR	X	X	Х	X	X	A		8/CB/G-02 RM
SWEL1-2			0	DG	20	11	C-035	G-02 EDG ALARM AND ELECTRICAL PANEL	X	Х	X	X	Х	A		8/CB/G-02 RM W WALL
SWEL1-2			0	DG	20	11	C-035A	G-02 EDG LOCAL TRANSFER PANEL	X	Х	X	X	X	A		8/CB/G-02 RM W WALL

SWEL	RISK	N E W	UNIT	SYS CODE	EQUIP CLASS	WALK BY AREA	EQUIP#	EQUIP NAME	1	2	3	4	5	TRN	IPEEE Equip. Enhanced	LOCATION DESC
SWEL1-2			0	DG	20	11	C-079	G-02 EDG DC POWER TRANSFER CONTROL PANEL	Х	X	Х	Х	Х	A		8/CB/G-02 RM
SWEL1-2			0	FO	21a	11	T-031B	G-02 DIESEL GENERATOR DAY TANK	Х	X	Х	Х	X	A		8/CB/G-02 RM
SWEL1-2			0	DA	21a	11	T-061A	G-02 EDG STARTING AIR RECEIVER (RIGHT BANK)	Х	Х	Х	Х	X	A		8/CB/G-02 RM
SWEL1-2			0	DA	21a	11	T-061D	G-02 EDG STARTING AIR RECEIVER (LEFT BANK)	X	Х	Х	Х	X	A		8/CB/G-02 RM
SWEL1-2			0	DA	21a	11	T-061F	G-02 EDG STARTING AIR RECEIVER (LEFT BANK)					X			8/CB/G-02 RM
SWEL1-2			0	FO	8a	1Ì	FO-03931	T-31B G-02 EDG DAY TANK INLET SECOND OFF ISOLATION	Х	X	Х	Х	X	A		8/CB/G-02 RM
SWEL1-2		·	0	SW	8b	29	SW-02820- S	K-2B IA COMPRESSOR INLET SOLENOID				Х		B		G-02 ROOM
SWEL1-2			0	SW	8ъ	29	SW-02826- S	K-2A IA COMPRESSOR INLET SOLENOID				Х		A		8/CB/AIR COMP RM
SWEL1-2	ļ		2	ΪA	7	23	2IA-03047	U2C IA HEADER INLET CONTROL					Х	A		26/PAB/PIPEWAY #3
SWEL1-2		-	2	IA	7	23	2IA-03048	U2C IA HEADER INLET CONTROL					X	В		26/PAB/PIPEWAY #3
SWEL1-2	Y		0	sw	8a	22	SW-02869	NORTH HEADER TO WEST HEADER	П			Х		A		26/PAB/CENTRAL
SWEL1-2	Y		0	SW	8a	46	SW-02870	SOUTH HEADER TO WEST HEADER CROSSCONNECT				Х		В		26/PAB/CENTRAL
SWEL1-2	Y		2	CC	5	20	2P-011A	COMPONENT COOLING WATER PUMP	X	Х		Х		Α	Х	8/PAB/CC PUMP AREA
SWEL1-2	Y		2	CC	5	20	2P-011B	COMPONENT COOLING WATER PUMP	Х	Х		Х		В	Х	8/PAB/CC PUMP AREA
SWEL1-2			2	SI	5	19	2P-014A	CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP					Х	A	Х	8/PAB/SPRAY PUMP AREA
SWEL1-2			2	SI	5	19	2P-014B	CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP					Х	В	X	8/PAB/SPRAY PUMP AREA
SWEL1-2	Y		2	SI	5	19	2P-015A	SAFETY INJECTION PUMP	X	Х	X	Х	X	A		8/PAB/SI PUMP AREA
SWEL1-2	Y		2	SI	5	19	2P-015B	SAFETY INJECTION PUMP	Х	Х	X	Х	Х	В		8/PAB/SI PUMP AREA
SWEL1-2			2	SI	8a	19	2SI- 00825B	T-13 RWST OUTLET TO P-15A/B SI PUMP	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	В		8/PAB/SPRAY PUMP AREA
SWEL1-2	Y		2	SI	8a	19	2SI- 00857B	HX-11B RHR HX OUTLET TO P-15B SI PUMP SUCTION		Х		Х		В		8/PAB/SI PUMP AREA
SWEL1-2	Y		2	SI	- 8a	19	2SI- 00896B	P-15B SI PUMP SUCTION	Х	X	Х	Х	Х	В		8/PAB/SI PUMP AREA
SWEL1-2	Y		2	480V	1	16	2B-32	480V MOTOR CONTROL CENTER PAB SAFEGUARDS					Х	A		8/PAB/U2 CHG PUMP AREA
SWEL1-2	Y		2	CV	5	40	2P-002C	CHARGING PUMP (Pump Only as Pressure Boundary)	X	X	Х			В		8/PAB/U2 CHG PUMP RM

SWEL	RISK	N E W	UNIT	SYS CODE	EQUIP CLASS	WALK BY AREA	EQUIP#	EQUIP NAME	1	2	3	4	5	TRN	IPEEE Equip. Enhanced	LOCATION DESC
SWEL1-2			2	CV	7	12	2CV-00142	CHARGING LINE FLOW CONTROL	Х	Х		X		A		8/PAB/PIPEWAY #4
SWEL1-2	Y		2	SI	8a	12	2SI- 00866A	COLD LEG INJECTION LINE ISOLATION	Х	Х	X	X	X	A	-	8/PAB/PIPEWAY #4
SWEL1-2	Y		2	CV	8a	16	2CV- 00112B	2P-2A-C CHARGING PUMP REFUELING WATER SUCTION		Х		X		A		8/PAB/U2 CHG PUMP AREA
SWEL1-2	Y		2	SI	8a	12	2SI- 00866B	CORE DELUGE INJECTION LINE ISOLATION	X	X	Х	X	X	В		8/PAB/PIPEWAY #4
SWEL1-2			2	SI	21a	49, 50	T-034A	SAFETY INJECTION ACCUMULATOR	Х	Х	Х			A	_	21/U2C/NW QTR, 46/U2CNWQTR
SWEL1-2			2	SI	8a	49	SI-00841A	T-34A SI ACCUMULATOR OUTLET OPERATOR	Х	X	Х			A		21/U2C/NW QTR
SWEL1-2			2	SI	8a	51	SI-00878A	P-15B SI PUMP R-1 REACTOR VESSEL INJECTION	X	Х	X		X	Α		21/U2C/C-1 AIR LOCK AREA EAST
SWEL1-2	Ÿ		2	RH	8a	52	RH-00720	RHR RETURN TO RCS	"	Х				A		46/U2C/SE QTR
SWEL1-2			2	MS	7	25	2MS-02015	HX-1B SG HDR ATMOSPHERIC STEAM DUMP CONTROL	X	X		Х		В		85/U2F
SWEL1-2			2	MS	7	25	2MS-02016	HX-1A SG HDR ATMOSPHERIC STEAM DUMP CONTROL	X	Х		Х		A		85/U2F
SWEL1-2			2	480V	1	21	2B-39	480V MOTOR CONTROL CENTER TRAIN A BATTERY CHARGER SUPPLY	Х	Х	Х	X	X	Α		8/CB/VSG RM
SWEL1-2			2	480V	1	21	2B-49	480V MOTOR CONTROL CENTER TRAIN B BATTERY CHARGER SUPPLY	X	X	Х	Х	X	В		8/CB/VSG RM
SWEL1-2	Y		2	4.16K V	3	21	2A-05	4.16 KV BUS SWITCHGEAR (SAFEGUARDS)	X	Х	Х	X	Х	Α		8/CB/VSG RM
SWEL1-2	Y		0	125V	14	21	D-02	125V DC DISTRIBUTION PANEL	X	Х	Х	X	Х	В		8/CB/VSG RM
SWEL1-2	Y		0	125V	15	45	D-06	125V DC STATION BATTERY	Х	Х	X	Х	X	В	X	8/CB/D-06 BATT RM
SWEL1-2	Y	Y	0	125V	16	21	D-07	D-05 DC STATION BATTERY CHARGER	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	A		8/CB/VSG RM
SWEL1-2	Y	Y	0	125V	16	21	D-08	D-06 DC STATION BATTERY CHARGER	Х	X	Х	X	X	В		8/CB/VSG RM
SWEL1-2			2	CC	19	8	TE-00621	HX-12C/D CC HX OUTLET HEADER TEMPERATURE RTD	X	Х		Х		0		46/PAB/CC HX AREA
SWEL1-2	Y	Y	0	CC	21b	8	HX-012C	COMPONENT COOLING WATER HEAT EXCHANGER	Х	X		Х		0		46/PAB/CC HX AREA
SWEL1-2	Y	Y	0	CC	21b	8	HX-012B	COMPONENT COOLING WATER HEAT EXCHANGER	X	Х		Х		0		46/PAB/CC HX AREA
SWEL1-2			0	VNBI	10	4	W-086	PAB BATTERY AND INVERTER ROOM VENT FAN	X	Х	X	X	Х	В		35/PAB/D-106 ROOF
SWEL2			0	SF	5	24	P-012B	SPENT FUEL COOLING PUMP						В		46/PAB/SFP HX AREA
SWEL2			0	SF	5	24	P-012A	SPENT FUEL COOLING PUMP						Α	-	46/PAB/SFP HX AREA

SWEL	RISK	N E W	UNIT	SYS CODE	EQUIP CLASS	WALK BY AREA	EQUIP#	EQUIP NAME	1	2	3	4	5	TRN	IPEEE Equip. Enhanced	LOCATION DESC
SWEL2			0	SF	21b	24	HX-013B	SPENT FUEL POOL HEAT EXCHANGER		Γ				В		46/PAB/SFP HX AREA
SWEL2			0	SF	21b	24	HX-013A	SPENT FUEL POOL HEAT EXCHANGER						A		46/PAB/SFP HX AREA
SWEL2			0	SW	8a	24	SW- 02930B	HX-13B SFP HX OUTLET						В		46/PAB/SFP HX AREA
SWEL2	,		0	SW	8a	24	SW- 02930A	HX-13A SFP HX OUTLET						Α		46/PAB/SFP HX AREA
SWEL2			0	SW	8a	24	SW- 02927B	HX-13B SFP HX INLET						В		46/PAB/SFP HX AREA
SWEL2			0	SW	8a	24	SW- 02927A	HX-13A SFP HX INLET						Α		46/PAB/SFP HX AREA
SWEL2			0	SW	0	14	SF-00785B	P-9 HUT RECIRC PUMP SUCTION FROM TRANSFER CANAL						В		8/PAB/P-9 HUT AREA WEST
SWEL1-2	Y		2	RH	5	44	2P-010B	RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL PUMP	X	X	X	X	X	A	X	-19/PAB

ATTACHMENT B Classes of Equipment Unit 2

	Transmit De Charles		_
	Classes of Equipment	SWEL1	SWEL 2
		Unit 2	
0	Other	0	11
1	MCCs and wall-mounted contactors	6	0
_ 2	Low voltage switchgear and break panels	2	0
3	Medium voltage, metal-clad switchgear	1	0
4	Transformers	2	0
5	Horizontal pumps	10	2
6	Vertical pumps	5	0
7	Fluid-operated valves	8	0
	MOVs	19	4
8b	SOVs	3	0
9	Fans	5	0
10	Air handlers	1	0
11	Chiller	0	0
12	Air Compressors	0	0
13	Motor Generators	0	0
14	Distribution panels and Auto Transfer Switches	8	0
15	Batteries and Racks	1	0
16	Battery chargers and inverters	5	0
17	Engine Generators	2	0
18	Instrument Racks	1	0
19	Temperature sensors	1	0
20	Instrumentation and Control panels	5	0
21a	Tanks	8	0
21b	Heat exchangers	2	2
	TOTAL	95	9

Note: There are no Chillers, Air Compressors and Motor Generators at Point Beach Unit 1 which are Seismic Category I. Therefore, none of these classes of equipment were included in the SWEL.

Attachment C Selected Equipment List Unit 2 and SFP

	Т		1		•				г	ı —	ı .			
SWEL	RISK	NEW	UNIT	SYS CODE	EQUIP CLASS	EQUIP NUMBER	EQUIPMENT NAME	1	2	3	4	5	LOCATION DESC	SEISMIC CAT
SWEL1-2	Υ		0	125V	14	D-02	125V DC DISTRIBUTION PANEL	Х	<u>x</u>	x	х	Χ	8/CB/VSG RM	1_
SWEL1-2	Υ		0	125V	15	D-06	125V DC STATION BATTERY	Х	x	x	х	X	8/CB/D-06 BATT RM	1
SWEL1-2	Υ	Υ	0	125V	16	D-07	D-05 DC STATION BATTERY CHARGER	Х	х	x	х	х	8/CB/VSG RM	1_
SWEL1-2	Υ	Υ	0	125V	16	D-08	D-06 DC STATION BATTERY CHARGER	Х	X	X	Х	Χ	8/CB/VSG RM	1
SWEL1-2		Υ	0	125V	14	D-11	125V DC DISTRIBUTION PANEL	Х	Х	Х	Х	Χ	26/CB/CSR EAST	1
SWEL1-2	Υ	Υ	0	125V	14	D-13	125V DC DISTRIBUTION PANEL	Х	Х	Х	Х	Χ	26/CB/CSR EAST	1
SWEL1-2		Υ	0	125V	14	D-26	125V DC DISTRIBUTION PANEL	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	26/CB/CSR	1
SWEL1-2		Υ	0	125V	14	D-27	125V DC DISTRIBUTION PANEL	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	26/CB/CSR EAST	ī
SWEL1-2	Υ		0	125V	14	D-40	G-04 EDG DC DISTRIBUTION PANEL	x	Х	Х	Х	Х	28/DGB/G-04 SWGR RM	1
SWEL1-2		Υ	0	125V	14	D-64	125V DC DISTRIBUTION PANEL	Х	х	х	х	Х	8/CB/AFP RM 2P-29 CUB	ı
SWEL1-2	Υ	ļ	2	4.16KV	3	2A-05	4.16 KV BUS SWITCHGEAR (SAFEGUARDS)	Х	Х	Х	X	Х	8/CB/VSG RM	1
SWEL1-2	Υ		2	480V	2	2B-03	480V SAFEGUARDS LOAD CENTER	Х	Х	х	<u>x</u>	х	26/CB/CSR	11
SWEL1-2	Υ		2	480V	2	2B-04	480V SAFEGUARDS LOAD CENTER	Х	Х	X	X	Х	26/CB/CSR	1
SWEL1-2	Υ		2 _	480V	1	2B-32	480V MOTOR CONTROL CENTER PAB SAFEGUARDS	×	x	x	x	x	8/PAB/U2 CHG PUMP AREA	1
SWEL1-2			2	480V	1	2B-39	480V MOTOR CONTROL CENTER TRAIN A BATTERY CHARGER SUPPLY	х	х	Х	Х	х	8/CB/VSG RM	11
SWEL1-2		Y	2	480V	1	2B-40	480V MOTOR CONTROL CENTER DGB	x	x	×	×	x	28/DGB/G-04 SWGR RM	i
SWEL1-2			2	480V	1	2B-49	480V MOTOR CONTROL CENTER TRAIN B BATTERY CHARGER SUPPLY	х	х	Х	х	х	8/CB/VSG RM	L
SWEL1-2	Υ		2	480V	4	2X-13	2B-03 STATION SERVICE TRANSFORMER	x	х	х	x	х	26/CB/CSR	1
SWEL1-2	Υ		2	480V	4	2X-14	2B-04 STATION SERVICE TRANSFORMER	Х	x	х	x	Х	26/CB/CSR	1
SWEL1-2		Υ	1	480V	1	B420C- B957D	P-32C SERVICE WATER PUMP NORMAL/ALT TRANSFER SW	Х			Х		8/CB/G-02 RM	I
SWEL1-2		Y	2	480V	1	B427C- B957D	P-32E SERVICE WATER PUMP NORMAL/ALT TRANSFER SW	X			х		8/CB/G-02 RM	<u> </u>

SWEL1-2			2	AF	8a	2AF- 04000	2P-29 AFP DISCHARGE 2HX-1B SG INLET ISOLATION MOV	x	x		x	8/CB/AFP RM 2P-29 CUB	
SVVLL1-2	 		- -	AF	oa	2AF-	2P-29 AFP DISCHARGE 2HX-1A SG INLET	├^-	 ^- -		-^-	8/CB/AFP RM 2P-29	
SWEL1-2	1	1	2	AF	8a	04001	ISOLATION MOV	X	x		x	CUB	1
SWEL1-2	Υ	Υ	2	AF	7	2AF- 04002	2P-29 AFP MINI RECIRC CONTROL	x	X		х	8/CB/AFP RM 2P-29 CUB	
SWEL1-2			2	AF	8a	2AF- 04006	2P-29 AFP SUCTION FROM SERVICE WATER	X	X		х	8/CB/AFP RM 2P-29 CUB	
SWEL1-2	Υ		2	AF	5	2P-029	AUX FEEDWATER TURBINE-DRIVEN PUMP	X	x		X	8/CB/AFP RM 2P-29 CUB	
SWELT-2	 Y		+-	AF	10	2P-029	2P-29 AUX FEEDWATER PUMP	 ^ -	+^-		^	8/CB/AFP RM 2P-29	1
SWEL1-2			2	AF	18	2RK-35	INSTRUMENTATION RACK	Х	х		х	CUB	1
SWEL1-2			2	AF	21a	2T-212	2P-29 AFP MINI RECIRC IA 2AF-4002 BACKUP ACCUMULATOR	X	X		Х	8/CB/AFP RM	 1
SWEL1-2		Υ	0	AF	7	AF-04014	P-38B SSGP MINI RECIRC CONTROL	×	х		х	8/CB/AFP RM P-38B CUB	I
SWEL1-2			0	AF	8a	AF-04016	P-38B SSGP SUCTION FROM SERVICE WATER	Х	X		Х	8/CB/AFP RM P-38B CUB	1
SWEL1-2			0	AF	7	AF-04019	P-38B SSGP DISCHARGE CONTROL	X	X		Х	8/CB/AFP RM P-38B	ī
SWEL1-2			0	AF	8a	AF-04020	P-38B SSGP DISCHARGE TO 2HX-1B STEAM GENERATOR	X	X		X	8/CB/AFP RM P-38B CUB	
SWEL1-2			0	AF	5	P-038B	STANDBY STEAM GENERATOR PUMP	X	X		X	8/CB/AFP RM P-38B CUB	1
SWEL1-2	Υ		2	cc	5	2P-011A	COMPONENT COOLING WATER PUMP	X	X		Х	8/PAB/CC PUMP AREA	
												8/PAB/CC PUMP	
SWEL1-2	Y		2	CC	5	2P-011B	COMPONENT COOLING WATER PUMP COMPONENT COOLING WATER HEAT	X	X		Χ.	AREA	L
SWEL1-2	Υ	Υ	0	СС	21b	HX-012B	EXCHANGER	Х	X		Х	46/PAB/CC HX AREA	1
SWEL1-2		Υ	0	СС	21b	HX-012C	COMPONENT COOLING WATER HEAT EXCHANGER	x	X		Х	46/PAB/CC HX AREA	1
SWEL1-2			2	СС	19	TE-00621	HX-12C/D CC HX OUTLET HEADER TEMPERATURE RTD	X	X		Х	46/PAB/CC HX AREA	1
SWEL1-2	Υ		2	CV	8a	2CV- 00112B	2P-2A-C CHARGING PUMP REFUELING WATER SUCTION	Х	Х		х	8/PAB/U2 CHG PUMP AREA	I
SWEL1-2			2	CV	7	2CV- 00142	CHARGING LINE FLOW CONTROL	X	X		х	8/PAB/PIPEWAY #4	
SWEL1-2	Υ		2	CV	5	2P-002C	CHARGING PUMP (Pump Only as Pressure Boundary)	Х	х	Х		8/PAB/U2 CHG PUMP RM	I

SWEL1-2			0	DA	21a	T-061A	G-02 EDG STARTING AIR RECEIVER (RIGHT BANK)	Х	x	X	x	x	8/CB/G-02 RM	
SWEL1-2			0	DA	21a	T-061D	G-02 EDG STARTING AIR RECEIVER (LEFT BANK)	X	X			X		1
SWEL1-2			0	DA	21a	T-061F	G-02 EDG STARTING AIR RECEIVER (LEFT BANK)	Х	х	х	х	х	8/CB/G-02 RM	I
SWEL1-2		Υ	0	DA	21a	T-171A	G-04 EDG STARTING AIR RECEIVER	х	x	x	x	_x_	28/DGB/G-04 RM	1
SWEL1-2		Υ	0	DA	21a	T-171B	G-04 EDG STARTING AIR RECEIVER	Х	Х	Х	X	Х	28/DGB/G-04 RM	1
SWEL1-2			0	DG	20	C-035	G-02 EDG ALARM AND ELECTRICAL PANEL	X	X	X	х	х	8/CB/G-02 RM W WALL	1_
SWEL1-2			0	DG	20	C-035A	G-02 EDG LOCAL TRANSFER PANEL	х	X	X	Х	х	8/CB/G-02 RM W WALL	1
SWEL1-2			0	DG	20	C-079	G-02 EDG DC POWER TRANSFER CONTROL PANEL	X	х	х	x	Х	8/CB/G-02 RM	1
SWEL1-2		Υ	0	DG	20	C-082	G-04 EDG CONTROL PANEL	Х	х	х	Х	Х	28/DGB/G-04 SWGR RM	1
SWEL1-2	Υ		0	DG	17	G-02	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR	Х	Х	х	Х	X	8/CB/G-02 RM	1_
SWEL1-2	Υ	Υ	0	DG	17	G-04	EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR	х	X	Х	Х	Х	28/DGB/G-04 RM	I
SWEL1-2		Υ	0	DG	9	W-181B1	G-04 EDG HX-265B RADIATOR FAN	Х	х	х	х	Х	50/DGB/G-04 RADTR RM	I
SWEL1-2		Υ	0	DG	9	W-181B2	G-04 EDG HX-265B RADIATOR FAN	X	x	x	Х	x	50/DGB/G-04 RADTR RM	1
SWEL1-2		Υ	0	DG	9	W-181B3	G-04 EDG HX-265B RADIATOR FAN	х	x	x			50/DGB/G-04 RADTR RM	1
SWEL1-2			0	FO	8a	FO-03931	T-31B G-02 EDG DAY TANK INLET SECOND OFF ISOLATION	Х	х	х	х	x	8/CB/G-02 RM	1
SWEL1-2			0	FO	21a	T-031B	G-02 DIESEL GENERATOR DAY TANK	Х	х	Х	X	Х	8/CB/G-02 RM	I
SWEL1-2			2	IA	7_	2IA-03047	U2C IA HEADER INLET CONTROL					X	26/PAB/PIPEWAY #3	1
SWEL1-2			2	IA	7	2IA-03048	U2C IA HEADER INLET CONTROL					x	26/PAB/PIPEWAY #3	11
SWEL1-2			2	MS	20	2C-197	P-29 AFP SUCTION PRESSURE CONTROL PANEL	Х	х		х		8/CB/AFP RM 2P-29 CUB	1
SWEL1-2			2	MS	7	2MS- 02015	HX-1B SG HDR ATMOSPHERIC STEAM DUMP CONTROL	Х	x		х		85/U2F	1
SWEL1-2			2	MS	7	2MS- 02016	HX-1A SG HDR ATMOSPHERIC STEAM DUMP CONTROL	Х	х		х		85/U2F	ı

SWEL1-2		2	MS	8b	2MS- 02090	P-29 AFP BEARING COOLING INLET	Х	X		Х		8/CB/AFP RM	1
SWEL1-2	Υ	 2	RH	8a	RH-00720	RHR RETURN TO RCS		x				46/U2C/SE QTR	I
SWEL1-2		2	RH	5	2P-010B	RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL PUMP	Х	х	х	Х	х		1
SWEL1-2		2	SI	8a	SI-00841A	T-34A SI ACCUMULATOR OUTLET OPERATOR	X	Х	X			21/U2C/T-34A ACCUM EAST	1
SWEL1-2		2	SI	8a	SI-00878A	P-15B SI PUMP R-1 REACTOR VESSEL INJECTION	x	X	x		X	21/U2C/C-1 AIR LOCK AREA EAST	
SWEL1-2		2	SI	21a	T-034A	SAFETY INJECTION ACCUMULATOR	Х	X	х			21/U2C/NW QTR	1
SWEL1-2		2	SI	5	2P-014A	CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP					х	8/PAB/SPRAY PUMP AREA	l
SWEL1-2	<u> </u>	2	SI	5	2P-014B	CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP					x	8/PAB/SPRAY PUMP AREA	11
SWEL1-2	Υ	 2	SI	5	2P-015A	SAFETY INJECTION PUMP	X	х	х	х	x	8/PAB/SI PUMP AREA	1
SWEL1-2	Y	 2	SI	5	2P-015B	SAFETY INJECTION PUMP	X	x	x	х	x	8/PAB/SI PUMP AREA	ı
SWEL1-2		2	SI	8a	2SI- 00825B	T-13 RWST OUTLET TO P-15A/B SI PUMP	x	х	х	x	х	8/PAB/SPRAY PUMP AREA	1
SWEL1-2	Υ	2	SI	8a	2SI- 00857B	HX-11B RHR HX OUTLET TO P-15B SI PUMP SUCTION	X	X	x	х	x	8/PAB/SI PUMP AREA	I
SWEL1-2	Υ	2	SI	8a _	2SI- 00866A	COLD LEG INJECTION LINE ISOLATION	X	Х	х	X	х	8/PAB/PIPEWAY #4	1
SWEL1-2	Υ	2	SI	8a	2SI- 00866B	CORE DELUGE INJECTION LINE ISOLATION	X	X	x	X	x	8/PAB/PIPEWAY #4	1
SWEL1-2	Υ	2	SI	8a	2SI- 00896B	P-15B SI PUMP SUCTION	x	х	x	x	x	8/PAB/SI PUMP AREA	1
SWEL1-2	Υ	0	sw	6	P-032B	SERVICE WATER PUMP	Х			Х		8/CWPH/SW BLDG	1
SWEL1-2	Υ	 0	sw	6	P-032C	SERVICE WATER PUMP	X			Х		8/CWPH/SW BLDG	1
SWEL1-2	Y	0	sw	6	P-032D	SERVICE WATER PUMP	X			х		8/CWPH/SW BLDG	ī
SWEL1-2	Υ	0	sw	6	P-032E	SERVICE WATER PUMP	x			х		8/CWPH/SW BLDG	1
SWEL1-2	Υ	0	sw	6	P-032F	SERVICE WATER PUMP	X			Х		8/CWPH/SW BLDG	1
SWEL1-2		0	sw	8b	SW- 02820-S	K-2B IA COMPRESSOR INLET SOLENOID				x		G-02 ROOM	1
SWEL1-2		0	sw_	8b	SW- 02826-S	K-2A IA COMPRESSOR INLET SOLENOID				X		8/CB/AIR COMP RM	

SWEL1-2	Υ		0	sw	8a	SW-02869	NORTH HEADER TO WEST HEADER				Х		26/PAB/CENTRAL	1
SWEL1-2	Y		0	sw	8a	SW-02870	SOUTH HEADER TO WEST HEADER CROSSCONNECT				X		26/PAB/CENTRAL	1
SWEL1-2			0	sw	8a	SW-02890	NORTH HEADER TO SOUTH SUPPLY HEADER CROSSCONNECT	Х			x		8/CWPH/SW BLDG	
SWEL1-2			0	sw	8a	SW-02891	SOUTH TO NORTH SUPPLY HEADER CROSSCONNECT	Х			х		8/CWPH/SW BLDG	1
SWEL1-2			0	VNBI	10	W-086	PAB BATTERY AND INVERTER ROOM VENT FAN	Х	Х	Х	Х	х	35/PAB/D-106 ROOF	I
SWEL1-2	Υ	Υ	0	VNDG	9	W-184B	G-04 EDG RM LARGE CAPACITY EXHAUST FAN	Х	X	х	х	х	50/DGB/G-04 FAN RM	1
SWEL1-2	Υ	Υ	0	VNDG	9	W-184C	G-04 EDG RM SMALL CAPACITY EXHAUST FAN	Х	х	Х	Х	X	50/DGB/G-04 FAN RM	1
SWEL1-2			2	Υ	16	2DY-01	RED 125V DC/120V AC INVERTER	Х	Х	Х	х	Х	_26/CB/CSR	1
SWEL1-2			2	Y	16	2DY-02	BLUE 125V DC/120V AC INVERTER	X	Х	х	х	х	26/CB/CSR	1
SWEL1-2			0	Υ	16	DY-0A	RED 125V DC/120V AC ALTERNATE INVERTER	Х	х	х	х	Х	26/CB/CSR	ı
SWEL1-2			0	Υ	14	Y-203	WHITE 120V INVERTER DISTRIBUTION PANEL	X	x	х	x	x	26/CB/CSR WEST WALL	1
PB			2	125V	2	2SAF- 04000	2P-29 AFP DISCH 2HX-1B SG INLET ISOL MOV STARTER	х	x		х		8/CB/VSG EQUIP RM	1
PB			2	125V	2	2SAF- 04001	2P-29 AFP DISCH 2HX-1A SG INLET ISOL MOV STARTER	Х	x		х		8/CB/VSG EQUIP RM	1
РВ			2	125V	2	2SMS- 02019	HX-1B SG HDR P-29 AFP STEAM SUPPLY MOV STARTER	Х	х		х		8/CB/VSG EQUIP RM	1
РВ			2	125V	2	2SMS- 02020	HX-1A SG HDR P-29 AFP STEAM SUPPLY MOV STARTER	х	х		x		8/CB/VSG EQUIP RM	ı
PB			2	125V	2	2SMS- 02082	P-29 AFP OVERSPEED TRIP STARTER	х	х		х		8/CB/AFP RM 2P-29 CUB	ı
PB			0	125V	14	D-04	125V DC DISTRIBUTION PANEL	Х	х	Х	х	Х	26/PAB/INVERT RM EAST	
PB		Υ	0	125V	15	D-106	125V DC STATION BATTERY	Х	х	x	х	x	26/PAB/D-106 BATT RM	
PB			0	125V	16	D-108	D-106 DC STATION BATTERY CHARGER	Х	х		x		26/PAB/INVERT RM EAST	1
РВ			0	125V	16	D-109	SWING STATION BATTERY CHARGER	х		Х			26/PAB/INVERT RM WEST	1

РВ	2	480V	1	B336A- B958B	P-10A RHR PUMP NORMAL/ALT TRANSFER SWITCH	Х	x	X	Х	x	8/PAB/COL P-11	
РВ	2	480V	1	B42-391	D-09 SWING STN BATTERY CHARGER TRAIN A CONTACTOR	Х	x		x		8/CB/VSG RM 2B-39	1
PB	2	480V	1	B42-394	D-107 STATION BATTERY CHARGER TRAIN A CONTACTOR	Х	X		Х		8/CB/VSG RM 2B-39	1
PB	2	480V	1	B42-491	D-08 STATION BATTERY CHARGER TRAIN B CONTACTOR	Х	Х		Х		8/CB/VSG RM 2B-49	ı
РВ	2	480V	1	B429A- B958B	P-10B RHR PUMP NORMAL/ALT TRANSFER SWITCH	Х	х		X		8/PAB/COL P-12	
РВ	0	AF	18	RK-25B	P-38B SSGP INSTRUMENTATION RACK	Х	x		Х		8/CB/AFP RM P-38B CUB	I
РВ	2	CC	8a	2CC- 00736A	2HX-11A RHR HX SHELL SIDE OUTLET RELIEF	Х	х		Х		8/PAB/PIPEWAY #3	1
PB	2	СС	8a	2CC- 00736B	2HX-11B RHR HX SHELL SIDE OUTLET RELIEF	Х	Х		х		8/PAB/PIPEWAY #3	1
PB	2	CC	8a	2CC- 00738A	2HX-11A RHR HX SHELL SIDE INLET	Х	х		х		8/PAB/PIPEWAY #3	1
РВ	2	СС	8a	2CC- 00738B	2HX-11B RHR HX SHELL SIDE INLET	Х	Х		х		8/PAB/PIPEWAY #3	1
PB	2	СС	8a	2CC- 00759A	2P-1A RCP CC OUTLET MOV	Х	Х		X		8/PAB/PIPEWAY #3	1
РВ	2	СС	21b	2HX-012D	COMPONENT COOLING WATER HEAT EXCHANGER	Х	Х		х		46/PAB/CC HX AREA	I
РВ	0	СС	21b	HX-012B	COMPONENT COOLING WATER HEAT EXCHANGER	Х	х		х		46/PAB/CC HX AREA	ı
PB	0	DA	21a	T-060A	G-01 EDG STARTING AIR RECEIVER (RIGHT BANK)	Х	Х	Х	х	х	8/CB/G-01 RM	1
PB	0	DA	21a	T-060D	G-01 EDG STARTING AIR RECEIVER (LEFT BANK)	х	х	х	Х	Х	8/CB/G-01 RM	1
PB	0	DA	21a	T-061B	G-02 EDG STARTING AIR RECEIVER (RIGHT BANK)	Х	x	х	х	Х	8/CB/G-02 RM	ı
PB	0	DA	21a	T-061C	G-02 EDG STARTING AIR RECEIVER (RIGHT BANK)	х	х	х	х	х	8/CB/G-02 RM	1
РВ	0	DA	21a	T-061E	G-02 EDG STARTING AIR RECEIVER (LEFT BANK)	Х	х	х	х	х	8/CB/G-02 RM	1
РВ	0	DA	21a	T-170C	G-03 EDG STARTING AIR RECEIVER	Х	х	х	х	х	28/DGB/G-03 RM	ī
РВ	0	DG	20	C-079	G-02 EDG DC POWER TRANSFER CONTROL PANEL	Х	X	<u>x</u>	Х	x	8/CB/G-02 RM N WALL	1

			· ·		-		Γ				50/DGB/G-03 RADTR	
PB	 0	DG	9	W-181A3	G-03 EDG HX-265A RADIATOR FAN	X	X	Х	X	X	RM	1
PB	2	MMS	20	2C-105	SECONDARY SYSTEM POWER SUPPLIES PANEL	X	х		Х		44/CB/CR	1
PB	2	мѕ	8a	2MS- 02019	HX-1B SG HEADER P-29 AFP STEAM SUPPLY MOV	X	x		х		46/PAB/BAST AREA	1
PB	2	MS	8a	2MS- 02020	HX-1A SG HEADER P-29 AFP STEAM SUPPLY MOV	x	x		х		46/PAB/BAST AREA	
PB	2	RH	21b	2HX-011A	RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL HEAT EXCHANGER	x	x	x	х	X	-5/PAB/RHR HX CUB	1
PB	2	RH	21b	2HX-011B	RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL HEAT EXCHANGER	x	x	х	х	х		1
PB	2	RH	5	2P-010A	RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL PUMP	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х		1
PB	2	RH	7	2RH- 00624	HX-11A RHR HX OUTLET CONTROL	X	X	X		Х	-5/PAB/EAST WALL	1
				2RH-							-5/PAB/EAST WALL	
PB	 2	RH	7	00625	HX-11B RHR HX OUTLET CONTROL	X	X	X	X	X	OVHD	
РВ	 2	SI	8a	2SI- 00825A	T-13 RWST OUTLET TO P-15A/B SI PUMP	x	х	Х	х	x_	8/PAB/SPRAY PUMP AREA	11
РВ	2	SI	8a	2SI- 00850A-M	P-10A RHR PUMP SUMP B SUCTION MOTOR/PUMP	x	x	x	x	X	8/PAB/PIPEWAY #3	1
PB	2	SI	8a	2SI- 00850B-M	P-10B RHR PUMP SUMP B SUCTION MOTOR/PUMP	X	X	Х	X	X	8/PAB/PIPEWAY #3	1
РВ	2	SI	8a	2SI- 00851A	P-10A RHR PUMP SUCTION FROM CONTAINMENT SUMP B	x	х	х		х	-5/PAB/RHR PIPEWAY	
				2SI-	P-10B RHR PUMP SUCTION FROM						-5/PAB/RHR	
РВ	 2	SI	8a	00851B	CONTAINMENT SUMP B	X	X	X	X	<u>X</u> _	PIPEWAY	1
РВ	2	SI	8a	2SI- 00857A	HX-11A RHR HX OUTLET TO P-15A SI PUMP SUCTION	Х	Х	Х	X	$ _{X_{_}}$	8/PAB/SI PUMP AREA	I
PB	2	Si	8a	2SI- 00896A	P-15A SI PUMP SUCTION	X	X	X	X	X	8/PAB/SI PUMP AREA	1
РВ	2	sw	7	2SW- 00012D	HX-12D CC HX OUTLET TEMPERATURE CONTROL				x		46/PAB/CC HX AREA	
РВ	0	SW	8b	SW- 02832B-S	K-3B SA COMPRESSOR INLET SOLENOID				X		G-02 ROOM	
PB	0	VNBI	10	W-086	PAB BATTERY AND INVERTER ROOM VENT FAN	×	X	x	X	x	35/PAB/D-106 ROOF	
РВ	2	Υ	14	2Y-02	BLUE 120V VITAL INSTRUMENT PANEL	X	X	X	Х	X	44/CB/CR WEST	i i

							OVERA DED 400VA O VITAL INIOT DAIL DIAVE			ι –	ι			τ
РВ		2		Υ	14	43/Y-01	2Y-01 RED 120V AC VITAL INST PNL PWR SUP TRANSFER SW	Х	X	X	x	x	44/CB/CR WEST	11
					,		2Y-02 BLUE 120V AC VITAL INST PNL PWR							
PB		2	<u>' </u>	Y	14	43/Y-02	SUP TRANSFER SW	X	X	X	X	X		1
PB				125V		D 004	CAUNO DA TTERV DIOTRIRI ITION BANEI	Х				\ \ \	26/CB/SWBD CHGR	i .
PB		0	<u>'</u>	125V	14	D-301	SWING BATTERY DISTRIBUTION PANEL	^_	X	X.	X	Х	RM	
PB		0	, ,	125V	15	D-305	SWING STATION BATTERY	X	X	X	x	Х	26/CB/D-305 BATT RM	
	 			1200	10	D-000	480V MOTOR CONTROL CENTER PAB	 ^	 ^	 ^	^	^	Talvi	 '
PB	Y	1		480V	1	1B-42	SAFEGUARDS	X_	Х	X	X_	Х	26/PAB/C-59 AREA	1
							480V MOTOR CONTROL CENTER PAB							
PB	Y	2	. 4	480V	1	2B-42	SAFEGUARDS	X	X	X	X	Х		1
	1				_	1	CHARGING PUMP (Pump Only as Pressure		١.,	١.,	1	ļ	8/PAB/U2 CHG PUMP	
PB	Y	2	!(CV	5	2P-002A	Boundary)	X	X.	X			AREA	
PB	Y	2	, ,	CV	5	2P-002B	CHARGING PUMP (Pump Only as Pressure Boundary)	X	X	X			8/PAB/U2 CHG PUMP RM	
ГГЬ	 ' 		·	CV		2F-002B	REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK W/6		 ^	 ^			TXIVI	
PB		2		SI	21a	2T-013	IMMERSION HTRS	X	X	Х	X	Х	U2F	1
PB		0	,	VNDG	9	W-012A	G-01 ROOM EXHAUST FAN	X	X	X	Х	Х	26/CB	1
PB	1	0	,	VNDG	9	W-012B	G-01 ROOM EXHAUST FAN	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	26/CB	I
PB		0	,	VNDG	9	W-012C	G-02 ROOM EXHAUST FAN	Х	Х	Х	Х	Х	26/CB	ī
PB		0		VNDG	9	W-012D	G-02 ROOM EXHAUST FAN	X	X	Х	Х	Х	26/CB	
SWEL2		0		SF	21b	HX-013A	SPENT FUEL POOL HEAT EXCHANGER						46/PAB/SFP HX AREA	1
SWEL2	+	0		SF	21b	HX-013B	SPENT FUEL POOL HEAT EXCHANGER						46/PAB/SFP HX AREA	1
SWEL2		0		SF	5	P-012A	SPENT FUEL COOLING PUMP	<u> </u>					46/PAB/SFP HX AREA	1
SWEL2		0		SF	5	P-012B	SPENT FUEL COOLING PUMP						46/PAB/SFP HX AREA	1
	1					SF-	P-9 HUT RECIRC PUMP SUCTION FROM						8/PAB/P-9 HUT AREA	1
SWEL2		0);	SF	0	00785B	TRANSFER CANAL	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>		WEST	1
CWELO		0	, ,	SW	00	SW- 02927A	HX-13A SFP HX INLET		ļ	1	ļ	ļ	 46/PAB/SFP HX AREA	ļ.,
SWEL2	 	^U	'	<u> </u>	8a	SW-	HA-13A SEP HA INLET		┼─	┼─	-		40/PAD/SFP FIX AREA	
SWEL2		0) :	SW	8a	02927B	HX-13B SFP HX INLET]	46/PAB/SFP HX AREA	1
						SW-								
SWEL2		0);	<u>SW</u>	8a	02930A	HX-13A SFP HX OUTLET		↓_	↓		<u> </u>	46/PAB/SFP HX AREA	
SWEL2		0	, ,	SW	8a	SW- 02930B	HX-13B SFP HX OUTLET				}		46/PAB/SFP HX AREA	1,
	+	0		SF		SFP	SPENT FUEL POOL	†	+-	+-	\vdash	 	46/PAB/SFP HX AREA	
PB		 '	<u>' </u>	<u>ог</u>	21a	SFF	YELLOW 120V INVERTER DISTRIBUTION	 -	-	-	 	╁─-	26/CB/CSR WEST	 -'
PB		lo)	Υ	14	Y-204	PANEL	X	X	X	X	X	WALL] [

Status: Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)	Y N U
· ,	
Equipment ID No.: 2P-015B	
Equipment Class: (5) Horizontal Pumps	
Equipment Description: SAFETY INJECTION PUMP	
Project: Point Beach 2 SWEL 1	
Location (Bldg, Elev, Room/Area): PAB, 8.00 ft, SI PUMP AREA	
Manufacturer/Model:	
Instructions for Completing Checklist	
This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgme findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.	
<u>Anchorage</u>	
 Is anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)? 	Yes
2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?	Yes
3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?	Yes
4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?	Yes
5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? (Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.) Six 1-1/4" anchors per SQ-000077. This issue has been entered into the corrective action program.	Yes
6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?	Yes

. Chair	tus: Y N U
Selsmic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)	us: [1] N U
Equipment ID No.: 2X-13	
Equipment Class: _(4) Transformers	
Equipment Description: 2B-03 STATION SERVICE TRANSFORMER	
Project: Point Beach 2 SWEL 1	
Location (Bidg, Elev, Room/Area): CB, 26.00 ft, CSR	
Manufacturer/Model:	
Instructions for Completing Checklist	
This checklist may be used to document the results of the Selsmic Walkdown of an Item of equipm SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of jud findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.	gments and
Anchorage	
 Is anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)? 	Yes
2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?	Yes
3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?	Yes
4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?	Yes
5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? (Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.) NE plate has north-south bolt spacing of 12-3/8", which is less than the 13" minimum shown on SK-MR-94-012. All dimensions are enveloped by	Yes
calculation 95-0168, Rev2, Therefore, the as built condition matches the plant documentation. 6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?	Yes

·	Status: Y N U
Selsmic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)	Status: [T] N U
Equipment ID No.: _D-13	·
Equipment Class: (14) Distribution Panels	
Equipment Description: 125V DC DISTRIBUTION PANEL	
Project: Point Beach 2 SWEL 1	
Location (Bidg, Elev, Room/Area): CB, 26.00 ft, CSR	
Manufacturer/Model:	
Instructions for Completing Checklist	
This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other con	of judgments and
<u>Anchorage</u>	
 Is anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the Item one of the 50% of SWEL Items requiring such verification)? 	Yes
 Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware? Panel mounted to 4 Unistrut P-1000 channels on wall. Each Unistrut is mounted with 2 – 3/8" expansion anchors. Calculation 2000-0024, Rev. 1 identifies mounting with additional center anchors in top and bottom Unistrut channels; these anchors are not accessible. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation? 4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?	Yes Yes
5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? (Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.) Verified per Calculation 2000-0024, Rev. 1, which conservatively ignored the center anchors in the top and bottom Unistrut channels.	Yes
6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?	Yes

	Status: Y N U
Selsmic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)	
Equipment ID No.: P-032F	<u> </u>
Equipment Class: (6) Vertical Pumps	
Equipment Description: SERVICE WATER PUMP	
Project: Point Beach 2 SWEL 1	
Location (Bldg, Elev, Room/Area): CWPH, 8.00 ft, SW BLDG	
Manufacturer/Model:	
Instructions for Completing Checklist	
This checklist may be used to document the results of the Selsmic Walkdown of an Item of SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other cor	s of Judgments and
Anchorage	
 Is anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)? 	No
2. is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?	Yes
3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?	Yes
Some corrosion on SE corner baseplate anchor: washer and baseplate corner. No immediate seismic concern. This issue has been entered into the station corre	ective action process.
4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?	Yes
Hairline crack at the NE corner baseplate is judged to be acceptable.	
 Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? (Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.) 	Not Applicable
6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?	Yes

	· OLIVINI TI
Selsmic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)	Status: Y N U
Equipment ID No.: T-031B	
Equipment Class: (21) Tanks and Heat Exchangers	
Equipment Description: G-02 DIESEL GENERATOR DAY TANK	
Project: Point Beach 2 SWEL 1	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Location (Bidg, Elev, Room/Area): CB, 8.00 ft, G-02 RM	•
Manufacturer/Model:	
Instructions for Completing Checklist	
This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the result findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other c	ilts of judgments and
Anchorage	
 Is anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)? 	Yes
2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?	Yes
3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?	Yes
4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?	Yes
Crack located above east top bolt, approximately 6" away. Cracks acceptable since anchors are through bolts.	
5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? (Note: This question only applies if the Item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.) Tank is mounted to steel frame with 5/8" diameter bolts and the frame is mounted with 1" thru bolts and one anchor welded to tan embed plate. Calculation N-90-043, Rev. 0, Attachment 2 shows analysis for 5/8" mounting bolts for tank and "thru bolts for the attachment of the frame to the wall.	Yes
Therefore, the plant documentation is confirmed. 6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?	Yes

Sta Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)	tus: YN U
Equipment ID No.: T-171B	_
Equipment Class: (21) Tanks and Heat Exchangers	
Equipment Description: G-04 EDG STARTING AIR RECEIVER	
Project: Point Beach 2 SWEL 1	
Location (Bidg, Elev, Room/Area): DGB, 28.00 ft, G-04 RM	
Manufacturer/Model:	
Instructions for Completing Checklist	
This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an Item of equipr SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of jud findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comment	Igments and
Anchorage	
 Is anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)? 	Yes
 Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware? Anchored to floor with 4 posts, 2 – 5/8" bolts each. Attached to wall at midhelght to two base angles with 2 – 3/" bolts each. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation? 	Yes Yes
4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors? Minor cracks in grout are judged to be acceptable.	Yes
5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation? (Note: This question only applies if the Item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.) Anchorage verified per drawing E-121202, Rev. 8 For floor anchor bolts and drawing E-221501, Rev. 3. for wall anchor bolts.	Yes
6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?	Yes

Status: Y N U

Area Walk-By Checklist (AWC)

	•	
L	ocation (Bidg, Elev, Room/Area): Area Walk-by 28: Pump House El. 8'. North Room.	
Instru	uctions for Completing Checklist	_
space	checklist may be used to document the results of the Area Walk-By near one or more SWEL below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and fi lonal space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.	
1.	Does anchorage of equipment in the area appear to be free of potentially adverse selsmic conditions (if visible without necessarily opening cabinets)? Bottom anchor bolt for W-2B not fully engaged. Missing anchor bolt on baseplate NW of P-35A. Loose grout at NE corner anchor bolt below SW-13. These issues have been entered into the station corrective action process.	Yes
2.	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	Yes
3.	Based on a visual inspection from the floor, do the cable/conduit raceways and HVAC ducting appear to be free of potentially adverse seismic conditions (e.g., condition of supports is adequate and fill conditions of cable trays appear to be inside acceptable limits)? Overhead raceways and piping well supported.	Yes
4.	Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic spatial interactions with other equipment in the area (e.g., ceiling tiles and lighting)? Overhead piping well supported.	Yes
5.	Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic interactions that could cause flooding or spray in the area? Overhead piping well supported.	Yes
6.	Does It appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic interactions that could cause a fire in the area?	Yes
7.	Does it appear that the area is free of potentially adverse seismic interactions associated with housekeeping practices, storage of portable equipment, and temporary installations (e.g., scaffolding, lead shielding)?	Yes



Plan for Future Seismic Walkdown of Inaccessible Equipment

Completion of the walkdowns for four items must be deferred due to accessibility. One item requires a bus outage and five items require a refueling outage. Table E-1 summarizes the reasons each item is inaccessible during normal plant operation. PBNP CRs have been written to identify these deferred components and to provide a schedule the future Seismic Walkdowns for these items.

Table E-1. Summary of Inaccessible Equipment

Component ID	Location	Description	Reason for Inaccessibility	Scheduled Completion
T-034A	21/U2C/NW QTR	Safety Injection Accumulator	Access to containment is restricted during plant operation	Complete
SI-00841A	21/U2C/T-34A Accum. East	T-34A SI Accumulator Outlet Operator	Access to containment is restricted during plant operation	Complete
SI-00878A	21/U2C/C-1 Air Lock Area East	P-15B SI Pump R- 1 Reactor Vessel Injection	Access to containment is restricted during plant operation	Complete
RH-00720	46/U2C/SE QTR	RHR Return to RCS	Access to containment is restricted during plant operation	Complete
C-035	8/CB/G-02 RM West Wall	G-02 EDG Alarm and Electrical Panel	Equipment energized	Complete
C-035A	8/CB/G-02 RM West Wall	G-02 EDG Local Transfer Panel	Equipment energized	Complete
C-079	8/CB/G-02 Rm	G-02 EDG DC Power Transfer Control Panel	Equipment energized	Complete
C-082	28/DGB/G-04 SWGR Rm	G-04 EDG Control Panel	Equipment energized	Complete

Table E-1 Summary of Inaccessible Equipment

Component ID	Location	Description	Reason for Inaccessibility	Scheduled Completion
T-034A	21/U2C/NW QTR	Safety Injection Accumulator	Access to containment is restricted during plant operation	Complete
SI-00841A	21/U2C/T-34A Accum. East	T-34A SI Accumulator Outlet Operator	Access to containment is restricted during plant operation	Complete
SI-00878A	21/U2C/C-1 Air Lock Area East	P-15B SI Pump R- 1 Reactor Vessel Injection	Access to containment is restricted during plant operation	Complete
RH-00720	46/U2C/SE QTR	RHR Return to RCS	Access to containment is restricted during plant operation	Complete
C-035	8/CB/G-02 RM West Wall	G-02 EDG Alarm and Electrical Panel	Equipment energized	Complete
C-035A	8/CB/G-02 RM West Wall	G-02 EDG Local Transfer Panel	Equipment energized	Complete
C-079	8/CB/G-02 Rm	G-02 EDG DC Power Transfer Control Panel	Equipment energized	Complete
C-082	28/DGB/G-04 SWGR Rm	G-04 EDG Control Panel	Equipment energized	Complete

3. PEER REVIEW TEAM & PROCESS

The Point Beach (PBN) Peer Review Team consisted of individuals from PBN operations, civil engineering, licensing, and PRA as well as structural/seismic engineers from Stevenson & Associates. These individuals participated in phases of preparation, performance, and peer review of the seismic walkdowns. This section documents the peer review process and how the Peer Review Team interacted with the Seismic Walkdown Engineering Teams.

3.1 Peer Review Team

The affiliation, role, and qualifications for each Peer Review Team member are summarized in the following table.

Name	Group	Role *	Qualifications **
Rick Merkes	PBN Operations	SWEL co-preparer	(e)(f)
Douglas P. Brown	PBN Civil Engineering	Peer Review Team Leader SWE SWEL co-preparer	(b) (c) (g)
David N. Carter	Stevenson &Assoc. (consultant eng.)	SWE Team #1 Leader SWE PR	(b) (c) (g)
Nabil Juraydini	Stevenson & Assoc. (consultant eng.)	SWE Team #2 Leader SWE PR	(b) (c) (g)
Stanley E. Guokas	PBN PRA Group	PR Team PBN SWEL Preparer	(d)
Russ Severson	DAEC PRA Group	SWEL PR	(d)
T. K. Ram	Stevenson &Assoc. (consultant eng.)	SWEL PR	(d) (e)
Jeffery Buboltz	PBN Civil Engineering	SWE Team Member SWE PR	(b) (c) (g)
Scott Kahl		SWE Team Member SWE PR	(b) (c) (g)
Richard L. LaPlante	7	SWE Team Member SWE PR	(b) (c) (g)
Coreen A. McDonald	1	SWE Team Member SWE PR	(b) (c) (g)
Mark C. Nielsen		SWE Team Member SWE PR License Basis PR	(b) (c) (g)
Dave J. Nuttall		SWE Team Member SWE PR License Basis PR	(b) (c) (g)

Notes:

- (a) Completed EPRI NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Training
- (b) Seismic engineering experience
- (c) Degree in mechanical engineering or civil/structural engineering
- (d) Seismic PRA / IPEEE experience

Role: PR (peer review), SWEL (seismic walkdown equipment list), SWE (seismic walkdown engineer)

^{**} Qualifications:

- (e) Knowledge of plant operations, documentation
- (f) Plant Operations member
- (g) Completed SQUG Walkdown Screening and Seismic Evaluation Training Course

3.2 Peer Review Process

PR Team Lead

Doug Brown served as the Peer Review Team Lead. In that role, he was responsible for coordinating the peer review and assembling this report. As described below, he also performed some additional roles as part of the walkdown team and checklist PR. He also participated in the SWEL preparation, so he was not part of that PR process. That is, even though he was a SWEL copreparer, the SWEL was independently reviewed and he did not partake in any of the SWEL PR. Therefore, performing as the lead peer review is considered acceptable.

SWEL Preparation

The SWEL was prepared by S. Guokas, who is a PBN PRA engineer, with familiarity with the PBN IPEEE Report and the PBN PRA model. Additional input into the SWEL was provided by a plant staff structural/seismic engineer (D. P. Brown), and a Plant Operations representative (R. Merkes).

The SWEL was Peer Reviewed by a team that included a PRA engineer (R. Severson), and a Seismic PRA/IPEE engineer (T.K. Ram).

Seismic Walkdown

The primary selsmic walkdown was conducted with two teams, each with two qualified structural/seismic engineers. A contractor engineer severed as Team Leader of each team. The second team member was an available PBN SWE or the two contract engineers worked together as one team.

The Peer Review of the walkdowns consisted of a Peer Review Team Lead with Operations and PRA knowledge, and structural/seismic engineers. The structural/seismic engineers made up the SWE teams, but also served to peer review each other's work. The Peer Review Team Lead also participated in a few of the walkdowns for logistical support. The ultimate judgments regarding licensing basis were made by qualified Point Beach structural engineers.

- Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWE):
 - SWE Team #1 D. N. Carter (team lead),
 - SWE Team #2 N. Juraydini (team lead),
 - SWE Team member D. P. Brown
 - SWE Team member J. Buboltz