

Vito A. Kaminskas  
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Fax: 440-280-8029June 25, 2013  
L-13-194


10 CFR 73.71(a)(4)

ATTN: Document Control Desk  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, DC 20555-0001**SUBJECT:**Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1  
Docket No. 50-440, License No. NPF-58  
Security Licensee Event Report Submittal

Enclosed is Security Licensee Event Report (SLER) Supplement 2013-S02-01, "Security Weapon Left Unattended." This supplement is being submitted to update the cause analysis and corrective actions associated with this event. There are no regulatory commitments contained in this submittal.

If there are any questions or if additional information is required, please contact Mr. Thomas Veitch, Manager – Regulatory Compliance, at (440) 280-5188.

Sincerely,



Vito A Kaminskas

Enclosure:  
SLER 2013-S02-01cc: NRC Project Manager  
NRC Resident Inspector  
NRC Region III Regional Administrator  
Director, Division of Security Policy, Office of Nuclear Security and Incident ResponseJE74  
NRR

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)**  
(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hrs. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA/Privacy Section (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to infocollects.resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202 (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

<b>1. FACILITY NAME</b> Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1	<b>2. DOCKET NUMBER</b> 0500-0440	<b>3. PAGE</b> 1 OF 4
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**4. TITLE**  
Security Weapon Left Unattended

5. EVENT DATE			6. LER NUMBER			7. REPORT DATE			8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO.	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
03	02	2013	2013	S02	01	06	25	2013	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
										05000
										05000

<b>9. OPERATING MODE</b>  1	<b>11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §:</b> (Check all that apply)										
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2201(b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(3)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)							
<b>10. POWER LEVEL</b>  093	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2201(d)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)							
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(4)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)							
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)							
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(x)							
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 73.71(a)(4)							
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.46(a)(3)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(a)(5)							
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)	<input type="checkbox"/> OTHER								
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)	Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A								

**12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER**

FACILITY NAME Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Robert Swartz, Compliance Engineer, Regulatory Compliance	TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) (440) 280-7664
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**13. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT**

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX

<b>14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED</b>	<b>15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE</b>	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO			

**ABSTRACT** (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)

On March 2, 2013, at 2137 hours, with the plant in Mode 1 (i.e., Power Operation) at 93 percent power, a Perry Nuclear Power Plant (PNPP) Site Protection Section (SPS) officer left his weapon unattended in the fire brigade room, which is located in the protected area. The loss of positive control of assigned security equipment resulted in a noncompliance with the SPS weapons control program. The security equipment was discovered by another SPS officer at approximately 2156 hours. The security equipment was taken to the central alarm station. The security equipment was inspected and no tampering was detected. The security equipment was unattended for approximately 19 minutes.

The cause was determined to be less than adequate compliance with procedures that provide barriers and are designed to preclude human performance errors, such as an unattended weapon. Additionally, a contributing cause was determined to be ambiguous procedure content with respect to positive weapon control.

This report is submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 73.71(a)(4). This report does not contain safeguards or personally identifiable information.

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)  
CONTINUATION SHEET**

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**NARRATIVE**

**INTRODUCTION**

On March 2, 2013, at 2137 hours, a Perry Nuclear Power Plant (PNPP) Site Protection Section (SPS) officer failed to continuously have assigned security equipment in his possession for approximately 19 minutes. The loss of positive control of the assigned equipment resulted in a noncompliance with the SPS weapons control program.

Notification was made to the NRC Operations Center (i.e., ENS Number 48803) on March 3, at 0049 hours, in accordance with 10 CFR 73.71.

**EVENT DESCRIPTION**

A patrol response officer has additional security equipment necessary to perform their assigned duty. The additional security equipment consists of a weapon, ammunition bag, and response position badge. Each patrol response position has its own equipment. When SPS officers assume a mobile response position they receive its assigned equipment from the officer being relieved.

On March 2, 2013, prior to 2130 hours, officer A entered the fire brigade room and hung his security equipment on an equipment rack in close proximity to his location. At approximately 2130 hours, officer B entered the fire brigade room and asked officer A if he was his relief. Officer A responded "yes" based on his notes from the SPS shift staffing report. Officer B physically transferred his weapon to officer A. Officer A accepted the weapon and also took possession of the associated ammunition bag. Officers A and B subsequently exited the fire brigade room, leaving officer A's original weapon and ammunition unattended on the equipment rack.

At approximately 2156 hours, officer C entered the fire brigade room and discovered and took control of the unattended security equipment. Approximately 19 minutes had elapsed since officers A and B had left the fire brigade room. Officer C transported the security equipment to the central alarm station (CAS) and transferred control to the CAS officer at approximately 2158 hours. The security equipment was placed in a locker in the CAS. The CAS officer reported the incident to the SPS shift supervisor at approximately 2200 hours.

Officer D reported to the CAS at approximately 2202 hours and took possession of officer A's original security equipment. Officer D performed required inspections and no tampering with the weapon or ammunition was detected. Therefore, based on officer C discovering the weapon in the same location as officer A placed it, officer D not finding any evidence of tampering, and satisfactory performance of a field test later performed on the weapon, it was concluded that the weapon was not disturbed during the 19 minutes it was left unattended.

The SPS Manager was notified of the incident at approximately 2258 hours. After all available facts were assembled and reviewed for accuracy, the control room shift manager was notified at 2355 hours. The control room shift manager notified the NRC Operations Center of the event on March 3, at 0049 hours via ENF 48803.

**CAUSE OF EVENT**

The cause was determined to be less than adequate compliance with procedures that provide barriers and are designed to preclude human performance errors, such as an unattended weapon. Additionally, a contributing cause was determined to be ambiguous procedure content with respect to positive weapon control.

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)  
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**NARRATIVE**

**EVENT ANALYSIS**

A mobile patrol response officer has additional security equipment necessary to perform his assigned duty. Each patrol response position has its own equipment. When officers assume a mobile response position they receive its assigned equipment from the officer being relieved.

Response position officers are required by procedure to wear position badges. The use of position badges was established in 2009 as a human performance tool to ensure proper position turnover. Both officers A and B had their position badges stored in their ammunition bags. Had officers A and B been wearing the position badges, it would have been a visual reminder to both officers, and officer A would have realized he could not possess security equipment for two response positions.

Response position officers are required by procedure to perform a physical and verbal turnover of security equipment associated with the position. A formal transfer of weapon, ammunition bag, and position badges, along with verbal acknowledgement should have taken place. This formal turnover did not occur during this event.

This event was not considered risk significant and did not adversely affect the health and safety of the public. Due to redundant features and a defense-in-depth strategy of the PNPP Protective Strategy, the ability of the security force to respond to an emergency event and interdict and delay an adversarial force would not have been hindered. The security force capacity to defend the plant against the Design Basis Threat would not have been diminished, depleted, or eliminated due to the unattended equipment.

**CORRECTIVE ACTIONS**

Corrective actions included reinforcement of procedure compliance requirements and performance of observations specifically related to mobile position rotations and transfer of security equipment.

Additional corrective actions included revising SPS procedures to more clearly delineate equipment turnover requirements. Response position officers are now required to perform rotation at a fixed post. Response position badges were made more robust and wearing the badge was made mandatory.

Corrective actions have been taken for the individuals involved with this event in accordance with the FENOC Performance Management Process.

**PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS**

A review of Licensee Event Reports and the corrective action database for the past three years determined that no similar events had occurred.

**ADDITIONAL INFORMATION (Required by Regulatory Guide 5.62)**

This event did not have an impact on the operation of the unit.  
 PNPP utilizes a proprietary site protection force.  
 No Local, State, or Federal law enforcement agencies were contacted.  
 There was no press release for this event.

### LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) CONTINUATION SHEET

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**NARRATIVE**

**COMMITMENTS**

There are no regulatory commitments contained in this report. Actions described in this document represent intended or planned actions, are described for the NRC's information, and are not regulatory commitments.