

**Doerflein, Lawrence**

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**From:** Russell, Andrea  
**Sent:** Tuesday, May 29, 2012 5:33 AM  
**To:** Lee, Samson; Bickett, Brice; Doerflein, Lawrence; Jennerich, Matthew; Dennig, Robert; Ulses, Anthony; MorganButler, Kimyata; Fretz, Robert; (b)(7)(C) Eul, Ryan; Safford, Carrie; Monninger, John; McIntyre, David; Collins, Timothy; Scott, Catherine; Albert, Michelle; Cook, William; McCarver, Sammy  
**Cc:** Vaidya, Bhalchandra; Thadani, Mohan  
**Subject:** G20120172 (Fitzpatrick 2.206): PRB Internal Meeting Notes on Initial Recommendation 2nd meeting (TAC ME8189)  
**Attachments:** ME8189 (G20120172) PRB Notes (2nd Mtg) 5-29-12 clean version.docx

Good morning,

Please bring a copy of the attached notes with you to the meeting this afternoon.

Thanks,  
Andrea

**From:** Russell, Andrea  
**Sent:** Tuesday, May 22, 2012 9:04 AM  
**To:** Lee, Samson; Bickett, Brice; Doerflein, Lawrence; Jennerich, Matthew; Dennig, Robert; Ulses, Anthony; MorganButler, Kimyata; Fretz, Robert; (b)(7)(C) Eul, Ryan; Safford, Carrie; Monninger, John; McIntyre, David; Collins, Timothy; Scott, Catherine; Albert, Michelle; Cook, William; McCarver, Sammy  
**Cc:** Vaidya, Bhalchandra; Thadani, Mohan  
**Subject:** Action: Request for Review of G20120172 (Fitzpatrick 2.206): PRB Internal Meeting Notes on Initial Recommendation 2nd meeting (TAC ME8189)

Good morning,

On behalf of Bhalchandra, I am providing you with the revised PRB internal meeting notes on the initial recommendation, for your review. These meeting notes have been updated based on the conversation at the PRB meeting on May 17<sup>th</sup>. The changes are shown in tracked format.

We will consider revising the notes again based on our discussion at the next meeting, which is scheduled for May 29<sup>th</sup>. We will discuss the revised notes and the e-mails from Bhalchandra, John Monninger, and Mohan concerning what issues, relative to the petitioners' requests for FitzPatrick, are addressed in GL 89-16 (e.g., prevention and mitigation of severe accidents).

Please provide your comments to myself and Bhalchandra by COB Friday May 25<sup>th</sup>.

Thank you for your time,  
Andrea  
2.206 Coordinator

Andrea Russell  
Project Manager  
Nuclear Regulatory Commission

NRR/DPR/PGCB  
Ph: 301-415-8553

**PRB Closed Meeting Notes – 05/29/12**

**SUBJECT:** GUNTER ET AL. 2.206 REQUESTING ENFORCEMENT ACTION AGAINST JAMES A. FITZPATRICK PLANT (G20120172) (TAC ME8189)

**PETITIONER:** Paul Gunter, et al

**DATE:** March 9, 2012, the supplements dated March 13, and March 20, 2012, and Petitioners' Presentations to the PRB in the Public Meeting on April 17, 2012.

**PRB MEMBERS & ADVISORS**

Samson Lee	(PRB Chair – Deputy Director, NRR, Division of Risk Assessment)
Bhalchandra Vaidya	(Petition Manager – NRR, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing)
Anthony Ulses	(Branch Chief – NRR, Division of Safety Systems, Reactor Systems Branch)
Robert Dennig	(Branch Chief – NRR, Division of Safety Systems, Containment and Ventilation Branch)
Robert Fretz	(Senior Project Manager – NRR, Japan Lessons Learned Project Directorate, Projects Management Branch)
John Monninger	(Associate Director – NRR, Japan Lessons Learned Project Directorate)
Andrea Russell	(Agency 2.206 Coordinator – NRR, Division of Policy and Rulemaking)
Kim MorganButler	(Branch Chief(A) – NRR, Division of Policy and Rulemaking, Generic Communications Branch)
Brice Bickett	(Senior Project Manager – Region 1, Branch 2, Division of Reactor Projects)
Mathew Jennerich	(Project Engineer – Region 1, Branch 2, Division of Reactor Projects)
Lawrence Doerflein	(Branch Chief – Region 1, Branch 2, Division of Reactor Safety)
Carrie Safford	(Deputy Assistant General Counsel – Materials Litigation and Enforcement – Office of General Counsel)
Ryan Eul	(Enforcement Specialist – Office of Enforcement)
Catherine Scott	(Assistant General Counsel – Materials Litigation and Enforcement - Office of General Counsel)
Mauri Lemoncelli	(Senior Attorney – Materials Litigation and Enforcement - Office of General Counsel)

**SUMMARY OF REQUEST:**

On March 9, 2012, as supplemented March 13 and March 20, 2012, Mr. Paul Gunter, et. al., submitted a joint petition to the NRC, under Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations*, Part 2.206, regarding James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (FitzPatrick).

The joint petitioners request that the FitzPatrick operating license be immediately suspended as the result of the undue risk to the public health and safety presented by the operator's reliance on non-conservative and wrong assumptions that went into the analysis of the capability of FitzPatrick's ~~pre-existing ductwork~~ containment vent system. The joint petitioners state that the risks and uncertainty presented by FitzPatrick's assumptions and decisions, in regard to NRC Generic Letter 89-16, as associated with the day-to-day operations of this nuclear power plant now constitute an undue risk to public health and safety. The joint petitioners request that the suspension of the operating license be in effect pending final resolution of a public challenge to the adequacy of the pre-existing vent line in light of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident. The joint petitioners do not seek or request that FitzPatrick operators now install the Direct Torus Vent System (DTVS) as it is demonstrated to have experienced multiple failures to

*-petitioner words as factual/true*

*licensee's*

*R*

mitigate the severe nuclear accidents at Fukushima Daiichi.

The joint petitioners request that the NRC take action to suspend the FitzPatrick operating license immediately until the following emergency enforcement actions are enacted, completed, reviewed, and approved by the NRC and informed by independent scientific analysis:

- 1) Entergy Nuclear Operations' FitzPatrick nuclear power plant shall be subject to public hearings with full hearing rights on the continued operation of the Mark I BWR and the adequacy and capability of a pre-existing containment vent which is not a fully hardened vent line as recommended by NRC Generic Letter 89-16. As such, the FitzPatrick operator uniquely did not make containment modifications and did not install the DTVS, otherwise known as "the hardened vent," as requested by NRC Generic Letter 89-16 and as installed on every other GE Mark I in the US;
- 2) Entergy Nuclear Operations shall publicly document for independent review its post-Fukushima re-analyses for the reliability and capability of the FitzPatrick pre-existing containment vent system as previously identified as "an acceptable deviation" from NRC Generic Letter 89-16 which recommended the installation of the Direct Torus Vent System and as outlined in the NRC Safety Evaluation Report dated September 28, 1992. The publicly documented post-Fukushima analysis shall include the reassessment of all assumptions regarding the capability and reliability of the pre-existing containment venting and specifically address non-conservative assumptions regarding:
  - a) the FitzPatrick cost-benefit analysis used to justify not installing a fully hardened vent system and;
  - b) "unlikely ignition points" as claimed in the FitzPatrick pre-existing vent line system that would otherwise present increased risks and consequences associated with the detonation of hydrogen gas generated during a severe accident.

In the March 20, 2012, supplement to the petition, the joint petitioners state that the Temporary Instruction 2515/183 provides the NRC inspection results in the "Follow-up to the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Station Fuel Damage Event." The joint petitioners draw attention to what is described at page 8 of the enclosure as an *"apparent beyond design and licensing basis vulnerability"* involving the FitzPatrick operator's refusal to install the DTVS as recommended by NRC in Generic Letter 89-16.

To summarize the supplement, the joint petitioners state that:

- The Commission's March 12, 2012, Order states that "Current regulatory requirement and existing plant capabilities allow the NRC to conclude that a sequence of events such as the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident is unlikely to occur in the US. Therefore, continued operation and continued licensed activities do not pose an imminent threat to public health and safety." The Order further states, "While not required, hardened vents have been in place in U.S. plants with BWR Mark I containments for many years but a wide variance exist with regard to the reliability of the vents."
- The NRC inspection report identifies that FitzPatrick's "existing plant capabilities" and "current procedures do not address hydrogen considerations during primary containment venting" which is further identified as a "current licensing basis vulnerability." The joint petitioners further reiterate that the NRC inspection finding that FitzPatrick's "existing plant capabilities" as assumed by the Order are in fact negated by the finding that "FitzPatrick's current licensing basis did not require the plant to have a primary

containment torus air space hardened vent system as part of their Mark I containment improvement program."

- The Commission Order timeline setting December 31, 2016, for installing the reliable hardened vent does not address in a timely way the unique condition of FitzPatrick.
- FitzPatrick uniquely does not have a fully hardened vent system on the vulnerable Mark I containment. As a result, FitzPatrick's current capability is identified with "a beyond design and licensing bases vulnerability, in that FitzPatrick's current licensing basis did not require the plant to have a primary containment torus air space hardened vent system as part of their Mark I containment improvement program." Given that the FitzPatrick unit willfully refused to install the DTVS, the documented discovery of the "licensing basis vulnerability" of its chosen pre-existing vent now uniquely warrants the suspension of operations pending closer scrutiny, public hearings, and full disclosure for its adequacy and capability in the event of a severe accident. The additional identified "vulnerability" and the relatively remote and uncertain mitigation strategy places the public health and safety unduly and unacceptably at risk by the continued day-to-day operations where "current procedures do not address hydrogen considerations during primary containment venting" and will not for nearly five (5) more years.

#### BASIS FOR THE REQUEST:

As a basis for the request, the joint petitioners' state that in light of the multiple failures of the GE Mark I containment and hardened vent systems at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station in the days following the March 11, 2011, station black out event, the joint petitions seek the prompt and immediate suspension of the FitzPatrick operations because:

- The GE Mark I BWR pressure suppression containment system is identified as inherently unreliable and likely to fail during a severe accident.
- The capability of FitzPatrick's pre-existing containment vent as approved for severe accident mitigation is not a fully "hardened vent" system.
- The capability of FitzPatrick's pre-existing containment vent as approved relies upon non-conservative and faulty assumptions.
- The capability of FitzPatrick's pre-existing containment vent system uniquely allows for a severe nuclear accident to be released at ground level.
- The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear catastrophe dramatically and exponentially changes the FitzPatrick cost-benefit analyses.
- The continued day-to-day reliance upon the significantly flawed pre-existing containment vent system as would be relied upon to mitigate a severe accident at the FitzPatrick Mark I reactor presents an undue risk to the public health and safety.
- The identified containment vulnerability, the non-conservative if not false assumption of "no likely ignition sources" in the pre-existing vent line and the unacceptable consequences of failure of the FitzPatrick pre-existing containment vent place both greater uncertainty and undue risk on public health and safety and are not reasonably justified by arbitrarily assigning a low probability of the occurrence of a severe accident.

#### IS THERE A NEED FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION: (If Yes, describe)

**NO.**

In its internal meeting on March 20, 2012, the PRB found that there is no immediate safety concern to FitzPatrick, or to the health and safety of the public and therefore, denied the request for emergency enforcement action based on the following considerations:

1. The Near-Term Task Force (NTTF), established by the NRC in response to the Fukushima

Daiichi nuclear event, concludes in its report dated July 12, 2011, that continued nuclear reactor operation and licensing activities do not pose an imminent risk to the public health and safety and are not inimical to the common defense because of the low likelihood of an event beyond the design basis at a U.S. nuclear power plant and the current mitigation capabilities at those facilities; and,

2. On March 12, 2012, the NRC ordered licensees of BWR facilities with Mark I and Mark II containments to have reliable hardened containment vents (EA-12-050). This order was based on the Commission's direction provided by the Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM) to SECY-12-0025, dated March 9, 2012. The order stated that:

Current regulatory requirements and existing plant capabilities allow the NRC to conclude that a sequence of events such as the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident is unlikely to occur in the U.S. Therefore, continued operation and continued licensing activities do not pose an imminent threat to public health and safety. However, the importance of reliable operation of hardened vents during emergency conditions was already well established and this understanding has been reinforced by the clear lessons of Fukushima. While not required, hardened vents have been in place in U.S. plants with BWR Mark I containments for many years but a wide variance exists with regard to the reliability of the vents. Additionally, hardened vents are not required on plants with BWR Mark II containments although as discussed above, Mark II containments are only slightly larger than Mark I. Reliable hardened venting systems in BWR facilities with Mark I and Mark II containments are needed to ensure that adequate protection of public health and safety is maintained.

The NRC staff was aware of the conclusions presented in its Safety Evaluation (SE) dated September 28, 1992, for Fitzpatrick with respect to GL 89-16, and considered this information in its overall assessment on whether or not BWR facilities with Mark I and Mark II containments were safe to operate following the events at Fukushima. In addition, the NRC staff was cognizant of and reviewed the results of inspections performed under TI 183 at FitzPatrick (Report dated May 13, 2011, ADAMS Accession No. ML111330455) following the events at Fukushima. The regional staff has communicated with NTF regarding the Vent system configuration at FitzPatrick, including the differences from GL 89-16 recommendations (Larry Doerflein e-mail). The petition for emergency enforcement action provided no new additional information relating to the existing containment venting capability of the Fitzpatrick plant.

#### DOES IT MEET CRITERIA FOR REVIEW?

##### Criteria for Reviewing Petitions Under 10 CFR 2.206:

1. The petition contains a request for enforcement-related action such as issuing an order modifying, suspending, or revoking a license, issuing a notice of violation, with or without a proposed civil penalty.

**YES.**

2. The facts that constitute the bases for taking the particular action are specified. The petitioner must provide some element of support beyond the bare essentials. The supporting facts must be credible and sufficient to warrant further inquiry.

**YES.**

3. There is no NRC proceeding available in which the petitioner is or could be party and through which the petitioner's concerns could be addressed.

3/12/12 Fitz. Order provided licensing  
4  
opportunity

**YES.**

Criteria for Rejecting Petitions Under 10 CFR 2.206:

1. The incoming correspondence does not ask for an enforcement-related action or fails to provide sufficient facts to support the petition, but simply alleges wrongdoing, violations of NRC regulations, or existence of safety concerns.

**YES, in part.**

2. The petitioner raises issues that have already been the subject of NRC staff review and evaluation either on that facility, other similar facilities, or on a generic basis, for which a resolution has been achieved, the issues have been resolved, and the resolution is applicable to the facility in question.

**YES, in part.**

On March 12, 2012, the NRC ordered licensees of BWR facilities with Mark I and Mark II containments to have reliable hardened containment vents (EA-12-050). This order was based on the Commission's direction provided by the Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM) to SECY-12-0025, dated March 9, 2012.

Accept on the basis of NTF Recommendation 5.1 and Recommendation 6.

Recommendation 5.1 orders licensees to include a reliable hardened vent in BWR Mark I and Mark II containments. This order included performance objectives for the design of hardened vents to ensure reliable operation and ease of use (both opening and closing) during a prolonged SBO. Recommendation 6 recommends, as part of a long-term review, that the NRC identify insights from hydrogen control and mitigation inside containment from other utilities as additional information to be added through further SWP at the Fukushima Daiichi site.

FitzPatrick's response to the GL 89-16 was also reviewed and approved by the NRC in September 1992, including the staff review of the licensee's processes and procedures, and inspections. The NRC staff evaluation stated, while approving FitzPatrick's positions with regard to GL-89-16, that FitzPatrick's containment vent system met the design bases and the design intent of GL 89-16.

With respect to Fukushima accident, the NTF evaluation and the subsequent Commission Order have concluded that a sequence of events such as the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident is unlikely to occur in the U.S. Therefore, continued operation and continued licensing activities do not pose an imminent threat to public health and safety.

3. The request is to deny a license application or amendment. **NO.**
4. The request addresses deficiencies within existing NRC rules. **NO.**

**IS THERE A NEED FOR OE, OI, OIG, or OGC INVOLVEMENT:**

The petition does not contain any allegations of licensee or NRC staff wrongdoing. However, the PRB includes representatives from OE and OGC.

**RECOMMENDED APPROACH AND SCHEDULE (Next Steps):**

**Accept in part (see Table for explanation).**

The next steps would be to:

- Ensure management agrees with the PRB initial recommendation.
- Inform the petitioners of the PRB's initial recommendation.
- Provide the second opportunity for the petitioners to address the PRB, and make the arrangements for an acceptable date and time.



Table (This table summarizes each issue for the following criteria).

Issue No.	Specific Issue Raised	Does this meet criteria for review under 2.206 process?	Recommendation
1	<p style="text-align: center;"><i>should</i></p> <p>FitzPatrick operating license be immediately suspended as the result of the undue risk to the public health and safety presented by <u>the operator's reliance on non-conservative and wrong assumptions that went into the analysis of the capability of FitzPatrick's pre-existing ductwork containment vent system</u>. The risks and uncertainty presented by FitzPatrick's assumptions and decisions, in regard to NRC Generic Letter 89-16, as associated with the day-to-day operations of this nuclear power plant now constitute an undue risk to public health and safety.</p>	<p>No.</p> <p><i>NTTF</i> <i>5/25/12</i> <i>SEW</i> <i>Inspection</i></p>	<p>The NTTF and JLD in the Commission Order have concluded that there is no immediate safety concern to FitzPatrick, or to the health and safety of the public, and therefore, the request for immediate action should be rejected. The Petitioners have not provided adequate basis for their argument regarding <u>the operator's reliance on non-conservative and wrong assumptions that went into the analysis of the capability of FitzPatrick's pre-existing ductwork containment vent system</u></p> <p>The petitioner's concerns regarding this issue do not require immediate shutdown of FitzPatrick based on the conclusions reached by NTTF and the Commission Order regarding Reliable Hardened Vent for the US GE Mark I BWRs.</p> <p>U. S. plants have implemented "beyond-design-basis" requirements such as ATWS, SBO, combustible gas control, aircraft impact assessment, mitigation of major fires or explosions, and extensive damage mitigation guidelines, thereby reducing the likelihood of core damage and radiological releases. <u>A sequence of events like those occurring in the Fukushima accident is unlikely to occur at US GE Mark I BWRs.</u></p> <p>The NRC NTTF report on July 12, 2011, based on review of insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi</p>

Issue No.	Specific Issue Raised	Does this meet criteria for review under 2.206 process?	Recommendation
			accident, made a recommendation to the Commission to include a reliable hardened vent system.
2	The suspension of the operating license be in effect pending final resolution of a public challenge to the adequacy of the pre-existing vent line in light of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident.	No.	This is merely a statement to support the petition in general. This is not an enforcement related action and is outside the scope of the 2.206 process and therefore, this request should be <u>rejected, pursuant to Criterion 1 for rejecting a petition under 10 CFR 2.206.</u>
3	The joint petitioners do not seek or request that FitzPatrick operators now install the Direct Torus Vent System (DTVS) Recommended by GL89-16, as it is demonstrated to have experienced multiple failures to mitigate the severe nuclear accidents at Fukushima Daiichi.	No.	This is merely a statement to support the petition in general. This is not an enforcement related action and is outside the scope of the 2.206 process and therefore, this request should be <u>rejected, pursuant to Criterion 1 for rejecting a petition under 10 CFR 2.206.</u>
4	FitzPatrick be subject to public hearings with full hearing rights on the continued operation of the Mark I BWR and the adequacy and capability of a pre-existing containment vent which is not a fully hardened vent line as recommended by NRC Generic Letter 89-16. As such, the FitzPatrick operator uniquely did not make containment modifications and did not install the DTVS, otherwise known as "the hardened vent," as requested by NRC Generic Letter 89-16 and as installed on every other GE Mark I in the US;	No.	The petitioner raises issues that have already been the subject of NRC staff review and evaluation either on that facility, other similar facilities, or on a generic basis, for which a resolution has been achieved, the issues have been resolved, and the resolution is applicable to the facility in question. The SE dated September 28, 1992 shows that FitzPatrick met the BWROG criteria recommended by GL 89-16. Therefore, this issue should be <u>rejected, pursuant to Criterion 2 for rejecting a petition under 10 CFR 2.206.</u>
5	FitzPatrick shall publicly document for independent review its post-Fukushima re-analyses for the reliability and capability of the FitzPatrick pre-existing containment vent system as previously		The licensee's response to the Order will be publicly available. Subsequent NRC documentation regarding additional efforts i.e., hydrogen control, would also be publicly available.



Issue No.	Specific Issue Raised	Does this meet criteria for review under 2.206 process?	Recommendation
	b) "unlikely ignition points" as claimed in the FitzPatrick pre-existing vent line system that would otherwise present increased risks and consequences associated with the detonation of hydrogen gas generated during a severe accident.		Recommendation 7.1 Order includes reliable hardened venting (W/R Mark and Mark) containment. This order includes performance objectives for the design of hardened vents to ensure reliable operability and ease of use (both opening and closing) during an event. 8.10 Recommendation 6.1 requires, as part of the ongoing review, that the licensee investigate additional containment or other buildings as additional information is revealed through other study of the Fukushima Daiichi accident.
6	The Temporary Instruction 2515/183 provides the NRC inspection results in the "Follow-up to the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Station Fuel Damage Event." The joint petitioners draw attention to what is described at page 8 of the inspection report as an "apparent beyond design and licensing basis vulnerability" involving the FitzPatrick operator's refusal to install the DTVS as recommended by NRC in Generic Letter 89-16.	No.	The petitioner raises issues that have already been the subject of NRC staff review and evaluation either on that facility, other similar facilities, or on a generic basis, for which a resolution has been achieved, the issues have been resolved, and the resolution is applicable to the facility in question. The Order on hardened containment vents (EA-12-050) has a timeline of December 31, 2016, for installing the reliable hardened containment vent. Therefore, this issue should be rejected, pursuant to Criterion 2 for rejecting a petition under 10 CFR 2.206.
7	The NRC inspection report [per TI-2515/183] identifies that FitzPatrick's "existing plant capabilities" and "current procedures do not address hydrogen considerations during primary containment venting" which is further identified as a "current licensing basis vulnerability." The joint petitioners	Yes.	Accept on the basis of NTF Recommendation 5.1 and Recommendation 6. Recommendation 5.1 Order includes reliable hardened venting (W/R Mark and Mark) containment. This order includes performance objectives for the design of hardened vents to

Issue No.	Specific Issue Raised	Does this meet criteria for review under 2.206 process?	Recommendation
	further reiterate that the NRC inspection finding that FitzPatrick's "existing plant capabilities" as assumed by the Order are in fact negated by the finding that "FitzPatrick's current licensing basis did not require the plant to have a primary containment torus air space hardened vent system as part of their Mark I containment improvement program."		<p>Ensure reliable operation and safe use (both operation and licensing) of all licensed SBWRs. Recommendation 3 recommends that the NRC identify issues about hydrogen control and other issues inside containment for other units as additional information is revealed through the study of the Fukushima Daiichi accident.</p>
8	The Commission Order timeline setting December 31, 2016, for installing the hardened vent Order does not address, in a timely way, the unique condition of the FitzPatrick nuclear power plant.	No.	<p>The petitioner raises issues that have already been the subject of NRC staff review and evaluation either on that facility, other similar facilities, or on a generic basis, for which a resolution has been achieved, the issues have been resolved, and the resolution is applicable to the facility in question. The SE dated September 28, 1992 shows that FitzPatrick met the BWROG criteria recommended by GL 89-16. Therefore, this issue should be <u>rejected, pursuant to Criterion 2 for rejecting a petition under 10 CFR 2.206.</u></p>
9	The FitzPatrick nuclear power plant uniquely does not have a fully hardened vent system on the vulnerable Mark I containment. As a result, FitzPatrick's current capability is identified with " <u>a beyond design and licensing bases vulnerability</u> , in that FitzPatrick's current licensing basis did not require the plant to have a primary containment torus air space hardened vent system as part of their Mark I containment improvement program."	No.	<p>The petitioner raises issues that have already been the subject of NRC staff review and evaluation either on that facility, other similar facilities, or on a generic basis, for which a resolution has been achieved, the issues have been resolved, and the resolution is applicable to the facility in question. The SE dated September 28, 1992 shows that FitzPatrick met the BWROG criteria recommended by GL 89-16. Therefore, this issue should be <u>rejected, pursuant to Criterion 2 for rejecting a petition under 10 CFR 2.206.</u></p>

Issue No.	Specific Issue Raised	Does this meet criteria for review under 2.206 process?	Recommendation
10	Given that the FitzPatrick unit willfully refused to install the DTVS, the documented discovery of the "licensing basis vulnerability" of its chosen pre-existing vent now uniquely warrants the suspension of operations pending closer scrutiny, public hearings, and full disclosure for its adequacy and capability in the event of a severe accident.	No.	<p>On 09/10/96, the licensee advised that it was still not able to determine the adequacy of the Mark I containment system. The licensee advised that it had determined that the NRC staff had requested the licensee to provide additional information regarding the adequacy of the containment system. The licensee advised that it was unable to provide the information requested by the NRC staff. The licensee advised that it was unable to provide the information requested by the NRC staff because it was unable to determine the adequacy of the containment system. The licensee advised that it was unable to provide the information requested by the NRC staff because it was unable to determine the adequacy of the containment system.</p> <p>In response to the NRC staff's request, the licensee advised that it was unable to provide the information requested by the NRC staff. The licensee advised that it was unable to provide the information requested by the NRC staff because it was unable to determine the adequacy of the containment system. The licensee advised that it was unable to provide the information requested by the NRC staff because it was unable to determine the adequacy of the containment system.</p> <p>By letter dated January 21, 1997, the NRC staff approved the licensee's request dated July 2, 1996, to prepare the results of its IPE program. The licensee advised that it was unable to provide the information requested by the NRC staff because it was unable to determine the adequacy of the containment system.</p>

Issue No.	Specific Issue Raised	Does this meet criteria for review under 2.206 process?	Recommendation
			<p>hardened vehicles qualified by NRC and provided by the manufacturer. The NRC staff has reviewed the information provided by the manufacturer regarding implementation of the hardened vehicle design and use of the hardened vehicle procedures and determined that the design and use of the hardened vehicle program and the status of investigations and accident management strategies associated with severe accidents.</p> <p>By letter dated September 28, 1992, the NRC staff reviewed the information provided by the manufacturer and the results of the NRC inspection of the hardened vehicle design and use of the hardened vehicle procedures and determined that the design and use of the hardened vehicle design and use of the hardened vehicle procedures and the status of investigations and accident management strategies associated with severe accidents.</p> <p>Furthermore, the NRC staff noted that the plant procedures and training are adequate to provide information and guidance necessary for design and status of the hardened vehicle design and use of the hardened vehicle procedures. Therefore, the NRC staff concluded that the existing vehicle design and use of the hardened vehicle procedures are adequate. Temporary Instruction 2515/183. "beyond design and licensing basis vulnerability [for beyond design basis accidents]" was not a consideration during GL 89-16 inspections.</p> <p>The petitioner raises issues that have already been the subject of NRC staff review and evaluation either on that facility, other similar facilities, or on a generic</p>

Issue No.	Specific Issue Raised	Does this meet criteria for review under 2.206 process?	Recommendation
			<p>basis, for which a resolution has been achieved, the issues have been resolved, and the resolution is applicable to the facility in question. The SE dated September 28, 1992 shows that FitzPatrick met the BWROG criteria recommended by GL 89-16. Therefore, this issue should be <u>rejected, pursuant to Criterion 2 for rejecting a petition under 10 CFR 2.206.</u></p>
11	<p>The additional identified "vulnerability" and the <u>relatively remote and uncertain mitigation strategy places the public health and safety unduly and unacceptably at risk by the continued day-to-day operations where "current procedures do not address hydrogen considerations during primary containment venting" and will not for nearly five (5) more years.</u></p>	Yes.	<p>Accept on the basis of NTTF Recommendation 5.1 and Recommendation 6.</p> <p>Recommendation 5.1 requires licensee to include a reliable hardened barrier (HBB) and secondary containment. This order includes performance objectives for the design of the HBB to ensure reliable operation and ease of use both during and outside of a prolonged SBO. Recommendation 6.1 requires, as part of the order, to review the HBB design and its ability to contain hydrogen gas and maintain inside containment of the HBB. As additional information is revealed through further study of the Fukushima Daiichi accident,</p>



**SUMMARY:**

- (1) The petition and the supplements do not include any new or additional information or facts that were not known to the NRC staff with respect to FitzPatrick's Containment Vent System.
- (2) FitzPatrick response to the GL 89-16 was also reviewed and approved by the NRC in September 1992, including the staff review of the licensee's processes and procedures, and inspections. The NRC staff evaluation stated, while approving FitzPatrick's positions with regard to GL-89-16, that FitzPatrick's containment vent system met the design bases and the design intent of GL 89-16.
- (3) Recommendation 6 orders licensees to implement a hardened vent design for Mark I and Mark II containment. This order included performance objectives for the design of hardened vents to ensure reliable operation and safe release to the outside and closing during a period of SBO. Recommendation 6 also includes a portion of the staff's review that the NRC identifies signs about hydrogen gas release from side containment in other buildings as additional information is revealed through further study of the Fukushima Daiichi accident.
- (4) After the issuance of the Facility Operating License, the NRC has conducted its regular and necessary inspections and assessments of the licensee's performance. The Commission has not found it necessary to issue any generic communications, based on the industry operating experience, or the plant specific communications, based on the licensee's performance, to require any changes to the design and operating requirements of the Containment Vent System. The plant continues to meet all the requirements with respect to the regulations and the licensing bases, including those with respect to the design basis accidents and natural phenomena. Fukushima events have been characterized as "Beyond Design Basis Accidents." The design and operating requirements for "Beyond Design Basis Accidents" for Containment Vent System are being addressed through the Commission-Issued Order.