



FEMA

March 29, 2013

Victor M. McCree, Regional Administrator - RII
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
One Marquis Tower
245 Peachtree Center Avenue, Suite 1200
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. McCree:

Enclosed is a copy of the final exercise report for the November 14, 2012, partial participation exercise of the offsite radiological emergency response plans site-specific to the Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant. This report addresses the evaluation of the plans and preparedness for the State of Florida and Citrus and Levy Counties.

In the event of an incident at the Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant, the State of Florida and Citrus and Levy Counties will send decision makers to Progress Energy's Emergency Operations Facility to coordinate their responses. This unique arrangement allows for the rapid exchange of information with the utility and prompt decision making by State and local officials.

Citrus and Levy Counties have dedicated staffs, both paid and volunteer, who demonstrated their commitment to the residents of their counties by participating both in-sequence and out-of-sequence activities during this exercise. It is notable that the State and both counties used the opportunity of this exercise to demonstrate enhanced capabilities. This report was prepared by the FEMA Region IV REP staff.

This successful exercise demonstrated the State and counties commitment to public health and safety. The Evaluation Team did not identify any Areas Requiring Corrective Action or Deficiencies during the exercise.


Based on the results of the November 14, 2012, exercise, and our review of Florida's 2011 and 2012 Annual Letter of Certification, the offsite radiological emergency response plans and preparedness for the State of Florida and the affected local jurisdictions site-specific to the Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant can be implemented and are adequate to provide a reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can be taken offsite to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological

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emergency at the site. The Title 44-CFR, Part 350, approval of the offsite radiological emergency response plans and preparedness for the State of Florida offsite radiological emergency response plans and preparedness site-specific to the Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant, granted on March 15, 1984, will remain in effect.

Should you have questions, please contact Conrad Burnside at the Atlanta Regional Office at 770/220-5486.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'P. May', written over the word 'Sincerely,'.


Major P. May
Regional Administrator

Enclosure

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CRYSTAL RIVER NUCLEAR POWER PLANT 10-MILE
EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONE



Revision 10/02

Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant After Action Report/ Improvement Plan

Exercise Date - November 14, 2012


Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program



FEMA

Published March 29, 2013

CRYSTAL RIVER NUCLEAR POWER PLANT 10-MILE
EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONE



Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant After Action Report/ Improvement Plan

Exercise Date - November 14, 2012

Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program



FEMA

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Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan

Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant

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Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant After Action Report/Improvement Plan

Published March 29, 2013

Contents

Executive Summary	3
Section 1: Exercise Overview	5
1.1 Exercise Details	5
1.2 Exercise Planning Team Leadership	5
1.3 Participating Organizations	6
Section 2: Exercise Design Summary	8
2.1 Exercise Purpose and Design	8
2.2 Exercise Objectives, Capabilities and Activities	9
2.3 Scenario Summary	10
Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities	13
3.1 Exercise Evaluation and Results	13
3.2 Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation	13
3.3 Criteria Evaluation Summaries	16
3.3.1 Florida Jurisdictions	16
3.3.1.1 State of Florida	16
3.3.1.2 Crystal River Emergency News Center	18
3.3.1.3 Citrus County	20
3.3.1.4 Levy County	24
Section 4: Conclusion	28
Appendix A: Exercise Timeline	29
Appendix B: Exercise Evaluators and Team Leaders	30
Appendix C: Extent of Play Agreement	31

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On November 14, 2012, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Region IV Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REPP) staff evaluated a plume exposure pathway exercise in the emergency planning zone (EPZ) for the Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant (CRNPP). The evaluations of out of sequence (OOS) exercises conducted throughout the month of October, 2012 are included in this report. The OOS activities included: protective actions for schools; emergency worker and equipment monitoring and decontamination; inspection of radiation monitoring equipment, personal dosimetry, on hand supplies of Potassium Iodide and training records. CRNPP operated by Duke Energy is located along the Gulf of Mexico, eight miles north of the community of Crystal River, Florida. The ten mile EPZ is divided into three zones and affects the risk Counties of Citrus and Levy.

FEMA's overall objective of the exercise was to assess the level of State and local preparedness in responding to a radiological emergency at CRNPP. This exercise was conducted in accordance with FEMA's policies and guidance concerning the exercise of State and local radiological emergency response plans and procedures. The evaluation team conducted this exercise using Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) methodologies. The previous federally evaluated exercise at this site was conducted on October 6, 2010. The qualifying emergency preparedness exercise for CRNPP was conducted March 10 and 11, 1982.

Officials and representatives from the State of Florida, Citrus and Levy Counties, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), FEMA, CRNPP as well as numerous volunteers participated in the exercises. Evident through the entire exercise were the elements of cooperation and teamwork, which are paramount for an exercise of this complexity to be completed successfully.

FEMA wishes to acknowledge the efforts and hard work of the many individuals whose contributions resulted in the successful conclusion of this exercise. Leadership from the State of Florida should be commended for their decision to participate more fully in the exercise than previously. Their participation provided more realism during the exercise and created the opportunity for local leadership to work with the entire incident management team that would be assembled for an actual event.

The staffs of the State and local counties emergency operation centers, emergency workers, elected officials, and volunteers each contributed immensely to the success of the response effort. They were all knowledgeable of their emergency response plans and procedures. They implemented their plans and procedures in an efficient and professional manner. The leadership maintained staff situational awareness through frequent briefings, provided competent guidance, and projected confidence and trust to their staffs.

There were no areas requiring corrective action or deficiencies identified during this exercise.

SECTION 1: EXERCISE OVERVIEW

1.1 Exercise Details

Exercise Name

Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant

Type of Exercise

Plume

Exercise Date

November 14, 2012

Program

Department of Homeland Security/FEMA Radiological Emergency Preparedness
Program

Scenario Type

Radiological Emergency

1.2 Exercise Planning Team Leadership

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1.3 Participating Organizations

Agencies and organizations of the following jurisdictions participated in the Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant exercise:

State Jurisdictions

- State of Florida, Division of Emergency Management, State Management Team
- State of Florida, Department of Health, Bureau of Radiation Control
- State of Florida, Department of Highway Safety, Division of Highway Patrol
- State of Florida, Fish and Wildlife Conservation

Risk Jurisdictions

- Citrus County Board of Commissioners

Citrus County Sheriff's Office
Citrus County Sheriff's Office, Emergency Management
Citrus County Fire Services
Citrus County Health Department
Citrus County Children and Family Services
Citrus County School Board
Citrus County Public Works
Citrus County Transportation Department
Citrus County Extension Service
Citrus County Animal Services
City of Crystal River
City of Inverness
Levy County Administrator
Levy County Sheriff's Office
Levy County Emergency Management
Levy County Public Safety Fire Rescue
Levy County Department of Health Services
Levy County School Board
Levy County Transportation Department
Levy County Road Department
Support Jurisdictions
Hernando County Fire Rescue
Private Organizations
American Red Cross (ARC)
The Salvation Army
Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Services (RACES)
Community Emergency Response Team (CERT) Citrus
Community Emergency Response Team (CERT) Levy
Nature Coast Emergency Medical Services
Federal Jurisdictions
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

SECTION 2: EXERCISE DESIGN SUMMARY

2.1 Exercise Purpose and Design

Department of Homeland Security (DHS)/ Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) administers the Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program pursuant to the regulations found in Title 44 Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) parts 350, 351 and 352. 44 CFR 350 codifies 16 planning standards that form the basis for radiological emergency response planning for State, tribal and local governments, and the licensee impacted by the emergency planning zones (EPZs) established for each nuclear power plant site in the United States. 44 CFR 350 sets forth the mechanisms for the formal review and approval of State, Tribal and local government radiological emergency response plans (RERPs) and procedures by DHS/FEMA. One of the REP program cornerstones established by these regulations is the biennial exercise of offsite response capabilities. During these exercises affected State, Tribal and local governments demonstrate their abilities to implement their plans and procedures to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency at the nuclear plant.

The results of this exercise together with review of the RERPs and procedures and verification of the periodic requirements set forth in NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1 through the Annual Letter of Certification and staff assistance visit enables FEMA to provide a statement with the transmission of this final After Action Report (AAR) to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) that the affected State, Tribal and local plans and preparedness are (1) adequate to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of the nuclear power facility by providing reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken offsite in the event of a radiological emergency; and (2) capable of being implemented.

Formal submission of the RERPs for the Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant (CRNPP) to FEMA by the State of Florida and local jurisdictions occurred on August 26, 1983. Formal approval of the Florida RERPs was granted by FEMA on February 14, 1984, under 44 CFR 350.

A REP exercise was evaluated on November 14, 2012, and included evaluations of the out-of-sequence activities held during the month of October 2012.

2.2 Exercise Objectives, Capabilities and Activities

Capability based planning allows for exercise planning teams to develop exercise objectives and observe exercise outcomes through a framework of specific action items. Using the Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Program (HSEEP) methodology, the exercise objectives, which meet the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP) requirements and encompass the REP programs emergency preparedness evaluation areas, elements and sub-elements were derived and negotiated with the State of Florida, and the Counties of Citrus and Levy. These objectives and associated capabilities are as follows:

Objective 1: Demonstrate the ability to provide Emergency Operations Center management including Direction and Control through the Counties' and State Emergency Operations Centers.

Capability- Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Management

Objective 2: Demonstrate the ability to provide protective action decision-making for State and County emergency workers and public through exercise play and discussions of plans and procedures.

Capability- EOC Management and Emergency Public Information and Warning

Objective 3: Demonstrate the ability to physically implement protective actions for State and County emergency workers and public through exercise demonstration.

Capability- EOC Management, Emergency Public Safety and Security Response, Citizens Evacuation and Shelter in Place, Hazardous Material Response and Decontamination

Objective 4: Demonstrate the ability to activate the Prompt Alert and Notification System (PNS) utilizing the PNS/EAS System through exercise play.

Capability- Emergency Public Information and Warning

Objective 5: Demonstrate the effectiveness of plans, policies and procedures in the Emergency News Center (ENC) for public and private sector emergency information communications.

Capability- Emergency Public Information and Warning

2.3 Scenario Summary

0700 INITIAL CONDITIONS: The plant is operating at 100% power. EFP-1 is tagged out for breaker maintenance and should be available next shift for post maintenance testing. MUP-1A is tagged out to replace a damaged fuse block in its breaker cabinet and should be available next shift for post maintenance testing. ARP-1B is tagged out for motor replacement and is scheduled to be completed in 48 hours. RCS routine sampling is in progress. DFT-4 is on recirc with DFP-4, sample is due at 1500.

0730 EVENT 1: ALARMS INDICATE FIRE IN EFP-3 BLDG (T = 00:00): EFP-3's fuel oil tank has been on recirc with DFP-4. A piping connection downstream of DFP-4 has failed and DFP-4 has been pumping fuel oil into the EFP-3 building sump for several hours. DFP-4 overheats and provides the ignition source for the fuel oil fire. Operators in the control room receive the following alarms over 3 minutes: EFP-3 sump level high, DFT-4 level low, EFP-3 Engine room Temperature high, EFP-3 out of service, EFP-3 Bldg Fire Service Panel Alarms

0733 FIRE IN EFP-3 BUILDING IS CONFIRMED BY VALID ALARM, SECURITY OFFICER, AND OPERATOR: A Security Officer reports a large quantity of smoke is coming out of the north side of EFP-3 Bldg. Operator sent to assess conditions confirms EFP-3 building is on fire. AP-880 is entered and the Fire Brigade is mustered.

0748 UNUSUAL EVENT (T = 00:18): An Unusual Event is declared based on EAL 2.14, FIRE in or threatening EFP-3 Bldg and fire not extinguished within 15 minutes from notification or receipt of a VALID fire alarm in the control room. (Note The 15-minute time period begins with the time when a credible notification that a fire is occurring or the time a VALID fire detection system alarm is received). Crew will send out a standby message to the ERO and may elect a discretionary staffing of the ERFs.

0800 FIRE IS OUT (T = 00:30): The Fire Brigade extinguishes the fire. Restoration from fire begins.

0815 EVENT 2: 160 GPM TUBE LEAK/MUP-1C BKR FAILS (T=00:45): After the Unusual Event is reported or at Controller discretion, a 160 gpm Tube Leak occurs on the "B" OTSG. A

plant shutdown is initiated per EOP-06. MUP-1C Bkr will fail open when selected to start.

0830 ALERT (T = 01:00): An Alert is declared based on the Fission Product Barrier Matrix(FPBM) 6.2, OTSG tube leak requiring one or more injection valves. Technical Support Center and Operational Support Center staffing is initiated and (simulated) in-shop accountability begins. EOF and ENC staffing is also initiated if not already performed.

0845 REACTOR IS SHUTDOWN (T = 01:15): The crew performs a controlled plant shutdown per EOP-06 (approx 30 minutes from start of plant S/D)

0910 TSC LIKELY OPERATIONAL (T = 01:40): The TSC will most likely be operational by this time (required 60 minutes from the Alert declaration). (EOF may also be operational per EOFD discretion). (EOF operation is required 60 minutes from SAE)
RERP-2012-EE01 Rev. 00 2-4

0915 EMERGENCY REPAIR TEAM REPAIRS MUP-1C (T = 01:45): Efforts to repair MUP-1C Bkr are successful.

0930 EVENT 3: LOSS OF VACUUM, ADV-25 FAILS CLOSED (T = 02:00): After the 1ST Dose assessment is performed, a loss of Vacuum occurs.

0930 TSC MUST BE OPERATIONAL (T = 02:00): The TSC is required to be operational by this time (or 60 minutes from the ALERT). TSC will likely already be in operation.

0935 OTSG TUBE LEAK STEAMS TO ATMOSPHERE (T = 02:05) Approximately 5 minutes after the vacuum leak begins, steaming to the condenser is stopped. The crew must steam to atmosphere using ADVs to continue with plant cool down and depressurization. MSV-25 (ADV on good OTSG) will not open requiring the crew to continue the cooldown with MSV-26 (ADV on the OTSG with the tube leak).

0950 SITE AREA EMERGENCY (T = 02:20): A Site Area Emergency is declared based on the combination of FPBM 6.2, OTSG tube leak requiring one or more injection valves AND FPBM 7.1, an OTSG has > 10 gpm tube rupture with prolonged steaming to the atmosphere from the affected OTSG.

1000 EMERGENCY REPAIR TEAM RETURNS EFP-1 TO SERVICE (T = 02:30): Efforts to return EFP-1 to service are successful.

1005 EVENT 4: RCP-1A IMPELLER FAILURE EJECTS LOOSE PART (T = 02:35): RCP-1A impeller fails resulting in Loose Parts entering the core. RCP-1A will be shut down due to high vibrations.

1015 EVENT 4: RCP-1A IMPELLER FAILURE EJECTS LOOSE PART WHICH DAMAGES FUEL CLADDING (T = 02:45) The Loose Parts entering the core and damaging the cladding on several fuel pins (approx 2%). Sample room detector RM-G3 raises to approx 150 mRem/hr indicating failed cladding. RM-A4 will go off scale high over 15 minutes from small leak by of Main Steam into condenser

1030 GENERAL EMERGENCY (T = 03:00): A General Emergency is declared based on the combination FPBM 6.2: RCS leak or OTSG tube leak requiring one or more injection valve AND FPBM 7.1 An OTSG HAS > 10 gpm Tube Rupture with prolonged steaming to the atmosphere from the affected OTSG AND FPBM 5.1 RCS Activity > 300 μ Ci/gm I-131 Dose Equivalent) Note: RM-G3 or sample line dose rates >100 mR/hr is equivalent to 300 μ Ci/gm I-131 Dose Equivalent. Primary Release Path: ADV to Atmosphere (RM-G28 will detect failed cladding) Secondary Release Path: Condenser to AB ventilation, RM-A12, RM-A4, RM-A2

1120 EMERGENCY REPAIR TEAM REPAIRS MSV-25 (T = 03:50): Efforts to repair MSV-25 (ADV on the good OTSG) are successful. The OTSG with the Tube Leak is isolated and the release to atmosphere is terminated. The crew continues cooldown with MSV-25.

1130 EVENT 5: SECURITY EVENT 1, REPORTERS ATTEMPT TO ACCESS OWNER CONTROLLED AREA (T = 04:00): Reporters attempt to access the Owner Controlled area via back roads near old gate 10; Security intervenes and turns reporters away.

1130 EVENT 6: NEWS/COMMUNICATION EVENT (T = 04:30): Rumors spread of unauthorized access to plant.

1200 TERMINATION (T = 06:00): The drill is terminated. Note: termination time could vary depending on demonstration of drill objectives.

SECTION 3: ANALYSIS OF CAPABILITIES

3.1 Exercise Evaluation and Results

This section contains the results and findings of the evaluation of all jurisdictions and functional entities that participated in the November 14, 2012 partial participation plume phase exercise and OOS activities. Exercise criteria are listed by number and the demonstration status of those criteria are indicated by the use of the following terms:

- Met (No Deficiency or ARCA(s) assessed and no unresolved ARCA(s) from prior exercise)
- ARCA(s) assessed or unresolved ARCA(s) from previous exercises
- Deficiency assessed
- Plan Issues
- Not Demonstrated

3.2 Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation

See section 3.3 Criteria Evaluation Summaries for the associated Capability Summaries for each jurisdiction.

Table 3.1 - Summary of Exercise Evaluation

DATE: 2012-11-14 SITE: Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant, FL M: Met, A: ARCA, D: Deficiency, P: Plan Issue, N: Not Demonstrated		State of Florida	Crystal River ENC	Citrus County	Levy County
Emergency Operations Management					
Alert and Mobilization	1a1	M	M	M	M
Facilities	1b1				
Direction and Control	1c1	M		M	M
Communications Equipment	1d1	M	M	M	M
Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations	1e1	M	M	M	M
Protective Action Decision Making					
Emergency Worker Exposure Control	2a1	M		M	M
Dose Assessment & PARs & PADs for the Emergency Event	2b1	M			
Dose Assessment & PARs & PADs for the Emergency Event	2b2	M		M	M
PADs for the Protection of persons with disabilities and access/functional needs	2c1			M	M
Radiological Assessment and Decision-making for the Ingestion Exposure Pathway	2d1				
Radiological Assessment & Decision-making Concerning Post-Plume Phase Relocation, Reentry, and Return	2e1				
Protective Action Implementation					
Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control	3a1	M		M	M
Implementation of KI Decision for Institutionalized Individuals and the Public	3b1	M		M	M
Implementation of Protective Actions for persons with disabilities and access/functional needs	3c1			M	M
Implementation of Protective Actions for persons with disabilities and access/functional needs	3c2			M	M
Implementation of Traffic and Access Control	3d1			M	M
Implementation of Traffic and Access Control	3d2			M	M
Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Decisions	3e1				
Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Decisions	3e2				
Implementation of Post-Plume Phase Relocation, Reentry, and Return Decisions	3f1				
Field Measurement and Analysis					
RESERVED	4a1				
Plume Phase Field Measurement and Analyses	4a2	M			
Plume Phase Field Measurement and Analyses	4a3				
Post Plume Phase Field Measurements and Sampling	4b1				
Laboratory Operations	4c1				
Emergency Notification and Public Info					
Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System	5a1	M		M	M
RESERVED	5a2				
Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System	5a3			M	M
Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System	5a4				
Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media	5b1	M	M	M	M
Support Operations/Facilities					
Monitoring, Decontamination, and Registration of Evacuees	6a1				
Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Workers and their Equipment and Vehicles	6b1			M	M
Temporary Care of Evacuees	6c1				
Transportation and Treatment of Contaminated Injured Individuals	6d1				

3.3 Criteria Evaluation Summaries

3.3.1 Florida Jurisdictions

3.3.1.1 State of Florida

Emergency Operations Center Management: State Management Team (SMT)

The Florida Division of Emergency Management (FDEM) State Emergency Response Team (SERT) deployed their forward asset, the State Management Team (SMT) to the utility's Emergency Operating Facility (EOF) at the Emergency Classification Level (ECL) Alert, simulated through the Extent of Play Agreement (EOPA). Due to the travel distance between the FDEM main office located in Tallahassee to the EOF in Crystal River; the State Regional Coordinators assigned to Citrus and Levy counties were deployed to function as State liaisons at the risk county EOCs during the virtual SMT travel time.

Key positions within the SMT are the Incident Commander (IC), Operations Chief, External Affairs-Public Information Officer (PIO), and the Planning Chief and their staffs. The SMT was in constant communications with the Florida State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) and SMT traveled as a self-sufficient asset. Office equipment, computers, printers, copier, faxes and general office supplies were sufficient to support the operation. The utility provided adequate office space in the EOF for the SMT to comfortably setup and conduct its mission. The utility also provided numerous electronic display boards, large maps of the area depicting possible plume projections, power plant schematics, and large screen TV's displaying local and national news coverage.

The SMT arrived at the EOF at 9:26 a.m. and organized their work space. Primary and backup communication checks were successfully conducted with the SEOC and risk county Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs). During the exercise, no communications failures were observed. Meanwhile, the IC and staff were briefed by the Utility Liaison concerning current plant status. The IC then briefed the utility on State activities. The SEOC was still in control for the state at that time. The SMT relayed all information gleaned from the EOF briefing back to the SEOC, ensuring situational awareness at the state level. A Hot Ring Down Line (HRDL) call was received which contained plant status. This required no action by the SMT.

Upon arrival at the EOF, the two risk county Emergency Management Directors (EMD) updated the SMT IC and utility's Recovery Manager of initial county actions and conversely received an update on plant conditions. This information was then relayed to each director's respective EOC. Concurrently, the SMT IC informed the SEOC that the team was ready to take over the mission lead for the SEOC and declared the SMT operational. Immediately following the SMT declaration, the State coordination and support role was transferred from the SEOC in Tallahassee to the SMT in Crystal River. The transfer was documented by a signed order from the State at 11:00am.

During conduct of the exercise, the SMT IC participated in discussions with the risk county EMDs, the utility's Recovery Manager and state personnel regarding the degrading situation at the plant and issuance of the utility's Protective Action Recommendations (PAR). The SMT IC and the County EMDs jointly discussed prescribed Protective Action Decisions (PAD) that the risk counties could take to safeguard the public and county interests.

At the ECL of Site Area Emergency (SAE), the risk counties jointly agreed on the most appropriate PAD and coordinated sounding of the sirens and dissemination of EAS messages. The SMT IC concurred with the decision and verified no state assets were needed to support the PAD.

During a situational briefing, the issuance of Potassium Iodide (KI) was recommended as a PAR by the utility. This PAR was recommended based on the utility's protocols and procedures but not on actual projected dose. The SMT IC asked the Florida State Bureau of Radiation Control (BRC) if they concurred with the recommendation to ingest KI. BRC did not concur with the recommendation and explained the rationale for their decision to the SMT IC and County EMDs. The SMT IC and County EMDs jointly concurred with the BRC decision not to ingest KI and KI was not provided to the public. Observed throughout the exercise were detailed documents prepared by the SMT staff for each PAD, which were signed by the County EMDs and the SMT IC, then transmitted to the SEOC.

The SMT IC and staff effectively demonstrated the SMT ability to coordinate and support Citrus and Levy counties efforts during the exercise.

Hazardous Materials Response:

This capability was successfully demonstrated by Florida Department of Health BRC staff at the CRNPP EOF. In accordance with the Extent-of-Play Agreement (EOPA), BRC staff members were pre-positioned near the EOF. The Mobile Emergency Radiological Laboratory and four field teams (FTs) participated in the exercise but were not evaluated.

The BRC Operations Officer at the EOF maintained overall direction and control of the BRC response effort. He also provided sound technical advice and recommendations to the SMT IC and county decision makers. Dose Assessment Specialists (DASs) properly performed independent accident analyses and compared their results to CRNPP analyses and FT measurements. The DASs frequently interacted with utility dose assessment personnel, comparing dose projection assumptions, and obtaining plant status information. Field Team Directors (FTDs) controlled the activities of the FTs, positioning them to locate the edges of the plume. The FTDs also ensured that FTs had been adequately briefed, followed all safety procedures, and periodically reported dosimeter readings.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.1, 2.b.2, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 4.a.2, 5.a.1, 5.b.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.1.2 Crystal River Emergency News Center

Emergency Public Information and Warning:

In response to a simulated event at CRNPP, the Public Information Officer (PIO) Representatives from the State of Florida, Citrus County, and Levy County in coordination with the CRNPP PIO successfully demonstrated the effectiveness of their organizations' plans and procedures as they relate to Emergency Public Information and Warning. The team provided coordinated, timely and accurate information and instructions to the news media and the public. Multiple venues to include social media were utilized to broadcast their coordinated information and instructions to the public.

The team worked out of the CRNPP Emergency News Center (ENC) which was located within the CRNPP Emergency Operations Facility (EOF). The ENC is established as a combined news center for the utility and the offsite response organizations (ORO). The ENC enabled the coordination of emergency information and instructions to the public; providing a single point for distribution of news releases and a professional setting for the joint presentation of press briefings by the utility and ORO. The ENC was activated at the Alert ECL by the CRNPP Public Information Director, who had overall responsibility for the management of the ENC. State staff located beyond a reasonable traveling distance for the exercise scenario, were prepositioned within commuting distance, as allowed in the EOPA. Citrus and Levy County staff were not prepositioned, however all were alerted and mobilized in accordance with established plans and procedures upon activation of the ENC.

The State, Citrus and Levy County PIOs were integrated into the primary staff in the ENC. Their roles were defined and included management of public inquiry and rumor control. Each were skilled, experienced and knowledgeable and conducted all coordinating activities with the State of Florida, Citrus and Levy Counties and CRNPP ENC staff agencies. They were proactive in coordinating, appraising and disseminating information. Their combined efforts resulted in accurate, coordinated, timely information and instruction to the public.

The ENC and Media room were well equipped, with redundant communications, equipment, supplies, maps, audio visual and reference material sufficient to support ENC and Media Brief operations.

Prescribed messages were effectively used for News Release (NR) and EAS messages. All information was reviewed, approved and coordinated by proper officials, prior to dissemination, which ensured procedural compliance and aided in development of coordinated NRs and EAS messages for dissemination to the media, the public and local radio and television stations. There were a total of six news releases from the ENC. Media briefs supported the coordinated dissemination of joint messages and were conducted by the Public Information staff. Briefings included references to available brochures, hot line phone numbers, public inquiry, internet and social media sources.

Public inquiry hotlines were located in Citrus and Levy County EOC and in the State EOC. Rumors were identified and recorded on butcher block paper in the ENC. Each rumor was investigated and responded to in follow on news briefs.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 5.b.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.1.3 Citrus County

EOC Management:

Citrus County Emergency Management staff and emergency support function (ESF) personnel demonstrated the capability for incident management by activating and operating an EOC. This demonstration included activating the EOC, direction and control of response activities, coordination with State governments and other county governments, and coordination of public information and warning.

Although personnel were pre-positioned, per the EOPA, the EMD and his Assistant EMD described the activation process, telephone calls and reverse calling system that could be used to activate EOC staff. The EOC was well equipped with computers, monitors and video displays. In addition all ESFs were provided with "Brief Notes for an Emergency Category Change," which contained references to the Standard Operating Guides (SOGs) relevant to their position. Primary and backup communication systems were available and all systems worked properly throughout the exercise.

The EMD demonstrated excellent direction and control until he left to coordinate activities with Levy County in the EOF. The Assistant EMD then took over and exhibited the same excellent direction and control for the rest of the exercise. Both individuals used the expertise and knowledge of their EOC staff to complete tasks and insure safety of the county citizens.

School District representatives and the County Transportation representative coordinated activities to relocate students and staff from five schools in the EPZ. Other schools in the county were closed as a precautionary action. A representative from County Health Department worked

with representatives from the Nature Coast Volunteer Center, EMS, County Transportation and Medical Services to relocate special needs individuals, nursing homes and hospitals.

The U.S. Coast Guard representatives and the Fish and Wildlife Commission representatives worked together to coordinate clearing the bay area and evacuating boaters. The Sheriff's Office representative coordinated staffing for traffic control points (TCP) and getting assistance for removing any impediments. Dosimetry packets that contained Direct Reading Dosimeters (DRDs), Permanent Record Dosimeters (PRDs) and potassium iodine (KI) were pre-distributed to emergency teams in the field. The REP Planner stated that all teams had information for briefing emergency workers on exposure limits and would call in results every 6 hours.

Emergency Public Information and Warning:

The Citrus County Public Information Officer issued and coordinated the initial press release with the Citrus County EMD before they deployed to the EOF. The Citrus County Assistant Public Information Officer at the Citrus County EOC successfully relayed EAS messages to the National Weather Service (NWS) in a timely manner and followed her checklist precisely. The Citizen Information Line staff received citizen inquiry calls and promptly addressed citizens' concerns. The Citizen Information Line staff provided reassurance to the public that the situation was being handled with the upmost caution and regard for unfettered continuance of their community.

Citizen Evacuation/Shelter in Place:

Citrus County Public Schools Risk Manager successfully demonstrated the appropriate actions to safeguard students during an out-of-sequence interview October 29, 2012. Representatives from the Academy of Environmental Science and the Marine Science Station located in the 10-mile EPZ were interviewed. The school system had created emergency plans and procedures to expedite the evacuation and relocation of students and faculty in the event of a situation at the nuclear plant. Participants were familiar with their unique traits at each academy and procedures were in place to assist them.

Public Safety and Security Response:

The Citrus County Sheriff's Office successfully demonstrated their capability to provide traffic

control during an incident at the CRNPP. The capability was demonstrated through interview with a Citrus County Sheriff's Deputy. The Deputy was provided a radiological safety briefing prior to being dispatched to his location. It was simulated that his dosimetry kit was issued to him at the Withlacoochee Technical Institute which is a confirmed distribution point. He was knowledgeable regarding his dosimetry, KI, administrative limits, and record keeping. He had adequate equipment and communications to conduct the operation. He also knew who to contact if additional resources were required. The TCP he was assigned to was located at the National Guard Armory. If impediments to traffic were identified the officer would attempt to clear the way for traffic. If he was unable to do so, he knew the appropriate agencies to contact for assistance. The officer interviewed was familiar with the plans and procedures and well prepared to execute the mission.

Hazardous Materials Response:

In response to a simulated event at CRNP, Citrus County Fire and Emergency Services, Citrus County Sheriff's Office Emergency Management Division, and the Community Emergency Response Team (CERT) successfully demonstrated the effectiveness of the County's plans and procedures for monitoring and decontamination of emergency workers and emergency workers equipment. This Out of Sequence (OOS) Emergency Worked Decontamination (EWD) exercise was conducted at the National Guard Armory in Crystal River, Florida. Citrus County was assisted in the joint operation by the Hernando County Fire Rescue Department.

All personnel and assets were staged in advance, in accordance with the EOPA. The county recall procedures were discussed. Discussion revealed the leadership was very knowledgeable of the County's plan and Standard Operating Guides (SOG) relating to recall and setup of the EWD station.

The EWD command structure was able to maintain constant communications with the Citrus County EOC by use of cellular phones. Commercial landlines and a county radio system were the backup systems for communications. The command element and teams working the individual EWD stations maintained effective communication by use of hand held radios.

The EWD station was laid out in a very organized manner which contributed extensively to the smooth flow of the entire monitoring and decontamination operation. The stations and routes of movement were clearly marked and identified. Signage providing direction and instructions

were visible which provided clear and concise instructions to persons being processed as well as providing job aids to the station workers. Radiation monitoring instruments, personal dosimetry and KI were available in adequate quantities. Both were inspected during a site assistance visit on October 15, 2012 and were within required calibration, leak test, and shelf life requirements.

Emergency workers were provided a very informative and detailed radiation safety briefing before dressing out and entering the established EWD work zone. During the exercise evaluators questioned the workers on radiation reporting levels, turn back levels, and decontamination action levels. They were all knowledgeable of these requirements. Workers were also very knowledgeable in the operation of their personal dosimetry and of the use of the radiation monitoring instruments at their individual stations.

Monitoring and decontamination procedures were correctly demonstrated for vehicles, equipment and personnel. Required documentation was accurately maintained on both personnel and equipment being processed, and the individual team members working the EWD stations. It was obvious the members were very well trained and the team had trained together.

Two emergency worker vehicles and two emergency workers with their equipment were monitored and decontaminated safely, effectively and efficiently by a very professional and well trained Citrus County team. The EWD process was carried out following the county's extensive SOGs.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.2, 2.c.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.a.1, 5.a.3, 5.b.1, 6.b.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

3.3.1.4 Levy County

EOC Management:

The Levy County EMD and the Assistant EMD successfully demonstrated the capability to alert, notify and mobilize key staff in response to an incident at CRNPP. Participation of the County Administrator throughout the exercise demonstrated a firm dedication to the safety and welfare of the county residents.

The EMD and his staff were highly proficient in the performance of their duties and were proactive in their planning and implementation of county emergency response actions. The EOC was activated in accordance with the county plan and the EOPA. The EMD and the Assistant EMD maintained direction and control, properly coordinated protective action recommendations/decisions, and ensured situational awareness by conducting frequent staff briefings. Through interview, the ability to coordinate with local, regional and State agencies to establish evacuation routes, traffic control points and back-up route alerting was successfully demonstrated. There was seamless coordination to ensure students and residents would be notified and relocated. Emergency information and instructions to the public were accurate and delivered in a timely manner. Redundant interoperable communications and sufficient equipment and supplies further enhance the county's emergency response capability. All personnel interviewed were professional, well trained and knowledgeable of their responsibility to the residents of Levy County.

Emergency Public Information and Warning:

Levy County successfully demonstrated the capability to develop, coordinate and disseminate accurate alerts and emergency information and instructions to the media and the public. A Levy County PIO was at the ENC for coordination between the State and County. Sirens, EAS and NWS warning systems were activated in a timely and accurate manner to notify the public of an emergency. Information and instructional messages distributed for Levy County by Citrus County were accurate, consistent and timely. Under the leadership of the County Commission, the EMD and AEMD coordinated with the State of Florida and Citrus County to decide on the appropriate messages to be issued. A report of the siren failure in Levy County was quickly identified and backup route alerting was discussed. The capability to coordinate and issue emergency information to the public, to include Public Inquiry, was demonstrated at the ENC.

Citizen Evacuation/Shelter in Place:

An OOS evaluation of Yankeetown School was conducted on October 16, 2012. The evaluation was conducted by interview with the Assistant Principal and staff of Yankeetown School. Levy County School Board and Yankeetown School staff successfully demonstrated the knowledge to safeguard students, staff and the faculty from the effects of a simulated accident at CRNPP.

Yankeetown School was the only Levy County School within the 10 mile Emergency Planning Zone. The school had current up to date emergency plans and procedures prepared to expedite the evacuation and relocation of students, staff and faculty in the event of an accident at CRNPP. The plans were reviewed and accepted by the school board, Levy County Emergency Management Division and the designated relocation school, Bronson Middle. Plans had been recently reviewed and exercised. The plans were very complete and detailed. The school maintained sufficient busses on site and enough staff trained and licensed to drive them to the designated relocation school if required. Participants interviewed were very familiar with their plans and procedures and displayed a high degree of professionalism and competence.

Public Safety and Security Response:

During the out of sequence EWD exercise the Levy County Sheriff's Office successfully demonstrated their capability to provide traffic control. The capability was demonstrated at the entrance to the EWD location on Highway 19 by a Levy County Sheriff's Deputy. The Deputy properly wore his personal dosimetry and was knowledgeable about the use of KI, administrative radiation limits, and radiation record keeping requirements. He had adequate equipment and communications to conduct the operation. The Deputy was very knowledgeable of primary and alternate evacuation routes and different shelters available for the evacuees. If impediments to traffic were identified, the officer would attempt to clear the way for traffic. If he was unable to do so, he knew the appropriate agencies to contact for assistance. The officer interviewed was familiar with his procedures and well prepared to perform the mission.

Hazardous Materials Response:

In response to a simulated event at CRNPP, Levy County Emergency Management Agency, Levy County Public Safety Fire and Emergency Medical Services, Levy County Sheriff's Department, Levy County Health Department, the American Red Cross, and the Community

Emergency Response Team successfully demonstrated the effectiveness of the county's plans and procedures for monitoring and decontamination of emergency workers and emergency workers equipment. This OOS EWD exercise was conducted the night of October 30, 2012. The exercise was held at the junctions of Highway 19, County Road 336, and State Road 121. This location was the primary designated location for Levy Counties EWD operations and is approximately five miles outside the 10-Mile EPZ in Levy County.

All personnel and equipment were staged in advance, in accordance with the EOPA. The county recall procedures were discussed and the discussion revealed the leadership was very knowledgeable of the county's plan and SOGs relating to recall of the EWD personnel.

The EWD command structure was able to maintain constant communications with the Levy County EOC by use of cellular phones. The county radio system and the state's 800 MHz radio system were available as backup systems for communications. Satellite Phones were also available if required. The command element maintained situational awareness and control of the process.

The EWD station was laid out in a very simple and organized manner which contributed extensively to the smooth flow of the entire monitoring and decontamination operation. The stations and routes of movement were clearly marked and identified. Signage providing direction and instructions were visible and provided clear and concise instructions to persons being processed and also provided job aids to the station workers. Radiation monitoring instruments, personal dosimetry and KI were available in adequate quantities. Equipment had been inspected during a site assistance visit on October 15, 2012 and were within required calibration, leak test, and shelf life requirements.

Emergency workers were provided a very informative and detailed radiation safety briefing before entering the established work zone. During the exercise evaluators questioned workers on radiation reporting levels, turn back levels, and decontamination action levels. Those questioned were all knowledgeable in these areas. Workers were also very knowledgeable in the operation of their personal dosimetry and use of the radiation monitoring instruments at their individual stations. Monitoring and decontamination procedures were performed correctly and very effectively. Reducing the spread of contamination was stressed at each station. Required documentation was accurately maintained on both personnel and equipment being processed, and individual team members working the EWD stations. It was obvious members were very well

trained and the team had trained together. During the exercise two emergency worker vehicles and two emergency workers with their equipment were monitored and decontaminated safely, effectively and efficiently by a very professional and well trained Levy County team.

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.2, 2.c.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.a.1, 5.a.3, 5.b.1, 6.b.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

SECTION 4: CONCLUSION

Officials and representatives from the State of Florida, Citrus and Levy Counties, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Progress Energy, as well as numerous volunteer agencies participated in this exercise. The concept of cooperation and teamwork was apparent during all phases of the exercise. FEMA wishes to acknowledge the efforts of the many individuals who contributed to make the exercise a success.

Florida should be commended for their decision to participate more fully in this exercise than in past CRNPP exercises. The State's participation provided more realism to this exercise and created an opportunity for the local jurisdictions to work with the entire team that would be assembled for an actual event. It is hoped the State will continue increasing their involvement in these exercises.

Staffs of the State and local counties emergency operation centers, emergency workers, elected officials, and volunteers contributed immensely to the success of the response effort. They were all knowledgeable of their emergency response plans and procedures. Each implemented their plans and procedures in an efficient and professional manner. The team demonstrated their ability to protect the public health and safety of their constituents in the event of an accident at CRNPP.

During the exercise FEMA identified no deficiencies or areas requiring corrective action. FEMA will continue to monitor and work with the State and risk counties to assist their organizations in maintaining the high level of preparation and readiness that they have so confidently demonstrated throughout this exercise.

APPENDIX A: EXERCISE TIMELINE

Table 1 - Exercise Timeline

DATE: 2012-11-14, SITE: Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant, FL

Emergency Classification Level or Event	Time Utility Declared	State of Florida	Crystal River ENC	Citrus County	Levy County
Unusual Event	0745	N/A	N/A	0754	0758
Alert	0822	N/A	N/A	0838	0838
Site Area Emergency	0944	1002	1036	1002	1002
General Emergency	1112	1131	1132	1131	1131
Simulated Rad. Release Started	0944	1002	N/A	1002	1002
Simulated Rad. Release Terminated	Ongoing	Ongoing	N/A	Ongoing	Ongoing
Facility Declared Operational		1100	1010	1015	0900
Declaration of Emergency: Local		1045	1010	1010	1010
Declaration of Emergency: State		1025	N/A	N/A	N/A
Exercise Terminated		1300	1300	1309	1305
1st Protective Action Decision: EAS Message 4C - Evacuate Schools		1037	1037	1007	1007
1st Siren Activation		N/A	N/A	1020	1020
1st EAS / NWS Message		N/A	N/A	1025	1025
2nd Protective Action Decision: EAS Message 14C - Evacuate Zone 1, SIP Zones 2 & 3, Waterway Clearance		1138	1138	1138	1138
2nd Siren Activation		N/A	N/A	1150	1150
2nd EAS / NWS Message		N/A	N/A	1155	1155
KI Administration Decision: Do Not Issue / Ingest		1138	1138	1138	1138

APPENDIX B: EXERCISE EVALUATORS AND TEAM LEADERS

DATE: 2012-11-14, SITE: Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant, FL

LOCATION	EVALUATOR	AGENCY
State of Florida	John Fill Willis Larrabee *Alex Sera	FEMA RIV ICFI FEMA-NP- TH-REP
Crystal River Emergency News Center	*Walt Cushman Odin Spencer	FEMA-NP- TH-REP FEMA
Citrus County	Walt Cushman *Joe Harworth Gerald Mclemore Lisa Rink	FEMA-NP- TH-REP FEMA FEMA RIV FEMA R4
Levy County	Walt Cushman Robert Nash Lisa Rink *Ronald Shaw	FEMA-NP- TH-REP FEMA-NP- TH-REP FEMA R4 FEMA-NP- TH REP
* Team Leader		

APPENDIX C: EXTENT OF PLAY AGREEMENT

EXTENT OF PLAY AGREEMENT Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE 14 November 2012

All selected activities will be demonstrated fully in accordance with respective plans. The Extent of Play agreement is written by exception. If it is not listed as an exception it will be demonstrated or discussed as described in the plans and standard operating guides or procedures. It is requested that any issue or discrepancy arising during exercise play be allowed correction immediately, at all player locations, if it is not disruptive to exercise play and if it is mutually agreeable to both controller and FEMA evaluator.

CAPABILITY: Emergency Operations Management (State and County EOC's)

Definition: Emergency Operations Center (EOC) management is the capability to provide multi-agency coordination (MAC) for incident management by activating and operating an EOC for a pre-planned or no-notice event. EOC management includes: EOC activation, notification, staffing, and deactivation; management, direction, control, and coordination of response and recovery activities; coordination of efforts among neighboring governments at each level and among local, regional, State, and Federal EOCs; coordination of public information and warning; and maintenance of the information and communication necessary for coordinating response and recovery activities. Similar entities may include the National (or Regional) Response Coordination Center (NRCC or RRCC), Joint Field Offices (JFO), National Operating Center (NOC), Joint Operations Center (JOC), Multi-Agency Coordination Center (MACC), Initial Operating Facility (IOF), etc.

Activity 1: Activate EOC (Definition: In response to activation, perform incident notifications, recall essential personnel, and stand-up EOC systems to provide a fully staffed and operational EOC.).

- 1.1 OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner.** (Sub-element 1.a, Mobilization, **Criterion 1.a.1:** NUREG-0654, A.1.a, e; A.3, 4; C.1,4, 6; D.4; E.1, 2; H.3, 4).

Citrus County: Personnel will be pre-positioned at the Emergency Operations Center on Nov. 14, 2012 at 8:00 AM. The EOC is located at the 3549 Saunders Way, Lecanto, FL. 34461. We will show or discuss our responses to effectively illustrate our plans and procedures to alert notify and mobilize EM personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner.

Levy County: Staff will be prepositioned at approximately 8:00 am for this exercise. There will be a simulation and discussion of procedures for mobilization, response time of key staff personnel and activation of the EOC in a timely manner. The location of the EOC is 9010 NE 79th Ave. Bronson, FL. 32621.

Division of Emergency Management:

SMT/EOF: State Management Team (SMT) personnel will pre-position at the EOF and will begin play at the notification of an Alert. The Mobile Command Vehicle (MCV) will also be pre-positioned at the EOF for use during the exercise. Activation will be demonstrated through discussion.

SEOC: Division of Emergency Management staff will be pre-positioned at the SEOC. At the Alert declaration, the Division of Emergency Management will demonstrate a real-time activation of the State Emergency Operations Center by notification to the emergency support functions to report to the State Emergency Operations Center in accordance with the State Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plan and Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan.

Bureau of Radiation Control: Covered Under HAZMAT

- 1.2 **At least two communications systems are available, at least one operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations. Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations.** (Sub element 1.d, Communications, **Criterion 1.d.1:** NUREG-0654, F.1, 2).

Citrus County: Commercial telephone will be the main line of communications with cellular phones, 800 MHz radio system. Amateur Radio Emergency Services (ARES), electronic methods and satellite phones as secondary systems. Citrus County ARES can demonstrate communications to either State of Florida EOC or other ARES members. There will be no simulated communication failures during the exercise.

Levy County: Commercial telephone will be the main line of communications with cellular phones, 800 MHz radio system. Amateur Radio Emergency Services (ARES), electronic methods and satellite phones as secondary systems. There will be no simulated communication failures during the exercise.

Division of Emergency Management:

SMT/EOF: A primary and one backup communication system between the State Management Team at the EOF and the SEOC will be demonstrated. There will be no simulated communication failures during the exercise.

SEOC: A primary and one backup communication system between the State Management team at the EOF and the SEOC will be demonstrated. Should an actual failure of the Hot Ring Down System occur during the exercise, a backup communications system will be demonstrated at the SEOC. Should no actual failure occur, this objective may be demonstrated through discussion. There will be no simulated communication failures during the exercise.

Bureau of Radiation Control: Covered Under HAZMAT

- 1.3 **Equipment, maps, displays, monitoring instruments, dosimetry, potassium iodide (KI), other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations.** (Sub-element 1.e., Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations, **Criterion 1.e.1:** NUREG-0654, H.7, 10; I.7, 8, 9; J.10.a, b, e; J.11, 12; K.3.a; K.5.b).

Citrus County: Equipment, maps, displays, etc, necessary to provide information to support the operation of the EOC for the ongoing scenario will be used and demonstrated throughout the exercise.

Upon evaluator request, inspection of KI, instruments and dosimeters can be performed during the out of sequence drill.

SAV: Instruments, dosimeters, KI and training records will be performed during the Site Assistance Visit in the morning of Oct. 15.

Levy County: Equipment, maps, displays, etc, necessary to provide information to support the operation of the EOC for the ongoing scenario will be used and demonstrated throughout the exercise.

SAV: Instruments, dosimeters, KI and training records will be performed during the Site Assistance Visit in the Afternoon of Oct. 15.

Division of Emergency Management:

SMT/EOF: The SMT will have sufficient equipment to support their mission as defined in the State Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plan. Dosimeters and potassium iodide for state emergency workers will not be transported. The radiological emergency preparedness technical specialist at the EOF will provide information related to the distribution of dosimeters and potassium iodide.

SEOC: The SEOC will demonstrate, sufficient equipment and supplies to support operations, it will be evaluated during the exercise.

Bureau of Radiation Control: Covered under HAZMAT

Activity 2: Direct EOC Operations (Definition: Following activation of the EOC system, staff and organize the EOC in accordance with the comprehensive emergency management plan (CEMP) and the requisite policies, procedures, and directives.)

2.1 Key personnel with leadership roles for the ORO provide direction and control to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible. (Sub-element 1.c.1, Direction and Control, **Criterion 1.c.1:** NUREG-0654, A.1.d; A.2.a, b; A.3; C.4, 6)

Citrus County: Florida Statue Chapter 252 provides legal authority for the Emergency Management Director or designee to take responsibility or Command and Control to protect the lives and property in Citrus County. The state, local government agencies and private sector organizations that comprise the overall response organizations and the responsibilities each assumes will be identified at the EOC on Nov. 14. We will show that NIMS has been adopted throughout our response activities.

Levy County: The state, local government agencies and private sector organizations that comprise the overall response organizations and the responsibilities each assumes will be identified at the EOC on Nov. 14.

Division of Emergency Management:

SMT/EOF: The SMT Incident Commander will provide direction and control at the EOF.

SEOC: The SERT Chief will provide direction and control at the EOC.

Bureau of Radiation Control: Covered under HAZMAT

- 2.2 **ORO use a decision-making process, considering relevant factors and appropriate coordination, to insure that an exposure control system, including the use of KI, is in place for emergency workers including provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or protective action guides.** (Sub-element 2.a., Emergency Worker Exposure Control, **Criterion 2.a.1:** NUREG-0654, C.6; J.10. e, f; K.4)

Citrus County: The decision making process will be scenario driven and demonstrated through the discussions and interviews in the EOC. The Exposure Control and the KI decisions are discussed at the EOF based on recommendations by BRC and Progress Energy. Appropriate Protective Actions Decisions will be determined by the Emergency Management Director or designee and then they will be discussed with the participants at the EOC for implementation. If exposure levels approach or exceed limits we will direct appropriate response precautions in accordance with our plans and SOPs.

Levy County: The decision making process will be scenario driven and demonstrated through the discussions and interviews in the EOC. The Exposure Control and the KI decisions are discussed at the EOF based on recommendations by BRC and Progress Energy. Appropriate Protective Actions Decisions will be determined by the Emergency Management Director or designee and then they will be discussed with the participants at the EOC for implementation.

Division of Emergency Management:

SMT/EOF: Information relative to state emergency worker exposure control will be provided through discussions with the radiological emergency preparedness technical specialist at the EOF. The SMT will participate in the development of initial and subsequent protective action decisions based on licensee and BRC protective action recommendations in accordance with the State Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plan.

SEOC: *Not Applicable*

- 2.3 A decision-making process involved consideration of appropriate factors and necessary coordination is used to make protective action decisions (PADs) for the general public (including the recommendation for the use of KI, if ORO policy).** (Sub-element 2.b., Radiological Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations and Decisions for the Plume Phase of the Emergency, **Criterion 2.b.2:** NUREG, A.3; C.4, 6; D.4; J.9; J.10.f, m)

Citrus County: The Emergency Management Director or designee at the EOF will show the capability to make initial and subsequent Protective Action Decisions (PADs) in a timely manner appropriate to the situation based on the scenario. (Notification from Progress Energy, assessment of plant status, radioactive material releases, recommendations from BRC and PARs from Progress Energy as per our plans and SOPs.). Based on the scenario, the Emergency Management Director or designee will determine if KI will be used as a protective measure for the general public as per recommendations for BRC and our plans and SOPs. The EM staff at the EOC will demonstrate/discuss the capability to make decisions on the distribution and administration of KI as a protective measure to the general public to supplement sheltering and evacuation.

Levy County: The Emergency Management Director or designee at the EOF will show the capability to make initial and subsequent Protective Action Decisions in a timely manner appropriate to the situation based on the scenario. Based on the scenario, the Emergency Management Director or designee will determine if KI will be used as a protective measure for the general public as per recommendations for BRC and our plans and SOPs. The EM staff at the EOC will demonstrate/discuss the capability to make decisions on the distribution and administration of KI as a protective measure to the general public to supplement sheltering and evacuation.

Division of Emergency Management:

SMT/EOF: *The SMT will provide a coordination role only, with counties implementing protective action decisions.* The SMT will participate in the development of initial and subsequent protective action decisions based on licensee and BRC protective action recommendations in accordance with the State Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plan.

SEOC: *Not Applicable*

Bureau of Radiation Control: BRC provides PAR

- 2.4 **Protective action decisions are made, as appropriate, for groups of persons with disabilities and access/functional needs.** (Sub-element 2.c., PAD Consideration for the Protection of Persons with Disabilities and Access/Functional Needs, **Criterion 2.c.1:** NUREG-0654, D.4; J.9; J.10.d, e).

Citrus County: The Emergency Management Director or designee will demonstrate the capability to alert and notify the school system of the emergency conditions at the plant and/or implement protective actions for the students depending on the emergency category declared by the plant as per our plans and SOPs. If School is in session and as a precautionary measure, depending on the scenario, we will initiate the school evacuation process during a declared Site Area Emergency.

Based on the scenario, during a declared Site Area Emergency, as described in our plans and SOPs, we will also contact the Daycare Centers, Assisted Living Facilities and Special Needs within the EPZ to begin their evacuation process as well.

Levy County:

The Emergency Management Director or designee will demonstrate the capability to alert and notify the school system of the emergency conditions at the plant and/or implement protective actions for the students depending on the emergency category declared by the plant.

Based on the scenario, during a declared Site Area Emergency, as described in our plans and SOPs, we will also contact the Special Needs within the EPZ to begin their evacuation process as well. Levy County does not have any assisted living facilities or day cares in the EPZ.

Division of Emergency Management:

Not Applicable

Bureau of Radiation Control:

Not Applicable

Activity 3: Support and Coordinate Response (Definition: Once requested, provide resource, technical, and policy support to the Incident Command by coordinating the actions of off-site agencies, organizations, and jurisdictions, implementing MAAs, and requesting higher-level assistance.)

3.1 The OROs issue appropriate dosimetry, KI and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plans and procedures. Emergency workers periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart. OROs maintain appropriate record-keeping of the administration of KI to emergency workers. (Sub-element 3.a., Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control, Criterion 3.a.1: NUREG-0654, J.10.e; K.3.a, b; K.4).

Citrus County:

Based on the scenario, the Emergency Management Director or designee will determine the appropriate time to distribute dosimeter kits as per our plans and SOPs. Each ESF in the EOC should have individual SOPs directing the appropriate response actions depending on which emergency is being declared. Procedures for emergency worker exposure control will be implemented and can be discussed during the exercise in the EOC. Procedures for emergency worker exposure control can be discussed in sequence during the exercise in the EOC. Procedures for emergency worker exposure control will be discussed in the out of sequence drill on Oct. 29 at the National Guard Armory. The emergency worker will be given a kit containing either an UltraRadiac electronic dosimeter/monitor or a Low Range and High Range PIC with an exposure card and 2 doses of KI (candy). The Worker is required to look at his dosimeters and record the readings every 30 minutes.

The Emergency Management Director or designee will show the capability to make the decisions for the consumption KI by emergency workers as per our plans and SOPs.

Levy County:

Procedures for emergency worker exposure control can be discussed in sequence during the exercise in the EOC. Procedures for emergency worker exposure control will be discussed in the out of sequence drill on Oct. 30 at Lebanon Station. The emergency worker will be given a kit containing either an UltraRadiac electronic dosimeter/monitor or a Low Range and High Range PIC with an exposure card and 2 doses of KI (Simulated).

Division of Emergency Management:
Not Applicable

Bureau of Radiation Control:
Not Applicable

- 3.2 **KI and appropriate instructions are available if a decision to recommend use of KI is made. Appropriate record keeping of the administration of KI for institutionalized individuals and the general public is maintained.** (Sub-element 3.b., Implementation of KI Decision, **Criterion 3.b.1:** NUREG-0654, J., 10.e.f.).

Citrus County: This objective can be discussed at the EOC. If BRC and Progress Energy makes a decision to recommend the use of KI, the decision to consume them will be determined by the Emergency Management Director or designee at the EOF. Implementation of the KI decisions will be discussed in the EOC based on the scenario as per our plans and SOPs.

During the out of sequence Emergency Worker Drill at the National Guard Armory on Oct 29, candy will be provided as representation of KI.

Levy County: This objective can be discussed at the EOC. If BRC and Progress Energy makes a decision to recommend the use of KI, the decision to consume them will be determined by the Emergency Management Director or designee at the EOF. Implementation of the KI decisions will be discussed in the EOC.

Division of Emergency Management:
Not Applicable

Bureau of Radiation Control:
Covered in HAZMAT

- 3.3 Protective action decisions are implemented for persons with disabilities and access/functional needs other than schools within areas subject to protective actions.** (Sub-element 3.c., Implementation of Protective Actions for Special Populations, **Criterion 3.c.1:** NUREG-0654, J.10.c, d, e, g).

NOT Required this Exercise

- 3.4 OROs/School officials implement protective actions for schools.** (Schools include: all public schools, licensed day care centers, and participating private schools) (Sub-element 3.c., Implementation of Protective Actions for Schools Includes Public, Private, kindergarten, preschools, licensed day cares, **Criterion 3.c.2:** NUREG-0654, J.10.c, d, e, g)

Citrus County:

Based on the scenario, procedures for implementing protective actions will be discussed in the EOC for special populations such as Special Needs, Assisted Living Facilities and Seven Rivers Regional Medical Center.

We will not be physically transporting students or physically activating our shelters for the school kids during this exercise but we will be simulating this process as defined in our REP plans and SOPs. The Academy of Environmental Science and the Marine Science Station will be visited by FEMA out of sequence on Oct 29, 2012 and an interview will be performed.

Address for schools to be interviewed:

Academy of Environmental Science
12695 W. Fort Island Trail
Crystal River, FL. 34429

Marine Science Station
12646 W. Fort Island Trail
Crystal River, FL. 34429

Levy County: Procedures for implementing protective actions will be discussed in the EOC for special populations such as Special Needs. We will not be physically transporting students or physically activating our shelters for the school kids during this exercise but we will be simulating this process.

Yankeetown School will be visited October 16, 2012 and an interview with the school principle will be done.

3.5 Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel. (Sub-element 3.d., Implementation of Traffic and Access Control, **Criterion 3.d.1:** NUREG-0654, A.3; C.1, 4; J.10.g, j)

Citrus County: This will be scenario driven and will be demonstrated through discussion between the EOC and the EOF based on Protective Action Decisions.

Law Enforcement will discuss the capability to select, establish and staff appropriate traffic and access control points, consistent with Protective Actions Decisions (PADs) in a timely manner as per our plans and SOPs.

Levy County: Will be demonstrated through discussion between the EOC and the EOF based on protective action decisions.

Law Enforcement will discuss the capability to select, establish and staff appropriate traffic and access control points, consistent with protective action decisions in a timely manner.

Division of Emergency Management:
Not Applicable

Bureau of Radiation Control:
Not Applicable

3.6 Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved. (Sub-element 3.d., **Criterion 3.d.2:** Implementation of Traffic and Access Control, NUREG-0654, J.10.k)

Citrus County: This will be demonstrated by injects and simulated response by law enforcement and fire rescue representatives in the EOC.

Law Enforcement and Emergency Management staff in the EOC will discuss our capabilities to provide instructions when modifications in Protective Actions strategies necessitate changes due to traffic impediments, road construction, etc., in evacuation patterns in area(s) per our plans and SOPs

Levy County: Law Enforcement and Emergency Management staff in the EOC will discuss our capabilities to provide instructions when modifications in Protective Actions strategies necessitate changes due to traffic impediments, road construction, etc., in evacuation patterns in area(s).

Division of Emergency Management:
Not Applicable

Bureau of Radiation Control:
Not Applicable

CAPABILITY: Citizen Evacuation and Shelter in Place

Definition: Citizen Evacuation and shelter-in-place is the capability to prepare for, ensure communication of, and immediately execute the safe and effective sheltering-in-place of an at-risk population (and companion animals), and/or the organized and managed evacuation of the at-risk population (and companion animals) to areas of safe refuge in response to a potentially or actually dangerous environment. In addition, this capability involves the safe reentry of the population where feasible.

Activity 1: Direct Evacuation and/or In Place Protection (Definition: In response to a hazardous condition for a locality, direct, manage, and coordinate evacuation and/or in-place sheltering procedures for both the general population and those requiring evacuation assistance throughout incident.)

OROs/ School officials implement protective actions for schools. (Sub-element 3.c., Implementation of Protective Actions for Schools, Criterion 3.c.2: NUREG-0654, J.10.c, d, e, g)

Citrus County:

Based on the scenario, procedures for implementing protective actions will be discussed in the EOC for Day Care Centers and Schools. The Emergency Management Director or designee will demonstrate the capability to alert and notify the school system of the emergency conditions at the plant and/or implement protective actions for the students depending on the emergency category declared by the plant as per our plans and SOPs. If School is in session and as a precautionary measure, depending on the scenario, we will initiate the school evacuation process during a declared Site Area Emergency. From 2.c.1

We will not be physically transporting students or physically activating our shelters for the school kids during this exercise but we will be simulating this process as defined in our REP plans and SOPs. The Academy of Environmental Science and the Marine Science Station will be visited by FEMA out of sequence on Oct 29, 2012 and an interview will be performed.

Address for schools to be interviewed:

Academy of Environmental Science
12695 W. Fort Island Trail
Crystal River, FL. 34429

Marine Science Station
12646 W. Fort Island Trail
Crystal River, FL. 34429

Levy County:

Based on the scenario, procedures for implementing protective actions will be discussed in the EOC for schools. Levy County has no daycares in the 10 mile EPZ. The one school will be completed by interview process on October 30th 9:00 am with the principle at the Yankeetown School located at
4500 Hwy 40 West
Yankeetown, Fl. 34498

Division of Emergency Management:

Not Applicable

Bureau of Radiation Control:

Not Applicable

CAPABILITY: Public Safety and Security Response (TCPs)

Definition: Public Safety and Security Response is the capability to reduce the impact and consequences of an incident or major event by securing the affected area, including crime/incident scene preservation issues as appropriate, safely diverting the public from hazards, providing security support to other response operations and properties, and sustaining operations from response through recovery. Public Safety and Security Response requires coordination among officials from law enforcement (LE), fire, and emergency medical services (EMS).

Activity 1: Activate Public Safety/Security Response (Definition: Upon notification, mobilize and deploy to begin operations.)

- 1.1 ORO's use effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner.** (Sub-element 1.a, Mobilization, **Criterion 1.a.1:** NUREG-0654, A.4. D.3, 4, E.1, 2, H.4)

Citrus County: We will show or discuss our responses to effectively illustrate our plans and procedures to alert notify and mobilize EM personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner. This event will be demonstrated through discussion at the EOC.

Levy County: We will show or discuss our responses to effectively illustrate our plans and procedures to alert notify and mobilize EM personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner. This event will be demonstrated through discussion at the EOC.

- 1.2 At least two communications systems are available, at least one operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations. Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations.** (Sub element 1.d, Communications, **Criterion 1.d.1:** NUREG-0654, F.1, 2)

Citrus County: ESF 16 at the EOC will keep law enforcement in the field informed of information ascertain in the EOC and the status of plant conditions as necessary. Communication with law enforcement in the field will mainly utilize the 800 MHz radio system. Cell phones can also be utilized when necessary.

Levy County: ESF 16 at the EOC will keep law enforcement in the field informed of information ascertain in the EOC and the status of plant conditions as necessary. Communication with law enforcement in the field will mainly utilize the 800 MHz radio system. Cell phones can also be utilized when necessary.

1.3 Equipment, maps, displays, monitoring instruments, dosimetry, potassium iodide (KI), other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations. (Sub-element 1.e, Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations, **Criterion 1.e.1:** NUREG-0654, H., J.10.a.b.e.f.j.k, 11, K.3.a).

Citrus County:

Equipment, maps, displays, Smart Books, Go Kits necessary to provide information to support the operation of the TCP's for the ongoing scenario will be used and demonstrated throughout the exercise.

Inspection of equipment and supplies used by first responders in the field such as the following: KI, instruments and dosimeters can be performed during the out of sequence drill Demonstration of TCP's will be through discussion.

SAV: Instruments, dosimeters, KI and training records will be performed during the Site Area Visit in the morning of Oct. 15, 2012.

Levy County:

Equipment, maps, displays, Smart Books, Go Kits, necessary to provide information to support the operation of the TCP's for the ongoing scenario will be used and demonstrated throughout the exercise. Inspection of equipment and supplies used by first responders in the field such as the following: KI, instruments and dosimeters will be performed during the out of sequence drill.

Demonstration of TCP's will be by discussion.

SAV:

Instruments, dosimeters, KI and training records will be performed during the Site Area Visit in the morning of Oct. 15, 2012.

- 1.4 The OROs issue appropriate dosimetry, KI and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plans / procedures. Emergency workers periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart.** OROs maintain appropriate record-keeping of the administration of KI to emergency workers. (Sub-element 3.a., Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control, **Criterion 3.a.1:** NUREG-0654, J.10.e, K.3.a,b, K.4).

Citrus County:

Procedures for emergency worker exposure control and reporting to their supervisors can also be discussed in the out of sequence drill on Oct. 29, 2012, at the National Guard Armory. The emergency worker will be given a kit containing either an UltraRadiac electronic dosimeter/monitor or a Low Range and High Range PIC with an exposure card and 2 doses of KI (candy). The Worker is required to look at his dosimeters and record the readings every 30 minutes. A Turn Back Dose of 500 mR can be implemented if necessary.

The Emergency Management Director or designee will show the capability to make the decisions for the consumption of KI by emergency workers as per our plans and SOPs.

Levy County:

Procedures for emergency worker exposure control and reporting to their supervisors can also be discussed in the out of sequence drill on Oct. 30, 2012, at Lebanon Station. The emergency worker will be given a kit containing either an UltraRadiac electronic dosimeter/monitor or a Low Range and High Range PIC with an exposure card and 2 doses of KI (candy). The Worker is required to look at his dosimeters and record the readings every 30 minutes. A Turn Back Dose of 500 mR can be implemented if necessary. The Emergency Management Director or designee will show the capability to make the decisions for the consumption of KI by emergency workers.

Activity 2: Control Traffic, Crowd, and Scene (Definition: Direct/redirect traffic and pedestrians out of the affected area(s). Assess, coordinate, and establish force protection and perimeter zones, maintain a visible and effective security presence to deter criminal conduct and maintain law and order.)

2.1 Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel. (Sub-element 3.d., Implementation of Traffic and Access Control, **Criterion 3.d.1:** NUREG-0654, A.3; C.1,4; J.10.g, j).

Citrus County: This will be scenario driven and will be demonstrated through discussion between the EOC and the EOF based on Protective Action Decisions.

Law Enforcement will discuss the capability to select, establish and staff appropriate traffic and access control points, consistent with Protective Actions Decisions (PADs) in a timely manner as per our plans and SOPs.

Levy County: Will be demonstrated through discussion between the EOC and the EOF based on protective action decisions.

Law Enforcement will discuss the capability to select, establish and staff appropriate traffic and access control points, consistent with protective action decisions in a timely manner.

Division of Emergency Management:
Not Applicable

Bureau of Radiation Control:
Not Applicable

2.2 Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved. (Sub-element 3.d., Implementation of Traffic and Access Control, **Criterion 3.d.2:** NUREG-0654, J.10.k)

Citrus County: This will be demonstrated by injects and simulated response by law enforcement and fire rescue representatives in the EOC.

Law Enforcement and Emergency Management staff in the EOC will discuss our capabilities to provide instructions when modifications in Protective Actions strategies necessitate changes due to traffic impediments, road construction, etc., in evacuation patterns in area(s) per our plans and SOPs

Levy County: Law Enforcement and Emergency Management staff in the EOC will discuss our capabilities to provide instructions when modifications in Protective Actions strategies necessitate changes due to traffic impediments, road construction, etc., in evacuation patterns in area(s).

Division of Emergency Management: *Not Applicable*

Bureau of Radiation Control: *Not Applicable*

CAPABILITY: Emergency Public Information and Warning (State and County EOC, ENC and JICs)

Definition: Develop, coordinate, and disseminate accurate alerts and emergency information to the media and the public prior to an impending emergency and activate warning systems to notify those most at-risk in the event of an emergency. By refining its ability to disseminate accurate, consistent, timely, and easy-to understand information about emergency response and recovery processes, a jurisdiction can contribute to the well-being of the community during and after an emergency.

Activity 1: (ENC Only) Public Information, Alert/Warning, and Notification Plans
(**Definition:** Activate key personnel, facilities, and procedures.)

- 1.1 **ORO's use effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner.** (Sub-element 1.a, Mobilization, Criterion 1.a.1: NUREG-0654, A.1.a, e; A.3, 4; C.1,4, 6; D.4; E.1, 2; H.3, 4)

Citrus County: The CCSO PIO should proceed to the ENC at Site Area Emergency declaration.

Levy County: The LCSO PIO should proceed to the ENC at Site Area Emergency declaration.

Division of Emergency Management:

SMT/ENC: Personnel will pre-position at the EOF and will begin play after notification of an Alert. Activation will be demonstrated through discussion.

SEOC: *Not Applicable*

Bureau of Radiation Control: *Not Applicable*

- 1.2 At least two communications systems are available, at least one operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations. Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations.** (Sub element 1.d, Communications, **Criterion 1.d.1:** NUREG-0654, F.1, 2)

Citrus County: As in EOC Management Capability.

Levy County: As in EOC Management Capability.

Division of Emergency Management:

SMT/ENC: AS in EOF.

SEOC: *Not Applicable*

Bureau of Radiation Control: *Not Applicable*

- 1.3 Equipment, maps, displays, monitoring instruments, dosimetry, potassium iodide (KI), other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations.** (Sub-element 1.e., Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations, **Criterion 1.e.1:** NUREG-0654, H.7, 10; I.7, 8, 9; J.10.a, b, e; J.11, 12; K.3.a; K.5.b).

Citrus County: As in EOC Management Capability.

Levy County: As in EOC Management Capability.

Division of Emergency Management:

SMT/ENC: Demonstration of equipment and supplies to support PIO operations shall be performed during the exercise based on scenario at ENC.

SEOC: *Not Applicable*

Bureau of Radiation Control: *Not Applicable*

Activity 2: Establish Joint Information System (JIS)

(Definition: Upon assigning PIO, activate and implement the JIS/JIC and disseminate information to the public.)

- 2.1 Ensure OROs provide accurate emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media in a timely manner (The responsible ORO personnel/representatives demonstrate actions to disseminate the appropriate information/instructions with a sense of urgency and without undue delay) (Sub-element 5.b., Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media, Criterion 5.b.1: NUREG-0654, E.5, 7, G.3.a, G.4, a, c.)**

Citrus County: A location at the EOF (JIC/ENC) will be established for briefing the Media which a PIO representing CCSO EM will be present. This CCSO PIO should begin proceeding to the EOF during a declared Site Area Emergency.

The roles and functions of the PIO are described in REP SOP #8 "PIO assigned in the EOF" and REP SOP 9 "PIO assigned in the EOC".

Levy County: A location at the EOF (JIC/ENC) will be established for briefing the Media which a PIO representing LCSO/EM will be present. This LCSO PIO should begin proceeding to the EOF during a declared Site Area Emergency but may proceed before.

Division of Emergency Management:

SMT/SEOC/ENC: Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media will be coordinated with the State Management Team PIO at the ENC and the ESF14 Officer at the State EOC. Pre-scripted messages will be selected based on the events. The approval process and the release of the messages will be simulated. The SMT PIO at the ENC and the ESF14 Officer at the State EOC will coordinate their messaging with one another.

Bureau of Radiation Control:
Not Applicable

Activity 3: Issue Emergency Warnings (Definition: Upon receiving Protective Action Decisions, issue emergency public warnings through established warning systems.)

3.1 Activities associated with primary alerting and notification of the public are completed in a timely manner following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. The initial instructional message to the public must include as a minimum the elements required by FEMA REP guidance. (Sub-element 5.a., Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System, **Criterion 5.a.1:** 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E & NUREG-0654, E.5, 6, 7

Citrus County:

The activation of the Emergency Siren System is a coordinated effort between Citrus and Levy County EM Directors or their designees. The clock for sounding the sirens in a reasonable time begins when the communication over the Hot Ring Down has been completed and the phone hung up. During a declared Site Area Emergency we will select the appropriate EAS Message, determine the time to sound the sirens and simulate contacting the National Weather Service. We will simulate sounding the sirens at the reasonable selected time by performing a silent test on the system. All other siren activations will be simulated.

Levy County:

Citrus County controls the activation of the sirens. The EM director or designee at the EOF will coordinate with Citrus County for siren activations.

Division of Emergency Management:

Not Applicable

SEOC:

Not Applicable

Bureau of Radiation Control:

Not Applicable

3.2 Backup alert and notification of the public is completed within a reasonable time following the detection by the ORO of a failure of the primary alert and notification system. (Sub-element 5.a., Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System, Criterion 5.a.3: NUREG-0654, E.6, Appendix 3.B.2.c)

Citrus County: An exercise inject indicating an inoperable siren prompting Backup Route Alerting will be released. The FEMA evaluator can interview the EM Director or designee of the process we would use to perform route alerting around an inoperable siren. Examples of maps indicating areas requiring route alerting around a particular siren can be utilized in relating our process to the FEMA evaluator. As per FEMA the route alerting should be completed within 45 minutes following of a siren activation report indicating an inoperable siren. The message broadcast from the PA of the vehicle would be similar to the following: "An emergency has been declared by the Progress Energy Nuclear Plant, please tune in to your local EAS station for further information."

Levy County: An exercise inject indicating an inoperable siren prompting Backup Route Alerting to be released. The FEMA evaluator can interview the EM Director or designee of the process we would use to perform route alerting around an inoperable siren.

Division of Emergency Management:
Not Applicable

SEOC:
Not Applicable

Bureau of Radiation Control:
Not Applicable

3.3 OROs provide accurate subsequent emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media in a timely manner. (Sub-element 5.b., Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media, **Criterion 5.b.1:** NUREG-0654, E.5, 7; G.3.a, G.4.a, c)

Citrus County: A location at the EOF (JIC/ENC) will be established for briefing the Media which a PIO representing CCSO EM will be present. This CCSO PIO should begin proceeding to the EOF during a declared Site Area Emergency.

The roles and functions of the PIO are described in REP SOP #8 "PIO assigned in the EOF" and REP SOP 9 "PIO assigned in the EOC".

Levy County: A location at the EOF (JIC/ENC) will be established for briefing the Media which a PIO representing LCSO will be present. This LCSO PIO should begin proceeding to the EOF during a declared Site Area Emergency or before if directed to do so.

SMT/ENC: Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media will be coordinated with the SMT PIO at the ENC and the ESF 14 Officer at the State EOC. Pre-scripted messages will be selected based on the events. The approval process and the release of the messages will be simulated. The SMT PIO at the ENC and the ESF 14 Officer at the State EOC will coordinate their messaging with one another. All messages will be reviewed and confirmed with county and utility PIOs prior to release.

Activity 4: (ENC Only) Manage Emergency Public Information and Warnings (Definition: In response to need for public notification, provide overall management and coordination of Emergency Public Information and Warning capability.)

4.1 Provide periodic updates and conduct regularly scheduled media conferences. (Sub-element 5.b. Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media, **Criterion 5.b.1:** NUREG-0654, E.5, 7, G.3.a, G.4, a., b., c.)

Citrus County: A location at the EOF (JIC/ENC) will be established for briefing the Media which a PIO representing CCSO EM will be present. This CCSO PIO should begin proceeding to the EOF during a declared Site Area Emergency.

The roles and functions of the PIO are described in REP SOP #8 "PIO assigned in the EOF" and REP SOP 9 "PIO assigned in the EOC".

Levy County: A location at the EOF (JIC/ENC) will be established for briefing the Media which a PIO representing LCSO will be present. This LCSO PIO should begin proceeding to the EOF during a declared Site Area Emergency.

The roles and functions of the PIO are described in REP SOP #8 "PIO assigned in the EOF" and REP SOP 9 "PIO assigned in the EOC".

SMT/ENC: SMT PIO will participate in all functions of the ENC during the exercise to include regularly scheduled media conferences.

Activity 5: Provide Public Inquiry Control (Definition: Upon activation of the JIS, track inquiries for rumors.)

5.1 OROs provide accurate subsequent emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media in a timely manner. (Sub-element 5.b., Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media, **Criterion 5.b.1:** NUREG-0654, E.5, 7; G.3.a, G.4.a, c).

Citrus County: This process will be discussed or demonstrated at the EOC on Nov. 14, 2012. We will simulate contacting the National Weather Service in Ruskin to assist us with the broadcast or Notification to the public. The EM Director or designee and Levy County EM Director or designee will coordinate in deciding which of the 19 pre-written EAS Messages should be appropriate for the current situation. We will simulate telling the National Weather Service when to broadcast the EAS Message and to repeat the message every 15 minutes for one hour.

Rumor Control: The EOC will demonstrate a citizen's information line to serve as an effective system for dealing with calls for public inquiry. It will provide information that corrects false or inaccurate information when trends are noted. It will also serve as an additional source for the public to receive emergency information and a way to refer them to additional appropriate information sources.

Levy County:

This process will be discussed or demonstrated at the EOC on Nov. 14, 2012. Citrus County will simulate contacting the National Weather Service in Ruskin to assist us with the broadcast or Notification to the public. The EM Director or designee and Citrus County EM Director or designee will coordinate in deciding which EAS Messages should be appropriate for the current situation.

Rumor Control: The EOC will demonstrate a citizen's information line to serve as an effective system for dealing with calls for public inquiry.

Division of Emergency Management:

SMT/SEOC/ENC: Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media will be coordinated with the SMT PIO at the ENC and the ESF14 Officer at the State EOC. Pre-scripted messages will be selected based on the events. The approval process and the release of the messages will be simulated. The SMT PIO at the ENC and the ESF14 Officer at the State EOC will coordinate their messaging with one another.

Bureau of Radiation Control:

Not Applicable

CAPABILITY: HAZMAT Decontamination and Response (Reception Centers, Emergency Worker Decontamination and Dose Assessment)

Definition: HAZMAT Response and Decontamination is the capability to assess and manage the consequences of a hazardous materials release, either accidental or as part of a terrorist attack. It includes testing and identifying all likely hazardous substances onsite; ensuring that responders have protective clothing and equipment; conducting rescue operations to remove affected victims from the hazardous environment; conducting geographical survey searches of suspected sources or contamination spreads and establishing isolation perimeters; mitigating the effects of hazardous materials, decontaminating on-site victims, responders, and equipment; coordinating off-site decontamination with relevant agencies, and notifying environmental, health, and law enforcement agencies having jurisdiction for the incident to begin implementation of their standard evidence collection and investigation procedures.

Activity 1: Site Management and Control (Definition: In response to activation, mobilize and arrive at the incident scene and initiate response operations to manage and secure the physical layout of the incident.)

- 1.1 ORO's use effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner.** (Sub-element 1.a, Mobilization, **Criterion 1.a.1:** NUREG-0654, A.1.a, e; A.3, 4; C.1,4, 6; D.4; E.1, 2; H.3, 4).

Citrus County: (OOS) All participating personnel will be pre-positioned at their EW Decontamination site for demonstration during OOS activities, Crystal River National Guard Armory October 29, 2012 at 10:00AM . Alert and notification procedures will be discussed with FEMA evaluators at this time.

Levy County: (OOS) All participating personnel will be pre-positioned at their EW Decontamination site for demonstration during OOS activities, Lebanon Station October 30, 2012 at 6:30PM. Alert and notification procedures will be discussed with FEMA evaluators at this time.

Division of Emergency Management:
Not Applicable

Bureau of Radiation Control:

DOSE: BRC personnel will arrive at the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) within one hour after the Alert ECL has been declared.

Field Teams: All Play simulated

Mobile Labs: All Play Simulated

- 1.2 Key personnel with leadership roles for the ORO provide direction and control to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible.** (Sub-element 1.c.1, Direction and Control, **Criterion 1.c.1:** NUREG-0654, A.1.d; A.2.a, b; A.3; C.4, 6).

Citrus County: *Senior person on site will demonstrate overall direction control and coordination with teams and other relevant agencies.*

Levy County: *Senior person on site will demonstrate overall direction control and coordination with teams and other relevant agencies.*

Division of Emergency Management:
Not Applicable

Bureau of Radiation Control:

The Operation Officer will demonstrate overall direction and control of Dose. Although field teams are not evaluated they should be managed through discussion with FEMA evaluator.

- 1.3 At least two communications systems are available, at least one operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations. Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations.** (Sub element 1.d, Communications, **Criterion 1.d.1:** NUREG-0654, F.1, 2).

Citrus County: *Communications will be in accordance with applicable plans and procedures.*

Levy County: *Communications will be in accordance with applicable plans and procedures.*

Division of Emergency Management:
Not Applicable

Bureau of Radiation Control:

Not Applicable, we are not running field teams for evaluation – only for training. Information the teams would gather is being furnished through injects.

- 1.4 Equipment, maps, displays, monitoring instruments, dosimetry, potassium iodide (KI) and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations.** (Sub-element 1.e, Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations, **Criterion 1.e.1:** NUREG-0654, H.7, 10; I.7, 8, 9; J.10.a, b, e; J.11, 12; K.3.a; K.5.b).

Citrus County: All radiation detection equipment will be inspected and operationally checked before each use. Radiological equipment will be calibrated or leak tested in accordance with existing plans. KI use will be simulated.

Decision to show when we would set up the Emergency Vehicle WashDown will be discussed/performed at the EOC on Nov. 14, 2012 but the actual set up will be conducted on Oct. 29, 2012 at the Crystal River National Guard Armory.

SAV: Site Area Visit will be completed in the morning of Oct. 15, 2012 at the EOC. An inspection of our instruments, Dosimeters, TLDs, KI inventory for emergency workers and training records will be conducted. Also, FEMA will visit Citrus County Health Dept. to inspect their inventory of KI for the General Public.

EWD: The Emergency Vehicle Wash Down Area will be set up and demonstrated out of sequence on Oct 29, 2012 at the Crystal River National Guard Armory. Two vehicles will be used. One showing as clean and a second one showing contamination in the front driver side wheel well. Contamination will be found on the driver's right hand and his left shoulder. No other contamination will be found. A picture of a TLD held with a clip and candy representing KI will be used by emergency workers.

Dress out will take place in the building. Instrument pre-operational checks, background determination and a safety briefing will be performed.

A Demonstration at the Vehicle Wash Down will show our methods/process for the following:

- vehicle and personnel monitoring
- vehicle and personnel decon
- vehicle and personnel documentation
- isolation of vehicles and/or equipment
- handling of contaminated waste
- flow path of our Wash Down and show station to control spread of contamination
- our method of donning and doffing of personal protective equipment

Levy County:

All radiation detection equipment will be inspected and operationally checked before each use. Radiological equipment will be calibrated or leak tested in accordance with existing plans. KI use will be simulated.

Decision to show when we would set up the Emergency Vehicle Wash Down will be discussed at the EOC on Nov. 14, 2012 but the actual set up will be conducted on Oct. 30, 2012 at Lebanon Station.

SAV:

Will be completed in the afternoon of Oct. 15, 2012 at the EOC. An inspection of our instruments, Dosimeters, TLDs, KI inventory for emergency workers and training records will be conducted. Will visit Levy County Health Dept. to inspect their inventory of KI for the General Public.

EWD:

The Emergency Vehicle Wash Down Area will be set up and demonstrated out of sequence on Oct 30, 2012 at Lebanon Station. Two vehicles will be used. One showing as clean and a second one showing contamination in the front grill. Contamination will be found on both hands of the driver. No other contamination will be found. A picture of a TLD held with a clip and "SIMULATED" KI will be used by emergency workers.

Dress out will take place under the dress out tent. Instrument pre-operational checks, background determination at the meter issue table, and a safety briefing will be performed.

A Demonstration at the Vehicle Wash Down will show our methods/process for the following:

- vehicle and personnel monitoring
- vehicle and personnel decon
- vehicle and personnel documentation
- isolation of vehicles and/or equipment
- handling of contaminated waste
- flow path of our Wash Down and show station to control spread of contamination
- our method of donning and doffing of personal protective equipment.

Division of Emergency Management:

Not Applicable

Bureau of Radiation Control:

DOSE: Dose equipment at the EOF will be evaluated by interview and observation during the exercise.

1.5 (Dose Assessment only) OROs use a decision-making process, considering relevant factors and appropriate coordination, to ensure that an exposure control system, including the use of KI, is in place for emergency workers including provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or protective action guides. (Sub-element 2.a., Emergency Worker Exposure Control, Criterion 2.a.1: NUREG-0654, C.6; J.10. e, f; K.4).

Citrus County: *Not Applicable*

Levy County: *Not Applicable*

Division of Emergency Management:

Not Applicable

Bureau of Radiation Control:

DOSE: BRC will discuss with the FEMA evaluator how exposure control decisions would be made for field monitoring teams.

Activity 2: Hazard Assessment & Risk Evaluation.

- 2.1 **(Dose Assessment only) Appropriate protective action recommendations (PARs) are based on available information on plant conditions, field monitoring data, and licensee and ORO dose projections, as well as knowledge of onsite and offsite environmental conditions.** (Sub-element 2.b., Radiological Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations and Decisions for the Plume Phase of the Emergency, **Criterion 2.b.1:** NUREG-0654, I. 10, and Supplement 3.).

Information normally provided by field teams will be provided by a controller through injects at appropriate times.

Citrus County: Not Applicable

Levy County: Not Applicable

Division of Emergency Management:
Not Applicable

Bureau of Radiation Control:

DOSE: BRC will make appropriate Protective Action recommendations based on field data and exercise play. Field data will be provided through injects.

- 2.2 **The OROs issue appropriate dosimetry, KI, and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plans/procedures. Emergency workers periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart. OROs maintain appropriate record-keeping of the administration of KI to emergency workers.** (Sub-element 3.a., Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control, **Criterion 3.a.1:** NUREG-0654, J.10.e; K.3.a, b; K.4).

Citrus County: Procedures for emergency workers exposure control will be discussed in the EOC on Nov. 14, 2012 during the exercise by the EM Director or designee. The issuance of the dosimeter kits and instruments will be performed out of sequence during the Emergency Vehicle Wash Down demonstration. **Emergency workers will be interviewed to determine their knowledge of radiation incident response procedures (i.e. exposure limits, protective clothing, dose record keeping, etc.). Personal exposure forms will be completed by emergency workers during OOS activities and provided to FEMA evaluators upon conclusion.**

OOS: The Vehicle Wash Down demonstration will be conducted at the Crystal River National Guard Armory on the morning of Oct. 29, 2012.

EWD: Emergency workers will be given instrument kits containing UltraRadiac electronic dosimeters/monitors with exposure cards or a dosimeter kit containing a low range dosimeter and high range dosimeter with exposure cards. They will also be given a picture representing a TLD and candy representing two doses of KI. The emergency worker is required to look at their dosimeter every 30 minutes and document their reading on their exposure record card.

The worker is required to notify his supervisor of his dose every 6 hours and if/when he reaches a total dose of 100 mRem. 500mRem total exposure is the limit set for emergency workers. This is also considered our turn-back dose. If required, procedures are set up for emergency workers to exceed 500mRem exposure limit if authorized by their supervisor and the EM Director or designee and accepted by the emergency worker.

EWD/Reception Center: NOT REQUIRED THIS EXERCISE

Levy County: Procedures for emergency workers exposure control will be discussed in the EOC on Nov. 14, 2012 during the exercise by the EM Director or designee. The issuance of the dosimeter kits and instruments will be performed out of sequence during the Emergency Vehicle Wash Down demonstration. **Emergency workers will be interviewed to determine their knowledge of radiation incident response procedures (i.e. exposure limits, protective clothing, dose record keeping, etc.). Personal exposure forms will be completed by emergency workers during OOS activities and provided to FEMA evaluators upon conclusion.**

OOS: The Vehicle Wash Down demonstration will be conducted at Lebanon Station on Oct. 30, 2012 at 6:30 PM.

EWD: Emergency workers will be given instrument kits containing UltraRadiac electronic dosimeters/monitors with exposure cards or a dosimeter kit containing a low range dosimeter and high range dosimeter with exposure cards. They will also be given a picture representing a TLD and KI (simulated). The emergency workers dosimeter will be checked every 30 minutes and recorded on an exposure record form by scribes. If required, procedures are set up for emergency workers to exceed 500mRem exposure limit if authorized by their supervisor and the EM Director or designee and accepted by the emergency worker.

EWD/Reception Center: NOT REQUIRED THIS EXERCISE

Division of Emergency Management:
Not Applicable.

Bureau of Radiation Control:

Field Teams: Not applicable, field operations are for training only – not for evaluation.

2.3 KI and appropriate instructions are available should a decision to recommend use of KI be made. Appropriate record keeping of the administration of KI for institutionalized individuals is maintained. (Sub-element 3.b., Implementation of KI Decision, **Criterion 3.b.1:** NUREG-0654, J.10.e, f).

Citrus County: The EM Director or designee will demonstrate the capability to make the decisions to distribute KI based on the scenario and BRC recommendations. Implementation of the KI decisions will be demonstrated in the EOC but the actual distribution will be simulated.

OOS: The Vehicle Wash Down demonstration will be conducted at the Crystal River National Guard Armory on the morning of Oct. 29, 2012.

EWD: Emergency worker knowledge for the ingestion of KI will be determined by interview of the emergency worker (Fire Fighter Personnel) during the Vehicle Wash Down Demonstration. Two KI doses with information sheet on effects, when to take them and dosages will be distributed with the dosimeter kits. Exposure record cards requesting the time KI was ingested are included with the dosimeter kits. If a recommendation from BRC/Progress Energy to take KI is given, the EM Director will give the authorization for emergency workers to take the first dose at a specified time. When the first KI dose is ingested a second dose should be ingested 24 hours later.

Levy County: The EM Director or designee will demonstrate the capability to make the decisions to distribute KI based on the scenario and BRC recommendations. Implementation of the KI decisions will be demonstrated in the EOC but the actual distribution will be simulated.

OOS: The Vehicle Wash Down demonstration will be conducted at Lebanon Station on Oct. 30, 2012.

EWD: Emergency worker knowledge for the ingestion of KI will be determined by interview of the emergency worker (Fire Fighter Personnel) during the Vehicle Wash Down Demonstration. KI with information sheet on effects, when to take will be distributed with the dosimeter kits. Exposure record cards requesting the time KI was ingested are included with the dosimeter kits. If a recommendation from BRC/Progress Energy to take KI is given, the EM Director will give the authorization for emergency workers to take.

Division of Emergency Management:
Not Applicable

Bureau of Radiation Control:

Field Teams:

Not applicable as field teams are for training only – not for evaluation.

BRC will use potassium iodide as stated in standard operating procedures. Based on the scenario's release of radioactive iodine, the Operations Officer will direct KI be taken by state radiation workers and will notify the affected counties of the decision. For this exercise our field team personnel will be issued hard rock candy to take if they so choose to simulate KI. During a rapidly escalating incident, where releases of radioiodine are imminent or have occurred, the county health officers may recommend county radiation workers take KI before consultation with the Operations Officer.

- 2.4 (Dose Assessment only) Field teams (2 or more) are managed to obtain sufficient information to help characterize the release and to control radiation exposure. (Sub-Element 4.a., Plume Phase Field Measurements and Analyses, Criterion 4.a.2: NUREG-0654, H.12; I.8, 11; J.10.a)**

Citrus County: *Not Applicable*

Levy County: *Not Applicable*

Division of Emergency Management:
Not Applicable

Bureau of Radiation Control:

Field Teams:

BRC will discuss this criterion with the FEMA evaluators at the EOF.

- 2.5 Ambient radiation measurements are made and recorded at appropriate locations, and radioiodine and particulate samples are collected. Teams will move to an appropriate low background location to determine whether any significant (as specified in the plan and/or procedures) amount of radioactivity has been collected on the sampling media. (Sub-Element 4.a., Plume Phase Field Measurements and Analyses, Criterion 4.a.3: NUREG-0654, I.9).**

Citrus County: *Not Applicable*

Levy County: *Not Applicable*

Division of Emergency Management:
Not Applicable

Bureau of Radiation Control:

Field Teams:

Not applicable as field teams are for training only – not for evaluation. Data that would be collected and provided by field teams will be provided through injects.

Activity 3: Decontamination and Cleanup/Recovery Operations.

- 3.1 The reception center facility has appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide monitoring, decontamination, and registration of evacuees. (Sub-element 6.a., Monitoring, Decontamination and Registration of Evacuees, Criterion 6.a.1: NUREG-0654, A.3; C.4; J.10.h; J.12).**

NOT Evaluated This Exercise.

Reception Centers would be demonstrated out-of-sequence. At least six people will be monitored and registered. Personnel decontamination will be demonstrated via walk-through and discussion. All necessary supplies will be on hand. Walkways will not be entirely covered with barrier material; however, some markings will be used to aid in directing evacuees.

A monitoring productivity rate will be developed by the FEMA evaluator. Demonstration will include the necessary radiological monitoring equipment and monitoring teams required to monitor 20% of the population allocated to the facility within 12 hours. At least **two vehicles** will be monitored and one vehicle will be processed as contaminated. Vehicle decontamination will be discussed in accordance with local SOPs.

3.2 The facility/ORO has adequate procedures and resources to accomplish monitoring and decontamination of emergency workers, their equipment and vehicles. (Sub-element 6.b, Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Workers, their Equipment and vehicles Criterion 6.b.1: NUREG-0654, K.5.a, b).

Emergency Worker Monitoring and Decontamination will be demonstrated Out of Sequence. Each location will display all necessary supplies in accordance with local SOPs. Water **will not** be used in demonstrating personnel decontamination. Two emergency workers will be monitored at each EWD location. Personnel decontamination will be demonstrated via demonstration and discussion. Two emergency vehicles will be monitored and decontaminated in accordance with local SOPs at each location. Water **will** be used when demonstrating decontamination of the emergency vehicles.

Citrus County Out of Sequence: SAV, Oct. 15, 2012
EWD, Oct. 29, 2012
School Interview, Oct. 29, 2012

Levy County Out of Sequence: SAV, Oct 15, 2012
EWD, Oct. 30, 2012
School Interview, Oct. 30, 2012

Citrus County: This objective will be demonstrated out of sequence on Oct. 29, 2012 at the Crystal River National Guard Armory on 8554 W. Venable St. Fire Rescue set up and demonstrate the operation of our Emergency Vehicle Wash Down Station.

The emergency workers will perform instrument pre-operational checks as described in REP SOP 21. An area found to be two times background will be considered contaminated and the appropriate paperwork will be initiated. All assigned workers in the posted contaminated area will be assigned dosimetry.

A demonstration at the Emergency Vehicle Wash Down area will show our methods/process for the following:

- vehicle and personnel monitoring
- vehicle and personnel decon
- isolation of vehicles and/or equipment
- handling of contaminated waste
- flow path of our Wash Down and show control of the spread of contamination
- our method of donning and doffing of personal protective equipment

The emergency worker will monitor a total of two vehicles showing proper documentation being completed. One vehicle will be clean and redirected out of the Wash Down Area and we will simulate the second vehicle to show contamination. At station 1, we will have two monitoring workers and one radiation safety officer. The emergency workers will monitor strategic locations on the second vehicle which we will simulate finding contamination in the driver side wheel well. Information will be filled out on documentation which will follow the vehicle. The vehicle will then proceed to station 2 which will have two decontamination workers. The radiation safety officer will inform the decontamination workers of the contamination location and the amount found at station 1. The workers will then proceed with the hand brush decontamination process. The vehicle will then be directed to proceed through the Wash Down Apparatus to station 3. Two monitoring workers will then re-survey the external area of the vehicle confirming the decontamination process was successful. If not, the workers will direct the driver to back up and return to station 2 to repeat the decon process. If the monitoring confirms the external decon process was successful, then the driver will be asked to open the vehicle door. The workers will then monitor the driver's hands, head and shoulders, and feet.

Contamination will be simulated to show contamination on the driver's right hand and left shoulder. Documentation will be filled out to show, contamination location and amount. The documentation will follow along with the driver. The workers will continue to monitor strategic locations on the interior of the vehicle showing no additional contamination and documentation filled out.

The vehicle will be impounded and the driver will be given booties and gloves and directed to station 4, the personnel monitoring area where two monitoring workers will complete detailed monitoring procedure which will show no additional contamination found. The driver will be given information about the chain of custody system, given a paper suit then directed to station 5, the personnel decontamination shower. The emergency worker will give direction on the proper removal of the contaminated clothing, place the clothing in a plastic bag, as well as proper washing and will be ask to come out the other end to be monitored. The worker can show FEMA the personnel decontamination shower system. The worker will simulate a shower was completed. Two additional monitoring workers will monitor the driver at the end of the shower system which will show the shower decon process was completed successfully and documentation filled out. The driver will be given booties and gloves then directed to the Access Control Point, where two additional monitoring workers will complete a final monitoring procedure.

Levy County:

This objective will be demonstrated out of sequence on Oct. 30, 2012 at Lebanon Station located at the intersection of US Hwy 19 and CR 326.

The emergency workers will perform instrument pre-operational checks at the meter issue table. An area found to be two times background will be considered contaminated and the appropriate paperwork will be initiated. All assigned workers in the posted contaminated area will be assigned dosimetry.

A demonstration at the Emergency Vehicle Wash Down area will show our methods/process for the following:

- vehicle and personnel monitoring
- vehicle and personnel decon
- isolation of vehicles and/or equipment
- handling of contaminated waste
- flow path of our Wash Down and show control of the spread of contamination
- our method of donning and doffing of personal protective equipment.

The emergency workers will monitor a total of two vehicles showing proper documentation being completed. One vehicle will be clean and redirected out of the Wash Down Area and we will simulate the second vehicle to show contamination in the grill. The driver of contaminated vehicle will be contaminated on backside of both hands. We will show decon process for both vehicle and driver.

Division of Emergency Management:
Not Applicable

Bureau of Radiation Control:
Not applicable as field teams are for training only – not for evaluation.

- 3.3 (Medical Service Drill Only) The facility/ORO has the appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide transport, monitoring, decontamination, and medical services to contaminated injured individuals.** (Sub-element 6.d, Transportation and Treatment of Contaminated Injured Individuals, **Criterion 6.d.1:** NUREG-0564/FEMA-REP-1, F2; H.10; K.5.a, b; L.1 4).

CAPABILITY: Mass Care

Definition: Mass Care is the capability to provide immediate shelter, feeding centers, basic first aid, bulk distribution of needed items, and related services to persons affected by a large-scale incident, including special needs populations. Special needs populations include individuals with physical or mental disabilities who require medical attention or personal care beyond basic first aid. Other special-needs populations include non-English speaking populations that may need to have information presented in other languages. The mass care capability also provides for pet care/handling through local government and appropriate animal-related organizations. Mass care is usually performed by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), such as the American Red Cross, or by local government-sponsored volunteer efforts, such as Citizen Corps. Special-needs populations are generally the responsibility of local government, with medical needs addressed by the medical community and/or its alternate care facilities. State and Federal entities also play a role in public and environmental health by ensuring safe conditions, safe food, potable water, sanitation, clean air, etc.

Activity 1: Establish Shelter Operations (Congregate Care) (Definition Staff and equip shelter in preparation to receive displaced persons and/or companion animals.)

- 1.1 Managers of congregate care facilities demonstrate that the centers have the resources to provide services and accommodations consistent with American Red Cross planning. Managers demonstrate the procedures to assure that evacuees have been monitored for contamination and have been decontaminated as appropriate prior to entering congregate care facilities. (Sub-element 6.c, Temporary Care of Evacuees, Criterion 6.c.1: NUREG-0654, J.10.h, 12.).**

NOT Evaluated this Exercise

CAPABILITY: Public Health Laboratory Testing (BRC).

Definition: The Public Health Laboratory Testing capability is the ongoing surveillance, rapid detection, confirmatory testing, data reporting, investigative support, and laboratory networking to address potential exposure, or known exposure, to all-hazards which include chemical, radiochemical, and biological agents in all matrices including clinical specimens, food and environmental samples, (e.g., water, air, soil). All-hazard threats include those deliberately released with criminal intent, as well as those that may be present as a result of unintentional or natural occurrences.

Activity 1: Direct Public Health Laboratory Testing

(Definition: Direct and coordinate local, State, and Federal public health, food testing, veterinary diagnostic, and environmental testing laboratory efforts in response to a radiological incident.)

- 1.1 Equipment, maps, displays, dosimeters, potassium iodide (KI), other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations. (Sub-element 1.e, Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations, Criterion 1.e.1: NUREG-0654, H., J.10.a.b.e.f.j.k, 11, K.3.a).**

Bureau of Radiation Control:

Mobile Labs: Not applicable mobile lab is for training only, – not for evaluation.

- 1.2 The OROs issue appropriate dosimeters and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plans and procedures. Emergency workers periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart. (Sub-element 3.a., Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control, Criterion 3.a.1: NUREG-0654, K.3).**

Bureau of Radiation Control:

Mobile Lab: Not applicable mobile lab is for training only, – not for evaluation.

- 1.3 The laboratory is capable of performing required radiological analyses to support protective action decisions. (Sub-Element 4.c., Laboratory Operations, Criterion 4.c.1: NUREG-0654, C.3, I.8, 9, J.11)**

Bureau of Radiation Control:

Mobile Lab: Not applicable mobile lab is for training only, – not for evaluation.

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