

**Spent Fuel Transportation Risk
Assessment (SFTRA)
Draft NUREG Rev. 2.3**

Overview for SFAS
2/22/2012



Purpose of Briefing

- Overview of SFTRA and related activities
 - Project and review teams
 - Purpose and goals
 - Basic Methodology
 - Improvements relative to previous studies
 - Structure and format
 - A few key results
 - Findings and conclusions
 - Schedule
 - Challenges



SFTRA Project and Review Teams



- Sandia National Laboratory
 - Doug Ammerman – principal investigator and structural
 - Carlos Lopez – thermal
 - Ruth Weiner – RADTRAN
- SFST's SFTRA Review Team *Association*
 - Gordon Bjorkman – structural
 - Chris Bajwa – thermal and overall message
 - Bob Einziger – fuels, source term
 - Anita Gray – health physics
- Review team member comments have been incorporated in Rev. 2.3, and all review team members concur in publishing Rev. 2.3 for Public Comment
- Oak Ridge External Peer Review Team
 - Matt Feldman
 - Cecil Parks
 - Other technical staff
- All ORNL comments also incorporated in Rev 2.3

Rev 1.0 - May 2010

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SFTRA Purpose and goals

- Continuing review
 - FEIS (NUREG-0170, 1977)
 - "Modal Study" (NUREG/CR-4829, 1987) *Urban*
 - "Reexamination..." (NUREG/CR-6672, 2000)
- NRC's safety mission
 - Considering public comment, provide updated basis for conclusion that NRC's regulations applicable to spent fuel transportation provide adequate public health and safety
- Outreach responsibilities
 - Reassure public regarding spent fuel shipments
 - Basic message: Risks are low so safety is high
 - Improve public understanding and acceptance of spent fuel shipments
- Update benchmark for environmental assessments
- Potential shipments
 - Significant issue when study began (2006) – much less so now (post Yucca Mtn shutdown)
 - Nevertheless applicable to future shipments

Strenuous
no pending comments

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SFTRA Basic Methodology

- Perform finite element analysis of cask response to impact and thermal accident conditions
- Use DOT “event trees” to estimate probabilities of accident conditions
- Use RADTRAN to calculate routine doses and accident dose risks for representative truck and rail shipments
- Approach similar to that in NUREG-0170 and NUREG/CR-6672

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SFTRA improvements over previous NRC spent fuel risk studies

- New rail and truck event trees
- RADTRAN new Version 6:
 - Elevated releases
 - New loss of shielding analysis
- Updated population data (2000 Census; trying to revise to 2010 Census pending TRAGIS update)
- Updated traffic density and accident data for truck and rail
- Hi-fidelity HI-STAR 100 and NAC-STC cask finite element models, including impact limiters
- Direct loaded fuel and welded inner canister fuel
- More precise structural (e.g., bolt model) and thermal (e.g., 3-D) analyses
 - better estimate of cask-to-environment release fractions

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SFTRA Report Structure and Format


- Audience
 - Public, media, industry, states, elected officials, federal agencies
- Graded structure and content
 - MD 3.7 and NUREG-0650
- Executive Summary and Public Summary [All audiences] *2 pg* *11 pg*
- Main body text [informed public, states, science media]
- Appendices [industry, other federal agencies] *equations, etc*
- Electronic and printed versions of Final SFTRA NUREG planned (latter may be limited)

before results



SFTRA Results: Routine conditions

Collective doses from background and from Maine Yankee to ORNL truck shipments of spent nuclear fuel (person-Sv).




*7.5600
No shipment*

*7.5629
Shipment*



SFTRA Results: Accident conditions

Accident collective dose risks from release and loss of gamma shielding (LOS) accidents. The LOS bars are not to scale.



study was flawed
 This study Rail stud (conductor)

Direct loaded



SFTRA Findings

- The collective dose risks from routine transportation are vanishingly small. **These doses are about four to five orders of magnitude less than collective background radiation dose.**
- The routes selected for this study adequately represent the routes for spent nuclear fuel transport, and there was relatively little variation in the risks per kilometer over these routes.
- **Radioactive material would not be released in an accident if the fuel is contained in an inner welded canister inside the cask.**
- Only rail casks without inner welded canisters would release radioactive material, and only then in exceptionally severe accidents.
- If there were an accident during a spent fuel shipment, there is only about one in a billion chance the accident would result in a release of radioactive material.
- **If there were a release of radioactive material in a spent fuel shipment accident, the dose to the maximum exposed individual would be less than 2 Sv, about the dose given in a single radiotherapy treatment to cancer patients.**

Any spent shipment acc. rate 10⁻⁷ so (in a billion) and then just use NRC - inner canisters



SFTRA Findings cont'd

- The collective dose risks for the two types of extra-regulatory accidents (accidents involving a release of radioactive material and loss of lead shielding accidents) are negligible compared to the risk from a no-release, no-loss of shielding accident.
- The risk of loss of shielding from a fire is negligible.
- None of the fire accidents investigated in this study resulted in a release of radioactive material.

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SFTRA Conclusion

- Based on these findings, **this study reconfirms that radiological impacts from spent fuel transportation conducted in compliance with NRC regulations are low**, in fact generally less than previous, already low, estimates.
Accordingly, with respect to spent fuel transportation, the previous NRC conclusion that the **regulations for transportation of radioactive material are adequate to protect the public against unreasonable risk** is also reconfirmed by this study.

support to activities
safety response,
for safety in
transport

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SFTRA Current Schedule

Milestone	Date
1. Submit Rev 2.3 to publications for NRC edit	2/15/2012 (completed)
2. Publications returns edited copy	3/15/2012
3. Publish for comment in Fed Reg	4/15/2012
4. Public comments due	6/15/2012
5. Sandia response to public comments (Rev 3.0)	7/15/2012
6. ACRS subcommittee review	8-9/15/2012 (unscheduled)
7. Sandia delivers final Draft NUREG (Rev. 4.0)	9/30/2012 (contract expires)
8. NRC publishes Final NUREG	By 12/31/2012

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SFTRA Challenges

- External:
 - Possible post-Fukushima public apprehension over nuclear activities
 - Policy-based opposition by certain environmental groups
- Internal:
 - Extent/response effort for public comments may exceed that planned
 - Placeholder to update population data to 2010 Census
 - ACRS review schedule not under our control
 - Sandia contract expires 9/30/2012

contract in ide

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