



December 28, 2012

Subject: 10 C.F.R. Part 21 Notification to Customers – COM-5 and SSC-T Protective Relays –
Telephone Relay Armature Pivot Pin

Notification By: ABB Inc.
4300 Coral Ridge Drive
Coral Springs, FL 33065

The following Notification is being resubmitted to include "Attachment 1" which was inadvertently omitted in the original fax.

Should you have any further questions, please contact me.

Best Regards,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Bryan Tauzer", is written over a horizontal line.

Bryan Tauzer
Quality Manager
ABB, Inc
4300 Coral Ridge Drive
Coral Springs, FL, 33065
Office: 954 825 0663
Mobile: 954 299 5761

4 Pages total in this Fax

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NRR



December 21, 2012

Document Control Desk
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555-0001

Subject: 10 C.F.R. Part 21 Notification to Customers – COM-5 and SSC-T Protective Relays
– Telephone Relay Armature Pivot Pin

Notification By: ABB Inc.
Distribution Automation
4300 Coral Ridge Drive
Coral Springs, FL 33065

Dear Sir or Madam,

ABB Coral Springs received notice from ABB Inc. in Florence, South Carolina of a return request by NextEra Energy (Point Beach Nuclear Plant) for one of our COM-5 relays. The customer complaint was identified as “A pin on the telephone relay fell out”.

ABB Coral Springs received the relay on October 25, 2012 with the telephone relay armature and armature pivot pin disassembled. The assembly process for the telephone relay armature calls for the armature pivot pin to have a knurl at one end and a flare at the opposite end. The knurl and flare secures the armature to the pivot pin. Our investigation found that on this telephone relay, the pivot pin was flared on the same end as that which had the knurl. It was determined that this was due to an operator error while performing a secondary operation.

The telephone relay was stamped with a manufacturing date code 08-38, indicating the thirty-eighth week of 2008. It is important to note the date of manufacture, as in mid 2010 the supplier and the assembly manufacturing process of the pin was changed. The hole and flaring was changed such that it is performed prior to cutting the pin to length, eliminating the secondary operation and potential for error.

In addition to the change to the flaring process described above, corrective action includes the addition of an additional step to our final Product Inspection procedure where all telephone relays are verified to have the knurl at one end of the armature pivot pin and a flare at the opposite end.

Inspection of our stock identified no similar condition.

We have identified COM-5 and SSC-T relays which shipped that may have a telephone relay of the same vintage as that of the subject telephone relay. There were eleven orders shipped, totaling twenty-five units to three customers; ABB Inc. Florence, S.C., Exelon Business Services and WESCO Distribution, Inc. Please see Attachment 1. ABB has determined that it does not have the capability to perform an evaluation to determine if a defect exists, and therefore in accordance with 10 C.F.R. 21.21(b), we are notifying our affected customers so that they may evaluate the deviation or failure to comply, pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 21(a).



A failure of the Telephone Relay to operate on either the COM-5 or SSC-T relay can result in the breaker not tripping during an overload condition. This condition could compromise the ability of the relay to perform its intended safety function.

We are providing our customers with the option of inspecting for evidence of the knurl and flare or returning the relays so we may perform the inspection.

Very truly yours,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Bryan Tauzer', is written over a horizontal line.

Bryan Tauzer

For Dennis Batovsky
Managing Director



ATTACHMENT 1
December 21, 2012

Subject: 10 C.F.R. Part 21 Notification to Customers – COM-5 and SSC-T Protective Relays –
Telephone Relay Armature Pivot Pin

Notification By: ABB Inc.
4300 Coral Ridge Drive
Coral Springs, FL 33065

Attachment 1 To 10CFR Part 21 Notification December 21, 2012 Defective Telephone Relay							
CUST. NAME	CUST. PO#	SALES ORDER #	ITEM#	STYLE	DESCRIPTION	QTY.	1E SERIAL Nos.
ABB Inc Florence MV Breaker	4500311122	AA0311122	10	1326D81A12	COM5 CLASS 1E	3	12558 Thru 12560
ABB Inc Florence MV Breaker	4500311122	AA0311122	40	1321D79A19	COM5 CLASS 1E	1	12570
ABB Inc Florence MV Breaker	4500487977	AA0487977	10	1326D81A12	COM5 CLASS 1E	6	12698 Thru 12703
ABB Inc Florence MV Breaker	4500763228	AA0763228	10	1326D81A07	COM5 CLASS 1E	1	12758
ABB Inc Florence MV Breaker	4500042219	CRS2010	10	1321D79A02	SSCT CLASS 1E	3	12166 Thru 12168
ABB Inc Florence MV Breaker	4500343779	AA0343779	10	1321D79A19	SSCT CLASS 1E	2	12650 and 12651
ABB Inc Florence MV Breaker	4500343779	AA0343779	90	1321D79A19	SSCT CLASS 1E	1	12652
ABB Inc Florence MV Breaker	4500515387	AA0515387	10	1321D79A02	SSCT CLASS 1E	1	12675
Exelon Business Services	459571	ENW0386	10	1326D81A01	COM5 CLASS 1E	1	12508
Exelon Business Services	474090	ENW0491	10	1326D81A01	COM5 CLASS 1E	3	12666 Thru 12668
WESCO Distribution, Inc.	3365-406137	VEP4339	10	1326D81A02	COM5 CLASS 1E	3	12481 Thru 12483

Part 21 (PAR)

Event # 48621

Rep Org: ABB INC.	Notification Date / Time: 12/21/2012 16:27 (EST)
Supplier: ABB INC.	Event Date / Time: 10/25/2012 (EST)
	Last Modification: 12/21/2012
Region: 1	Docket #:
City: CORAL SPRINGS	Agreement State: Yes
County:	License #:
State: FL	
NRC Notified by: BRYAN TAUZER	Notifications: GORDON HUNEGS R1DO
HQ Ops Officer: HOWIE CROUCH	BRIAN BONSER R2DO
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY	KENNETH RIEMER R3DO
10 CFR Section:	BLAIR SPITZBERG R4DO
21.21(a)(2) INTERIM EVAL OF DEVIATION	PART 21 GROUP EMAIL

DEFECT DISCOVERED IN COM-5 AND SSC-T PROTECTIVE RELAYS DISTRIBUTED BY ABB, INC.

The following information was obtained by ABB, Inc. via fax:

"ABB Coral Springs received notice from ABB Inc. in Florence, South Carolina of a return request by NextEra Energy (Point Beach Nuclear Plant) for one of [their] COM-5 relays. The customer complaint was identified as 'A pin on the telephone relay fell out'.

"ABB Coral Springs received the relay on October 25, 2012 with the telephone relay armature and armature pivot pin disassembled. The assembly process for the telephone relay armature calls for the armature pivot pin to have a knurl at one end and a flare at the opposite end. The knurl and flare secures the armature to the pivot pin. [ABB's] investigation found that on this telephone relay, the pivot pin was flared on the same end as that which had the knurl. It was determined that this was due to an operator error while performing a secondary operation.

"The telephone relay was stamped with a manufacturing date code 08-38, indicating the thirty-eighth week of 2008. It is important to note the date of manufacture, as in mid-2010 the supplier and the assembly manufacturing process of the pin was changed. The hole and flaring was changed such that it is performed prior to cutting the pin to length, eliminating the secondary operation and potential for error.

"In addition to the change to the flaring process described above, corrective action includes the addition of an additional step to [ABB's] final Product Inspection procedure where all telephone relays are verified to have the knurl at one end of the armature pivot pin and a flare at the opposite end.

"Inspection of [ABB's] stock identified no similar condition.

Part 21 (PAR)

Event # 48621

"[ABB has] identified COM-5 and SSC-T relays which shipped that may have a telephone relay of the same vintage as that of the subject telephone relay. There were eleven orders shipped, totaling twenty-five units to three customers; ABB Inc. Florence, S.C., Exelon Business Services and WESCO Distribution, Inc.. ABB has determined that it does not have the capability to perform an evaluation to determine if a defect exists, and therefore in accordance with 10 CFR 21.21(b), [ABB is] notifying [their] affected customers so that they may evaluate the deviation or failure to comply, pursuant to 10 CFR 21(a).

"A failure of the Telephone Relay to operate on either the COM-5 or SSC-T relay can result in the breaker not tripping during an overload condition. This condition could compromise the ability of the relay to perform its intended safety function.

"[ABB is] providing [their] customers with the option of inspecting for evidence of the knurl and flare or returning the relays so [they] may perform the inspection."
