



Collaboration Through Participation

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NRC Year-in-Review and Agenda

- Changes at the NRC
- Status of Licensing Activities
- Inspection Overview
- Your Participation
 - Present and Future
- Fukushima Dai-ichi

NRC Activities Related to Fukushima Dai-ichi

- Near-Term Task Force Recommendations
- Industry participation and contribution
 - Industry guidance on NRC Orders endorsed with exception by the staff
- Commission directed assessment
 - No need for immediate action for RTRs
- International collaboration activities
- TRTR's lessons learned related to Fukushima

Improved Communication

- Communications have been enhanced
- Progress with the license renewal backlog
- Commission Meetings
 - RTR License Renewal
 - Mo-99 Production
- Public Meetings
- Significant feedback from RTR community

Future Opportunities to Participate

- Cyber Security Assessment Audits
- Public Meetings
- Rulemaking for Streamlining License Renewal
- Continued Update to NUREG-1537
- Electronic Information Exchange

Conclusion

- Positive and enhanced communication
- Current communication avenues
- Future opportunities

Backup Slides

Tier 1 Activities

- **Orders**
 - EA-12-049 – Mitigating strategies beyond design basis events
 - EA-12-050 – Hardened vents for Mark I and II containments
 - EA-12-051 – Spent fuel pool instrumentation
- **Request for Information under 10 CFR 50.54(f)**
 - Seismic and flooding walkdowns
 - Seismic and flooding reevaluations
 - Enhanced EP staffing and communications
- **Rulemakings**
 - Station blackout (SBO)
 - Integration of emergency procedures

Tier 2 Recommendations

- Spent fuel pool makeup capability – Require licensees to:
 - Provide safety-related AC electrical power for SFP makeup
 - Revise TS to require one train of onsite emergency electrical power be operable for SFP makeup and SFP instrumentation whenever irradiated fuel is in the SFP
 - Have an installed means to spray water into the SFP, including an easily accessible connection to supply the water.
- Emergency preparedness – Require licensees to:
 - Have guidance for multiunit dose assessment capability
 - Hold training and exercises for multi unit and prolonged SBO scenarios
 - Practice the identification and acquisition of offsite resources
 - Ensure that sufficient EP equipment and facilities exist to deal with multiunit and prolonged SBO scenarios,
- Reevaluation of other external hazards
 - Request licensees reevaluate external hazards (other than seismic and flooding)

Tier 3 Recommendations

- 2.2 Ten-year confirmation of seismic and flooding hazards
 - 3 Enhanced capability to prevent /mitigate seismically induced fires and floods
- 5.2 Reliable hardened vents for other containment designs
 - 6 Hydrogen control and mitigation inside containment or in other buildings
- 9.1/9.2 Emergency preparedness (EP) enhancements for prolonged SBO and multiunit events
 - 9.3 Improve ERDS capability
 - 10 Additional EP topics for prolonged SBO and multiunit events
 - 11 EP topics for decision-making, radiation monitoring, and public education
- 12.1 Reactor Oversight Process modifications to reflect the recommended defense-in-depth framework
- 12.2 Staff training on severe accidents and resident inspector training on SAMGs
 - Revisit Emergency Planning Zone Size (Additional Issue)
 - Prestage potassium iodide (KI) beyond 10 miles (Additional Issue)
 - Transfer of spent fuel to dry cask storage (Additional Issue)
 - Reactor and Containment Instrumentation (Additional Issue)