# UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 10 CFR 2.206 PETITION REVIEW BOARD (PRB) 5 CONFERENCE CALL RE **PALISADES** + + + + + WEDNESDAY AUGUST 29, 2012 10 11 The conference call was held, Michele 12 Evans, Chairperson of the Petition Review Board, 13 presiding. 14 PETITIONER: MICHAEL MULLIGAN 15 16 PETITION REVIEW BOARD MEMBERS MICHELE EVANS, PRB Chairman, Director, Division of 17 Operating Reactor Licensing 18 TERRY BELTZ, Petition Manager for 2.206 petition 19 LEE BANIC, Petition Coordinator 20 21 NRC HEADQUARTERS STAFF 22 23 STEVE FRANKL, Acting Branch Chief, LPL3-1, NRR 24 CHRIS HAIR, Office of the General Counsel 25

## PROCEEDINGS

(10:03 a.m.)

MR. BELTZ: Okay. I want to thank everybody for attending the meeting. My name is Terry Beltz. I'm a Senior Project Manager in the Division of Operating Reactor Licensing at NRC Headquarters.

We're here today to allow the Petitioner, Mr. Mike Mulligan, to address the Petition Review Board regarding his 2.206 Petitions dated July 27<sup>th</sup> (July 27<sup>th</sup> is actually Rev 1), and July 28<sup>th</sup>, 2012.

I'm the Petition Manager for the petition and the Petition Review Board Chairman is Michele Evans.

As part of the PRB's review of the petition, Mr. Mulligan has requested this opportunity to address the PRB. The meeting is scheduled from 10:00 to 11:00. The meeting is being recorded by the NRC Operation Center and will be transcribed by a court reporter.

The transcript will become a supplement to the petition and will also be made publicly available. Is the court reporter on the line?

COURT REPORTER: Sorry for the delay.

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1	Yes, I'm on line.
2	MR. BELTZ: Okay, good morning.
3	COURT REPORTER: Good morning.
4	MR. BELTZ: Okay. I'd like to open the
5	meeting with introductions. And as we go around the
6	room make sure to clearly state your name, your
7	position, and the office that you work for within
8	the NRC for the record.
9	Okay. My name is Terry Beltz. I'm a
10	Senior Project Manager in NRR DORL, and I am the
11	Petitioner Manager.
12	MS. EVANS: And I'm Michele Evans. I'm
13	the Director of DORL in NRR, and I'm the PRB
L4	Chairman.
15	MR. FRANKL: I'm Steve Frankl. I'm Acting
16	Branch Chief for LPL3-1 at DORL.
17	MS. BANIC: Lee Banic, NRR, Petition
18	Coordinator.
19	MR. HAIR: Chris Hair, attorney with the
20	Office of the General Counsel.
21	MR. BELTZ: Okay. Are there any
22	additional NRC Headquarters participants on the
23	line? Do we have any NRC participants from the
24	Regional office on the phone? Okay. Are there any
2 5	representatives for the licensee on the phone?

MS. DOTSON: Barb Dotson, Palisades 1 2 Licensing. BELTZ: Okay, thank you. What was MR. 4 your last name? MS. DOTSON: Dotson, D-O-T-S-O-N. 5 6 MR. BELTZ: All right. Good morning, Barbara. Is that it? 7 8 MS. DOTSON: Yes, sir. 9 MR. BELTZ: Okay, thank you. Mr. Mulligan, would you please introduce yourself for 10 the record? 11 MR. MULLIGAN: I'm Mike Mulligan, and I'm 12 a whistle blower, and I worked in the industry for a 13 number of years. 14 BELTZ: Okay, good morning. Okay. 15 MR. Although it's not required for other members of the 16 public to introduce themselves for the call, if 17 there are any other members of the public on the 18 phone that wish to do so at this time, please state 19 20 your name for the record. Okay. Not hearing anyone, I'd like to 21 emphasize that we need to speak clearly and loudly 22 to make sure that the court reporter can accurately 23 transcribe this meeting. If you do have something 24 25 that you would like to say, please first state your

name for the record.

For those individuals dialing into the meeting, please remember to mute your phones to minimize any background noise or distractions. If you do not have a mute button, this can be done by pressing the keys \*6. To unmute, press the \*6 keys again. Okay, thank you.

At this time I'll turn the discussion over to Michele Evans, the PRB Chairman.

MS. EVANS: Okay. Good morning, everyone. Welcome to this meeting regarding the 2.206 petition submitted by Mr. Mike Mulligan.

I'd like to first share some background on our process. Section 2.206 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations describes the petition process, the primary mechanism for the public to request enforcement action by the NRC in a public process. This process permits anyone to petition NRC to take enforcement type action relating to NRC licensees or licensed activities.

Depending on the results of this evaluation, NRC could modify, suspend or revoke an NRC-issued license or take any other appropriate enforcement action to resolve a problem. The NRC staff's guidance for the disposition of 2.206

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petition requests is in Management Directive 8.11, which is publicly available.

The purpose of today's meeting is to give the Petitioner an opportunity to provide any additional explanation of support for the petitions before the Petition Review Board's initial consideration and recommendation.

This meeting is not a hearing, nor is it an opportunity for the Petitioner to question or examine the PRB on the merits for the issues presented in the petition request. No decisions regarding the merits of this petition will be made at this meeting.

Following this meeting, the Petition Review Board will conduct its internal deliberations. The outcome of this internal meeting will be discussed with the Petitioner.

The Petition Review Board typically consists of a Chairman, usually a manager at the Senior Executive Service level at the NRC, and has a Petition Manager, and a PRB Coordinator. Other members of the Board are determined by the NRC staff based on the content and the information in the petition request.

At this time, I would like to introduce

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the Board. I'm Michele Evans, the Petition Review Board Chairman. Terry Beltz is the Petition Manager for the petitions under discussion today. Lee Banic is the Office's PRB Coordinator. Dave Pelton is the Branch Chief for the Generic Communications Branch responsible for coordination of the 10 CFR 2.206 petition process. Steve Frankl is the Acting Branch Chief for Plant Licensing Branch 3-1 which includes Palisades.

The following individuals are from the regional office, Jack Geissner is the Branch Chief for Project Branch 4, Region III, Division of Reactor Projects. Jay Lennartz is a Project Engineer in Project Branch 4, Region III, Division of Reactor Projects. We also obtain advice from our Office of General Counsel represented by Christopher Hair.

As described in our process, the NRC staff may ask clarifying questions in order to better under the Petitioner's presentation, and to reach a reasoned decision whether to accept or reject the Petitioner's request for review under the 2.20 petition process.

I would like to summarize the scope of the two petitions under consideration, and the NRC activities to date.

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The first petition, on June 27<sup>th</sup>, 2012 Mr. Mulligan submitted to the NRC a petition under 2.206 regarding concerns associated with leakage from the safety injection refueling water tank at the Palisades Nuclear Plant.

In this petition, Mr. Mulligan requested that the Palisades Nuclear Plant remain shut down. Mr. Mulligan is critical of Entergy, the NRC, and the programmatic aspects of the regulatory program, including the Agency staff and the ROP based upon recent events at Petition Review Board and other Entergy plants as to the values of Entergy and a lack of NRC regulatory oversight.

He focuses on the recent leak of the safety injection and refueling water tank at Palisades, but also discusses past events at both Palisades and other Entergy-owned facilities. The Petitioner also discusses a lack of adequate safety culture environment at Palisades.

Mr. Mulligan requests the following actions be taken. One, the shut down resulting from the safety injection refueling water tank leak should be categorized as unplanned. Two, the NRC move the Palisades' performance indicator from red to the next level 5, unacceptable performance.

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Three, an outside authority, not the OIG, should determine why the NRC did not force Palisades to thoroughly investigate the safety injection refueling water leak when the leak first appeared. Why didn't the NRC make Entergy fix the leak in the last safe shutdown period according to the Agency's own nuclear safety culture philosophy?

Number four, top Palisades management staff be fired and replaced before startup. Number five, Entergy's corporate nuclear senior staff be fired and replaced before restart. Number six, assign two additional NRC inspectors to Palisades and to the rest of the Entergy nuclear plants. Number seven, formation of a local public oversight panel around every plant. Number eight, formation of an emergency NRC senior official oversight panel to reform the oversight process. Number nine, a national NRC oversight panel of outsiders, a mixture of professional and academic people, as well as people, to oversee and report on Agency activities. Number ten, perform an analysis of the exceedingly numerous findings of problems with Entergy plants this inspection reporting cycle. during Number eleven, evaluate if Region III has enough personnel Number twelve, Palisades remains and resources.

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shutdown until all procedures are fully implemented and corrected, all technical and maintenance backlogs are updated and corrected, all training completed, and all reports and safety processes are fully completed and implemented. Number thirteen, an independent outside investigation review the insufficient process of the 2008-2009 outcome security falsification, investigation, Palisades safety survey local and fleet wide training and President Obama fire safety surveys. Fourteen, Chairman Jaczko and the four Commissioners.

Okay. The second petition, on June 28<sup>th</sup>, 2012 Mr. Mulligan submitted to the NRC a petition under 2.206 associated with roof leakage at Palisades Nuclear Plant.

In this petition, Mr. Mulligan requests that the Palisades Nuclear Plant remain shut down. Mr. Mulligan focuses on roof leaks at Palisades, and also discusses past events at both Palisades and other Entergy-owned facilities.

He discusses the lack of adequate safety at Palisades, and is also environment culture the NRC staff for tolerating and critical of serious safety problems covering up very at Palisades, and throughout the Entergy organization.

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Mr. Mulligan included specific questions related to roof leaks at Palisades. Number one, what is a safety-related roof? Number two, is the roof above the emergency diesel generators or control room a critical nuclear safety-related barrier? roof leaks Third, where are the current at Palisades, and are there any safety-related components near these leaks? Number four, list all the roof leaks at Palisades in the last 10 years and is the trend of roof leaks increasing or decreasing? Number five, is Palisades properly evaluating roof leaks and repairing them in a timely manner?

In addition to the requests mentioned in the first petition, Mr. Mulligan also states that the following actions be taken. Entergy be prevented from starting up until all the safety problems at the site have been publicly identified and the safety culture repaired.

Two, heads need to roll in Region III and at Headquarters for tolerating and covering up these very serious safety problems at Palisades and throughout the Entergy organization. This all has the potential to gravely damage our nation.

Third, report on why the 2.206 petition process failed so utterly for us, for the Agency to

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hold officials accountable to the plant employees and me with not doing their jobs and trying to understand what was gone on at the site, and not repairing the organization at the earliest point.

The whole Entergy organization is involved and they have a huge costly hole to dig out of. It is easier digging the hole than crawling out of one.

This request appears to be based on final determinations made in past 2.206 petitions and that Entergy and the NRC processes failed to detect and resolve safety culture issues.

Fourth, Mr. Mulligan also requested a meeting with the Palisades inspector and other inspectors to discuss the conditions of Palisades before the Petition Review Petition Board's prehearing.

Allow me to discuss the NRC activities to date. The PRB met internally on July 10<sup>th</sup> and July 31<sup>st</sup> to discuss the request for immediate action associated with the June 27<sup>th</sup> and June 28<sup>th</sup> petitions respectively.

The PRB denied Mr. Mulligan's request for immediate action on the basis that there was no immediate safety concern identified that would

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prohibit a Palisades Reactor Plant start up, or had an affect on the health and safety of the public. His requests also do not provide any new information or information specific enough for the NRC to further consider making an immediate action determination.

He was informed on July 17<sup>th</sup>, and again on August 8<sup>th</sup> of the PRB's decision to deny his request for immediate action related to the two petitions under consideration.

On August 8<sup>th</sup>, the Petition Manager contacted him to discuss the 10 CFR 2.206 process and to offer an opportunity to address the PRB by phone or in person. He was also informed that the petitions he submitted would be consolidated since the petitions were submitted at or about the same time, the requested actions were against the same licensee, and with a few unique issues addressed essentially the same specific concerns.

Consolidation of the petitions does not reduce the importance of the circumstances being discussed, but does streamline the NRC staff's review process and response.

On August 9<sup>th</sup>, he informed the Petition Manager of his desire to address the PRB by phone

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prior to its internal meetings to make the initial recommendation to accept or reject the petition for review.

On August 21<sup>st</sup>, a discussion was held between Mr. Mulligan and the Regional staff regarding ongoing issues at Palisades. On August 23<sup>rd</sup>, Petition Manager informed him that the PRB could support a teleconference today, and he agreed to that date and time.

As a reminder for the phone participants, please identify yourself if you make any remarks, as this will help us in the preparation of the meeting transcript that will be made publicly available. Thank you.

Mr. Mulligan, I'll now turn the meeting over to you to allow you to provide any information you believe the PRB should consider as part of these petitions. Please bear in mind that you have approximately 40 minutes to address the PRB. Thank you.

MR. MULLIGAN: Hi, 59 percent. I want to thank the Staff for talking with me over Palisades issues. I found that the staff was very knowledgeable and they were very polite to me and stuff.

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The problems I have, though, is that this is a very problematic plant, and I found a lot of the times they were justifying and rationalizing the behavior of Palisades. You know, they were buffing up Palisades and their troubles, and stuff like that. They really weren't giving me an objective, accurate assessment of what was happening at Palisades.

My ability to be effective here is to be able to know what's -- to objectively know what's going on at the plant and express my problems across the Petition Board, and stuff like that.

I mean, I would have thought there would have been a lot more negative towards Palisades, you know. These are the problems they have, and these types of stuff, instead of rationalizing, placing a happy tune on them, and things like that. It bothers me that the staff would -- and I find that at the NRC as a whole. They do that all the time. They put a happy tune on a lot of these things. They're always in defense of the industry instead of being a cold -- a regulator with a cold heart, this is what's happening and stuff like this. You know, set limits.

We will not tolerate this kind of

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behavior in the United States. We will not tolerate this kind of disorganization, and this type of chaos, this type -- this equipment conditions that repeatedly happen over and over again across many plants, and especially at Palisades. We're better than that.

I found as a whole a lot of these issues and stuff like that, you know, I think the NRC employees are good people, and really good people.

And I think Palisades' employees are really good people, and they're trying really hard.

The problem I have is that the rules and regulations, over and over again you see these rules and regulations coming up, and tolerating and acceptance of and repetitive leaks, leaks, leaks, and we don't have that philosophy of -- we have control of the facility, we have the ability to -- we have the resources, and we have the technical intellectual ability control to and the facilities under our feet. And our first object is to understand what's happening at our facilities. If degradation comes up and stuff we have the heart to fix it immediately. And if it takes -- and if we don't fix -- if we have all this degradation going around us and we don't fix it in the outage and

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stuff like that, well, we have the heart to shut that plant down and fix it right. And we pay the price for our inability to control our facilities, instead of sitting there rationalizing hey, you know, it's only a leak. It's not a safety system, it's a low-pressure system and stuff like that, you know.

This is very important stuff for our nation, and we're sitting under a lot of energy as far as with the fuel, and the radionuclides underneath it and stuff like that. And I find it amazing.

I was working -- I'm working on -- this is another example, you know. It's not associated with Palisades, but it is an example -- my problem with the NRC. I'm working on NOEDs, and license amendment associated with the drought and heat conditions. And, essentially, what comes up is over one NOED at Braidwood and one license amendment at Millstone, basic temperatures were increasing and stuff. And all of a sudden we get into this kind of, you know, through the NOEDs, and through a license amendment we get into oh, it's an emergency.

And then they go into talking about the conditions of the plant, and this is why we need

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this special permission to stay up at power and stuff like that. And they get the technical justifications and stuff like that. But it's only half the story, you know.

You know, a lot of this stuff, there's very little science behind it, behind their justifications and stuff. There's no sense of, you know, what got us into this, you know, through the piece processes, the NOEDs and license amendment. What got us to this point? What are our failures in this point? What have we failed to see and stuff like that? How come we weren't anticipating this? And how weren't building in cooling come we capacity? How come the NRC processes didn't force these utilities to take a look at the historical record, you know? Take a look at the -- you know, take a look at the heat sink temperature rates and stuff. Was the heat sink temperatures coming up through the last decade? And, of course, they were, but the license amendment and the NOEDs were -- they didn't explain that, you know.

They didn't say, you know -- we have a understand how these utilities right to are operating. You know, we have a right to understand that these guys were measuring heat sink

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temperatures. They were measuring and, you know, you put it on the ground, you see the trends where they're going, and then you say oh, by this date, you know, we're going to have troubles with the cooling capacity of keeping a plant up at power and stuff like that.

That's science and engineering, that's basic science and engineering. And that should be in these license amendment requests. So, you sit back and you talk to a lot of the NRC officials, and you get this all the time, this spin, you know, this well, the rules tell me I can tell you part of the truth. And I don't have to tell you everything and stuff. It's all about spin, and what I am -- what the rules tell me I can tell you what's going on at a plant. Not what your heart shows you, not what your heart tells you what's going on, not what your heart knows what you should be doing and stuff like that.

And like I said, you know, that should have been in there with the NOEDs and the license amendment requests, you know. We've seen those temperatures coming up and we failed to act. We failed to act responsibly to our society.

The utility industry has a

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responsibility not just to make profits, but to serve the American public. And really they -- you know, if you're an American, you know, we're supposed to serve our greater good. We're not supposed to serve our pockets and stuff. And I see a lot of this stuff going on here with like rules and regulations all gained towards serving the money in our pockets, not the knowledge in our heads, and it bothers me a lot when I see this.

So, that's the repetitive pattern I see over not just Palisades, but a lot of things I've been doing and watching these plants over the years and stuff like that, you know. Ideology and group customs trumps science. Ideology and group rules and customs, and these mechanical rules that are so insufficient and so limiting, and contain so little information trumps what you know in your heart is right.

And I know a lot of you guys know in your heart a lot of this stuff is wrong, and for a number of reasons you can't change it. But I don't find that a good enough excuse, you know. If you know something is wrong, especially if it's national in scope, then you have a responsibility to try all your might to change it, and not just sit back and

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collect money in your pockets.

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The example with -- you know, I was reading the inspection report, the last inspection report, and the licensee determined that the root cause management oversight contributing to plant issues was that managers and supervisors had focused more on work practices rather than on supervisory oversight and employee development.

The contributing cause identified was that some managers and supervisors do not always understand that what they perceived as distractions are part of their roles and responsibilities. And reviewing licensee performance over the first and second quarters of 2012, the inspectors know the issues were being encountered in the of area management and oversight. Multiple condition reports, observation by inspectors and causal evaluation conducted on issues that arose during the refueling most recent outage has identified insufficient oversight and vendor control as a contributor to rework activities that increased accumulation of dose over the outage.

As an example, installing and replacing the reactor head, you know. You had troubles -- they had troubles -- I mean, this is fundamental. They

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had troubles taking off the head, and then they damaged equipment putting the head back on. That's an example of these continuing problems and stuff like that, that happen over and over again.

In the inspection report, one of the things was in aspects dealing with conservative assumptions under the decision making component of human performance crosscutting areas. The inspectors discovered during the review that some of the corrective actions developed by the licensee had either been incorrectly stated as incomplete or still pending completion.

You know, I mean just the idea that -- I mean, that's falsifying paperwork as far as concerned. And that's the essence of, you know, are we honorable people? Are we men and women of our words? Are we men and women of our conscience? Do we and wrong? aspire right Do we to something bigger than we are, instead of people that just, you know, put money in their pockets? Do we have principles and ideals that are higher than ourselves?

I mean, that's what I'm asking. And you know what, people don't talk like I do and stuff, but that's what I'm asking, you know. What's in your

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heart? Do you tell the truth? Do you tell the full truth? Do -- if the rules prohibit you from telling the full truth and explaining what's going on, you know, you either change them or -- you know, I hate to say it but, you know, sometimes you have to break the rules. You know, consider rules, like a rule like crossing a street, you know, crossing a busy avenue and stuff like that.

You know, the typical -- the rule that my mother taught me, you know, look both ways before you cross the street. And play it conservative and stuff like that. The rules that's going on around here is like, you know, in order to cross -- the rule goes in order to cross the street you've got to look at your shoelaces, and you've got to walk across the street without looking at -- looking to see what the traffic does. And then it comes back, you know, and then you come back with, you know, the -- you collect a certain set of evidence and you say oh, well, he crossed that street five times looking at his shoelaces, so that's -- it must be safe.

I mean, that's what I think of a lot of your rules. I think rules are good and bad. They're not just God's rules. Rules, you have -- there has to be a part of you that's set apart from everything

else. And a lot of times you follow the rules instinctively, and I do, and it's not really right.

There's got to be a part of you, a little bug inside of you that says okay Mike, you've got to look at this rule in the big picture. Is it good, or is it bad? Rules can make you a better person. It can open up the world to you if you follow the rules, if you follow this set of standards. You see a bigger picture of the world, you become a better person.

Following the rules could do the exact opposite. You could end up, you know, being blind, you could walk towards being more blinded. You could walk towards being a lesser person and stuff like that. And that's the nature of rules and stuff. And I -- you know, rules are either good or bad. They either open up the world, or they close the world down for you.

You can see more and experience more, or you can see less, put more money in your pockets. That's what I think about rules.

You know, back on February 22<sup>nd</sup>, 2001, this is in my petition. And here's a quote for you. "God help us all. Can you see the problems with the repetitive nature of Entergy having instincts not to

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do the proper inspections, to do it over and over again like in Mad Men. They are laughing at us and the NRC because these employees and managers know we can't control them. The NRC has no ability to control Palisades. That is my Goddamned political statement to the NRC."

And here we are, you know, we've got, you know, with this roof leak -- is it a roof leak? With the SIR FWT tank, whatever, you know, there's insinuations that a Commissioner was pressuring the staff to, you know, withholding information to a Chairman about Palisades. And the Chairman wanted an investigation of it, and Ostendorff or whatever his name yelled at a woman, a staff person about it. And he tried to influence having the investigation, you know.

The instinct there was this was not a useful use of NRC resources and stuff. And this is the stuff that bothers me, that the Commissioners, you know, they're so disorganized. They're in a state of war with each other, that we might not be overseeing the nuclear industry like we should.

I asked the NRC Region III Staff could a Commissioner intimidate you? They all answered me, of course, we wouldn't let a Commissioner intimidate

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me. I'd never allow the NRC Commissioners to make me do something wrong. So, I mean, that was the response to me. I asked the question.

Anyway, with the safety injection refueling water tank, you know, over and over again the first instinct was it's a roof leak. And then over and over again through the outage and stuff, everybody is making guesses of what's causing the leak and stuff, and how bad it is, and how riskful it is, and all that sort of stuff.

And, oh, God, in the outage it's fixed. And then they retest it, and it's still leaking and stuff. And then they had to go do something to -- and over and over again, you know, they missed what was —-- first missed what was causing the leak. They had an improper interpretation of the risk of the leak. They had an improper interpretation that they fixed the leak. Over and over again, you know, they didn't get it right, you know.

They didn't call -- I see a red light, you know, and it was a red light, you know. They weren't -- they didn't get it right over and over again. Numerous times, both the Palisades staff and the NRC didn't put your foot down and say, you know what, we ought to fix this thing right the first

time.

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And I think you destroy the staffs of the NRC and Palisades when you don't have that in control attitude, you know. We are our facility , we have adequate resources, have adequate enough resources with the parent company that a shutdown won't bother us. We take things seriously, and we will shut that plant down and find out where that leak is and fix it immediately.

A situation like the refueling storage tank, you know. It eats up resources, you know. Repetitive issues of broken equipment and stuff like that eats up plant resources, intellectual and engineering resources. And, you know, like I say to everybody, you know, it might not just be related to risk-relatedness of the component. It might be that small problems end up overwhelming the staff, and they don't pick up on the big problems. They don't pick up on developing or emergency problem because they were too busy doing this other stuff that they should have taken care of.

And they started banging into these reports and processes, and they get consumed by the processes. And they can't effectively operate the plant because they're too busy with their heads in

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the processes of degraded and failing components. It's just -- I mean, it's an easy thing to understand. To me it is, anyway, because I've seen it.

As far the within the as war Commissioner's office, I've been in a war. I've been in a war at a plant, ended up me getting fired. And I ended up, you know, playing these rules, these wars, and inflicting, you know, inflicting rules on other people, you know. You did this wrong and stuff like that, and then they do it back at me. And I've seen it. I've seen it between groups of people at a plant, you know, two different groups fighting each other.

It's terrible. It is traumatic because, you know, employees, your families are involved. You could go home, you're not the same person you are because you're in this big battle of rules and interpretations. It consumes everything about a person when you get in these employee battles, you know, over ideals and stuff. It consumes -- I've seen it when I was anonymous at the plant, when I was doing this stuff. And I've seen the employees talking about me. And they were talking about me when I was there. Of course, they didn't know it was

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me and stuff like that.

I could see who the -- you know, they were talking about who do you think it is? Who do you think it is? What do you think is behind this? And they spent a lot of time -- the staff spent a lot of time, you know, talking about me, if you know what I mean, because I was anonymous. And I was doing a lot of the stuff behind the scenes, and stuff like that. So, I've seen how traumatic it can make the environment and stuff. How consuming it becomes on the person, how much damage it does to the personhood, everybody involved and stuff.

And it affects your ability and your judgment, and it clouds everything. And it's terrible, it is utterly terrible to live in that environment. You know, post traumatic stress and all that involved in it and, you know, I got wounded, and I know I wounded a lot of other people. I'm just saying that, that it happens, and somehow you've got to put a stop to it before people get hurt, and careers get destroyed, and families break up, you know.

So, we went -- I talked about the inspectors kind of realize that there was still problems with the plant during that last inspection

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report. And, you know, here we are. You had a month of shutdown because of the refueling water tank. You had -- you're in two weeks plus of a shutdown. You operated, I mean, from the last outage 108 days. Right? You've had 44 days of outages, then 109 days of -- since the last outage, and 109 days -- it's been 109 days since the last outage. You have a 59 percent plant capacity factor.

This thing is worse. In these last three or four months from the outage have been -- it's terrible problems with the plant. You know, does it raise to a rule-based safety issue? You know, can you see it principally that you're unsafe, or can that the organization is in chaos and disorder and stuff like that? And, you know, they that's might missinq emerging information be important and stuff. And the repetitive nature of these leaks, the refueling water tank was leaking for a year. The control rod drive mechanism was, you know, it emerged after the outage, and it was leaking for the next month, and increasing. And you think you know where the leak is coming from, and then you find out once it's shut down -- how come when the first leak went you didn't know that it was a pressure boundary leak that says that you need to

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shut down and stuff like that?

How come a month before that leak start

--- when that first leak started, how come people
didn't get curious and say, you know, I don't like
this, and we're going to find -- God help us, we're
going to find out what's causing that leak. And
we're going to pay whatever price it is to stop it.
How come it took a month? And everybody kind of, you
know, was dozing away as the leak was increasing
and stuff like that.

I like the circular logic with the industry, you know, when a plant is sitting there, you know, has a lot of capacity -- you know, has breaker to breaker operation without no shutdowns. They brag that, you know, we're safe because we've got high capacity factors. And then when you get a low capacity factor and you have to shutdown, then they say we're safe because we do shut downs and stuff like that.

Well, when are you degraded, you know? When are you -- I mean, everything is about spin, you know. Everything justifies the happy tunes and stuff, and nobody takes the hard, you know, the hard choices and pays the fiddler, you know. And puts their integrity on the line, and put their foot down

and says this got to stop and stuff, you know.

And the NRC, you know, with Palisades you're sending a message to the rest of the plants. You can paper whip these plants to death, you know, as far as having all these rules and regulations that there's no teeth in it. And nobody is afraid of you. Or on the other hand you could, you know, punish a bunch of -- a few plants and you could, you know -- and create fear in the eyes of the utilities and stuff. And if you say boo, that they automatically will, you know, do the right thing and stuff, instead of wasting all this resource on these paper whipping rules that nobody is afraid of and stuff. And then, you know, you see that -- we know that -- in the recent New York Times article, you know, Clinton -- he was appeasing the utilities by hiring pro utility Commissioners, and you had a mismatch of power, you had four Commissioners that were extremely pro utility and stuff, while you had one guy that was, you know --- he was kind of pro utility, but he wasn't like the rest of the four. And there was a power mismatch. You couldn't -- you didn't have equal sides of the argument with equal powers, you know, talking about the issues. You had one side overriding the other and stuff. And that

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was Obama. I'm sorry to say that that was Obama the way he set up the NRC Commissioners as being -- as appeasing the utility people.

Then you see this Presidential-type of influence with Exelon, and the utilities in general, how the utilities across the United States have so much influence on the state governments and federal government, how most of the utility -- there's an assortment of utility people that step in to actually help us govern. They don't have anybody else. These guys are skilled at governance. These utility guys are skilled at governance, and we can't get along without them.

And all I'm saying is that's a lot of influence. Utilities have a lot of influence over President Obama, and the Republicans, and stuff. And there's no counteracting power against that. There's no equivalent force, and money, and intellectual, and access to the NRC and to the government and stuff.

One side has too much power, and that's our politics in general, and stuff. And, you know, it's really important that -- we see this over the summer with the utilities in general, and the troubles they had with meeting their commitments to

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provide power to big Metropolitan areas -- excuse me, I can't even hardly talk.

You know what bothered me in that last inspection report? They hooked up a AC power source into a DC power source, you know, something as simple as that. They were working on a component. The inspection report doesn't tell you -- you know, it was in May. It doesn't tell you if they were at power or they were in the outage and stuff like that. And, you know, it gets you to wondering, you know, what -- and then they said well, we'll cover it next quarter. It happened in the prior quarter, but we're going to cover it in the next quarter.

And it just asks you, you know -- I mean, that's -- why couldn't they -- why didn't they -- how come they -- how come the NRC didn't have -- how come they couldn't have what happened with connecting an AC power system to a DC power system, and an assortment of alarms in the control room. How come they couldn't explain what happened in that last inspection report? Was the NRC overwhelmed? Was Region I staff overwhelmed, they didn't have enough resources in order to do this? And they kick it over to another period and stuff?

How come we don't see things as they

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actually happen at a plant like Palisades? How come it takes us -- you know, and I talked about that in past petitions, you know, how these processes -- you know, some of them are a couple of months long, some of them are a year long, some of them are -- you discovery phase, and then then the know, investigation phase, and then the resolution phase and stuff like that. And all these problems are out different states of discovery, there in resolutions. Nobody has a handle on, you know, the big picture. You know, what is -- you know, is it a green light? Do we have a green light, do we have a yellow light, or do we have a red light, you know, as the conditions of the -- the overall far conditions of a plant?

These processes are out there in so many different states of knowing and stuff like that. You know, it's a problem that we don't have -- at least I don't have -- I can't see the real conditions of a plant. And you might not -- you know, they might not disclose that they know a problem for a year or two after the discovery, you know. And then this thing, oh, we got it fixed, you know. And then they wait a year, and then they got it fixed. And oh, it was never no problem because they got it fixed,

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because it took us so long to disclose it. You never get it disclosed in that unknown area, you know, they have a problem and they don't know what they're going to do, how they're going to fix it.

You know, it looks bad, so they wait until after an adequate length of time, disclose that they had a problem. Oh, it's already fixed. There's nothing to worry about.

In the inspection report, you know, the impellers, the reactor coolant pump impellers were broken, and they had parts in the reactor. You know, I say well, you had parts in the reactor. You must have fuel damage, because those pieces of metal certainly -- they're like weapons when they're flowing through the coolant that fast. I'd like to know if they had any fuel problems.

But, anyway, over and over again, you know, Palisades had reason to find this thing. The NRC had reason to, you know, fix that impeller, note that impeller is broken and stuff like that. And nobody had -- that's the, you know, okay, we're going to take a shutdown and we're going to -- first, we're going to know how our plant operates, and we're going to see degradations, and we're going to have the people looking at the insignificant

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little problems that show up, you know, the insignificant little problems that are data rich, and information rich, and shows you the world.

That's the I look at little way problems, insignificant problems, they're a gold mine in there. But they don't have people looking at things. then asking the these types of And question, is the impeller working right? You know, why does it take, you know, three or four times over many years, repeating over and over time, why does it take so many times to discover a problem like in the reactor coolant pump impellers? Why does it take so many efforts to fix it? And why is there so much -- you know, in the inspection report they talked about rework. Why does it take so much rework? Why does it waste so much resources with rework, fixing something once. Oh, it's not fixed, and fixing it again, and that type of thing.

You know, what does it take, you know -according to the rules, you know, every plant in
the United States could be like Palisades. You know,
the NRC would have questions about them, but it's
acceptable operations. Every plant in the United
States would be like -- imagine every plant being
like Palisades and stuff. Imagine -- we're at the

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point where, you know, how many plants will it take in Region III that the NRC wouldn't have the resources to afford a troubled plant like Palisades.

When does -- there are so many problems in the industry that the industry -- the NRC gets blind. And, you know, only sees -- only has the ability to see a limited set of data points. They're overwhelmed. I mean, that's what Palisades is. And, you know, Browns Ferry is the same thing, you know. It's a red finding, and they're still having problems, and they're delaying the inspection, the final inspection and stuff, you know, because they don't have enough resources, or they don't have everything fixed yet, and stuff like that.

How long is this just keep going on where these plants, you know -- where they stumble along, they keep adding these bureaucratic process on top of them, and it eats up limited resources, and it causes a plant to end up in big trouble. When does it, you know -- it just boggles the mind to think about that we don't have -- Governor Chris Christie last night, "Our leaders today have decided it's more important to be popular, to do what is easy and say yes rather than to say no when no is required."

This goes on, "His late mother's advice that there would be times in your life when you have to choose between being loved and being respected." Chris Christie last night and stuff. And that's a question for all of us, you know. When does, you know -- this paper whipping the industry, does that lead to -- does that -- you know, where a lot of these inspectors are -- don't have enough power and This paper whipping, the problems in stuff. industry stuff, does that lead to respect? Does the utilities respect the NRC employees? You think they do? I don't think so. I think they know who the NRC is, and the inspectors are intimidated by way up in the NRC. And the utilities have so much power and stuff like that, that the fault with the NRC employees is, you know, I've just got to go along. For the good of my family I've just got to go along and play the game, and put money in my pocket.

I mean, that's what American life is today instead of us having these ideals, and ideas that we aspire to, these ideas that we can never reach, you know, that we're always trying, and trying, and trying. And we're always failing and trying to be better, and push us into being better, you know. Or we can just play the game. Right? We

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can be mushrooms, and we can play the game. And we could be somebody who we're not, because that's not us. That's not us when you play the game.

There's an aspect of you, you have to submerge underneath this, and that's not you. And, you know, are we a great nation? Do we have great aspirations? Do we want to be bigger than we are, or do we want to go by these silly sets of ideological rules, and codes, and customs, and little people -- are we big, or are we small? Are we big at over Palisades? Is the best part of us showing over Palisades? You know, the repetitive nature of leaks, the safety injection refueling tank leaked. Right? Then they had this next leak that goes on for a month. Is that us? Is that who we are? Is that the best of us?

Thank you very much for listening to me.

MS. EVANS: Okay. This is Michele Evans, again. Thank you, Mr. Mulligan, for your address to the PRB.

At this time, does anyone here at Headquarters have any questions for Mr. Mulligan?

(No response.)

MS. EVANS: No. How about the licensee's representative who's on the phone, do you have any

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questions? 2 MS. DOTSON: No questions from the 3 licensee. MS. EVANS: Thank you. Mr. Mulligan, 5 thank you for taking time to provide the NRC staff with clarifying information on the petitions you've 6 submitted. Before we close, does the court reporter 8 need any additional information for the meeting 9 transcript? 10 COURT REPORTER: No, I'm all set. Thank 11 you very much. Oh, there was one. The organization 12 that you are with, DORL. 13 MS. EVANS: DORL, D-O-R-L, and it stands 14 for Division of Operating Reactor Licensing. 15 COURT REPORTER: Wow, that's new to me, 16 but otherwise I'm covered. Thank you. 17 MS. EVANS: Okay, thanks. With that, this 18 meeting is concluded and we will be terminating the 19 phone connection. Thank you. 20 (Whereupon, the above-entitled 21 went off the record at 11:01 a.m.) 22 23

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