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CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

February 22, 2012

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

ATTENTION: Document Control Desk

SUBJECT: Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant
Unit Nos. 1 & 2; Docket Nos. 50-317 & 50-318
Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation; Docket No. 72-8
Report of Changes, Tests, and Experiments – 10 CFR 50.59 and 10 CFR 72.48

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.59(d)(2) and 10 CFR 72.48(d)(2), a report of changes, tests and experiments is provided as Attachment (1). This attachment contains brief descriptions of changes, tests, and experiments approved under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59 between January 1, 2011 and December 31, 2011. There were no approved changes, tests, and experiments under 10 CFR 72.48 for the January 1, 2011 to December 31, 2011 timeframe.

Should you have questions regarding this matter, please contact Mr. Douglas E. Lauver at (410) 495-5219.

Very truly yours,

James J. Stanley
Manager – Engineering Services

JJS/PSF/bjd

Attachment: (1) Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Report of Changes, Tests, and Experiments
[10 CFR 50.59(d)(2) and 10 CFR 72.48(d)(2)]

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ATTACHMENT (1)

**CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
REPORT OF CHANGES, TESTS, AND EXPERIMENTS
[10 CFR 50.59(d)(2) and 10 CFR 72.48(d)(2)]**

ATTACHMENT (1)

CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT REPORT OF CHANGES, TESTS, AND EXPERIMENTS
[10 CFR 50.59(d)(2) and 10 CFR 72.48(d)(2)]

Document Id SE00508	Doc Type 50.59	Rev Status 60	Revision 0000	Date Issued 3/7/11
Subject	Evaluate One Keyway (1/8" x 1/8" x 5/8") from the flange machine being dropped into the Reactor Coolant System.			
Summary	The proposed activity 'accepts as is' an identified loose part in the reactor vessel or reactor coolant system. The loose part is a small stainless steel key (1/8" x 1/8" x 5/8"). The debris is assumed to remain within the reactor vessel or more likely migrate to a number of potential locations including: steam generator inlet (hot leg) bowl or be captured within a steam generator u-tube, or the shutdown cooling suction nozzle on 22 hot leg, the pressurizer surge line on the 21 hot leg, or if the loose part is small enough it could travel through a steam generator U-tube and exit out into a cold leg and either into the reactor vessel bottom or interfacing Reactor Coolant System systems. This evaluation considered the likelihood and consequences of loose part intrusion into any one of these locations and concluded that there are no credible failure mechanisms that exceed the design basis described for accidents and malfunctions in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report.			