

ACCELERATED DISTRIBUTION DEMONSTRATION SYSTEM

REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR: 8807070144 DOC. DATE: 88/06/22 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET #
 FACIL: 50-265 Quad-Cities Station, Unit 2, Commonwealth Edison Co. 05000265
 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION
 BRITZ, D.J. Commonwealth Edison Co.
 BAX, R.L. Commonwealth Edison Co.
 RECIP. NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT: LER 88-015-00: on 880530, partial Group II isolation from blown fuse due to unknown reason.

W/8 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D COPIES RECEIVED: LTR 1 ENCL 1 SIZE: 5
 TITLE: 50.73 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

NOTES:

	RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME	COPIES	LTT	ENCL	RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME	COPIES	LTT	ENCL
	PD3-2 LA	1	1		PD3-2 PD	1	1	
	ROSS, T	1		1				
INTERNAL:	ACRS MICHELSON	1	1		ACRS MOELLER	2	2	
	AEOD/DOA	1	1		AEOD/DSP/NAS	1	1	
	AEOD/DSP/ROAB	2	2		AEOD/DSP/TPAB	1	1	
	ARM/DCTS/DAB	1	1		DEDRO	1	1	
	NRR/DEST/ADS 7E	1	0		NRR/DEST/CEB 8H	1	1	
	NRR/DEST/ESB 8D	1	1		NRR/DEST/ICSB 7	1	1	
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	NRR/DEST/PSB 8D	1	1		NRR/DEST/RSB 8E	1	1	
	NRR/DEST/SGB 8D	1	1		NRR/DLPQ/HFB 10	1	1	
	NRR/DLPQ/QAB 10	1	1		NRR/DOEA/EAB 11	1	1	
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	NRR/DRIS/SIB 9A	1	1		NUDOCS-ABSTRACT	1	1	
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	RES/DE/EIB	1	1		RES/DRPS DEPY	1	1	
	RGN3 FILE 01	1	1					
EXTERNAL:	EG&G WILLIAMS, S	4	4		FORD BLDG HOY, A	1	1	
	H ST LOBBY WARD	1	1		LPDR	1	1	
	NRC PDR	1	1		NSIC HARRIS, J	1	1	
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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

Facility Name (1) QUAD-CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT TWO										Docket Number (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 6 5				Page (3) 1 of 0 4			
Title (4) Unit 2 Partial Group II Isolation From Blown Fuse Due to Unknown Reason																	
Event Date (5)			LER Number (6)				Report Date (7)			Other Facilities Involved (8)							
Month	Day	Year	Year	Sequential Number	Revision Number	Month	Day	Year	Facility Names		Docket Number(s)						
0 5	3 0	8 8	8 8	0 1 5	0 0	0 6	2 2	8 8			0 5 0 0 0						
OPERATING MODE (9) 2			THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10CFR (Check one or more of the following) (11)														
POWER LEVEL (10) 0 0 0			20.402(b)		20.405(c)		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)		73.71(b)								
			20.405(a)(1)(i)		50.36(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)		73.71(c)								
			20.405(a)(1)(ii)		50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)		Other (Specify in Abstract below and in Text)								
			20.405(a)(1)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)										
			20.405(a)(1)(iv)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)										
			20.405(a)(1)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)										
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																	
Name Douglas J. Britz, Technical Staff Engineer, Ext. 2141										TELEPHONE NUMBER							
										AREA CODE							
										3 0 9		6 5 4 - 2 2 4 1					
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																	
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC-TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC-TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS							
X	J M	B 5 6 9															
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)										Expected Submission Date (15)		Month Day Year					
Yes (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO																	
ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)																	

On May 30, 1988, at 0931 hours, a partial Group II isolation signal was received. Upon investigation it was determined that a fuse had blown. The root cause of the blown fuse could not be determined. The replacement fuse remained intact. The circuit current was measured and found to be well below the fuse size. There were no operational or maintenance activities occurring at the time the fuse blew.

The safety significance of this event is minimal. The blown fuse caused the system to actuate in a conservative manner causing the partial Group II isolations. All systems performed their intended functions as designed.

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LICENSE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)						Page (3)		
		Year	///	Sequential Number	///	Revision Number				
Quad Cities Unit Two TEXT	0 5 0 0 0 2 6 5	8 8	-	0 1 5	-	0 0	0 2	OF	0 4	

PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION:

General Electric - Boiling Water Reactor - 2511 Mwt rated core thermal power. Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX].

EVENT IDENTIFICATION:

A. CONDITIONS PRIOR TO EVENT:

Unit: 2 Event Date: 05-30-88 Event Time: 0931
 Reactor Mode: 2 Mode Name: Refuel Power Level: 0%

This report was initiated by Deviation Report D-4-2-88-029.

REFUEL Mode (2) - In this position interlocks are established so that one control rod only may be withdrawn when flux amplifiers are set at the proper sensitivity level and the refueling crane is not over the reactor. Also, the trip from the turbine control valves, turbine stop valves, main steam isolation valves, and condenser vacuum are bypassed. If the refueling crane is over the reactor, all rods must be fully inserted and none can be withdrawn.

B. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT:

On May 30, 1988, Unit Two was in the REFUEL mode at 0 percent rated thermal power with all control rods inserted. At 0931 hours a partial Group II isolation [JM] signal was received and caused the following Engineering Safety Feature (ESF) [JE] actuations to occur: The 'A' Train of Standby Gas Treatment System (SBGTS) [BH] auto-started, Reactor Building Ventilation [VA] isolated, Control Room Ventilation [VI] isolated, Drywell Ventilation [VB] valve 2-1601-23 auto-closed, and Torus Ventilation [VC] valve 2-1601-60 auto-closed.

Upon investigation, it was determined that fuse [FU] 595-71B in panel 902-40 had blown which simulated a partial Group II isolation. The fuse was replaced and remained intact. The isolations were reset and SBGTS was stopped at 1015 hours.

At 1050 hours, the NRC Resident Inspector was notified and at 1052 hours appropriate notification was made using the Emergency Notification System (ENS).

LICENSE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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Quad Cities Unit Two	0 5 0 0 0 2 6 5	8 8	-	0 1 5	-	0 0	0 3	OF	0 4	
TEXT										

C. APPARENT CAUSE OF THE EVENT:

This report is submitted to you in accordance with the requirements of the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Part 50.73(a)(2)(iv), which requires the reporting of any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any Engineered Safety Feature (ESF), including the Reactor Protection System (RPS).

The cause of the partial Group II isolation was the blown fuse in panel 902-40. This resulted in a Group II isolation to a portion of the Primary Containment Isolation (PCI) Atmospheric Control [JM] system. The root cause of the blown fuse could not be determined. The replacement fuse remained intact. The circuit current was measured by Electrical Maintenance personnel and was found to be normal (approximately one amp) and well below the fuse size. There were no operational or maintenance activities occurring at the time the fuse blew.

This event has been attributed to an unknown or random failure of the fuse.

D. SAFETY ANALYSIS OF EVENT:

The safety significance of this event is minimal. The blown fuse caused the system to actuate in a conservative manner causing the partial Group II isolation. All systems performed their intended function as designed.

A Group II isolation is normally actuated from one of the following signals: Reactor Vessel Low Water Level, Drywell High Radiation, or Drywell High Pressure. Had one of these signals occurred during the event, the rest of the Group II actuations would have taken place as designed.

E. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

The immediate corrective action was to replace the fuse and reset the partial Group II isolation. This allowed the Group II isolation system to be returned to normal.

Since this event cannot be attributed to any cause, there is no further corrective action.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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		Year	///	Sequential Number	///	Revision Number				
Quad Cities Unit Two	0 5 0 0 0 2 6 5	8 8	-	0 1 5	-	0 0	0 4	OF	0 4	
TEXT:										

F. PREVIOUS EVENTS:

A search of the previous Licensee Event Reports (LER) at Quad Cities Station revealed three similar events. These are detailed below:

<u>LER NUMBER</u>	<u>TITLE</u>
50-254/85-021	Unit One RCIC Inop. Due to Failed Fuse in Controller
50-254/85-022	Standby Gas Train A Loses Flow Due to Obstructed Intake and Train B Doesn't Start Due to Blown Fuse
50-265/87-001	Failure of 1/2 Diesel Generator to Auto-Start During Core Spray Logic Testing Due to Electrical Drawing Error, (which caused blown fuse)

G. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA:

<u>Manufacturer</u>	<u>Nomenclature</u>	<u>Model Number</u>	<u>MFG Part Number</u>
McGraw-Edison (Bussmann Division)	Fuse	Fusetron	FNA 5 Amp



Commonwealth Edison
Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station
22710 206 Avenue North
Cordova, Illinois 61242
Telephone 309/654-2241

NRC

RLB-88-211

June 22, 1988

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

Reference: Quad-Cities Nuclear Power Station
Docket Number 50-265, DPR-30, Unit Two

Enclosed is Licensee Event Report (LER) 88-015, Revision 00, for
Quad-Cities Nuclear Power Station.

This report is submitted in accordance with the requirements of the Code
of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Part 50.73(a)(2)(iv): The licensee shall
report any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation
of any Engineered Safety Feature, including the Reactor Protection System.

Respectfully,

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY
QUAD-CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION

R. A. Robey for
R. L. Bax
Station Manager

RLB/RW/ad

Enclosure

cc: I. Johnson
R. Higgins
INPO Records Center
NRC Region II

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